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| {{Adams | | {{Adams |
| | number = ML20141E369 | | | number = ML20217Q092 |
| | issue date = 06/23/1997 | | | issue date = 08/12/1997 |
| | title = Discusses Insp Rept 50-333/97-03 on 970304-13 & Forwards Notice of Violation.Violation Re Inadvertent Control Rod Withdrawal Event Which Resulted from Human Error | | | title = Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-333/97-03 on 970629 |
| | author name = Hehl C | | | author name = Rogge J |
| | author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) | | | author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| | addressee name = Colomb M | | | addressee name = Colomb M |
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| | license number = | | | license number = |
| | contact person = | | | contact person = |
| | document report number = 50-333-97-03, 50-333-97-3, EA-97-118, NUDOCS 9707010042 | | | document report number = 50-333-97-03, 50-333-97-3, NUDOCS 9708290146 |
| | package number = ML20141E372 | | | title reference date = 07-30-1997 |
| | document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE | | | document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE |
| | page count = 5 | | | page count = 3 |
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| s June 23, 1997 I
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| | August 12, 1997 |
| EA No. 97-118 Mr. Michael Site Executive Officer New York ''ower Authority I James A. F tzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Post Office Box 41 Lycoming. aY 13093
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| SUBJECT: NOTICE OF VIOLATION REGARDING SPECIAL INSPECTION 50-333/97-03
| | Mr. Michael Site Executive Officer New York Power Authority James A.' FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Post Office Box 41-Lycoming,.NY 13093 |
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| ==Dear Mr. Colomb:== | | ==Dear Mr. Colomb:== |
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| | Subject: NRC Inspection Report No. 50 333/97 03 and Notice of Violation |
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| | , This letter refers to your July 30,1997 correspondence, in response to our June 29,1997 letter. |
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| l On March 14,1996, the NRC completed a specialinspection of Ln inadvertent control rod l withdrawal avent which was the result of human error at your FitzPatrick Power Plant.
| | Thank you for informing us of the corrective and preventive actions documented in your |
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| | letters. These actions will be examinec' during a future inspection of your licensed program. |
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| In this event, a licensed reactor operator, as part of impromtu training of a reactor operator
| | Your cooperation with us is appreciated. |
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| candidate, inadvertently withdrew a control rod without following established station procedures for this evolution. The reactor operator, in order to demonstrate a control recoupling check for the trainee, noted that he intended to select a rod that was full out. I H( wever, the rod selected was not full out. In addition, the control room supervisor, a licensed senior reactor operator, granted permisFion for this activity while procedures require the shift manager to grant permission for this evolution. The causes for this event included inattention to detail and failing to control the activity per established station procedures. A predecisional enforcement conference to discuss this apparent violation was conducted on May 8,1997. A copy of your presentation is attached.
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| - This evolution reflects an informality in the conduct of control room activities. As discussed at the enforcement conference, this event is also similar to several past events | | Sincerely, Original Signed by: |
| ; in that personnel involved failed to cc,.. sider the consequences of their actions prior to conducting an evolution, and indicated an operating environment where a questioning attitude is not consistertly a part of station practices. For example, three incorrect control rod drives were removed during the last refueling outage. In September 1996, an automatic reactor scram was initiated during improper relay chlibration. Operator errors and performance weaknesses were evident during this event as reflected by operators
| | John F. Rogge, Chief Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-333 cc: |
| ; transferring the reactor protection system (RPS) buses to alternate power supplies that | | ~ C. Rappleyea, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer |
| , | | 'R. Schoenberger, President and Chief Operating Officer J. Knubel, Chief Nuclear Officer and Senior Vice President |
| were de-energized, in spite of clear indication that the buses were energized and the alternate power supply was not powered. In each of these events, personnel failed to exercise sound decision making and a questioning attitude.
| | .H. P. Salmon,- Jr., Vice Presider.. of Nuclear Operations W. Josiger, Vice President - Engineering and Project Management J. Kelly, Director - Regulatory Affairs and Special Projects T. Dougherty, Vice President - Nuclear Engineering l R. Deasy, Vice President - Appraisal and Compliance Services R. Patch, Director - Quality Assurance l-l G. Goldstein, Assistant General Counsel C. Faison, Director, Nuclear Licensing lllllh!k,5 K. Peters, Licensing Manager |
| | ' T. Morra, Executive Chair, Four County Nuclear Safety Committee 9708290146 970812-PDR ADOCK 05000333 G PDR OFFICIAL RECORD COPY IE:01 |
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| I 9<07010042 970623 i PDR ADOCK 05000333 I
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| | Michael cc w/ copy of Licensee's Response Letter: |
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| | Supervisor, Town of Scriba_ |
| t t 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY Tc: 0;
| | C. Donaldsoni Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, New York Department of Law P. Eddy, Director, Electric Division, Department of Public Service, State of New York G. T. Goering, Consultant, New York Power Authority J. E. Gagliardo, Consultant, New York Power Authority E. S. Beckjord, Consultant, New York Power Authority F. William Valentino, President, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority J. Spath, Program Director, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority s |
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| . | | Michael Distribution w/ copy of Licensee's Response Letter: |
| Michael The NRC recognizes that the automatic systems functioned to limit the rod withdrawal,
| | RI EDO Coordinator A. Dromerick, NRR K. Cotton, NRR D. Hood, NRR M. Campion, RI R. Correia, NRR F. Talbot, NRR Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC) |
| ; | | PUBLIC NRC Resident inspector Region l Docket Room (with concurrences) |
| and the reactor operator reicted appropriately when a rod block monitor alarm alerted the operator to the error. Nc.ietheless, this event demonstrates the importance of formality i and oversight during the conduct of control room operations. Based on this event, a
| | Inspection Program Branch, NRR (IPAS) |
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| | J. Rogge, DRP R. Barkley, DRP R. Junod, DRP DOCDESK |
| ' violation is being cited. The violation is described in the endorsed Notice of Violation and is classified at Severity Level IV in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600.
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| | DOCUMENT NAME: A:\RL9703.FTZ |
| | - To receive a copy of this document, Indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment / enclosure "E" = |
| | Copy with attachment / enclosure '"N" = No copy l OFFICE Hl/DRP Rl/DRP lNAME- GHunegs JRogge /J d , |
| | lDATE 08/gl97-- 08/tg9T OFFICIAL RECORD COPY |
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| | *j J:mes A. Fit: Patrick |
| | , . Nucteer Power Ptent |
| | ** K4 Lcks Motd Po Bos 41 Lycomeg, New York 13093 315 342 3640 |
| | #> NewWrkPower Ze'd!da";! |
| | 4# Authority |
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| | July 30, 1997 l |
| | JAFP-97-0268 - |
| | U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Mail Station P1 137 Washington, DC 20555 |
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| | SUBJECT: James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50 333 Reply to Notice of Violation 14RC SoecialInsoection Reoort 50 333/97 03 Gentlemen: |
| | In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Notice of Violation, the Authority submits a response to the notice transmitted by your letter dated June 23,1997. Your letter refers to the results of the special safety inspection cor. ducted by Messrs. G. Hunegs, L. Briggs, and R. Fernandes from March 4,1997 to March 13,1997, at the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. |
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| | The Authority believes the corrective actions taken have been effective in improving our human performance. There have been no significant errors since the March 3,1997 ovent and there is indication that the number of personnel errors has decreased through the last quarter (April- June,1997). A heightened awareness of human performance has been achieved. Daily and weekly manager observations in the field have noted personnel exercising sound decision making and a questioning attitude. When discrepancies are identified, corrections are made and the appropriate feedback is provided to the plant staff via standdowns, tailgates, or briefs. Senior Plant Management continues to reinforce that reactor safety a a site and individual culture that must be personalized in our day-to day activities. Emphasis and monitoring of human performance results will continue to ensure an improving trend. |
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| | Attachment 1 provides the description of the violation, reason for the violation, the corrective actions that.have been taken and the results achieved, corrective actions to be taken to avoid'further violations, and the date of full compliance. |
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| | There are no commitments contained in this submittal, if you have any questions, please contact Mr. Arthur Zaremba at (315) 349-6365. |
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| | Very truly your |
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| | STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF OSWEGO |
| | * Subscribed and sworn to before me |
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| | l MICHAEL J. COLOMB |
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| | p<" [* this 30 day of Ldt, |
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| | ,1997. |
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| I You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the
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| ! enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part,
| | MJC: RAP:las Netary Pdblic c: Next page NANCY B. CZEROW Notary Pubitc. state of NewYork Quelmed in oewego County e4664611 i ? Commleston Empiree _ h * k- U # |
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| | *cc: Regional Administratcr U.S. Nuclear __ Regulatory Commission - |
| | 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 |
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| to deteimine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements, j in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter
| | Office of the Resident inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 136 Lycoming, Nsw York 13093 Ms. K. Cotton, Acting Project Manager Project Directorate 11 Division of Reactor Projects l/II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 14 B2 |
| ; and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
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| | Washington, DC 20555 Attachments: |
| | Reply to Notice of Violation |
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| | Reply tD Notico ef Viol:: tion f Sneelal Innoaction Raoort 97-03 - |
| | L Violation , |
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| | Technical Specification 6.8(A)2 requires that written procedures and administrative |
| | ;. policies shail be established, implemented and maintained that are recommended in App'endix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, November 1972. Appendix A of Regulatory |
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| | Guide 1.33 requires. operating procedures governing the controlrod drive system and administrative procedures for safe operation. Operations Survelliance Test i |
| | - Procedure (ST 20C) governs testing to verify control rod drive system operability; l |
| | paragraph 8.1.16, in particular, govems the performance of a controlrod coupling Integrity check. NYPA Administration Procedure (AP)-12.03, Administration of Operations, Revision 9, provides direction Vo plant personnel concerning general |
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| . | | practices and philosophy for safety operations. Paragraph 7.2 requires that self. |
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| | l checking shall be practiced when operating plant equipment and paragraph 8.17, |
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| | . Reactivity Management, requires independent verification of correct controlrod v selection and motion. |
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| | ' Contrary to the above, on March 3,1997, ST-20C was not followed in that a |
| | - control rod that was not fully withdrawn to position 48 was selected for movement |
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| | and the shift manager's permission was not obtained prior the performance of the evolution. In addition, self checking and independent verification of correct control |
| | * rod selection and motion was not accomplished during this control rod |
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| | manipulation, resulting in a mispositioned controlrod. The consequence of this |
| | !. error was an unplanned, but modest reactivity addition. |
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| Sincerely,
| | This is a severity LevelIV violation (Supplement I). |
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| ; Original Signed by:
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| Charles W. Hehl, Director,
| | Adminnlon Or Danlal Of The Allaaed Violation i |
| , Division of Reactor Projects i Docket No.: 50-333 | | , |
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| | The Authority agrees with this violation. |
| License No.: DPR-59
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| Enclosures:
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| , 1. Notice of Violation 2. NYPA Handout at the May 8,1997, Enforcement Conference i | | Ransons for Violation i The cause of this violation was personnel error. A team root cause analysis of this event identified the following human performance problems: |
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| | Work Praceh - Self-Checkina |
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| | : - When the RO initiated control rod movement, he failed to monitor available indications that would have immediately told him enexpected rod movement-4- was taking place. Self-checking was not applied to verify rod selection and ensure the expected response. Rod motion was terminated on the receipt of the rod block, a design feature, as opposed to being recognized and |
| | . . terminated by the RO. In addition, a second ' qualified' individual was not __ |
| | present to assist in monitoring indications to detect rod motion (were it to occur) contrary to the expectations of AP 12.03. |
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| C. D. Rappleyea, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer i R. Schoenberger, President and Chief Operating Officer j J. Knubel, Chief Nuclear Officer and Senior Vice President
| | Reply t*> N:ti:o cf Viol: tion t' |
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| H. P. Salmon, Jr., Vice President of Nuclear Operations
| | Snecial innosction Reoort 97 03 i Work Practican - Document Use |
| | - The RO did not refer to the coupling check surveillance procedure and selected a control rod for the coupling check that was not fully withdrawn as |
| | . he intended. The CRS and the RO considered a second verification of the selected control rod required by administrative procedure AP 12.03, Administration of Operations, was not required because actual rod motion was not anticipated. |
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| | Sunervisorv Methods |
| | - The Control Room Supervisor (CRS) granted permission to perform an unplanned, unscheduled evolution without notifying th; Shift Manager (SM). |
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| | The CRS did not recognize that a control rod coupling check could result in control rod movement and associated reactivity changes. As a result of not recognizing potential adverse consequences of performing this task, the CRS direction to the Reactor Operator (RO) was informal and did not adequately communicate job performance and self checking standards. |
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| | . Manaaeria! Methods |
| | - Management expectations prohibiting plant equipment manipulations solely for training was not clearly communicated. The absence of a clearly defined policy allowed this evolution to proceed without an adequate assessment of risks and consequences because it was an unscheduled, unplanned task, liabit Intrusion c |
| | - The CRS and RO were not focused on the task, they viewed the task as |
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| | easy to perform. The individuals involved had actually performed or observed many coupling checks in the past during surveillance testing. The RO did not self check rod selection and focused his attention entirely on control rod drive (CRD) system hydraulic parameters and explanation of |
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| | system response to the trainee. |
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| | Corrective Actions That Have Been Taken o - |
| W. Josiger, Vice President - Engineering and Project Management J. Kelly, Director - Regulatory Affairs and Special Projects T. Dougherty, Vice President - Nuclear Engineering R. Deasy, Vice President - Appraisal and Compliance Services
| | - The improperly withdrawn control rod was restored to its original location (position 22). |
| ; R. Patch, Director - Quality Assurance l G. C. Goldste.n, Assistant General Counsel C. D. Faison, Director, Nuclear Licensing, NYPA
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| | - The CRS and RO were removed from licensed responsibilities and disciplined in accordance with Human Resources policies. Fitness' for Duty for cause testing was conducted on the RO with negative results. Both individuals were placed in a remedial training program. The CRS has been successfully remediated and retumed to licensed duties. |
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| | SpecialInsoection Rooort 97-03 |
| | - Immediately after the event, the Operations Manager suspended reactivity manipulations for license candidates and conducted standdown briefings for all Operations personnel before their next operating shift to communicate the following: |
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| | * A clear definition that any manipulation of the rod movement control switch is a control rod manipulation and a reactivity manipulation regardless of the circumstances. |
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| | * Reinforced the special nature of any reactivity manipulation as requiring the full concentration of the control room staff. |
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| | * Defined the condition under which control rod manipulation could be performed and by whose authority (i.e., Shift Manager). |
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| | * Established that plant equipment status changes for training purposes is not permitted unless planned, scheduled, and properly assessed for plant risks. |
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| K. Peters, Licensing Manager T. Morra, Executive Chair, Four County Nuclear Safety Committee l Supervisor, Town of Scriba C. Donaldson, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, New York Department of Law
| | Emphasized the responsibility of SRO's and RO's to question and challenge all activities, even those that appear uncomplicated and |
| . P. Eddy, Director, Electric Division, Department of Public Service. State of New York i G. T. Goering, Consultant, New York Power Authority i J. E. Gagliardo, Consultant, New York Power Authority | | * reinforced expectations for procedure use, self-checking, reactor safety, and communication. |
| ; E. S. Beckjord, Consultant, New York Fower Authority F. WiPiam Valentino, President, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority i
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| J. Spath, Program Director, New York State Energy Research
| | - AP 12.03 has been revised to identify the critical responsibilities and authorities associated with reactivity control and plant configuration control that are to be implemented in a consistent manner shift to shift. It has also been revised to formalize the expectations for equipment manipulations performed for training. |
| ; and Development Authority
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| | - The Operations Department implemented a peer check policy to improve individual focus on contiol room panel manipulation. This type of policy has been successful at other utilities in helping prevent personnel errors. |
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| | - The Operations Manager conducted training on lessons learned from 14 industry events'that emphasized the importance of: supervisory oversight in the control room; procedure use; teamwork; operating practices; and reactivity management. All operators and operations training instructors |
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| | , . Reply t3 N3tico cf VI:l:ti:n Soncial Innoection Report 97-03 Results Achieved Management oversight during scheduled plant power reductions have shown that our Operations personnel are performing these evolutions in the proper manner with the proper respect and formality required for reactivity manipulations. |
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| | Management observations and oversight of other reactivity manipulations required for scheduled maintenance or core management have also confirmed that these manipulations are being conducted in a manner which meets management expectations. These observations have been conducted in the Control Room and plant simulator. |
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| | Qorrective Actions To Be Taken Plant management has implemented and promulgated expectations in the area of Control Room operations with additional emphasis on reactivity manipulations. |
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| | Management will continue to provide the oversight needed to reinforce that reactor safety is a site and individual culture that must be personalized in our day to-day activities. Operator performance continues to be monitored and coached both on shift and in training. |
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| Michael Distribution w/encls:
| | Operations staff meetings are being conducted every two weeks and are normally attended by SRO's from 3 or 4 of the six operating shifts. These meetings are providing an excellent forum for discussing department operating standards. These meetings in the future will provide a continuing mechanism for reinforcing JAF operating philosophies, including the need for a questioning attitude. |
| W. Axelson, DRA D. Screnci, PAO
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| ! R. Zimmerman, ADPR, NRR l J. Goldberg, OGC l J. Lieberman, OE (OEMAIL)
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| l D. Holody, EO, RI I Nuclear Safety Information Conter (NSIC)
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| PUBLIC NRC Resident inspector Region i Docket Room (with concurrences) 1 J.Rogge,DRP <
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| R. Barkley, DRP !
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| R. Junod, DRP I
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| Distribution w/encls: (VIA E-MAIL)
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| W. Dean, OEDO (WMD)
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| S. Bajwa, NRR K. Cotton, NRR D. Hood, NRR M. Campion, RI Inspection Program Branch, NRR (IPAS) j R. Correia, NRR j F. Talbot, NRR I DOCDESK DOCUMENT NAME: G:\ BRANCH 2\lR97-03.VIO To receive a copy of this document, indicate irt the box: "C" = Copy without attachment / enclosure ,"f" = Copy with attachment / enclosure "N" = No copy OFFICE Rl/DRP [ [ Rl/DRP Rl/EO hQ Rl/DRP JRoggq9 7 CHe M
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| NAME RBarkley [y 1V DHolody
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| DATE 06/$/97 06/f/j/97 06/g/97 06fd/97 ' j
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| OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
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| | Management observations and assessments will continue to be conducted to ensure continued improvement in Control Room formality and questioning attitude. |
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| Michael Distribution w/encis:
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| W. Axelson, DRA D. Screnci, PAO
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| R. Zimmerman, ADPR, NRii
| | Data When Full Comollance Will Be Achieved Full compliance was achieved upon restoration of the control rod to its original location at position 22 on March 3,1997. |
| - J. Goldberg, OGC !
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| J. Lieberman, OE (OEMAIL)
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| D. Holody, EO, RI Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
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| PUBLIC NRC Resident inspector Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
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| J. Rogge, DRP R. Barkley. DRP R. Junod, DRP
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| Distribution w/encis: (VIA E-MAIL)
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| S. Bajwa, NRR K. Cotton, NRR D. Hood, NRR
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| M. Campicn, RI Inspection Program Branch, NRR (IPAS)
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| R. Correia, NRR F. Talbot, NRR DOCDESK DOCUMENT NAME: G:\ BRANCH 2\lR97-03.VIO
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| 'See previous concurrences To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without l i
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| OFFICE * Rl/DRP * Rl/DRP * J/EO
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| * Rl/DRP l NAME RBarkley/RSB JRogge/JR DHolody/DH CHehl/CH DATE 06/19/97 06/19/97 06/20/97 06/23/97 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY j i
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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML20217M1851999-10-19019 October 1999 Forwards NRC Rept Number 17, Requal Tracking Rept from Operator Licensing Tracking Sys.Rept Was Used by NRC to Schedule Requalification Exam for Operators & Record Requal Pass Dates JPN-99-035, Forwards Comments on Version 2 of Reactor Vessel Integrity Database for Plant.Table Listing Recommended Changes to Info in Rvid,Encl as Attachment 11999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards Comments on Version 2 of Reactor Vessel Integrity Database for Plant.Table Listing Recommended Changes to Info in Rvid,Encl as Attachment 1 JPN-99-034, Forwards Proposed risk-informed ISI Program,Provided from NRC Review & Approval as Alternative to Current ASME Section XI Insp Requirements for Class 1 & 2 Piping1999-10-13013 October 1999 Forwards Proposed risk-informed ISI Program,Provided from NRC Review & Approval as Alternative to Current ASME Section XI Insp Requirements for Class 1 & 2 Piping JPN-99-033, Provides Response to Questions Contained in 990712,facsimile from NRC Re Ja FitzPatrick USI A-46 Program.Questions Were Also Discussed Between Members of Util & NRC Staff During Telcon1999-10-0808 October 1999 Provides Response to Questions Contained in 990712,facsimile from NRC Re Ja FitzPatrick USI A-46 Program.Questions Were Also Discussed Between Members of Util & NRC Staff During Telcon JPN-99-030, Forwards Application for Amend to License DPR-59,proposing Change to TS 3.5.B.3 & Associated Bases to Extend LCO Allowable Out of Service Time for RHRSW Sys from 7 Days to 11 Days1999-09-29029 September 1999 Forwards Application for Amend to License DPR-59,proposing Change to TS 3.5.B.3 & Associated Bases to Extend LCO Allowable Out of Service Time for RHRSW Sys from 7 Days to 11 Days JPN-99-032, Forwards Info Re Potential Environ Effects of Alternatives to Proposed Expansion of FitzPatrick Spent Fuel Pool,In Response to NRC Project Manager Request1999-09-29029 September 1999 Forwards Info Re Potential Environ Effects of Alternatives to Proposed Expansion of FitzPatrick Spent Fuel Pool,In Response to NRC Project Manager Request ML20212F8341999-09-22022 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-333/99-07 on 990718-0828.No Violations Noted JAFP-99-0262, Forwards Voluntary Response to Administrative Ltr 99-03, Re Preparation & Scheduling of Operator Licensing Exams. Completed NRC Form 536,containing Info Re Proposed Exam Preparation Schedule & Initial Operator License Exams,Encl1999-09-16016 September 1999 Forwards Voluntary Response to Administrative Ltr 99-03, Re Preparation & Scheduling of Operator Licensing Exams. Completed NRC Form 536,containing Info Re Proposed Exam Preparation Schedule & Initial Operator License Exams,Encl ML20212A8341999-09-0909 September 1999 Requests That Licensees Affected by Kaowool Fire Barriers Take Issue on Voluntary Initiative & Propose Approach for Resolving Subj Issues.Staff Plans to Meet with Licensees to Discuss Listed Topics ML20212A6951999-09-0909 September 1999 Requests That Licensees Affected by Kaowool Fire Barriers Take Issue on Voluntary Initiative & Propose Approach for Resolving Subj Issues.Staff Plans to Meet with Licensees to Discuss Listed Topics 05000333/LER-1998-015, Forwards LER 98-015-02 Re Logic Sys Functional Test Inadequacies,Per 10CFR50.73(A)(2)(i)(B).Rept Revised to Reflect Scheduled Completion Date for Corrective Action 3 of Jan 15, 2000 & Updates Status of Other C/As as Complete1999-09-0808 September 1999 Forwards LER 98-015-02 Re Logic Sys Functional Test Inadequacies,Per 10CFR50.73(A)(2)(i)(B).Rept Revised to Reflect Scheduled Completion Date for Corrective Action 3 of Jan 15, 2000 & Updates Status of Other C/As as Complete ML20211N4301999-09-0808 September 1999 Discusses Proposed Meeting to Discuss Kaowool Fire Barriers. Staff Requesting That Affected Licensees Take Issue on Voluntary Initative & Propose Approach for Resolving Issues JAFP-99-0258, Forwards Operator License Restriction Change for Tj Pelton, License SOP-10090-3.License Is Requested to Be Reissued with Restriction for Corrective Lenses.Encl Withheld1999-09-0808 September 1999 Forwards Operator License Restriction Change for Tj Pelton, License SOP-10090-3.License Is Requested to Be Reissued with Restriction for Corrective Lenses.Encl Withheld JPN-99-028, Informs That Util Requires Extension from 990901 to 1015,to Complete Review of Rvid & Forward Comments to Nrc,Per GL 92-01,Rev 1,Suppl 1, Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity1999-08-30030 August 1999 Informs That Util Requires Extension from 990901 to 1015,to Complete Review of Rvid & Forward Comments to Nrc,Per GL 92-01,Rev 1,Suppl 1, Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity JAFP-99-0247, Forwards JAFNPP Effluent & Waste Disposal Semi-Annual Rept for 990101-0630, IAW Amend 93,App B,Section 7.3.C of Plant Ts.Format Used for Rept Is Outlined in App B of Reg Guide 1.21,Rev 1.Distribution Is IAW Reg Guide 10.1,Rev 41999-08-26026 August 1999 Forwards JAFNPP Effluent & Waste Disposal Semi-Annual Rept for 990101-0630, IAW Amend 93,App B,Section 7.3.C of Plant Ts.Format Used for Rept Is Outlined in App B of Reg Guide 1.21,Rev 1.Distribution Is IAW Reg Guide 10.1,Rev 4 JAFP-99-0245, Informs That Two Licensed Operators Have Returned to Site Upon Release for Normal Duties by Physician.R Korthas, License OP-11159,meets ANSI Std 3.4-1983 & R Sarkissian License SOP-10007-3,was Terminated in Mar 19991999-08-19019 August 1999 Informs That Two Licensed Operators Have Returned to Site Upon Release for Normal Duties by Physician.R Korthas, License OP-11159,meets ANSI Std 3.4-1983 & R Sarkissian License SOP-10007-3,was Terminated in Mar 1999 ML20210U2621999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-333/99-06 on 990601-0717.No Violations Noted JPN-99-025, Forwards Relief Request 17 Re Proposed Alternatives IAW 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) for Reactor Pressure Vessel Circumferential Shell Weld Exams1999-08-0505 August 1999 Forwards Relief Request 17 Re Proposed Alternatives IAW 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) for Reactor Pressure Vessel Circumferential Shell Weld Exams JPN-99-026, Forwards Relief Requests 18 & 19 to Jaf ISI Program Re Proposed Alternatives IAW 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) & Relief from ASME Section XI Code Re Insp of RPV Vertical Shell & Shell to Flange Welds1999-08-0505 August 1999 Forwards Relief Requests 18 & 19 to Jaf ISI Program Re Proposed Alternatives IAW 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) & Relief from ASME Section XI Code Re Insp of RPV Vertical Shell & Shell to Flange Welds ML20216D9421999-07-28028 July 1999 Forwards Safety Evaluation Granting Requests for Relief from Requirements of ASME Code,Section XI for Second 10-year ISI Interval for James a FitzPatrick NPP JAFP-99-0229, Forwards Three Sets of Corrected Summaries of Changes for Inclusion Into Security Plan for Ja FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant,Rev 19 & Security Contingency Plan,Rev 5.Encls Withheld Per 10CFR73.21 & 10CFR2.790)d)(1)1999-07-22022 July 1999 Forwards Three Sets of Corrected Summaries of Changes for Inclusion Into Security Plan for Ja FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant,Rev 19 & Security Contingency Plan,Rev 5.Encls Withheld Per 10CFR73.21 & 10CFR2.790)d)(1) JAFP-99-0228, Forwards Rept Re Changes & Errors in ECCS Evaluation Models, Per 10CFR50.46(a)(3)(ii) for Period from 980701-990630.No Commitments Contained in Submittal1999-07-21021 July 1999 Forwards Rept Re Changes & Errors in ECCS Evaluation Models, Per 10CFR50.46(a)(3)(ii) for Period from 980701-990630.No Commitments Contained in Submittal ML20210A7001999-07-16016 July 1999 Forwards Request for Addl Info to Supplement Response Provided for GL 97-05, Steam Generator Tube Insp Techniques JAFP-99-0208, Provides Clarification of Info Re Proposed Its, & 0601.Table Reconciling Differences,Encl1999-07-14014 July 1999 Provides Clarification of Info Re Proposed Its, & 0601.Table Reconciling Differences,Encl ML20209D5511999-07-0606 July 1999 Informs That as Result of NRC Review of Licensee Response to GL 92-01,rev 1,suppl 1,staff Revised Info in Reactor Vessel Integrity Database & Releasing Database as Rvid Version 2 ML20210C9031999-06-30030 June 1999 Summarizes Impact of Changes & Errors in Methodology Used by GE to Demonstrate Compliance with ECCS Requirements of 10CFR50.46.Summary of Changes & Errors Provided in Attached Table JPN-99-021, Forwards Application for Amend to License DPR-59,changing to Pressure Temp Limits.Pressure Temp Curves & Associated LCO & Bases Changes Included in Proposed Amend1999-06-22022 June 1999 Forwards Application for Amend to License DPR-59,changing to Pressure Temp Limits.Pressure Temp Curves & Associated LCO & Bases Changes Included in Proposed Amend JPN-99-020, Submits Response to RAI Re ISI Program Relief Requests for Second 10-yr Interval Closeout & Summary Rept,Per 990426 Telcon with Nrc.Info Provided to Clarify or Withdraw Individual Relief Requests Contained in Summary Rept1999-06-21021 June 1999 Submits Response to RAI Re ISI Program Relief Requests for Second 10-yr Interval Closeout & Summary Rept,Per 990426 Telcon with Nrc.Info Provided to Clarify or Withdraw Individual Relief Requests Contained in Summary Rept ML20196G2981999-06-18018 June 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-333/99-04 on 990412 to 0529.Violations Being Treated as non-cited Violations ML20212J0541999-06-17017 June 1999 Responds to Requesting That NRC Staff ...Allow BWR Plants Identified to Defer Weld Overlay Exams Until March 2001 or Until Completion of NRC Staff Review & Approval of Proposed Generic Rept,Whichever Comes First JPN-99-019, Withdraws Recent Exemption Request Re 10CFR50,App R, Use of Core Spray to Achieve Safe Shutdown. Exemption Dealt with Use of Core Spray for Reactor Coolant Makeup to Achieve Safe Shutdown in One Fire Area at Plant1999-06-15015 June 1999 Withdraws Recent Exemption Request Re 10CFR50,App R, Use of Core Spray to Achieve Safe Shutdown. Exemption Dealt with Use of Core Spray for Reactor Coolant Makeup to Achieve Safe Shutdown in One Fire Area at Plant ML20196L1451999-06-0707 June 1999 Informs That NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Reorganized Effective 990328.As Part of Reorganization,Div of Licensing Project Mgt Created.Ss Bajwa Will Be Section Chief for Ja Fitzpatrick & Indian Point NPPs JPN-99-018, Forwards Revised Application,Previously Submitted,For Amend to Plant TS for Converting CTS to ITS Consistent with Improved Std TS (NUREG-1433,Rev 1)1999-06-0101 June 1999 Forwards Revised Application,Previously Submitted,For Amend to Plant TS for Converting CTS to ITS Consistent with Improved Std TS (NUREG-1433,Rev 1) ML20207D9191999-05-27027 May 1999 Informs That on 990521 NRC Staff Held Planning Meeting to Identify Insp Activities at Facility Over Next Six Months JAFP-99-0171, Forwards Revised Ja FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant 1999 FSAR Update. Update Also Includes Changes to Chapter 17, QA Program Which Described in Attachment 1.No Commitments Contained in Ltr1999-05-20020 May 1999 Forwards Revised Ja FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant 1999 FSAR Update. Update Also Includes Changes to Chapter 17, QA Program Which Described in Attachment 1.No Commitments Contained in Ltr JPN-99-016, Forwards Application for Amend to License DPR-59,requesting 14 Day AOT for EDG Sys.Commitment Made by Util,Encl1999-05-19019 May 1999 Forwards Application for Amend to License DPR-59,requesting 14 Day AOT for EDG Sys.Commitment Made by Util,Encl ML20207A6751999-05-17017 May 1999 Forwards RAI Re 960626 Submittal & Suppl Related to IPEEEs for Plant.Licensee Committed to Revise Plant Fire IPEEE to Reflect Issues Associated with EPRI Fire PRA Implementation Guide within 120 Days of Issues Resolution JAFP-99-0168, Forwards Eight Operator License Renewal Applications for Listed Individuals.Without Encls1999-05-13013 May 1999 Forwards Eight Operator License Renewal Applications for Listed Individuals.Without Encls ML20206N0721999-05-11011 May 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-333/99-03 on 990301-0411.Four Violations of NRC Requirements Occurred & Being Treated as non-cited Violations,Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy JAFP-99-0160, Forwards 1998 Annual Radiological Environ Operating Rept for Ja FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. Distribution for Rept Is IAW Reg Guide 10.1,Rev 41999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards 1998 Annual Radiological Environ Operating Rept for Ja FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. Distribution for Rept Is IAW Reg Guide 10.1,Rev 4 ML20206C8551999-04-27027 April 1999 Informs That Util 990406 Submittal, Licensing Rept for Reracking of Ja FitzPatrick Spent Fuel Pool,Rev 7, Will Be Marked as Proprietary & Will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure Pursuant to 10CFR2.790(b)(5) & Section 103(b) ML20205T1141999-04-22022 April 1999 Provides Comments from Technical Review of Draft Info Notice Re Unanticipated Reactor Water Draindown at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2,ANO,Unit 2 & JAFNPP JPN-99-012, Informs That Authority Identified Typographical Error on Page 3 of Attachment 3 of 990331 Response to NRC RAI Re App R.Corrected Response to NRC Question 3 Is Attached1999-04-16016 April 1999 Informs That Authority Identified Typographical Error on Page 3 of Attachment 3 of 990331 Response to NRC RAI Re App R.Corrected Response to NRC Question 3 Is Attached ML20205P4641999-04-15015 April 1999 Forwards for Review & Comment Draft Info Notice That Describes Unanticipated Reactor Water Draindown at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Unit 2,Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 & Ja Fitzpatrick NPP ML20205P1991999-04-0909 April 1999 Discusses 990224 PPR & Forwards Plant Issues Matrix & Insp Plan.Advises of Planned Insp Effort Resulting from Plant PPR Review JAFP-99-0129, Submits Comments on Technical Review of Draft Info Notice Describing Unanticipated Reactor Water Draindown at Quad Cities Unit 2,ANO & FitzPatrick1999-04-0909 April 1999 Submits Comments on Technical Review of Draft Info Notice Describing Unanticipated Reactor Water Draindown at Quad Cities Unit 2,ANO & FitzPatrick JAFP-99-0127, Forwards Affidavit Signed by Holtec Which Describes Proprietary Nature of Licensing Rept & Addresses Considerations Listed in 10CFR2.790.Attachment 4 in Util Re Design Features Should Be Withheld1999-04-0808 April 1999 Forwards Affidavit Signed by Holtec Which Describes Proprietary Nature of Licensing Rept & Addresses Considerations Listed in 10CFR2.790.Attachment 4 in Util Re Design Features Should Be Withheld JAFP-99-0124, Forwards Rev 19 to JAFNPP Security Plan,Which Enhances Requirements of 10CFR73.55.Changes Do Not Decrease Safeguards Effectiveness of Plan.Plan Withheld IAW 10CFR73.21 & 2.790(d)(1)1999-04-0707 April 1999 Forwards Rev 19 to JAFNPP Security Plan,Which Enhances Requirements of 10CFR73.55.Changes Do Not Decrease Safeguards Effectiveness of Plan.Plan Withheld IAW 10CFR73.21 & 2.790(d)(1) ML20205M8941999-04-0707 April 1999 Forwards Rev 21 to App C of JAFNPP Emergency Plan & Rev 1 to EAP-32, Recovery Support Group Manager JAFP-99-0125, Forwards Rev 5 to JAFNPP Security Contingency Plan,Which Enhances Requirements of 10CFR73.55.Changes Do Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan.Plan Withheld IAW 10CFR73.21 & 2.790(d)(1)1999-04-0707 April 1999 Forwards Rev 5 to JAFNPP Security Contingency Plan,Which Enhances Requirements of 10CFR73.55.Changes Do Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan.Plan Withheld IAW 10CFR73.21 & 2.790(d)(1) 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML20217M1851999-10-19019 October 1999 Forwards NRC Rept Number 17, Requal Tracking Rept from Operator Licensing Tracking Sys.Rept Was Used by NRC to Schedule Requalification Exam for Operators & Record Requal Pass Dates ML20212F8341999-09-22022 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-333/99-07 on 990718-0828.No Violations Noted ML20212A6951999-09-0909 September 1999 Requests That Licensees Affected by Kaowool Fire Barriers Take Issue on Voluntary Initiative & Propose Approach for Resolving Subj Issues.Staff Plans to Meet with Licensees to Discuss Listed Topics ML20212A8341999-09-0909 September 1999 Requests That Licensees Affected by Kaowool Fire Barriers Take Issue on Voluntary Initiative & Propose Approach for Resolving Subj Issues.Staff Plans to Meet with Licensees to Discuss Listed Topics ML20211N4301999-09-0808 September 1999 Discusses Proposed Meeting to Discuss Kaowool Fire Barriers. Staff Requesting That Affected Licensees Take Issue on Voluntary Initative & Propose Approach for Resolving Issues ML20210U2621999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-333/99-06 on 990601-0717.No Violations Noted ML20216D9421999-07-28028 July 1999 Forwards Safety Evaluation Granting Requests for Relief from Requirements of ASME Code,Section XI for Second 10-year ISI Interval for James a FitzPatrick NPP ML20210A7001999-07-16016 July 1999 Forwards Request for Addl Info to Supplement Response Provided for GL 97-05, Steam Generator Tube Insp Techniques ML20209D5511999-07-0606 July 1999 Informs That as Result of NRC Review of Licensee Response to GL 92-01,rev 1,suppl 1,staff Revised Info in Reactor Vessel Integrity Database & Releasing Database as Rvid Version 2 ML20196G2981999-06-18018 June 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-333/99-04 on 990412 to 0529.Violations Being Treated as non-cited Violations ML20212J0541999-06-17017 June 1999 Responds to Requesting That NRC Staff ...Allow BWR Plants Identified to Defer Weld Overlay Exams Until March 2001 or Until Completion of NRC Staff Review & Approval of Proposed Generic Rept,Whichever Comes First ML20196L1451999-06-0707 June 1999 Informs That NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Reorganized Effective 990328.As Part of Reorganization,Div of Licensing Project Mgt Created.Ss Bajwa Will Be Section Chief for Ja Fitzpatrick & Indian Point NPPs ML20207D9191999-05-27027 May 1999 Informs That on 990521 NRC Staff Held Planning Meeting to Identify Insp Activities at Facility Over Next Six Months ML20207A6751999-05-17017 May 1999 Forwards RAI Re 960626 Submittal & Suppl Related to IPEEEs for Plant.Licensee Committed to Revise Plant Fire IPEEE to Reflect Issues Associated with EPRI Fire PRA Implementation Guide within 120 Days of Issues Resolution ML20206N0721999-05-11011 May 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-333/99-03 on 990301-0411.Four Violations of NRC Requirements Occurred & Being Treated as non-cited Violations,Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy ML20206C8551999-04-27027 April 1999 Informs That Util 990406 Submittal, Licensing Rept for Reracking of Ja FitzPatrick Spent Fuel Pool,Rev 7, Will Be Marked as Proprietary & Will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure Pursuant to 10CFR2.790(b)(5) & Section 103(b) ML20205P4641999-04-15015 April 1999 Forwards for Review & Comment Draft Info Notice That Describes Unanticipated Reactor Water Draindown at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Unit 2,Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 & Ja Fitzpatrick NPP ML20205P1991999-04-0909 April 1999 Discusses 990224 PPR & Forwards Plant Issues Matrix & Insp Plan.Advises of Planned Insp Effort Resulting from Plant PPR Review ML20205F8031999-04-0202 April 1999 Forwards Draft Info Notice Describing Unanticipated Reactor Water Draindown of Listed Plants ML20205C1041999-03-26026 March 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-333/99-02 on 990125-0209.No Violations Noted.Insp Evaluated Results of Investigation Into Causes of 990114 Hydrogen Fire Event & Licensee Response to Event. Licensee Overall Response to Event,Acceptable ML20204J3791999-03-23023 March 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-333/99-01 on 990111-0228.No Violations Noted.Security Program Was Effectively Implemented ML20203E9231999-02-10010 February 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-333/98-08 on 981123-990110.No Violations Noted.Conduct of Activities Generally Characterized by safety-conscious Operations,Sound Engineering & Maintenance Practices ML20203B9001999-02-0808 February 1999 First Partial Response to FOIA Request for Documents. Forwards Documents Listed in App a Already Available in PDR, Documents in App B Released in Entirety & Documents in App C Being Withheld in Part (Ref Exemption 6) ML20202J0571999-02-0303 February 1999 Forwards Safety Evaluation Authorizing Rev 2 of Third Interval Inservice Testing Program for Pumps & Valves for James a FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant ML20202C1871999-01-26026 January 1999 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Util 971014 Request for Changes to James a Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant TSs to Increase Capacity of Sf Pool.Response Requested within 30 Days of Date of Ltr ML20203H8941999-01-21021 January 1999 Forwards Notice of Withdrawal of Application for Amend to License DPR-59.Amend Would Have Modified TS Re Inservice Leak & Hydrostatic Testing Operations ML20199G7161999-01-19019 January 1999 Informs That NRC Review of Relief Requests Submitted on 980126 for James a FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, Considered Complete ML20198L4041998-12-17017 December 1998 Forwards Insp Rept 50-333/98-07 on 981005-1122 & NOV Re Design Deficiency That Resulted in Main Steam Safety Relief Valve Pilot Solenoid Cables Not Being Installed in Conduit ML20198C2331998-12-15015 December 1998 Ltr Contract:Task Order 236, Review & Evaluation of Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant Application for Conversion to Improved TS, Under Contract NRC-03-95-026 ML20198B4531998-12-10010 December 1998 Advises of Planned Insp Effort Resulting from Insp Resource Planning Meeting on 981110.Historical Listing of Plant Issues Encl ML20198F9861998-12-0404 December 1998 Forwards Assessment Re Util 980916 Info Re NRC Bulletin 96-003, Potential Plugging of ECC Suction Strainers by Debris in Bwr. NRC Agrees with Util Conclusion That Plant Remains within Licensing Basis ML20196J3431998-12-0404 December 1998 Forwards SER Accepting Util Program for Periodic Verification of MOV design-basis Capability at FitzPatrick in Response to GL 96-05 ML20196F9181998-11-25025 November 1998 Forwards Safety Evaluation Re Third 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Program Relief Requests for Plant ML20195K3631998-11-17017 November 1998 Forwards SE Authorizing IST Program Relief Request VRR-05, Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) & Relief Requests PRR-01,PRR-02R1, PRR-03,PRR-04,VRR-02,VRR-03 & VRR-04,per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(ii) ML20195D9711998-11-13013 November 1998 Forwards SE Accepting Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves, Issued on 950817 ML20195B7331998-11-0505 November 1998 Submits Request for Addl Info Re Proposed Extension of Emergency Diesel Generator Allowed Outage Time ML20155H5251998-11-0303 November 1998 Forwards SE Authorizing Licensee 980508 Request for Relief from Certain ASME Code Requirements at Ja FitzPatrick Npp. Licensee Requested Relief from Requirements for Addl Exams of CRD Bolting When Cracks Detected in head-to-shank Area ML20155H5751998-11-0303 November 1998 Forwards SE Authorizing Proposed Alternative to RPV Shell Weld Exam Requirements of Both ASME BPV Code,Section XI,1989 Edition & Augmented Exam Requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(A)(2) for Ja FitzPatrick NPP ML20155B5681998-10-27027 October 1998 Informs That GE Rept GENE-187-30-0598,DRF B13-01920-30, CRD Bolting Flaw Evaluation for Ja FitzPatrick Np, Rev 0,dtd May 1998,submitted by 980507 Affidavit Will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure,Per 10CFR2.790(b)(5) ML20154Q9251998-10-19019 October 1998 Forwards RAI Re GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions ML20154Q5111998-10-16016 October 1998 Responds to Re Concerns on Use of Reactor Building Crane to Move Sf with Fuel Pool at Jafnpp.Regrets That Did Not Address Concerns in Satisfactory Manner & Provides Addl Info Re Concerns ML20154L6381998-10-14014 October 1998 Forwards SE Accepting Licensee 980126 Submittal of ISI Program & Relief Requests for Third 10-year Interval for Plant ML20154M0951998-10-14014 October 1998 Forwards Insp Rept 50-333/98-06 on 980824-1004.No Violations Noted.Testing & Control Room Operations Were Conducted Appropriately with Formal Communications ML20154L2371998-10-13013 October 1998 Responds to Util Re NRC Bulletin 96-003, Potential Plugging of ECC Suction Strainers by Debris in BWR, Which Addressed Issues Discussed in 980521 Meeting. Request to Defer Completion of Actions Acceptable ML20154B3951998-09-29029 September 1998 Provides Addl Info Re Response to GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions ML20154B3421998-09-28028 September 1998 Advises That Info Contained in 980803 Application Re cycle-specific Safety Limit Min Critical Power Ratio for Cycle 14,will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure,Per 10CFR2.790 ML20154B8201998-09-28028 September 1998 Forwards Insp Rept 50-333/98-05 on 980727-0814 & NOV Re Failure to Analyze Effects of LOCA Plus LOOP on Containment Penetration Protection ML20153F8791998-09-22022 September 1998 Forwards RAI Re Licensee Response to GL 96-05 for Plant & Indicating Intent to Implement Provisions of JOG Program on motor-operated Valve Periodic Verification ML20153D2551998-09-21021 September 1998 Forwards SE Accepting Proposed Alternative Testing of Containment Following ECCS Suction Strainer Replacement ML20153B3341998-09-14014 September 1998 Advises That Matl Marked as Proprietary in from Pasn & 980625 Affidavit from Holtec Intl Will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure Per 10CFR2.790(b)(5) & Section 103(b) of Atomic Energy Act of 1954,as Amended 1999-09-09
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August 12, 1997
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Mr. Michael Site Executive Officer New York Power Authority James A.' FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Post Office Box 41-Lycoming,.NY 13093
Dear Mr. Colomb:
Subject: NRC Inspection Report No. 50 333/97 03 and Notice of Violation
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, This letter refers to your July 30,1997 correspondence, in response to our June 29,1997 letter.
Thank you for informing us of the corrective and preventive actions documented in your
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letters. These actions will be examinec' during a future inspection of your licensed program.
Your cooperation with us is appreciated.
Sincerely, Original Signed by:
John F. Rogge, Chief Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-333 cc:
~ C. Rappleyea, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
'R. Schoenberger, President and Chief Operating Officer J. Knubel, Chief Nuclear Officer and Senior Vice President
.H. P. Salmon,- Jr., Vice Presider.. of Nuclear Operations W. Josiger, Vice President - Engineering and Project Management J. Kelly, Director - Regulatory Affairs and Special Projects T. Dougherty, Vice President - Nuclear Engineering l R. Deasy, Vice President - Appraisal and Compliance Services R. Patch, Director - Quality Assurance l-l G. Goldstein, Assistant General Counsel C. Faison, Director, Nuclear Licensing lllllh!k,5 K. Peters, Licensing Manager
' T. Morra, Executive Chair, Four County Nuclear Safety Committee 9708290146 970812-PDR ADOCK 05000333 G PDR OFFICIAL RECORD COPY IE:01
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Michael cc w/ copy of Licensee's Response Letter:
Supervisor, Town of Scriba_
C. Donaldsoni Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, New York Department of Law P. Eddy, Director, Electric Division, Department of Public Service, State of New York G. T. Goering, Consultant, New York Power Authority J. E. Gagliardo, Consultant, New York Power Authority E. S. Beckjord, Consultant, New York Power Authority F. William Valentino, President, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority J. Spath, Program Director, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority s
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Michael Distribution w/ copy of Licensee's Response Letter:
RI EDO Coordinator A. Dromerick, NRR K. Cotton, NRR D. Hood, NRR M. Campion, RI R. Correia, NRR F. Talbot, NRR Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
PUBLIC NRC Resident inspector Region l Docket Room (with concurrences)
Inspection Program Branch, NRR (IPAS)
J. Rogge, DRP R. Barkley, DRP R. Junod, DRP DOCDESK
DOCUMENT NAME: A:\RL9703.FTZ
- To receive a copy of this document, Indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment / enclosure "E" =
Copy with attachment / enclosure '"N" = No copy l OFFICE Hl/DRP Rl/DRP lNAME- GHunegs JRogge /J d ,
lDATE 08/gl97-- 08/tg9T OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
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, ,
, . Nucteer Power Ptent
- K4 Lcks Motd Po Bos 41 Lycomeg, New York 13093 315 342 3640
- > NewWrkPower Ze'd!da";!
4# Authority
July 30, 1997 l
JAFP-97-0268 -
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Mail Station P1 137 Washington, DC 20555
!
SUBJECT: James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50 333 Reply to Notice of Violation 14RC SoecialInsoection Reoort 50 333/97 03 Gentlemen:
In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Notice of Violation, the Authority submits a response to the notice transmitted by your letter dated June 23,1997. Your letter refers to the results of the special safety inspection cor. ducted by Messrs. G. Hunegs, L. Briggs, and R. Fernandes from March 4,1997 to March 13,1997, at the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.
The Authority believes the corrective actions taken have been effective in improving our human performance. There have been no significant errors since the March 3,1997 ovent and there is indication that the number of personnel errors has decreased through the last quarter (April- June,1997). A heightened awareness of human performance has been achieved. Daily and weekly manager observations in the field have noted personnel exercising sound decision making and a questioning attitude. When discrepancies are identified, corrections are made and the appropriate feedback is provided to the plant staff via standdowns, tailgates, or briefs. Senior Plant Management continues to reinforce that reactor safety a a site and individual culture that must be personalized in our day-to day activities. Emphasis and monitoring of human performance results will continue to ensure an improving trend.
Attachment 1 provides the description of the violation, reason for the violation, the corrective actions that.have been taken and the results achieved, corrective actions to be taken to avoid'further violations, and the date of full compliance.
There are no commitments contained in this submittal, if you have any questions, please contact Mr. Arthur Zaremba at (315) 349-6365.
Very truly your
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STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF OSWEGO
- Subscribed and sworn to before me
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l MICHAEL J. COLOMB
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p<" [* this 30 day of Ldt,
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,1997.
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MJC: RAP:las Netary Pdblic c: Next page NANCY B. CZEROW Notary Pubitc. state of NewYork Quelmed in oewego County e4664611 i ? Commleston Empiree _ h * k- U #
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- cc: Regional Administratcr U.S. Nuclear __ Regulatory Commission -
475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406
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Office of the Resident inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 136 Lycoming, Nsw York 13093 Ms. K. Cotton, Acting Project Manager Project Directorate 11 Division of Reactor Projects l/II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 14 B2
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Washington, DC 20555 Attachments:
Reply to Notice of Violation
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Reply tD Notico ef Viol:: tion f Sneelal Innoaction Raoort 97-03 -
L Violation ,
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Technical Specification 6.8(A)2 requires that written procedures and administrative
- . policies shail be established, implemented and maintained that are recommended in App'endix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, November 1972. Appendix A of Regulatory
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Guide 1.33 requires. operating procedures governing the controlrod drive system and administrative procedures for safe operation. Operations Survelliance Test i
- Procedure (ST 20C) governs testing to verify control rod drive system operability; l
paragraph 8.1.16, in particular, govems the performance of a controlrod coupling Integrity check. NYPA Administration Procedure (AP)-12.03, Administration of Operations, Revision 9, provides direction Vo plant personnel concerning general
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practices and philosophy for safety operations. Paragraph 7.2 requires that self.
l checking shall be practiced when operating plant equipment and paragraph 8.17,
. Reactivity Management, requires independent verification of correct controlrod v selection and motion.
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' Contrary to the above, on March 3,1997, ST-20C was not followed in that a
- control rod that was not fully withdrawn to position 48 was selected for movement
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and the shift manager's permission was not obtained prior the performance of the evolution. In addition, self checking and independent verification of correct control
- rod selection and motion was not accomplished during this control rod
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manipulation, resulting in a mispositioned controlrod. The consequence of this
!. error was an unplanned, but modest reactivity addition.
This is a severity LevelIV violation (Supplement I).
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Adminnlon Or Danlal Of The Allaaed Violation i
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The Authority agrees with this violation.
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Ransons for Violation i The cause of this violation was personnel error. A team root cause analysis of this event identified the following human performance problems:
Work Praceh - Self-Checkina
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- - When the RO initiated control rod movement, he failed to monitor available indications that would have immediately told him enexpected rod movement-4- was taking place. Self-checking was not applied to verify rod selection and ensure the expected response. Rod motion was terminated on the receipt of the rod block, a design feature, as opposed to being recognized and
. . terminated by the RO. In addition, a second ' qualified' individual was not __
present to assist in monitoring indications to detect rod motion (were it to occur) contrary to the expectations of AP 12.03.
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Reply t*> N:ti:o cf Viol: tion t'
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Snecial innosction Reoort 97 03 i Work Practican - Document Use
- The RO did not refer to the coupling check surveillance procedure and selected a control rod for the coupling check that was not fully withdrawn as
. he intended. The CRS and the RO considered a second verification of the selected control rod required by administrative procedure AP 12.03, Administration of Operations, was not required because actual rod motion was not anticipated.
Sunervisorv Methods
- The Control Room Supervisor (CRS) granted permission to perform an unplanned, unscheduled evolution without notifying th; Shift Manager (SM).
The CRS did not recognize that a control rod coupling check could result in control rod movement and associated reactivity changes. As a result of not recognizing potential adverse consequences of performing this task, the CRS direction to the Reactor Operator (RO) was informal and did not adequately communicate job performance and self checking standards.
. Manaaeria! Methods
- Management expectations prohibiting plant equipment manipulations solely for training was not clearly communicated. The absence of a clearly defined policy allowed this evolution to proceed without an adequate assessment of risks and consequences because it was an unscheduled, unplanned task, liabit Intrusion c
- The CRS and RO were not focused on the task, they viewed the task as
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easy to perform. The individuals involved had actually performed or observed many coupling checks in the past during surveillance testing. The RO did not self check rod selection and focused his attention entirely on control rod drive (CRD) system hydraulic parameters and explanation of
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system response to the trainee.
Corrective Actions That Have Been Taken o -
- The improperly withdrawn control rod was restored to its original location (position 22).
- The CRS and RO were removed from licensed responsibilities and disciplined in accordance with Human Resources policies. Fitness' for Duty for cause testing was conducted on the RO with negative results. Both individuals were placed in a remedial training program. The CRS has been successfully remediated and retumed to licensed duties.
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. . R: ply to Nctiso cf VI:lation
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SpecialInsoection Rooort 97-03
- Immediately after the event, the Operations Manager suspended reactivity manipulations for license candidates and conducted standdown briefings for all Operations personnel before their next operating shift to communicate the following:
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- A clear definition that any manipulation of the rod movement control switch is a control rod manipulation and a reactivity manipulation regardless of the circumstances.
- Reinforced the special nature of any reactivity manipulation as requiring the full concentration of the control room staff.
- Defined the condition under which control rod manipulation could be performed and by whose authority (i.e., Shift Manager).
- Established that plant equipment status changes for training purposes is not permitted unless planned, scheduled, and properly assessed for plant risks.
Emphasized the responsibility of SRO's and RO's to question and challenge all activities, even those that appear uncomplicated and
- reinforced expectations for procedure use, self-checking, reactor safety, and communication.
- AP 12.03 has been revised to identify the critical responsibilities and authorities associated with reactivity control and plant configuration control that are to be implemented in a consistent manner shift to shift. It has also been revised to formalize the expectations for equipment manipulations performed for training.
- The Operations Department implemented a peer check policy to improve individual focus on contiol room panel manipulation. This type of policy has been successful at other utilities in helping prevent personnel errors.
- The Operations Manager conducted training on lessons learned from 14 industry events'that emphasized the importance of: supervisory oversight in the control room; procedure use; teamwork; operating practices; and reactivity management. All operators and operations training instructors
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attended.
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, . Reply t3 N3tico cf VI:l:ti:n Soncial Innoection Report 97-03 Results Achieved Management oversight during scheduled plant power reductions have shown that our Operations personnel are performing these evolutions in the proper manner with the proper respect and formality required for reactivity manipulations.
Management observations and oversight of other reactivity manipulations required for scheduled maintenance or core management have also confirmed that these manipulations are being conducted in a manner which meets management expectations. These observations have been conducted in the Control Room and plant simulator.
Qorrective Actions To Be Taken Plant management has implemented and promulgated expectations in the area of Control Room operations with additional emphasis on reactivity manipulations.
Management will continue to provide the oversight needed to reinforce that reactor safety is a site and individual culture that must be personalized in our day to-day activities. Operator performance continues to be monitored and coached both on shift and in training.
Operations staff meetings are being conducted every two weeks and are normally attended by SRO's from 3 or 4 of the six operating shifts. These meetings are providing an excellent forum for discussing department operating standards. These meetings in the future will provide a continuing mechanism for reinforcing JAF operating philosophies, including the need for a questioning attitude.
Management observations and assessments will continue to be conducted to ensure continued improvement in Control Room formality and questioning attitude.
Data When Full Comollance Will Be Achieved Full compliance was achieved upon restoration of the control rod to its original location at position 22 on March 3,1997.
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