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| {{Adams | | {{Adams |
| | number = ML20248M313 | | | number = ML20236Y532 |
| | issue date = 06/09/1998 | | | issue date = 08/07/1998 |
| | title = Insp Rept 50-346/98-06 on 980422-0507.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Aspects of Licensee Code Repairs of MSIV & Nondestructive Exam of Control Rod Drive Housing & Main Steam Nozzle & Decay Heat Sys Welds | | | title = Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-346/98-06 Issued on 980609.Corrective Actions Will Be Examined During Future Inspections |
| | author name = | | | author name = Grobe J |
| | author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) | | | author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| | addressee name = | | | addressee name = Wood J |
| | addressee affiliation = | | | addressee affiliation = CENTERIOR ENERGY |
| | docket = 05000346 | | | docket = 05000346 |
| | license number = | | | license number = |
| | contact person = | | | contact person = |
| | document report number = 50-346-98-06, 50-346-98-6, NUDOCS 9806150283 | | | document report number = 50-346-98-06, 50-346-98-6, NUDOCS 9808120285 |
| | package number = ML20248M306 | | | title reference date = 07-24-1998 |
| | document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS | | | document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE |
| | page count = 15 | | | page count = 2 |
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| | August 7, 1998 i |
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| | Mr. John Vice President - Nuclear Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Centerior Service Company 5501 North State Route 2 Oak Harbor, OH 43449 SUBJECT: NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-346/98006(DRS)) |
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| | ==Dear Mr. Wood:== |
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| | This will acknowledge receipt of your letter dated July 24,1998, in response to our letter dated June 9,1998, transmitting a violation of NRC requirements for the Davis-Besse Nuclear i |
| | Power Station. The violation pertained to the untimely identification of an event which took place l during maintenance work on the steam generator. We have reviewed your corrective actions and l have no further questions at this time. These corrective actions will be examined during future |
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| | l Inspections. |
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| | Sincerely, t i |
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| l l U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j i i i | | Original /s/ J. A. Grobe John A. Grobe, Director Division of Reactor Safety Docket No.: 50-346 ' |
| l | | License No.: NPF-3 / |
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| | r See Attached Distribution l |
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| | . DOCUMENT NAME: G:DRS\DAV98006.TY To ,ecebwe e copy of this document, Indicate in the bos: *C* a Copy without ettechment/ enclosure *F" a Copy Wth attachment %nclosure "pr a No copy l OFFICE Rill j6 Rill a u,l jf Rlli j .lM Rlli _J l NAME Green-Bates:de@ Gavula W/) KozaBdll/ GrobeCN DATE 08/.r/98 ' |
| REGIONlli '
| | M 08/7/98\ I " 08/6/98 ' |
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| | u OFFICIkL RECORD COPY oh , |
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| ! l l Docket No: 50-346 License No: NPF-3 l 1 l
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| ! Report No: 50-346/98006(DRS) l I
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| | . cc: J. Stetz, Senior Vice President - Nuclear J. Lash, Plant Manager J. Freels, Manager, Regulatory Affairs M. O'Reilly, First Energy S?. ate Liaison Officer, State of Ohio |
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| Licensee: Toledo Edison Company !
| | R. Owen, Ohio Department of Health C. Glazer, State of Ohio Public Utilities Commission Distribution: |
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| | Project Mgr., NRR J. Caldwell, Rlli |
| Facility: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station l
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| ' Location: 5501 N. State Route 2 I
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| Oak Harbor, OH 43449 I
| | C. Pederson, Rlll |
| [ Dates: April 22 - May 7,1998 f
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| | B. Clayton, Rill SRI Davis-Besse DRP l TSS l DRS (2) |
| | l RlliPRR PUBLIC IE-01 Docket File GREENS LEO (E-Mail) |
| | DOCDESK (E-Mail) |
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| I l Inspector: K. GreenBates, Reactor inspector l
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| Approved by: J. A. Gavuta, Chief, Engineering Specialists Branch 1 l
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| | sh & Davisksne Nucinar Ponce State SbOf North Swa Route a m Oak Harbor. Ohio 43449 9760 |
| | .lchn Vce lhostdent - Nuclear rax 419 321-8337 |
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| | Docket Number 50-346 l |
| EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station NRC Inspection Report 50-346/98006 This routine inspection focused on the conduct of inservice inspection (ISI) activities at
| | License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 1-1168 July 24, 1998 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Subject: Response to Inspection Report Number 50-346/98006 (DRS) |
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| | Ladies and Gentlemen: |
| Davis-Besse. The inspection included aspects oflicensee Code repairs of the main steam isolation valve and nondestructive examination of control rod drive housing, main steam nozzle and decay heat system welds, as weil as the reactor vessel head, reactor coolant pump flywheels and steam generator. The following specific observations were made:
| | Toledo Edison has received Inspection Repon Number IR 50-346/98006 (Toledo Edison Log Number 1-3967) and the enclosed Notice of Violation issued on June 9,1998. The violation , |
| Maintenance
| | pertains to the untimely identification of an event which took place during maintenance work on a steam generator. Toledo Edison provides the attached response to the subject violation. The submission date of this reply was extended from July 9,1998 to July 24,1998, based on discussions with the Region 111 Projects Branch Chief for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) following the Alert on June 24,1998, at the DBNPS; and based on discussions with the DBNPS Senior Resident inspector and the Region 111 Engineering Specialists Branch 1 Chief on July 20,1998. |
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| The licensee adequately demonstrated the ability to properly implement ISI and flow assisted corrosion programs (FAC), including eddy current examinations of the steam generator tubes (Sections M1.1 and M1.2). | |
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| . | | Should you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. James L. Freels, Manager - Regulatory Affairs, at (419) 321-8466. |
| In general, licensee personnel and contracted personnel involved in FAC and ISI efforts appeared knowledgeable, well trained, and competent (Sections M1.1 and M1.2).
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| * Code repair work performed on the main steam isolation valve was well implemented with active technical vendor oversight (Section M1.3).
| | Ve truly yours, i |
| | GMW/dic |
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| | cc: A. B. Beach, Regional Administrator, NRC Region 111 A. G. Ilansen, DB-1 NRC/NRR Project Manager i S. J. Campbell, DB-1 Senior NRC Resident inspector Utility Radiological Safety Board I |
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| * One violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI was identified pertaining to the lack of corrective action for an event which took place during maintenance work on the steam generator. Although personnel became aware that unauthorized equipment was used, the lack of procedural adherence was not documented and the occurrence was not entered into the licensee's corrective action program for evaluation (Section M7.1).
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| Technically, the most current technology and dispositioning protocols were used to assess and disposition the steam ge'ierator tubes. Although not required until 1999, many of the good practices recommended by Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
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| Pressurized Water Reactor Steam Generator Examination Guidelines, Revision 5, were implemented. The examination data was found to be in accordance with the applicable ISI procedures and American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code requirements (Section M1.1).
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| Consistent with the components importance to safety, the licensee demonstrated an aggressive assessment of vendor code repair and ISI contractor supplied procedures to assure that applicable ASME and regulatory requirements were met (Section M3.1 and M3.2 ).
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| * The addition of a ' data patrolman' to the steam generator eddy current examination team, in order to provide an additional quality assurance layer, demonstrated a thorough and rigorous effort to obtain quality data in this area important to safety (Section M1.1). | |
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| REPORT.. DETAILS l- :
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| p ( The Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 second 10 year inspection interval commenced on September 21,1990. The plant was in their 11th Refueling Outage (RFO 11) and the third >
| | Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 1-1168 Attachment Page1 Renly to a Notice of Violation (50-346/98007-01) |
| period of the current inservice inspection (ISI) interval. During this interval, the ISI program is l~ committed to meet the requirements of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Vessel Code,1986 i Edition for Class 1,2, and 3 components and Section XI of the ASME Code 1992 (as modified j by 10 CFR 50.55a), for Class MC components.
| | Alleced Violation During an NRC inspection conducted from April 22 - May 7,1998, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with NUREG-1600, " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," the violation is listed below: |
| | 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, " Corrective Action" requires that measures be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, |
| | - deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are prompt,1y identified and corrected. |
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| l l 11. Maintenance i
| | Contrary to the aoove, a condition adverse to quality was not promptly identified a nd corrected, in that on April 15,1998, a Potential Condition Adverse to Quality Report (PCAQR) was not initiated after an unauthorized wire brush, used to clean steam generator B primny manway stud holes, failed resulting in the uncontrolled introduction of carbon steel wire bristies into the primary coolant system. Further, on April 18,1998, and April 19,1998, a PCAQR was not initiated when wire bristles were identified by video camera to be present on the steam generator tube sheet and bottom bowl. In addition, on April 25,1998, eddy current examinations identified a wire bristle wedged inside a steam generator tube. Although a PCAQR was initiated to address j |
| l M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 Steam Generator ISI
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| ' Insoection Scone (73753. 73755)
| | the effect of the metal on the fuel, control rod drive mechanisms, pump seals and other primary system components, until prompted by the inspector, no actions were initiated to address the noncompliance with the applicable maintenance procedure which authorized only stainless steel l or nylon brushes. |
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| Inspectors observed the licensee's contracted personnel from Framatome Technology Inc. acquiring eddy current (ET) examination data for the reactor coolant system l pressure boundary portion of the steam generators (SGs). The analysis of ET data was l conducted off-site; however inspectors reviewed the licensee's disposition of ET indications identified from this analyzed data, j' ~ Observations and Findinas l: ET Acquisition l.
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| l Eddy current examinations were conducted on all accessible tubes, along the full tube
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| ! length of the once through steam generators (OTSG). A bobbin coil was used to l perform the standard ASME Code examination for defect detection and sizing. A Plus Point probe and motorized rotating pancake coil (MRPC) were employed to supplement bobbin coil examination. The MRPC was also used to further characterize manufacturing burnish marks and unidentified indications found by the bobbin coil
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| | This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement 1). I Response to Alleced Violation 50-346/98006-01 Reason for Violation When the carbon steel brush failed during use on April 14,1998, it was not realized by the worker that the wrong type of brush had been used. A carbon steel brush has the same general I appearance as a stainless steel brush, and unless a side-by-side comparison is performed, the material of the brush is not obvious. At one point in time, carbon steel brushes were exclusively used to clean the carbon steel stud holes of the steam generators et Davis-Besse. A change was l made to the applicable procedure to only use stainless steel or nylon brushes because they are l more durable. It appears that all carbon steel brushes were not removed from the steam generator tool boxes after their use was discontinued. |
| l l The inspector observed that a " data patrolman" was added to the ET team. The purpose of this additional member was to randomly access the computers of the data l acquisition personnel to assure that the appropriate ET parameters were being used l and that procedural requirements were continually being met by the contract personnel.
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| l The self police of the ongoing data acquisition process provided an additional layer of assuring that quality data was obtained in this area important to safety. The inspector considered that this demonstrated an aggressive quality assurance mind set and a conservative focus on safet L
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| . ET Data Anmsis and Disposition of Indications I
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| During this outage, a total of 55 tubes were identified through ET examination as being tess than acceptable for cycle 12 plant operations. All indications found other than {
| | Docket Number 50-346 I License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 1-1168 Attachment Page 2 It is common knowledge of the Framatome Technology, Inc. (FTI) personnel involved in this work that carbon steel brushes may fail in the manner observed and should not be used. The steam generator B manway and diaphragm were still in place at the time of the brush failure, which prevented any wire bristles from entering the steam generator at that time. The worker believed the failed brush that was taken from the steam generator tool box was of the proper i material. Another brush, this one stainless steel, was retrieved from the same tool box, and work I |
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| | was continued after cleaning up the bristles from the failed brush. Since steam generator B was not open at the time of the brush failure, no concerns about foreign material entering the steam generator existed. No procedural violation was known to have existed at this time. Per the FTl l Quality Assurance (QA) Plan in place for the eleventh refueling outage, no documentation of the failed tool was required. , |
| those identified as wear or bumish n; arks were plugged or re-rolled. Technical Specification (T.S.) 3.4.5 required that tubes having indications exceeding 40% through wall be plugged. Because there was not an approved sizing technique available to accurately determine whether the 40% through wall limit was exceeded for the tube indications, the licensee conservatively assumed that the defec,ts were in excess of this limit and required repair prior to entering Mode 4. The steam generators were I considered inoperable and tracked in the inoperable tracking tog against T.S. 3.4. )
| | It is believed that the wire bristles were transponed into steam generator B via the filter hose that was positioned under the stud hole to collect the debris generated during cleaning. The same filter hose was used to draw any debris out of the stud hole. Once the manway and diaphragm were removed, a shield door was installed, and the same filter hose was connected to the shield j door to ventilate the steam generator. If any of the wire bristles remained in the filter hose after i the brush failed, they could have entered the steam generator once the hose was connected to the i shield door. Any loose wire bristles remaining on the work platform could also have been introduced into steam generator B during installation of the remotely-operated eddy current equipment. |
| and T.S. 3.4.5 pending repairs (plugged y reroll).
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| : Technically, the most current technology and dispositioning protocols were used to
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| ! assess and disposition the tubes. Although not required until 1999, many of the good practices recommended by EPRI PWR Steam Generator Examination Guidelines, Revision 5, were implemented. The examination data was found to be in accordance with the applicable ISI procedures and ASME Code requirement The total number of tubes in each OTSG is 15,457. The following tubes were plugged and sleeved as a result of this examination:
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| Steam Generator No. 2-A l
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| Tubes plugged this outage: 32 Total tubes plugged: 413 Tubes re-rolled this outage: 1 Steam Generator No.1-B Tubes plugged this outage: 18 Total tubes plugged: 84 Tubes re-rolled this outage: 3 Conclusions - SG ISl Technically, the most current technology and dispositioning protocols were used to assess and disposition the tubes. The licensee's approach to tube plugging was considered to be very conservative. The addition of a " data patrolman" to the steam generator ET team to provide an additional quality assurance layer, demonstrated a thorough and rigorous effort to obtain quality data in this area important to safety. The licensee adequately demonstrated the ability to properly implement ISI eddy cLrrent examinations of the steam generator tubes. Licensee personnel and contracted personnel involved in SG ISI efforts appeared knowledgeable, well trained and competent. No violations were identifie !
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| | When the wire bristles were identified by video camera to be present on the steam generator B tube sheet on April 18,1998, they were entered into the FTI Open Systems Log for Steam i Generator Activities as required by the FTI QA Plan to document the as found condition. This entry ensured the wire bristles would be removed prior to closcout of the steam generator in i accordance with the FTI Field Procedure for Steam Generator Closcout. No further actions were required at this time in accordance with the FTl QA Plan. Toledo Edison personnel were infonned of the presence of the wire bristles in steam generator B on April 21,1998. A plan was i developed to obtain a sample of these wire bristles from the steam generator to identify how long ) |
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| | the bristles had been in the reactor coolant system, while maintaining personnel dose as low as reasonable achievable. On April 23,1998, a sar.iple of the wire bristles was obtained and delivered to Radiation Protection personnel. On April 25,1998, after determination that the wire 1 l |
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| M1.2 ISI of the ASME Code Class 1 and 2 System Pressure Boundarv Insoection Scoce (73753. 73755)
| | bristles had not been in the steam generator during reactor operation, meaning they were introduced dur'mg the current refueling outage, Potential Condition Adverse to Quality Report (PCAQR) 1998-0781 was initiated by Toledo Edison personnel to ensure all bristles were i |
| Nondestructive examination (NDE) activities were completed by Toledo Edison and Framatome Technologies Inc. personnel during RFO 11. The inspectors observed and had discussions with NDE personnel during various ISI work-in-progress activities and the data obtained from the examinations was reviewed. The following is a sample of the work activities that were observed by the inspectors:
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| Framatome personnel performing Dye Penetrant examination (PT) of control rod drive housing weld No. B14.010.0716.1 for CRD Housing and Penetration No. B53-5 Framatome personnel performing Magnetic Particle c.xamination (MT) of the reactor coolant pump motor flywheel No.1-2- Welding Services Incorporated personnel performing a MT of the main steam isolation valve MS-100 prior to weld repai David Besse personnel performing a Visual Examination (VT) of the reactor vessel head bolt hole Framatome personnel performing an Ultrasonic Examination (UT) of a 10-inch elbow to pipe weld DH-33B-CCB-6-10-SWB in the decay heat syste Contract personnel performing a UT on a Feedwater system weld for flow assisted corrosion (FAC) indication Observations and Findinas The inspectors observed ISI activities and reviewed the resulting documentation from the NDE of control rod drive housing, main steam nozzle, and decay heat system welds, as well as the reactor vessel head and reactor coolant purnp motor flywheels. In general, the inspectors concluded that licensee personnel and contracted personnel involved in ISI efforts appeared knowledgeable, well trained, and competent. The examination data was found to be in accordance with the applicable ISI procedures and ASME Code requirement MT of the reactor coolant pump motor flywheel No.1-2 2, and a PT of the bore and i
| | removed from the steam generator. The m erial of the wire bristles was not known at this time. 1 Later that same day, eddy current examinations identified a tube in steam generator B was i obstructed, and FTl personnel initiated Nonconformance Report (NCR) 98-200 as required by the FTI QA Plan. The tube obstruction was pushed into the lower bowl of the steam generator, I where it was discovered that this obstruction was a wire bristle similar to those discovered on the |
| keyway area performed to supplement the MT determined that there were no changes 1 to the area of the bore that was previously scored in 1996 during flywheel removal. No recordable indications were found during the observed ISI activitie Conclusions - Pressure Boundarv ISI The licensee adequately demonstrated the ability to properly implement ISI and FAC programs. In general licensee personne; and contracted personnel involved in ISI and
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| FAC efforts appeared knowledgeable, well trained and competent The examination data was found to be in accordance with the applicable ISI procedures and ASME Code requirements. No violations or deviations were identifie M1.3 Code Reoair of 36-inch Rockwell Main Steam isolation Valve (MSIV) Insoection Scooe (73753)
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| Inspectors conversed with licensee MSIV project engineers and observed the licensee's contracted personnel from Edward Valves Inc. and Welding Services Inc. (WSI)
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| performing various activities for an ASME Code weld repair on MSIV MS-10 Observations and Findinos i MSIV MS-100 was found to have disk ring wear in the valve bore. After examination, the valve vendor believed that the gouges may have been caused by opening up tolerances in RFO 9 when the area of concem was " smoothed" to v.sure proper strok The increased tolerance would have allowed the disc to vibrat A planned repair was performed by welding on the upper bore of the valve and the top portion of the disc guide rib. These surfaces were then machined to the original equipment manufacturers specification. The Code repair was performed by WSI personnel to the ASME Section XI,1986 Edition requirement The inspectors observed portions of the welding of the MSIV valve body and viewed the MS-100 stud drilling and tapping work-in-progress. Code repair work periormed on the valve was well organized with active technical vendor oversight in all aspects by the license Conclusions MSIV Code Reoair Code repair work performed on the MSIV was well implemented with active technical vendor oversigh M3 Maintenance Procedures and Documentation M3.1 ISI Procedures Insoection Scoce (73753. 73052)
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| The inspector reviewed ISI procedures for the ISI activities observed in Section M Observations and Findings All applicable ISI procedures were approved by the Authorized Nuclear inspector. The ISI procedures were found to be acceptable and in accordance with ASME Section V, 1986 Edition requirements. The licensee documentation reviewed by the inspector
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| | upper steam generator tube sheet. Another wire bristle was also found in the lower bowl of the B steam generator and removed. The material of the wire bristle was then evaluated to determine the effects of any potentially undiscovered bristles on the Reactor Coolant System. When it was determined that the wire bristle was made of carbon steel, the origination of the wire bristles was traced to the wire brush that had failed during cleaning of the steam generator stud holes. At this time it was not recognized that the use of a carbon steel brush constituted a procedural violation. |
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| | The fact that a procedural violation had occurred in the use of a carbon steel brush on April 14, 1998, was not realized until FTI personnel were interviewed by Toledo Edison personnel and the j NRC inspector on May 6,1998. |
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| being performed to assure that applicable ASME and regulatory requirements were me Conclusions - ISI Procedures The licensee demonstrated an aggressive assessment of the contractor supplied procedures to assure that applicable ASME and regulatory requirements were me M3.2 Code Reoair of Main Steam Isolation Valve Procedures Insoection Scoce (73753)
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| The inspector reviewed pre-weld and post weld non-destructive examination (NDE)
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| procedures and records, as well as the welding procedures and supporting procedure qualification records (PQR) used for the ASME Code repair of for the 36-inch Rockwell main steam isolation valve (MSIV) MS-10 Observations and Findings l
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| The inspector observed that the licensee had an established quality assurance program in place to examine contractor procedures, and that the vendor weld procedures for the MSIV repair had been through a licensee review circuit prior to welding. The inspector reviewed the programs evaluation of the vendor weld procedures used for the MSIV Code repair and concluded that an aggressive assessment had creen conducted to assure that all ASME Code requirements were met. The personnel performing the review revealed a high level of expertise in the areas of welding and ASME codes consistent with the components importance to safety. The valve vendor procedure review demonstrated a rigorous control of contractor services to assure quality on the part of the license The MSIV Code repair was performed to ASME Section XI,1986 No Addenda Edition requirements. Inspector review of the vendor MT procedures, POR's and weld procedures used for the repair identified no significant discrepancie Conclusions - Code Reoair Procedures Consistent with the component's importance to safety, the licensee demonstrated an aggressive assessment of the vendor code repair supplied procedures to assure that applicable ASME and regulatory requirements were me MS Maintenance Staff Training and Qualification M5.1 Personnel Qualifications Insoection Scoce (73753)
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| The inspector reviewed ISI personnel qualifications of licensee and contract personnel performing the ISI activities observed in Section M1. Additionally, the inspector reviewed welder qualification records for the ASME Code weld repair of MSIV, MS-10 _ _ . . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _
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| The 12 NDE personnel qualifications records reviewed by the inspector met ASME Code, SNT-TC-1 A recommendations and NRC requirements. Recent industry ;
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| experience for training and testing NDE personnel demonstrated a focus on safety. In I two cases, the inspector observed that a level lli qualified person was performing level ll NDE field examination which also demonstrated a high level of expertise and good safety focu Conclusions - Personnel Qualifications !
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| No violations were identified. The use of recent industry experience for training and testing NDE personnel demonstrated good safety focu M7 Quality Assurance in Maintenance Activities M7.1 Steam Generator Maintenance l Insoection Scoce (73753)
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| Inspectors interviewed licensee and contract maintenance staff, and reviewed corrective actions documented in condition reports for ISI related findings of ASME Code component Observations and Findings After review of steam generator studs and studhole maintenance documentation and discussions with contract and licensee personnel, the inspector concluded that a procedure to perform maintenance and ISI activities on the steam generator had not been not followed. Although both the contract personnel and licensee became aware that unauthorized equipment was used when portions of a maintenance tool were discovered within the steam generator, the lack of procedural adherence was not documented and the occurrence was not entered into the licensee's corrective action program for evaluatio For ISI preparatory cleaning and ISI activities maintenance work performed on the steam generator, Framatome Procedure No. SLG Proc-34, Document 1222097A," Field Procedure for OTSG Primary Manway and Handhole Removal, Installation, and Maintenance", Revision 6, dated February 5,1998 was used. The procedure required that primary handhole and primary manway studhole cleaning activities be performed using a stainless steel (SS) brush or a nylon bristle brush. The requirement is stated in numerous steps and notes in the procedure, as well as task equipment list On April 15,1998, Framatome contract personnel used a carbon steel (CS) brush instead of a nylon or SS brush, as specified by the procedure and equipment list, to perform maintenance on steam generator B primary manway studholes. Besides having different color bristles than the SS brush, the use of a CS brush was immediately noted
| | When the wire bristles were identified by video camera to be present on steam generator B tube I sheet on April 18,1998, they were entered into the FTI Open Systems Log for Steam Generator f |
| | | ! Activities. After determining the wire bristles had been introduced during the current refueling l |
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| by contract workers and their management when 75% of the brush promptly unwound and freed hundreds of individual bristles. This is a common failing of carbon steel brushes and one of the reasons it is barred from use for maintenance work where its introduction into the primary system boundary may be possible. The contractor did not report the lack of procedural adherence or the resultant equipment failur By failing to generate a Potential Condition Adverse to Quality Report (PCAQR) to place
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| , this event within the licensee's corrective action program, an opportunity was missed to l prevent an uncontrolled release of foreign materialinto the primary system. An evaluation as to whether the use of CS in lieu of SS would have any effect on the SG, an evaluation of a possible pathway for the introduction of CS materialinto the primary system, and an evaluation of how incorrect tools had become provisioned and available for this maintenance work would be expected for such an event on a significant safety componen As a result of not following the procedure and not promptly identifying potential conditions adverse to quality, an unknown amount of CS wire segments, each approximately 2.5 inches in length, entered into the primary system. On April 18,1998, contract personnel using a video camera to watch ET equipment, identified wire filaments (bristles) on the steam generator tubs sheet and documented the foreign material on a materials log sheet but a PCAQR was not generated. On April 19,1998, video camera contract personnel found an additional CS bristle in the lower head of the steam generator and again documented the foreign material on a materials log sheet but a PCAOR was not generate On April 25,1998, a CS bristle was found by ET to be wedged into one of the steam generator tubes. The ET evolution and analysis process brought the CS brush event to the licensee's attention. A PCAOR was generated which stated that CS wire segments were present in the SG and since the number was unknown, the concerns for the CS wire entering into the fuel, control rod drive mechanisms, pump seals and other primary systems was addressed. The PCAQR to address the front end of the problem: lack of procedure adherence, effect on the SG of using CS for a SS application and future prevention for this foreign material path into the SG was not generated by the license The SG equipment gangboxes were also immediately inspected for other procedurally proscribed CS brushes. Another two inch CS brush (used for SG manways), and three one inch CS brushes (used for SG handholes) were found. A total of two SS and two OS brushes were originally in the manway gangbox equipment supplied by the license for this maintenance work. A PCAQR was not generated to determine how the incorrect tools had become provisioned and available for maintenance work on the safety related componen On May 6,1998, the licensee issued a PCAO'1 to address the inspector findings. The lack Crompt identification of a deviation potentially adverse to safety, in order to init W, associated evaluation and corrective actions is considered a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI (50-346/98006-01(DRS)).
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| In addition to suppling the incorrect brush material to the contractor for the above mentioned maintenance work, the inspector noted that there appeared to be a general relaxed attitude to the control of brushes during maintenance which did not meet the aggressive quality assurance standards of the rest of the program. The brushes were not nu'mbered, there appeared to be no brush cleaning requirement or mandated disposal after use on a CS application in the procedures reviewed by the inspector, j After a SS steel brush was used on a CS maintenance application, (therefore becoming l contaminated with CS), the inspector inquired as to how the licensee controlled the brush being used for maintenance at a later date for a SS application. This would be considered a poor practice as its reuse would transfer the CS to the SS application therefore increasing the potential for corrosion of a safety componen Conclusions
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| in general, the ISI program appeared to be well implemented, with a strong maintenance quality assurance mind set. However, the control of carbon steel brushes l and carbon steel contamination was considered a weakness. The untimely identification of a problem with a steam generator maintenance activity was a violation of 10 CFR 50, i Appendix B, Criterion XVI.
| | outage, PCAQR 1998-0781 was initiated on April 25,1998. Upon discovery of a wire bristle inside a steam generator B tube and determination that the wire bristle was from a carbon steel wire brush, all steam generator tool boxes were inspected. The four carbon steel brushes discovered in the manway tool box were discarded based on the common knowledge that carbon i |
| | | steel brushes should not be used due to their likelihood of failure. All steam generator activities involving the use of wire brushes had been completed by this time, so no fmther actions were |
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| lil. Engineering E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment i
| | necessary to ensure carbon steel brushes were not used. |
| E2.1 Correctivo Actions for ASME Code Comoonents l l l
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| ' Insoection Scooe (92720)
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| l Inspectors interviewed licensee engineering staff and reviewed engineering documents I related to a steam generator tube in-Situ Pressure Test and SG tube re-rolls, i Observations and Findinas b.1 SG Condition Monitorina:
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| Based on engineering judgement, the licensee determined that the worst case defect identified in the SG's during RFO 11 was a single axial crack in the freespan section of tube 143-61 in SG 2-A. The defect was forming in a dent in this tube and was estimated to be up to 77% through wall. On April 26,1998 a full length in-Situ pressure test was performed on this SG tube as a worst case scenario. The test was to aid in the verification that the reactor pressure boundary tubing was capable of withstanding accident conditions at the end of the operating cycle. The test was performed in accordance with the safety factors detailed in NRC Draft Regulatory Guide 1.121, Revision 1. The tube was tested up to three times normal operating differential pressure and the tube did not fail. The inspector noted that this test helped to demonstrate that the plant was not operating with a SG defect which could have failed under accident conditions at the end of cycle 11,
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| | I A thorough video inspection of steam generator B was performed to locate all potential wire bristles in addition to the 100 percent eddy current examination cf the steam generator. All identified wire bristles were removed from the upper bowl of steam generator B. The one wire bristle discovered in the tubes of steam generator 11 was removed, and the lower bowl was l thoroughly vacuumed to remove all wire bristles. These actions were completed on l May 2,1998. |
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| | On May 6,1998, after learning that a procedural violation had occurred in the use of a carbon steel wire brush, NCR 98-218 was initiated by FTl personnel. This NCR was also tracked along with NCR 98-0200 under PCAQR 98-0781, which was revised to address the procedural noncompliance. |
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| The inspector determined that the repair rolls in the upper tubesheet for tube 90-2 (SG A), and tubes 11-57,93-27 and 106-4 (SG B) were accomplished in accordance with T.S. 4.4.5. Conclusions - SG Condition Monitoring From the SG In-Situ Pressure Test and SG tube re-roll documents reviewed, the licensee demonstrated a conservative engineering approach with a focus on safety. All applicable ASME Code and regulatory requirements appear to have been met. No violations were identifie IV. Management Meetings X1 Exit Meeting Summary
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| The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the l | | Corrective Ste as Taken to Avoid Further Violations The FTI procedure used for steam generator manway removal and installation will be clarified to specifically delineate that only stainless steel or nylon brushes shall be used for stud hole maintenance. Additionally, the procedure will be revised to reflect that if a brush to be used for this task is not marked, or there is no reasonable assurance a brush is of the proper material, the brush will be discarded. This procedure will be revised prior to the next refueling outage, which i |
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| conclusion of the inspection on May 7,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented and did not identify any of the potentia' report input as proprietar I i
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| i PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED i
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| Davis-Besse l
| | . Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 1-1168 Attaciunent l Page 4 is currently scheduled for April,2000. Training on the revised procedure and proper brush material will be performed during the next refueling outage for the workers specifically involved in steam generator work. This training will reinforce that the use of the proper brush material is a procedural requirement. |
| P. Boissoneault, MSIV Engineer
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| ! C. Daft, ISI Senior Engineer
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| R. Donnellon, Director Engineering & Services l
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| D. ^2erren, SG System Senior Engineer, Engineering & Services J. Lash, Plant Manager D. Lockwood, Supervisor Regulatory Affairs A. McAllister, Supervisor Test and Performance l D. Munson, Plant Engineering l
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| M. Sheppard, ISI Senior Plant Engineer A. Wilson, Vice President i G. Wolf, Regulatory Affairs Framatome Technoloales Inc R. Herman, Level lli NDE D. Langenfeld, Supervisor, Level ill NDE B. Stallings, Outage Manager ,
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| L. Padtruska, SG Supervisor Edward Valves In P. Brown S. Adams NBC S. Campbell, SRI
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| ' K. Zellers, RI l
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| INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED l i
| | Based upon the described sequence of events, Toledo Edison believes that reasonable corrective actions were taken in accordance with governing procedures, based upon the circumstances and information available. Therefore, no corrective steps are necessary in relation to the corrective action process at the DBNPS. |
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| IP 49001: Inspection of Erosion / Corrosion Monitoring Programs i IP 73051: Inservice Inspection - Review of Program IP 73052: Inservice Inspection - Review of Procedures
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| [ IP 73753: Inservice Inspection lP 73755: Inservice Inspection - Data Review and Evaluation ;
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| | Date When Full Compliance will be Achieved |
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| | Full compliance was achieved on May 6,1998, when NCR 98-218 was initiated by FTI personnel to document the procedural noncompliance of using a wire brush of the wrong material to clean the steam generator stud holes. This NCR and NCR 98-200, which was initiated on April 25,1998, to document the concern of the wire bristles inside the steam generator, are being tracked by PCAQR 1998-0781, which was also initiated on April 25,1998. |
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| ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED ITEMS OPENED 50-346/98006-01(DRS) VIO Lack ofidentification and evaluation of a deviation /nonconformance i
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| ITEMS CLOSED None ITEMS DISCUSSED l
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| None LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers ;
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| PWR Pressurized Water Reactor Plant j DRS Division of Reactor Safety EPRI Electric Power Research institute ET Eddy Current Examination ;
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| FAC Flow Assisted Corrosion l
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| FME Foreign Material Exclusion GL Generic Letter ID Inside Diameter IP Inspection Procedure IR inspection Report ISI Inservice inspection !
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| MRPC Motorized Rotating Pancake Coil MSIV Main Steam Isolation Valve MT Magnetic Particle Examination NDE Non-destructive Examination NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OTSG Once Through Steam Generator PCS Primary Coolant System PCAQR Potential Condition Adverse to Quality Report PDR NRC Public Document Room PT Dye Penetrant Examination RT Radiographic Testing SG Steam Generator UT Ultrasonic Examination VT Visual Examination WSI Welding Services In _ __ _-_-_____________ ______ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
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| i PART;AL LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Toledo Edison Administrative Procedure No. DB-PF-00104, " Inservice Inspection Program -
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| Engineering Test," Revision 00, dated July 30,199 Davis-Besse Procedure Development Form 97-0069," Revision to Toledo Edison Administrative Procedure No. DB-PF-00104, inservice Inspection Program Revision 00, dated July 30,1991,"
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| dated June 9,199 Centerior Service Company ISI Summary Report "In Service inspection Report of the Tenth Refueling Outage for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station," dated August 199 Welding Services Inc. Welding Procedure Specification No.1.1.1-DB "GTA'N/ Manual,"
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| Revision 1, dated April 24,1998, used for the MSIV Code Repai Welding Services Inc. Welding Procedure Specification No.1.1.6-DB "GTAW/ Machine,"
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| Revision 2, dated April 24,1998, used for the MSIV Code Repai Welding Services Inc. Welding Procedure Specification No. HfTmi-d-2 " Revision 2, dated March 3,1998, used for MSIV Code Repa' Welding Services Inc. Procedure No. QAP 9.7 " Magnetic Particle inspection Procedure,"
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| Revision 2, dated February 28,1997, used for MSIV Code Repai Welding Services Inc. Procedure Qualification Record No. 00067, dated September 17,1994, used to support MSIV weld procedure Nos.1.1.1-DB and 1.1.6-D Welding Services Inc. Procedure Qualification Record HfTM1(21MH), dated March 3,1998, used to support MSIV weld procedure No. HfTm1-d- Davis-Sesse Contractor Procedure Review Form No. VPROC 98-0019-01, " Contractor Procedure Number 1.1.1-DB," dated April 24,199 Framatome Technologies Inc. Safety Related inservice Procedure No. 54-ISI-120-36,
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| " Ultrasonic Examination of Piping Welds and Vessels Up To Two inches Thickness,"
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| Revision 36, dated December 1,199 Framatome Technologies Inc. Safety Related inservice Procedure No. 54-ISI-270-36, " Wet or Dry Methods of Magnetic Particle Examination of Welds Base Materials, Studs Bolts, and Pump Motor Flywheels and Coated Surfaces of Components and Piping," Revision 36, dated November 24,199 l
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| Davis Besse Potential Condition Adverse to Quality Report PCAQR No. 1998-0772, " Steam Generator Tube Degradation," dated April 26,1998 Davis-Sesse Potential Condition Aaverse to Quality Report PCAQR No. 1998-0781, " Wire Filame nts in OTSG Upper Bowls," dated April 28,199 Davis-Sesse Potential Condition Adverse to Quality Report PCAQR No. 1998-0667, "MSIV Wear,' dated April 19,199 Framatome Technologies Inc. NonConformance Report No. 98-200, " Upper Primary Manway Stud f loles in SG B were Cleaned Using a Rotary CS Brush Rather than a Rotary Nylon Bristla/SS Brush as Required by Procedure," dated May 6,199 Framatome Technologies Inc. NonConformance Report No. 98-218, " Reactor Operation with Loose, Foreign Matter in RCS at DB-1," dated May 2,199 Toledo Edison Administrative Procedure No. EN-DP-01301," Engineering Department Procedure Corrosion-Erosion Monitoring and Analysis Program (CEMAP)," dated February 11, 199
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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML20217P2061999-10-26026 October 1999 Forwards for First Energy Nuclear Operating Co Insp Rept 50-346/99-17 on 990928-1001.Insp Was Exam of Activities Conducted Under License Re Implementation of Physical Security Program.No Violations Identified ML20217N3851999-10-20020 October 1999 Forwards RAI Re Licensee 990521 Request for License Amend to Allow Irradiated Fuel to Be Stored in Cask Pit at Davis-Besse,Unit 1.Response Requested within 60 Days from Receipt of Ltr ML20217N2321999-10-15015 October 1999 Requests NRC Approval to Use Alternative to Requirements of 10CFR50.55a(f)(4)(ii).Licensee Requests Extension to Specified Schedule for Implementing Updates to IST Program ML20217G9201999-10-14014 October 1999 Discusses Utils Request for Approval of Quality Assurance Program Changes PY-CEI-NRR-2438, Informs That DBNPS & Pnpp Staffs Have Modified or Withdrawn Several of Positions Proposed within Re Request for Approval of Qap.Revised Positions Encl1999-10-14014 October 1999 Informs That DBNPS & Pnpp Staffs Have Modified or Withdrawn Several of Positions Proposed within Re Request for Approval of Qap.Revised Positions Encl ML20217F8371999-10-0808 October 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/99-10 on 990802-0913.One Violation Occurred Being Treated as NCV ML20217A5641999-09-30030 September 1999 Informs of Completion of mid-cycle PPR of Davis-Besse on 990901.Informs That NRC Plans to Conduct Addl Insps to Address Questions Raised by Issues Re Operator Errors & Failure to Commit to JOG Topical Rept on MOV Verification ML20212L0691999-09-30030 September 1999 Forwards,For Review & Comment,Copy of Preliminary ASP Analysis of Operational Condition Discovered at Unit 1 on 981014,as Reported in LER 346/98-011 ML20216J6701999-09-24024 September 1999 Forwards Post Examination Documentation for Written Operator Initial License Examination Administered at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station on 990920.Without Encls ML20212D3501999-09-21021 September 1999 Forward Copy of Final Accident Sequence Precursor Analysis of Operational Event at Plant,Unit 1 on 980624,reported in LER 346/98-006 05000346/LER-1998-001, Forwards Rev 1 for LER 1998-001,which Updates Corrective Actions & Revises Completion Date Re Implementation of Changes to Plant Emergency Operating Procedure.List of Commitments Attached1999-09-0909 September 1999 Forwards Rev 1 for LER 1998-001,which Updates Corrective Actions & Revises Completion Date Re Implementation of Changes to Plant Emergency Operating Procedure.List of Commitments Attached ML20216E5961999-09-0707 September 1999 Forwards Application for Amend to License NPF-3,revising Tech Specs 3/4.3.2.1,safety Features Actuation Sys Instrumentation & Associated Bases 3/4.3.1 & 3/4.3.2,reactor Protection Sys & Safety Sys Instrumentation ML20211P3001999-09-0707 September 1999 Forwards FEMA Transmitting FEMA Evaluation Rept for 990504 Emergency Preparedness Exercise at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant.No Deficiencies Identified.One Area Requiring C/A & Two Planning Issues Identified ML20211K6681999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards Copies of Certified Personal Qualification Statement - Licensee (NRC Form 398) for Operator Candidates Listed Below.Without Encls ML20211K6611999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards Copies of Operator License Renewal Applications for Individuals Listed.Operators Have Successfully Completed Appropriate Operator Requalification Training Program at Dbnps.Without Encls ML20211K0951999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Fire & Seismic Analyses of IPEEE for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1. Response Requested within 60 Days ML20211H0201999-08-25025 August 1999 Forwards semi-annual FFD Rept for 990101-0630 for DBNPS, Unit 1,IAW 10CFR26.71(d) ML20211D1171999-08-20020 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/99-09 on 990623-0802.Violations Identified & Being Treated as Noncited Violations ML20211G3911999-08-20020 August 1999 Forwards Update to Estimated Info for Licensing Action Requests Through 010930,re Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Reactor Licensing Action Estimates PY-CEI-NRR-2411, Informs That Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Co Has Developed Corporate QA Program Manual for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station & Perry Nuclear Power Plant,As Discussed on 990318 Between Util & Nrc.Revised USAR Pages,Encl1999-08-19019 August 1999 Informs That Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Co Has Developed Corporate QA Program Manual for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station & Perry Nuclear Power Plant,As Discussed on 990318 Between Util & Nrc.Revised USAR Pages,Encl ML20211J9201999-08-13013 August 1999 Urges NRC to Find Funds for Stockpiling Radiation Pills for Residents Living Near Plant ML20211B0161999-08-13013 August 1999 Forwards SE Accepting Evaluation of Second 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Program Request for Relief Numbers RR-A16, RR-A17 & RR-B9 for Plant,Unit 1 ML20210T1061999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Preliminary NRC Forms 398 & 396 for Listed Candidates,Per Operator License Exam Scheduled for Week of 990913.Encl Withheld ML20210S6071999-08-11011 August 1999 Provides Final Response to NRC RAI Re GL 98-01, Y2K Readiness of Computer Systems at Npps ML20210P8051999-08-0909 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/99-15 on 990712-16.No Violations Noted.However,Several Deficiencies Were Identified with Implementation of Remp,Which Collectively Indicated Need for Improved Oversight of Program IR 05000346/19980211999-08-0606 August 1999 Refers to NRC Insp Rept 50-346/98-21 Conducted on 980901- 990513 & Forwards Nov.Two Violations Identified Involving Failure to Maintain Design of Valve & Inadequate C/A for Degraded Condition Cited in Encl NOV 05000346/LER-1998-009, Forwards LER 98-009-01,IAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B). Commitments Made by Util Are Encl1999-08-0606 August 1999 Forwards LER 98-009-01,IAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B). Commitments Made by Util Are Encl ML20210H6101999-07-30030 July 1999 Informs That Region III Received Rev 21 to Various Portions of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Emergency Plan.Revision Was Submitted Under Provisions of 10CFR50.54(q) in Apr 1999 ML20210H0491999-07-28028 July 1999 Forwards Application for Amend to License NPF-3,revising TS 3/4.7.5.1, Ultimate Heat Sink, to Allow Plant Operation in Modes 1-4 with Water Temp Less than or Equal to 90 F ML20210G5521999-07-28028 July 1999 Provides Addl Response to 980923 OL Licensing Exam Rept 50-346/98-301 Re OL Exam Administered in Aug 1998.Results of Root Cause Investigation & Corrective Actions,Discussed ML20210G3831999-07-27027 July 1999 Forwards Application for Amend to NPF-3,changing TSs 6.4, Training, 6.5.2.8, Audits, 6.10, Record Retention, 6.14, Process Control Program & 6.15, Odcm ML20211P3071999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards Final Rept for 990504 Biennial Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise for David-Besse Power Station.No Deficiencies Identified for Any Jurisdiction During Exercise ML20210G4391999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards Application for Amend to License NPF-3,revising Tech Specs 3/4.3.2.1, Safety Features Actuation Sys Instrumentation, & Associated Bases 3/4.3.1 & 3/4.3.2, Reactor Protection Sys & Safety Sys Instrumentation ML20210G7151999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards Application for Amend to License NPF-3,revising TSs 3/4.3.3.1, Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation, 3/4.3.3.2, Instrument - Incore Detectors & 3/4.3.3.9, Instrumentation - Waste Gas Sys Oxygen Monitor ML20210G5151999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards Application for Amend to License NPF-3,revising Tech Specs for Implementation of 10CFR50,App J,Option B for Type B & C Containment Leakage Rate Testing ML20210G3211999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards Written OL Exam & Supporting Matl for Exam to Be Administered at DBNPS During Week of 990913.Listed Encls Withheld from Public Disclosure Until After Exam Complete ML20210C4381999-07-20020 July 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/99-08 on 990513-0622.Unidentified RCS Leak Approached TS Limit of 1 Gallon Per Minute Prior to Recently Completed Maint Outage.Three Violations of NRC Requirements Identified & Being Treated as NCVs ML20209G3681999-07-15015 July 1999 Advises That Info Submitted in & 990519 Affidavit Re Design & Licensing Rept,Davis-Besse,Unit 1 Cask Pit Rack Installation Project,Holtec Intl, HI-981933,marked Proprietary,Will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure ML20207H6401999-07-0909 July 1999 Discusses Closure of TAC MA0540 Re Util Responses to RAI on GL 92-01,rev 1,suppl 1, Rv Structural Integrity. Staff Has Revised Info in Rvid & Releasing It as Rvid Version 2 ML20209D1341999-07-0808 July 1999 Forwards Notice of Withdrawal of Application for Amend to Operating License.Proposed Change Would Have Modified Facility TSs Pertaining to Allowable as-found Pressure Lift Setting Tolerance of Two Pressurizer Code Safety Valves 05000346/LER-1998-012, Forwards LER 98-012-01,which Is Being Submitted to Provide Addl Info Re 981018 Occurrence.Commitment List Attached1999-07-0707 July 1999 Forwards LER 98-012-01,which Is Being Submitted to Provide Addl Info Re 981018 Occurrence.Commitment List Attached ML20209C3981999-07-0101 July 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-346/98-21.Corrective Actions:Developed Rev to Boric Acid Control Program & Work Process Guideline on Plant Leakage ML20209B5821999-06-24024 June 1999 Provides Justification for Rev to Completion Date for One of Insp follow-up Items Cited in Insp Rept 50-346/98-03, Designated as Inspector follow-up Item 50-346/97-201-10 ML20196G1251999-06-23023 June 1999 Responds to NRC RAI Re GL 98-01, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants ML20196E5321999-06-17017 June 1999 Forwards Addl Info Re Relief Request RR-A16 to Support NRC Approval of Relief Request ML20195K2751999-06-16016 June 1999 Forwards Safety Evaluation Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20196A6601999-06-16016 June 1999 Forwards Master Decommissioning Trust Agreements Revised After 1990 for Ohio Edison Co,Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co,Toledo Edison Co & Pennsylvania Power Co Re Bvnps,Units 1 & 2,DBNPS,Unit 1 & Perry Unit 1 ML20195F9071999-06-10010 June 1999 Forwards Application for Amend to NPF-3,changing Tech Specs 3/4.6.4.4, Hydrogen Purge Sys, TS 3/4.6.5.1, Shield Bldg Emergency Ventilation Sys & TS 3/4.7.6.1, Crevs ML20195F8851999-06-0707 June 1999 Withdraws 950929 License Amend Application,Proposing Mod to Allowable as-found Pressure Lift Setting Tolerance of Two Pressurizer Code Safety Valves ML20207G0751999-06-0707 June 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/99-04 on 990323-0513.Violations Occurred & Being Treated as non-cited Violations,Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML20217P2061999-10-26026 October 1999 Forwards for First Energy Nuclear Operating Co Insp Rept 50-346/99-17 on 990928-1001.Insp Was Exam of Activities Conducted Under License Re Implementation of Physical Security Program.No Violations Identified ML20217N3851999-10-20020 October 1999 Forwards RAI Re Licensee 990521 Request for License Amend to Allow Irradiated Fuel to Be Stored in Cask Pit at Davis-Besse,Unit 1.Response Requested within 60 Days from Receipt of Ltr ML20217G9201999-10-14014 October 1999 Discusses Utils Request for Approval of Quality Assurance Program Changes ML20217F8371999-10-0808 October 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/99-10 on 990802-0913.One Violation Occurred Being Treated as NCV ML20217A5641999-09-30030 September 1999 Informs of Completion of mid-cycle PPR of Davis-Besse on 990901.Informs That NRC Plans to Conduct Addl Insps to Address Questions Raised by Issues Re Operator Errors & Failure to Commit to JOG Topical Rept on MOV Verification ML20212L0691999-09-30030 September 1999 Forwards,For Review & Comment,Copy of Preliminary ASP Analysis of Operational Condition Discovered at Unit 1 on 981014,as Reported in LER 346/98-011 ML20212D3501999-09-21021 September 1999 Forward Copy of Final Accident Sequence Precursor Analysis of Operational Event at Plant,Unit 1 on 980624,reported in LER 346/98-006 ML20211P3001999-09-0707 September 1999 Forwards FEMA Transmitting FEMA Evaluation Rept for 990504 Emergency Preparedness Exercise at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant.No Deficiencies Identified.One Area Requiring C/A & Two Planning Issues Identified ML20211K0951999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Fire & Seismic Analyses of IPEEE for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1. Response Requested within 60 Days ML20211D1171999-08-20020 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/99-09 on 990623-0802.Violations Identified & Being Treated as Noncited Violations ML20211B0161999-08-13013 August 1999 Forwards SE Accepting Evaluation of Second 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Program Request for Relief Numbers RR-A16, RR-A17 & RR-B9 for Plant,Unit 1 ML20210P8051999-08-0909 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/99-15 on 990712-16.No Violations Noted.However,Several Deficiencies Were Identified with Implementation of Remp,Which Collectively Indicated Need for Improved Oversight of Program IR 05000346/19980211999-08-0606 August 1999 Refers to NRC Insp Rept 50-346/98-21 Conducted on 980901- 990513 & Forwards Nov.Two Violations Identified Involving Failure to Maintain Design of Valve & Inadequate C/A for Degraded Condition Cited in Encl NOV ML20210H6101999-07-30030 July 1999 Informs That Region III Received Rev 21 to Various Portions of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Emergency Plan.Revision Was Submitted Under Provisions of 10CFR50.54(q) in Apr 1999 ML20210C4381999-07-20020 July 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/99-08 on 990513-0622.Unidentified RCS Leak Approached TS Limit of 1 Gallon Per Minute Prior to Recently Completed Maint Outage.Three Violations of NRC Requirements Identified & Being Treated as NCVs ML20209G3681999-07-15015 July 1999 Advises That Info Submitted in & 990519 Affidavit Re Design & Licensing Rept,Davis-Besse,Unit 1 Cask Pit Rack Installation Project,Holtec Intl, HI-981933,marked Proprietary,Will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure ML20207H6401999-07-0909 July 1999 Discusses Closure of TAC MA0540 Re Util Responses to RAI on GL 92-01,rev 1,suppl 1, Rv Structural Integrity. Staff Has Revised Info in Rvid & Releasing It as Rvid Version 2 ML20209D1341999-07-0808 July 1999 Forwards Notice of Withdrawal of Application for Amend to Operating License.Proposed Change Would Have Modified Facility TSs Pertaining to Allowable as-found Pressure Lift Setting Tolerance of Two Pressurizer Code Safety Valves ML20195K2751999-06-16016 June 1999 Forwards Safety Evaluation Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20207G0751999-06-0707 June 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/99-04 on 990323-0513.Violations Occurred & Being Treated as non-cited Violations,Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy ML20207G0621999-06-0404 June 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/98-21 on 980901-1201 & 990425-0513.Violations Identified & Licensee Being Provided Opportunity to Either Respond to Violations within 30 Days or Inform NRC That LER Rept Already Contain Info Requested ML20207B8161999-05-25025 May 1999 Confirms Discussion Between Members of Staffs to Have Mgt Meeting on 990608 in Oak Harbor,Oh to Discuss Recent Performance at Davis-Besse as Described in Plant Performance Review ML20207B3141999-05-24024 May 1999 Informs That in September 1998,Region III Received Revision 20 to Various Portions of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Emergency Plan.Rev Submitted Under Provisions of 10CFR50.54(q) ML20206T0881999-05-18018 May 1999 Confirms 990517 Telcon Between Lindsey & M Bielby Re Arrangements Made for Administration of Licensing Exam at Facility for Week of 990913 ML20206N5311999-05-11011 May 1999 Informs That NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Reorganized Effective 990328.As Part of Reorganization,Div of Licensing Project Mgt Created.Aj Mendiola Will Be Section Chief for Davis-Besse Npp.Organization Chart Encl ML20206H2291999-05-0707 May 1999 Forwards Proposed Change to Plant,Unit 1,TS Bases Section 2.2.1, Limiting Safety Sys Settings - Reactor Protection Sys Instrumentation Setpoints - Rc Pressure - Low,High & Pressure Temp ML20206B8171999-04-27027 April 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/99-05 on 990405-09.No Violations Noted.Purpose of Insp Was to Examine on-line Maint Risk Assessment Program Recently Implemented in Response to Maint Work Control Weaknesses ML20205G5681999-03-26026 March 1999 Advises of Completion of Plant Performance Review on 990202 to Develop Integrated Understanding of Safety Performance. Overall Performance of Plant Acceptable.Plant Issues Matrix & Insp Plan Encl ML20207G1701999-03-0505 March 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/99-01 on 990102-0212.No Violations Noted ML20207D4351999-02-25025 February 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/99-02 on 990202-05.No Violations Noted.Examples of Deficiencies with Station Procedures, Similar to Those Identified Through Staff self-assessments & in Previous NRC Insps,Were Noted IR 05000346/19960141999-02-17017 February 1999 Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-346/96-14 on 970225.Ack That Due to Plant Events,There Has Been Delay in Completion of C/As for Violation 50-346/96-14c ML20203F2541999-02-10010 February 1999 Informs That Beginning 990216,DE Hills Will Be Chief of Operations Branch Which Includes Operator Licensing Function ML20206S0811999-01-22022 January 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/98-18 on 981110-990102.No Violations Identified.Conduct of Activities at Davis-Besse Generally Characterized by Conservative Plant Operations, & Effective Engineering Involvement in Plant Issues ML20199H5821999-01-20020 January 1999 Forwards SE Re Ampacity Derating Issues Due to Application of Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Matl at Plant ML20198E6821998-12-17017 December 1998 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/98-20 on 981116-20.No Violations Noted.Implementation of Licensed Operator Requalification Program Was Generally Characterized by Safety Conscious Operations & Sound Evaluation of Operator Performance ML20198C9881998-12-15015 December 1998 Informs That as Part of NRC PRA Implementation Plan, Commission Assigned Two SRAs to Each Regional Ofc.Sras Will Routinely Assess Licensee Event Repts,Plant Event,Insp Findings & EAs from Risk Perspective ML20198B5391998-12-0909 December 1998 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/98-17 on 980918-1109 & NOV Re Inadequate Maint Work Order Used by Electrician During Removal of Primary Water Storage Tank Temp Indicator ML20196G1621998-12-0303 December 1998 Submits Response to Request for TS Interpretation Re Surveillance Interval Extension Allowances ML20196H4411998-12-0303 December 1998 Confirms Plans to Hold Meeting on 981216 in Lisle,Il,To Discuss Recent Performance at Davis-Besse & Actions Being Implemented by Licensee ML20198B1511998-12-0202 December 1998 Forwards Insp Activity Plan for Next 6 Months & Plant Issues Matrix.Infor Provided to Minimize Resource Impact on Staff & to Allow for Scheduling Conflicts & Personnel Availability to Be Resolved in Advance of Inspector Arrival Onsite ML20196J5111998-12-0101 December 1998 Fowards Year 2000 Readiness Audit Rept,Which Documents Results of NRR Audit Conducted at Facility from 981027-29 ML20196D4371998-11-25025 November 1998 Discusses Concerns Re Announced Asset Transfer Between Firstenergy Corp & Duquesne Light Co ML20196C6491998-11-20020 November 1998 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/98-19 on 981014-23.No Violations Noted.Inspectors Reviewed Circumstances Surrounding Events Leading Up to & Following Reactor Trip IR 05000346/19983011998-11-0909 November 1998 Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-346/98-301OL Issued on 980923.Effectiveness of C/A Will Be Reviewed Following Submittal of Root Cause Investigation Results ML20155J1471998-11-0303 November 1998 Informs That on 981007,NRC Administered GFE Section of Written Operator Licensing Exam to Employees of Facility. Exam Answer Key for Forms a & B,Grading Results & Individual Answer Sheets Encl.Without Encl ML20155B6641998-10-28028 October 1998 Forwards Safety Evaluation Re Request for Reduction in Commitment Changes in QA Program Matl Receipt Insp Process ML20154Q6711998-10-16016 October 1998 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/98-15 on 980914-18.No Violations Noted.Emergency Preparedness Program Effectively Implemented During 980624 Tornado Event & Station Personnel Responded Well to Event ML20154Q5891998-10-14014 October 1998 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/98-14 on 980808-0918.No Violations Noted.Online Safety Equipment Outages Were Performed Well & IAW Established Procedures ML20154H0241998-10-0606 October 1998 Discusses Arrangements Made During 980924 Telcon for Insp of Licensed Operator Requalification Program at Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station During Wk of 981116 ML20154D1801998-09-30030 September 1998 Forwards Insp Rept 50-346/98-16 on 980831-0904.No Violations Noted 1999-09-07
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August 7, 1998 i
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Mr. John Vice President - Nuclear Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Centerior Service Company 5501 North State Route 2 Oak Harbor, OH 43449 SUBJECT: NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-346/98006(DRS))
Dear Mr. Wood:
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This will acknowledge receipt of your letter dated July 24,1998, in response to our letter dated June 9,1998, transmitting a violation of NRC requirements for the Davis-Besse Nuclear i
Power Station. The violation pertained to the untimely identification of an event which took place l during maintenance work on the steam generator. We have reviewed your corrective actions and l have no further questions at this time. These corrective actions will be examined during future
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l Inspections.
Sincerely, t i
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Original /s/ J. A. Grobe John A. Grobe, Director Division of Reactor Safety Docket No.: 50-346 '
License No.: NPF-3 /
r See Attached Distribution l
. DOCUMENT NAME: G:DRS\DAV98006.TY To ,ecebwe e copy of this document, Indicate in the bos: *C* a Copy without ettechment/ enclosure *F" a Copy Wth attachment %nclosure "pr a No copy l OFFICE Rill j6 Rill a u,l jf Rlli j .lM Rlli _J l NAME Green-Bates:de@ Gavula W/) KozaBdll/ GrobeCN DATE 08/.r/98 '
M 08/7/98\ I " 08/6/98 '
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u OFFICIkL RECORD COPY oh ,
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. cc: J. Stetz, Senior Vice President - Nuclear J. Lash, Plant Manager J. Freels, Manager, Regulatory Affairs M. O'Reilly, First Energy S?. ate Liaison Officer, State of Ohio
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R. Owen, Ohio Department of Health C. Glazer, State of Ohio Public Utilities Commission Distribution:
Project Mgr., NRR J. Caldwell, Rlli
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C. Pederson, Rlll
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B. Clayton, Rill SRI Davis-Besse DRP l TSS l DRS (2)
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DOCDESK (E-Mail)
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sh & Davisksne Nucinar Ponce State SbOf North Swa Route a m Oak Harbor. Ohio 43449 9760
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Docket Number 50-346 l
License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 1-1168 July 24, 1998 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Subject: Response to Inspection Report Number 50-346/98006 (DRS)
Ladies and Gentlemen:
Toledo Edison has received Inspection Repon Number IR 50-346/98006 (Toledo Edison Log Number 1-3967) and the enclosed Notice of Violation issued on June 9,1998. The violation ,
pertains to the untimely identification of an event which took place during maintenance work on a steam generator. Toledo Edison provides the attached response to the subject violation. The submission date of this reply was extended from July 9,1998 to July 24,1998, based on discussions with the Region 111 Projects Branch Chief for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) following the Alert on June 24,1998, at the DBNPS; and based on discussions with the DBNPS Senior Resident inspector and the Region 111 Engineering Specialists Branch 1 Chief on July 20,1998.
Should you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. James L. Freels, Manager - Regulatory Affairs, at (419) 321-8466.
Ve truly yours, i
GMW/dic
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cc: A. B. Beach, Regional Administrator, NRC Region 111 A. G. Ilansen, DB-1 NRC/NRR Project Manager i S. J. Campbell, DB-1 Senior NRC Resident inspector Utility Radiological Safety Board I
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Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 1-1168 Attachment Page1 Renly to a Notice of Violation (50-346/98007-01)
Alleced Violation During an NRC inspection conducted from April 22 - May 7,1998, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with NUREG-1600, " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," the violation is listed below:
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, " Corrective Action" requires that measures be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions,
- deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are prompt,1y identified and corrected.
Contrary to the aoove, a condition adverse to quality was not promptly identified a nd corrected, in that on April 15,1998, a Potential Condition Adverse to Quality Report (PCAQR) was not initiated after an unauthorized wire brush, used to clean steam generator B primny manway stud holes, failed resulting in the uncontrolled introduction of carbon steel wire bristies into the primary coolant system. Further, on April 18,1998, and April 19,1998, a PCAQR was not initiated when wire bristles were identified by video camera to be present on the steam generator tube sheet and bottom bowl. In addition, on April 25,1998, eddy current examinations identified a wire bristle wedged inside a steam generator tube. Although a PCAQR was initiated to address j
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the effect of the metal on the fuel, control rod drive mechanisms, pump seals and other primary system components, until prompted by the inspector, no actions were initiated to address the noncompliance with the applicable maintenance procedure which authorized only stainless steel l or nylon brushes.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement 1). I Response to Alleced Violation 50-346/98006-01 Reason for Violation When the carbon steel brush failed during use on April 14,1998, it was not realized by the worker that the wrong type of brush had been used. A carbon steel brush has the same general I appearance as a stainless steel brush, and unless a side-by-side comparison is performed, the material of the brush is not obvious. At one point in time, carbon steel brushes were exclusively used to clean the carbon steel stud holes of the steam generators et Davis-Besse. A change was l made to the applicable procedure to only use stainless steel or nylon brushes because they are l more durable. It appears that all carbon steel brushes were not removed from the steam generator tool boxes after their use was discontinued.
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Docket Number 50-346 I License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 1-1168 Attachment Page 2 It is common knowledge of the Framatome Technology, Inc. (FTI) personnel involved in this work that carbon steel brushes may fail in the manner observed and should not be used. The steam generator B manway and diaphragm were still in place at the time of the brush failure, which prevented any wire bristles from entering the steam generator at that time. The worker believed the failed brush that was taken from the steam generator tool box was of the proper i material. Another brush, this one stainless steel, was retrieved from the same tool box, and work I
was continued after cleaning up the bristles from the failed brush. Since steam generator B was not open at the time of the brush failure, no concerns about foreign material entering the steam generator existed. No procedural violation was known to have existed at this time. Per the FTl l Quality Assurance (QA) Plan in place for the eleventh refueling outage, no documentation of the failed tool was required. ,
It is believed that the wire bristles were transponed into steam generator B via the filter hose that was positioned under the stud hole to collect the debris generated during cleaning. The same filter hose was used to draw any debris out of the stud hole. Once the manway and diaphragm were removed, a shield door was installed, and the same filter hose was connected to the shield j door to ventilate the steam generator. If any of the wire bristles remained in the filter hose after i the brush failed, they could have entered the steam generator once the hose was connected to the i shield door. Any loose wire bristles remaining on the work platform could also have been introduced into steam generator B during installation of the remotely-operated eddy current equipment.
When the wire bristles were identified by video camera to be present on the steam generator B tube sheet on April 18,1998, they were entered into the FTI Open Systems Log for Steam i Generator Activities as required by the FTI QA Plan to document the as found condition. This entry ensured the wire bristles would be removed prior to closcout of the steam generator in i accordance with the FTI Field Procedure for Steam Generator Closcout. No further actions were required at this time in accordance with the FTl QA Plan. Toledo Edison personnel were infonned of the presence of the wire bristles in steam generator B on April 21,1998. A plan was i developed to obtain a sample of these wire bristles from the steam generator to identify how long )
the bristles had been in the reactor coolant system, while maintaining personnel dose as low as reasonable achievable. On April 23,1998, a sar.iple of the wire bristles was obtained and delivered to Radiation Protection personnel. On April 25,1998, after determination that the wire 1 l
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bristles had not been in the steam generator during reactor operation, meaning they were introduced dur'mg the current refueling outage, Potential Condition Adverse to Quality Report (PCAQR) 1998-0781 was initiated by Toledo Edison personnel to ensure all bristles were i
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removed from the steam generator. The m erial of the wire bristles was not known at this time. 1 Later that same day, eddy current examinations identified a tube in steam generator B was i obstructed, and FTl personnel initiated Nonconformance Report (NCR)98-200 as required by the FTI QA Plan. The tube obstruction was pushed into the lower bowl of the steam generator, I where it was discovered that this obstruction was a wire bristle similar to those discovered on the
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, Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 1-1168 Attachment Page 3
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upper steam generator tube sheet. Another wire bristle was also found in the lower bowl of the B steam generator and removed. The material of the wire bristle was then evaluated to determine the effects of any potentially undiscovered bristles on the Reactor Coolant System. When it was determined that the wire bristle was made of carbon steel, the origination of the wire bristles was traced to the wire brush that had failed during cleaning of the steam generator stud holes. At this time it was not recognized that the use of a carbon steel brush constituted a procedural violation.
The fact that a procedural violation had occurred in the use of a carbon steel brush on April 14, 1998, was not realized until FTI personnel were interviewed by Toledo Edison personnel and the j NRC inspector on May 6,1998.
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Corrective Stens Taken and Results Achieved
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When the wire bristles were identified by video camera to be present on steam generator B tube I sheet on April 18,1998, they were entered into the FTI Open Systems Log for Steam Generator f
! Activities. After determining the wire bristles had been introduced during the current refueling l
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outage, PCAQR 1998-0781 was initiated on April 25,1998. Upon discovery of a wire bristle inside a steam generator B tube and determination that the wire bristle was from a carbon steel wire brush, all steam generator tool boxes were inspected. The four carbon steel brushes discovered in the manway tool box were discarded based on the common knowledge that carbon i
steel brushes should not be used due to their likelihood of failure. All steam generator activities involving the use of wire brushes had been completed by this time, so no fmther actions were
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necessary to ensure carbon steel brushes were not used.
I A thorough video inspection of steam generator B was performed to locate all potential wire bristles in addition to the 100 percent eddy current examination cf the steam generator. All identified wire bristles were removed from the upper bowl of steam generator B. The one wire bristle discovered in the tubes of steam generator 11 was removed, and the lower bowl was l thoroughly vacuumed to remove all wire bristles. These actions were completed on l May 2,1998.
On May 6,1998, after learning that a procedural violation had occurred in the use of a carbon steel wire brush, NCR 98-218 was initiated by FTl personnel. This NCR was also tracked along with NCR 98-0200 under PCAQR 98-0781, which was revised to address the procedural noncompliance.
Corrective Ste as Taken to Avoid Further Violations The FTI procedure used for steam generator manway removal and installation will be clarified to specifically delineate that only stainless steel or nylon brushes shall be used for stud hole maintenance. Additionally, the procedure will be revised to reflect that if a brush to be used for this task is not marked, or there is no reasonable assurance a brush is of the proper material, the brush will be discarded. This procedure will be revised prior to the next refueling outage, which i
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. Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 1-1168 Attaciunent l Page 4 is currently scheduled for April,2000. Training on the revised procedure and proper brush material will be performed during the next refueling outage for the workers specifically involved in steam generator work. This training will reinforce that the use of the proper brush material is a procedural requirement.
Based upon the described sequence of events, Toledo Edison believes that reasonable corrective actions were taken in accordance with governing procedures, based upon the circumstances and information available. Therefore, no corrective steps are necessary in relation to the corrective action process at the DBNPS.
Date When Full Compliance will be Achieved
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Full compliance was achieved on May 6,1998, when NCR 98-218 was initiated by FTI personnel to document the procedural noncompliance of using a wire brush of the wrong material to clean the steam generator stud holes. This NCR and NCR 98-200, which was initiated on April 25,1998, to document the concern of the wire bristles inside the steam generator, are being tracked by PCAQR 1998-0781, which was also initiated on April 25,1998.
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