IR 05000155/1988013

Insp Rept 50-155/88-13 on 880602-0718.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Surveillance Observation of Pressure Test on NSSS & Reactor Depressurization Sys & Security Observations Re Day to Day Plant Activities

ML20151T203
Person / Time
Site:	Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png
Issue date:	08/05/1988
From:	Jackiw I NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20151T187	List: ML20151T183 ML20151T196 ML20151T203
References
50-155-88-13, IEB-88-005, IEB-88-007, IEB-88-5, IEB-88-7, NUDOCS 8808160287
Download: ML20151T203 (8)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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l REGION III I f

hport No. 50-155/88013(DRP)

Docket No. 50-155 License No. DPR-6 Licensee: Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name: Big Rock Point Nu ear Plant Inspection At: Charlevoix, MI 49720 Inspection Conducted: June 2 through July 18, 1988 ,

Inspector: E. Plettner 8'd 7N Uate Inspector: N. Williamsen .

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Approved By: 1 N  !

ReactorPyojectsSection28 Date Inspection Summary Inspection on June 2 through July 18,1988 (Report No. 50-155/88-013(DRP))

Areas Inspected: The inspection was routine, unannounced, and conducted by-the Senior Resident Inspector and the Resident Inspector. The functional '

areas inspected consisted of the followina areas. Surveillance observation of the pressure test on the nuclear steam supply system and the reactor depressurization system. Maintenance observation of work performed on motor operated isolation valves and the reinstallation of the reactor depressurization valves. Operational safety verification, radiological

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practices, and security observations involving day to day plant activitie Startup/ refuel activities associated with the refuel and startup of the reactor. NRC Bulletins on defective piping material and pover oscillations

ir, boiling water reactor Results: The licensee has demonstrated a desire to respond in a timely manner to issues and concerns presented to them by the NRC. The surveillance, maintenanca, operational safety, radiological program, and the security program appeared to ensure public health and safety. Two violations were

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identified in this report. The violation in the maintenance section addresses inadequate quality controls and the violation in the operational safety section addresses the failure to follow procedure when using a copy

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of a controlled documen gDR ApoCK 05000155 '

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DETAILS Persons Contacted

• T. Elward, Plant Superintendent

• A. Pet'tjean, Planni:ig and Administrative Services Superintendent G. Withrow, Engineering Maintenance Superintendent

• R. Alexander Technical Engineer L. Monshor, Quality As:urance Superintendent

• J. Seer, Chemistry / Health Physics Superintendent

• R. Scheels, ' Acting Operations Supervisor

"R. Hill, Sr. QA Consultant

• P. Donnelly, Nuclear Assurance Administrator

• R. Schrader, E & M Superintendent, Acting .

• Bielinski, Production and Plant Performance, Superintendent, Acting

• T. Hagan, Director Nuclear Training The inspector a'.so contacted other licensee personnel in the Operations, Maintenance, Radiation Protection, and Technical Department * Denotes those present at exit intervie . Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The NRC inspectors observed Technical Specification required surveillance tests. The reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility surveillance operations were performed in accordance with the requirements established in the Operating License and Technical Specificatio The Senior Resident Inspector (SRI) observed the licensee's performance of the following surveillance tests on the indicated dates:

June 20, 1988, TV-10, "Pressure Test of Nuclear Steam Supply System,"

Revision 37, dated June 14, 1988, with approved. temporary changes to allow the use of a new hydro test pump. A failed relief valve in the Reactor Water Clean-up System was noted during the test. A maintenance work order was issued and a new valve installed. The licensee also replaced two other relief valves in the system since they were the same age as the failed valve. A second test was performed and observed by the SRI on June 22, 1988, with satisfactory result July 13,1988, T30-30, "RDS Cabinet Test (Sensor Cabinet C/ Actuation Cabinet 3)," Revision 24, dated January 11, 1988. The procedure was satisfactorily performed by a licensed operator and an auxiliary operato No violations or deviations were identified in this are _ _

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. Monthly Maintenance Observation ' ?703)

Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specification The following items were considered during this review: the limiting .

conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing ond/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qual fied personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemente Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performanc On June 18, 1988, the SRI observed the performance of maintenance on motor operated Valve IA-760 under Work Request 88-PCS-007 The SRI reviewed the certification test reports of the Reactor Depressurization System Valves from Wyle Laboratory. The certification reports identified each main valve and its associated pilot valve, the full-stroke time, the leak rates, acceptance criteria, and test proceoure used to perform the test. Pilot valve assembly number one failed the test on the first attemp Repairs were made and testing was conducted with the second test results being satisfactory. The certificate numbers were 49294-1, -2, -3, and -4. The SRI observed the installation of the valves on June 24 and 25, 1988, under Maintenance Work Orders 88-RDS-065 and 06 During the refueling / maintenance outage the licensee replaced the diaphragms in the Control Rod Drive Scram Valves (CRDSV), a safety-related system. All 64 valve diaphragms were replaced and tested for proper operatio It was during post maintenance testing that personnel discovered excessive air leakage from the valves. The licensee investigated the problem and found that the diaphragms had been installed upside down and, in addition, four of the 64 diaphragms had been incorrectly manufactured resulting in failure of the diaphragm Subsequently, all 64 diaphragms, manufactured by Hammel-Dahl, were replaced for a second time. The licensee sent a letter to General Electric and the Boiling Water Reactor Owner's Group to inform them of the possible defective diaphragms. Big Rock Point was one of the first plants to replace these diaphragms because of General Electric's Service Information Letter No. 457. The SRI inquired into the amount of Quality Control (QC)

provided during the maintenance activit The results of the inquiry revealed that QC had reviewed the purchase agreement documents before work and work completion documents. During the first installation performed in

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April and May.1988, of the 64 diaphragms, no member'of:the plant's QC organization observed the activity through one complete disassembly, repai*, and reassembly process. No inspection was performed to include a dimensional. check of the diaphragms or a comparison between diaphragms fcr consistency. The failure to inspect installation activities.and perform measurements or tests of material ~ is an apparent violation of quality .

control requirements of 10 CFR 50, . Appendix B, Criterion X, as implemented by Big Rock Point's, "Quality Assurance Description for Operational Nuclear Power Plants," as described in Section 10. (155/88013-01).

Work on the CRDSVs was performed by Consumers Power Company's traveling ,

maintenance crew who had their own supervisor. Training was conducted for the crew prior to allowing work to commence on the CRDSV. Corrective actions taken b/ the licensee prior to the second installation in June 1988, were to revise the installation procedure, and have a plant QC individual observe at least one complete installation, The SRI verified by record review and interview that the licensee implemented the corrective actions. Full-stroke testing proved operability of the CRDS This problem resulted in an extended outage, a great deal of rework and testing, and additional cost to purchase the replacement part One violation was identified in this are . Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators-during the inspection period. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the containment sphere and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenanc The inspector observed plant housekeeping /

cleanliness conditions and controls. During the. inspection period, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the Reacto Depressurization Post Incident, Core Spray, and Containment Spray systems to. verify operabilit During plant tours conducted this period, the SRI noted that. copies of the controlled documents used to direct safety activities listed below were found at their associated work site without being marked "Working Copy" or "Working Controlled Copy," on the date shown:

June 18, 1988: System Operating Procedures (S0P) 19, "Make up System," Revision 14 June 21, 1988: S0P 15, "Condensate System," Revision 9 June 21, 1988: 50P 11, "Radioactive Waste System," Revision 11 July 6, 1988: Administrative Procedure 4.2.1, "Material Control," Revision . -

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10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, as implemented by Big Rock Point's,

"Quality Assurance Program Description for Operational Nucle'ar Power Plants," as described in Section 5.0, requires that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented procedures. Administrative Procedure 4.1.8 "Procedure Assurance," Revision 1, dated February 12, 1988, Section 12.0 titled "Short Term Controlled Documents," requires that controlled documents needed as working level procedures shall be clearly marked "Working Copy" or "Working Controlled Copy." Failure of the three working SOP's and the working Administrative Procedure to be marked

"Working Cr,sy" or "Working Controlled Copy," is an apparent violatio (155/88013-02).

One violation was identified in this are . Radiological Protection Observations (71709)

The NRC inspectors verified that-selected activities of the licensee's -

radiological protection program were. implemented in compliance with the facility policies, procedures, and regulatory requirements. The activities observed and/or reviewed during this inspection period were that health physics (HP) supervisory personnel were conducting plant tours to check on activities in progress. Radiation work permits contained the appropriate information to ensure work was performed in a safe and controlled manner. Personnel in radiation controlled areas (RCA) were wearing the required personnel monitoring equipment and protective clothing. Radiation and/or contamir.sted areas were properly posted and controlled based on the activity levels within the are Personnel properly frisked prior to exiting an RC No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Security Observations (71881)

The NRC Inspectors verified by observation or record review that physical security measures were being implemented as prescribed in the licensee's approved physical security plan. The elements contained in the inspection ,

were security manning requirements, access control of both personnel and' !

vehicles, and detection / assessment aids. Throughout the inspection period, the inspectors observed that personnel within the protected area )

(PA) properly displayed their identification badges. Vehicles were '

properly authorized, searcheu, and escorted or controlled within the P Persons and packages were properly checked and cleared before entry into the PA. When security equipment failure or impairment occurred the 1 required compensatory measures were empluyed. Security force actions !

were conducted in a professional manne '

No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Startup Testing - Refueling (72700)

On June 11, 1988, during refueling operations the licensee found that a l fuel bundle could not be placed into the position required by the fuel !

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load sequence Procedure TR-46. . Fuel loading activities were stopped until the problem could be resolved. The reactor had been verified subcritical throughout the performance of the procedure. Core verification was performed with a TV camera to ensure all remaining fuel bundles were correctly loade No other bundles were found out of position. The reactor engineer made the necessary temporary changes, with approval, to the fuel load sequence procedure to place the misplaced bundle into.its correct position. The remaining steps of the procedure were completed without further problems. Final core verification was performed satisfactoril The. licensee will be performing an' evaluation to determine the root cause and recommend actions to prevent reoccurrenc This apparent violation of the fuel load sequence procedure will not be issued because it appears to meet the five criteria stated in 10 CFR 2, Appendix C (V), Section G.1: (a) it was identified by the licensee; (b) it fits in Severity Level IV or V; (c) it was reported, if required; (d) It is being corrected including measures to prevent recurrence, within a reasonable time; and (e) it was not a violation that could reasonably be expected to have been prevented by the licensee's corrective action for a previous violatio On June 27, 1988, at 7:59 p.m., the reactor at Big Rock Point achieved criticality following an 80 day refueling outage. The NRC inspectors observed the start-up. Besides the normal on-shift crew, an extra Reactor Operator and Auxiliary Operator were present. The start-up was performed in a professional manner with detailed procedures. Procedures used during the start-up were TV-34, "Reactor Start-up with Low Source Counts,"

Re<1sion 3, dated February 20, 1987; General Operating Procedure (GOP) 1,

"Plant Start-up from Cold Shutdown," Revision 115, dated May 14, 1988; '

and Technical Data Book 15.5.I.2, "Control Rod Withdrawal and Insertion Sequence Cycle 23," Revision 8 The plant continued to heat up within required limits and the required turbine overspeed trip tests were performed. Problems were encountered when the licensee tried to place the generator on line. When an electrical problem c: curred in the generator excitation and automatic voltage control, power ascension was halted to perform repairs. After rep- were completed and power was raised to approximately 20 megawatts elt ., control room Operators noted that each one of the three nei . stalled Wide Range Monitor (WRM) nuclear systems was indicating lev e than expected. Power ascension was halted until a course of action could be determined by the Plant Review Committee (PRC). Following several hours of discussion, the PRC decided to allow Instrument and ,

Control (I&C) technicians to move the detectors to a higher flux positio '

At 4:54 a.m., on June 29, power was raised to 35 megawatts electrical and a heat balance calculation was performe i I&C technicians using the heat balance calculation results attempted to !

calibrate the WRMi s with no success. The shift supervisor contacted l appropriate management personnel and a decision was made to shutdown the reacto Plant personnel commenced shutdown at 5:25 a.m., per GOP-6, i

"Plant Shutdown to Hot Shutdown," Revision 115. Shutdown was completed '

at 7:47 a.m., when all rods were fully inserte !

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During.the review of this event, the. licensee determined that the' shutdown met the criteria of Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP-1) and at 8:00 a.m., on June 29, a Notification of-Unusual Event was declared. The NRC, the State.of Michigan, and the Charlevoix County Sheriff's Department were notified.within ten minutes. The event was terminated at 2:30 p.m.,

when the reactor achieved cold shutdown and the above agencies.were notified of the same. The licensee contacted General Electric, the equipment vendor, for assistance and subsequent repairs were completed by the morning of July 1. A reactor start-up was commenced per procedure but was terminated at 6:44 a.m., when the source range nuclear instruments failed to properly respond. A PRC meeting was conducted, a course of action was determined, subsequent repairs were.made, and post maintenance testing was completed. A reactor start-up commenced, with criticality being achieved at 5:41 p.m. on July When attempting to place the turbine generator on line early on July 2, a problem with the hydrogen seal oil system was discovered which resulted in a plant shutdown. Repairs were made and the reactor was re-started on July 7. The NRC inspector monitored the WRM's during power ascensio Following a heat balance calculation, I&C personnel were unable to calibrate WRM Channel 2. The channel was placed in the inoperable condition and power ascension was stopped until repairs could be accomplished. General Electric was contacted, repair parts for each of the three WRM channels were obtained and installed, and the WRM's were calibrated satisfactorily on July 1 Power ascension was resumed with heat balance calculations and calibrations of instruments being performed as necessar The NRC has been conducting a separate follow-up inspection of the problems encountered during the~ start-up of the WRM's. . Inspection Report No. 50-155/88017(DRS) will be completed after review of the Licensee's Event Report dealing with the same subjec No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Licensee Action on IE Bulletins

The NRC requested that all licensees review NRC Bulletin No. 88-05, Supplement 1, "Nonconforming Material Supplied By Piping Supplies Inc. at Folsom, New Jersey and West Jersey Manufacturing Company at Williamstown, New Jersey." The bulletin included information on defactive piping materials supplied by Piping Supplies Incorporated and also by West Jersey Manufacturing Company. The licensee's

investigation of the problem described in the bulletin revealed that Big Rock Point had never purchased any material from the above companie This item will remain open pending written confirmation from the license .. . .

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NRC Bulletin No. 88-07, "Power Oscillations In Boiling Water Reactors (BWR)," issued June 15,.1988, required all BWR licensees to thoroughly brief all licensed reactor operators or shift technical advisors regarding the March 9, 1988, LaSalle Unit 2 event within 15 days of receipt. The event involved excessive neutron flux oscillation while the reactor was on natural circulation. The licensee completed the briefing of required on-shift individuals within the 15 day Other' required members of the ~

licensee staff who were on leave reviewed the material upon their retur The SRI reviewed the attendance sheet to verify licensee's action Item 1 of Requested Actions for NRC Bulletin No. 88-07 is close No violations or deviations were ident).'ied in this are . Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

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throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection period and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged these findings. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietar P i

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