IR 05000298/1987025
| ML20236K239 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 10/29/1987 |
| From: | Fisher W, Terc N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236K234 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-298-87-25, NUDOCS 8711090160 | |
| Download: ML20236K239 (7) | |
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{{#Wiki_filter:... .,i.] .L l l ' ' , , l APPENDIX l oi _.
U.S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l ,
REGION IV
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NRC Inspection Report: 50-298/87-25 License: DPR-46
' Docket: 50-298 Licensee: Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD)
P. O. Box 499 h.< Columbus, NE 68601 Facility Name: Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) Incpection At: Brownville,, Nebraska ' Inspection Conducted: October 5-8, 1987 ~ '4 '# 7 Inspectors:
- Nemen M. Terc, Emergency Preparedne s Analyst Date Accompanying , ' Personnel: 8. Nicholas, NRC-RIV T. Essig, NRC-HQ P. Harrell, NRC-SRI D. Schultz, Comex Corporation . Approved: i bw 4h VL >/J 7/eP7 WiTliam L. Fisher, Chief, Nuclear Materials te ' and Emergency Preparedness Branch Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted Octeber 5-8, 1987 (Report 50-298/87-25) Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the licensee's implementation of the licensee's emergency response plan and procedures during ' - their annual exercise.
Results: Within the area inspected, no violations or deviations were found.
However, six deficiencies were identified.
8711090160 871104 PDR ADOCK 05000298 O PDR
y.,. .- ~ yc, L ..r. . . c DETAILS l 1.- Persons Contacted } Licensee t j
- L. Kuncl, Vice President, Nucle'ar
.*G. Horn, Division Manager, Nuclear Operations-AC. Goings-Merrill, Emergency Preparedness Specialist .
- J. Sayer,. Radiological Manage'r
- R. tiayden, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
- J. Flash, Public-Information Coordinator
- G. Trevors, Division Manager, Nuclear Support
- G. Smith, Manager, Quality Assurance
- R. Brungard, Manager, Operations
- E. Mace,. Manager, Engineering
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- 0. Norvell, Manager, Maintenance t
- S. Peterson, Manager, Plant' Services j
- J. Meacham, Senior Manager, Technicol Support Services a'l
' NRC " p '
- E. A. Plettner, Resident Inspector
- W. Long, Project Manager, NRR
- Denotes those present during the exit interview.
l The NRC inspector also held discussions with other station and corporate l" personnel in the areas of security, health physics, operations, training, and emergency response organization.
2.
Inspector Observations The NRC inspector discussed the following observations with the lictnsee during the exit interview.
These observations are neither violations nor x unresolved items.
They were identified for licensee consideration, but l they have no specific regulatory requirement.
The licensee indicated that these items would-be considered.
o' The licensee's Emergency Plan and Emergency Implementing Procedures erroneously refer to three Operational Support Centers (OSCs).
The NRC inspector noted that there was in fact only one OSC which consisted of three areas where v.*ious trades would assemble according to expertise, a briefin / staging area where they will u converge to be briefed in technical ar.d radiological matters, and finally an area within the Technical Support Center (TSC) where the
OSC Director and his radiological counterpart are located.
The NRC l
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, inspector also noted that the hierarchy of. command for tne direction
and coordination of the inplant teams was clearly defined,' and that ' the OSC functioned as a whole, therefore as one OSC.
The NRC inspector reviewed Procedure EPIP-20, "Protecti;/e' Action o Recommendations," and noted that explicit references and guidance - based on_ plant status were not sufficiently emphasized.
' ' .o The'NRC Inspector reviewed Procedure EPIP-5, " Recovery Operations," and noted that explicit guidance addressing notification and consultation with federal and state authorities prior to declaring - ' and initiating Phaze II Pecovery Operation was not included.
The;0perationsSupervisor,whoactedastheControlRoomDirector,was o.
. repositioned.at 7:'15 a.m. prior to any staff notifications of abnormal plant conditions.
o The TSC staff failed to evaluate the core flow cnomalies which occurred at 10:00 a.m.,until 11:22 a.m. when prompted by NRC observer y - questions.
The v9ndor was not contacted until 12:11 p'.m.
- i o There were no site maps or plume overlays to track protective measures activities in the TSC.
> o The General Office logged off dose assessment mainframe users in the . _ TSC.
o There were no visual aids in the. EOF to help decisionmakers visualize . the actual and projected radioactive plume in order to determine ' -. protective action recommendations.
~ No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Followup on Previously Identified Items (Closed) Deficiency (298/8625-01): Inadequate Dose Projections - The NRC inspector noted that during the 1987 exercise, dose projections were accurate.
' (Closed) Deficiency (298/8625-03):, Lack of Procedure - The NRC inspector . noted that Procedure CNEP 5.0, "Reco0ery," issued on July 7,1987, addresses recovery planning and support activities in the General Office , - Emergency Center.
. No violations or deviations were identified.
.4.
Program Areas Inspected The following program areas were inspected.
Unless otherwise noted, the inspection was completed and revealed no violations, deviations, deficiencies, unresolved items, or open items.
The inspection included ' .
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, ,, , ' interviews wi.th~ cognizant individuals,. observations of activities,.and ' , record reviews. The depth and scope of these activities were consistent with past findings,and with the current status of.the facility.
Notations af ter a specific inspection item are used to identify.the following* I.= item not'inspe~cted or only partially inspected; V = violatien; 1' 0 = deviation;' H =' deficiency; V = unresolved. item; and 0 = open item.
Procedure Program Area and Inspection Requirements i 82301 Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors 021 - 10 CFR 50,. Appendix E, Part IV.F.1 (C) (I) 022 - Evaluation Criteria: j (1) Control. Room (H). . (2)~ Technical Support Center (H) (3) Emergency Operations Facility f (4) Operational Support Center ! (5) Corporate Command Center (I) (6) ;0ffsite Monitoring Team (I) (7) Corrective Action / Rescue Team . (8) Security /Accountab lity Team (I) ! (9). Press Center (I) l (10) Medical Team (H) (11) Postaccident Sampling > 5.
Control Room
a.
The NRC inspector noted that not all notifications originating from the Control Room.(CR) to offsite authorities were made in a timely or consistent manner.
The Emergency Director (ED) declared the Alert at 8.34 a.m.; however: ., o The authorities of the state of Nebraska were notified of the Alert at 8:51 a.m.
o The authorities of the state of Missouri were notified of the Alert at 8:55 a.m.
, o The ED did not declare a Site Area Emergency until about 26 minutes after plant conditions warranted the same.
As a consequence, notifications to offsite authorities pertaining to this escalation in accident severity were delayed.
The above constitutes a deficiency (285/8725-01).
b.
Information pertaining to plant status was not conveyed from the CR to the TSC in a timely manner, as follows: o Information abcut the discharge-volume drain valve being inoperative at 9:15 a.m. was not received in the TSC until 9:27. , - g- - -- - - - , L, , ' -, , , , .
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,. L o; 'At 10:03 a.m., the CR mandated through.the public address system the evacuation of the Reactor Building due to'high radiation levels.:At 10:09 a.m., the ED called the CR to find,out why this i evacuation took place, indicating lack of continuous flow of information from the CR to the TSC.
o An alarm pertaining to the inoperable scram discharge valve was received by CR operators at 9:30 a.m. ~This required, visual-inspection by procedure.
The CR operators. failed to inform the
- TSC staff about this situation, and as a consequence the valve inspection team was not dispatched until 9
- 53 a.m.
' o Several face-to-face meetings between the CR and TSC staffs were necessary to compensate for the shortcomings of other means of communication throughout the exercise, indicating a possible need for' additional communication hardware between these two emergency response facilities.
~ The above constitutes a deficiency (285/8725-02).
c.
The NRC inspector noted that the Shift Supervisnr (SS) acting as the ED, in the CR, and the Control Room Supervisor (CRS), became involved ] with administrative details, or failed to delegate functions to the TSC.
This. detracted from their ability.to direct and coordinate emergency response activities in an efficient manner, as follows: o The ED (SS) failed to brief the CR operators on the circumstances surrounding the fuel handling accident which occurred at 8:30 a.m., until the CR operators asked what was happening.
o At about 10:02 a.m. the ED (SS) was or, the telephone, conversing with an officer of the state of Missouri instead of directing the efforts to stabilize the plant, o The CR operators attempted to formulate a plan for correcting an inoperative scram-discharge-volume drain valve until the ED overheard their discussions, and ordered the SS to delegate this problem to the TSC according to the intent and structure of the emergency response organization, o The CR staff attempted to manage the medical emergency at 10:00 a.m. instead of directing their efforts to recovering from the reactor scram.
The above constitutes a deficiency (285/8725-03).
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6' d.
-The'NRC inspector noted that Procedure EPIP-1, " Emergency " Classification," listed Emergency Action Level (EAL) 2.6-as the loss of.two fission product barriers as a General Emergency.
This.EAL in , < some situations would produce minimal offsite consequences that would ~ not justify taking mandatory protective actions as is the case in a General Emergency class. Additionally, the guidance in NUREG 0654, Appendix A, states that a General Emergency. requires the loss'of 2 out of.3 fission product barriers with a potential loss of the third barrier.
.The above constitutes a deficiency.(285/8725-04).
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Technical Support Center The NRC inspectors noted that the TSC engineering staff used uncontrolled j copies of plant system diagrams, that could be out of date, for i troubleshooting during the unfolding of the accident scenario, f The status boards in the TSC were deficient in that: o The status boards were not maintained up-to-date (e.g., equipment status was not updated from 10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.). o Parameter trends were not indicated.
o Parameters such as valve positions for critical systems, like Standby Gas Treatment and Switch Liquid Control, were not indicated.
! The above constitutes a deficiency (285/8725-05).
The licensee identified some of the above concerns during their formal j critique.
' No violations or deviations were identified.
.} 7.
Medical Team The NRC inspector determined that the medical' team failed to take appropriate first-aid actions to save the life of the injured-contaminated individual, and was unable to establish priorities between medical and , radiological concerns.
I The above constitutes a deficiency (285/8725-06).
No violations or deviations were identified.
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1 8c ! Exercise Critique-The NRC' inspector attended the post exercise, critique _by_the licenseeL ' staf f on October 8,1987, to. evaluate the licensee's identification of-deficiencies and _ weaknesses as required by 10 CFR 50.54(q), 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.F.5.
. Corrective action for identified deficiencies and weaknesses will be.
examined during a future NRC inspection, j 9.' Exit' Interview 'l The NRC inspectors' met with the NRC resident inspector-and licensee ~ representatives ~ identified in paragraph 1 on October 8, 1987., and summarized the scope'and-findings of the inspection as presented in.this report.
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