IR 05000298/1998017

Insp Rept 50-298/98-17 on 980504-08.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Support

ML20249C249
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	05/26/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20249C236	List: IR 05000298/1998017 ML20249C235 ML20249C248
References
50-298-98-17, NUDOCS 9806260261
Download: ML20249C249 (10)

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i ENCLOSURE 2 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket No.: 50-298 License No.: DPR 46 Report No.: 50-298/98-17 Licensee: Nebraska Public Power District Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station Location: P.O. Box 98 Brownville, Nebraska Dates: May 4-8,1998 Inspector A. B. Eamest, Physical Security Specialist Plant Support Branch Approved By: Blaine Murray, Chief, Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety

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Attachment: Supplemental Information

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-2-l I EXE IVE SUMMARY Cooper Nuclear Station NRC Inspection Report 50-298/98-17 This routine, announced inspection focused on the licensee's physical security program. The areas inspected included review of personnel access ;ontrol, access authorization, package and material access control, compensatory measures, vital area detection, vital area barriers, training and qualifications, security organization, and management effectiveness. Overall, the -

- physical security program was effectively implemente Plant Support

• A violation of the physical security plan, paragraph 1.5.2, was identified for improperly processing visitors into the plant protected area. Members of a tour group were not issued visitoc badges (Section S1.1).

• Program strengths were identified in the areas of access authorization, package and material control, compensatory measures, training and qualifications and management *

l effectiveness (Sections S1.2, S1.3, S2.1, SS.1, and S6.1). .

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l * An effective vital area barrier system was in place (Section S2 2).

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• The vital area detection aids were effective to ensure an intruder attempting to enter the vital areas would be detected (Section 32.3).

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' Report Details IV. Plant Suonort 81 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities S1.1 - Access Control - Personnel -

'a . Inspection Scope The ~ personnel access control program was inspected to determine compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(1), (2), (3), (5), (6), and (7), and the physical security plan.

7' - Observations and Findinos The inspector determined through observation that personnel access to the protected

' area was adequately controlled. The protected area access control equipment was inspected and found to be functional and well maintained. The Icst control area for

! access to the plant was contained within a bullet resistant enclosur During the inspection on May 6,1998, the inspector observed the processing of a tour -

group from a local high school.-

10 CFR 73.55 (d)(6) requires visitors to be badged and escorted while inside the protected area. Paragraph 1.5.2 of the facility physical security plan requires all visitors to be issued a visitor's badge. Paragraph 8.4.2 of Security Procedure 2.5,

" Personnel Entry / Exit," Revision 15.4, requires the visitor to card in and enter the plant protected area through the personnel tumstile The inspector noted that the tour group was not issued visitor badges as required by

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both the rule and the physical security plan. The members of the tour group were not processed as visitors. They did not card in and did not enter the protected area through the personnel tumstiles. Security Procedure 2.5 contradicted the rule and plan requirements by allowing tours to be processed differently than visitors. Tour groups are composed of visitors to the facility. The procedure contradicted itself and the plan by allowing tour groups to not be issued a badge, not to card in into the

. protected area and entered into the security computer data base, and to bypass the

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' protected area tumstiles. The root cause of the improper handling of visitors appeared to be Security Procedure 2.5. The licensee acknowledged the mistake,

' changed the procedure, and trained the security force on the procedural change prior to.the end of the inspection. The failure to properly issue visitor badges and process Lthe visitors through the personnel tumstiles is a violation of the physical security plan and procedures (VIO 298/9817-01).

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-4- Conclusion A violation was identified for improperly processing visitors into the plant protected area, S1.2 Access Control - Packaaes Inspection Scope The package access control program was inspected to determine compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55 (d)(3) and the physical security pla Observations and Findinas The inspector observed the searching of packages and materials at the personnel access control points. The package and material search process was very efficien The security officers operating the equipment appeared to be well trained and promptly and completely answered all the inspector's question Conclusion The program for searching hand carried packages and material was very efficien S1.3 Access Authorization Inspection Scope Portions of the access authorization program were reviewed in order to determine compliance with 10 CFR 73.56 and the physical security pla Observations _pnd Findinas The inspector reviewed 10 access authorization records. The records indicated that thorough background investigations were completed. The records reviewed contained derogatory information in some instances and two involved denial of access authorization. The records indicated a conservative but fair approach. All files indicated that individuals were informed of their right to appeal the decision to deny authorizatio Conclusion The access authorization program was significantly improved and effectively implemente j l

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-5-S2 Status of Security facilities and Equipment S Compensatory Measures Inspection Scope The compensatory measures program was inspected to determine compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(a), (g)(1), and the Physical Security Plan. The areas inspected included the deployment of compensatory measures and the effectiveness of those measure . Observations and Findinas The inspector confirmed that the licensee deployed compensatory measures in a manner that adequately compensated for degraded security systems. The inspector reviewed Security Procedure 2.14," Compensatory Measures," Revision 5.4. The procedure was user friendly and comprehensive. The procedure committed the licensee to compensatory measures that met all NRC guidance documents. The inspector asked three security officers questions about compensatory measures requirements and determined that they were very knowledgeabl Conclusion The compensatory measures progiam was very effectively implemented. The security {

officers were well trained on the program requirement S2.2 Physical Barriers - Vital Area inspection Scoce The vital area physical barriers were inspected to determine compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(a), (c)(1), (2) and (6), (e)(1), and the physical security pla Observations and Findinas The inspector conducted a walkdown of a sample of the vital area barriers. The inspector confirmed that the vital equipment was contained in vital areas that were protected by physical barriers that provided penetration resistance to both forced ano surreptitious entry. The barriers were maintained in an effective manner. Prior to the removal of vital area barriers, security will be notified in order to adequately

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- compensate for the degraded barrier. The inspector determined through observation :

L that the vital areas were contained within a protected area and that an intruder would:

l- ' have to penetrate two physical barriers prior to access to vital equipment. The

! Inspector confirmed that the control room and central alarry, station were protected within a bullet resistant structure, Conclusion An effective vital area barrier system was in plac S2.3 Vital Area Detection Aids

~ Inspection Scope The vital area detection aids were inspected to determine compliance with 10 CFR 73.55(a), (d)(7), and (e)(3) and the requirements of the physical security pla Observations and Findinas The inspector observed tests of the detection system on vital area portals. The alarm system performed as required and would effectively detect a forceful or surreptitious attempt at entry into the vital areas. The transmission lines were line-indicating, and the balanced magnetic switches were tamper-alarme Conclut iga The vital area detection aids were effective to ensure an intruder attempting to enter the vital areas would be detecte Security and Safeguards Staff Training and Organization S Security Training and Qualifications Inspection Sco.p_t The security training and qualification program was inspected to determine complisnce with the requirements of Appendix B of 10 CFR Part 73,73.55(b)(4),

(h)(5),' and the training and qualifications pla Observations and Findinas The inspector reviewed the tral.11ng and qualification records c,f 10 security officer The training and qualifications records _of the officers were complete and readily

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'available for inspectio The inspector observed classroom training on May 7,1998. The instructor was

. proficient in the subject matter, and the training was presented in a manner that was both interesting and well received by the security officers. During the inspection, the i

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-7-inspector observed numerous security officers in the performance of their duties to include access control, alarm station operation, patrolling, and response to incident The security officers were thoroughly familiar with the requirements of their position The training and qualification program was very effective and met the Training and Qualification Plan requirement s Conclusion The training and qualification program for security officers was very effectiv S6 Security Organization and Administration S Manaaement Effectiveness Inspection Scope The effectiveness and adequacy of the licensee's management as it related to the administration of the security program was evaluated. The inspector reviewed the addition of security systems improvements and interviewed security management personnel in order tu determine the level of support from licensee managemen Observation 1 and Findinas The inspector determined that senior level management provided very strong support to the security program. The inspector was briefed on plans to enhance the security computer and to install a hand geometry system for access control. The planned application of new technology indicated senior level management support. The inspector determined that security management staff was proactive, highly professional, and well trained and qualified to manage the security program, Conclusion The security program received very strong management suppor S6.2 Security Organization inspection Scope L The security organization was inspected to determine compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(a), (b)(1), (2), and (h), and the requirements of the physical security pla Observations and Findinas

The security force consisted of adequate numbers of armed uniformed officers to 1 L meet the plan requirements. The licensee had sufficient security force personnel to l meet contingencies. Morale appeared to be good. The officers appeared to be

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capable of performing any assigned task .l

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S-c. Conclusion The licensee has a good security organization capable of meeting security and contingency plan requirement V. Management Meetings X1 Exit Summary The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on May 7,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietary information was identifie .

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ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee J. Banks, Security Training Specialist P. Carlock, Security Operations Specialist P. Caudill, Senior Manager, Site Support Z. Easley, Security Shift Supervisor M. Hamm, Security Manager J. Harrington, Security Services Supervisor B. Houston, Manager, Licensing P. Hyzer, Engineering Project Supervisor R. Koeppel, Nebraska Public Power District Security l J. Robinson, Acting Senior Quality Assurance l J. Uglow, Access Authorization Technician l R. Wolters, Security Shift Supervisor l

NRC Chris Skinner, Resident inspector INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED 81700 Physical Security Program for Power Reactors 71750 Plant Support Activities ITEMS OPENED 298/9817-01 VIO Personnel Access Control ITEMS CLOSED None l

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2-LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Physical Security Plan, Revision 36 Security Procedure 2.14, Revision 5.4," Compensatory Measures" Safeguards Event Logs, First and Second Quarters,1998 Security Procedure 3.0, Revision 7, " Deportability" Security Procedure 2.b, Revision 15.4, " Personnel Entry / Exit" '

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