IR 05000298/1987004

Insp Rept 50-298/87-04 on 870126-29.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Implementation & Compliance to Safe Shutdown Requirements of 10CFR50,App R

ML20207S286
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	03/10/1987
From:	Hunter D, Jaudon J, Mullikin R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207S280	List: IR 05000298/1987004 ML20207S279 ML20266E464
References
50-298-87-04, 50-298-87-4, NUDOCS 8703190239
Download: ML20207S286 (6)

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APPENDIX U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-298/87-04 License: DPR-46 Docket: 50-298 Licensee: Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD)

P. O. Box 499 Columbus, NE 68601 Facility Name: Cooper Nuclear Station Inspection At: Cooper Nuclear Station, Nemaha County, Nebraska Inspection Conducted: January 26-29, 1987

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Inspector: . /o!P'7 * P.' Mullikin, Project Inspector, Project Date Section B, Reactor Projects Branch Participating in the Inspection: K. L. Parkinson, Brookhaven National Laboratory R. Hodor, Brookhaven National Laboratory-Approved: , A.(*/ . J& N n, Chief, PPoject Section A h* )

Date Reactor Projects Branch b1ud /o 87 D7 R. ~ Hunter, Chief, Project Section B Date Reactor Projects Branch Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted January 26-29, 1987 (Repo'.t 50-298/87-04)

Areas Inspected: Nonroutine, announced inspection for implementation of and compliance to the safe shutdown requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R.

Results

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie Two open items and one unresolved item were identified (paragraph 2).

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!. ... .- -2-DETAILS Persons Contacted Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD)

• G. R. Horn, Division Manager, Nuclear Operations

• L. Swantz, Senior Engineer

• H. T. Hitch, Plant Services Manager

• E. M. Mace Engineering Manager

• J. M. Meacham, Senior Manager, Technical Support

• C. R. Goings, Regulatory Compliance Specialist

• F. R. Alderinan, Station Fire Chief R. Brungardt, Operations Manager W. Fischer, Senior Electrical Engineer L. Bednar, Senior Staff Engineer T. Arlt, Engineering Technician D. Dea Control Room Supervisor Other Licensee Personnel R. Lemos, Project Manager, Engineering Planning and Management (EPM)

A. Morisi, Staff Engineer, EPM

• Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted on January 29, 198 The NRC inspectors also interviewed other licensee personne . Followup on Previously Identified NRC Items (Closed) Violation (298/8615-06): Failure to Establish a Continuous Fire Watch. This violation resulted from the failure,to establish a continuous tire watch while the locking mechanisms were removed from the access doors to the auxiliary relay room and reactor protection system Rooms 1A and IB in the control building at elevation 903 feet 6 inches. The licensee initiated a continuous fire watch after notification of the problem by the NRC inspector during the previous inspectio In addition, the licensee will submit a Technical Specificaticn (TS) change to allow for a fire watch patrol in certain cases. This item is close (0 pen) Violation (298/8615-07): Conflict Between Technical Specification and Procedure for Control of Fire Doors. Technical Specification states that a continuous fire watch is required for all inoperable fire door ~

Procedure 0.16. " Control of Fire Doors," gives various fire watch requirements for different categories of fire doors. The licensee has prepared a TS change that will allow them the flexibility of posting either a continuous fire watch or a patro In addition, this change will describe which fire doors come under TS surveillance requirements. This item remains open pending NRC approval of the TS chang _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ - . l

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-3-(Closed) Violation (298/8615-08): Fire Door With Greater Than Allowable Ocor to Floor Ga Fire Door No.109 was found to have a door to floor gap in excess of the 3/4 inch allowed by NFPA-80. The licensee installed a sill beneath the door to reduce the gap and revised applicable maintenance procedures to include a reference to NFPA-80 for the installation of fire doors. This item is close (Closed) Unresolved Item (298/8615-01): This item involved the need for licensee analysis of possible core uncovery using automatic depressurization system (ADS)/ low pressure systems for inventory contro For a fire in Fire Areas RB-A, CB-A, CB-C, RB-E, and RB-I there is no high pressure system available for reactor makeup, and a combination of ADS and low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) is used. Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) Procedure E0P RCL-11 is the controlling procedure for an event which results in an uncontrolled decrease of reactor water leve The procedure takes into account the possibility that high pressure injection systems may not be available. For that case, the procedure requires the operator to delay ADS initiation until the reactor water level reaches the top of the active fuel. The licensee's reasons for delay are: (a) the seriousness of the transient requires several actions simultaneously and the delay allows the operators to prioritize other steps which need to be done, and (b) the delay time before blowdown allows the reactor decay heat generation rate to decrease prior to initiating a transient which may uncover the core. An analysis perfonned by Engineering Planning and Management (EPM) dated October 30, 1986, was reviewed b The analysis concluded that it would take 5.4 (LPCI)y the NRC inspectors.and 5.1 (core spray) minutes to replenish enough in recover the core after the reactor water level reached the top of the active fuel due to inventory loss and blowdown initiation. During inventory replenishment, the maximum core uncovery indicated by the analysis is approximately 20 percent. Table 1-2 of E0P-1 indicates that the core can safely be uncovered for 6.25 minutes when blowdown is initiated 24 minutes after scram (reactor pressure vessel level at top of active fuel). The NRC inspectors found this analysis satisfactory. This unresolved item is considered close (Closed)UnresolvedItem(298/8615-02): This item involved the need for licensee completion and NRC review of the alternate shutdown procedure, associated hardware installations, and emergency lighting and connunication equipment required by procedur To perform alternative shutdown from outside the control room, Procedure 5.4.3.2, " Post Fire Shutdown From Outside the Control Room,"

i would be implemented. This procedure provides the direction necessary to place the plant in cold shutdown using the alternate shutdown (ADS) panel.

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It will be used, as required, following a fire in the control room, computer room, cable spreading room, cable expansion room, auxiliary relay room, or reactor building northeast corner (903 feet elevation).

The procedure review indicated that there is a sufficient level of detail; however, the team recommended that the long list of valve lineups performed by the reactor building operator be prioritized to ensure diesel

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cooling service water availability within the required time frame after l start. The licensee agreed to make the necessary changes in the J procedur A walkdown of the procedure was performed during the. inspection with members of the NRC inspection team accompanying the operators at their respective stations. During the walkdown, the operators exhibited the requisite familiarity with the procedure, shutdown' controls and instruments and necessary actions to bring the plant to hot shutdow Portable radios were used for consnunication and were found to work satisfactorily between the different stations. The team commented to the licensee, however, that for the operator in the alternate shutdown room, a table or shelf for the procedures, instead of the floor while using the hand held radio would be more efficient. The licensee agreed to provide a suitable space for the procedure The adequacy of emergency lighting was inspected during the alternate shutdown procedure walkdown. The number of and placement of the emergency lighting units appeared adequate to supply the needs of the operators while performing their functions. Also, the licensee has Surveillance Procedure 6.3.13.2 which will verify the proper alignment of the lamps on a regular basis. This unresolved item is considered close The prioritization of valve lineups in Procedure 5.4.3.2, and the installation of a shelf for procedures in the alternate shutdown room is an open item (298/8704-01).

~(Closed) Unresolved Item (298/8615-03): This item required the licensee to review what appeared to be a hot shutdown repair for the diesel fuel

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pump cable and the battery charger cables. The NRC inspectors reviewed

the licensee's data and found that this was not a hot shutdown repair j concern. This unresolved item is considered closed.

I (Closed)UnresolvedItem(298/8615-04): This item required licensee's

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completion and NRC's review of the associated circuit analysis, current

- transfonner analysis, multiple high independence faults analysis, high/ low pressure interface analysis, and outstanding modifications from the j breaker-fuse relay coordination study.

l The licensee completed their study of the above areas and the NRC inspector reviewed their results. This unresolved item is considered close However, during the licensee's breaker and fuse coordination study, l

incorrect substitution of fuses was found. To preclude improper fuse

. substitution, the licensee should implement fuse replacement controls.

i The licensee has initiated action to establish fuse replacement controls i

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with proposals to maintain fuse replacement information in the Equipment l

Data File (EDF) or to revise the 3000 series one-line prints to include the informatio Also, the licensee has an established program for breaker and relay

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testing. Circuit breakers are tested under Maintenance Procedure 7.3.2, l Revision 9. dated August 15, 1985, " Low Voltage Circuit Breakers Setting, l-

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-5-Testing, and Maintenance." Low voltage circuit breaker testing is scheduled for each refueling outage. Relays are tested and calibrated under Maintenance Procedure 7.3.1, Revision 9, dated November 14, 1985,

" Protective Relays Settings and Testing." Attachments B, C, D, and E to

Maintenance Procedure 7.3.1 specify relay testing at 1, 2, 3, and 5-year intervals. Relay maintenance records for three randomly selected relays were examined as follows:

FA Overcurrent Relay 51 Ph C - 1-year testing interval specifie Records for the past 3 years (three testing cycles) were requeste Records presented by licensee representatives were dated December 12, 1984, and October 24, D86. The licensee failed to present objective evidence that IFA Overcurrent Relay 51 Ph C was tested at 1-year intervals as specified by Cooper Nuclear Station Operations Manual Maintenance Procedure 7.3.1, Attachment Field Ground Relay DEV/64F - 2-year testing interval specifie Records for the past 6 years (three testing cycles) were requeste Licensee representatives presented one record dated January 21, 198 The licensee failed to present objective evidence that Field Ground Relay DEV/64F was tested at 2-year intervals as specified by Cooper Nuclear Station Operations Manual Maintenance Procedure 7.3.1, Attachment ICN Time Overcurrent Relay 51 Ph C - 3-year testing interval specified. Records for the past 9 years (three testing cycles) were requested. Licensee representatives presented records dated September 24, 1976, and March 19, 1980. The licensee failed to present objective evidence that ICN Time Overcurrent Relay 51 Ph C was tested at 3-year intervals as specified by Cooper Nuclear Station Operations Manual Maintenance Procedure 7.3.1, Attachment The implementation of fuse replacement controls by the licensee is considered an open item (298/8704-02). Objective evidence (records) that protective relays have been maintained in accordance with Maintenance Procedure 7.3.1 is considered an unreso.ved item (298/8704-03).

(Closed) Unresolved Item (298/8615-05): This item involved the addition of one smoke detector in the auxiliary relay room and the protection of a conduit bank in the cable expansion roo The NRC inspector verified the addition of the smoke detector in the auxiliary relay room. Also, the licensee produced documentation that the

circuits required for safe shutdown were located in the middle of the cable expansion room conduit bank. As located, the NRC inspector determined that the existing flame impingement shield provided adequate protection from a floor based fire. This unresolved item is considered close . Open Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the NRC inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. Open items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in paragraph 2.

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-6- Unresolved Item An unresolved item is one about which more information is required to determine whether the item is acceptable or is a violation. One unresolved item is identified in paragraph . Exit Interview An exit interview was conducted on January 29, 1987, with those personnel denoted in paragraph 1 of this report. The NRC senior resident _and resident inspectors also attended. At this meeting, the scope of the inspection and the findings were summarized.

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