ML20206L793
| ML20206L793 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 11/15/1988 |
| From: | Bennett W, Constable G, Greg Pick NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206L780 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-298-88-31, NUDOCS 8811300248 | |
| Download: ML20206L793 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000298/1988031
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APPENDIX B
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION IV
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NRC Inspection Report:
50-298/88-31
Operating License: OPR-46
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Docket:
50-298
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Licensee:
Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD)
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P.O. Box 499
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Columbus, NE
68602-0499
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Facility Name:
Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS)
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Inspection At:
Inspection Conducted: October 1-31, 1988
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Inspectors:
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G.A. Pick,(VDv
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nt Inspector, Project
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Section C
ton of Reactor Projects
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W. R. Bennett, Senior Resident Inspector,
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Project Section C, Division of Reactor Projects
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Approved:
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'G.7. Constable, Chief, Project Section C,
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Div ion of Reactor Projects
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Inspection Summary
Inspection conducted October 1-31, 1988 (Report 50-298/88-31)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of followup of plant events,
operational safety verification, access control, monthly surveillance and
maintenance observations, and emergency excercise.
Results: The licensee continued to operate the plant in a safe, controlled
manner.
Surveillance and maintenance activities were performed in accordance
with prescribed programs.
One violation was identified in this report.
It involved allowing an
individual unescorted site access after his required training had expired.
The root cause appears to be a problem with training records which is similar
to the root cause of a previous violation.
This may indicate a problem with
the licensee's corrective action program. Another example of this potential
problem is the connonications deficiency in the practice energencies exercise
which had been previously identified in the 1987 annual emergency exercise.
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Principal Licensee Employees
- G. R. Horn, Division Manager, Nuclear Operations
- G. A. Trevces, Division Manager, Nu: lear Support
- J. W. Dutton, Nuclear Training Manager
- G. E. Smith, Quality Assurance Manager
- E. M. Mace, Senior Manager, Technical Support
- J. V. Sayer, Radiological Manager
- L. E. Bray, Regulatory Compliance Specialist
- G. R. Suith, Licensing Supervisor
R. Windham, Technical Training Supervisor
In addition to the Senior Resident Inspector and the Resident Inspector,
NRC was represented by:
- P. W. O'Connor, Senior Project Manager
- Denotes those present during the exit interview conducted on
November 2,1988.
The NRC in..'-:ctors also interviewed other licensee employees during the
inspection period.
2.
Plant Status
The plant operated at essentially full power throughout the inspection
period.
3.
followuptoPlantEvents
(93702)
On October 21, 1988, the licensee performed Surveillance
Procediare 6.3.12.1, "Diesel Generator Operability Test," Revision 25, on
the Nt.mber 2 emergency diesel generator (EDG). Approximately 2 1/2 hours
into the test, a loss of control air pressure occurred and the "Turbo
Bearing Wear" annunciator alarmed. Consequently, the No. 2 EDG was
declared inoperable at 11:23 a.m. due to the unscheduled shutdown. A
maintenance work request (MWR) was issued to investigate and repair, or
replace, the relay and valve associated with maintaining a constant
control air pressure for the various EDG protective trips. After
replacement of the relay and rebuilding of the valve, control air pressure
still could not be maintained.
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Subsequently, the licensee performed o walkdown of the control air
instrument lines and identified a circumferential crack in a 1/4-inch
stainless steel instrument line.
The cracked line allowed 30 psi control
air to bleed off reducing pressure on the safety trip valve solenoid and
securing the EDG. Approximately 1 inch of the line was removed and
replaced with a compression fitting. The diesel generator was restarted
and, after completing a 4-hour run per SP 6.3.12.1, was declared operable
at 10:45 p.m.
Engineering sent the failed stainless steel instrument
tubing section to an offsite laboratory on November 3,1988, for analysis
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to determine the probable cause of the failure.
The control air system is a subsystem of the starting air system. The
starting air goes through two pressure reducing valves, 80 psi and 30 psi,
respectively, before it becoces control air. The control air subsystem is
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used to maintain the engine at a set speed regardless of engine load and
prctects the engine from abnormal conditions through protective trip
functions. The control air is used during engine operation, to hold the
valve open to the allow 80 psi air to hold the fuel racks in position.
If
control air or any of the diesel generator trips occur, 80 psi air flow to
the fuel shutoff cylinder is stopped which dumps the fuel racks and trips
the EDG.
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During followup of this event, the licensee identified to the NRC
inspectors that a design change relating to the EDGs is scheduled to be
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implemented on both EDGs during the next refueling outage.
The design
changes (DC 86-024 for EDG No. 2 and DC 87-061 for EDG No.1) will involve
replacing all copper instrunent tubing with stainless steel tubing and
moving all instruments subject to high vibration off the engine and onto
instrument racks.
The licensee demonstrated prompt, conservative action in responding to
this event.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
4.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The NRC inspectors ubserved operational activities throughout the
inspection period.
Proper control room staffing was observed to be
maintained, and control room activities and conduct were observed to be
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well controlled and professional.
The SRI observed selected shif t
turnover meetings and verified that infomation concerning plant status
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was properly communicated to the oncoming operators.
Control board
walkdowns and tours of accessible areas at thc facility were conducted to
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verify operability of plant equipment. Overall plant cleanliness was
observed to be very good throughout the inspection period.
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The NRC inspectors verified that selected activities of the licensee's
radiological protection program were implemanted in conformance with
facility policies and procedures and regulatory requirements.
Radiation
and/or contaminated areas were properly posted and controlled. Radiation
work permits contained appropriate information to ensure that work could
be performed in a safe and controlled manner.
Workers in radiation and/or
contaminated areas were observed to be wearing required protective
clothing and utilizing good radiological practices.
Radiation monitors
were properly utilized to check for contamination.
The NRC inspectors observed security personnel perform their duties of
vehicle, personnel, and package search.
Vehicles were properly authorized
and controlled or escorted in the protected area (PA). The NRC inspectors
conducted site tours to ensure that compensatory measures were properly
implemented as required because of equipment failure or equipment
deenergization due to the security upgrade in progress.
Personnel access
is documented in paragraph 5 of this report.
The PA barrier had adequate
illumination and the isolation zones were free of transient material.
The licensee continued to operate the plant in a safe, controlled manner.
Licensee personnel are aware of health physics requirements and perform
their duties utilizing good radiological control practices.
No violations
or deviations were identified in this area.
5.
Access Control - Personnel
(81070)
The NRC irspectors observed security personnel monitor personnel access to
the site.
On October 23, 1988, and October 24, 1988, an individual was
allowed unescorted access to the site after his security training had
expired. This is an apparent violation (298/8831-01), of Plant Services
Procedure 1.1, "Station Security," Revision 9, dated October 3,1988.
The NRC inspectors determined that the recurity department had not
received notice from the training department that the individual's
training had expired, as required by procedure. The training department
had not issued the required notice due to a computer problem.
Previous
records have been documented in NRC Inspection
problems with training (Violation 298/8802-02) and 50-298/88-09.The
Reports 50-298/88-02,
licensee was in the process of attempting to manually identify persons
whose site access training had expired, when the apparent violation was
identified by the NRC inspector.
The individual's training had been
expired for approximately 6 weeks.
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The root cause of the apparent violation is similar to a previous
violation and may indicate lack of timely corrective action.
No other
violations or deviations were identified in this area,
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6.
Monthly Surveillance Observations (61726)
The SRI observed the performance of portions of Surveillance
Procedure (SP) 6.2.1.4.3, "PCIS Main Steam Line Low Pressure Calibration
and Functional / Functional Test," Revision 19, dated April 14, 1988.
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toverify(protective
surveillance was performed on October 26, 1988,
TS). The test
instrumentation operability per Technical Specifications
was performed by qualified technicians in accordance with the procedure.
All precautions and prerequisites were met and all reviews of the
completed procedure were properly performed. Test results were within TS
and procedure limits.
The SRI reviewed SP 6.3.12.1, "Diesel Generator Operability Test,'
Revision 25, dated October 6,1988. On October 21, 1988, this
surveillance was performed twice on diesel generator (DG) No. 2.
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first performance was conducted to meet TS requirements demonstrating
monthly operability of DGs. The second performance was to demonstrate
monthly operability as well as operability after repair.
The procedure,
in each instance, was properly reviewed by all required personnel.
The
first procedure adequately described the reason for termination and
failure of the test.
The liMnsee perfonced surveillances in accordance with applicable
procedures.
Corrective action is orompt and conservative when problems
are observed.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
7.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
On October 23, 1988, reactor recirculation Pump A twice increased speed
for no apparent reason, and with no operator action to cause the speed
increase.
The first time the speed increase was observed, the
recirculation pump returned to normal speed within a short period of time
with no operator action. When the speed increased the second time, the
reactor operators reduced speed manually to a level below the initial
speed setpoint and continued to monitor the pump.
On October 24, 1988, Work Item 88-4435 was issued to troubleshoot and
repair the problem.
It was determined that the speed increase was caused
by a dirty potentiometer which has since been replaced.
The NRC
inspectors monitored the troubleshooting and repair, and verified that no
limits had been exceeded during the pump speed increase.
The licensee's response to the plant problem was prompt and
conservative. No violations or deviatiens were identified in this area.
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8.
Emergency Excercise (82301)
The NRC inspectors observed a practice emergency exercise on October 4,
1988, and attended the NPPD critique and NRC exit concerning the annual
emergency exercise conducted on October 18, 1988.
Results of the annual
emergency exercise are documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-298/88-29.
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During the practice exercise the RI observed the licensee's response to a
personnel injury.
Inadequate medical team response had previously been
identified as a deficiency (298/8725-06).
During this portion of the
exercise, the RI noted that the injured man was moved approximately
50 feet to an area with a lower radiation dose rate with no apparent
consideration as to whether the radiation levels indicated an innediate
need to move the individual or whether further injury could be caused by
the move.
In addition, it was noted that there was little action taken by
personnel to prevent any potential spread of contamination although
sufficient time and resources were available.
Deficiency 298/8725-06 is
still open.
The NRC inspectors noted problems with communication and the exercise
scenario during the practice exercise and connunicated these observations
to licensee management.
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The SRI considered the practice exercise satisfactory; however, some
problems were observed.
The comnunications problem was identified during
the 1987 annual emergency exercise. No violations or deviations were
identified.
9.
Exit Interview (30703)
An exit interview was conducted on November 2,1988, with licensee
representatises (identified in paragraph 1).
During this interview, the
SRI reviewed the scope and findings of the inspection. Other meetings
between the NRC inspectors and licensee management were held periodically
during the inspection period to discuss identified concerns.
The licensee
did not identify as proprietary any information provided to, or reviewed
by, the inspectors.
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