IR 05000298/1989017

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Insp Rept 50-298/89-17 on 890501-05.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Action on Previously Identified Insp Findings,Inservice Insp & Welding
ML20247C874
Person / Time
Site: Cooper Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 05/15/1989
From: Barnes I, Ellershaw L, Mcneill W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20247C855 List:
References
50-298-89-17, NUDOCS 8905250070
Download: ML20247C874 (7)


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APPENDIX B

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report:

50-298/89-17 Operating License:

DPR-46 Docket: 50-298 Licensee:

Nebraska Public Pover District (NPPD)

P.O. Box 499 Columbus, NE 68602-0499 Facility Name:

Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS)

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Inspection At:

CNS, Brownville, Nebraska Inspection Conducted: May 1-5, 1989 f}]/

07t-S S SV Inspectors:

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L/ E.(El't@lity Programs Section, Division of rshaw, Reactor Inspector, Materials Date and Qua Reactor Safety 5~ N

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Of E M.' McKeil', Reactor Inspector, Materials Date and Quality Programs Section, Division of Reactor Safety

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  1. VI f f #7 Approved:

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Date g. Bhrnesg Chief, Materials and Quality Programs Section, Division of Reactor Safety Inspection Summary l

Inspectior, Londucted May 1-5, 1989 (Report 50-298/89-17)

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Areas Inspected:

Routine, unannounced inspection of action on previously identified inspection findings, inservice inspection, and welding.

Results: The observation of inservice inspection (ISI) found the activities

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were effective in accomplishment of their objectives. Work was performed in accordance with the ISI.cogram, procedures, and other requirements.

One programmatic deficiency with the ISI program was identified.

It was identified j

8905250070 890517 PDR ADOCK 05000298 PDC Q

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by the NRC inspector that 9 supports and 15 welds were not included in the ISI program.

This was identified as an apparent violation (see paragraph 3). The observation of welding found the activities were not effectively controlled by the licensee.

It was identified by the NRC inspector that changes in nonessential variables had been made without documenting such changes. This was identified as an apparent violation (see paragraph 4).

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Persons Contacted

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NPPD

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J. M. Albredit, Material Control Specialist

  • L. A. Bray, Regelatory Compliance Specialist
  • J. R. Flaherty, r Dint Engineering Supervisor
  • S. S. Freiborg, Assistant Plant Engineering Supervisor
  • R. L. Gardner, Maintenance Manager
  • J. C. Hall, Mechanical Supervisor

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G. R. Hanson, Engineering Specialist

  • G. R. Horn, Division Manager, Nuclear Operations
  • E. M. Mace, Manager, Technical Support

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  • J. M. Meacham, Senior Manager, Technical Support
  • D, R. Robinson, Quality Assurance (QA) Supervisor R. A. Schutz, ISI/IST Engineer J. Smith,-Technical Welding Specialist
  • G. R. Smith, Nuclear Licensing & Safety Supervisor

G. E. Dubose, Level III J. E. Easton, tevel II H. A. Heath, Project Manager E. P. I'*zyck, Level I H. M. "oilard, Level I J. R..WL.deau, level II H. W. Schlort, Level II R. G. Spivey, Level II Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company J. R. Tetreaut, Authorized Nuclear Inservice Inspector (ANII)

  • Denotes those persons that attended the exit meeting on May 5,1989.

The NRC inspector also contacted other personnel including administrative and clerical personnel.

2.

Followup on Previously Identified Inspection Findings (92701)-

(Closed)OpenItem(298/8804-04): This item addressed concerns regarding the document control system being very dependent on:

(a) the users of drawings taking the time to go outside their work areas in order to access l

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-4-current information, and (b) the diligence of the engineering specialist in maintaining the files and records of changes.

At the time these concerns were expressed, drawings and any applicable design change notices (DCNs) were maintained in the training building which was located outside the protected area. The physical location lent itself to creating an inconvenience for users of drawings, thus precluding the assurance that users would take the time to acquire the latest information. Subsequent to expressing this concern, all drawings and DCNs were relocated and filed in the Technical Support Center of the new Administrative Building, which is located inside the protected area.

In addition, to assure that personnel using drawings at controlled drawing locations are aware of the existence of DCNs, a transmittal form and acknowledgement form is signed at the time of issuance..These actions should eliminate the cause for the concerns; therefore, this item is considered closed.

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3.

Inservice Inspection (ISI) - Observation of Work (73753)

The objectives of this inspection were to ascertain whether ISI and repair of components are performed in accordance with technical specifications (TS), the applicable American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code, correspondence between NRC and the licensee concerning relief requests, and requirements imposed by NRC/ industry initiatives.

In this regard, the NRC inspector reviewed TS, Amendment No. 128, dated February 21, 1989; the QA Program for Operations Policy Document, Revision 4, dated April 5, 1988; Inservice Inspection Program for ASME Classes 1, 2, and 3 Components, F.evision 3, dated March 3,1986, and its Addendum through February 1989; and the following GE ISI procedures:

MIMSN-W812, " Manual Procedure for Magnetic Particle Examination,"

Revision 1, dated October 30, 1986; MIUP-W812 " Manual UT Examination of Full Penetration Welds "

Revision 1, dated February 3,1988; UT-51, " Procedure for Automatic Ultrasonic Examination of Dissimilar Metal Welds," Revision 1, dated November 8, 1988; and IV4-W812. " Visual Examination VT-4," Revision 2, dated September 18, 1987.

ector witnessed the performance of the magnetic particle (MT),

The NRC.insp(UT), and visual examinations (VT-4) of the followin Weld RHE-CF-19 (MT and manual UT), Weld RRJ-BF-1 (automatic UT)g:

ultrasonic

,and Supports RHH-56, -57, and -60 (VT-4).

It was found that approved procedures were followed, and, in regard to UT, the appropriate calibration blocks were used. The personnel were found qualified, and the results were recorded as required. The equipment used

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(MT yokes, MT powders, UT search units UT scopes, and UT gels) was found i

to be certified, and the instruments calibrated as required.

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Code repairs or replacement activities available to be witnessed at the

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time of the inspection, and they are reported in paragraph 4.

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At the request of the NRC senior resident inspector (SRI), the ISI report, for the last outage, was reviewed. The SRI questioned the frequency of VT-4 rejections reported. The NRC inspector reviewed this report and found that the appra 'iate increases were taken in sampling as a result of rejections (i.e.,

..acent supports).

In this review, it was noted that certain of the ar'.cional supports, that were inspected as a result, were not identified '... the ISI program.

The nine supports, in question, were:

RFH-FC-112, -59A, -58-56, -54, -54A, -53; and RHF-FB-59 and -55.

The licensee infonned the NRC inspector that all of the supports, with the exception of RHF-FC-112, were found on one isometric drawing No. 2623-3,

"RF 1 Piping from HPCI Pump Disch. Class II N Piping-Reactor Bld."

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addition, it was noted that 15 welds (now identified as weld Nos. HPID-52

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through 66), on this isometric, were also not included in the ISI program.

It appeared that this isometric drawing was overlooked when the ISI program was established.

It was reported by the licensee that the short comings of the ISI program had been previously recognized but a nonconformance report had not been issued to document the condition. A Noaconformance Report 89-71 was issued during this inspection. The failure of the ISI procedure to identify all supports and welds is an apparent violation (298/8917-01) of the 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V and TS 3.6.G, ASME Code Section IX, IWA-1400, and 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4).

4.

Welding (55050,55100)

This area was inspected to determine, through direct observation, whether welding activities were being performed in accordance with the applicable WPS and the requirements of the ASME and AWS Codes.

The NRC inspector observed in-process welding being performed by three different welders.

Two of the welders were performing work associated with Maintenance Work Request (MWR) 89-1965, while the third welder was performing work associated with MWR 89-1968, a.

MWR 89-1965 This MWR was dated April 25, 1989, and was faitiated in order to replace 6-inch, schedule 80 piping and fittings on the suction side of the Reactor Water Cleanup Pump. The need for this replacement was predicated upon the detection of intergranular stress corrosion cracking through the use of UT examination. The MWR package included the ASME Section XI, " Repair / Replacement Plan," dated May 1, 1989.

This plan specifies the applicable codes and standards, and any special requirements associated with the MWR.

It showed the applicable design specification to be ANSI B31.7-1969, and that fabrication was to be in accordance with the 1983 summer adder 1 of the 1983 edition to Section III of the ASME Code.

Further, the

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package contained an ASME Section XI, " Work fraveler, No. 89-1965-1,"

dated May 1,1989, which provided the specific instructions in terms of the Maintenance Procedure and WPS to be used for welding.

For this MWR, WPS P8-A, a gas tungsten arc welding (GTAW) procedure for austenitic stainless steel, was specified. The WPS is intended to

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provide direction for the welder, and as such, all essential,

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supplementary essential (when required), and nonessential variables

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as specifically listed for each welding process, are to be included in the WPS. The ASht Code allows changes to be made in the nonessential variables to suit production requirements without requalification of the WPS, provided such changes are documented either in an amendment to the original WPS or a new WPS.

WPS P8-A provided, in addition to others, the following nonessential variables and their parameters:

Amperage:

Root Pass 60-95, All others70-115 Voltage:

10-14 Torch Gas - Cubic Feet / Hour (CFH):

15-20 Backing Gas - CFH:

10-15 l

l The NRC inspector observed welder No. 5909 depoe t the root pass on weld No. 6 (a 3-inch pipe to a 6-inch X 3-inch concentric reducer).

The flow rates for the torch gas and backing gas were observed to be

25 CFH and 30 CFH, respectively.

Since the power sources were not

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instrumented with volt meters and ammeters, the NRC inspector

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requested that a tong (clamp-on) ammeter (to read amperage'

nd volt meter be provided in order to verify that amperage and voltage were within the parameters specified on the WPS. The resultant readings, obtained for amperage and voltage, were 109-124 and 14.9-15.5, respectively.

Therefore, the amperage and voltage were in excess of the specified ranges in the WPS.

The NRC inspector asked the welder if he knew the ranges specified in the WPS, and his response was no.

With respect to gas flow, the requirements associated with this nonessential variable are invoked only if the gas flow rate is decreased more than 10 percent (torch gas) and 15 percent (backing gas) that what is specified in the WPS.

However, this nonessential variable is one that is observed and signed off as being acceptable on the Weld Checklist and Completion Record by a quality control representative, and, in fact, this had been done.

The NRC inspector observed welder No. 0428 deposit several passes on weld No. 5 (another 3-inch pipe to a 6-inch X 3-inch concentric

reducer). The flow rate, for the torch gas and backing gas, were

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J also observed to be 25 CFH and 30 CFH, respectively. Using the provided tong meter and volt meter, tne amperage and voltage were verified to be 61-83 and 12.7-13.3, respectively. The amperage reading, for most of the observed time, was below the minimum requirement of 70.

The welder, in response to the question regarding the amperage range specified in the WPS, responded by saying that he

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thought the range should be 60-120.

He was sure that the high gas i

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The failure to identify and document, either in an amendment to the WPS or a new WPS, that changes to nonessential variables had been made, is an apparent violation (298/8917-02).

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MWR 89-1968 This MWR was dated April 1989 and was initiated to fabricate a carbon steel component support, No. RCC-H182, in accordance with WPS Pl.

This WPS specified the shielded metal arc welding (SMAW) process in accordance with the 1985 Edition of the AWS D1.1, " Structural Steel Welding Code." The WPS showed the ranges for amperage and voltage to be 70-110 and 19-24, respectively. The NRC inspector observed welder No. 867/ make the weld deposits. The power source in use was similarly not instrumented; therefore, a tong meter and volt meter had to be requested. The use of these instruments, during the in-process welding, showed the welder to be in compliance with the

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parameters specified by the WPS.

However, the NRC inspector asked the welder if he knew the amperage and voltage ranges specified in the WPS. He responded by saying that he did not.

5.

Exit Meeting An exit meeting was held on May 5,1989, with those individuals denoted in paragraph 1 of this report. At this meeting, the scope of the inspection and the findings were summarized. The NRC resident inspector also attended.

The licensee did not identify, as proprietary, any of the information provided to, or reviewed by, the NRC inspector.

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