IR 05000298/1998001

Insp Rept 50-298/98-01 on 980125-0307.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support

ML20217H748
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	03/31/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20217H742	List: IR 05000298/1998001 ML20217H739
References
50-298-98-01, 50-298-98-1, NUDOCS 9804060044
Download: ML20217H748 (29)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:- . i ^ .. ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket No.: 50-298 License No.: DPR 46 Report No.: 50-298/98-01 Licensee: Nebraska Public Power District Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station Location: P.O. Box 98 Brownville, Nebraska Dates: January 25 through March 7,1998 Inspector (s): Mary Miller, Senior Resident inspector Chris Skinner, Resident inspector Peter Alter, Reactor Engineer (in training) Approved By: Elmo Collins, Chief, Branch C Division of Reactor Projects ATTACHMENT: Partial Listing of Persons Contacted List of Inspection Procedures Used List of items Opened, Closed, and Discussed ' 9004060044 980331 PDR ADOCK 05000298 G PDR

. . EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Cooper Nuclear Station NRC Inspection Report 50-298/98-01 Ooerations Operations, turnovers, watch standing, and control of plant conditions continued to . improve. Shift turnovers of complex plant status were comprehensive, effectively managed, and of minimal disruption to crew function. During the shutdown for the midcycle outage, operations demonstrated strong positive control of plant conditions.

Crew management controlled the schedule to ensure crew performance was not challenged. Crew communications, command, and control were generally excellent.

Inspectors observed higher training standards and strong management involvement in the training process (Section 01.1).

Operations' responded promptly to a grass fire on the owner-controlled area. They . assessed smoke effects, briefed the loss of offsite power procedure in the control room, and requested offsite fire response to extinguish the fire. Operations management was in the control room when the fire was identified and provided oversight throughout the

event. Operations' overall response was excellent (3ection 01.2).

Of several operability evaluations reviewed, inspectors noted two evaluations which did . not provide a quantitative basis for the conclusion of operability, e.g., no estimate of air leakage rate for an accumulator subject to a pressure drop acceptance criteria and no estimate of change of offsite exposure for a Technical Specification valve failing to isolate. The licensee provided quantitative and design basis information to resolve the concerns (Section O2.1).

Shift technical engineers demonstrated several examples of strong safety performance.

. They identified that the off-gas building, which housed seismically qualified standby gas system support equipment, was not seismically qualified. They also identified that an eye bolt retaining the drywell equipment hatch had failed in a manner indicating a need to inspect all hatch eye bolts. Shift technical engineers, with support of shift supervisors, have continued to successfully demand timely resolution of specific plant safety issues and higher performance from engineering and maintenance. This was due in part to strong support by operations crews and operations and plant management (Section 04.1).

Prior to the outage, inspectors identified that contingencies associated with an - inadvertent mode change due to high decay heat had not been systematically evaluated.

The licensee had not performed a review to assess vulnerabilities and to identify potential contingency actions. Contingency plans were developed and distributed before entry into the shutdown condition. Two minor weaknesses were observed in implementing these contingencies during the outage (Section 04.2).

The inspectors identified that the shift supervisor exited a contingency action while the . initiating condition still existed. The inspectors also identified an example of a weakness i

._ .. . . -2-in the control and implementation of contingency actions in that one'of the contingency actions was not briefed or communicated to the implementing personnel..The . contingency actions were completed by an individual who did not know this contingency - action was expected (Section 04.3).

Maintenance Observed work activities were generally performed well (Section M1.1).

. The pilot valve replacement was performed according to instructions. During a drywell

walkdown, inspectors found that a work order document and about a yard of emery paper had been inappropriately left in the drywell. Subsequent detailed walkdowns by plant management identified other foreign material in the drywell (Section M1.2).

' Licensee maintenance personnel demonstrated excellent control of safety relief valve . surveillance testing (Section M1.3).

After a small change in reactor equipment cooling inventory, the licensee implemented . . procedures to identify whether a leak had occurred. During subsequent troubleshooting of the reactor equipment cooling heat exchanger, inspectors identified several weaknesses, including failure to plan for contingencies, procedural omissions, and inconsistencies and failure to clarify the required system configuration (Section M1.4).

A few days before the midcycle outage, operations identified that the feedwater startup . valves, which had failed in a manner which complicated past shutdowns and startups,' . had not had preventive maintenance or testing before the scheduled outage.

Subsequent testing revealed that a startup valve controller failure would have complicated the plant shutdown. This indicated poor implementation of lessons learned . by maintenance (Section M2.2).

During the outage, the licensee replaced a Division ll vital breaker, requiring de- . energization of the Division ll vital bus. This was the most risk significant evolution of the outage. The bus outage and restoration, a maintenance activity, was controlled by procedure from the control room by an additional senior reactor operator. Three unanticipated effects on equipment occurred, including de-energizing the reactor head vent valve, causing it to move to the closed position (Section M3.1).

Tagout/ clearances were significantly improved over the previous outage. The licensee . . had assigned two additional licensed operators to assist clearance and tagout activities during the outage, significantly improved the layout of the clearance desk to facilitate interdisciplinary reviews, and planned clearance points before the outage. During the midcycle outage, no clearance order or tagout errors were noted (Section M4.1).

In a followup effort on nonsafety-related fuse sizing, the licensee performed multiple

.- circuit walkde/ Jins. The assessment of extent of condition was prompt and thorough and . Y

. -3-demonstrated effective leadership by maintenance and coordination with operations.

Thirteen fuses were found in nonsafety-related applications which were of improper size.

No safety significant concerns were identified (Section 4.2).

Encineerina The licensee's use of risk information was not comprehensive. Inspectors identified that . the probabilistic risk analysis model fault tree inaccurately modeled the reactor core isolation cooling controller and the diesel generator controls. Licensee evaluation determined that neither of these inaccuracies resulted in significant changes in risk assessment. Inspectors also identified that the licensee's proposed plant modifications were not evaluated to assess risk. Licensee event reports (LERs) were also not evaluated for risk. The licensee has subsequently decided to evaluate these items (Section 3.1).

Plant Sucoort Inspectors noted that, although as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) efforts . achieved dose reduction within departmental and work group efforts, no activities were performed to coordinate across departments to achieve dose reduction. The licensee immediately addressed this concern. For example, the containment coordinator obtained required diagnostic photographs of equipment on his daily surveys instead of having an engineer making a separate entry into the drywell. This resulted in immediate reductions in radiation exposure below estimated doses (Section R1.1).

Security responded well to a quick succession of access point metal alarms. During a - crowded morning outage shift change, several consecutive personnel metal alarms resulted in a condition in which the access station guard force could be quickly , I overburdened. The impending congestion at the security access area was promptly averted. Security demonstrated excellent coordination to obtain more guard staff and slow personnel entries. The multiple access metal alarms were processed in less than 2 minutes (Section S1.1).

Inspectors identified several weaknesses during an unannounced weekend fire drill. The . appearance of the fire protection coordinator in the control room at 7 a.m. on a weekend telegraphed the impending drill, although a licensed operator or qualified fire brigade responder could have more unobtrusively observed the control room response.

Examples of weaknesses included lack of formality in communication, failure to evacuate all potentially affected areas, and lack of haza-dous materials response for a fire drill in a paint storage room (Section F5.1).

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'%.- m . Report Details .. < Summarv of Plant Status The plant operated at full power for the first five weeks of the report period,' except for a scheduled 'down power for turbine testing performed on February 1,1998.. On February 28, 1998, the plant entered a midcycle outage to replace all safety relief valve pilot valves and to b t . install modifications to a sump affecting the stand y gas treatmen system.

I. Operations

Conduct of Operations s01.1 Shift Crew Control of Plant Ooerations a.

Insoection Scone (71707) Inspectors observed control room activities during full power, mode transition, and outage operations.. The observations included control room shift changes, daily control room activities l routine watch standing, and scheduled training activities. The inspectors performed control board walkdowns and observed performance of procedures and crew briefings. Inspectors observed the control room crew perform the plant shutdown from full power to cold shutdown starting February 27,1998.

b.

Observations and Findinas ' Inspectors observed approximately 45 shift crew turnovers and found that the turnover process was implemented in a rigorous and complete manner. Crew members and operations management demonstrated several examples of self-critical evaluation and improvement of the turnover process.' Oncoming operators prepared for turnover by - review of written information or by discussing tumover information with their counterparts.

Relief crew turnover' meetings were also systematically improved to convey more complete and relevant plant status and planning information, increase formality, reduce duration, include affected plant staff supporting expected operations activities, direct operator actions required early in the shift, and emphasize focus on potential safety challenges and contingencies.

Shift Supervisor and control room supervisors demonstrated positive control of crew activities and briefings, maintained clear and crisp communications, typically anticipated I . contingencies in plant vulnerabilities, solicited and obtained crew input regarding ' ! potential concems, and emphasized the need to know and control plant conditions.

Plant and operations management demonstrated involvement and increased ' performance standards for crew turnovers, logkeeping, decision making, and watch standing. A' shift clerk was assigned to reduce' administrative distractions to the control room staff by performing activities such as answering phones during shift brie ings, r editing status markups and turnover briefings, auditing procedure revisions, and ~ providing general administrative support to the control room.'

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. -2-Inspector observations of selected operations shift training classes'and simulator scenarios and critiques found strong management involvement in selection and presentation of training materials. Management demanded higher training standards and crew performance in areas of. communications, watch standing, and control room formality. These initiatives directly improved the crew's command and control.

Inspectors observed that operations management evaluated at least three crew simulator scenarios weekly and actively participated in crew critiques.

Inspectors observed several examples of strong crew control of plant conditions and communications during the plant shutdown and cooldown for the midcycle outage. Pre-evolution briefs were conducted prior to each major evolution using an operations department briefing checklist. These briefs involved the entire operations department crew and supporting staff from chernistry, radiation protection, maintenance, and work control. The briefs typically reviewed the planned evolution, procedure precautions and limitations; expected complications, and anticipated problems. The control room supervisor emphasized proper communications and command and control and ensured that all those involved were aware of lessons learned from previous downpower evolutions and transitions to shutdown cooling.

The cuntrol room supervisor exercised positive command and control throughout the evolutions observed. He responded well to equipment problems, delegated responsibility for specific activities, and maintained overall awareness on the plant. He regularly alerted the shift supervisor to pending changes in plant status and briefed him on unexpected equipment response. He periodically briefed the control room staff on changing plant status and sought inputs from the reactor operators, the shift supervisor, and the shift technical engineer.

Inspectors observed several examples of good command and control over equipment status and plant configuration. The reactor operator responsible for the power reduction ] demonstrated positive control of control room trainees and local operation of a reactor , ! recirculation pump speed control. The reactor operator assigned responsibility for placing the residual heat removal system in shutdown cooling established conditions for the residual heat removal heat exchanger performance test, carefully monitored cooldown rate, and secured the test (after 9 minutes) as soon as the most limiting vessel temperature dropped 50*F.

The reactor operators maintained a questioning attitude during plant evolutions. They delayed the performance of a scheduled reactor water level surveillance while shutdown cooling was being placed in service and questioned the appropriateness of removing the remaining recirculation pump from service shortly after shutdown cooling was placed in service with high decay heat load stillin the core.

, Inspectors did note some examples of operations weaknesses. The initial order to commence power reduction did not include a prescribed ramp rate. Reactor water level ' was raised prior to reopening the main steam isolation valves to continue the plant

- , - , , t 3- ' . - , , < cooldown. This resulted in an unexpected high reactor water level trip. Crew communications were hampered at times due to over' dependence on cellular phones -- which failed because of weak batteries and ineffective remote transmitters.

' c.

Conclusions Operations,. tumovers, watch standing, and control of plant conditions continued to improve. Shift turnovers of complex plant status were comprehensive, effectively

managed, and of minimal disruption to crew function. Inspectors observed higher training standards and strong management involvement in the training process.

During the shutdown for the midcycle outage, operations demonstrated strong positive . control of plant conditions. Crew management controlled the schedule to ensure crew. performance was not challenged. Crew communications, command, and control were generally excellent.. Few negative performance indications were observed.

- 01.2 - Resoonse to Grass Fire on Owner Controlled Area - - a.

Insoection Scone (71707)

Inspectors observed the licensee's response to a grass fire on the owner-controlled area.

b.

Observations and Findings On March 4,1998, the licensee secunty force observed a grass fire on the owner-c controlled area. An operator was dispatched to determine the proximity of smoke to the switchyard and transmission lines. The loss of offsite power procedure was promptly briefed to the control room crew. Operations management had been present in the control room when the fire was identified and provided continuous oversight during the event.

Smoke was not anticipated to be a problem due to wind direction. Offsite fire response was requested and the fire was extinguished. The facility was not threatened.

c.

Conclusions Operations responded promptly to a grass fire on the owner-controlled area. They assessed smoke effects, briefed the loss of offsite power procedure in the control room, and requested offsite fire response to extinguish the fire. Operations management was in the control room when the fire was identified and provided oversight throughout the event. Operations' overall response was excellent. ' i h } M t-t-

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Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment 02.1 Ooerability Evaluation Weaknesses a.

Inspection Scooe (71707) The inspectors reviewed several operability evaluations performed over this inspection i period and identified concerns regarding two evaluations.

b.

Observations and Findinas The licensee identified that the nonessential inlet and outlet valves of the mechanical ) vacuum pump did not fail in the closed position on a main steam line high radiation signal. The operability evaluation concluded that the probability of the valves failing open

concurrent with the main steam valves remaining open was very remote. The inspector j asked what effect this situation would have on the releases governed by 10 CFR l Part 100.

i i Further review by the licensee determined that, consistent with the Updated Safety l Analysis Report, the vahres were not required to close to mitigate radiological release j under this assumed accident condition. As a result, radiological releases were bounded by existing design calculations. The operability evaluation was revised to reflect these i conclusions.

During outage activities, the licensee examined the main steam isolation valve air accumulators for leakage. A small leak was identified on a fitting. An operability evaluation concluded that the leak was sufficiently small and the last accumulator pressure drop surveillance indicated sufficient margin to assure that the accumulator would perform it's design basis function if called upon.

i ' l The inspector noted that the conclusion was made without quantitative information regarding the estimated leak rate, the pressure drop test margin for the accumulator, or the accumulator system integrity degradation rate. To address these concems, the licensee documented the estimated leak rate based on rate and volume of air bubbles observed during soap solution testing and compared this with worst case degradation of the accumulators over the past two cycles based on the pressure drop surveillance testing. The quantitative evaluation concluded that significant margin to operability was available.

c.

Conclusions Of several operability evaluations reviewed, inspectors noted two evaluations which did not provide a quantitative basis for the conclusion of operability, e.g., no estimate of air ) leakage rate for an accumulator subject to a pressure drop acceptance criteria and no j i _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .. .. . .

' , . . -5-estimate of change of offsite exposure for a Technical Specification valve failing to ' j isolate. The licensee provided quantitative and design basis information to resolve the ' - concerns.

Operator Knowledge and Performance , 'O41 Examoles of Strenaths in Shift Technical Enaineer Performance i . a.

Insoecticn Scooe (71707) , . .

L Inspectors reviewed shift technical engineer performance during this inspection period.

l l > b.

Observattoris and Findinos l Inspectors observed two noteworthy examples and sustained high standards for effective . problem identification and followup of safety issues demonstrated by shift technical '; engineers with the assistance of their respective shift supervisors and operations crews.

A shift technical engineer questioned whether the offgas building which houses the dilution fans, the Z-Sump pump, and support equipment had adequate basis for seismic Class I qualification. The Z-Sump must function properly to assure operability of the standby gas treatment system. Further evaluation found that the building was originally q seismically qualified, but had been altered, resulting in the qualification no longer being j L met. The shift technical engineers coordinated a report made in accordance with ' l; 10 CFR 50.72. The building was subsequently evaluated, modified, and returned to seismic Class i status.

A shift technical engineer questioned whether the eye bolts on the primary containment clamshell for the equipment hatch were adequate, since one of the bolts appeared to be separated at the eye. Further evaluation and involvement by the engineer resulted in all j-bolts on both primary containment hatches being inspected and another faulted bolt being identified. Before startup, all bolts were replaced, in addition to the above, inspectors observed several examples of shift technical engineers, with shift supervisor support, coordinating efforts to demand higher standards by engineering to support opertsbility determinations and technical evaluations.

l Of note was increased support by operations and plant management. The operations organization increased the expectations for technical performance by shift crews.

Operations also demanded a lower threshold for repeat problems for all plant organizations; in several examples, shift technical engineers identified problems and operations and plant management provided prompt support to obtain appropriate resources necessary to address the concems.

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-6-The operability evaluation data base and higher standards for technical adequacy of operability evaluations improved the shift test engineer's technical standards. This resulted in a more thorough understanding of the system functions, interactions, and requirements.

c.

Conclusions

Shift technical engineers demonstrated several examples of strong safety performance.

They identified that the off-gas building, which housed seismically qualified standby gas treatment system support equipment, was not seismically qualified. They also identified that an eye bolt retaining the drywell equipment hatch had failed in a manner indicating a need to inspect all hatch eye bolts. Shift technical engineers, with support of shift supervisors, have continued to successfully demand resolution of specific plant safety issues and higher performance from engineering and maintenance. This was due in part to strong support by operations crews and operations and plant management.

04.2 Failure to Systematically Address Outaae Continaencies I_ns ection Scoce (62707) o a.

Inspectors reviewed preparations for the outage and actions to identify and address contingencies such as loss of shutdown cooling or unexpected mode change.

b.

Observations and Findinas Lack of Systematic Review Two days before the scheduled midcycle outage, the licensee identified that the maintenance process for replacement of safety relief valve i pilot valves did not consider the potential for loss of shutdown cooling and the subsequent need to quickly install pilot valves to reestablish the reactor coolant system boundary. Work control promptly established instructions to implement contingencies for that effort. The next day, the day before the scheduled outage, the inspector noted that no efforts had been directed to systematically evaluate and determine if other contingencies, such as making primary or secondary containment functional, were potentially significant and to put instructions in place to properly address the concerns.

The inspector noted that the plant conditions involved high decay heat loads and a rapid approach to inadvertent mode change if a loss of shutdown cooling were to occur.

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The licensee acknowledged the issue, responded promptly, and put several l contingencies in place to address potential challenges. Before the issue was raised, the l licensee referred primarily to an industry computer program for probabilistic risk, to focus on potential safely challenges. This program does not model or predict consequential effects of loss of shutdown cooling relative to Technical Specification requirements.

initially, no process was in place for controlling or documenting these contingencies, l other than briefings and maintenance work documents. Those contingencies which were I temporary in nature and under the control of the operating crew were logged in the . _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ - - .. . .... .. . ,

. -7-operations log. On the second day of the outage, a problem identification matrix was completed which documented and provided the overall strategies and specific instructions for various contingencies. This matrix was distributed to the operations department, the control room, the work control center, and selected maintenance activities. Two minor weaknesses were observed in implementing these plans, discussed in Section 04.3, below.

c.

Conclusions Prior to the outage, inspectors identified that contingencies associated with an inadvertent mode change due to high decay heat had not been systematically evaluated.

The licensee had not performed a review to assess vulnerabilities and identify potential contingency actions. Contingency plans were developed and distributed before entry into the shutdown condition. Two minor weaknesses were observed in implementing these contingencies during the outage.

04.3 Imolementation of Continaency Actions I l a.

Insoection Scoce (71707) The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of contingency actions for various activities during the outage. The inspectors observed control room activities during the restoration of shutdown cooling. The inspectors held discussions with licensee management, operations and engineering.

b.

Observations and Findinas 1. 480V Bus 1G Outaae On March 5,1998, the licensee implemented contingency actions while 480V Bus 1G was out of service. This was considered a high risk evolution since the Division il vital bus was deenergized. The lead operator for the evolution performed a prejob brief discussing contingencies and identifying the specific individuals who would be perfoiming the actions associated with the contingencies.

Also, the lead operator provided the control room supervisor a written list of the contingency actions for the evolution. The inspectors noted, during a conversation between the shift supervisor and the lead operator that the reactor equipment coolant surge tank would be isolated from both the make-up source and level indication; therefore, the surge tank level would need to be monitored. The inspectors questioned if the surge tank level was being monitored, since there was no contingency action described by the prejob brief or the written list. Neither the shift supervisor nor lead operator had verified that the surge level was being monitored. Through discussions with the station operator, the inspectors determined that the station operator did not know that monitoring the surge tank level was a contingency action nor that it was his responsibility. During these discussions, the inspectors also determined that the surge tank level was being monitored by the station operator, because actions for another __ I

. , . -8- ' contingency required the station operator to pass by the surge tank, at which time the swge tank level was checked due to his concern and understanding of the importance of that equipment.

2. Continaency Actions for the Restoration of Shutdown Cooling On March 12,1998, the licensee removed shutdown cooling from service and placed both reactor recirculation pumps in service with the expectation that the outage work would be completed soon and reactor startup would commence. Due to the amount of time still needed to complete outage work, the operators decided to place shutdown cooling back ' in service. Based on the heatup rate of the reactor, the shi*t supervisor established contingency actions to ensure primary and secondary containment were operable prior to exceeding 212*F. At 200*F, these actions involved closure of the Z-Sump (secondary containment) and at 205'F, closure of the reactor vessel head vents (primary containment).

Reactor vessel temperature reached 200*F at 8:54 a.m. At that time, the shift supervisor informed the work control center to start the closure process for the Z-Sump. At 8:59 a.m. the control room operator started a residual heat removal pump and the shift supervisor called the work control center to retract th.

Sump contingency action. The inspectors questioned the shift supervisor's retraction of the contingency actions prior to placing the heat exchanger in service to establish cool down. The shift supervisor stated that he was confident that the temperature would be quickly reduced below 200*F. The inspectors monitored the temperature. The highest temperature was 201*F and a cooldown rate was not established until approximately 9:18 a.m. The inspectors j

determined that exiting the contingency action when the pump was started rather than i when the temperature demonstrated a cooldown rate below 200'F was nonconservative with respect to minimizing the risk of an uncontrolled release of radioactive material, c.

Conclusion The inspectors identified that the shift supervisor exited a contingency action while the initiating condition still existed. The inspectors also identified an example of a weakness . in the control and implementation of contingency actions in that one of the contingency actions was not briefed or communicated to the implementing personnel. The contingency actions were completed by an individual who did not know this contingency . action was expected.

'08.

Miscellaneous Operations issues (92901) 08.1, (Closed) LER 50-298/97-019: Incorrect perception and scheduling process results in a Technical Specification violation. The root cause and corrective actions will be followed under Violation 50-298/97011-01.

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II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance - 'M1.1-General Comments

a.

Insoection Scoos (62707. 61726) Inspectors observed several maintenance activities during this inspection. Inspectors observed work in the field, held discussions with plant staff, and reviewed relevant documentation.

b.

Observations and Findings , ' The inspectors observed and reviewed the following work and associated work orders, tagout orders, and other related documents: HPCI injection line shutoff valve replacement HPCI injection line backup line shutoff Reactor equipment cooling heat exchanger troubleshooting i ' Safety relief valve pilot valve replacement maintenance and surveillance HPCI exhaust line containment boundary Valve HPCI-AOV-43 maintenance 4160V Division il breaker replacement inspectors found that, in general, the maintenance staff performed activities in a step-by-step fashion and were appropriately trained and conscientious in performance of maintenance. Workers followed ALARA practices and prejob briefs were performed to address potential radiation exposure concems. The inspectors found that parts and .consumables were labeled consistent with procedure and work document requirements.

Work release requirements were followed, including verification of procedure revisions and proper sign-offs and reviews by the control room and work control. Communications with the control room were maintained as required and discussed in prejob briefings and a . procedures. Supervisors were observed in the field during part of each of the activities.

Measurement and test equipment were within calibration and properly logged in the procedure or work document. Inspectors found that the work discussed above was generally well controlled and accomplished.

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Conclusions Observed work activities were generally performed well. Some exceptions were noted.

and are discussed later in the report.

M1.2 Reclacement of Safety Relief Valve Pilot Valves a.

Insoection Scooe (62707) .The _midcycle outage was performed in order to replace safety relief valve pilot valves.

Inspectors observed their replacement and conducted a drywell closeout walkdown prior - to the licensee's management closeout walkdown of the drywell, and prior to declaring the primary containment operable.. Inspectors interviewed maintenance technicians, health physics personnel, and management personnel.

b.

Observations and Findinas Maintenance technicians performed pilot valve replacement in a step-by-step manner, consistent with work instructions. A mockup had been used to prepare for the work and is discussed in Section R1,1 below. Maintenance technicians followed radiation protection technician briefing instructions and maintained radiation exposure ALARA.

Technicians maintained the valve configurations and availability of the valves to be re-installed consistent with the contingency plans for potential loss of shutdown cooling.

During the drywell closeout walkdown, the inspector found the drywell to be generally clean, with the exception of a seven-page maintenance work order document associated with the valve replacement for Valve SRV-71D. The paperwork also contained a yard of emery paper. The safety significance of this finding was minor since it represented a very small fraction of materials analyzed to be entrained during a design basis event. In response to the finding, and during completion of scheduled management closeout walkdowns of the drywell, plant management conducted detailed walkdowns of the drywell and identified and removed a few additional examples of foreign material in the drywell, such as metal tools. No safety significant findings were identified.

c.

Conclusions The pilot valve replacement was performed according to instructions. However, during a drywell walkdown, inspectors found that a work order document and about a yard of emery paper had been inappropriately left in the drywell. Subsequent detailed

walkdowns by plant management identified other foreign material in the drywell.

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. -1 1 - I M1.3 Surveillance Testina of Safety Relief Valves a.

Scoce (61726) Inspectors observed surveillance testing of the safety relief valves after pilot valve replacement.

b.

Observations and Findinas inspectors noted the surveillance testing was well controlled and demonstrated operability of the safety relief valves. Operators followed the procedure in a step-by-step manner, ensuring that, after testing, the tailpipe temperatures stabilized to close to the temperatures recorded before testing of each of the valves. Command and control was excellent, and control of plant parameters illustrated strong safety focus. All valves passed the acceptance criteria of lifting on demand and subsequently seating.

c.

Conclusions The licensee demonstrated excellent control of the safety relief valve surveillance testing.

M 1.4 Reactor Eauioment Coolina System Leakaae Troubleshootina Plan a.

Insoection Scoce (62707) The inspectors monitored the licensee's actions in determining the cause of a 17 gallon loss of reactor equipment cooling system inventory. Discussions were held with licensee engineering and operations staff and with management.

b.

Observations and Findinas . On January 25,1998, a station operator reported that the reactor equipment cooling surge tank level decreased 5/8 inches in 9 hours. This 5/8-inch drop corresponded to 17 gallons. The shift supervisor declared both systems of reactor equipment cooling inoperable and entered Technical Specification 3.12.b.4. Troubleshooting documentation was issued.

After the troubleshooting briefing, but before initiation of the troubleshooting, the inspector discussed the following concerns. The inspector noted contradictions in the procedure, including that the procedure limited the surge tank level to less than a 5/8-inch drop in a 10-hour period, but the note after Step 5 allowed a drop of 5/8-inch per hour. Operations and engineering staff assumed they held a uniform understanding of system configuration during testing. In fact, they assumed different configurations for Heat Exchanger B. Further discussion identified that the plan did not state if Heat Exchanger B was isolated or in service. In addition, the inspector identified that the plan did not identify contingency actions, such as what actions would be expected to be

.. -12-performed, by which operator, under what indications, and if a design basis accident occurred with Heat Exchanger A in service and leaking with a leak not identified. The licensee resolved the concerns before proceeding with the test-c.

Conclusion After a small change in reactor equipment cooling inventory, the licensee implemented procedures to identify whether a leak had occurred. During subsequent troubleshooting of the reactor equipment cooling heat exchanger, inspectors identified several weaknesses, including failure to plan for contingencies, procedure omissions and inconsistencies, and failure to clarify required system configuration.

M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Obs,ervations Concernina Material Condition a.

Scooe (61726) Several instances of degraded or unexpected material condition were identified. The causes and resolution of these conditions are described in other sections of this report.

The issues are consolidated in this section to more succinctly describe the material condition of various equipment items in the facility.

b.

Observations and Findinas incorrect Size Fuses Installed - 13 fuses located in the control room panels were I identified as being the wrong size (Section M4.2).

Reactor Eauiomerit Coolina System Leakaae - the surge tank level was reduced by i t gallons and the licensee had not determined the cause of the loss of inventory. The system was placed back in the normal line-up and no further loss of inventory had been j observeu by the end of the inspection period. Station operators have been given the i expectation to monitor the surge tank level whenever in the area (Section M1.4).

Becirculation Pumo Soeed Problem - the reactor recirculation Pump B speed controller was faulted, requiring local operation during the reactor shutdown (Section 01.1).

Two Alarm Multiolexer Unit Failures - Alarm multiplexers failed, due in one case to a technician causing a momentary ground (Section 01.1).

Valve Accumulator Leaks - Small leaks were observed by the licensee on air accumulators for main steam isolation valves. They were found to be operable by < quantitative evaluation (Section O2.1).

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r o. . -13- . Building inadvertentiv Altered to invalidate Seismic Qualification - A building housing seismically qualified equipment supporting the standby gas treatment system was found to have been modified at an earlier date, invalidating it's qualification (Section 04.1).

Drvwell Hatch Eve Bolt Failures - Two of eight eye bolts retaining drywell equipment hatches had cracked or faulted at weld joints and required replacement. All bolts were replaced (Section 04.1).

4180 Vac Breaker Reolacement - The last of the safety-related breakers which had not. been overhauled in the 23-year life of the plant was replaced by an overhauled breaker (Sections M1.1 and M3.1).

Reolacement of Main Steam Safety Relief Valve Pilot Valves - All main steam safety valve pilot valves were replaced during the outage to address corrosion concerns (Section M1.2).

Drvwell Cleanliness - Some foreign material from maintenance work was found in the drywell during closeout walkdowns (Section M1.2).

Feedwater Startuo Valve Controllers - Reactor feedwater startup valve controllers were found to be faulted during surveillance testing performed in anticipation of the scheduled outage. Repair work delayed the scheduled shutdown (Section M2.2).

c.

Conclusion Several instances of degraded or poor material condition were observed. Some

improvements were observed as well.

M2.2 Failure to Check Reactor Feedwater Startuo Flow Control Unit Function a.

Scooe (61726) Inspectors observed the licensee's identification and resolution of a lesson leamed from prior shutdowns and startups. Inspectors held discussions with operations and . maintenance staff and management.

b.~ Observations and Findings s During simulator training for a plant shutdown, for the midcycle outage, the shift supervisor asked if the startup feedwater controllers had been tested to determine if they

would work properly during the plant shutdown. Several previous shutdowns and

. startups had been complicated by failure of these controllers, and he wanted assurance ' that the valves and controllers had received surveillance testing and preventive ') > d ' r

7 E. . - _. _.____.__j

-14-maintenance. When operations found that no testing or evaluations had been performed, they demanded that the controllers be tested and preventive maintenance be performed if indicated.

During testing, the controller was found to have failed. Subsequent troubleshooting and repair activities occurred during the time the shutdown was scheduled, causing a delay of a few hours in the scheduled shutdown of the plant.

Subsequent inspector inquiries found that the preventive maintenance and testing of the j controllers had not been added to the preshutdown schedule, although lessons learned j had noted the vulnerability. Also, the past examples of startup valve and flow controller { problems indicated that the preventive maintenance frequency may not have been properly established. A problern identification report was issued to address this concern.

c.

Conclusion A few days before the midcycle outage, operations identified that the feedwater startup valves, which had faiiud in a manner which complicated past shutdowns and startups, had not had preventive maintenance or testing before the scheduled outage.

j Subsequent testing revealed a startup valve controller failure which would have { complicated the plant shutdown. This indicated poor implementation of lessons learned by maintenance.

M3 Maintenance Procedures and Documentation M3.1 480V Division 11 Outace a.

Insoection Scoce (71707) The inspectors observed operator actions to de-energize 480V Bus 1G for planned maintenance. Discussions were held with operations management and staff.

b.

Observations and Findinos On March 5,1998, the licensee de-energized 480V Bus 1G using Procedure 2.2.18, "4160v Auxiliary Power Distribution System," Revision 45ci, and Procedure 2.2.23, "120/240 vac Instrument Power Distribution System," Revision 25. Procedure 2.2.18, Attachment 9, provided Steps 1.1 through 1.13 for removing 480V Bus 1G from service.

Attachment 9, Table 1, Steps 1.4 through 1.11 instructed the operators to remove motor control centers in accordance with the corresponding table. The lead operator of the procedure did not complete the steps on Table 1 in the order presented. For example, Attachment 9 Table 1, Step 1.4, required that Motor Control Center MCC-S be removed from service per Table 2. Prior to completing Table 2, the operators performed part of the actions listed on Table 6, which was to be completed to support Table 1, Step The inspectors observed that, when the control room supervisor questioned the lead operator regarding the remainder of the procedure activities, his response did not always include all the equipment that was left to be de-energized. In general, the operator's approach to the procedure indicated it was used as a check list rather then a process for direction of activities. The inspectors questioned how the order in which equipment was isolated was controlled, and the lead operator stated that the order was dependent on plant pers:,nnel available.

With three-quarters of the tables completed, the lead operator reviewed the procedure with both the shift supervisor and the control room supervisor, independently, to ensure - that all were in agreement as to the status of the evolution. The inspector did not identify any steps that were not performed. The control room operators' directions and responses were crisp and concise. Also, good command and control was observed during this evolution.

Procedure 0.1, " Introduction to CNS Operations Manual," Revision 16, Step 2.7, indicated that, for this procedure, deviation from or omission of procedural steps would not be acceptab'e. Operators did not recognize the applicable administrative requirements and performed about 62 actions which changed plant configuration outside of step order. No steps were identified as being missed. This lack of recognition of the administrative requirements is a weakness, since the associated procedures identified that these 480V busses were not interdependent. Inspector review did not identify contrary examples.

During the Bus G outage, three unexpected occurrences were observed. The reactor head vent valve shut upon bus deenergization, a service water systems cross-connect valve isolated due to a low service water pressure spike, and Air Valve SA-AOV-600, in the fuel pool filtration system, deenergized open while Air Valve SA-AOV-41 was in l backwash position, causing air to be driven into the fuel pool return line and resulting in bubbling of air from below the water level of the fuel pool.

Operators re-established normal configuration for the service water system. The reactor head vent valve operator failed on demand to retum to the vented position and was later repaired. Venting was re-established via a manual valve. The fuel pool bubbling source was isolated. Problem identification reports were generated for each of the concerns and combined in an operations initiative to find the root cause and extent of condition of problems during the evolution. Inspectors noted that the fuel pool bubbling was not identified by the condition review group as a potential safety concern. Inspectors also noted that, had this bus become deenergized during a fuel drop event, expected dose could have been greater due to scrubbing of iodine and more spread of radioactive contamination due to fuel pool surface agitation. No restrictions regarding positioning of Valve SA-AOV-41, or fuel handling restrictions relative to repair of the air leaks which allowed the air flow path, had been in place. The licensee is addressing the issue.

$ '

, . .

e . ) , t . -16- - The cause of the unexpected equipment configuration changes, and the safety . consequences and interim corrective actions for the potential for air bubbling in the spent - fuel pool, will be followed by an open item (50-298/98001-01).

- c.- ConciusiDD During the outage, the licensee replaced a Division ll vital breaker, requiring - deeneigization of the Division ll vital bus. This was the most risk significant evolution of 'the outage The bus outage and restoration a maintenance activity was controlled by . , , procedure from the control room by an additional senior reactor operator. Three , unanticipated effects on equipment occurred, including deenergizing the reactor head . vent valve, causing it to move to the closed position.

M4 Maintenance Staff Knowledge and Performance

' M4.1 Imerovement in Clearance and Taaout Performance a.

Insoection Scone (71707) Inspectors reviewed problem identification reports, work orders, clearance orders, tagouts, and tagout logs. Inspectors held discussions with maintenance and clearance desk staff and with licensee management.

b.

Obsentations and Findinos Tagouts and clearance orders for multiple, complex evolutions during the midcycle outage were planned and implemented without errors. interviews and observations indicated that tagouts and clearances were developed with teamwork between maintenance, operations, work control, and the clearance desk. This practice caused a notoworthy improvement, in comparison to past outage findings of several instances of licensee identified errors and weaknesses in tagout and clearance implementation.

Licensee management noted that the improvement had occurred due to three initiatives.

Two additional licensed reactor operators assisted the tagout desk, the clearances had been preplanned before the outage, and the recently re-arranged work control center improved the proximity of the various craft, work control, and operations staffs. This Lresulted in strong, effective communications with the tagout and clearance staff.

, c.

Conclusions

Tagout and clearances were significantly improved over the previous outage. The ) licensee had assigned two additional licensed operators to assist clearance and tagout

activities during the outage, significantly improved the layout of the clearance desk to

"

facilitate interdisciplinary reviews, and planned clearance points before the outage.-

'

During the midcycle' outage, no clearance order or tagout errors were noted.

j

- n

-- -

. -17-M4.2 Identification of Incorrect Size Fuses a.

Insoection Scoce (62707) The inspectors monitored the licensee's actions in determining the extent of condition when incorrect size fuses were identified in a control room panel. Discussions were held with licensee management, engineering, and operations.

b.

Obsen/ations and Findinas On January 27,1998, the licensee identified that five of five fuses located in a nonsafety-related control room panel were the incorrect size. Problem identification Report 2-27633 was initiated to document the problem. The shift technical engineer determined that the extent of the condition was not bounded by the problem identification report. The shift technical engineer performed an inspection of those fuses with the fuse size visible (without removing the fuses) in the same control room panel and identified that an additional three of four fuses were also incorrect. All of the incorrectly sized fuses were nonessential.

The licensee identified that a walkdown was performed in 1988 through 1990 and was suspended due lack of funds. This walkdown was performed in all of the control room panels except Panels VBD-C and -G. The incorrectly sized fuses were all located in Panel VBD-G. Also, the licensee identified that Condition Report 95-0049 was written in 1995 on fuse controlissues. Corrective actions to perform a veri *ication of fuse sizes remained open.

j A team was formed to determine the extent of condition and the safety significance of having the wrong size fuses installed. The team was lead by maintenance with members from engineering and operations. Team members performed walkdowns of all of the control room panels and auxiliary relay room panels and were able to visually verify 66 out of 385 fuse sizes. One fuse from the 66 fuses was found to be the incorrect size.

The tean was able to verify that, for each of the fuses installed in 3quipment used in emergenc / operating procedures and Technical Specifications, either the correct fuse size was i:istalled or it was replaced. The team also reviewed Quality Assurance Fire Protectica Audit 97-08 and found that three motor control center cubicles were sampled as part of the audit with no incorrect fuse sizes being identified. The rest of the fuses in { Panels VBD-C and -G were to be verified in the midcycle outage. The licensee identified ' a total of 13 incorrectly sized fuses.

Based on the results of the team's walkdowns and the audit, the team concluded that there was no immediate concern with fuse control program. This issue will be followed with Followup item 50 298/97008-02 documented in Section M8.1.

, l: _... _ _.

-18- ) c.

Conclusion i in a followup effort on nonsafety-related fuse sizing, the licensee performed multiple ' circuit walkdowns. This assessment of extent of condition was prompt and thorough and demonstrated effective leadership by maintenance and coordination with operations.

Thirteen fuses were found in nonsafety-related applications which were of improper size.

No safety significant concerns were identified.

M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902) M8.1 (Ocen) Insoector Followuo item 50-298/97008-02: Weak maintenance documentation and lack of an evaluation on interchangability of different fuse manufacturers. This item addressed both fuse control and fuse dedication. Fuse control is still being evaluated; therefore, the item will remain open.

Further evaluation by the inspectors indicated that, although the problem identification report stated that the fuse control program should be addressed, the problem identification report was closed without addressing this fuse control program. On October 7,1997, a second problem identification report was written regarding a nonconservatively sized fuse in a safety-related circuit. This item will be followed to evaluate the extent of condition and the corrective actions in this section as well as Section M4.1.

Ill. Enaineerina E3 Engineering Procedures and Documentation E3.1 hsues Concernina Probabilistic Risk Model Assumotions a.

Insoection Scone (37551) Inspectors questioned risk evaluations and some fault tree assumptions. Inspectors held discussions with engineers and managers, b.

Observations and Findinas During a review of the licensee's individual plant examination, inspectors ideatified that the reactor core isolation cooling controller, described and modeled as being powered from the no-break power supply, had been found to be independent of the notreak power supply in' separate licensee engineering evaluations. Also, the diesel controllers were modeled as being able to automatically perform the safety functior, of sequencing onto the vital bus if an emergency core cooling system signal were to occur during a

diesel generator surveillance run. During a surveillance run, the diese's are not able to automatically sequence in response to an emergency core cooling system signal, but - - - -

-19-require two operator action steps to be taken in the control room. The licensee evaluated these errors and found that the change in risk associated with these errors were not significant, since the relevant fault tree examples were eliminated during solution of the model.

The inspector asked if the licensee used risk information to evaluate the safety significance of events documented in LERs. The licensee had not in the past, but planned to evaluate risk for future LERs. The inspector also asked if modifications to the plant were evaluated using risk insights to determine prioritization and risk worth and achievement. The licensee stated that they had not in the past, but intended to in the future.

c.

Conclusions The licensee's use of risk information was not comprehensive. Inspectors identified that the probabilistic risk assessment model fault tree inaccurately modeled the reactor core isolation cooling controller and the diesel generator controls. Licensee evaluation determined that neither of these inaccuracies resulted in significant changes in risk assessment. Inspectors also identified that the licensee's proposed plant modifications were not evaluated to assess risk. LERs were also not evaluated for risk. The licensee has subsequently decided to evaluate these items.

IV. Plant Support R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R1.1 Lack of Cross-Deoartmental Coordination in ALARA Reviews a.

Insoection Scoce (71750) Inspectors observed multiple work activities and held discussions with many members of j plant staff regarding ALARA planning and practices.

b.

Observations and Findinas inspectors found that work activities were coordinated within work groups to minimize radiation dose. For example, a mockup of the safety relief valve pilot valve was used extensively to best minimize dose for the mechanics performing the replacement work.

Further, briefings preparing for drywell closeout inspections were well focused and resulted in minimal dose for the required actions by plant staff and inspectors. Many other examples of dose reduction within specific work groups were observed. However, inspectors found during observations and interviews with maintenance craft, engineers, quality control, and health physics staff that no planning across departments had taken , place to reduce dose. After discussions with A,LARA personnel, immediate actions by ! - -.

. -20-the containment coordinator to consolidate tasks during drywell entries, resulted in approximately an 80 millirem dose reduction for a single task. Additional activities to perform cross-departmental coordination further reduced dose.

c.

Conclusions inspectors noted that, although ALARA efforts achieved dose reduction within departmentel and work group efforts, no activities were performed to coordinate across departments to achieve dose reduction. The licensee immediately addressed this concern. For example, the containment coo.-dinator obtained required diagnostic photographs of equipment on his daily surveys instead of an engineer making a separate entry into the drywell. This resulted in immediate reductions in radiation exposure below estimated doses.

S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities S1.1 Access Point Entry Control (71750) a.

Insoection Scooe (71750) Inspectors observed a fast developing metal alarm processing situation which immediately required more guard staff and a slower rate of personnelinflux.

b.

Observations and Findinas During an outage shift change, inspectors noted that workers' steel toed shoes and various winter clothing items caused multiple, personnel alarms in quick succession. In response to the need to process these alarms, the guard staff responded rapidly to avoid overburdening the detector area as a result of continuing the rate of personnel entries.

Guards calmly requested and obtained immediate cooperation from plant personnel entering the access area to stop entries and wait quietly, despite a crowded waiting area and cold weather which encouraged personnel to crowd noisily into shelter. Plant personnel waiting outside the processing area clearly informed the large numbers of entering staff coming in from the winter conditions of the need to stop and wait quietly for processing. _ Guards also obtained immediate guard force support to the access area to more quickly process the metal alarms. The impending congestion in the access detector area was averted, the waiting crowd remained professional and quiet, the detector and metal testing area was cleared, and processing resumed at it's previous rate, within two minutes.

c.

Conclusions Security responded well to a quick succession of access point metal alarms. During a crowded moming outage shift change, several consecutive personnel metal alarms resulted in a condition in which the access station guard force could be quickly .

. . m-21 -- I ' overburdened. The impending congestion at the security access area was promptly . averted. Security demonstrated excellent coordination to obtain more guard staff and - slow personnel entries. The multiple access metal alarms were processed in less than . two minutes.

.

F1 - Control of Fire Protection' Activities F5.1 L; Fire Drill Observations , s.

Insoection Scone (71750) During. routine backshift inspection, inspectors observed an unannounced fire drill and its critique, inspectors interviewed fire brigade, fire protection, and management personnel.

, b.

- Observations and Findinos On February 15,1998, the inspector observed control room participation in an . unannounced fire drill. The drill scenario involved fire in a paint locker in the turbine building. Operations response was generally timely and effective and control room monitoring of vital plant parameters continued throughout the drill in a conscientious fashion. The postdrill critique did not identify significant e Acems and concluded proper drill performance. Equipment performance was satisfactory with the _ exception of one radio which failed during the drill. An alternate radio was iramediately available. The . control room staff required that the radio be immediately replaced and tested to assure . appropriate function in the various plant areas. The shift supervisor declared a notice of unusual event for the drill within 10 minutes of the initiation of the fire. This was ' observed by the drill monitors and considered appropriate. The monitors considered communications to be appropriate as well. The drill monitors observed activities and

facilitated good communication in the postdrill briefing. However, the concerns noted by the inspector had not been noted by the drill monitors. The licensee's critique determined that the drill was satisfactory and concluded that minor specific concerns needed enhancement. After the critique, the inspector provided the following

' observations to the licensee: -1. The contro room o server or t e r, a re pro ec on eng neer, arr ved in the control l b f h d ill fi t ti i i room early on a weekend morning and assumed a stationary, overview position ~ 5 minutes before the drill. The inspector observed that this may have preconditioned the . . control room's response to fire alarms since the back shift hour was not a time the fire - protection engineer was typically in the plant.

2/ The inspector monitored several communications from the control room to the fire brigade involving multiple alternate communication statements by the control room and _ 'the fire brigade. The control room consistently began each series of communications . .h t _. ' 9 g ' . b' - .L --_ __,--_. _ L f xY'.A

.. ; i i ,$. -22-with the' statement "This is a Drill." However, throughout the remainder of each series of-- exchanges, "This is A Drill" was not spoken by either the fire brigade communicator or .the reactor operator in the control room.

3. When the shift supervisor determined that a notificaticn of unusual event be declared for the drill, the control room supervisor gave the order to the reactor operator indicating ~ , c that the notification of unusual event had been declared. However, the control room - supervisor used the shift supervisor / emergency director's first name. This indicated a lack of formality in communications and was ambiguous.

4. During the drill the decision was made to call for offsite assistance. The drill monitors did not evaluate whether the security station had adequate manning to escort incoming offsite fire assistance personnel. Security manning wouid have been somewhat reduced i because of the backshift hour and the security force's need to assisted as fire brigade _ responders.

~ 5.- During the initial stages of the drill, the evacuation announcement included only the area local to the fire. No announcement for roof evacuation or entire turbine building ventilation envelope evacuation was considered or announced.

6., Since the drill scenario fire was located in a paint locker, liquid incendiaries could be released in the fire area. This was not addressed by other than an installed berm.- The _ fire brigade also provides hazardous materials response! however, no hazardous ! materials response considerations were noted during the communications between the fire brigade and the control room, although personal protection gear for the members of _ the fire brigade did take into consideration possible hazardous materials.

7. The drill monitors did not validate that self-contained breathing apparatus qualified i glasses were available for all drill responders requiring use of glasses.

Other minor weaknesses were identified. The licensee concluded that the concems l ' ' should be addressed.

c.- Conclusions Inspectors identified several weaknesses during an unannounced weekend fire drill. The appearance of the fire protection coordinator in the control room at 7 a.m. on a weekend telegraphed the impending drill, although a licensed operator or qualified fire brigade responder could have more unobtrusively observed the control room response.

Examples of weaknesses included lack of formality in communication, failure to evacuate all potentially affected areas, and lack of hazardous materials response for a fire drill in a paint storage room.

. >

1' -

. ( -23-X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the exit meeting on March 5,1998, and a supplemental exit meeting on March 12,1998,- to address findings obtained at the end of the inspection period, after the initial exit meeting. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

I f

. ..- '/ ' PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee +* L. Newman, Operations Manager

• W. Green, Staff Technical Engineering
• D. Van DerKamp, Assistant Operations Manager

- ' *D. Madsen, Licensing Engineer

• C. Gaines, Maintenance Manager -
• M. Hale, Radiological Protection Manager-

+*J. Burton, PAD Manager - +*M. Peckham, Plant Manager +*J. Pelletier, Senior Manager of Engineering

• B. Houston, Licensing Manager
• J.' Scheuerman, TSG Supervisor /ASD -
• T. Chard, Assistant Radiological Protection Manager

+L. Dewhirst, Licensing Engineer +R. Stoddard, Chief Engineer, Lincoln Electric System +B._Newell, Assistant Maintenance Manager +P. Caudill, Senior Manager Attended March 5,1998, meeting

~+ Attended March 12,1998, meeting INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED . IP 37551: Onsite Engineering IP 61726: Surveillance Observation . IP 62707: Maintenance Observation }i IP 71707: Plant Operations p - IP 71750: Plant Support Activities IP 92901: Followup-Operations . IP 92902: Followup - Maintenance ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 298/98001-01 .IFI

Unexpected equipment actuations during vital bus outage (Section M4.1)

, b ' - -

. , . i i !

2-Closed 298/97019-00 LER Incorrect perception and sche.uling process results in a Technical Specification violation (Section 08.1) Discussed . 298/97011-01 VIO Incorrect perception and scheduling process results in a TS violation (Section 08.1) - 298/97006-02 IFl' Weak maintenance documentation and lack of an evaluation on interchangability of different fuse manufacturers (Section M8.1).

, 't- }}