IR 05000298/1998010
| ML20217A374 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 03/19/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217A353 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-298-98-10, NUDOCS 9803250016 | |
| Download: ML20217A374 (10) | |
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ENCLOSURE 2 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket No.:
50-298 License No.:
DPR 46 i
i Report No.:
50-298/98-10 Licensee:
Nebraska Public Power District Facility:
Cooper Nuclear Station Location:
P.O. Box 98 Brownville, Nebraska Dates:
March 2-6,1998 Inspector (s):
A. B. Earnest, Physical Security Specialist, Plant Support Branch Approved By:
Blaine Murray, Chief, Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety Attachment:
Supplementalinformation
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9903250016 990319 PDR ADOCK 05000298
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-2-EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Cooper Nuclear Station NRC Inspection Report 50-298/98-10 This routine, announced inspection focused on the licensee's physical security program. The areas inspected included review of access authorization, vehicle access control, assessment aids, safeguards event logs, plans and procedures, and the audit and self-assessment programs. Overall, the physical security program was very effectively implemented.
Plant Sucoort Overall, the access authorization program was excellent. An unresolved item was
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identified involving update background investigations received as transfers from another utility. (Section S1.1)
A very efficient vehicle access control program was in place (Section S1.2).
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The assessment aids system provided excellent assessment of the perimeter detection
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zones. The addition of the video capture system was a significant addition to the assessment aids system. (Section S2.1)
An excellent safeguards event log system for reporting safeguards events was in place
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(Section S3.1).
An excellent security plan and procedures program was in place (Section S3.2).
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The audit and internal self-assessment programs were excellent (Section S7.1).
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A violation for failing to follow fitness for duty requirements was identified (Section S8.1).
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3-S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities S1.1 Access Authorization a.
iD3pection Scoce Portions of the access authorization program were reviewed in order to determine compliance with 10 CFR 73.56 and the physical security plan.
b.
Observations and Findinas The inspector reviewed 10 access authorization records. The records indicated a thorough background investigation was completed.
The inspector reviewed Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Vendor Audit AUD-SPS-97-01, dated March 17,1997, and noted the following in the audit. "It should also be noted that files were reviewed against the screening rcquirements of NUMARC 91-03 and the checklist criteria of NEl 94-02. With one exception, allinvestigations had been completed in accordance with the listed requirements for the type of screening requested. Update investigations conducted for PECO, however, did not always contain the required reference contact. When Wackenhut personnel were questioned on this situation, the scope of investigation documents was produced which verified that reference contact was not a required element for update investigations under the PECO scope of work. Utilities accepting 91-03 and PADS transfers may want to evaluate these investigations on a case-by-case basis against their individual utility commitments prior to acceptance of these transfers."
Paragraph 1.2.1 of the licensee's physical security plan requires the licensee to implement all elements of Regulatory Guide 5.66 (Access Authorization Program for Nuclear Power Plants), dated June 1991 as a means of meeting 10 CFR 73.56.
Paragraph 8.3 of Regulatory Guide 5.66 requires that all personnel whose unescorted access has been interrupted for more 365 days must have a background investigation for that interrupted period. The elements of a background investigation are detailed in Paragraph 6 of Regulatory Guide 5.66. Part of the background investigation includes given and developed references.
The inspector asked the access authorization supervisor if the evaluation recommended by the audit was completed on the access authorization transfers from the subject licensee. The supervisor stated that the recommendation had been overlooked in the audit. The access authorization supervisor at the request of the inspector completed a computer check for 1937-1998 transfers and discovered that 10 employees had been granted access based on a transferred background investigation by the subject licensee.
One of the 10 employees had been granted access based on an update background investigation. Further review of this employee revealed that the update background investigation did not include reference checks. The root cause of the issue is that the access authorization group did not closely review the audit report. In addition, NEl did
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-4-not review their own audit and notify the licensee's of the potential problem. The failure to ensure that complete update background investigations were completed is an unresolved item pending review by the NRC (298/9810-01).
The licensee immediately suspended all update transfers from the licensee that failed to complete the background investigation miii the matter is permanently resolved.
Additionally, the licensee notified NEl of the prob!em and ensured that the matter would receive database attention.
c.
Conclusiqu Overall, the access authorization program was excellent. An unresolved item was identified involving update background investigations received as transfers from another utility.
S1.2 Access Control - Vehicles a.
Jnspection Scoce The vehicle access control program was inspected to determine compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55 (d)(4) and the physical security plan.
b.
Observations and Findinas The inspector observed searches of two vehicles to ensure that they were properly
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searched prior to entering the protected area. The security officers conducted the search in conspliance with their procedural requirements. The searches were thorough, and the active vehicle barrier system was properly used to ensure that vehicles were properly searched prior to allowing entry to the protected area.
c.
Conclusion A very efficient vehicle access control program was in place.
S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment S2.1 Assessment Aids a.
Insoection Scoce The assessment aids program was inspected to determine compliance with 10 CFR 73.55 (h)(4) and (6) and the physical security plan. The areas inspected included the application of closed-circuit television to provide observation of the perimeter isolation zones and the adequacy of the monitoring system in the alarm stations. In addition, the inspector inspected the adequacy of a recently installed video capture monitoring system as a compensatory measur.
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5-b, Observations and Findinas The inspector observed tests of the closed-circuit television system and determined that it was an excellent system. The closed-circuit television cameras were properly placed to ensure 100 percent coverage of the alarmed zones. The alarm station monitors were positioned to facilitate assessment by operators. The addition of the video capture monitoring system was a significant enhancement to an already excellent system. The manner in which it was installed and the system capabilities erhanced the licensee's q
abilities to determine the cause of false and nuisance alarms, reduce response j
requirements, and significantly reduce the requirements to post security officers as q
compensatory measures in case of a security computer or power failure.
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Conclusion The assessment aids system provided excellent assessment of the perimeter detection zones. The addition of the video capture system was a significant addition to the q
assessment aids system, j
S3 Security and Safeguards Procedures and Documentation S3.1 Security Event Logs a.
Insoection Scope The security program safeguards event logs were inspected to determine compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.71(b) and (c),10 CFR 73.70(a)-(c), and the physical security plan. The inspector reviewed the safeguards event logs for the third and fourth quarters of 1997 and the first quarter of 1998.
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Observations and Findinas The inspector determined that the licensee conformed to the regulatory and license requirements to report security events.- The licensee's security staff was correctly t
identifying security events required by regulations. In addition, the licensee used the information contained in their records and reports to track and trend problem areas.
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Conclusion An excellent safeguards event log system was in place for reporting safeguards events.
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-6-S3.2 Security Plans and Procedures a.
Insoection Scooe The licensee's physical security plan and several implementing procedures were reviewed to determine compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(p),
10 CFR 50.90, and 10 CFR 73.55(b)(3).
b.
Observations and Findinas The inspector reviewed Physical Security Plan Revisions 35 and 36 end deterri,ined that the licensee was adhering to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(p) wbon submitting changes to the plans. Procedures and plans are reviewed annually for accuracy and to ensure they remain current with changing conditions. The procedures were user friendly, comprehensive, and current.
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Conclusion An excellent security plan and procedures' program was in place.
I S7 Quality Assurance in Security and Safeguards Activities S7.1 Security Proaram Audit a.
Insoection Scoce The audits of the security program were inspected to determine compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(g)(4) and the requirements of the physical secarity plan.
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Observations and Findinas The inspector reviewed Nuclear Security Audit 98-03, dated March 2,1998, performed by the licensee's quality assurance department and confirmed that security program audits were conducted at least every 12 months. By a review of licensee's records and i
interviews with licensee personnel, the inspector confirmed that the audit team personnel were independent of plant security management and plant security management supervision. It was determined that the audit team personnel were qualified to conduct audits. The audits were comprehensive, intrusive, self critical, and appeared to accurately characterize the security program. An authority in nuclear security was employed as a consultant to provide expertise to the audit team.
In addition, NEl Vendor Audit AUD-SPS-97-01, dated March 17,1997, was reviewed.
The audit was excellent; however, the findings were not reviewed as closely as they should have been as indicated in paragraph S1.1 above. Licensee Supplier Surveillances Nos-. SS97-046 and SS97-064 were reviewed and indicated a very effective and thorough surveillance progra.. :
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Recent improvements in the self-assessment program by the security operations staff should soon result in continued improvements in the security program. The inspector.
j was briefed on several results of the self auditing program, c.
Conclusion The licensee audits and internal self assessment programs were excellent.
S8 Miscellaneous Security and Safeguards issues S8.1 Fitness-for-Duty a.
Insoection Scooe The licensee's investigative report, dated February 2,1998, was reviewed to determine if the licensee had violated fitness for duty requirements as stated in their procedures.
b.
Observations and Findinas Paragraph 4.4 of Administrative Procedure 0-NPG-2.3 (NPG Fitness-for-Duty Program),
Revision 0, requires that the supervisor, prior to directing the employee to report to work, shall require the individual to state if they had consumed alcohol or taken prescription drugs within the 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> prior to being directed to work. Further, if they answered in the affirmative and their work was essential, tha supervisor will arrange transportation to the site and security would test the individual by administering a breathalyser exam.
A licensee investigative report, dated February 2,1998, documented that on five separate occasions, licensee management called in workers to perform back shift work without providing either transportation or requiring security to administer a breathalyser test. As corrective action, the licensee trained all management personnel on the requirements of Administrative Procedure 0-NPG-2.3. The failure to provide transportation for potentially impaired workers and provide a breathalyser test was a violation of paragraph 4.4 of Administrative Procedure 0-NPG-2.3 (50-298/9810-02),
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Papelusion A violation for failing to follow fitness-for-duty requirements was identified.
S8.2 [ Closed) Violation 50-298/9715-01: Vehicle Barrier System i
The inspector previously determined that there was a gap in the vehicle barrier. During this inspection, the inspector reviewed additional barriers emplaced to close the gap.
The barriers effectively closed the gap in the vehicle barrier system.
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-8-S8.3 (Closed) Insoection Followuo item 50-298/9715-02: Vehicle Barrier System The inspector previously determined that the summary description of the vehicle barrier system did not reflect the as-built description of the vehicle barrier system. The licensee committed to submit changes to the summary. During the current inspection, the inspector reviewed the summary description changes and determined that the summary description accurately reflected the as-built vehi:le barrier system.
S8.4 (Closed) Unresolved item 50-298/9715-03: Falsification of Access Authorization Information The inspector previously determined that the licensee identified a falsification of access authorization records. The licensee canceled unescorted access and reported the falsification to NEl in ordei to ensure the individual would not be granted access to other facilities. The NRC reviewed the issue and determined that licensee actions were appropriate, and no further action was warranted.
S8.5 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort 97-S01: Shotaun Shell Unattended in Protected Area The licensee identified and reported that a security shotgun shell was missing during an inventory of contingency weapons cabinets. The shell was discovered several days later. The inspector confirmed that the licensee changed the inventory system. A numbered seal has been placed on weapons storage cabinets. Security officers will inventory the seal and ensure it is unbroken instead of opening the cabinets. The corrective action was an effective means of ensuring that human errors will not recur during inventory and handling of weapons and ammunition.
V. Management Meetings X1 Exit Summary The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on March 5,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietary information was identified.
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ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED 1.ir&Datt J. Banks, Security Training Specialist
' J. Bebb, Security Team Leader P. Cariock, Security Operations Specialist M. Coulter, Access Authorization Technician Z. Easley, Security Shift Supervisor M. Hamm, Security Manager J. Harrington, Security Services Supervisor R. Koeppel, Nebraska Public Power District Security R. Sessions, Senior Quality Assurance Manager M. Shafer, Security Shift Supervisor J. Uglow, Access Authorization Technician R. Whittington, Systems Analyst INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED 81700 Physical Security Program for Power Reactors 71750 Plant Support Activities 92904 Followup ITEMS OPENED 298/9810-01 URI Access Authorization 298/9810-02 VIO Fitness-for-Duty ITEMS CLOSED 298/9810-02 VIO Fitness-for-Duty 298/9715 01 VIO Vehicle Barrier System 298/9715-02 IFl Vehicle Barrier System Summary Description 298/9715-03 URI Falsification of Access Authorization Information 298/97-S01 LER Unsecured Ammunition in the Protected Area
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-2-LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Physical Security Plan, Revisions 35 and 36 Security Procedure 2.6, * Vehicle Entry / Exit," Revision 12.2 Vehicie Barrier System Summary Description, dated February 16,1995 Radiological Protection Procedure 9.1.2.4, " Access Control-Radiological," Revision 14 Radiological Protection Procedure 9.RADOP.3, " Area Posting and Access Control," Revision 0 Administrative Procedure 0.12. " Working Hour Limitations," Revision 14 Security Program Performance Quarterly Reports, Third and Fourth Quarters,1997 Nuclear Power Group Directive 2.3, Fitness-for-Duty Program, Revision 7
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