IR 05000298/1999007

Insp Rept 50-298/99-07 on 990718-0828.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Implementation of Reactor Safety & Emergency Preparedness Programs

ML20212J523
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	09/27/1999
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20212J511	List: IR 05000298/1999007 ML20212J506
References
50-298-99-07, NUDOCS 9910050185
Download: ML20212J523 (9)

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ENCLOSURE I U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket No.: 50-298 l

License No.: DPR-46 i Report No.: 50-298/99-07 Licensee: Nebraska Public Power District Facility- Cooper Nuclear Station Location: P.O. Box 98 Brownville, Nebraska j Dates: July 18 through August 28,1999 j Inspectors: M. Miller, Senior Resident inspector M. Hay, Resident inspector G. Pick, Sr. Project Engineer, Project Branch E W. Sifre, Resident inspector, South Texas Project R. Azua, Project Engineer, Project Branch B Approved By: Charles S. Marschall, Chief, Project Branch C ATTACHMENT: Supplementalinformation i

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9910050185 990927 PDR ADOCK 05000298 0 PDR l

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! SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Cooper Nuclear Station NRC inspection Report 50-298/99-07 (DRP)

i- The report covers a 6-week period of baseline resident inspectio The body of the report is organized under the browd categories of Reactor Safety, Emergency Preparedness, and Other Activities as listed in the summaries belo No significant finding !

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Report Details The plant operated at 100 percent power, except for a routine downpower of about 3 percent to shift the control rod patter . REACTOR SAFETY 1R01 Adverse Weather Preoarations Inspection Scong The inspectors reviewed the I;censee's procedures for addressing adverse weather (specifically high wind conditions including tornados) to limit the risk of weather- related initiating events and to adequately protect mitigating systems from adverse weather-related effect . Observations and Findinas The inspectors did not identify any findings during this inspectio R03 Emeraent Work Insoection Scope On July 14 and August 19, inspectors observed emergent work to replace selected cells of the 125 Vdc and 250 Vdc batteries. Special Procedure SP 99-004, dated July 14, 1999, controlled the work. The 125 Vdc battery cell voltage had dropped to less than Technical Specification voltage requirement Observations and Findinas Although' the inspectors did not identify any findings, they observed several problems relating to the quality of work' associated with the cell replacemen After workers started cell replacements, inspectors observed that the additional battery cells in parallel did not have their cell terminals covered (protected) like the installed 125 Vdc battery cells in the work area. The cells rested on the floor, behind and within

12 inches of electricians performing degraded cell removal and replacement. After the inspect'or questioned the vulnerability of the terminals, workers covered the terminals with protective rubber mats in a manner similar to the installed 125 Vdc batter Although the Station Operations Review Committee received assurances that a prejob f walkdown would ensue all torque wrenches and other necessary tools were at the job site before work began, the torque wrench for seismic restraint reassembly was not i specified before start of the wor l

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The electricians moved ahead in the maintenance instruction, as allowed by adn#nistiative procedure, leaving the seismic restraint step incomplete. Workers consulted the engineer for each step taken out of order, except the step where

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l electricians intended to take intercell voltage readings before disconnection of the parallel cell jumpers. As electricians proceeded with the step to measure intercell voltage, the inspector recognized the reading may not indicate valid voltage, thus invalidating comparison with the acceptance criteria. The inspector asked the job supervisor if the engineer had been consulted. The engineer recognized the vulnerability when asked and did not allow the voltage reac .1g step to be conducted before the parallel circuit jumpers were removed. The inspectors concluded that, although procedures allowed performing steps out of order, maintenance personnel did not take sufficient action to ensure a valid test until questioned by the inspectors.

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1R04 Eauipment Alianments

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l Inspection Scoce The inspectors performed a complete walkdown of the reactor core isolation cooling system. The inspectors performed the complete walkdown, as described in the semiannual equipment alignment module, of the reactor core isolation cooling system, using plant procedures which indicated system lineups required for operability at powe The inspectors reviewed surveillance tests and work history to verify that the system had been maintained consistent with requirements intended to ensure it would perform its design function if called upon. The inspectors also performed a partial walkdown of the 125 V/250V ac System. The inspection included a review of the component alignments designated in System Operating Procedures 2.2.24,"250 VDC Electrical System," and 2.2.25,"125 VDC Electrical System." The inspectors verified correct component alignments during the inspection using the procedures checklist Observations and Findinas The inspectors did not identify any findings during this inspectio R05 Fire Protection Insoection Scope inspectors performed fire protection walkdown on the control room, cable spreading room, vital switchgear room, diesel generator rooms, and turbine lube oil storage roo Observations and Findinas i The inspectors did not identify any findings during this inspectio R06 Flood Protection l Lrlsoection Scope Inspectors reviewed Procedure 2.4.8.7," Turbine Building Basement Flooding,"

Revision 1, which responds to a turbine building flooding scenario. This procedure was developed in response to unexpected through-wailleakage on a 2.5 foot diameter t

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h -3-unisolable turbine equipment cooling discharge pipe in June 1998. After the licensee evaluated electrical circuits, the licensee concluded that, although a plant shutdown l would be required due to feed pump and other power generation equipment and electrica! faults, no mitigation equipment would be affected and therefore no significant risk would be expected due to turbine building flooding, Observations and Findinas The inspectors did not identify any findings during this inspectio R09 f r' service Testina Insoection Scoce The inspectors observed the following inservice tests:

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Procedure 6.2CS.101, " Core Spray Test Mode Surveillance Operation (DIV 2)

(IST)," Revision 11

Procedure 6.PC.201," Primary Containment isolation Power Operated Valve Operability and Closure Timing Test (IST)," Revision 9C3 Observations and Findinos Testing was adequate to verify compliance with code requirements. All components !

met the acceptance criteria. There were no findings identified during this inspectio j 1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation i Insoection Scope l The inspectors reviewed equipment conditions related to the diesel generators and Train B reactor equipment cooiin Specifically, the following Maintenance Rule functions were reviewed:

a. D3-PF01a Provide Train A emergency diesel power to plant equipment required for safe shutdown of the plant in emergencies b. DG-PF01b Provide Train B emergency diesel power to plant equipment required for safe shutdown of the plant in emergencies l c. EC-PF01b Provide cooling to the core standby cooling areas and the residual heat removal pump bearing and seal water coolers I

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-4- Obseivations and Findinas The inspectors did not identify any findings during this inspectio !

1R15 Ooerability Evaluations Inspection Scope The inspectors discussed the operability evaluation of Cell 87, which had exhibited a severe failure at the start of an as found bench test. In addition, the inspectors reviewed Operability Evaluation 4-02287, Revision 0, evaluation of the effects of thermally induced pressure locking on Valve HPCI-MO58 (high pressure coolant injection motor-operated isolation valve for suction from the suppression pool). l Observation and Findinas The inspectors did not identify any findings during this inspectio j 1R16 Ooerator Workarounds Inspection Scope  !

- The inspectors reviewed Operating Instruction 15, " Operator Work Arounds and Operations Priority items," Revision 6. The inspectors reviewed temporarily installed ,

- Auxiliary River Temperature Indicator Mi-TI-ART and associated Problem Identification l Report 4-03830 to determine if the licensee had appropriatel.y evaluated the conditions and determined if they should be tracked as operator workaround Observations and Findinas The inspectors did not identify any findings during this inspectio R19 Postmaintenance Testing 1 Inspecticq Scope l The inspectors observed and evaluated postmaintenance tests to determine whether the tests confirmeo' equipment operability:

• localleak rate test for Valve PC-247AV, outboard postaccident sampling system drywell atmosphere sampling isolation;  ;

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verification of individual cell voltage, specific gravity, electrolyte level, and intercell connection resistance for Train A 250 Vdc Battery Cells 47 and 48; and

• logic and electrical connector testing for Valve SW-MO-650, the reactor equipment cooling Heat Exchanger A outlet valve. '_ _

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l I Observstions and Findinas The inspectors did no't lhentify any findings during this inspectio R22 Surveillance Testina

. Insoection Scope l- The inspectors observed surveillance tests and reviewed test data to verify that the l licensee continued to maintain operability of high risk systems. The following l

l- surveil!ance tests were reviewed:

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• Procedure 6.2DG.101, " Diesel Generator 31 Day Operability Test (DIV 2) (IST),"

Revision 14, C5

• Lack of guidance to comply with limiting conditipn for operation " greater than 2 gpm increase in unidentified drywell leakage"

• Surveillance Procedure 6.HPCI.317, "HPCI Overspeed Hydraulic Reset Timing Calibration and Functional Test" Observations and Findinas The inspectors did not identify any findings during this inspection Emergency Preparedness 1EP1D Drill. Exercise. and Actual Events Irisoection Scope During the emergency drill on August 11,1999, inspectors observed selected drill activities and critiques in the control room simulator, emergency operating facility, and technical support center. Inspectors reviewed classification and protective action recommendations and critique finding b. . Observations and Findinas The inspectors did not identify any findings during this inspectio t i

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.= 4.- OTHER ACTIVITIES .

- 40A4. Qther - lInsoection' Scope j i

l The staff conducted an abbreviated review of Y2K activities and documentation using Temporary Instruction 2515/141, " Review of Year 2000 (Y2K) Readiness of Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants." Observations and Findinae The review addressed aspects of Y2K management planning, documentation, implementation planning, initial assessment, detailed assessment, remediation activities, Y2K testing and validation, notification activities, and contingency planning. The reviewers used NEl/NUSMG 97-07, " Nuclear Utility Year 2000 Readiness," and NEI/NUSMG 98-07, " Nuclear Utility Year 2000 Readiness Contingency Planning," as the primary references for this revie The results of this review were combined wi:n the results of other reviews in a summary report issued in August 199 )

40A5 Meetinos (Includina Exit Meetinal  !

l The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Swailes and other members of .j licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on August 26,1999. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The licensee did not consider .

proprietary any material examined during the inspectio ,

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ATTACHMENT PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee M. Boyce, System Engineering Manager J. Burton, Performance Analysis Department Manager

. P. Caudill, Technical Services Senior Manager T. Chard, Radiological Manager '

L. Dewhirst, Licensing Engineer K. Dorwick, Assistant to Operations Manager J. Edom, Assistant to Operations Manager C. Fidler, Assistant Maintenance Manager J. Flaherty, Assistant Design Engineering Manager M. Gillan, Outage Manager B. Houston, Quality Assurance Operations Manager

' E. Jackson, Operations Support Group Specialist L. Kohles, Maintenance Manager J. Mcdonald, Plant Manager, in trainin L. Newman, Licensing Manager M. Peckham, Plant Manager J. Peters, Licensing Secretary B. Rash, Senior Manager of Engineering A. Shiever, Operations Manager J. Sumpter, Nuclear Licensing and Safety Supervisor J. Swaites, Vice President, Nuclear Energy .

R. Wachowiak, Risk Management Supervisor R. Zipfel, Emergency Preparedness Manager LIST OF ACRONYMS AND INITIALISMS USED CFR Code of Federal Regulations LER licensee event report NCV noncited violation NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Y2K Year 2000 I

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