ML20151Q914
| ML20151Q914 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 07/15/1988 |
| From: | Bennett W, Constable G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151Q908 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-298-88-20, IEB-88-005, IEB-88-5, NUDOCS 8808110328 | |
| Download: ML20151Q914 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000298/1988020
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APPENDIX-B
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
-REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report:
50-298/88-20
License: DPR-46
Docket: 50-298
Licensee: Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD)
P. O. Box 499
Columbus, NE
68601
Facility Name: Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS)
Inspection At: Cooper Nuclear Station, Nemaha County, Nebraska
Inspection Conducted: June 1-July 4, 1988
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Inspector:
W. R. Bennett, Senior Resident Inspector
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Approved:
.G. L. Constable, Chief, Project C, Division of
Date
Reactor Projects
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Inspection Summary-
Inspection Conducted June 1 through July 4, 1983 (Report 50-298/88-20)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of operational safety
verification, monthly surveillance and maintenance observations, ESF walkdown,
IE Bulletin-88-05 followup, radiological protection, and security.
Results: Within the areas inspected, three violations were identified (failure
to post a fire watch, paragraph 4; failure to perform adequate valve lineup,
paragraph 5; and failure to use adequate test instrumentation, paragraph 5).
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DETAILS
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Persons Contacted
NPPi
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- G. R. Horn, Division Manager of Nuclear Operations
J. M. Meacham, Technical Support, Senior Manager
- H
T. Hitch, Plant Services Manager
- G. E. Smith, Quality Assurance Manager
- R. Brungardt, Operations Manager
- J. Flaherty, Plant Engineering Supervisor
- L. E. Bray, Regulatory Compliance Specialist
- G. R. Smith, Licensing Supervisor
- R. D. Black, Operations Supervisor
The NRC inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees during the
inspection period,
- Denotes those present during the exit interview conducted on July 7, 1988,
2.
Plant Status
Cycle 12 refueling outage was completed during this inspection period.
The outage was extended due to problems with tudine stationary blading
and core dummy fuel assemblies, and seismic concerns regarding safety
system supports. Criticality was achieved on June 17, 1988, following NRC
review of a Justification for Interic Operation (JIO) regarding the safety
system supports. The plant was Unchronized to the grid on June 18, 1988.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
(92701)
(0 pen) Open Item 298/8814-03: Large Backlog of DRNs in Control Room - This
item concerned thr. large backlog of Drawing Revision Notices (DRNs) to be
incorporated ints as-built drawings.
Prior to reactor startup, the licensee modified its drawing control
system. A?1 interim drawings and DRNs applicable to a certain as-built
drawing are placed together so that operators are required to look in
only one place to find all changes to a particul.ar drawing.
The SRI
considers this an improvement, but the backlog of DRNs is still a problem.
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This item is still open.
(Closed)UnresolvedItem 298/8636-01:
Diesel Sequential Loading -
This item concerned the adequacy of the diesel sequential loading
procedure.
The licensee, in letter NLS8700633 dated December 4,1987, specified that a
diesel generator (DG) startup time of 16 seconds from receipt of the DG
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initiation signal is adequate for Cooper Nuclear Station configuration -and
. committed to revise Surveillance Procedure (SP) 6.3.4.3 to include the
specific acceptance criterion.
In a memorandum to the SRI, dated
December 21,1987,- the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)
concurred that the licensee's response was satisfactory' Sequential Loading
and recommended
closure of 298/8636-01.
of Emergency Diesel Generators," Revision 24, dated May 19, 1988, and
verified that the 16 second acceptance criteria was included in the
procedure.
This item is closed.
4.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
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The SRI observed operational activities throughout the inspection period.
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Control room activities and conduct were observed to be well controlled.
Proper control room staffing was maintained.
Discussions with operators
determined that they were cognizant of plant status and understood the
importance of, and reason for, each lit annunciator.
The SRI observed
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selected shift turnover meetings and noted that information concerning
plant status was properly communicated to the oncoming operators.
On June 17, 1988, the SRI observed a reactor startup following the
Cycle 12 refueling outage which commenced on March 5, 1988.
All
conditionsandrequirementsforstartupwereproperlymetanddocumented
in General Operatin
Technical Specification
Pre-StartupChecks,gProcedure(G0P)2.1.1.2
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Revision 7, dated December 10, 1987.
The mode switch
was placed in the startup position at 2:24 a.m. and criticality was
achieved at 4:20 a.m.
The startup was conducted in a controlled,
cautious, professional manner in accordance with GOP 2.1.1, "Cold Startup
Procedure," Revision 52, dated June 2, 1988.
A second licensed operator
verified all rod movement during the startup as required.
Tours of accessible areas at the facility were conducted to confirm
operability of plant equipment.
The SRI performed a walkdown of the
Results of this walkdown are documented in
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paragraph 7 of this report.
On June 22, 1988, during a routine plant tour, the SRI noted that the
access door to the critical switchgear room was propped open with
temporary ventilation installed.
A security guard was properly stationed
monitoring access to the critical switch gear room.
The SRI also noted
that door H300, entry to the control corridor, was tied open.
Door H300
is required by CNS Procedure 0.16, "Control of Fire Doors," Revision 6,
dated May 26, 1988, to have a fire watch when it is obstructed from
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closing securely.
The SRI asked the guard for the critical switchgear
room if he was acting as a fire watch for door H300. The guard responded
that he was only watching the access for the critical switchgear room.
When the SRI notified the control room that the H300 door was oprn with no
the snift supervisor immediately ordered the door to be
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closed. The failure to have a fire watch stationed with door H300 tied
open is an apparent violation (298/8820-01) of CNS Procedure 0.16.
No other violations or deviations were identified in this area.
5.
Monthly Surveillance Observations (61726)
The SRI observed and/or reviewed the performance of Surveillance Procedure
(SP) 6.3.4.3, "Sequential Loading of Emergency Diesel Generators";
SP 6.4.3.1, "HPCI Turbine Overspeed Functional Test"; and SP 6.3.1.1,
"Primary Containment Local Leak Rate Test."
SP 6.3.4.3, "Sequential Loading of Emergency Diesel Generators,"
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Revision 24, dated May 19, 1988: This surveillance was perfonned to
meet TS requirements to demonstrate load shedding and sequencing on a
simulated loss of offsite power.
The SRI observed the diesel
generator No. 2 test performance on June 9, 1988.
The test was
performed by qualified individuals in a professional manner. The
control room supervisor briefed all involved individuals ensuring
that they knew their functions during the test and that they were
aware of what indications to expect during the test. Test results
were reviewed and verified to be acceptable per the procedure.
During the performance of the test, the core spray (CS) and residual
heat removal (RHR) injection valves opened causing a reactor vessel
level increase of greater than 100 inches. The valve lineup for the
test required that the valves be closed and deenergized; however, the
valves were, in fact, closed, but energized. When the test signal
was applied the CS and RHR pumps started, the CS and RHR injection
valves opened, and water was injected into the reactor vessel. The
failure to perform an adequate valve lineup is an apparent
violation (298/8820-02). The SRI considers that the root cause of
the violation was an inadequate procedure in that the format for the
valve lineup was confusing, requiring the operator to perform two
actions in one step of the valve lineup. The licensee has issued
Revision 25 to SP 6.3.4.3, changing the format of the valve lineup to
require one initial for valve positioning, and one initial for power
In addition, due to some confusion that was evidenced during
status.
the performance of SP 6.3.4.3, the licensee committed to review the
conduct of all complex surveillance procedures (those requiring more
than one shift to perform) to attempt to reduce any confusion that
may occur during performance of these tests.
SP 6.4.3.1, "HPCI Turbine Overspeed Functional Test," Revision 13,
dated February 25, 1988: This surveillance was perfonned to
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demonstrate operability of the overspeed trip on the High Pressure
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Coolant Injection (HPCI) turbine. The SRI observed and reviewed
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portions of the surveillance on June 7,1988.
The SRI noted that a
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Simpson 260 Multimeter had not been used as required by Step 7.7 of
the procedure.
In addition, various portions of the recovery portion
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of the procedure (steps 8.1.38 through 8.1.41) had been completed
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prior to completion of steps 8.1.35.5 through 8.1.37.
Neither the
use of a Fluke Multimeter vice a Simpson Multimeter or the
completion of steps out of sequence was authorized in the procedure.
A temporary change notice had not been processed. This is a similar
occurrence to that documented as NRC Violation (298/8814-01).
Corrective actions for this violation have not been completed at this
time. This occurrence will be reviewed during a subsequent
inspection to verify corrective actions for Violation 50-298/8814-01.
The SRI considers that the above actions did not adversely affect the
performance of the surveillance.
SP 6.3.1.1, "Primary Containment Local Leak Rate Tests," Revision 22,
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dated February 25, 1988:
This test was performed to verify that TS
allowable leakage was not exceeded. The SRI reviewed the data for
the 58 psi drywell personnel airlock test performed on April 14,
1988, and the 3 psi drywell personnel airlock tests performed on
June 15, 1988, and June 18, 1988. All calculations were reviewed and
results were within the acceptance criteria of TS and the procedure.
The SRI noted that for the 3 psi test, a pressure drop of .01 would
cause the test to fail. The SRI questioned the licensee concerning
the accuracy and readability of the gauge used, and was informed that
the gauge was accurate to .05 psi with readability of .05 psi.
Failure to use adequate test instrumentation is en apparent
violation (298/8820-03). When informed of the gauge problem, the
licensee repeated the 3 psi airtest utilizing a digital pressure
monitor accurate to .0025 psi. The SRI witnessed this test on
July 1, 1988. The test was performed by a qualified engineer in
accordance with the procedure. All test equipment was verified to be
in calibration and test results were within the acceptance criteria
of the procedure and TS. The SRI further reviewed the licensee's
calculations and verified that the acceptance criteria of the
procedure met the requirements of the NRC approved exemption to
Appendix J of 10 CFR 50.
No other violations or deviations were identified in this area.
6.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
The SRI observed the performance of General Operating Procedure
(GOP) 2.1.14, "ASME Class 1-N System Leakage Test," Revision 20, dated
April 22,1988. This test was performed in conjunction with Maintenance
Procedure 7.0.8, "Pressure Testing," to verify reactor vessel and
connected system integrity and to verify integrity of various systems and
components upon which maintenance had been performed. The SRI observed
the start of GOP 2.1.14 on June 5,1988.
For the test, the reactor
recirculation pumps are required to be run to mair.tain reactor
When the reactor recirculation pump motor generator (MG)
temperature.
sets were started they immediately tripped. Maintenance Work
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Request 88-2787 was issued to troubleshoot and repair the MG sets.
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problem was determined to be reverse polarity applied to the loss-of-field
relays which caused the MG sets to trip.
The problem was 1dentified and
repaired by maintenance personnel.
The SRI observed the performance of GOP 2.1.14 on June 7,1988.
The SRI
perforned an inspection of containment at test pressure to verify findings
of the licensee during the test. All leakage identified was properly
documented and evaluated by the licensee, and repairs were made as
required.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
7.
Engineered Safety (ESF) Feature Walkdown (71710)
The SRI performed an independent walkdown of the Standby Gas Treatment
(SGT) System. The inspection was performed to verify operability, to
confirm that licensee system lineup procedures match plant drawings and
the as-built configuration, and to identify equipment conditions or items
that might degrade system performance. This system was chosen because it
is designed to mitigate contamination release in the event of a
loss-of-coolant accident.
The SRI utili ed System Operating Procedure (SOP) 2.2.73A, "Standby Gas
Trcatment System Valve Checklist," Revision 0, dated February 25, 1988, in
performing the system walkdown.
During the walkdown, minor discrepancies
concerning cables in the system were identified. The licensee was
notified of the cable discrepancies and initiated actions to correct them.
The SRI compared the valve checklist to an as-built drawing
Burns & Roe 2037 "SGT and Off Gas Filters." No discrepancies were noted,
to other violations or deviations were identified in this area.
8.
NRC Bulletin 88-05 (92701)
Piping Supplies,
This bulletin concerns nonconforming material supplied by(WJM).In
Ir;corporated (PSI) and West Jersey Manufacturing Company
accordance with the bulletin, the licensee determined that four flanges
supplied by WJM were installed in the plant.
Two of the flanges are in nonsafety-related systems and, thus, no
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bulletin-related action is required.
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One flange is located in the scram discharge volume.
The licensee is
making preparations to test the flange for hardness and chemical
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composition. The bulletin requires reporting of testing results
within 30 days of receipt of Supplement I to the bulletin, dated
June 15, 1988.
One flange is locatt.d in the reactor head spray. This flange is
inaccessible during power operations.
In accordance with the
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bulletin, the lir.nsee performed an analysis justifying (JCO) was
continued
operation. Thi! Justification for Continued Operation
given to the NRf on June 24, 1988.
The SR1 and Region IV personnel
reviewed the JC(., and no discrepancies were identified.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
9.
Radiological Protection Observajions
(71709).
The SRI verified that selected activities of the licensee's radiological
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protection program were implemented in conformance with facility policies,
procedures, and regulatory requirements.
Radiation work permits contained
appropriate information to ensure that work cculd be performed in a safe
and controlled manner. Radiation and/or contaminated areas were properly
posted and controlled. High radiation areas were properly established and
controlled during reactor startup'and power ascension. Radiation monitors
were utilized to check for contamination.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
10.
Security (71881)
The SRI observed security personnel perform their duties of vehicle,
personnel, and package search. Vehicles were properly authorized and
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controlled or escorted in the protected area IPA).
The licensee continued
implementation of the security equipment upg ade during this inspection
period. The SRI conducted site tours to ensure hat compensatory measures
were properly implemented as required because of equipment failure or the
security upgrade. The PA barrier had adequate illumination and the
isolation zones were free of transient material.
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No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
11. Exit Interview (30703)
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An exit interview was conducted on July 7,1988, with licensee
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representatives (identified in paragraph 1). During this interview, the
SRI reviewed the scope and findings of the inspection.
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