ML20245K902

Forwards 841219 Draft Memo Re Ineffective NRC Insp for Concurrence

ML20245K902
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford, 05000000
Issue date:	01/04/1984
From:	Martin R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:	Connelly S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR & AUDITOR (OIA)
Shared Package
ML20245J949	List: IR 05000445/1975005 ML20245J946 ML20245J952 ML20245J960 ML20245J974 ML20245K073 ML20245K109 ML20245K113 ML20245K131 ML20245K141 ML20245K153 ML20245K166 ML20245K176 ML20245K182 ML20245K195 ML20245K201 ML20245K207 ML20245K212 ML20245K218 ML20245K224 ML20245K308 ML20245K323 ML20245K328 ML20245K355 ML20245K421 ML20245K445 ML20245K474 ML20245K477 ML20245K487 ML20245K508 ML20245K512 ML20245K525 ML20245K785 ML20245K803 ML20245K807 ML20245K814 ML20245K833 ML20245K842 ML20245K848 ML20245K855 ML20245K869 ML20245K873 ML20245K890 ML20245K897 ML20245K902 TXX-1264, Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-445/75-05 & 50-446/75-05.Corrective Actions:Reactor Cavity Areas Containing Most Damage Removed as Part of Safeguards Bldg Excavation
References
FOIA-87-535 NUDOCS 8905050208
Download: ML20245K902 (1)

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NOTE TO: Sharon ly, OIA FROM: Robert Martin, RIV [h'

SUBJECT:

MEMORANDUM REGARDING INEFFECTIVE NRC INSPECTION -

Attached is my earlier memorandum drafted on December 19, 1984, same subject as above, which was inadvertently delayed during the review for concurrence.

Sorry for the delay. ,-

Enhart W sin Regional Administrator Attachment

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fEEDOM OF INFORMATION  !

ACT REQUEST l F3EEC:' OF INFORMATION ACT REQUEST f Director /hf,  %

office of Administration '

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20210 TO MHOM IT ?.AY CONCERN ,

Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA, 5 U.S.C. 552,) the '

Government Accountability Project (GAP) requests copies of any and all agency records and information, including but not limited to notes, letters, memoranda, drafts, minutes, diaries, logs, calenders, tapes, transcripts, summaries, interview reports, procedures, instructions, engineering analyses, drawings, files, graphs, charts, maps, photographs, ag re. enent s , handviritten notes , studies, data sheets, notebooks, books, teltphene messages, computations, voice recordings,. computer runoffs, and any :.ther data compilations, interirn and/or final reports, status reports, and any and all other records relevant to and or generated in connection with all NRC decisions and consideration of the Region IV problems including the recent considerations of problems in the OIA report 86-10 and subsequent overview inspections.

This reques: includes.all agency records as defined in 10 C.F.R. 9.3a(b) and the NRC Manual, Appendix 0211, Parts 1.A.2 and A.3 (approved October 8, 1980) whether they currently exist in the NRC offical, " working" investigative or other files, or at any other location, including private residences.

If any records as defined in 10 C.F.R. 9.3a(b)'and the NRC Manual, supra, and covered by this request have been destroyed and/or removed after this request, please provide all surrounding records, including but not-limited to a list of all records which have been or are destroyed and/or r e.r.o re d , a description of the action (s) taken relevant to, generated in conn-ection'with and/or issued in order to implement the action (s).

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orgui. : , n t io: cc: cc r:.oJ ' '- F o : . e n '. and econ govern:cen' . Through publi.e outreach, the Pra 'er . e r r... s '. ' h i n t ] o l d n.w r r, as agents of government cccountabi.ity. ' .:r c agh it :o v i r c::* . n t n : '!hi s Flob] cwer Cli nic, GAP offers assistLnce to lecal pubJic,interent and citizens groups and interveners in the ccncern for safety.ct nuclear po'..'er plants.

We are requestin; hhis information as part.of an. ongoing monitoring project of the NBC's efforts to protect _public health.and safety at and near .,.

nuclear processing plants / and radioactive waste facilities.

For any documents or portions that you deny due to a specific FOIA , . ,

l exemption, please prc/ide an index itemizing The index andshould describing provide theadocuments detailed or pcrtions of dccumnts withheld.

iustificaticn of your . grou:.ds f or claiming each exemption, explaining why each exemption is relevant..to the document or portion Rosen of the (I), document 404 F.2d 020 withheld. This index i( required under Vaugln,v.i _

(D.C. Cir. 1913),. cert. . denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974).

We look forward to your response to this request within ten (10) workAng days.

Sincerely,

'I Linda Bauman FOIA Coordinator

Midwest Office E c.: s p oa s o to this iccuesk shoujd bhi mailed Eo the Midwest Office:

104 E. Wisconsi:. Avenue ~B.. .

Applec tri; Wisconsin 54911-4897

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UNITE D STATES

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i January 17, 1985 MEMOPANDUM FOR: Sheron R. Conrrily, Director Of# ice of Inspretor and Auditor THRU: hellis Bevers, Actino Ts!ictant 04rectb for IrTectioPticrs, OlA FF0f t: Henry *.fiumenthal,investien+rrg.[h Office c' !r! rector err Auditor j 5!' EJECT: TR[STIGATIVE EALYSIC CF UATERFOPC ? ALL EGATIN S FECEIVEC FF # PEGinN !V Oh JANUARY /. 19P5 l Ttis is in response to a reccest ' reuived fror Fr. Follis Bowers on j January 9, 1985, to perferr an investigative aralysis er the materials for- l werded to you f ron Mr. Robert D. Martir, Reaion IV Administrator. The j materials, nov, found in File Inc. 85-11, concern miscellaneous information i dealing with the Ouality Assurance /0cality Control (QA/0C1 rroblens at the i Waterford 3 Nuclear Power Facility (Waterford 3) and NRC cversight of the QA/QC program. The key allegations contained in these materials that would be cf OIA interest are as follows:

1. The NRC (Regior IV) was bought and pair for by Louisiana Power erd Light (L P&L ) . This is partially responsible for $he poor state of construction and leck of quality at Waterferd 3. (A-343) (The allect. tion that follows, if confirred, would support this ellegation.)

2. The ineffectiveness of NRC Peoion IV inspections tr timely and j adequately detect, docur.ent, and fc110w up on improper 0A/0C practices t

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The numbers in parentheses are allegations identified in the Waterford SSEP No. 7, deted Septerher 1984

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01 file 4-84-010 may have additional specifics relating to the ineffectiveness of Region IV inspections, but as of 1/9/85 was incomplete and unavailable for review.

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I. A A and procedures exercised by the licensee (L&PL ), its prime contracter (Ebasco) and at least two subcontractors (Mercury of Norwood, Inc., end Torpfins-Beckwith) (A-46, A-47, A-118, A-Il9), i.e., the NRC:

2.1 Narrowly drfined issues raised by in'orrents and failed to inspect beyond hardware exampirs the informant was able to specifically ic'entify.

2.2 Failed to record interviews or take effidavits, particularly on the most sionificent issues being raised by informants.

2.3 Failed to include affidavits in the public reports vben the stater tr ts cont rac"c t ed the NRC 's of ficiel Iosition er the prrblenc. at ruclear plan't .

2.4 Feiled to kern tere with ner allecatiers ir. a tineiy r.eener.

2.5 Lent'ucted clos ed-dor r r.retinos wi+h utility erd contrar+0r executives when irvesticeting infoments' allegations.

2.6 Providec advance warrine tr utiliti,es about where and when Peoion JY was going tr irspect ha.rdware.

2.7 Relied on industry's tcchnical conclusions vithout disclesure o' supporting data anc' calculations fer evalurtion of infernent allegations.

2.8 Reviewed and informally approved licersee practices before approved by corporate officials with 0A responsibilities, thereby undercutting employees who tried to carry cut their duties objectively despite the pressure of nanacenent urgings that "it's all rigFt with Regior IV, so why are you holding things up?"

2.9 Attempted to discrec'it critics, e.g., inferrants, arti-nuclear crpanizations, or interested and concerned citizens, by questioning their motivations, patriotism, integrity, and technical competence to raise ouestions about public health and safety.

2.10 Destroyed draf ts of reports, significe.rt tape records, created secret files, failed to adnit the eyistence of documents requested under the Freedom of Inferration Act (F01A). j 2.11 Gave confidentiality to utility executives in order to prevent the public from learning how inspection findings were covered j up. '

2.12 Turned over to LP&L and Ebasco ell allegations fostering a cover up and exposing the ellegers. (A-342) j 2.13 Was " set up" (the Construction Appraisal Team (CAT)) by being given packages that were "croored." This was the reason for so few findings. (A-344) l L j

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2.14 Ignored findinas (the CAT) that were not in their area of inspection. (A-345)

Allegations 2.1 through 2.11 ebove were included within a " Statement of B'111e Perner Garde, Citizens for Accountable Government on the Vrterford 3 Nuclear Power Plant" dated April 11, 1984 As these allegations are somewhat generalized, more specific infomation is needed from the Government Accountability Project (GAP) or other sources before a decision can be nede whether to commence en inquiry.

Allegations 2.12 through 2.14 ebeve are also corcidered generalized in reture.

Specifics dealiro with these ellegatices may be glee.ned from fUrther infoma-tion tFet ray be available fror GAP.

I will now awei+ ouidance of: eprrnprietr follow ur, ection.

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UNITED STATES

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V MEMORANDUM FOR:

Sharon Connelly, Director l Office of Inspector and Auditor THRU:

Hollis Bowers, Acting Assistant Direct r for vestigations, 01 A FROM:

Henry Blumenthal, investigator Office of inspector and Auditor TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH MS. BILLIE GARDE,

SUBJECT:

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT (GAP)

On February 5, 1985 at approximately 2:55 p.m. I returned the telephone call I had received from Ms. Garde concerning the letter she received from OIA dated January 30, 1985 concerning Waterford 3 allegations, fds. Garde asked I responded in if I was aware ** I was the stated point of cc+ tact on the letter.She then stated the affirmative.

investigator until she sees progress with George Mulley's case on Comanche Peak.

I referred her to Mulley for information concerning Comanche Peak Ms. Garde in- and indicate my willingness to discuss Water'ord 3 allegations with her.dica i

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'w/ e8 February 20, 1985 MEMORANnUM FOR: Sharon R. Connelly, Director Office of Inspector and Auditor THRU: George H. Messenger, Deputy Director, 01A Hollis Bowers, Acting AD/I, 01 FROM: Henry S. Blumenthal, Investigator b '

Office of Inspector and Auditor

SUBJECT:

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH RILLIE GARDE CONCERNIllG WATERFORD 3 ALLEGATIONS On February 20, 1985, at approximately 10:00 a.m., I telephonically ontacted Ms. Billie Garde of the Government Accountability Project (GAP) conc'" ning Waterford 3 allegations made by GAP. My purpose in calling Garde we, to expedite our understanding of any specifics GAP may have concerning their generalized allegations.

Garde indicated that she had been sick with the flu and thereby had been unable to return my previous phone calls to her. She indicated her willing-ness to discuss Waterford 3 allegations with OIA during the week of February 25, 1985, and promised to call r'e on February 22, 1985, to establish an interview date. Garde wants either Mr. Ton Devine or Ms. Lynn Bernabei of GAP to accompany her during the OIA interview.

When talking to Ms. Garde, she asked the status of the OIA investigation on "whistleblowers" as that investigation relates to the Comanche Peak inquiry.

I advised her that I was unaware of any specifics concerning the Comanche Peak case as that case was assigned to George Mulley. Garde replied that many of the Comanche Peak allegations and Waterford 3 allegations are

" generic" Region IV issues concerning the manner in which Region IV interfaces with power reactor licensees and their contractors and subcontractors, i

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/ ATTAD lMENT 5

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19 LCS qMW m skw&& M Nh mL kAq cubs s DCT29 5 g h, Mr. J. H. Goldberg Group Vice President Nuclear ,

Houston Lighting & Power Company E

P.O. Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001

SUBJECT:

REVIEW 0F THE HL&P v. B&R LITIGATION RECORD: HL&P FILE NO. G25, G4.2 Th' s .u for your letter dated August 30, 1985, in which a program document was ....!osed describing Houston Lighting & Power Company's review of the litigation record in the lawsuit by the owners of the South Texas Project against Brown & Root, Inc., and its parent company, Halliburton, Inc. In your letter you asked for our comments on the document.

Both Region IV as well as several of our headquarters' offices reviewed the document. Subject to your incorporation of the essence of the comments contained in the attachment to this letter into the review program, it would appear to the.NRC'that HL&P will be able to provide adequate assurance that any unreported deficiencies or defects that should have been identified to NRC will now be ;dantified.

We will periodically monitor the review while it is under way and request your full cooperation in that endeavor.

Sincerely.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY ROBERT D. MARTIN Robert D. Martin Regional Administrator

Attachment:

As stated bcc:

J. Lieberman, OELD .R. P. Denise, D/DRSP E. Reis. OELD R. D. Martin RPB Section Chief, RPS-C RRI - OPS R. Pirfo, ELD RRI - CONST.

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1. Beginning on the fifth line on page 16 of the review program document is the following statement: " Documents exchanged between the parties in response to requests for production are not generally availeble because they were not filed with the Court." Certainly the documents received by the plaintiffs should be available to HL&P and we would expect such documents to be reviewed in accordance with the criteria set forth in the program plan.

2. The methodology of the litigation review beginning on page 29 refers to the "line-by-line review to identify any assertions of deficiencies" on that part of the litigation record not screened out. A deficiency is defined on page 31 and in Attachment 5. We suggest that the definition be more closely tied to 10 CFR 50.55(e). In addition, we point out the need to keep in mind your continuing notification responsibilities under 10 CFR 21.

3. In Part I, C., 3. of Attachment 2, personnel qualifications are excluded as they also are in other attachments (see Attachments 3 and'4). We believe that substantive deficiencies in the qualifications of personnel conducting safety-related work is germane and to the issue and should be addressed.

4. In Part I, C., 8., Brown & Root's and Halliburton's affiliations with NUS, EBASCO, or other Halliburton subsidiaries is excluded from the review if the interrogatory or set'of interrogatories requests only information about that subject. We believe that the basis for this exclusion should be amplified.

5. It is noted in Part I, C. of Attachment 3, that depositions relating to HL&P directors and executive officers are being ruled out unless any of the deposition testimony relates to the technical adequacy of STP design ,

or construction. We wobad expect, nevertheless, that George Opres's l deposition testimony would be reviewed in full.

6. Part 3 of Attachment 5 sets forth the criteria that an assertion must satisfy. The criteria appear to be unnecessarily limiting.

7. Attachment 6 limits the FSAR review to Section 3.2 which appears unnecessarily limiting. There are many things in the FSAR and SER that are not in Section 3.2 which HL&P is required to do.

8. In attachment 9, the criterion for interdisciplinary review should be clarified to reflect that " safety-related" is intended to be used in the  ;

sense consistent with our above comments in No. 2, above. j

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k.....[ January 28, 1987 MEMORANDUM FOR: Sharon R. Connelly, Director Office of Inspector and Auditor FROM: Mark E. Resner, Assistant to the Director MM~ -- -

SUBJECT:

INQ 86-54 A review of the information contained in the subject file, specifically, the July 15, 1986, memorandum with attachment to you from Robert D. Martin, Regional Administrator, Region IV, was made. Based on my review of that information, it appears as though the references therein to the performance of certain NRC personnel are founded in opinion rather than specifics supported by facts. The opinions expressed primarily focus on the quality of employee

-performance and are oriented to resolution by management action as opposed to an i_s_ sue of wrongdoing within OTAirmeview. ---

As part of my review of this case file, contact was made with Martin on January 27, 1987. In response to questions posed to Martin, he advised that because of the large volume of documents from the law suit (Houston Lighting and Power (HL&P) vs. Brown and Root) to be reviewed, Region IV human resource expenditure necessitated that the region enlist sources external to the NRC to perform the review. In that regard, Martin believes a verbal request was made to HL&P and a written commitment from them was received in responte. Addi-tionally, HL&P employed an independent law firm and technical consultant to conduct the review. According to Martin, Region IV monitored the review by conducting "several" inspections which involved random sampling of HL&P's review. In order to complete our case file, Martin is forwarding copies of these inspection reports and a copy of the written commitment from HL6P to undertake'the review.

In consideration of the foregoing information, and panding_aIA's.. satisfactory review of the information Martin is forwarding, I recommend closing this cai,s.

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If you concur with this recommendation, I believe a follow-up telephone call to Martin should be made so that he may proceed with any management actim , if any.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Ben B. Hayes, Director c Office of Investigations FROM: Sharon R. Connelly, Director Office of Inspector and Auditor

SUBJECT:

ALLEGATIONS OF IMPROPER DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION BY 01 INVESTIGATOR Attached is the Office of Inspector and Auditor investigation of alleged improper disclosure of a confidential source by Donald D. DRISKILL, Investigator, Office of Investigations, Region III, NRC. This investigation is predicated on testimony, before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, that Evert MOUSER, a former Quality Control (QC) Inspector at Comanche Peak, provided information, allegedly in confidence, to DRISKILL which became known to the utility company's supervisory or management personnel.

MOUSER indicated that he never requested confidentiality nor was it offered or inferred by DRISKILL. Information MOUSER provided to DRISKILL in instances where formal confidentiality was not requested may have been discussed with others. However, MOUSER is not aware of any confidential information he provided to DRISKILL which may have been released.

In an 01A interview on April 30, 1985, MOUSER indicated he has had two conversations with DRISKILL. He has never asked for confidentiality nor was it offered to him by DRISKILL. Although he recalls telling DRISKILL that he would not like what he disicussed with him "to become general knowledge," he has never signed any document that granted him confidentiality.

An 01 confidential source identified by NOUSER as a possible breach was interviewed and indicated he signed a formal confidentiality agreement with DRISKILL relative to information he provided during five or six discussions he had with DRISK1LL. While the source did perceive a lot of " pressure" being placed on him subsequent to his discussions with DRISKILL, he has no reason to believe his confidentiality was compromised by the NRC or DRISKILL.

I CONTACT: Keith Logan m a - 27 m DPC!At JJ8E ONLY 4

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Conclusion

! 4 The allegation of breach of confidentiality again_st DRISKILL is not substantiated. No evidence was found to indicate any misconduct on the part of 01 Investigator Donald DRISKILL.

Attachment:

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\ ****+/ May 23, 1985 MEMORANDUM REPORT

SUBJECT:

COMANCHE PEAK: ALLEGED IMPROPER DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE OIA FILE: 85-29 BACKGROUND This investigation is predicated on testimony, before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, that Evert MOUSER, a former Quality Control (QC) Inspector at Comanche Peak, provided information, allegedly in confidence, to Donald D.

DRISKILL, Investigator, Office of Investigations (01), Region IV, and that the information was shortly thereafter known to the utility company's supervisory or management personnel.

SUMMARY

A comprehensive review of the hearing transcript revealed testimony pertinent to this allegation was contained on pages 22936 through 22939 and 23090 l' through 23100. The testimony on pages 22936 through 22939 is in response to questions from Judge Peter BLOCH, Chairman, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and Anthony Z. ROISMAN, Esq. Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, on behalf of the Citizens Association for Sound Energy. Copies of pages 22936 through 22939 have been appended to this report as Attachment 1. Pertinent portions of this testimony have been highlighted.

The testimony on pages 23090 through 23100 is in response to questions from Stuart A. TREBY, Esq., NRC, on behalf of the NRC staff. Copies of pages 23090 through 23100 have been appended to this report as Attachment 2. Pertinent portions of this testimony have been highlighted; portions relevant to the allegation are summarized below:

1. MOUSER states that he never requested confid,:ntiality nor was it offered or inferred by DRISKILL; This report is the property of the Office of Inspector and Auditor. It may not be reproduced or placed in the Public Document Room without written i' permission.

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2. MOUSER appears to indicate that information provided to DRISKILL in )

instances where formal confidentiality was not requested may have been discussed with others. However, MOUSER appears to indicate that the information which was confidential was not so discussed;

3. Throughout the pertinent testimony, MOUSER was questioned regarding DRlSKILL revealing the sources of his information and/or status of )

ongoing investigations and in each instance, MOUSER stated DRISKILL did J' not do so.

On April 29, 1985, DRISKILL was interviewed. He has known MOUSER for several years but has only had one interview with him wherein an in-depth discussion took place relative to an 01 matter. He has never had any discussions with MOUSER wherein a request for confidentiality was brought up either by MOUSER or him. As a general rule, he does not talk to more than one person at a time and he cannot recall any instance where he might have been sought out by MOUSER and other individuals and engaged in a group discussion relative to any subject. He does not recall mentioning the name of Dave AMBROSE to MOUSER.

On one occasion he did have an individual who requested confidentiality and executed an agreement with him before providing information. This individual provided a quantity of " highly technical" information. The information was of such a nature that he could not make a judgment as to what warranted invest-igation. He provided a summary of the information to the Region IV enforce-ment division. At a subsequent enforcement meeting, at which representatives of the Texas Utility Generating Commission were present, these items were discussed, not the specific source of the information, but the specific problems. This information could have been passed to officials at Comanche Peak.

On April 30, 1985, MOUSER was interviewed. He has known DRISKILL for about two years and has had two conversations with him. One conversation took place only between DRISKILL and him. He has never asked for confidentiality nor was it offered to him by DRISKILL. He recalls telling DRISKILL that he would no' like what he discussed with him "to become general knowledge." He has ney_. l signed any document that granted him confidentiality.

On May 14,1985, an 01 confidential source was interviewed. He was granted confidentiality and signed a formal confidentiality agreement with DRISKILL '

relative to information he provided during five or six discussions he had with him from March 1983 to June 1983. While he did perceive a lot of " pressure" being placed on him subsequent to his discussions with ORISKILL, he had no reason to believe his confidentiality was compromised by the NRC or DRISKILL.

He was never confronted by anyone accusing him of supplying information to the NRC.

Conclusion The allegation of breach of confidentiality against DRISKILL is not substantiated. No evidence was found to indicate any misconduct on the part of 01 employee, Donald DRISKILL. This matter is therefore closed.

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C4M< l. L det2- ' a Charles Kraus, Investigator Office of Inspector and Auditor

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Keith Ta. Logan, KsjstantDirector for Investigat' ons Office of Inspec' W ind Auditor Attachments:

1. Cy of transcript pages 22936-22939

2. Cy of transcript pages 23090-23100 i

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' - .BRT 1 O When you had your conversation with,Mr. Driskill 2 in November of '83, did -- was it a recorded conversation?

I 3 Did someone transcribe it in some way? Or tape it?

4 A No, it was not. It was just between him and 5 myself.

6 O Did you feel comfortable in answering all the 7 questions that he asked you without any reservation?

8 A Well, I knew Mr. Driskill and I was hesitant to 9 talk to the gentlemen.

10 0 Why is that?

11 A I don't trust the gentlemen.

12 O Trust in what sense?

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That he was doing the job that he was hired to 14 do.

15 O Were you concerned that --

16 JUDGE BLOCH: I'm sorry. What did that mean? )

17 THE WITNESS: g7 hat,he was indeed an investigatgri ,

18 tand that,-indeed, from prior experience with the man,'c.thaty 19 what you told to him in confidence did indeed not stay.in .

~

20 confidence.'

21 BY MR. ROISMAN:

22 O And had you had an experience like that with him 23 before?

24 A Yes, I did.

25 0 would you recount it for us, please?

[:, -

ATTACHMENT 1 nv

O N

!T4M upr A l 21578.0 Nb' r!!. Uut kh 22937

. CRT 1 A It was when I was in the design change authority 2 group up on the hill, working with some other gentlemen,

(

3 who were -- two other gentlemen and myself, that talked to 4 Mr. Driskill during an audit that they did.on the site.

5 And some of what the one gentimman brought up was 6 questioned a few days later by t'te supervisor.

7 0 ,You mean somebody,frc.n s,he plant raised B questions about a subject that this man had mentioned as 9 far as you and he knew, only to the NRC investigator? '

10 A Yes. And then also at that meeting one of the 11 gentlemen -- I should say after the meeting, one of the 12 gentlemen said that Mr. Driskill had been talk -- had 13 talked to many of the inspectors on-site at different t -

14 ti'mes and that -- like I say, this is hearsay from this 15 gentleman -- and that the information that they talked 16 about was immediately general information of the utility.

17 'And being an NRC man, that was not supposed to be the way 18 it was. What you told them in confidence was to be -kept 19 in confidence. ~

20 0 .Do you think that was fairly common knowledge 21 among the people that you had contact with at Comanche 22 Peak? That is, that if you told something to Mr. Driskill 23 you should expect that it would ultimately get to the 24 company?

25 A -It wasn't so much to Mr. Driskill. It was told --

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/ f. h h{ Q 21578.'O 22938 BRT l

1 and this is the feelings that the inspectors had, and many l

i 2 of them made comment about it -- that they felt that if

( 3 you talked to the resident man or any of the NRC people 4 that were dealing with the plant down there, that it is 5 just like talking into a loudspeaker. It went right back 6 into the utility.

7 0 Was that a condition that was prevalent at the 8 time that you first started at Comanche Peak?

9 A Yes.

10 0 or is it something that arose after that?

11 A That was the feeling that was there all the time.

12 The inspectors all felt that way. That if you talked to 13 the resident man or something like that, it was talking 14 directly to the utility. I hate to point the finger ht' 15 the guy, this is kind of deep charges, you could say ---

1 16 but this is the feelings that were there.

17 O And how broad was your exposure to inspectors 18 and other people that formed the basis of your feelings 19 that it was a fairly widespread belief at the plant?

20 A .A number of the inspectors that I talked to that 21 had been there for a very long' period of time, all felt 22 that way.

23 0 Both coatings and non-coatings inspectors?

24 A Yes, ASME inspectors, non-ASME side of the house, 25 welding inspectors, hanger inspectors.

m 5 g

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OFMl, USE ggy 21578.'O

=BRT 22939 1 Q In your job in the design change area, did you 2 have occasion to come in contact with lots of different 3' inspectors from different disciplines?

4 A Yes, I did. Like I say, we are all a family.

5 We knew each other from different jobs. I worked with 6 them in Idaho, Washington, places like this.

7 Q When you say "we" you are-now talking about QC 8 inspectors as the "we"?

9 A Yes.

10 JUDGE BLOCH: With respect to the people who 11 worked with you when you were the supervisor, you told us 12 that all but three of them had spoken to the NRC. Did you l

13 have any feeling from what they told the NRC at that time 14 that their confidences were not kept?

15 THE WITNESS: I think the inspectors felt that 16 the reason why the -- the feelings management had was' '

17 because of the information that was getting back to them 18 through a source, which they all tebbed as being the NRC 19 man.

20 Like I say, these are all feelings and thoughts from 21 these inspectors.

22 MR. ROISMAN: I have no further questions at 23 this time.

24 EXAMINATION 25 BY JUDGE BLOCH:

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21578.'O ,f7EOff1/

~"" " -l 23090 BRT 1 BY MR. TREBY:

2 O Mr. Houser, I would like to take you back to the 3 1983 interview, I believe it was in November, with

(

4 Mr. Driskill, when you were at the Midland site.

l 5 A Yes.

6 0 I think you've previously testified that the 7 trip report matter was not his principal purpose for 8 interviewing'at that time, but rather it came up rather-9 casually during the interview; is that correct? l 10 A I seem to recall that; yes.

11 O Have I properly characterized your testimony?

12 A I felt as though'- I got this feeling from him 13 that he was there more in the Dunham case, but he did not

( 14 tell me specifically it was for the Dunham case ~.

15 0 okay. ' And when he discussed the trip report, 16 did he show you a copy of it? .

i 17 A I don't recall seeing itt no.

18 O Jid he indicate how he had come to know about 1

19 the trip report? l l

20 A No. I don't think he told me how he did come to j 4

21 know about its no.

22 O Did he indicate in any way that he was 23 e nducting any investigation with regard to the trip I

24 report?

25 A No, he did not. At least I don't recall it.

i n 1 b:ori ATTACHMENT 2

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0FF! Nil LM DNLY

+21578.0 23091 BRT 1 O Well, what, if anything, do you recall about the l 2 conversation between you and him, about the trip report?

( 3 A That it did exist and he made indication that he --

4 I think he asked me: Do you know of the Lipinski trip 5 report? I told him yes, I did.

6 O And was that the end of the conversation? Did 7 he ask you -- well, was that the end of the conversation?

I don't recall much more than that; no.  !

8 A 9 0 You don't recall whether he asked you how you 10 became aware of the trip report?

11 A 'No, I don't.

12 O And he didn't indicate in any way how he had become aware of it?

13 I

14 A No, he did not say anything about that.

15 0 With regard to the discussions you and he had 16 about the Dunham matter, did he ask you whether you wanted 17 any confidentiality with regard to those matters?

18 A I- don't recall him saying anything about that:

4 19 no.

20 0 Did you request any confidentiality?

21  ? No, I don't think I did. I don't recall'.

22 O Do you recall signing any document with regard 23 'to the question of confidentiality?

24 A No, I don't. I don't recall anything like that; 25 0 1[n the course of his discussing the Dunham U ,_

O O '

21578.'O DIRM' u-li', $$[ 'Aly 23092

, BRT #i 1 matter, did he discuss with you any information which 2 other employees at the Comanche Peak site may have given

[ 3 him about the Dunham matter?

4 A He had indicated that someone down there told 5 him that I would be able to give him some information 6 about it.

7 0 Did he identify who that person might be?

8 A No, he did not.

9 O Can you recall in any esy how he might have 10 violated anybody's confidences in i. > discussions with you 11 about the Dunham matter?

12 A one name did come up in the. conversation,.a 13 gentleman by the name of Ambrose.

( 14 O Did you tell me how that name came up in the 15 course of the conversation?

16 A It might have been that had said -- told l I

17 Mr. Driskill that I might have something to say about it.

18 :I don't recall. I remember Dave's name came up but I: l l

\

i 19 don't recall the' context it was in. I also said Dave was 1 20 a friend I knew.

21 O what job did Mr. Ambrose have at the Comanche 4

22 P,eak site?

23 A He was a coatings inspector that worked for me.

24 O Mr. Dunham was also a coating's inspectorr is 25 that not correct?

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R QCC'mp1 w p

( 21578.0 " ' 5 007 hkkf 23093 BRT ,

1 A Yes, he was.

2 O Did Mr. Ambrose have anything to do with the l g- 3 Dunham matter, as it related to the Department of Labor?

4 A Not to my knowledge; no.

)

5 0 p. you think there was any -- well, at the time, 6 do you recall any concern that Mr. Ambrose' name was 7 mentioned to you?

' l l

8 A No, I don't. i i

1 9 O Had you ever had any other discussions with ]

10 Mr. Driskill?

I l

11 A I had talked to him at the plant if you mean f l

12 that? l I

13 0 Yes. I I 14 A I talked to him down at Comanche Peak.

15 O Bow many times had you talked to him down at

)

16 comanche Peak?

l 17 A It was not so much myself. I was in with a 18 group of three of us that talked to him. There was one 19 gentleman that did all the talking. And that was the one 20 time he came -- or, I guess twice he came up there. Two 21 days in a row, I should say.

22 O And what was the subject matter of that 23 discussion?

24 A The subject matter of that discussion centered 25 around the design change documents we were working on.

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1 And some of the hanger inspection wo'rk that some of the 2 other groups was doing, the as-built group was doing. And I

4 3 the discussion centered around documentation problems we 4 were running into. And that's basically the big thing I 5 could remember from that conversation.

6 0 Did Mr. Driskill state the purpose of that 7 discussion at the time you and these two other people were 8 meeting with him?

9 A State the discussion -- of what we were going to 10 talk about?

i 11 Q Right. I i

12 A It is kind of on the basis of, he was there and 13 we talked to him. And it's -- we have something to tell l 4 14 you about the design change area that -- things that we 15 have found, things that we know of.

16 O Did you seek him out or had he sought you?

17 A We seeked him cut, talked to him.

18 O The three of you together?

19 A Yes.

20 Q At that time do you recall whether you had asked l

21 for confidentiality?

22 A I don't think we did.

I 23 0 Did you sign any statement with regard to the j 8

24 question of confidentiality?

25 A No, I don't remember anything.

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21578.0 ' "' ' 4 23095 BRT 1 Q Do you know whether the other two people who 2 were with you requested confidentiality in your hearing?

( 3 A That I don't have any way of knowing.

4 Q Did you observe them signing any documents?

5 A No, I did not.

6 Q And during that conversation you provided 7 Mr. Driskill with whatever information the three of you 8 had to provide to him?

9 A Yes.

10 Q During that conversation, did he raise any 11 information that he had heard on that subject from any 12 other people at the Comanche Peak site?

13 A I don't think he did. I don't recall anything.-

( 14 Q Did you have any or do you have any reason to 15 believe that any of the information that you or the two 16 other people gave him became known to other persons?

By talking with other inspectors and by ' talking

~

17 A  ;

i 18 to this other gentleman who was with us, the third man in 19 the group, he said that some of the things that he had 20 thoughts -- was in the as-built group, I had nothing to do 21 with the as-built group -- some of the things that he had 22 brought to Mr. Driskill's attention were, indeed, brought 23 to management personnel's attention also.

1

' 24 Q But was that the same information that occurred 25 during your meeting with Mr. Driskill?

V t. .

l

21578.'O k \$. h hf 23096 CRT 1 A That I don't -- that I'm not able to recall.

2 O Did the person Who told you that indicate that 3 he had requested confidentiality?

4 A At one time this gentleman did address it as 5 confidentiality with Mr. Drisk111. The time that he told 6 me the information had surfaced was a time later on after 7 he had left the site.

8 O Did he ever indicate to you that he had executed 9 any document with regard to confidentiality?

10 A Yes, he did.

11 0 During the time that you were a QC lead 12 inspector, or supervisor in the coatings area, did you 13 ever hear of a notice of violation and a civil penalty  ;

I

( 14 being imposed against the Comanche Peak facility for ,

15 actions of Harry Williams?

16 A Yes, I did. I was told by Mr. Driskill while I 17 was at -- when he talked to me in Michigan, that that had j 18 happened. )

1 19 0 Were you aware of that, at any time While you l

)

were at the Comanche Peak site?

l 20 21 A No, I was not.

22 JUDGE BLOCH: Mr. Treby, you used the word 23 " imposed." Was it imposed or proposed?

f 24 MR. TREBY: Proposed. If I said " imposed" I 25 meant " proposed." As far as I know there has never been l

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21578.~0 [TTIv.9' , ((F [j'j( y 23097 f i .

BRT 1 any passage of money.

2 BY MR. TREBY:

3 Q When Mr. Driskill discussed that matter with you, 4

4 did he indicate that there had been an investigation done J 5 by the NRC's Office of Investigation? )

6 A Yes, he did. He indicated that there had been a l 7 very thorough investigation done and that, indeed, the NRC 8 had -- was giving them a penalty, and that Mr. Williams 9 had, indeed, signed an affidavit indicating intimidation.

10 0 Did he indicate that during the course of this 11 investigation they had spoken to QC inspectors?

12 A Yes, he did.  ;

13 Q Did he give you any idea of how many QC .

( 14 inspectors they had spoken to?

15 A No, he did not.

16 O Did he indicate that -- whether it was one or  !

17 two or a 1.arger number than that?

18 A I took it that it was a large numbar.

19 O Given that information, do you find it 20 surprising that QC inspectors at -- in the coatings 21 department, indicated they had had conversations with the 22 NRC?

23 A I feel that they did.

i 24 O Do you know whether those conversations related {

25 to that investigation or related to other discussions they 8 m

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k: k 0,lf f, 21578.0 23098 CRT 1 may have had?

2 A I'm not able to indicate that but it could have p 3 been; yes.

4 0 Do you have any personal knowledge one way or 5 the other? .

t 6 A No, I do not.

7 O Do you recall a time in December, approximately 8 December 13th, when I had a telephone conversation with 9 you and inquired whether you had selected an attorney?

10 A Yes, I do.

11 Q And did you advise me you had selected an 12 attorney?

13 A Yes, I did. .

I 14 O Subsequent to that date, did you or I ever have 15 any other conversations?

16 A No. Nothing that I remember.

17 O Subsequent to that date did you have 18 conversations with any other lawyers in this room? I 19 A Yes. Mack Watkins had called, and told me that 20 they were in the process of trying to locate a lawyer for  !

21 me, under the conditions that I had talked to Ms. Garde 22 about.

23 0 Right.

8 24 A And that I should not freely speak to anyone 25 other than my lawyer and let him handle all of the work.

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1 The same thing -- basically the same thing I told -- you 2 know -- that we talked about. l 1

i 3 Q And did you have any further conversations with f 4 Mr. Watkins? a

~

5 A No. I did not have any conversations with 6 Mr. Watkins but there was a gentleman from Mr. Watkins' 7 firm called and told me that, I guess it's after -- this 8 is after I talked to you. And told me that they were 9 still looking for some -- for a lawyer. And at that time 10 I indicated that I had selected Mr. Sims.  !

11 O Did you ever have any conversations with 12 Mr. Gallo?

. 13 A No. I never met the man before.

( 14 MR. GALLO: Yesterday.

15 THE WITNESS: Excuse me; Thursday.

16 BY MR. TREBY:  !

17 O Did you have any conversations with Ms. Garde or lu Mr. Roisman after that -- after you selected Mr. Sims as 1

19 your attorney?

20 A I think Mr. Roisman placed a couple of calls to 21 my house but I was not there. And I don't recall having 22 any conversations with Ms. Garde. If I did, I probably 23 indicated to her to talk to my lawyer also.

I 24 O There was an indication that a transcript was 25 sent to you by Ms. Garde?

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- s e. . . .

21578.0 23100 CRT 1 A Yes.

2 O Was that before or after Mr. Sims was selected 3

as your attorney?

4 A Before.

5 O Did you request her to send you that transcript?

6 A She said she could send me a transcript of the 7 trial if I was interested and I said: Yes, send it to me.

8' I'll look at it.

9 0 Was this at the time that she had called you to 10 tell you about their offer to get you an attorney?

11 A No, this was prior to that time.

12 MR. TREBY: All right. I have no further 33 questions.

I 14 JUDGE BLOCH: I am a' bout to take my leave. May 15 I ask though, before I go -- let's go off the record and 16 discuss the schedule.

(Discussion off the record.)

17 18 JUDGE BLOCH: Mr. Reporter, let the record 19 indicate that I have left the deposition.

20 CROSS-EXAMINATION 21 BY MR. GALLO:

22 O Mr. "vuser, going back to that day in 1983 when 23 you made a copy of the Lipinski trip report, the one that

! 24 he gave you to read, Judge Bloch asked you a series of 25 questions about the operation of the Xerox machine, Lt;... _. ,,[

n n U.S. NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION Of fice of Inspector and Auditor May 1, 1985 o ei ei ir...... ... .

Report of Interview Evert MOUSER, Evaluation Research Corporation, Braidwood Nuclear. Power Plant, Braidwood, Illinois, residing at Rt.1, Box 170, Willmington, Illinois, was interviewed on the telephone and stated essentially as follows:

He has known Donald L. DRISKILL for about two years and during that period has had two conversations with him. One conversation took place only between he and DRISKILL. The other conversation involved DRISKILL, OIA CS 5-2, himself, and another individual whose name he does not recall. He has never asked for confidentiality-nor was it ever offered to him by DRISKILL. He recalls telling DRISKILL that he would not like what he discussed with him "to become general knowledge." He has never signed any document that granted him confidentiality. He did have a conversation with OIA CS 5-2 wherein 0IA CS 5-2 indicated he had provided DRISKILL with information subsequent to signing an agreement of confidentiality. OIA CS 5-2 stated that subsequently, the information he provided DRISKILL was known to the people at the power plant.

........... April 30. 1985 4E ntho netn- M et - ...= 85-29  !

,, Charles R. Kraus. Investigator. OT ,c i. i. a Mnv 1 1985 l

'?,'s o oe'Oc'L'I" S."U sc7",'$fr .'.s'a'Us.o'~'U~r'." ^oi'.7c'il ^,*sife' ' 'd'o"I'u$"E% " " '""""

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l U.S. NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMisslON Othee of Inspector and Auditor on....,.........

April 30, 1985 Report of Interview l

Donald D.- DRISKILL, Office of Investigations (01), Region IV, Arlington, Texas, was interviewed on the telephone and stated essentially as follows:

He has known of Evert MOUSER for several years, but has only had one interview with MOUSER wherein an in depth discussion took place relative to an 01 matter. He reviewed his trip log and identified the interview as having transpired at Midland on either November 14 or 15, 1983. This discussion was in reference to 01 File 4-83-016 concerning the Intimida-tion of Quality Control Inspectors at Comanche Peak. He has never had any discussions with MOUSER wherein a request for confidentiality was brought up either by MOUSER or him. He never brings up the subject of confidentiality with interviewees unless, during the course of the discussion, it becomes obvious that the interviewee will only provide the information he has within the cover of confidentiality. As a general rule, he does not talk to more than one person at a time and he cannot recall any instance were he might have been sought out by MOUSER and other individuals and engaged in a group discussion relative to any subject.

He does not recall mentioning the name of Co e AMBROSE v to MOUSER. While he knows AMBROSE, he does not recall any instance where AMBROSE referred him to MOUSER as the person who could provide him informatit.n relative to a matter he was making inquiry on. It is not his practice to open interviews by indicating he had been referred by a third party. He would do this only if it was clearly evident he needed to establish credibility with an interviewee.

On one occasion, he did have an individual who requested confidentiality and executed an agreement with him before providing information. The information provided is reported under 01 file 04-83-009 This individual provided a quantity of. " highly technical" information. The information was of such a nature that he could not make a judgment as to what warranted investigation. He would bring the information back to Region IV and discuss it with John COLLINS, then Region IV Administrator, James GAGLIARDO, and others in an attempt to determine those items needing 01 attention. Arthur B. BEACH, currently assigned to the Enforcement Staff, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Headquarters, attended one of the debriefings of this individual and during post interview discussion at the Region, two or three issues were determined d /y f? / *2 vilJ l

...u......,, April 29, 1985 e Bethesda. Md. . . .. : 85-29 Charles R. Kraus, Investigator, OI[ , , , , ,

April 30, 1985

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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ ._. I

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1. h ('s to be important. He was asked to write up the issues and provide a summary to the Region IV enforcement people. At a subsequent Enforcement Meeting at which representatives of the Texas Utilit/ Generating Commission were present, these items were discussed, not the specific source of the information, but the specific problems. This information could have been passed to officials at Comanche Peak. The information was of such a nature that utility officials could possibly surmise the source, if not specifically, at least a certain group of people from whom it had originated. This confidential source had also identified MOUSER as one of the people who could provide additional information relative to the matters discussed with him.

It is a common opinion among utility and contractor quality control and inspector personnel that the NRC holds nothing in confidence. It is very difficult to convince utility and contractor employees that NRC can be trusted. To the best of his knowledge, he has never violated the confidentiality rules within NRC.

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NUREG-0797 Supplement No.8 Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of Comanche Peak Steam Eectric Station, Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446 Texas Utilities Generating Company, et al.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reac'.or Regulation February 1985 j,.. ** %.,

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Allegation Category: Civil and Structural 16. Excavation and Backfill {

1.'

2. A11ecation Number: AQ-64

3. Characteri2ation: It is alleged that overexcavation and improper fill uno : the Unit 1 Containment Building could invalidate the expected seis-mir response of the foundation due to the change in properties resulting from the removal of in-situ material.

Assessment of Safety Significance: The NRC Technical Review Team (TRT) 4.

did not initially attempt to contact the alleger because the allegation was sufficiently clear to allow the TRT to proceed with its investigation.

1. During an investigation conducted in 1984, the NRC Office of Investigation (01) interviewed the alleger (84-006, 3/7/84 A-7) and reference was made to overexcavation and improper repairs in the foundation rock for the Unit 1 Containment Building. The alleger stated that the excavation was erroneously made 6 t', 8 feet too deep and that upon realization of the error, the repair tecnniciue was simply to throw the loose rock back into the excavation and fill it in with concrete.

The TRT reviewed NRC inspection reports, the FSAR, and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) hearing transcript, where this concern was the sucject of contention No. 7 and was admitted into the hearing on June 16, 1980.

By order of March 5,1982, the ASLB granted summary disposition of con-tention No. 7, based on the finding that no genuine issue as to anyThe TRT also reviewed material fact was shown by any of the filings.

affidavits and statements filed by These TUEC documents and by theadequately NRC in support of the describe rock motion for summary disposition. Affected areas 3 overbreak, accompanying fissures, and subsequent repairs.

were backfilled witn concrete having a minimum compressive strengtn of 2400 pounds per square inch at 28 days, or were grouted to maintain The conti'nuity of the competent rock in which fissures were identified.

TRT reviewed the procedures utilized to replace fractured rock with dental concrete and to grout surrounding fissures and the accompanying compres-The TRT found that FSAR figures 2.5.4-33a through sive test results. l

' 2.5.4-35 are maps of the excavation showing These the figureslocation showed of fractures that the and t

the extant of dental concrete backfill. area of overexcavation represe I area. FSAR figure 2.5.4-37, sheets 1 through 21, showed photographs of The TRT interviewed the NRC inspector who was present the excavated walls.

during the excavation process and verified the conditions presented in the

{ FSAR.

g 3

The TRT independently evaluated the potential impact on the seismic re-y 6

sponse of the Unit 1 containment Because of the facts that foundation due to the i

j of possible changes in foundation stiffness.(a) the dental concre were essentially identical to those of the natural rock replaced at the 6

b

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I K-93 I.

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j site as indicated by the foundation report and (b) the area affected by f '

i the replacement work was relatively small (refer to FSAR Figures 2.5.4-33a through 2.5.4-35), the TRI de.termined that no sporeciable impact on either the static or dynamic response characteristics of the foundation resulted '

A'n evaluation prepared by a geotechnical enai from the overexcavation.

neer in the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation,upports This con-clusion. He evaluated the effects on static and dynamic foundation sta- 9 bility of replacing undisturbed limestone and claystone foundation rock with dental concrete and concluded that the abilitv of the repaired foun-dation materials to withstand seismic disturbances had not been impaired.

4

5. Conclusion and Staff Positions: The TRT concludes that the overexcavation l of a small portion of the Unit 1 Containment Building foundation and the 8 subsequent replacement of the affected area with 2500 psi strength dental '

concrete and grout did not affect either the static or dynamic character- I istics of the foundation. Therefore, the expected seismic response has j not been invalidated as alleged. The excavation and repairs have had no $

safety impact upon foundation integrity. Accordingly, this allegation has neither safety significance nor generic implications.

The TRT has contacted the alleger to arrange an interview to inform him of the TRT's finding.

5. Actions Reouired: None.

1 I

K-94 l -

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. R m CONFIDr.NTIAL CASE'S DISCUSSION OF SSER f 8, ALLEGATION NO. AQ-64, PAGES K-93 AND K-94 The following is a discussion of CASE's concerns regarding the manner in which subject Allegation was handled by members of the TRT team, as well as the conclusions to which the TRT came. We have quoted the TRT's statements, followed by comments about specific portions of those s t a te me nt s.

This allegation was' characterized by the TRT as follows:

"It is alleged that overexcavation and improper fill under the Unit 1 Containment Building could invalidate the expected seismic response of the foundation due to the chanFe in properties resulting from the-removal of in-situ material."

The TRT then stated:

" Assessment of Safety Significance: The NRC Technical Peview Teae (TRT) did not initially attempt to contact the alleFer because the allegation was sufficiently clear to allow the TRT to proceed with its investigation.

"During an investigation conducted in 1984, the KRC Office of Investigation (01) interviewed the alleger (84-006, 3/7/84, A-7) and reference was made to overexcavation er.d improper repairs in the foundation rock for the Unit 1 Containment Building. The alleger stated that.the excavation was erroneously made 6 to 8 feet too deep and that upon realization of the error, the repair technique was simply to throw the loose rock back into the excavation and fill it in with concrete."

From the information contained in the preceding, it is obvious to all (since the Board and all parties were provided with copies of the OI Report and its attachments) that the alleger referred to was George Clancy (see attached applicable portion from 3/7/84 OI Report 84-006, 8/19/83 investigative interview of George F. Clancy, pages 48 through 51).

1 j

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- A A, CONFIDENTIAL We note, first of all, that CASE believes that any reliance by the TRT (or anyone else) on any conclusions in this particular 01 Report is inappropriate and ill-advised, since (in CASE's opinion and in the opinion of many of the individuals who were interviewed for that Report) the investigation and resultinF Report were totally inadequate, in many cases inaccurate, and lacked any commitment to ascertaining the facts.

Next, the characterization of the allegation by the TRT is incorrect. l l

George Clancy never even brought up the possibility that the overexcavation .]

and improper fill could invalidate the expected seismic response of the foundation (though CASE agrees that this is a loFical and proper extension of his actual allegation and should have been included as part of the investigation of his alleFation). Mr. Clancy's alleFation was regarding the overexcavation and rocks having been thrown back into the hole and concrete having been poured over them. It was NRC OI investigator Broh ,Ariffin who brought up seismic studies. It therefore appears that the allegation (as characterized by the TRT) which was investigated was primarily that of 01 investigator Brooks Griffi<,. Mr. Clancy's allegation regarding rocks having been thrown back into the hole and concrete having been poured over them is /

not even mentioned in the TRT's characterization of the allegation (though it is mentioned, in passing, under Assessment of Safety Significance).

How did this mischaracterization of Mr. Clancy's allegation come about?

Who (specifically) made the determination of how this allegation should be characterized? Who (specifically) made the determination of what should be investigated regarding this allegation?

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Further, it should be noted that the TRT totally ignored that part of the allegation relating to loose rocks being thrown back into the excavation. There is no indication that the TRT made any effort whatsoever to investigate this aspect of the allegation. Thus, they made the assumption, without independent investigation, that the dental concrete was of the correct, carefully monitored materials and consistency which it should have beer. CASE has additional information regarding this aspect of the allegation. Please contact us for details.

CASE believes that the TRT made a major error when it chose not to contact the alleger, and instead decided that "the allegation was sufficiently clear to allow the TRT to proceed with its investigation."

CASE is aware of instances where the TRT had initially thought they understood an allegation, but f ound in follow-up interviews with the alleger i

that the concern was different than what the TRT had originally understood i

it to be. The procedure of the TRT's getting back with each alleger before publishing findings and conclusions has worked well in other instances. }iad this been done in this instance, it very likely would never have been necessary for CASE to be writing this now, and these questions never would have arisen about the TRT's handling of this allegation.

It is obvious (from reading his interview) that Mr. Clancy's information was second-hand. Had he been promptly contacted by the TRT, by l

that time he might have been able to provide the TRT with the name of the I

person from whom he received his information. However, it appears that the TRT did not contact Mr. Clancy until after they had completed theit 3

l O O CONrtDENTtAL.

investigation and come to their conclusions (and then it is not clear whether or not they actually ever had the follow-up interview with him); the TRT stated (page K-94, item 5, second paragraph):

"The TRT has contacted the alleger to arrange an interview to inform j him of the TRT's finding." j lt would also have been reasonable to assume that the TRT would have

• contacted CASE's Juanita Ellis and/or Betty Brink (formerly with the l

intervenor, CTUR, whose contention No. 7 is discussed on page K-93 of SSER

1. 8) for further information regarding this allegation, since Mr. Clancy specifically suggested that they do so (see paFes 50 and 51 of Mr. Clancy's deposition). CASE believes that failing to do so was another major error on the part of the TRT.

Further information (in addition to other information f rom the record of the Comanche Peak proceedings discussed herein) was also available to the TRT for the asking. That information was available from either CASE or CTUR (and whichever organization was contacted would have undoubtedly referred the $nvestiFator to the other organization as well). CASE is also aware of one other person who has told CASE he/she told the NRC about the allegation, but without the same detail as indicated by the TRT. This individual is not certain at this point in time whether it was someone with OI or the TRT to whom he/she. talked. This individual has stated in the last few days that he/she has not been contacted by the NRC following up on the allegation; nor has he/she been sent a copy of SSER #8 by the TRT. (This leads CASE to believe that this individual spoke with OI rather than the TRT, and that the TRT never contacted this individual regarding the allegation.)

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CASE will advise the TRT of the name of this individual (but we consider it confidential at this time and do not want to put it in writing here); this individual e tid like for CASE to be involved in any seetings or telephone conferences between him/her and the TRT.

The TRT further states:

"The TRT reviewed NRC inspection reports, the FSAR, and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) hearing trancript, where this concern was the subject of contention No. 7 and was admitted into the hearing on June 16, 1980.

"By order of March 5, 1982, the ASLB granted summary disposition of j contention No. 7, based on the finding that no genuine issue as to any 5 material fact was shown by any of the filings."

The TRT only discussed the ASLB hearing transcript regarding contention No. 7. This was a contention of Citizens for Fair Utility Regulation (CTUR), which withdrew from the hearings on February 23, 1982. The only

" hearings" which were held on contention 7 (the " hearings" to which the TRT apparently referred) would have had to be a prehearing conference prior to l

formal hearings (which were never held on CFUR's contention 7).

Strikingly noticeable by its absence is any sention of the fact that a formal hearing g held (June 1982) regarding the overexcavation -- under CASE's Contention 5. Also missing is any reference to the sworn testimony during the hearings, the documents (including photographs made from color slides which were shown by CASE during the hearings) supplied by Applicants on discovery which CASE placed into evidence, the NRC Staff's own inspection report on the lack of proper QA by Applicants during the excavation, the Proposed Findings of the parties and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board's 5 ,

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l CONflDENTLAL Orders resulting from that hearing. As discussed later herein, these are very important omissions which call into question the credibility and/or competence of the TRT members who investigated this allegation.

In addition, the TRT apparently f ailed to realize that CFUR withdrew from the hearings prior to the ASLB's granting of the summary disposition on contention No. 7, and that CFUR never filed any answer to the summary disposition, which was granted with no opposition. Therefore, the TRT in effect apparently accepted one side of the argument without ever even having attempted to get in touch with CFUR or the alleger to discuss the allegation, the summary disposition, or anything else regarding this matter i prior to arriving at its conclusions. At this point, had the TRT team j adecuately investigated and followed up, there was yet another opportunity for them to have obtained further information which might have averted their current problem as discussed herein.

The TRT continued:

"The TRT also reviewed the af fidavits and statements filed by TUIC and by the KRC in support of the motion for summary disposition. These documents adequately describe rock overbreak, accompanying fissures, and subsequent repairs. Affected areas were backfilled with concrete having a minimum compressive strength of 2,500 pounds per square inch at 28 days, or were grouted to maintain continuity of the competent rock in which fissues were identified."

This appears to be further confirmation that the TRT did not know about the sworn testimony during the hearings, the documents (including the I

photographs made from color slides which were shown by CASE during the hearings) supplied by Applicants on discovery which CASE placed into l

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CONFIDENTIAL evidence, the NRC Staf f's inspection report on the lack of proper 0A by Applicants during the excavation, the Proposed Findings of the parties and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board's Orders resulting from that hearing.

(We note that, although the TRT stated that they reviewed "NRC inspection reports" (page K-93, third paragraph under Assessment of Safety Significance), there is no mention of the f act that Applicants were cited in one such report for the lack of proper QA by Applicants during the j i

excavation. This too was an important omission.) )

In addition, CASE is still reviewing certain aspects of this portion of .

l the TRT's statements; we will share the results of such review with the l 1

TRT/TRT design issues panel when it is completed.

How could this have happened the way it did? Why did the TRT team not follow the practice which has been followed in other cases of contacting the alleger bef:re putting their findings into print? Who told the TRT about the ASLE hearing transcript to which they referred? How did the TRT know to look at the motion for summary disposition, or the affidavits and statements l 1

filed by TUEC and by the NRC in support of the motion for summary disposition? If they were told about these things by someone, who was that someone? Was it someone with Applicants? Was it someone with NRC Region IV? Was it "the NRC inspector who was present during the excavation process"? Why didn't that someone also tell them about the June 1982 hearings which were held regarding the overexcavation, the sworn testimony l

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Applicants on discovery which' CASE placed into evidence, the NRC Staff's ,

. inspection report on the lack of proper QA by Applicants during the

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excavation, the Troposed Findings of the parties and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board's Orders resulting from that hearing? Why was the j information relied on by the TRT incomplete and misleading by omission?

The TRT continued:

"The TRT reviewed the procedures utilized to replace fractured rock with; dental concrete and'to grout surrounding fissues and the accompanying compressive test results."

Again who pointed the TRT to this information? What procedures (specifically) were reviewed by the TRT? What'other documents (specifically) did the TRT review'with regard to this matte?? CASE would like to review all such documents.

The TRT then stated:

"The TRT found that TSAR figures 2.5.4-33a through 2.5.4-35 are maps of the excavation showing the location of fractures and the extent of dental concrete backfill. These figures showed that the area of overexcavation represented a small portion of the entire excavated area. TSAR figure 2.5.4-37, sheets 1 through 21, showed photographs of the excavated walls."

We are attsching copies of pages 2.5-121 and 2.5-122, and Figures 2.5.4-33a, 2.5.4-33b, 2.5.4-34, 2.5.4-35, 2.5.4-36, and 2.5.4-37 (sheets 1  !

through 21). These attached pages all appear to be current as of Applicants' most recent Amendment 55 to the FSAR dated July 19, 1985..

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As revealed during the June 1982 hearings, the damage from the overexcavation was fgr more eFtensive than was (and still is) indicated by Applicants in their FSAR. We are attaching a copy of CASE's 2/24/83 Provisional Proposed Findings of Fact, which details (with quotations and citations to the record of the June 1982 hearings) the facts regarding the overexcavation (pages 1-59). (We urge that CASE's entire attached Findings and documents regarding the overexcavation be read thoroughly; we are highlighting portions which we believe are especia11? sportant and applicable to the matter at hand.)

As discussed below, it appears that the TRT has again relied upon representations by the Applicants -- in this instance, sworn representations in the PSAR which the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board in the Comanche Peak 1

proceedings has ruled constitute a material false statement, and perhaps more recent representations as vell. Thus, Applicants' initial material false statement in the FSAR regarding the extent of the overexcavation has now not only been repeated, but compounded, and it appears that the TRT has also been misled by it.

At this point, we believe it would be helpful to review the findings of i

the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board regarding the overexcavation (rock l 1

overbreak): I v I From the Licensing Board's 7/29/83 Proposed Initial Decision (Concerning aspects of construction quality control, emergency planning and Board questions), pages 5-10 (footnotes, primarily transcript citations, omitted), emphases added: f 9 ,

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s CONFIDENTIAL "One of the specific allegations encompassed within Contention 5 was that during construction blasting, rock which was supposed to remain intact was displaced and cracked. The foundation for Comanche Peak is set on a rock structure known as the Glen Rose limestone. This is a marine formation of the Cretaceous age. The Glen Rose limestone is

' soft' or ' weak' rock and is not homogeneous. Both of these factors '

make it difficult to predict and control the effects of blasting in this particular rock.

"The applicant's geotechnical consultants, Mason-Johnston and Associates, Inc. , recommended that all safety-related structures be

- placed against intact rock. It was planned that once the site had been leveled off at plant grade (i.e., the mountain top had been removed down to a specified level) excavation for the reactor buildings would assure that their bases would be 40 feet below plant grade. Explosives were used for the purpose of creating a crack in the rock around the perimeter of the hole for each containment building. Furthar blasting was contemplated t: break up the rock within that perimeter crack.

" Unexpectedly, the blasting to create the hole for the Unit I containment caused approximately the top ten feet of the rock wall around the planned hole to be displaced and to suffer both horizontal and vertical cracking. Although changes were made to the blasting procedures when the hole for the Unit 2 containment was blasted, a similar overbreak pattern emerged. Overbreak also occurred in excavating for other safetv-related buildings. Indeed, the overbreak was so extensive that there was no point in associating particular fractured rock with the excavation of a particular building. Applicant reported the overbreak to the h*RC pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 50.55(e).

"The extent of the overbreak was determined by digging trenches at increasing distances from the excavation wall and examining them for cracks. When a trench was dug for which any cracks on the side closest to the excavation were found not to have been propagated to the far side of the trench, that was determined to be the edge of the l overbreak. Overbreak was detected up to approximate 1v thirty feet from f the excavation. While some overbreak is common during construction, the amount of overbreak at Comanche Peak was unexpectedly large.

"To ' repair' the overbreak, all rock within the area of the overbreak was removed utilizing techniques which did not require blasting. Once this rock had been removed, some cracks were found in the newly created walls. These cracks did not appear to be associated with displaced rock and were grouted. The original shape of the excavation was j

restored by filling v4.th concrete the area from which the fractured I rock had been remover,.

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"This ' dental' concrete was.less strong than that used in constructing-the reactor buildings; nevertheless, it was stronger than the fractured rock had been. There was uncontroverted testimony from the. applicant's panel that, once these sepairs had been effected, the foundation was actually improved from what it would have been if the overbreak had not occurred. The applicant's witnesses also testified, without contradiction, that the seismic capacity of'the site was not impaired by LLe repair.

"The NRC cited the applicants for failing to have and to utilice-quality control procedurer, for excavation for these safety-related structures. Applicant subsequently developed such procedures.. It is apparent, however, that, even without quality assurance procedures for ~

this excavation, the applicant detected and took action to remedy the overbreak. .Horeover, the soundness of all areas excavated before the quality control procedures were instituted was verified by an engineering geologist who was present during all phases of the excavation. The engineering geologist verified the soundness of all the materials on which concrete was to be placed. In making this judgment, he relied on professional knowledge and confirming photographs. The repair work, in addition, was subject to quality assurance procedures.

"While~it was a quality control deficiency to have done the eveavation without quality control procedures, we find that this has not led to a lasting deficiency. This potential problem has been negated by the detection and satisf actory repair of the excavation defects which should have been detected by the quality control program. The possible implications of management's f ailure to implement quality assurance procedures for the excavation activities is not being considered in  ;

this decision." l Following the filing of Proposed Findings of Fact by all parties,' the Licensing Board issued another Order in which the overexcavation was i

discussed: From the Board's 9/23/83 Memorandum and Order (Emergency f

Planning, Specific Quality Assurance Issues and Board Issues), pages 37-40.

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(footnotes omitted), emphases added-

"A. Rock Overbreak

" CASE argues that the Board should have found that applicant attempted ,

to mislead the NRC concerning the extent of rock overbreak at the site.

f it argues that it should have amended its Final Safety Analysis Report d (FSAR) to reflect the full extent of the overbreak. It also states i 11

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that applicant's 50.55(e) report to the Commission created the impression that the overbreak was limited to the excavations for Units 1 and 2 Reactor buildings rather than being 'so extensive that there was no point in associating particular fractured rock with the excavation of a parti: alar building.'

"We agree that the FSAR should have been amended to disclose the overbreak problem securately and to comply with full disclosure principles governing applications for an operating license. Failure to amend the FSAR reflects adversely on the seriousness with which applicant takes its obligations as an applicant for a license. On this matter, we are surprised to find that applicant appears to have lef t a void in the record. Considering that its integrity was being i challenged, this seems a strange silence.

" Failure to describe the rock overbreak problem in a reasonable manner in the FS AR constitutes a material f alse statement under 10 CFR 50.100, as CASE has argued. Because this violation of the regulations is mitiFated by the filing of a 50.55(e) report covering the situation, we vili not attach any independent licensing significance to this event.

However, we may consider this event subsequently.

"We disaFree with CASE's objection concerning the report of rock overbreak to the NRC. Although applicant has not directiv contradicted CASE's statement about the narrow wording of its report, the report that it filed indicated a problem of sufficient dimensions to trigger a staff investigation. Given the likelihood that such an investigation would be conducted, we find no serious harm in applicant's apparent understatement of the overbreak condition in its 50.55(e) report.

CASE's objection does not provide us with any reason to believe that a differently worded report would have caused the NRC national office to become direr ty involved, as CASE suspects. Furthermore, officials in the national office are aware of regional reports. NRC is one organization. We make nothinF of CASE's alleFation concerning a possible motivation by applicant to limit the investigation to the regional office. Consequently, the objection concerning overbreak is denied.

"B. Dental Concrete "In our proposed decision, we described the rock overbreak problem as we understood it from the evidence. In our description, we acknowledged the problems applicant had in predicting the effects from blasting. CASE now calls this dif ficulty to our attention through its objections. However, we see no direct relationship between this dif ficulty in predicting the reaction of limestone to blasting and the inference CASE would have us draw that the concrete placed in the hole 12

CONFIDENTIAL represents an incorrect repair technique. In particular, CASE has not given us anv reason to reverse our opinion that the concrete la stronger than the fractured rock that it was vand to replace. The purpose of the dental concrete is different from that of structural concrete, which is reinforced with steel bars. CASE has not given us any reason to suspect applicant's testimony concerning the use of unreinforced concrete for replacement of broken rock. Consequently, this objection is denied.

"C. Confirming Photographs

" CASE would have us find that the loss of one photograph, of the largest crack' formed in the limestone formation, is so critical that we -

I should find that applicant has not carried its burden of proof concerning the safety of the foundation. However, there is direct testimony in our record concerning this feature and its current status.

We do not think CASE's reason for doubting these experts--their track record in predicting the effects of blasting on these foundations--is sufficient fer us to reverse our findings on this fact. The applicant has sustained its burden of proof concerning the safety of the foundation. Hence, this objection is denied."

It should be noted that the Licensing Board did not address CASE's Proposed Finding that Applicants should perform a seismic reanalysis of the f oundation (see discussion regarding this in attached NEW CONTIDENTI AL ALLEGATION).

As stated earlier, it appears that the TRT was misled by Applicants' material f alse statement in the FSAR -- which Applicants still have not corrected. In addition, Applicants made no mention of the true extent of the overexcavation during the 6/18/85 Staff / Applicants meeting -- even though some of Applicants' representatives at that meeting were well aware of the facts of the matter. See further information in attached NEW CONFIDENTIAL ALLEGATION, especially items (6) through (9). We are still reviewing and investigating this matter.

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i Certainly the TRT's leaving out of any reference whatsoever to the l hearings and ' findings on the overexcavation, and the leaving out of any mention of the overexcavation ef fects to the foundation of other safety- j related structures (such as the Fuel Building, which was the most badly damaged of all), coupled with the TRT's incomplete and/or erroneous findings and conclusions, are in and of themselves very misleading to anyone reading SSSR #8 (regardless of the reason for such omissions, findinFs, and conclusions and whether intentional or not).

In addition, there are additional questions raised by the following wording by the TRT in SSER #8:

"The TRT interviewed the NRC inspector who was present during the excavation process and verified the conditions presented in the FSAR."

CASE assumes that "the NRC inspector who was present during the excavation process" ref erenced by the TRT was Region IV's Robert Stewart (since it was he who testified regarding the overexcavation during the June 1982 hearings; 3 ASEC Proposed Tindings 268-269; g also CASE Proposed Finding 93).

How did the TRT know to contact the NRC inspector who was present during the excavation process? How did they know that an NRC inspector was, present during.the excavation process? How did they determine who that NRC inspector was? What process was followed to make such determinations (i.e.,

did someone, and if so who, tell them, etc.)?

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. m n CONFIDENTIAL If the "TRT interviewed the h'RC inspector who was present during the excavation process and verified the conditions presented in the FSAR," why didn't that inspector tell the TRT about: the fact that a formal hearing was held in June 1982 regarding the overexcavation, and about the sworn .,

testimony during the hearings, the documents (including photographs made from color slides which were shown by CASE during the hearings) supplied by Applicants on discovery which CASE placed into evidence, the NRC Staff's inspection report on the lack of proper QA by Applicants during the ,

I excavation (regarding which Region IV's Mr. Stewart was one of the {

l inspectors -- sy CASE Exhibit 15 Inspection Report 75-05, copy attached )

hereto; but sg also CASE Exhibit 16. Inspection Report 75-01, paFe 6, top of page, which contains a statement which raises questions in and of itself), the Proposed Findings of the parties and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board's Orders resulting from that hearing?

If the inspector Q tell the TRT about these things, why didn't the TRT include any mention of these things or of the true extent of the overexcavation ir the SSER? k'hy didn't the TRT include anything under this allegation in SSER #8 about the lack of proper OA by Applicants during the excavation, to alert other TRT members that it should be picked up for inclusion in the TRT's SSER #11 on OA/0C?

I How could the NRC inspector who was present during the excavation process verify the conditions presented in the FSAR, and/or how did the TRT either independently or through the NRC inspector who was present during the excavation process (the wording in the SSER is not too clear here), verify ,

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the conditions presented in the FSAR -- when the ASLB has ruled that

" Failure to describe the rock overbreak problem in a reasonable manner in l

l the FSAR constitutes a material false statement under 10 CFR 50.100"? Did j L

the TRT rely on representations made by this NRC inspector, rather than upon representations by the Applicants (other than those in the FSAR)? Or did i

they rely upon a combination of representations made by this NRC inspector and by the Applicants?

Whatever the answer to these questions may be, CASE believes that an explanation is called for frem the TRT, not only regarding this necessary clarification in wording, but also with regard to the verification itself.

The impression which is given is that the small amount of damage indicated in the FSAR (which constitutes a material false statement) was verified by the TRT, either independently or through an interview with the NRC inspector i 1

-- and that such small amount of damage was/is all the damage which was done. This is very misleading, and the TRT should clarify, correct, and supplement their SSER accordingly.

It is important to note that CASE presented no witnesses on the overexcavation (rock overbreak) during the June 1982 hearings, and we did not have the benefit at that time of anyone with expertise in this regard.

(If we had had access to such expertise, and if we had been more knowledgeable, there is some testimony which would undoubtedly have been strongly challenged during the hearings, as well as some testimony which 16

t R r, l CONFIDENTIAL might not even have been allowed because it was hc9rsay; for instance, the j engineering geologist did not testify himself. Thus, some of the Board's I conclusions might have been dif ferent under dif ferent circumstances.) In any event, this is no longer the situation; CASE Witnesses Mark Walsh and Jack Doyle have had a considerable amount of experience in the design of concrete structures, and Mark Walsh has such experience specifically in Texas and the Glen Rose area.

The TRT continued \

"The TRT independently evaluated the potential impact on the seismic l response of the Unit I containment foundation due to the replacement of l a limited aucunt of original rock with dental concrete from the i standpoint af possible changes in foundation stiffness. Because of the facts that (a) the dental concrete's behavior, stiffness, and structural strength were essentially identical to those of the natural rock replaced at the site as indicated by the foundation report and (b) the area affected by the replacement work was relatively small (refer to FSAR Figures 2.5.4-33a through 2.5.4-35), the TRT determined that no appreciable impact on either the static or dynamic response characteristics of the foundation resulted from the overexcavation. An evaluation prepared by a geotechnical engineer in the NRC's Office of ,

Nuclear Reactor Regulation supports this. conclusion. He evaluated the 1 effects on static and dynamic foundation stability of replacing undisturbed limestone and claystone foundation rock with dental  ;

concrete and concluded that the ability of the repaired foundation '

materials to withstand seismic disturbances had not been impaired."

CASE is of the opinion that the " evaluation prepared by a geotechnical engineer in the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation" was a waste of time, noney, and effort. It is obvious that this was a case of " garbage in, garbage out." If (as in this instance) one makes the assumption that there was only a very small amount of dental concrete utilized to replace a 17 l

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2/24/83 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD aM in the Matter of APPLICATION OF TEXAS UTILITIES Docket Nos. 50-445 GENERATING COMPANY, ET AL. FOR I and 50-446 AN OPERATING LICENSE FOR COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNITS #1 AND #2 ,

(CPSES) i CASE'S PROVISIONAL 4 PROF 0SEDFINDINGSOFFAg  !

TABLE OF CONTENTS Pace

l. OVEREXCAVATION (ROCK OVER3REAK) 3 General Information and Details (Findings 1-255) 3 No QA/0C for excavation work (finding 83-89) 12 (Finding 107-112) 16

( Finding 156-178) 24 (Finding 242-250) 39 Applicants cited by NRC for failing to develop 27 L end implement excavation procedures (Finding 179-181,186)

Resolution of deficiency (Finding 182-185) 23 Applicants' opinion of QA/QC program effectiveness 39 (Finding 243)

Timing (Findings 256-276) 43 THE DAMAGE FROM OVEREXCAVATION (OR ROCK OVERBREAK) WAS 47 EXTENSIVE (Findings 277-284)

ADEQUACY OF REPAIR REMAINS UNPROVEN (Findings 285-313) 48

. Violations of NRC and other Regulations (Findings 311-313) 51 APPLICANTS DID NOT REPORT THE FULL EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE TO 52 CATEGORY I FOUNDATIONS, EITHER IN THE FSAR OR IN WRITING TO THE NRC (Findings 314-352) ,

Applicants' failure to include any information regarding 53 i the damage to the Safeguards Buildings or the Fuel Building {

foundations would appear to be a material f alse statement. j ITindi ngs 327-329) J i

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OVEREXCAVATION (ROCK OVERSREAK) (continued):

1 APPLICANTS DID NOT REPORT THE FULL EXTENT. OF.THE DAvAGE TO CATEGORY I FOUNDATIONS, EITHER IN THE FSAR OR'IN WRITING TO

'THE NRC (continued):

Applicants' failure to include any information regarding 56 the over-excavation of the Fuel Building foundation (although it was probably damaged most of al1) and their giving a false impression regarding the extent of damage .

to the Unit #2 Containment foundation would appear to be  !

. material false statements. (Finding 352.)

TESTIMONY OF APPLICANTS' WITriESSES REGARDING OVEREXCAVATION 56 0F SAFEGUARDS BUILDING FOUf1DAT10NS IS INCONSISTENT (findings 353-370) ,

11. THE CRACK IN THE BASE MAT / RADIATION SHIELD /WHEREVER (Findings 60 371-389)

Quality of concrete arouna and under the Unit i reactor 61 itself is indeterminate and there is no method by which the true extent, location, and adequacy of repair of the crack (s) can be detemined (Findings 385-386) 111. CASE'S DOCUMENTS (Finding 390) 61

,N. CREDISilliY OF THE NRC (Findings 391-393) '62 9

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C O 2/24/83 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD in the Matter of APPLICATION OF TEXAS UTILITIES Docket Nos. 50-445 GENERATING COMPANY, ET AL. FOR and 50-446 AN OPERATING LICENSE FOR COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNITS #1 AND #2 (CPSES) g CASE'S PROVISIONAL PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT Pursuant to the Board's directive in its December 21, 1982, Reconsideration of December 7,1982 Order, CASE (Citizens Association for Sound Energy), Intervenor herein, hereby files this, its Provisional Proposed findings of Fact.

In its December 7,1982, Order, the Board directed the parties "to file i

provisional proposed findings of fact on all controverted matters covered to l date in the evidentiary record" by January 14,1982(p.3). In its Dece .ber 21, 1982, Order, the Board stated " Good cause has been shown to allow more time for these filings, and the date is therefore extended to and including February l i

25, 1983. Further, proposed findings of fact regarding the Walsh/Doyle allega-tions will not be included in these proposed findings, and a date therefor will be fixed after the record has been closed on evidence pertaining to such allegations." The Board further reaffirmed its previous Order that the parties were to file their proposed findings of fact simultaneously. I The Board also detailed its expectations as to what the proposed findings j of fact should contain (p. 2 and 3), and stated "The Board intends, as it has previously informed the parties during trial, to request closing arguments  !

that will cover in depth all controverted matters. It is contemplated that such 1

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. 2 closing arguments will not be pro foma, but will' cover the 5 cope of proposed -

fi:.;ings of fact, as well as conclusions of law and legal arguments." 'The Board further reiterated that "...these proposed findings are expressly stated to be open to subsequent modification or supplementation," as indicated in the Board's December 7,1982 Order "...as a result of further infomation when the record is closed" (p. 4).

Since the Board's December 21, 1982, Order, the Board has filed its January 4,1983, Memorandum and Order, in which it indicated that:

The intervenor has challenged the NRC Staff's competence in handling and investigating OC allegations by " whistle-blowers," and has questioned the Staff's alleged bias in favor of the Applicants. Clearly further evidence gn these issues will be required when the evidentiary hearing resumes._g . (Footnote 9] Tr. 2669-70.)

It is anticipated that one more (and hopefully final) hearing will be helt after the Staff has completed its gr)alyses and filed its documents as d.'scussed in previous Board Orders.h/ Prior to that hearing, the parties shall complete discovery and file prefiled direct testir.ony on all remaining issues, including the underlying facts and evidence re-garding the Atchison matter contained in CASE Exhibit 738, the Walsh/

Doyle allegations. SSER No. 3, and unresolved Board Notification matters having a significant relationship to the issues in. controversy. (Foot-note 19/ ld. (Orders dated December 21, December 7, and September 22, 1982) Tee aTso Tr. 5438,5412-14,5426.)

Further, the Board may require further evidence if uncertainties arise from lack of sufficient information in the record. (See 10 CFR Part 2, App.

A.V.g.(1).)

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1. OVEREXCAVATION (ROCK OVERBREAK)

1. Testimony regarding the overexcavation is contained on the following transcript pages: 789-853; 915-958; 1030-1180; 1207-1216; and 1225-1258,

2. Applicants' Panel on both the Overexcavation and the Crack in the Base Mat were: Raymond C. Mason; John T. Merritt, Jr.; Kenneth L. Scheppele; Ralph E. McGrane; and Ronald G. Tolson. (Tr. 789 and 790.)

3. Applicants' witness Mason is Chairman of the Board and Principal Engineer of Mason, Johnston and Associates, Incorporated (tr. 791); his statement of educational and professional qualifications were admitted into evidence as Applicants ' Exhibit 16 (tr. 791-792) .

4 Applicants' witness Merritt is Manc9in of Engineering and Construction.

Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (tr. 793); his statement of educa-tional and professional qualifications were admitted as Applicants' Exhibit 17 (tr. 793-794).

5. Applicants' witness McGrane is Assistant Chief of Structural Engineering for Gibbs and Hill, incorporated (tr. 794); his statement of educational and professional qualifications were admitted as Applicants' Exhibit 18 (tr. 794-796) .

6. Applicants' witness Scheppele is Senior Vice President, Gibbs and Hill, New York, N. Y. (tr. 797); his statement of educational and professional qualifications were admitted as Applciants' Exhibit 19 (tr. 797-798).

7. Applicants' witness Tolson is Construction Quality Assurance Supervisor, Texas Utilities Generating Company,- Glen Rose, Texas (tr. 798); his statement of educational and professional qualifications were admitted as Applicants ' Exhibit 20 (tr. 798-800) . Second highest 0A man (Finding 163).

8. Applicants' Mason described his involvement during the early stages ,

of Comanche Peak construction (in the time frame of January 1975) l (tr. 800-803).

9. He stated that he was involved in the excavation activity as a monitor and providing the services of engineering jobs, and that as a 800-801); he was employed contractor, they did by Texas Utilities Services not move Inc. any(material (tr.TU51) (tr. 801-802). and his com services consisted of geo-technical engineering, in which he was directly involved (tr. 802-803). The services included evaluation of the materials present at the site both from a geological standpoint, from the strength of the physical materials standpoint, from the engineering standpoing and from that formulating recommendations which were transferred to their client TUSI and then direct to the structural group of its affiliate (tr. 802-803). Mason and Johnston studied the geologic structures at Comanche Peak and did pre-construction activity surveys or site suitability surveys (tr. 803).

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1. OVEREXCAVA*i10N (ROCK OVERBRE AK) (continued):

10. The Comanche peak foundation is set'on what is known geologically as Glen Rose limestone (a marine formation of crustaceous age), a type of rock (Applicants' Mason testimony, tr. 803-804).

11. Category One structures are structures which are safety related (Mason testimony, tr. 804). Category One relates to seismic activity, as well as floods , hurricanes. tornadoes, and any other phenomena which would imDair the safety of the completed project (Mason testimony, tr. 804).

12. The actual excavation job was of no concern whatsoever to Category One or other non-safety related structures; the excavation procedures were the same regardless of whether the structure was Category One or non-Category One (Mason testimony, tr.' 805,807).

'13. Applicants' witness Mason described the typography and excavations (tr. 805-825).

14. Excavation took place down to the top of the proposed excavation. The hilltop had been removed to a plane. From this newly established plane or plant grade all excavation for foundation for plants and anything on the ground then commenced. (Tr.807.)

15. Mr. Mason's recollection was that the reactors were some 40 feet or so below the plant grade (tr. 808 and 813).

16. He stated that he no longer remembered the depth on the . fuel build-ing or any other of the lesser depths (tr. 808).

17. In Mason and Johnston's earlier geotechnical recommendations to the owners, who in turn provided them to Gibbs and Hill, it was recommended that all structures, Category One and others be founded on in situ (meaning intact) in-place materials and that no fills be constructed to support any portion of tne plant; it was further recomended that in the case of safety-related or sensitive structures, the concrete that would comprise these structures be placed against intact rock. (Tr. 808-809, Masontestimony.)

18. For that reason, in the case of the nuclear reactor containment vessels themselves (which are circular in form) the contractor proposed

. an excavation scheme that would comply with this design requirement (tr.

809).

19. This excavation scheme consisted, as surveyed by the specifications, l of a process called line drilling, which consists of a series of very closely spaced holes outlining the perimeter of the shape of the structure to be excavated (in this case, a circle). 50 the circu'nference of the circle was line-drilled by holes of two to four inches in diameter and placed probably two feet apart. (Tr. 809.)

20. In addition, a series of holes in the center from the excavation (in this case midpoint of the circle) was also drilled. Charges of dyna-mite were placed by the contractor in the holes from the line drilling operation and in the holes in the center of the planned excavation area.

(Tr. 809.)

21. The planning of the line drilling and the determination of the dynamite charges were adopted as a result of a conference between the l

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1. OVERExCAVAT10" (ROCK OVERBRE AK) (continued):

contractor's management people, by (on one occasion) representatives of the DuPont Powder Company and (on another and distinctly different occasion) representatives of the Hercules Powder Company. These were all meetings relating to the size of the charge in the excavation for each unit. (Tr. 810.)

22. Those loaded blast-offs were detonated with or loaded with time delay caps or fuses, such that a limited number of the charges would be exploded and in the case of the plain drilling holes (those around the perimeter) would start, for example, at zero degrees and progress clock-wise until they reached 360 degrees, with milli-delayed blasting caps at (to Mr. Mason's remembrance) four delay intervals, such that the total delay time was in the range of 16 milliseconds. This was an attempt to create a fractured, or a controlled crack totally around the perimeter of the material to the excavating, so as to prevent any cracks going beyond the intended limit and damaging rock. Had it been a simultaneous shot you would also have run that risk, since you run more risk with the volume of dynamite that goes of f at any one time. (Tr. Bil, emphasis added.)

23. The strength of the rock was such that a crack could be propcgated by a series of closely spaced impacts rather than by one big jolt which would break up the whole smear. (T r. 811. )

24. Following the detonation of the perimeter blasting, or the line drilling blast-offs, the central portion of the excavation containing several holes (Mr. Mason did not remember how many) was detonated. This was to create the first breaking of large volumes of rock to permit a load-out operation coming from the center of the circle, the center of the planned excavation. The intended function of the charges on the peri-meter was only to crack the rock into a cylindrical pattern beginning at the surface and to the bottom of the planned excavation, to create by this blasting a separation of the rock to be removed from the rock to be retained. The shot in the middle of the area was subsequent to the perimeter shots by milliseconds. (Tr. 812.)

25. That portion of the rock that had been torn loose or removed from its in-place position in the central portion of the excavation was then removed by proper tools, probably a front-end loader. There was very little rock that could be removed by that technique, and additional blasting was required. This was done by drilling holes on the radii from the center of the circle approaching the previously split perimeter, and additional charges placed and additional blasting performed. Now the rock throw is from the newly created perimeter wall around the center of the exce-vation into the center portion of the excavation where it can be loaded out. This process continued until the excavation was deemed complete, ,

meaning that it had its proper diameter and depth. (Tr. 813, emphasis added.)

26. The excavation depth was in the range of 40 feet. The holes drilled for the placing of the charges were approximately 40 feet, probably slightly deeper. (Tr. 814.)

27. So now the process involved removing the fractured rock, by front-end loaders. As the rock was removed, Mason and Johnston's engineer-ing geologist came in for the first time to inspect the rock wall, the wall that was intended to have been left intact and undamaged. (Tr. 814, emphasis added.)

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1. OVEREXCAVAT10'J (ROCK OVERBRE AE) (continued):

28. In response to the questions: "Was the rock wall basically on the plane that you were seeking? Did you basically accoi,iplish what you were after with regard to the circle you were trying to excavate?" Mr. Mason testified that a casual observer would agree that the excavating was in general in search of facts, and it was to the proper depth, but that it was not in such a way as to leave in place the quality of rock that they as engineers wanted to transfer the load to, so they were disappointed.

(Tr. 814, 815, emphasis added.)

29. In regard to the walls of the excavation specifically, the upper portion of the 40 feet, for a distance of somewhat less than ten feet, looked as if all of the blasting charges had elevated the rock, had tilted it 50 that it was upward toward the center of the excavation. Distances of displacement were in inches. Void spaces were present. One could run his hand flatly into the previously intact rock that was then elevated Ju . There were vertical f actors present that had not been present in situ, created by additional gases escaping toward the side walls. These conditions decreased with depth, and Mr. Mason testified that he believed they were totally confined to the Ulin upper ten feet of the excavation, so that the lower 30 feet of the 40 foot deep excavation were acceptable from his standpoint. (Tr. 815, emphases added.)

30. The upper ten feet had experienced these cracks. Cracks were present of both horizontal and vertical types, but by sheer majority they were present more in a horizontal direction as a result of rock masses being pushed up. As to the significance as to a vertical crack versus a hori-Zontal crack, it's a question of the strength of the material; the material is broke, and when its shear strength is exceeded, it cracks. (T r. 815, 816, empnases added.)

31. Mr. Mason testified that he observed the cracks first-hand. They were mapped by Mason and Johnston's staff geologist, photographed and documented. (Tr. 816, emphases added. )

32. Mason and Johnston did not rccommend at that time that they proceed with the pouring of concrete. Af ter a concurrence with a member of the firm of Gibbs and Hill, a solution was finally adopted from the several methods that could have been used to correct the problem. (Tr. 817. )

33. The method which Mason and Johnston recommended, and was eventually adopted, consisted of the total removal of all displaced rock, the removal radially until all cracks that were apparent from the then ground surf ace were removed, physically removed. The rock was excavated very carefully with a totally different method and hauled off. The rock was broom cleaned, air hosed, watered until they were all convinced that all evidence of cracks and/or displacements created by the blasting had been removed, and then the desired geometry required to contain con-crete for the containment vessel was restored by means of dental concrete.

(Tr. 816, 817, emphases added.)

34. Mr. Mason discussed the alternative measures they could have taken that they chose not to take (tr. 817-818). He stated that in his pro-fessional opinion, the best option to pursue from a structural stand-point was the one that they recommended; he stated that Mr. Ralph McGrane and their client owner concurred without a moment's hesitation. (Tr.

818.)

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1. OVEREXCAVATION (R03 OVERBRE AK) (continued):

3f . At that point, what they had was a 40 foot or so high wall, the upper ten feet of which looked as if one had a deck of cards tilted upward with each card representing a layer of rock. The upper ten feet of the i fortnation had been broken free from the loJer 30 feet and each layer of '

rock pushed upward as it approached the perimeter of the excavation.

This continued radially, horizontally, beyond the intended cut line for distances in the range of ten to twenty feet. (Tr. 819, emphasis added.)-

36. The distances were determined by a very careful technique. First, all debris on the ground surface was removed by brooms, then by tir and

[ then by water, 50 that they could see precisely what was on the ground  ;

t surface. They saw cracks. A trench was then excavated in a circular form R around the perimeter wall and back a distance selected by the field geolo-gist in the range of five feet. This trench was big enough that he could get in and look and see if there was a crack on the cut side and on the side away from the cut. In other words, if it continued across the tNnch that was declared bad, and a second trench was excavated, and so on, un-til the last trench was in total sound rock, That last trench was in the vicinity of 30 feet out from the excavation wall, which indicated that no fractures had been propagated beyond that distance. The trench was as shallow as they could make it, probably no more than three feet, because that is a most sensitive area, the area that had no restraint on it. (Tr. B19, 620, emphases added.)

37. In response to the question "Couldn't you have not found cracks in a three-foot trench yet found cracks had you trenched deeper?", Mr. Meson answered "f40, not in that formation...because of the techniques of the crack propacations in a limestone containing clay stone layers." (Tr.

820, 821, emphasis added.) Through the previously described process, they determined the extent of the cracking. Then the entire area con-tainino cracks and displaced material was removed bd replaced with dental concrete. (ir. 620, 821, emphasis added.)

38. The front-end loaders and hand tools were brought into play again in the removal of the material. The front-end loaders would operate only in a certain width; any width beyond that had to be done by hano tools, picks and shovels. (Tr. 821.)

39. Mr. Mason testified that there was only one other time that blasting was used to break that cracked rock free. There was a zone of crystalline rock, crystalline meaning somewhat harder than its surrounding neighbors, that as a result of the blasting fell into the excavation in such a way that the front-end loader's bucket was too small, or the rock was too big to fit into the bucket. That rock was capped, meaning that a small piece, or charge of dynamite with an electrical cap was detonated on it so that that one rock was split in tu, which it did do. This was not rock which was contiguous with the t.nderlying rock formation; it was rock that had previously been bletied and fell into the hole as it i should have, but in a piece too big for the piece of construction equip-ment to remove it. (Tr. 821, 822.)

40. Mr. Mason testified that if there had been other blasting on the foundation itself he would have known about it, and there was none.

(Tr. 822.)

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.1. OVEREXCLVAT10N (ROCK OVERBREAK) (cor.tinued):

limestone ittelf. (Tr. 826, 827, emphasis added.)

49. Mr. Mason stated that as far as any engineering significance to the fact that the dental concrete would be stronger than the rock below it, the concrete could have had a strength lesser than what it had because it was now (or would be when it cured) stronger than the rock. He stated that their philosophy was there is nothing to be gained by reducing the cement content such that it is equal only to the strength of the rock.

Let's use a non-cement content, nomal placing techniques, as called for in the previously adopted specifications. From the soils and foun-dation standpoint, it was quite adequate. (Tr. 827, emphasis added.)

50. Reinforcing steel vias not placed in the area where dental concrete was placed. (Mason testimony, tr. 827-828, emphasis added.)

51. The reason reinforcing steel was not placed in the area where dental concrete was placed was that the mission in using dental concrete is to try and approximate what is in the ground. The Glen Rose limestone con-tains no reinforcing steel. They were attemptino for uniformity, to reproduce by mankind a femation that is already present and is as near the reproduction as we can economically do 50 as to create a unifem system for the final structure. (Mason testimony, tr. 828, emphases added.)

52. Mr. Mason testified (tr. 828):

Q: "What in your opinion was the engineering significance of the repaired excavation, relative to the excavation as it would have been had there been no cracks?"

A: "In service people and construction costs, appreciably more."

Q: "In service equal?"

A: "Yes."

53. Mr. Mason stated that the procedure for excavation of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 containment building were both the same way. (Tr. 828.)

54. Mr. Mason testified that the excavations for Units 1 and 2 were not done simultaneously, that Unit I was excavated first, then Unit 2.

(Tr. 829.)

55. He also stated trat the excavation procedure was changed for Unit 2 after their experience with Unit 1; that the powder companies were changed, powder consultants were changed, and that the distance on the line drilling holes was reduced (meaning that they were then closer to-gether) taking less of an explosion to perpetuate a crack. (Tr.829.)

56. Even though all those changes were made, they nevertheless experienced basically the same amount of cracking. Mr. Mason attributed this to the j mechanics and characteristics of the Glen Rose fomation, which are such that he does not believe it possible to get an intact base resulting from line drilling and blasting; he stated that a different technique was called on, which was later employed on the site which worked fine. (Tr. 829-830.)

57. He stated that the prior technique for repair of Unit I was also used for Unit 2 and that it worked fine. (Tr. 830.)

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1. l OVEREXCAVA110'! (ROCK OVERBRE AK) (continued):

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58. The extent of dental concrete placement for Unit 2 was about the '

same as for Unit 1, about ten feet deep and from 15 to 20 feet beyond

. the intended wall line. (T r. 630, emphasis added.)

59. Applicants' witness Merritt testified that the Fuel Building joins Units 1 and 2 containments. (Tr. 831, emphasis added.) l

60. The proximity of the wall of the fuel building to that va the reactor is relatively c'.ose, in the range of 50 feet or less. In the plan view there is a service water pipe tongue that parallels one wall of the fuel building. ln the drilling and blasting of that operation, some substantial blocks of rock were displaced horizontally. (Mason testimony, tr. 831.)

61. Mr. Mason described the size of the substantial blocks of rock which were displaced: 50 feet in width, approximately 100 feet in length, and a depth of somewhere between 5 and 10 feet, which was physically moved horizontally a distance that you could put your fist througn.

It slid horizontally. (He identified a reproduction of their own photo-graph that shows that displacement in " Friday's paper.") (Tr. 832, emphases added.)

62. There were cracks in the bottom of the excavation of the fuel build.

ino which Mr. Mason does not consider significant of less than a quarter TiEch in maximum width, and the decay or beginning end of every crack was visible; they knew where it started and where it ended and its r.aximum width. (Tr. 832, emphases added.)

63. Mr. Mason described the criterion they used to distinguish between cracks which would be repaired by grouting and cracks which would have to be removed and replaced with cental concrete: Rock which had been displaced horizor. tally and was intended to give resistance to a wall, to be pushing against it, they considered worthless. it was removed.

They did not want any stress on it. "The cracks that I'm alluding to, or describing in the fuel building were in place, as other places, but those in other places were immediately removed in the excavation process when we removed the rock mass. Those remaining had experienced no displacement and were best treated by means of the grout injection."

(Tr. 832, 833, emphases added.)

64. The large block of displaced rock which Mr. Mur-n recomended be removed was in f act removed, and the repair proteoure was what he had previously described ar6und the containment building, dental concrete.

(Tr. 833, emphasis added.)

65. He stated that foms were placed and the dental concrete poured; he felt sure that, with the volume that was there, it was not a con-tinuous pour. (Mas F lestimony, tr. 834, emphasis added.)

66. The dental concrete was not reinforced with reinforcing steel, for t'he same reason as previously given (see Finding of Fact Nos. 50

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1. - 0VEREXCA"ATION (ROCK OVERBREAK) (continued):

67. and 51; also 47-49). (Tr. 834, emphasis added.)

68. Mr. Mason expanded on how the dental concrete was joined to the rock that was unbroken: "When I used the words displaced and fractured rock was removed down to sound rock, this means that in order to accom-plish that, jackhammers or Clay spades are used to make sure that all drummy rock, all loose rock is, number one, identifiec, and number two, ,

removed, and the result is a reasonably horizontally plane that acts really j as a continuous key way, it is rough, it shows undulations of two to six inches, all caused by the jackhammer tools and/or the clay spades, and gouged it out. So in that sense of the word there's intimate con-tact, shear resistant contact between the dental concrete and the under-lying firm, undisturbed rock. (Tr. 834.)

69. Mr. Mason testh led that upon repair of the area under discussion, the foundation was structurally as it wculd have been had there been no cracking in the rock; he stated that it definitely was. (Tr. 635, emphasis added.)

70. But when he was asked if it was stronger, he stated that "It was stronger." (ir. 835, emphasis added.)

71. Mr. Mason testified that he had experience prior to the Comanche Peak excavation project, in the excavation or blasting in limestone of the quality of the Glen Rose limestone foundation (tr. 835).

72. He stated in response to the question "Did the Glen Rose lir.estone react consistent with jour past experience in similar limestone deposits?":

"In a very general sense, yes, in that it was blastable and we did fracture the rock, in a less than expected sense, inasmuch as it was a softer material, so f ar as the blast charge that was used, we were all surprised, including both representatives of the two major power (sic - should be powder?) companies." (Tr. 835, emphases added.) (Applicants' Attorney Reynolds suggested immediately after this statement that this would be a convenient time to break for lunch.)

73. Mr. Mason described the foundation of the excavation when it was completed and the repairs were effective: "...with respect to the view on the top of the completed excavation, the first thing to note is the observer is standing on concrete; approximately eight to ten feet beneath him is a vertical concrete wall. Then the wall, while continuing vertically, is composed of the limestone, the intact, unfractured rock. Then, due to the structural requirements, the diameter of the excavation decreases.

One would see the intact, unfractured parts on the surface of the lime-stone, and thence the lowermost portion of the reactor excavation, which is a central, somewhat deeper section. it is composed of intact, un-fractured limestone." (Tr. 837.)

74. Mr Mason testified that there was no rock breakage in the deeper center excavation after the repairs were effected. (Tr. 837.) .

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75. Mr. Mason testified (tr. 837, 838, emphasisadded):

Q: "In your professional opinion, was anything done during the excavation in repair work that would or cause cracks in any structure to be placed upon the foundation?"

A: "No. Absolutely not. The condition at the completion of the excavation and remedial measures were equal to or superior to those that were intended in the design."

76. Applicants' witness Scheppele testified that he had heard Mr. Mason's testimony over the preceding one or two hours and that there were no aspects of that testimony with which he disagreed; he also stated that there was no clarification that he felt should be made to that testimony. i (Tr. 838.)

i

77. Applicants' witness McGrane testified that he had heard Mr. Mason's '

testimony, that in his professional opinion it was accurate, and that he did not think any corrections should be made to it. (Tr. 838, 839.)

78. Mr. McGrane testified that he was present for some of the work described by Mr. Mason at the Comcache Peak site, that he was on site during the excavation when the excavations had been cleared of rock prior to repair.

Asked whether he observed the cracks which were experienced as a result of the blast, he r,tated "At the time that I believe they're referring to, we had the excavation, or the fractured rock had been cleared." He stated that he had ob orved the cracks before that had been cleared, that he observed the technical approach to resolving this, and that he Concurred in that technical procedure for repairs that were effected. (Tr. 839, 840.)

79. Mr. McGrane further testified that he discussed those with Mr.

Mason. He stated that he is a civil structural engineer. (Tr.840.)

80. Mr. McGrane stated that he observed the cracks in the fuel building exca-vation first-hand. (There were no structures that had been built at that time.) (Tr. 840.)

81. He stated that he concurred in the repair procedures devised for the repair work in the fuel building area, and that in his opinion as a ,

structural engineer, there was nothing done durir3 the excavation and I repair work that could or would cause cracks in any structure placed upon the foundation. (Tr.841.)

82. Applicants' witness Scheppele testified that in his opinion as a structural  ;

engineer, there was nothing done during the excavation and repair work j that could or would cause cracks in any structure placed upon the founda-tion. (Tr. 941.)

83. Applicants' witness Tolson testified that the excavation work for Cate-cory 1 structures at Comanche Peak was not subject to Quality Assurance procedures and controls. (Tr. 841.) He stated the reason for this was that the specifications for the excavation work did not impose the re-quirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. (Tr. 841.) (Emphases added.)

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84. Mr. Tolson further testified that the proced res f or Quality Assurance did not come into play until the stage of construction which is at the end of the excavation stage and prior to the placement of the Category 1 structure. (Tr. 842, emphasis added.)

85. Mr. Tolson reaffirmed that there were no Quality Assurance or Quality Control procedures pursuant to which excavation was conducted, and that his Quality Assurance organization was not involved in in-specting, auditing and surveilling the excavation activities. (Tr.

842, emphasis added.)

86. Mr. Tolson testified that he was employed by Texas Utilities at  ;

the time of the excavation of Comanche peak as a senior Quality Assurance  !

engineer assigned to the corporate QA staff in Dallas. (Tr. 842. )

87. Mr. Tolson testified that he was familiar with the rock breakage that occurred during the excavation, and that he observed it first-hand. ]

(Tr. 842, 843.) 4 88.

He stated that the reason he observed it first-hand (since it was not subject to Quality Assurance procedures) was that it was of interest to him as a professional. He stated "My personal background is in the geophysical field, and therefore ] have more than just a . passing interest in the excavation work. As I stated previously, QA/0C function was to be applied prior to concrete placement, which is just imediately sub-sequent to the period of time that we're currently talking about." ,

i (Tr. 843.)

89. Quality Assurance procedures were employed for the repair work, i because at that time the poject specifiution was modified to imptsE 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, on the repair work. (Tolson testimony, tr. '

B43,844.)

90. Mr. Tolson testified that the excavation and rock overbreak was reocrted to the NRC, "casically verbally and followed up in writing by an iriterim

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report in February '75, and a final report in December of '75." (Tr.

845, emphasis added.)

91. 'He stated H. answer to the question "Was the excavation cleared of broken rock before the NRC was advised, or was the NRC advised imedi-ately upon the shooting of dynamite?" (Tr. 845, 846, emphasis added.):

"Let me try to answer it this way. I think we need to go back to part of Mr. Mason's testimony relative to the pre-splitting opera- j tion, the concentric blasting operation and the removal of the rr sulting rock, which occurred over a tremendous period of time, and I don't have the exact date in my mind. Evidence of the rock over-breakage, if you will, did not really become visually apparent until we had reached the final grade, if you will, thinking in tenns of the excavation."  !

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1. OVERE AC AA'il0N' (ROCK OVERBRE AK) (continued):

92. Mr. Tolson stated that it was at that point (see preceding finding) that the NRC Staff was advised verbally and was notified in writing:

"in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e), we filed, as I mentioned earlier, both an interim and final report." (Tr. 846.)

93. Mr. Tolson testified that NRC principal inspector Bob Stewart came to the site to observe the excavation, based on Mr. Tolson's first-hand knowledge. He also stated that Mr. Stewart would have observed the excavation for the containments for Unit I and Unit 2 and for the fuel building, and that there was no way Mr. Stewart could not have seen the rock damage in the fuel buildino if he observed the excavations for the containment units, because (as Mr. Mason described) the rock fracturing in that particular area was quite visible so that one standing at the opening of the hole for a containment would have a view of the entire excavated area. He stated that the displacement of rock in the fuel build-ing was very obvious and very pronounced. (Tolson testimony, tr. 846, 847, emphases addec.)

94. Mr. Mason testified that, with regard to the length of displacement for the rock in the fuel building, "I recall an open crack, meaning that the rock was displaced in an amount that -- and I'm not very big, but I could squeeze my body throuch, let's say ten inches. .. Substantial ." He also stated that it was very visible and that there was " daylight where it should be rock." (Tr. 847, 848, emphases added.)

i

95. Mr. Tolson stated that in his opinion the Applicants fully and completely fulfilled the requirements of reporting to the hRC, that notning was withheld from the NRC, that the inspector was 09 Site and observed all aspects of the overbreak. (Tr. 846, 849, emphasis added.)

96. Applicants' witness Scheppele testified that it would be fair to use the terminology foundation for the rock surface and the repaired concrete, and that this is the cican and repaired Excavation, the rock surface on which the concrete foundation of the primary structure (in this case the i containment structure) would rest. (Tr.849.)

97. Mr. Scheppele stated that the containment structure for Unit No.1 was placed immediately on top of that foundation first. "I think if you woulo bear in mind the description that has previously been given, what we basically have here is" two circles, a large circle that would be about 150 feet in diameter; then there would be a smaller circle within that larger circle, which would represent the depressed portion of the land itself which would be non-concentric with the center of the reactor building or the containment structure, slightly offset but never-theless a smaller circular shape which would be roughly 20 to 24 feet below that.

"These would represent the concrete -- the rock surfaces which had been prepared for the placement then of the concrete foundation mat, which is the supporting element for the containment structure itself.

"Now, that mat is 12 feet in thickness. The construction sequence would ba one in which the concrete would be placed first at the lowest i

depth. It would be placed entirely around the smaller circle at a depth wtiich would be roughly 24 feet below. the, larger circle.

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1. OVEREXCAVATION (ROCK OVERBREAK) (continued):

-97.(cont.)

"Then the next point to be constructed after that lower mat was con-structed would be the walls, the little wall going up which would in effect be a vertical surface to the foundation mat. That would be roughly 12 feet in height. The inside surface of that would be a steel arm added '

to the fonn...it would be 12 feet in thickness as well.

"Now.. .we have a 12-foot horizontal mat. We have a 12-foot cylindri-cal wall. On top of that then we would have a 12-foot thick concrete mat that would 90 out to the exterior of the larger circle.

98. "All of that concrete is heavily reinforced. That concrete...is the basic support element for the containment structure. On top of that liner, on top of that construction, that concrete construction there is eventually a liner placed at the proper surface of the horizontal concrete pours.

"So in ef fect what we have then is a steel liner at the top of the foundation mat, again in a shape that would be compressed in the center, vertical in the vicinity of the reactor, horizontal on the larger diameter circle, and that steel plate would extend to the cylindrical wall where the Steel liner plate and the cylindrical wall would be joined and that in turn would go up over the hemisphere. So then in effect what we have is a complete steel envelope which is at the top of the foundation mat, which is the point now in question."

99. Regarding the purpose of the reinforcing steel in a structure such as that, which we could call a base mat, Mr. Scheppele testified that "This reinforcement was placed in that base mat, is designed to acconno-date all the various loading combinations which that containment would realize during the course of its life and also during all of the environ-mental effects which that plant would have received.

"Tnis would involve loading combinations, which would incorporate internal pressure, it would incorpc' ate seismic conditions. It woulc incorporate the reguTar operating conditions of the plant. All of these factors in accordance with the generally recognized practice f rom the viewpoint of cesign of the containment strut.ture.

100. In response to a question as to .what function the concrete would serve in such a structure, Mr. Scheppele testified: "In the design-of reinforced concrete, primarily they use concrete as a compression element. Concrete really is never used as tension because concrete in j itself -- as .a tension element because concrete as tensTo~n is a very weak j

materl al , j

• As a consequence, we marry the compressive strength of concrete and the tensile strength of steel, and basically that's a marriage which .

has worked out well for many, many hundreds of years."

101. Mr. Scheppele defined compression element of concrete: "A compression element is one which we primarily have a situation where the forces are working towards one another, and that produces a compressive stress as )

opposed to a tensile stress, which would tend to pull things apart. A "If you can visualize something like concrete, which is a brittle )

material when it's subjected to a tension it would tend to crack, and basically the design of reinforced concrete structures does indeed .

Involve cracking, because in order for the reinforcing steel to physically I work it is necessary for the concrete in most instances to crack."

(Findings 97 through 101 preceding, tr. 849-853, emphases added.) ]

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1. OVEREXCAVATION (ROCK OVEREREAK) (continued):

102, Mr. Scheppe,le testified that " concrete is not used as a tensile resistant material, without the use of reinforcing steel, which, in effect, provides the tensile strength in reinforced concrete." (Ir. 866, emphasis added.)

103. He stated that the reinforcing steel in the reactor cavity wall "provides structural purposes, any loading combination that results in

' tension in the concrete, requires reinforcing steel and, generally speak-ing, in all reinforced concrete construction, we normally have all exposed concrete surfaces with reinforcing steel placed in two directions to minimize extensive cracking." (Tr. 866, emphasis added.)

104. He further stated that "when you get this tension force which I <

mentioned previously, concrete is not good at withstanding. When you get this tensile force resulting from the shrinkage, then the concrete does have hairline cracks" in the reinforced concrete "which seek out the most l

-- the weakest point in the concrete matrix." (Tr. 871, emphases added.)

105. He also stated in reference to shrinkage cracks that they were

" cracks which ! previously explained was due primarily because of the heating and then eventually the cooling of the concrete caused by the I chemical reaction." (He was still referring to the shrinkage tracks '

in the reinforced concrete.) (Tr. 880, emphases added.)

106. And he testified (regarding the cracks in the base mat or radiation shield or whatever they were): "My viewpoint is that the strength is not impaired because we have made judicious use of reinforcing steel to account for situations in which the concrete cannot take tension."

(Tr. 885, emphasis added.)

CROSS-EXAMINATION:

-107. Applicants' witness Tolson testified that there was no QA/QC pro-cedure developed subsequently to the rock overbreak for later blasting that occurred; that therE would have been a construction procedure issued for the blasting activities that is therefore subject to monitor-ing and surveillance, which would have applied to the subsequent blasting.

(Tr. 915, 916, emphasis added.)

108. Applicants' panel was asked if anyone of them knew of any construction grocedure or 0A procedure for the excavation for Unit 1 or Unit 2; Mr.

ToTson indicated that there were none. (Tr. 916, 917, emphasis added.)

(No one else on the panel responded.)

109. There were no construction procedures or QA procedures for the excavation of the fuel handling buildino (Tolson testimony, tr. 917, 918, emphasis added.)

110. There was no QA procedure for later blasting, but there was a con-struction procedure for monitoring and surveilling blasting subsequent I to approximately November or December 1975. (Tolson testimony, tr.

918, emphasis added.)

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1. OVEREyCAVATION (ROCK OVER6REAK) (continued):

111. Applicants' witness Mason testified that their firm (Mason & Jonnston Associates, Jr.corporated), R. A. Mason, or any of his employees did l not develop a procedure for blasting. "The blasting sequence and blast-ing procedure was primarily developed by the contractor Brown and Root with input from this round-table discussion, from the then powder company and the powder companies changed - ...That was for the entire reactor excavation, albeit there were two." He testified that his firm developed the recommendations to use this sequence and method "(o)nly to the extent-of contributions to a round-table discussion, attended by the owners' representative, construction manager in that case, the contractor's ad-ministrative chief and superintendent of excavation, myself or my repre-sentative, Mr. Croft, and from that evolved specific instructions, I'm sure, that went from Brown and Root's administration to the field super-intendent, to the people on the machines that were doing the work."

(Tr. 919, 920.)

112. That was all for the first excavation for Unit 1. (Tr. 920.)

113. Mr. Mason discussed further the excavation for Unit 1. (Tr. 920, 921.)

114 There was a plateau at one level and then a smaller excavation in the middle of that plateau that goes down to a lower level and that is where the reactor will eventually go for Unit 1, as illustrated by Appli-cents' Exhibits 21 and 22. (Mason testimony, tr. 921.)

115. The reactor cavity excavation was done after the initial excavation through the first level . The first leve? Was a unifom grade from which the cavity excavation was shcon by the blue hic) concrete fill in place.

(Mason testimony, tr. 921.)

116. The total cepth, 40 feet, would be approximately somewbere from the plant grade to the bottom of the cavity; so the first excavation was somewhat less than that. (Mason testimony, tr. 921,922.)

117. The second excavation did not use the same process as in Unit 1.

"In the second level, as in the first level, the reason being, with all i

of the pain and suffering that had gone on with the overbreak from tE first blasting process. Now, my best memory of that one time was that, i

there was no blasting at that lcwer level and that those walls were created l by a different technique, pemitted in the specification called drilling

( and broaching. The holes are now drilled tangent to one another to create the vertical walls. A series of vertical holes are drilled that close and then an expansion tool is lowered and creates a fracture. (Mason testimony,tr.922.)

118. Mr. Mason testified that he did not know the date of the Unit 1 J excavation from the original break. He also testified that he couldn't l

get within a year of the date when Unit 2 excavation was made. (Tr.

923.)

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1 OVEREXCAVATION (ROCK OVERBREAK) (continued):

119. When asked how long af ter the Unit I excavation was done, was the Unit 2 excavation, Mr. Jordan referenced CASE's Exhibit 4 (which had been originally marked Exhibit 22 in CASE's Answer to the Motion for Summary Disposition of Contention 5). (Tr. 923.)

(

120. Mr. Mason testified that "As I recall, the Unit I blasting operation occurred in the first few days of January,1975." (Tr. 923, emphasis added.)

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121. Mr. Tolson continued the testimony: "That excavation goes on for a trenendous period of tire or a significant period sf time subsequent to the blasting operations...My date refers to blasting as opposed to excavation. I do not have an end date in mind when the finish (sic) excavation...Again, the Unit 1 blast occurred around January 5th,1975, as stated in the letter 1 just referred to, CASE Exhibit 22." (formerly ,

CASE Exhibit 22; see Finding 119). .However, CASE Exhibit 4 does not i state that the Unit I blast occurred around January 5,1975. ( T r!-~~

924; CASE Exhibit 4 introduced and accepted into evidence tr. 924, 925.)

122. Mr. Mason testified that the same problem arose at both of the two

. units as a result of a blasting excavatf an, and that after blasting for Unit 1, the problem' of the overbreak was discovered and the blasting was  ;

modified to some extent for the Unit 2 excavation. (Tr. 925, 926.)

123. Mr. Mason continued his testimony: "...the overbreak condition from the blast from Unit I was determined only after subsequent excavation.

We were suspicious, however, that some similar condition that was actually found might have increased, and as a result, the contractor changed the pattern (sic) suppliers. The whole station was reduced approximately' in half. Powder charoes were reduced and other remedial neasures that I do not now recall of that type. Ar.d in containment 2, we detonated. ,

' during the same week that we had been able to see the side walls of reactor one, which Mm Tolson mention?d but the impact of that I need to bring l' out. (Mason testimony, tr. 925, emphases added )

124. " Replying to one hour and tnen the calEncar, Said you have b?asted the second one. Of course, we'd oniy been blind two days when that event occurred. Yes, I need to repeat the time when we were able to confirm the conditions on Reactor No.1 went off. It was only 24 to A8 hours before it went eff in Reactor 2 and that was subsequently determined

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I to nave been only a ha'lf of a correction btcause it was~ destroyed also, i

...I'm trying to emphasize that the blast that took place at Unit 2 was "

underway when we had the full story of what the walls looked like on Reactor 1...We had already reduced for discharges, changed arms supplies, powder suppliers, those precautions turned out to be inadequate to keep rock damage from occurring." (Mason testimony, tr. 926, 927, emphases added.) I l

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1. OVEREXCAVATION (ROCK OVERBREAK) (continued):

125. When asked a question as to how soon after the Unit 2 blasting was Unit 2 excavated, Mr. Mason stated that he did not know the time period, but "I can assure you it was a lot longer than a day." (Mason testimony, tr. 928.)

126. The rest of the panel was asked the same question; no one replied. j (Tr. 928.)

127. Mr. Mason further testified that it was a lot longer than a day for the excavation Sf Unit I to reach the point where they knew how exten-sive the problem was, a9d as to a range of time, he stated that it was "Several weeks. Possialy longer." (Mason testimony, tr. 928, emphasis added.)

128. He further stated: "Before we got the full story of the wall appear-ance on Reactor One excavation, the blast for Reactor Two went off within

...probably two days, three days." (Mason testimony, tr. 929, emphasis added.)

129. In a discussion regarding CASE Exhibit 4 (Applicants initial letter ,

of notification to the NRC about the overexcavation), Mr. Mason Stated I that " memory tells me that the blast for the Unit 1 occurred on January 5th,1975" and that that the excavation for Unit No.1 containment which was approximately at eleveation 793 began (tne actual digging out of meterials) on January 23, 1975. (Tr. 929, 930, empnases added.)  ;

130. Applicants' witness Tolson testified that he was involved in the reporting of the overexcavation to the NRC; he stated that "I reviewed the letter" (CASE Exhibit 4). (Tr. 930.)

131. In response to the question as to why the company reported to the NRC that after the blasted material was removed from Unit 2, visual in-spection revealed little if any demane to the perimter walls (in lignt of Mr. Mason's testimony that, in fact, the damage to Unit 2 was approx'i-mately equal to the damoge on Unit 1), Mr. Tolson responded "Maybe we need to Leap in mind that this is a report to the Commission after the facts as we understand them at that time. I have no feel for the magni-tude of the or the depth of the excavation on Un$t 2 that had occurred on Febn ary 4th. Intuitively I would believe that it wot,ld be very little because _we're only talking about, at most, a couple of weeks between January 25th and February 4th when we sent the letter to the Commission." (Tr. 930, 931, emphases added.)

132. WhenTASE attempted to pursue this matter further and clarify the full picture of what went on when and why, Applicants' attorney made a comment and the Board tolo us to move along. (Tr. 931. ) See further information under Timing.

133. No one on Applicants' panel had any details or knew about how the exca-

]

vation of the fuel building was handled. (Tr. 932, 933, emphasesadded.)

134. Mr. Tolson testified that the fuel handling building is located approximately the center of the two excavations previously discussed, off to one side.

(Tr.933.)

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1. OVERExCAVATION (ROCK OVERBREAK) (continued); l

.135. Mr. Mason testified regarding the fuel building foundation excavation:

" Rock has been disturbed on the well that was intended to remain intact by the fuel building...I could walI- through the crack that had been created ty impact rock being displaced horizontally, a gap of perhaps ten inches He stated that this impact displacement "obviou'aly had to have occurred during a blasting operation in. connection with the excavation for the fuel building, which I've already replied in the negative th'at I do not have the details of it." (Tr. 933, 934, emphases added.)

136. CASE Exhibit 's was _ introduced and accepted into evidence (tr. 934-938);

this is a two-page memorandum from Herbert C. Crowder Field Geologist for Mason-Johnston & Associates, Inc., Field Office, CPSES, to Raymond C. Mason, under Subject of " Blast Overbreak on Containments and fuel Building Excavations," and a one-page attached titled " References."

Applicants supplemented the exhibit to complete it ( Applicants Exhibit 24, tr. 936-940: Note: Applicants' Exhibit 24 was provided and accepted into evidence at tr. 1061-1062. Mr. Mason stated that there were additional geology sheets and photographs which had been a part of the original document. (Tr. 936.)

137. Mr. Mason testified that CASE Exhibit 5 had a date of November 26, 1975 (which was not clear on the copy CASE had and introduced into evi-dence). (Tr. 941.) He also stated that on December 2,1975, by letter

. identified as MJT-185, CASE Exhibit 5 and Applicants' Exhibit 24 were transmitted to -TUSI . (Tr. 942. ) The December 2,1975, was not in CASE's possession and it was not introduced into evidence by Applicants.

138. CASE Exhibit 6 was introduced and accepted into evidence (tr. 942,943).

It is the final raport provided to the NRC by TUGC0 with respect to the rock overbreak or overexcavation (tr. 943).

139. Mr. Tolson testified that to his knowledge there were no , reports to the NRC on the subiect between the report of February 4,19/5 (CASE Exhibit 4) and the reoort of December 12,1975 (CASE Exhibit 6). He further testified that to his knowled2e there were t.o supplMents to the December 12,'1975 report. (Tr. 943, etaphases added.)

140. The language of the final report to the NRC (CASE Exhibit 6) closely tracks the language of the internal memorandum from his geologist to Mr. Masrn (CASE Exhibit 5), with sNne notable exceptdons, including the fact that the following paragrYph which was contained in the ge-ologist's memorandum (next-to-last paragraph) was completely omitted from the letter to the NRC:

" Major fracturing also occured in the Fuel Building foundation area when the Service Water intake Pipe Tunnel was blasted.

l Tiiis rock is being removed and will be completed as stated above. Photographs (6) were taken and mapping (4 & 7) is basic-ally complete at this time." (Emphases added.)

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1. OVEREXCAVATION (RDCE OVERBRE AK) (cor.tinued):

141. Applicants' witness Tolson testified regarding the preceding (Find-ing 140). When asked if there were ever reports to the NRC under Section 50.55(e) of their regulations or under any other Commission regulations reporting that major fracturing had occurred in the fuel building founda-tion, he testified (tr.. 943-945, emphases added):

A: "I've already referred to the letters, the two letters, the interim report and the final report that were submitted to the Comission under 50.55(e).

Q: "And those, as I understand it, were reports on the over-break in Containment I and 2 excavations, correct?"

A: "It's not correct. Those are your words. The intent of the reports was t.o report over-break in the Category I structure."

Q: "And the fuel handling building is a Category I structure, is

.it not?"

A: "That is correct."

Q: "I see no reference to the fuel handling building in your December 12th of (sic - should be or) February 4th letter to the Nuclear Regulatory Comission, yet I see a separate paragraph in M*. Mason's report that was sent to TUGCO. Your testimony is that there is no report from TUGC0 to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that specifically informs that agency of the major f racturing that occurred in the fuel building - "

MR REYNOLDS: " Objection, Mr. Chairman. The witness already answered that question."

JUDGE MILLER: "What did he anWer?"

M . REYNOLDS: "He answered nc."

c'IDGF MILLER: "All ri ght, it's been answered 'no.' If you'll accept that answer 1 believe we - "

MR. JORDAN (for CASEI: "It wasn't clear to me that he answered

'no,'"

li See 'further discussion of this matter in section APPilCANTS DlD NOT REPORT  !

FULL EXTENT OF DAMA5E TO CATEGORY l'FOUNDAT10NS, beginning with Finding 314. I 142. Applicants' witness Mason was ask if he and those who worked or it had taken into account his knowledge of geological structures in lime-stone in deve' loping the proposal for the cerimeter blasting for these containment excavations. He replied "Linitially thought we had.. .

We attemJt.ed to."

Q: "So apparently tr.is limestone turned out to be Eifferent, or otherwise, or perhaps softer. I believe you used the tenn sof ter, is that correct?" A: "I think I used the generic tenn weak rock as opposed to hard rock." (Tr. 945, 946, emphases added.)

143. Mr. Mason testified that he was aware that there existed an aquifer below the Comanche Peak site. (Tr. 946, 947.)

144. He further testified that their problem was not caused by a dif-ference in the limestone over-break in this case because the limestone is soluble and that it could involve sink holes and solution channels with the aquifer there. (Tr. 947.)

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1. OVEREXCAVAT10f; (ROCK OVERBREAK) (continued):

145, Mr. Mason defined ribbing: "I used the term ribbing" (when talking about blasting and ribbing) "but in a way I think is common to con-struction industry to describe a chisel like tool that is pulled by a tractor." ' When asked if that was in the seMe of a sharp heavy plow

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that is used to pull off the rock, he stated "It's a sharpened member  !

that much more resembles a chisel than it does a plow." (Tr. 947, 948.) i 146. When asked the question "in discussing this whole question of the blast-ing and the effects that it caused, I believe you said that the crack is worst from closely spaced impacts than from a single large jolt.  !

Is that correct?"...Mr. Mason responded: "Let me try my version of your 1 question in my terms. When I used that phrase we wem describing modi-fications, or at least the principle of lime drilling and blasting so as to induce a perimeter crack, thereby separating one rock mass from another. The propagation of that crack from one hole to another is much  ;

more controllable by a sequence of charges, time delayed so as to propogate the crack in its intended direction." (Tr. 948, 949.)

147. Mr. Mason testified that, when testing to determine just how extensive the cracking was, they dug a three-foot trench and found a crack; then they dug out the rock down to ten feet and expanded that whole platform; then they looked at the bottom of the then resolving depth, until they got to a trench that had no crack on the other side. (Tr. 949-951. )

148. In discussing the cracks which were found af ter the initial excavations were exanined and thought to be acceptable, Mr. Mason testified: "I do not have the coordinates nf these 30-odd locations, bJt they are in  !

existence...My positive statement is that there are none in the base of the reactor building. There might be one in Reactor 1 because of scale when ! graphed, it's either there or it's i'n the safeguard room, and }

cannot clarify that. There are others in the safeguard building, or Reactor 1, some in the safeguard building for Reactor 2, and a bunch 4

in the fiele zoning." (Tr.951-953.) '

149. Mr. Mason testified that Mason and Johnston prepared work to be performed 3 by others, "what 1 hopefully am correctly calling a construction pro-cedure" for the repair of the cracks just discussed. He furthar stated "There's another input; a portion of that construction procedure called for an input frca Gibbs & Hill for the very reasor that in sealitg in open crack by the grouting process you must have resistance on top of the crack to keep the grout from coming up and failing to go where it's supposed to, so the solution to this involved the two firms, with the structural people telling us what the confining pressure that would be produced Ly this structure was so that we in turn could monitor and hold the grout pressure, as measured at the ground, to a lower number so as to not in any way do anything except force the grout into the ground, not propogate a crack or left (sic) up a building." (Tr. 953, 954.)

150. He further stated: "The time dilemma was that we had to provide for something that could not be repaimd until after the building mat was on. That was the dilemma in time. We could not repair the crack until the building mat had been completed..." (Tr. 955, emphases added.)

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151. Mr. Mason testified that the dental concrete strength was less than that which was used for the structural concrete. (Tr. 955, emphasis added.)

152. He also testified that "the ramifications of economy were simply stating that there was no point in exceeding the strength of the rock with the replacement concrete, but rather than go to the equal strength of the rock, which was less than what we used, we adopted 2,500 p.s.i .

Strength concrete, as measured in 28 days, as being a flexible, economical mix that was stronger than the rock, and the dental concrete is in fact stronger than the Glen Rose limestone." (Tr. 955, 956, emphases added.)  ;

153. Mr. Mason testified that the data on the p.s.i. of the limestone is contained in both the PSAR and the FSAR. (Tr. 956.)

154. Mr. Mason testified (tr. 956-958, emphasesadded): I 0: "In makind (sic - should be making) the determination to 90 with the dental concrete, did Mason and Johnson (sic - should be Johnston), or anyone else, to your knowledge, do a seismic reanalysis of the foundation?"

A: "That was one of the items considered by Mason and Johnson, it was one of the items considered, to my personal knowledge, by Gibbs and Hill, and the conclusion to all of us that we had improved from the seismic standpoint in transmissibility of the foundation. 50 in essence by visual inspection and the thought process 1 just outlined, that was the re-examination.

We had improved the conditions, and that's true."

Q: "You had imoroved the conditions by having two separate materials ,

now that presumably shif ted differently in'the seismic event?"  !

A: "We had improved conditions in the foundation to the extent that the propagation of seiesmic (sic) forces, and the stronger material was more desirable than a weaker material. Concrete is stronger than the Glen Rose limestone."

Q: "But at the same time you've eliminated the uniformity of the .j Glen Rose limestone, correct?"

A: "We certainly introduced a different material, but by no means is the Glen Rose limestone a uniform material. It contains clay stones, hard crystalline limestone layers, and it's as far from being uniform as any material you could possibly have drug up. That's a terrible illustration. I'm sorry."

155. Mr. Scheppele interjected (tr. 958):

"I'd like to comment if I may, and that is that from the viewpoint of any reanalysis seismically, I think the only place that would have been warranted, frankly, I don't think it would have been seriously considered, would be if you put soils, for example, in l Quite an extended depth beneath the foundations, benerath (sic) '

l the concrete foundations and above the limestone surface, which would indeed change the mathematical model to a degree on a containment s truc ture .

"The basis hing (sic) we're talking about here is relatively i

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155.(continued):

small differences,1 think, in materials, which really would have no j impact whatsoever on any seismic analysis where we're considering, as  !

Mr. Mason indicates, a non-homogenous material with regard to the lime-stone formations, so it should not have an impact on the seismic analysis, unless, I say, you introduce a very soft material such as soil, but certainly not concrete."

156. Mr. Tolson testified that he was familiar with Brown & Root quality construction procedure CP-QCP-12, titled excavation and soil backfill compaction, inspection and testing, issued in July of 1974. (T r. 1030. )

(This document was referenced in I&E Report 75-05, CASE Exhibit 15, in which the NRC cited Applicants for a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, because they had not developed and implemented an inspec-tion procedure for activities related to the excavation for the reactor containment structures of CPSES, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with B&R ProcedureCP-QCP-12.) (B&R Construction Procedure CP-QCP-12 uas later introduced as Applicants Exhibit 25, tr.1031 157. Mr. Tolson further testified that B&R Procedure CP-QCP-12 did not apply to all excavations, whether or not safety related and that it applied to excavations in primarily rock soils and did not involve rock ex ca va ti ons . (It was noted for the record that Mr. Tolson did not have the document before him at the time.) (Tr. 1032.)

158. Mr. Tolson reaffirmed that to his knowledge there was no similar quality construction procedure developed for foundation rock excavations.

(Tr.1032, emphasis added.)

159. Applicants' witness Merritt testified that he believed there were ex-cavations taking place prior to June of 1975, but that none of those excavations were considered to be safety relateo by the Applicants (Merritt testimony, tr.1033) or bv its contractor, Brown & Roots, or any of the Cther aDplicant agents (Tolson testimony, tr.1033). (Emphases added.)

160. Prior to June 1975, Brown & Root and the Applicants had an inslettion i procedure for safety related excavations in soil but not in rock.  !

(Tolson testimony, tr. 1033, 1034, emphasis added.)

161. Mr. bison identified tie gener61 forma) and purpore of CASE Exhibit 14, an office: memo from P. L. Bussolini, Brown & Root, to C. L. Whitford,  !

dated February 5,1975. Mr. Tolson stated that he was not familiar with that specific memo, but was familiar generally with documents of that type. He stated that it was a monthly QA/QC report for CPSES, prepared by the Brown & Root project QA manager assigned at the site, to be sub-mitted to his imediate supervisor, with apparently copies to a subordi-nate and a construction representative. (Tr. 1034-1036. )

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1. OVEREXCAVATION'(ROCK OVERBREAK) (continued):

162. Mr. Tolson further testified that he had not reviewed all of the Brown & )

Root QA/QC monthly reports. (Tr. 1036.) _ He further stated that those reports, of which CASE Exhibit 14 is an example, are not reviewed as a matter of course by him personally, that they are available and on occa-sion, if time pemits, "I may choose to look at them. It's not routine Lfor me to pore (sic) over these type of reports." (T r. 1038, 1039. )

163. Mr. Tolson is Construction Quality Assurance Supervisor (for TUGCO);

he reports directly to the TUGC0 Manager of Quality Assurance (so there is one QA person above him). (T r. 1038. )

164. Mr. Tolson 'oegan his employment in October,1974. (Tolson testimony, tr.,1040.)

165. In regard to any reconsideration or re-evaluations of the decision that Category One Structure excavations should be considered non-safety related.. Mr. Tolson testified: That he did not know who made the initial .

decision, at least not directly, that it is a decision that is typically an engineering decision. He stated that it was not the decision of Brown and Root, the contractor. He stated that "They say the engineering organization, which in this case, I would presume would be Gibbs and Hill."

(T r. 1040. )

166. Applicants' witness Merritt intersected "I believe it was a decision between Gibbs and Hill and Texas Utilities" and suggested that Mr.

McGrane could possibly address that. (T r. 1040, 1041. )

167. When asked, Mr. McGrane testified "The specifications for excavac-tion (sic) was prepared by Gibbs and Hill'and Gibbs and Hill did not classify tnem at the time as safety-related." He stated that he did not recall the date the specification was first issued and that "All of our specifications were approved by Texas Utilities before they were issued to the field con-s truc ti on. " (Tr.1041.)

168. Applicants' panel was asked "Are you aware of a reconsideration, a re-evaluation of tt.at decision (not to classify Category One Structure excavations as safety-related) in... late 1974 or early 1975?" (Tr.

1041.)

169. h. Tolson stated "I'm aware of the reconsideration in early 1975, yes." He further testified in response to question, that (referritcg to l CASE Exhibit'4\ "This rrnter of tne decision to report this item, your 10 CFE 50.55(e) was the breaking gap route, if you will, for reconsiders- l' o tion of the classification of the excavations and 50.55(a) only applies E to safety related activities" and that was the Februsry 4,1975, document. i In response to the question of how long before February 4th this cor.clu-  !

sion was reached that this was reportable, he stated "I think we have i established that it was complete and had been reached at this point  ;

in time" (the conclusion that this was reportable). (Tr. 1041-1043.)

170. He stated that "The decision to report under 50.55(e) was made a  !

l few days to a week or so prior to the publication of the letter" (of February 4,1975). (Tr.1044.)

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1. I OVEREXC AVATIO" (ROCV. OVERBREAE) (continued):

171. In regard to the second page of CASE Exhibit 14, dated February 5,1975, where it is indicated that an audit of excavation procedures was under-taken because a predesignation might occur and in later meetings, it was decided that only shottrete work for plant site excavations would be considered safety-related, Mr. Tolson was asked "When was this decision with respect to shotcrete work made?" (T r. 1044. ) He stated that he did not recall attending that particular meeting and that therefore he really shouldn't try to answer that particular question. (Tr. 1044.)

172. Mr. Tolson defined shotcrete as "a concrete material excluding coarse -l aggregate...used as a protective membrane on intact rock slopes at Coaanche  !

Peak," pneumatically applied. (T r. 1044, 1045. )

173. Mr. Tolson stated that "(s)ubject to lapse of memory" he believed that he was involved in the reconsideration of whether there was exca-vation that should be considered safety related or not in early 1975.

(Tr. 1045.)

174. He further stated that Category One Structures were the excavations which were considered for reclassification. (Tr. 1045.) i 175. Mr. Tolson further testified (tr.1046):

Q: "Was the reason not to reclassify Category One excavations as safety related, based on the conclusion that the excavations of the Category One buildings, structures, did not affect the quality or safety of those structures?" i A: "That would be a reasonable conclusion."

0: "You recall l'm asking you whether that was the r6ason?"

A: "Yes, sir. I will state -- as I tried to say yesterday, what's importent from a quality standpoint is what the concrete placed against and not what creat,ed the h0le in the. ground."

176. Mr. Mason interjected: "I'd like to expand and perhaps disagree l or amplify because there is ont factor that i; being omitted. I touched 1 on it yesterday. It's inportant at this point for clarification of your understanding of what actually tam place. I "I met tioned that from the very beginHng we had an engineering l geologist on tite, in the original specifications, as prepared b/ Gibbs '

and Hill, as reviewed by us prior to issuance, it provided for the presence of the engineering jobs to verify the soundness of all materials in the excavation, upon which concrete was to be placed.  ;

"Previously, there existed a committment (sic) from TUSl to the ,

then Atomic Energy Comission and to the NRC, that this person would be present at all times. Would photograph, would perform engineering, be a project manager and photograph the sites of all excavations, as well as determine the quality of the rock handled base.

"That person was there. Those services were perfortned. At any time that a defect was noted, that was reported to the owner and the principal engineer, Gibbs and Hill and those reports did exist and did take place.

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1. OVERExCAVATION (ROCK OVERBRE AK) (continued):

182. Mr. Tolson testified that the deficiency identified in CASE Exhibit 15 (l&E Report 75-05) was resolved and that the resolution of the iten

' included a new Brown & Root procedure titled Plantsite Rock Blasting and Surveillance in June of 1975; he also stated that in about June (of1975),

the NRC, responding to Applicants Exhibit 26, in essence classified the excavation as safety-related, so that from then forward all plantsite rock blastings for Category I structures were then considered safety related. (Tr. 1055, 1056, emphasis added.)

183. Mr. Tolson identified the Plantsite Rock Blasting and Surveillance procedure (CPS QCPS 35) as a QA/QC procedure. (Tr.1056.)

184. CPS QCPS 35 was to be implemented in conjunction with B&R construction procedure CCP-25, titled Blasting for Plant Structures and 551 dams.

(Tolson testimony, tr.1057.)

185. Once the NRC's June 4,1975, letter was received, and in an answer to those the appropriate requirements of Appendix B, then it was an internal mechanism that accomplished the rest of it (the development' of the 0A/0C procedure previously discussed). (Tolson testimony, tr. 1057-1058 and Applicants Exhibit 27, NRC June 4,1975 letter.)

186. The NR" did not withdraw its citation (CASE Exhibit 15)(Tolson testi-mony, tr. 1056-1059).

187. CASE Exhibit 16, I&E Report 75-01, was identified by Mr. Tolson and accepted into evidence (tr. 1059-1061).

188. The start of blasting and ex;avation for the reactor containn.ent structure was scheduled for late Februan at the time of the January 8-9, t 1975 MC inspection (CASE Exhibit 16, p. 6 of report).

189. Mr. Tolson testified that he did not tMnk he was in a position to answer that question (whether the blasting for Containment I and 2 origi-nally scN.eduled for late February), becaue I'm be. ginning to get cUnfused about some dates." ( T r. 1061. )

190. Mr. Mason read from a letter dated 1 february '75 to TU51 that alluded '

to an inspection that he was to make (tr.1062) and stated "On January the 23rd, on Thursday, January the 24th, on Friday, of 1975, and again on Mond6y, January the 27tn,1975, Containments 1 and 2 were inspected to reveat the damages resulting from blasting and over-bret.k. Therefore. I they would have detonated at a prior date." He testified that he did not know about the scheduling or rescheduling. (Tr. 1063, 1064.)

191. No one else on the panel responded when asked if anyone else knows about the scheduling. (T r. 1064. ) I 192. The control building was identified as also being called the lower auxiliary building, the control building being the building in which the control room is found, or located; it is a Category 1 structure (Merritt testimony,tr.1064). I 1

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). OVEREXCAVATION (ROCr. OVERBRE AK) (continued):

193. None of- the members of Applicants' panel had any knowledge of any over-excavation with respect to the control or safeguard building (tr.

1066-1067).

194. Mr. Mason was questioned regarding the section in the FSAR (Final Safety l Analysis Report, Applicants' Exhibit 3) dealing with the excavations and backfill, Section 2.5.4.5, beginning on page 2.5-121 (tr.1069-1074).

195. Mr. Mason testified (tr. 1070-1075, emphases added):

Q:

...to your knowledge, is all the information about the over-excavations of Category One Structures contained in that section (2.5.4.5)?"

A: "All of the information?" .

4 Q: "Yes. For example, all the photographs, does it fully describe all the overexcavations for Category One Structures?"

A: "I am of the opinon and I'm sure I'll be corrected if it's wrong, that there is a supplemental photographic. file referred to repeatedly in here, which are not contained in the FSAR."

Q: "Okay, that is not contained in the FSAR. This particular FSAR  !

contains at page.. 2.5-122. It refers to the photogrids or .l photographs taken at one contaiment of the outer excavation I walls. The, if you know, would the remaining supplementary l file which is not in the FSAR include the similar photogrids i of other overexcavations?"

A: "That sentence in the paragraph that you are reading states that all other fracture mats (sic - should be maps) and photo-graphs are part of the permanent construction records which are available for review from Texas Utilities Services, Incorporated."

Q: "Have you seen those pemanent construction records?" j A: "No, I have not."

Q: "Has anyone on the panel seen them?"

A: "Yes, Mr. Jordan. I have.'

0: "Would there be- a photogrid with those?"

A: "Yes, sir, I believe so. May I correct my answer?"

0: "Sure."

A: "We prepared it."

Q: "Which? ine pnotogrio - "

A: "The photogrid and the photographs obtaintd during the cor.struction and excwation. My reply was meant, I had not seen it in its final fem or in the possession now of Texas Utilities Services."

Q: "I understand. Now, these photographs were all taken by Mason and Johnston, I believe."

A: "Yes."

Q: "Now, are you aware of other -- of overexcavating related to other Category One structures, other than the Unit I containment?"

A: "Yes."

Q: "For the Unit 2 contaiment?"

A: "Yes."

Q: "The safeguard building No.1?"

(No imediate response.)

"First, let me ask you, is that a Category One structure?"

A: "Yes, and to my knowledge, you're going to get maybe maxes (sic) f rcn here on. I'm not aware of any other Category One excavation. overbreak '

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1. OVEREXCAVATION (RD:t DVERBRE AK) (continued):

195. (continued):

Q: "You know of no others but the containment for Unit I and Unit 27"  !

A: "Well, let me define the terms, real quick. I have previously i testified that the largest overbreak of all is the fuel building j wall. That was the subject of yesterday's - " )

JUDGE MILLER: " Pardon me. You're not being asked to recapitulate.

Simply tell us what buildings, if any, other than those described, where there was an overbreak."

WITNESS MASON: "I have done that, sir. The reactors and fuel pumps."

Q (BY MR. JORDAN): "The reactors and fuel pumps. Were there photos taken of the reactor core area?" ,'

A: "I would have to say yes. I do not personally know if there were orders out to photograph every square inch. I'm sure they were followed."

Q: "And yo) don't find any mention in the FSAR, do you, Mr. Mason, of overestimation (sic - should be overexcavation) as to either the containment or the fuel handling building in the FSAR?"

A: "00 the lower portion of Page 2.5-122 is a complete paragraph.

The tail-end of the second sentence states that blast fractured (sic - should be fracture) maps were developed by the site geologist. The FSAR states in item 8, that material was fractured as a result of blasting and in that particular sentence,1 submit that it does not state that that material was removed."

0: "So you're making a distinction between, then, what one would call overbreak and what one might call fractured?"

A: "The overbreak resulted in fractures and the fractures were remove d . The following sentence states -- at least to me --

at the time the geologist approsed an excavaticn assuring the QA/QC program, became involved, assuring cleanliness (sic -

should be cleanliness) prior to application, curing and testing of the protective coatings. That's a true statement."

Q. "I'll take it as a true statement."

JUDGE COLE: "You say protective coatings. What do you mean, sir?"

WITNESS MASCN: "Shotcrete in this case, which was the -- the only reason shotcrete was applied was to protect wet ring from occur-ring on the excavations."

JUDGE COLE: " General concrete is the same category? Is that a protective coating, too, or is that something else?"

WITNESS MASON: "No. That's entirely different. That was a re-placement of the broken and fractured rock."

JUDGE COLE: "So vou used shotcrete on it possibly before you applied general concrete?"

WITNESS MASON: "No,"

JUDGE COLE: "This was another area?"

WITNESS MASON: "Others where it was applied."

JUDGE COLE: "All right. Thank you."

JUDGE MILLER: "We will recess for lunch and return at 1:00 o' clock."

(Whereupon, the luncheon recess was taken. . .)

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1. OVEREXCAVATION (ROCK OVERBREAK) (cor.tinued):

196. Mr. Mason identifies and discusses the photographs (shown as slides) of overexcavations referenceo on the third page of CASE Exhibit 5:

Photo Nos. U 362T87 - 2 thru 20 inclusive, U 362192 - 2 and 5, U 362193 1, - 1,16,17, and 20, Containment #1 Misc. Photographs; K 153774 - 10, 11, and 12, Containment #1 proof photographs of fracture removal; K 153774 - 30 and 31 Containment #2 proof photographs of fracture removal; O 223556 - 24 thru 28 inclusive, photographs of fractures to be grouted; K 153772 - 30 thru 36 inclusive and K 153778 - I thru 8 inclusive, photographs of fractures in Fuel Building foundation area.

These were admitted into evidence as CASE Exhibit Nos.17A-Z,17AA-II, and 18A-0, respectively. (T r.1076-1127. )

197. Mr. Mason stated, in part: CASE Exhibit 17A - The rod against tne wall is marked in foot increments, he thinks. (T r. 1080. ) It was the intent that the wall be solid all the way to the top, as it is in the middle of the picture (tr. 1080-1061). Everythino above what appears to be the 10' mark on the rod would probably have been cleared from that area. "I still do not know what's below the lowermost portion of that picture." The u tire photograph is that of the Glen Rose lime-stone formation (tr. 1081-1082). Toward the bottom third of the photograph there appears what seems to be a rough area of rock; this is a clay stone layer or seam normally and naturally contained in the Glen Rose limestone (tr.1081-1082); there is weathering that is obvious there throughout the areas that are clay stone -- that would be the one perhaps three or four or five feet above the base of the photograph, and one immediately below th3t, too. It would be removed back to firm material; that seam would be dug back inside the wall. ( T r. 1083. ) The vertical lines are the lines resulting frort the lime drilling operation, and each one indicates, on that particular scale, to be separated by I'd judge about three feet as compared witn the rule. (Tr.1032.) It is Containment *l.

198. CAS_E Exhibit 17B - Still Containment #1. Misc. Photo Everything atave the clean-cut wrll would be stripMd away (graphs.

similar to CASE Exhibit 17A), and same information, applied regarding the clay stone layer (see Finding 197 above). ( T r. 1083-1084. )

199. CASE Exhibit 17D - Still Containment #1 Misc. Photographs. Regard-ing what appears to be a rather large crack that runs approximately through the center horizontally: "From what I see in the photograph. ..

I'm going to make the assumption that this was our two crack situations.

That was excavated back. There's also a horizontal crack with an air gap, I think, above the major one. I think this is the beginning of the area that was taken out to the depth of the lowermost crack. I'm not certain..." (Tr.1085, emphasis added.)

200. CASE Exhibit 17E - Still Containment #1 Misc. Photographs. Assumed it was the same two-crack situation; certainly it's similar to the previous i photo. (Tr. 1085-1086.)

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1. OVEREXCAVATION (ROCK OVERBREAK) (continued):

201. Mr. Mason's testimony (continued):

CASE Exhibit 17G - Still Containment #1 Misc. photographs. ,

A situation where the cracks got considerably worse across the hori-Zontal area in the middle; the excavation would have been from the crack that is in the approximate center of that photograph. (Tr. 1086-1087.)

202. CASE Exhibit 17H - A multiple line crack, and we're also pick-ing up areas of horizontal displacement where the upper rock, from about the midpoint of the photograph -- all the rock above that is moved radially into the excavation. As to the approximate distance that it moved into the excavation, "That information is a detail map. Yes, we have the infomation. I do not have it here, and it would depend entirely on where that is radially around the excavation." A rough guess would be maybe five inches or more. (T r. 1087-1088, emphases added.)

203' .

CASE Exhibit 171 - The blast had not left a perfect wall up at the top and that continues to be the case. (Tr. 1088-1089.)

204, CASE Exhibit 17M - Another example of having been blasted out ,

I into tne excavation, in ef fect, to create overhang. "We also have the first line that I have detected, the indication of the horizontal displacement within a given layer. Layer 1, 2, 3, 4 down from the top of the intact rock, has been horizontally displaced to the right," as indicated by the blast line drilling holes that have moved. ( T r. 1089-1090, emphasis added.)

205. CASE Exhibit 17N - Mr. Mason was unable to identify this exhibit other than to the extent that it was one of. the numbers of the miscellane-ous photographs that his firm provided. (T r. 1090-1091.) Mr. Merritt stated that that nay have been an access ramp. "But I don't know. I don't know where it was taken from or the location." (T r. 1091. )

206. CASE Exhibits 17-0 through 175 - Back on the Containment wall.

207. CASE Exhibit 17T "It appears to show the view from the rim of Containment , according to the notes. At least I'm assuring that the camera is sitting on the rim. I'm not sure that that's a fair assumption.

.j No, the original ground rim. I cannot positively identify that as the original ground, in the photograph. It has the excavation, has been cleaned i ta at least the floor to permit wheeled vehicles and tne excavation and the inner circle appears to be unce way." Mr. Mcson thought ths t inner circle was then going to be the reactor cavity. (Tr. 1094. )

208. CASE Exhibit 170 - Q: "...is this apparently a different view of essentially the same thing?" A: "Well, it's certainly a different view, and I again believe that to be Containment 1." (Tr.1095.)

209. CASE EXHIBIT 17V - Still Containment #1 Misc . Photographs.

At the lower left corner or lower left side, where tiare appears to be an indentation in the lower excavation, that would tv a portion of the wall of the reactor cavity sad that indentation is undoubtedly the fractur-ing and/or weathering of the clay scheme (sic - should be seam?). (Tr.

1096.) .

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1. OVEREXCAVATIO" (ROCK OVERBRE AK) (continued):

Mr. Mason's testimony (continued):

210. CASE Exnibit 17W - The lo'wer half or so of the photograph is the reactor cavity portion of the excavation and the upper half or '

50 is the outer perimeter wall of the Containment excavation. The large amount of rock and rubble in the lower two excavations is there to be removed, as is the material up on the very top portion of the photograph -

and most likely down to the horizontal fracture on the upper wall, and continue down that one "right there." All of the upper rock, which has the appearance here of soil, would also have been removed, ~in the excavation for the reactor cavity itself, what appears to be a crack very similar to the cracks we've seen in the upper excavation, going across slightly below the top of that excavation, is a layer of clay stone,-

which is in the weathering stage there; and that clay stone was excavated back to weather under ' firm conditions. To Mr. Mason's knowledge, that was not the result of some overbreak or something of that sort in the excavation itself. (T r. 1096-1098. )

211. CASE Exhibit 17X "I truly think..." that we are looking into the reactor cavity excavation with the Containment excavation higher level behind it. "But that could be a remnant of a ramp that was used in getting the material out...la fact, I rather think it is a portion of a ramp that is as yet unexcavated. To be honest, I don't know."

(Tr. 1098.)

212. CASE Exhibit 17Y - The reactor containment cavity, essentially cleared of all major rubble, and "I think I see the ramp that I was afraid (sic) as in a previous photograph, leading one out." (Tr.1099,)

213. CASE Exhibit 172 - Beginning of section marked proof photographs of fracture removal. Contai nr.ent #1. A portion fron Containment 1 to clean-up, removing the material, or in the process of removing the material ,

and in the process of setting a form to contain replacement concrete 'l from whateser the lower elevation of the r7tk is, to the original natural ground. That would be at least one more line of

• forms and perhaps one more excavation level to the lef t of the pnotograph. There would be some other work that's obscured in this photograph down the wall. (Tr.

1100-1101.)  ;

21 4. CASE Exhibit 17AA - Essentially the same thing, still in Con-tainment-1. Thi forms go down because the rock was removed to a different lower elevation. Forms will ell be brought Up eventually. (T r. 1101-1102.)

215. CASE Exhibit 17BB - All part of the same excavation effort in Containment 1 (see CASE Exhibits 17Z and 17AA). (Tr.1102. )

216. CASE Exhibit 17CC - First of two proof photographs of fracture removal, Containment $2. Mr. Mason was not sure he could explain it, and suggested that Mr. Merritt answer. Mr. McGrane testified that "This photograph would have been taken from the Unit 2 safeguard building.

You're looking at the Unit 2 reactor excavation. At the point where you see this lift coming down in the front, the fore part of the photograph,

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1. ~ OVEREXCAVATION (ROCK OVERBREAL) (continued): i 216. CASE Exhibit 17CC (continued):

Mr. Merritts testimony (continued).: 1 is where a portion of the safeguard building was replaced. The safeguard ]

building is adjacent to the containment (sic - should be containment) j structure at that point." (Emphasis added.) The hole where the scaffold- j ing type structure goes down into a hole is a reactor cavity for Unit 2. j There is a wall behind what in essence is a donut with some people stand-  !

ing just abo'.e it; that well would fom the outer limit of the contain- J ment mat and containment wall, also referred to as the perimeter. Q: j "Since my impression is that the reactor cavity excavation was essentially "

below the level' of the bottom of the containment excavation, or perimeter excavation, if you will, could you explain why that -- in effect that donut of unexcavated material is around the reactor cavity and apparently above the level of the excavation all the way to the perimeter?" A:-(McGrane):

"It is not above the level of the excavation. That perimeter is, or that flat portion that you see there around the reactor cavity is the bottom of the foundation mat or perimeter mat that we've been talking about."

A: (Merritt): 'That's your upper mat that shows back over here. It's a lef t-hand drawing which is blue and goes horizontally" (referring to Applicants ' Exhibit 21). (Tr.1102-1104.)

217. CASE Exhi bit 170~) - Second of two proof photographs of fracture removal, Containment 12. (See also CASE Exhibit 17CC.) Mr. Mason stated:

" Basically what that is, you're sitting over in the Unit 2' safeguard building looking essentially due east right across the top of the opening for the reactor vessel itself." (T r. 1104 -1105. )

218. CASE Exhibit 17EE - The first of five photographs of fractures to be grouted. In connection with something that is adjacent to either Containment 1 or Containment 2 and is in a Category 13rea. Mr. Mason stated that he thought tre photograph illustrates by a fracture in the rock angling upward to the right from the base of the photograph. The existence of a fracture that "I'm assuming is open inasmuch as that is the reason that the photograph was included in our memorandum to start wi th , it wculd be relatively impossible to grout that fra-ture without first filling the area in the forefront of that fracture with concrete so as to close the fractures and that would later concline (sic) any introduction of grout into that open fracture. That is the purpose of the photograph and is the reason that it was included under the caption photograph of a fracture to be groute." (T r. 1105-1106. )

219. CASE Exhibit 17FF through 1711 - The other four photographs of fractures to be grouted (same area)(see CASE Exhibit 17EE also).

CASE Exhibit 17GG - Shows the forin work beginning to progress at the upper left. The fractures to be grouted are in that dark area along a 45-degree angle, Mr. Mason assumed. To grout that particular fracture, it is necessary to remove rock that is not intrically and structurally sound. When that has been done and there still persists an open joint, which may be natural, or open fracture which may be created by blasting, then a judgment call has to be made as to how it is repaired. If it is decided, on the judgment level, that that should be treated like grout-ing, then yes, it is necessary to clean it off and then replace concrete.

(T r.1106-1108. ) -

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1. OVEREXCAVATION (ROCK OVERBREAM) (continued):

(Mr. Mason's testimony - continued):

220. CASE-Exhibit 18A - The first of a series of photographs of fractures in Fuel Building foundation area (CASE Exhibits 18A through 18-0). Mr. Mason assumed that the rule or marker is marked in foot-lengths (on this and all previous photographs). The fracture shown in this photograph is "one of many in the wall sep6 rating -- I shouldn't say separating because I don't know what's on the other side at the mome nt. I don't know the orientation of that photograph. One of the walls of the fuel building. I think I see daylight through the crack." The crack in the fuel building Mr. Mason stated yesterday that he could almost fit himself into was, Mr. Mason thought, larger than that one. (Emphases added.) (T r. 1110-1111. )

221. CASE Exhibit 18B - ( Appears to be slightly different angle of CASE Exhibit 18A; Mr. Mason did not specifically discuss it.)

222. CASE Exhibit 18 - Mr. Mason testified regarding this photograph (tr.1111-1113), which is still of the fuel Building foundation area:

0: "Can you tell us what that's a picture of, Mr. Mason?"

A: "I can tell you what it's a picture of, but I can't tell you why it was taken. To me it's a picture of a pickup truck."

(Laughter.)

0: "Could it be a picture of overhand (sic - should be overhang) from the excavation?"

A: "I don't know what it is."

0: "...You've testified and indicated in the slides that in fact in the containment excavation, at least for Unit le there were areas where the excavation blast resulted in the wall, in effect, moving forward somewhat radially, I believe you put it, into the excavation by sone distance which you guessed at as around -

five inches or so, in a particular photograph that we looked at. Did that problem arise in the fuel handling building and could this be a picture of it?"

0: "Truly,1 do not know what that picture is intended to delineate to the observer. That's my best answer. Now, a problem did arise in the fuel building which hopefully you would reproduce

, some of the other photographs of those fonnations moving in.

l but this particular on (sic - should be one) I can't tell you why it was taken." (Emphasis added.)

0: " Fine. Tha nk you . . . "

223. CASE Exhibit 18D - Mr. Mason indicated that this was an example of the movement into the excavation referred to in his previous answer.

He stated: " ...it's a three-dimensional movement. The intact rock, prior to blasting, had been drilled. The path of the drill has been highlighted by either red or orange paint to illustrate the offset.

The eye can be used, or at least my eye can, to detect that the upper portion of the rock has been moved forward over the clay stone seam or, and equally probably, the lower portion of the rock has been moved away from the camera back from the upper rock, and I cannot, without .or-ientation, tell you which way the movement was. I think we can all agree that there has been a relative movement on two axis...When there is an  !

air gap on the back side of the rock mass that we are looking at, what

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1. OVEREXCAVATION (ROCK OVERBREAK) (continued):

223. Mr. Mason's testimony (continued):

I'm saying is if a rock pedestal in horizontal thickness is not a sub-stantial number we have all kinds of weird movements in the rock, in a three-dimensional, three-axis movement, so yes that (the lower parts as well in fact move backwards) can be possible under certain conditions."

224. CASE Exhibit 18E "Obviously that's a crack in the rock with a horizontal displacement. I don't detect any vertical displacement.

I see either a saw cut or concrete in the upper right-hand portion,

- and again without the photo log mat and the proper orientation, that's about all I can tell you." Mr. Mason stated that he didn't know (and rather doubted) that the upper left-hand or left quarter, approximately, of the photograph was looking into the fuel building excavation at that point. The rest of the panel was asked, and Mr. Merritt stated: "No.

You get a unanimous no, we don't know where that is." (Tr.1114-1115, emphasis added.) This is still part of the Fuel Building foundation area.

225. CASE Exhibit 18F - Continuing with the fractures in the fuel Building Foundation area. Mr. Mason stated that he could not identify where this particular tract is and that he could not even differentiate this one from the previous one, that they could be the same, that he did not know, other than that it is in the area of the fuel building foundation. (Tr.1115.) He further stated "Mr. Jordan, you are aware that there is a photo 100 we have that gives better descriptions, which we don't have at our availability." (See later discussion regarding this.) He stated that that crack appears to be extending eway fro"i so9e excavation, for whatever the distance of the crack is, that the fore-ground of the photograph appears to be disappearing fron view,-indicating some fom of a near vertical wall. "I'm puzzled by what the second rise in the rock surface is, it seems to be a plateau and then it goes up again. I don't know what that is." (Tr.1116. )

226. CASE Exhibit 18G - Another view of the fractures in the Fuel Building Foundation area. Mr. Mason initially thought that the big crack on the right was the one he previously described that he could get into up on top (tr.1117); but later he stated that he had been misled uy the scale of the photograph and that it was not that particular crack (tr. 1123-1124). He did, however, repeat his testimony that there was a crack in the wall or the foundation of the fuel handling building that was 50 large that he could get into it himself, that there was one approaching his body thickness; but that we did not have a picture of it in the photographs were shown as slides and admitted into evidence as CASE Exhibits series 17 and 18, photograph copies from the slides.

(T r. 1127. ) He stated that this view was for the fuel building.

...the fuel building would be on the inside, or the foreground of the i photograph, and again I'm puzzled by the orientation of what appears )

to be the crane housing coming up at a high elevation, indicating another excavation on the other side...That's the best that you're going to get from us here with that view, We don't know." (T r. 1117. )

227. Mr. Merritt stated that "we may be looking to the southwest of the switch yard in the far, f ar background. That may be the rise back there, such that you would have that cherry-picker sitting over in the turbine f

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1. OVEREXCAVATION (ROCK OVERBREAK) (continued):

227. (Mr. Merritt's testimony - continued:) 1 hall, or even the auxiliary building." Mr. Mason: "It could be either." l At this point, Mr. Reynolds suggested that perhaps the witnesses could state whether if this slide were in backwards the orientation would j help, to which Mr. Mason responded "Our orientation would be totally wrong if that is the case. That's a serious point." (It should be noted, however, that there is nothing in the record to indicate that the slide was backwards, and the pictures correspond exactly to the way the Appli-cants provided them to CASE insofar as their facing correctly ) (Tr.1117-1118.)

228. Mr. Mason testified in regard to the approxirnte size of the large block that begins about, not quite. halfway down the crack, that he could not say from the data that's instantly available. "I can appror% ate it as something in the vicinity of a free length of around 50 or more feet." He defined f ree length: "If one would extend the plane -- well, first of all, I'm assuming I know what I'm looking at, and I've already tried to disclaim a positive identification, if we are correct, or approximately correct, I believe that that plane of the rock that is illu-strated on the right-hand side of the photograph comes to a vertical face, ,

or daylight in about 50 more feet, representing a junction. That, I think, is the entire mass of rock that was, by judgment call, totally removed f rom the si te and replaced with concrete." (Note: In view of the fact that Mr. Mason was mistaken about the scale of the photograph, it may be that his estimate of size and disposition was not correct for this particular photograph; however, he has clearly indicated that there was such an area, whether or not we had photographs of it.) (Tr.

Il18-1TT!i.)

229. CASE Exhibit 18H - Mr. Mason stated that CASE Exhibits 18H through 15-0 (K-153778-1 through -8) are all a continuation of sequence but a change in numbers in the fuel building area, and that he thought CASE Exhibit 18H was ths same view as CASE Exhibit 18G. (T r. 1119. )

230. . CASE Exhibit 181 -.Mr. Mason stated that he did not recognize it, that there was no orientation, and the best we know is that it's in the fuel handling building ma. "According to our records, it's in the same area and may possibly be a detail of the previous two. It appears that the cameraman is zeroing in on this." (Tr. 1120.)

231. CASE Exhibit 18J - Mr. Mason stated that he'd have to see the previous slide (CASE Exhibit 18-H), but that "I d6n't think it's that material at all. All I can tell you is that's somewhere in the fuel buildihg. . That's obviously a crack, yes. And there's also one on the lef t, and there's one halfway between the two." (Tr.1120-1122.)

232. Mr. Mason was asked: " ...there appebrs to be a wall behind, relatively in the background, above the man in the photograph. Is that an additional crack?" A: "That would be too far away for any crack to show up I think.

That would be from some other cause. What in reality is present, is an excavation behind the rock that the man -- well, let's start over. There is a man in the photograph and a reentrant corner. That is a corner of an excavation. Horizontally, away from the camera, there appears to be l-

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1. OVERE XCAVAT10N (R?D. 0VIRERE AK) (continued):

23?. ~ (Mr. Mason's testimony - continued):

a rock. surf ace. Then there must be -- there was another vertical wall where the excavation goes down because.the cherry picker and the loading

-- or the truck loaders or rock loaders, is at a lower elevation. Now, the black l-shaped mark on the far corner would not be visible, in my opinion, if the crack of the sa"e size as that besides the man were present over there and I would suspect that to be something entirely different."

Asked if we wouldn't be looking at the. turbine building wall on this particular location, and if so,-is there an excavation parallel to the wall on the lef t, with the loose rock on top, Mr. Mason stated "]'m not sure about that...I think we got the switchyard behind us, and if that's the case, then we're looking at the far wall of the turbine building."

(Tr. 1122-1123.)

233. CASE Exhibits 18K and 18L - The best we bnow is that they are in the fuel building foundation area, and that they are photographs of

' ~

fractures. ( T r. 1125. )

234. . CASE Exhibit IBM - still photograph of fractures in Fuel Building Foundation area. Mr. Mason was able to tell us "Nothing other than some effort has been made by someone to attenpt to remove obscuring loose neterial on the top of a rcck in order to determine the location of the crack" and that there is what appears to be a crack extending away from an excavation. (Tr. 1125-1126.)

235. CASE Exhibits 18N and 18 Mr. Mason was acked: " . . . ius t fron reviewing inis slice (CASE Exnibit 18-0) and tne previous ones, you recall, it does appear that the crack we are looking at in the face of the wall extends across a plateau to another excavation, is that correct?" A: "Yes. This is, as you correctly pointed out, another view of the sane defect as the result of blasting and your assumption is correct that crack does extend and continue down the other sice.

We have had, with these slides, many such photographs. What we are look-ing at is three or four or rore vie.is of the precise crack taken from dif ferent angles ." ( T r. 1126-1127, emphases added.)

236. CASE Exhibits 19 through 36 are admitted into evidence (tr. 1129-1152).

237. Regarding CASE Exhibit 21 /1/ Mr. Mason testified to the following breakdown by e Jmber of the color code on page 1 of the Exhibit (tr.

1153-1164):

~1/ Tr.1153, lines 23 and 24, states: "MR. JORDAN: Well, I would propose to go with at least one of the facilities - " This has a typographical error; it should indicate that Mr., Jordan was proposing to ask some questions re-garding CASE Exhibit 21.

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.l. OVEREXCAVATION (ROCK O'.'ERBREAK) (continued):

237. CASE Exhibit 21, Mr. Mason's testimony (continued):

• 1 - Red - horizontal surfaces

1. 2 - Red - vertical surfaces

1. 3 - Blue .

1. 4 - Green

1. 5 - Yeliow

1. 6 - purple

1. 7 - Brown i 238. Applicants' attorney Reynolds stipulated that (with Mr. Mason's consent that this is accurate) we can stipulate that this diagram represents the areas in the plant which required remedial work and that in accordance with the color code, the remedial work for each portion is described in the memorandum. (Tr. Il6r : CASE Exhibit 21.)

239. Regarding CASE Exhibit 21, Mr. Mason, in using an example, stated:

"For example, re very last one, Brown, which is a major portion of h.. Spens to consist of the entire fuel building and it the coloring, states: ' RockTaquires further excavation to remove damaged rock.'"

(tr.1162, emphases added.)

240. Regarding CASE Exhibit 31, second page of Exhibit, Mr. Mason confimed that the references listed under "1.D. No." are references to individual grout pipes that were used in the repair process of the buildings designated under " Building." (T r. 1165. )

241. Regarding CASE Exhibit 32, Mr. Mason stated that the terin "have not been grouted back" means that they have not yet been grouted, the work is incomplete, they need to be done. (T r. 1166. )

242. The decision for excavation not to be included under safety related quality assurance was made by the engineer at Gibbs and Hill. (Tolson testimony, tr.1172.)

243. Asked what sort of differences there might be with respect to having safety-related quality assurance activities with excavation and the absence of quality assurance, Mr. Tolson testified "The primary dif-ference, or principal difference, would be the absence of what all of us have come to refer to as the independent verification surveillance or inspection effort over the contractor's procedures for blasting."

He stated that records kept of the excavation were not much different than the records that would be kept if QA were involved, and that "The only difference would be the absence of the surveillance evidence" which "would be done by the contractor's organization; in this case, Brown

& Root." ( Tr.1172-1173. )

Mr. Tolson testified that, in his opinion, any problems associated with the excavation would not stand a better chance of being discovered I

were the situation to be different than QA involved. He praised the QA program presented by Mr. Mason the previous day, and stated "I would

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1. OVEREXCAVATION (ROCK OVERBRE AK) (continued):

243. Mr. Tolson's testimony (continued):

have been hard pressed to add to what Mr. Mason established, the inter-face between the contractor and the power (sic - should be powder?) I manufacturer, et cetera, in terms of resulting in no over-break. ! ]

don't know in my own mind, and for five years there's been nobody able to come up with a plain thing, if you will, where a formalized QA/QC group could contribute anything to the end product." (Tr.1173-1174, emphases added.)

244. Asked with respect to those deficiencies that were uncovered, would the technical fixes have been any different than those that were proposed and realized by virtue of the absence of quality assurance, Mr. Tolson testified "Okay. Let me again clarify a point here, and it was a point I was attempting to make yesterday. The fixes were handled within the formalized QA/QC system...That was always our claim. Okay, but the point I tried to drive home yesterday was from the start it was planned, and I use that term within the broad concept of the definition of quality assurance, for the engineering geologist to clarify the adequacy of the finished excavation prior to placing concrete." He stated that the tech-nical fixes would not have been any different. (Tr. 1174-1175.)

245. Mr. Mason commented as follows: "...The investigative process that is normal, the geotechnical group, was performed in close coordina-tion with the structural group of Gibbs and Hill, which generated to the  ;

publication of certain specifications. Among those were that the usual '

excavation should be made to the lines and grades shown on the drawings.

Excavations can be permitted by line drilling, roaching, blasting, and so forth, all perfectly normal, and i+. then stated that no concrete --

I'm sorry, that the geotechnical consultant's representative on site would innediately that defects and/or damage had not resulted. If they had resulted or an over-break occurred, these would be repaired.

"I have here earlier answered that over-breaks did occur in certain areas , but in reality I'm wondering if I haven't accidentally misled peo pl e . Over-breaks always occur in construction. No one excavates to a neat line and grade. 50 all my answers are that the process employed at Comanche Peak through our firm's activities, Gibbs and Hill's and the owner's, was a very tight control, resulting in good foundation wo rk . " (Tr. 1175-1176, emphasis added.)

246. Mr. Mason stated that he (and presumably his firm as well) has not participated in a similar activity on other jobs and other sites.

He stated that they have participated in many jobs without a QA program, that this one is with a complete QA program after excavation. (Tr.1176.)

247. Mr. Mason was asked by Dr. Cole "Now, when you say QA program, what do you mean, sir? The reason why I ask, let me tell you that I would assume that any contractor would want to make sure that the quality of his end product is acceptable in terms of his contract so he's going to i have some n"?lity control himself. Now, when you say quality control, l quality assurance, what do you rean, sir?" A: " Basically the same I thing, but better documented." (Tr.1176, emphasis added.)

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1. OVEREXCAVATION (ROCK OVERBREAK) (continued):

248. Asked if he thought the technical fixes would have been any different than those actually realized Mr. Mason stated " Definitely not."- Asked if he thought problems would have been better identified if the QA progran had been installed, he stated "In my opinion, no, because 1 think we perfomed -- we perfomed the same before that. There was no distinguish-able change in our activities." (Tr.1176-1177.)

249. Asked if his level of participation was unusual for a typical project.

Mr. Mason stated "Not in my opinion. We're all partners in trying to accomplish a conrion mission, and the cooperation was ideal. I don't call that unusual." (Tr.1177.)

250. Mr. Merritt asked to address that for the utility and stated "The level of involvement that Mason and Johnson (sic) provided in the exca.ation process is what we at Texas Utilities have experienced on some sites in that because of the changing nature of the materials and soils and mechanics area, we have always leaned very strongly on the soils con-sultant in conjunction with our AB to help prepare a foundation, either for structures or dams or the like. As such, they give us that degree -

of independence from the contractor to assure that we do have a body or group that is working in the best interest of us, the final customer, so we believe that from th standpoint of the level of involvement, this is what I have experienced in 15 years, ten of which were on fossil plants with Texas Utilities. This is not abnormal for us." (T r. 117 7-1178, emphases added.)

251. Mr. Mason was asked if he knew ho.v much dental concrete was used, if he had an estimate of the number of yards of dental concrete that was involved in restoring the overbreak back to the original. He testified "No, I personally don't. The dental concrete consisted primarily of the area that'was exhibited in the last slides, where cleanup operations E e under way, a thickness of perhaps 5 to 7 feet; the max perhaps 10.

"hirizontal distance with step configuration maxium (sic) of perhaps 20 teet. I think that was the largest volume of dental concrete.

-'Ine only other application of the dental concrete would have been for the 4etthering of the clay stone required a dental application and, to the best of my memory, and someone here may be able to correct me -- I think all of that was placed by shotcrete mechanism because of the diffi-culty of conforming.

"So, the overbreak was more than we wanted. More than anybody wanted and I do not have a better answer for you. Perhaps members of the panel do as to the cubic yardage that was involved." (Tr.1179, emphases added.)

252. Mr. Mason was asked "Now, what about the cracks in the rock in'the area of the fuel building? You talked about a 10-inch crack and I believe you also testified how that crack was filled. Could you repeat that quickly and then -- do you have an estimate of the number of cubic yards of grout that were used there to fill up these kinds of things -- cracks?"

Mr. Mason testified "I have stated that and, again, lef t the wrong impression. That block of rock, whatever the yardage may have been, we

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.1 , OVEREXCAVATION (RDCE OVERBREAK) (continued): l 252. Mr. Mason's testimony (continued):

deemed it non-repairable. Let's remove the entire mass of rock if it contained that type of cracks, down to the face of the cracks. Let's in turn, build a new concrete wall, if you will, to replace this cracked and damaged rock with all the cracks. Now, I lean on somebody else here for testimony about the yardage. I do not know. That may have been the largest yardage of dental concrete, right there." ( T r. 1179-1180, emphases added.)

- 253. The rest of the panel was asked if they had an estinate of the number of yards of dental concrete which was used. Mr. McGrane testified that "If we. look at the dimensions of the building and had that, we could figure the yardage. It's not that difficult." He stated that they could not supply an order of magnitude, as far as the scope of the activi ty, without a computer. (Tr. 1180.)

254. The following testimony regarding CASE Exhibit 21 was given by Mr. Mason (tr.1207-1208):

0. JUDGE COLE: "The original testimony that we had earlier where you were presenting your testimony, prior to cross-examination, 1 interpret as being almost entirely involving the location of the very large circles in the figure which amount to the contain-ment vessels, Containment No. I and Containment No. 2 excavation.

Is that correct?"

A. WITNESS MASON: "Yes. That is correct."

Q: "And so you did not go outside of that in your discussions or saying whether there was or wasn't other overbreaks that were a problem at that time? That didn't say that there wasn't some more over-break that you ran into as a problem as you went through all the other buildings?"

A: "I think that's a correct statement, yes."

255. Mr. Merritt interjected: "Let me add something...Throughout the majority

-- well, throughout those building areas we did have cases of over-ex-cavation or over-break, whichever the case may be. In some cases we used the blasting technique. In some cases we used the ripping technique. .

Whatever method we had used, there were cases where we had over-excavation  !

beyond the neat lines called for on the prints, and the solution in those cases was to go back with the so-called dental concrete in those areas."

( T r. 1208-1209.

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1. OVEREXCAVAT10'; (ROCK OVERBREAL) (continued):

Timing 256. Applicants' witness Mason testified that based on his memory, the blast for the Unit 1 occurred on January Stn,1975 (tr. 930).

257. Inspection and Enforcement (l&E) Report 75-01 (CASE Exhibit 16) was perfomed by R. C. Stewart, NRC Region IV's Reactor inspector at the time, on January 8-9,1975 (Exhibit page 1); it was signed by Mr. Stewart on 1/16/75 and reviewed and signed by W. A. Crossman, NRC Region IV's Senior Reactor Inspector at the time, on 1/17/75.  !

258. The report states that "The inspection was limited to the review of the site QA program implementation as it applies to safety related work ictivities in the initial Construction Phase. In addition, a revien and examination was conducted of the activities associated with the co 1struction of the 551 Dam." (Report page 4.) It is not clear  !

whethet or not this inspection was at the site; however, no mention is made in the report to the effect that the inspector was aware of any blasdng having taken place around January 5. In fact, the report further s'.ates "The start of excavation and construction of the SSI Dam has F;en delayed. The B&R representatives indicated that con-structic n of the 551 Dar is nor scheduled to start the first week in Februar3 and that the delay would not affect the overall schedule."

(Report page 6.) And the report also states "The start of blasting and excavation for the reactor containment structure is currently scheduled for late February." (Report page 6 - emphases added.)

259. An inspection of paperwork at the TUSI corporate offices (not at the plant site) was made on January 17.1975 (l&E Report 75-02, CASE Exhibit

). There is no indication that Applicants advised the NRC of any change in the schedule of late February for the start of blasting and excavation for the reactor containment structure, that Applicants advised the NRC that blasting and overexcavation had already occurred arcund January 5, or that the NRC had any knowledge that blasting and excava-tion had already occurred. Mr. Stewart is shown on the report as Princi-pal Inspector, and Mr. Crossman reviewed and signed the report.

260. "On January 23, 1975 the structural excavation, to approximately eleva-tion 793, for Unit No.1 containment began." (CASE Exhibit 4. Applicants '

initial letter to the NRC dated February 4,1975, reportin0 the over-excavation under 10 CFR 50.55(e).)

261. Applicants' witness Mason testified that Unit I was excavated first, then Unit 2 (tr. 829). He also testified that for Unit 2 the distance on the drilling holes for the placing of the explosives was reduced, meaning that they were closer together, taking less of an explosion f to perpetuate a crack, and that powder companies were changed, powder consultants were changed, procedures and method specifications were changed (tr. 829,926-927).

262. Since the initial blast for excavation to elevation 793 on Unit ,

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1. OVEREXCAVATION (ROCK OVERBREAK) (continued):

T' ming (continued):

262. No. 2 was accomplished on 1/25/75 (CASE Exhibit 4), the holes in which i (cont)the charges were placed had to have been made prior to 1/25/75. Al- )

though there is nothing in the record to indicate how long this would have taken, it is reasonable to assume that the drilling of the holes  !

and the placing of the explosives would have taken a few days at least. 1 263. The initial blast for excavation to elevation 793 on Unit No. 2 was accomplished on 1/25/75 (CASE Exhibit 4).

264. Applicants' witness Mason testified that it was several weeks, possibly innger (following the blast for Unit 1 about January 5) for the exca-vation of Unit 1 to reach the point where they really knew how extensive the problem was (tr. 928-929). Using the minimum of three for the term "several" would bring this date to 1/26/75 or later.

265. He further testified that "before we got the full story of the wall appearance on Reactor One excavation, the blast for Reactor Two went off within...probably two days, three days." (Tr.928-929.)

He stated that af ter blasting for Unit 1. "the overbreak condition from the blast from Unit 1 was determined only after subsequent excava-tion. We were suspicious, however, that some similar condition that was actually found might have increased, and as a result,the contractor changed the pattern (sic) Suppliers...l'm trying to emphasize that the blast that took place at Unit 2 was underway when we had the full story of what the walls looked like on Reactor 1." (Tr. 926-927.)

266. The initial Environmental Protection announced inspection of paperwork was made January 31,1975 (I&E Report 75-03, CASE Exhibit ); a site visit was not conducted as part of this inspection (Report page 6, item 8). Messrs. Stewart and Crossman were not shown to be involved in this inspection. There is no indication that Applicants advised the NRC of {

any change in scheduling of blasting and excavation or that blasting ]

and overexcavation had already occurred, or that the NRC had any knowledge i that blasting and excavation had already occurred.

267. Applicants' initial letter to the NRC dated February 4,1975, reported I the overexcavation under 10 CFR 50.55(e) (CATE Exhibit 4). It stated, I in part: l "On January 23, 1975 the structural excavation, to approximately elevation 793, for Unit No. I containment began...Following a meeting between representatives of Brown & Root, Inc., Mason-Johnston

& Associates and Texas Utilities Generating Company, the blasting techniques which had been used on Unit No. I containment were modi-fied. The initial blast for excavation to elevation 793 on Unit No. 2 was accomplished on 1/25/75."

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Timing (continued):

268. NRC Staff witness R. C. Stewart testified that he was the " principal re-actor inspector for the period June 1974 to January 1978, during which time 1 had responsibility for coordinating all safety related inspections of the Comanche Peak construction." (T r. 1268.)

269. He testified that he was aware of detrimental rock overbreak which occurred during construction (tr.1268) and that "the overbreak occurred, to my observation, in... February of 1975" (emphasis added).

270. An inspection of paperwork at the TUSI corporate offices (not at the plant site) was made on February 5,1975 (l&E Report 75-04, CASE Exhibit

) in regard to the ' Brown & Root QA Program Manual for Comanche Peak.

The report states (Report page 4, item 2) "At the conclusion of the re-view and discussions, the inspectors indicated that there were no substan-tive deficiencies observed during the review; however, the matter will remain unresolved pending the issuance of the final approved manual and subsequent IE review."

271. The report also states (Report page 5) "The inspectort discussed, with the Project staff, the TUSl system and format of reports to be submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e). The licensee representatives stated that a standard fomat for the construction deficiency report (CDR) would be developed which would include such items as description, cause, evaluation, plant status, and corrective measures / actions to be initiated or completed." The discussion of reporting under 50.55(e) took place a day after Applicants' initial February 4,1975, report to the NRC regarding the overexcavation ' CASE Exhibit 4). Messrs. Stewart and Crossman were shown as the Principal NRC Inspector and Accompanying inspector, respectively, on the report. There is no indication in this report that Applicants advised the NRC of any change in the schedule of late February for the start of blasting and excavation for the reactor containment structure, that Applicants advised the NRC that blasting and overexcavation had already occurred and been reported in their February 4 letter to the NRC, or that the NRC had any knowledge that blasting and excavation had already occurred. At the time of the February 5 1&E Report, there had been no indication that the NRC had been advised oT any different circumstances from what was contained in 1&E Report 75-01 (January 8-9, 1975) in any NRC-generated document in the record regarding the overexcavation. This is important because "It has been an accepted practice in NRC adjudicatory proceedings that the Staff's inspection and Investigation Reports are admitted into evidence..."

and "...in Comanche Peak, the Licensing Board has admitted into evidence numerous inspection and Investigation Reports..."/l/ This will be  :

discussed further later in this pleading. l l

1/ NRC Staff's Brief in Response to the Questions Raised by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board at the Oral Argument of January 19, 1983, filed January 26, 1983, pages 3 and 4.

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1. OVEREXCAVATION (ROCK OVERBREAK) (continued):

Timing (continued):

272. 1&E Report 75-01 (January 8-9, 1975)(CASE Exhibit 16) states (page 6) that " construction of the 551 Dam is now scheduled to start the first week in February" and that "the start of blasting and excavation for the reactor contairrnent structure is currently scheduled for late February."

273. On February 27-28, 1975, a routine, unannounced inspection was made by NRC Region IV inspectors at Comanche Peak (l&E Report 75-05, CASE Exhibit 15). R. C. Stewart, Reactor Inspector, was shown as Principal Inspector; W. G. Hubacek, Reactor Inspector, was shown es Accompanying Inspector; and W. A. Crossman, Senior Reactor Inspector, was shown as having reviewed and signed it for all three inspectors. It was signed on 3/6/75. . (CASE  ;

clarified for the record that 1&E Report 75-05 (CASE Exhibit 15) was '

Mr. Stewart's report, since it was signed by Mr. Crossman; see tr.1360.)

274. As a result of that inspection, the NRC inspectors wrote up a QA/QC Procedural Deficiency because (Report page 2. Item 1.A.3.a):

" Contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B Criterion V, an inspection procedure was not developed and implemented for activities related to the excavation for the reactor containment structures of CPSES, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with Brown & Root Procedure CP-QCP-12."

275. There is nothing in 1&E Report 75-05 to indicate that the NRC inspectors had any knowledge of the overexcavation prior to the February 27-28, 1975 inspection, either fro : their own personal knowledge or fro , having been informed by tne Applicants, although clearly they knew from the Applicants' February 4 letter (CASE Exhibit 4). It is unclear whether or not any onsite inspection was made during the January 8-9, 1975, inspection (l&E Report 75-01, CASE Exhibit 16); this appears to be the only possible time an onsite inspection was made in 1975 prior to the february 27-28, 1975, inspection (I&E Report 75-05, CASE Exhibit 15),

since it is specifically stated in I&E Reports 75-02, 75-03, and 75-04 that they were not onsite inspections (see Proposed Findings i

l 276. CASE was attempting to clarify several matters, including the time periods involved in the overexcavating and reporting of the excavation and overexcavation, but were instructed by the Board to move along. '

Because of the unusual circumstances under which we were operating at the time, we were unable to complete the record regarding the timing regarding these matters, and there remain many unanswered questions in this regard. (See tr. 931.)

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- OVERExCAVAT10'; (ROCK OVERBREAK) (continued):

-THE DAMAGE FROM OVEREXCAVATIO'; (OR ROCK OVERBREAK) WAS EXTENSIVE.

277. The damage to Unit 1 foundation due to overexcavation was extensive.

(See findings 29, 30, 33, 35, 36, 41, 43, 148, 196-215.)

278. The damage to Unit 2 foundation due to overexcavation was extensive.

(See findings 43, 56, 58,196 and 216.)

279. The damage to the Fuel Building foundation was extensive (Findings 43, 59-65, 80, 93-95, 134-135, 196, 220-235); and Applicants' witness Mason said the damage to the Fuel Building foundation was the most extensive of all (Findings 195,239,-252).

280. There was also damage to the Safeguard Building foundation, although it was apparently not as extensive as the damage to the Fuel Building foundation (Mason testimony, Finding 148.)

281. Fractures were still being found in the Unit i Safeguard Building founda-tion as late as 5/12/76 (CASE Exhibit 20, page 8).

282. CASE Exhibits 5,17A-11. and 18A-0 (pictures from slides)(see findings .

196-235),19 through 36 (see Findings 236-241) deal with the overexca-vation of foundations for Class I structures. (See also Findings 218-219.)

283, Applicants' witnesses McGrane and Tolson saw the damage to the foundations (Findings 80, 87-8B.)

284 TAC inspecter . Stewart sav: the da . age to the containments for Units 1 and 2 and the Fuel Buildinc foundations (Tolson testimony, Finding 93; see also findings 268-269.{

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R. r OVEREXCAVATION (ROCL OVERBREAK) (continued):

ADEOUACY OF REPAlR REMAINS UNPROVEN 285. The foundation for Unit I was excavated first, then Unit 2 was done (Findings 54,55,122).

286. Even though many changes were made, they nevertheless experienced basically the same amount of cracking in the Unit 2 foundation as in Unit I (Find-ing56,58).

287. . Applicants' witnesses would have the Board believe that the overexcavation has all been repaired correctly and that everything's all right now (Find-ings 37, 49, 52, 62, 68-70, 73-75,143-144,154-155,176-178, 243-250) .

288. However, there were many times during the course of the overexcavating when they thought they had corrected previous problems and that they knew what they were doing and could do it correctly, but they were con- i stantly surprised by the results they got (Findings 17, 18, 22, 27, 28, 42, 56, 60, 72, 124, 135, 142, 148, 150, 251).

289. Applicants' witnesses McGrane and Scheppele agreed with Mr. Mason's testimony (thrcugh Finding 75 - see Finding 76-82).

290. Af ter having experienced the surprisingly extensive overexcavations, Applicants would have the Board believe that the overexcavation was not really their fault, but was rather dJe to the mechanics and character-istics of the Glen Rose formation which are such that it is not possible to get an intact base resulting from line drilling and blasting (Findings 56 and 154).

291. ...Even though Mason Johnston and Associates had been studying the site since 1970 or 1971 (Tr. 803).

292. . .. And even though. line drilling and blasting was the pr eferred, agreed-upon method (Findings 17-22).

293. Dental concrete was used. to replace the rock which was removed as a result of the extensive overexcavation (Findings 33,37,64,255).

294. Applicants were in a time dilemma because they had to provide for something that could not be repaired until after the building mat was on; they could not repair the crack until the building mat had been completed (Finding 150).

295. There was a great amount of weight to be placed on the dental concrete used to replace the rack which had been removed due to the overexcavation (Findings 96-98).

296. There was even what Enounted to a new wall built to replace damaged rock in the Fuel Building overexcavation (finding 252).

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RE A5:) (centinued)'

OVEREXCAVATION UNPROVEN (ROCK OVERS as the strength of (continued)-

same not the ADEQUACY OF REPAIR REMAINSl concre 297 Therockstreng(thFindings of the tdenta47the strength49,51, of the2869-70, and that daysoperties far greater the Although Mr. Mason squarestated inch tha at an age areofith stren 298 uses was 2,500 pounds perthis the limestone itselftes(see rties that thereof produced tures. thea mate lime than that possessed strength byreview and physical of the F5AR propelican

( App a

wide variations materials in thewhich formed thetefoun used to replace cavation (Findings.50-and other(See Finding 153.)

299. No reinforcing steel was removed duestructures to the(Find- overex the rock which had been concrete used in 51 , 66) . not as strong as yp mat / radiation shield 300 Dental concrete is ings 48, 151), crack in the base that "dAll d of base in that that con-the i ations which itness Scheppele reinforcementtestifie was place In his testimony regarding This various loadino comb nand a receive 331 - d all the course of its life ld nave wherever, mat, is designed to A;:plicants' acco modate wcrete is heavily incorporate internal re envirornental seffects whjch would In the de that containment wou a a._ compression element.

, involve loadinoseco during all of the .bination concrete as ,porate use concrete seismic in itselfco v?ry weak materia l.

4 T his would and the pressure, it would incor forced concrete, really is never primarily e used they as u of roncretesomet tension strength concrete, becaconcr ld ter Concrete as aconsequence, tension elementweI lf you becausmarry the compressive reinforcing steel s toto tensile strength material As a of stee . .. when it's sub e is a brittle lly the design of reinforced con use in order for the f

/

which resistant to crack, and basicaindeed involve cracking, b work it sed as a tensileeffect,provi which, in reinf physically (Findings97-101.) " concrete is not u a of reinforcing steel,He stated that structural purposesequires the ~

crack."He further use stated:

302 material, without the in rTinforced concrete."

cavity wall "providesin tension in the l'

the tensile strength surfaces cracking.

inq steel in theenerally speaking, in a combination reactorIoading all exposed concreteminimize ex I

r reinforcing steel and,have nonnally g to l

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construction, 102103.)

weinq steel placed in two directi (hndings i

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0VEREXCAVATION (ROCK OVERBREAK) (continued):

ADE00A Y OF REPAIR ret'AINS UNPROVEN (continued):

303. Mr. Scheppele also stated: "when you get this tension force which

] mentioned previously, concrete is not good at withstanding. When you get this tensile force resulting from the shrinkage, then the concrete does have hairline cracks" in the reinforced concrete "which seek out the most -- the weakest point in the concrete matrix," He explained that such cracks were "due primarily because of the heating and then eventually the cooling of the concrete caused by the chemical reaction"

-- still referring to the cracks in the reinforced concrete. He stated that in his view the strength is not impaired "because we have made judicious use of reinforcing steel to account for situations in whicn the concre(e cannot take tension." (Fi ndings 104-106.)

304. Yet here we have a massive amount of concrete being used to replace what should have been solid bedrock, which will have Category I safety-related structures built on top of it which will have a tremendous amount of weight. The strength of the dental concrete which was used is not as strong as concrete used in structures, had no reinforcing steel added to it, while at the same time the dental concrete does not have the same strength and physical properties as the limestone which it is replacing.

(See previous findings.)

305. Applicants did not have an estimate of the amount of grout and dental concrete used to repair the overexcavation (Findings 252-253).

However, from the amount of damage which was done to the foundations of the Category I structures, it was a massive amount.

306. The mission in using dental concrete was to try and approximate and repro-duce as closely as possible the original strength and physical properties of the rock as possible. (Findings 51, 69; but see also 70.)

307. Category I relates to seismic activity, as well as floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, and any other phenomena which would impair the safety of the completed project (Finding 11).

l 308. In a letter dated May 26,1975, to TUS1, Mr. Mason discussed two basic l remedial measures which were available and stated:

"Since the block has been moved on a claystone seam, and since the block is required to support both vertical and lateral loads, it appears that only two basic remedial measures are available..."

309. In discussing the second measure, which would consist of the installa-tion of vertical rock bolts grouted in pre-drilled holes and the plugging of all vertical air gaps by a pressure grouting system whereby the grout would also develop a minimum compressive strength of 2500 psi at 28-day age, Mr. Mason stated:

"While no evaluation of the depth and number of rock bolts that would be required has been made at this time, and no cost analysis

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OVEREXCAVATION (ROCK OVERBRE AK) (continued):

ACEOUACY OF REPA1R REMAINS UNPROVEN (continued):

309. (cont.)

of the rock bolt and pressure grouting technique has been made or obtained from the contractor, it is apparent that any such procedure  ;

will have to be proven to be the equivalent of the adjacent undisturbed rock mass. ine procedure of making such a proof would undoubtedly include additional seismic work to verify that the shear wave velocity across the restored block would be the same as or superior to that of the undisturbed and surrounding rock and that the vertical load-ing of the block of the imposed structural loads would react identi-cally to that of the undisturbed natural rock formation. The exact cost, investigative procedures, and time delay involved in such a procedure would have to be added to the cost of the physical rock bolting and pressure grouting.

"In view of the preceding imponderables, it appears that the more logical remedial measure would consist of the physical removal of .

the displaced block and replacement therewith with adequate strength I concrete." I (CASE Exhibit 34, emphases added.)

310. Mr. Mason stated that rock which had been displaced horizontally and was j intended to give resistance to a wall, to be pushing against it, they '

considered worthless and it was removed. They did not want any stress on it. (Finding 63.)

311. No one did a seismic reanalysis of the foundation. (Findings 154-155.)

312. Thus, Applicants have not complied with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 100, V. SEISMIC AND GEOLOGIC DESIGN BASES, (d)(i)(b), which states, in part:

"The following geologic features which could affect the foundations l

of the proposed nuclear power plant structures shall be evaluated,

[ uking into account the infonnation concerning the physical properties of materials underlying the site pursuant to paragraphs (a)(1), (3),

ano (4) of section IV and the effects of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake:

"(i) Areas of actual or potential surface or subsurface subsidence, uplift, or collapse resulting from:

"...(b) Man's activities such as withdrawal of fluid from l or addition of fluid to the subsurface, extraction

! of minerals, or the loading effects of dans or reser-voirs , . ,"

313. There may also be other requirements or regulations which Applicants have violated in this regard. At a minimum, they should be ordered to do a sophisticated, in-depth analysis to determine whether or not the founda-tion as repaired meets all applicable NRC criteria and regulations; they should also prove that the analysis which is used is capable of dealing with the variations in strength and physical properties of the different types of rock as well as the differences between the types of rock and j the dental concrete used to repair the overexcavations. Any computer program used should be sophisticated enough to deal with all such variations.

We believe they may also be in. violation of ACI ]

Institute) requirements, specifically Title 70-45, July1973 ( American Concrete AC1 Journal,

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m n OVEREXCAVATION (ROCL OVERBRE Ar.) (continuedh 313 (cont.) Reported .by AC) Committee 207, "Effect of Restraint, Voltrne Change, and Reinforcement on Cracking of Itassive Concrete."

APPLICA'TS DlD N3T REPORT THE FULL EXTENT OF THE DA" AGE TO CATEGORY 1 FOUNDATIONS, EITHER IN THE FSAR OR IN WRITING TO THE NRC 314. Applicants' witness Mason saw the cracks in the foundations due to the overexcavations; they were mapped, photographed and documented. (Findings 31, 176, 195, 224-225.)

315. Mr. Mason stated that "there is a photo log we have that gives better descriptions, which we don't have at our availability." (Finding 225.) i 316. Applicants did not introduce this photo log into evidence.

317. Mr. Tolson saa the damage from the overexcavations (Findings 87-88).

318. NRC inspector Stewart saw the damage from the overexcavations (Findings 93 and 268-269).

319. No one on Applicants' panel had any details or knew about how the exca-vation of the fuel building was handled. (Finding 133,135.)

320. Mr. Mason testified several times that there was rock which was disturbed on the wall that was intended to remain intact by the fuel building and that "I could walk through the crack that had been created by impact rock being displaced horizontally, a gap of perhaps ten inches." (Findings 94, 135, 220, 226, 252.)

321. However, there was no photograph either contained in the photographs presented by CASE from the slides (CASE Exhibits 17A-Il and 18A-0) or presented into evidence by Applicants (Finding 226).

322. CASE Exhibit 5 (third page) lists by number photographs of overexcavations; these photographs are numbered in sequence, but there are numbers i ..ich were missing from the listing. Mr. Mason stated that "If they existed, they were provided to the Applicant in the photo log and my assumption is that they do exist, because, to my knowledge, there is not interruption in our photographic sequence. That's my best memory." (Tr. 1095-1096.)

323. Mr. Mason also stated that his engineering geologist "would photo-graph, would perform engineering, be a project manager and photograph the sites of all excavations...That person was there. Those services were pe rformed. At any time that a defect was noted, that was reported to the owner and the principal engineer, Gibbs and Hill and those reports did exist and did take place." (Finding 176.)

324. It is not lo5' cal to believe that photographs were taken of the Fuel Building foundation overexcavation without there being a photograph taken of that 10" crack which made such an impression on Mr. Mason. j 325. There is no mention in Applicants' Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) of the damage to the Safeguards Building foundation or to the Fuel Building i

foundation, even though such damage d_id_ occur and even though the Fuel Building foundation was probably damaged most of all. (FSAR Section 2.5.4.5 Excavations and Backfill, Apolicants' Exhibit 3; Findings 279-280,195.)

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OVEREXCAVAT10'i (ROCK OVERSREAK) (continued):  ;

APPLICANTS DID NOT REPORT THE FULL EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE TO CATEGORY l TOU'iDA110NS, ElTHER IN THE FSAR OR IN WRITING TO THE NRC (continued):

326. The photographs and fracture maps contained in the FSAR are very I misleading as an indication of the extent of damage to Category 1 foun- l dations as a result of the overexcavations. (See FSAR Section 2.5.4.5, Applicants' Exhibit 3; Finding 195.)

327. Had there been no Intervenor in the proceedings for Applicants to obtain their operating license for Comanche Peak, a decision would probably have been made based largely on the information contained in the FSAR.

328. Applicants' failure to include any infomation regarding the damage to the Safeguards Buildings or the Fuel Buildina foundations would appear to be a material false statement.

329. "A license or construction pemit may be revoked, suspended, or modified, in whole or in part, for any material false statement in the l application for license or in the supplemental or other statement of l fact required of the applicant..." (10 CFR 50.100.)

330. 10 CFR 50.55(e) sets forth the requirements for reporting significant breakdowns in QA/QC programs or significant deficiencies or deviations.

331. Under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e),"The holder of a construction pemit shall also submit a written report on a reportable deficiency within thirty (33) days to the appropriate NRC Regional Office shown in Appendix 0 of Part 20 of this chapter. Copies of such report shall be sent to the Director of Inspection and Enforcement, U. 5. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555. The report shall include a description of the deficiency, an analysis of the safety implications and the corrective action taken, and s1fficient information to pemit analysis and evaluation of the deficiency and of the corrective action, if su1ficient information is not available for a definitive report to be submitted within 30 days, an interim report containing all available infomation shall be filed, together with a statement as to when a complete report will be filed."

(Emphasis added.)

332. The NRC has a section regarding reporting of deficiencies under 10 CFR 50.55(e) contained in its NRC Guidance (CASE Exhibit 300).

333. Applicants' witness Tolson was involved in the reporting of the over- .

excavation to the NRC; he stated that "I reviewed the letter" (CASE Exhibit 4). (Finding 130.)

334. The overexcavation was reported to the NRC in writing on February 4  ;

1975 (CASE Exhibit 4); a final report was sent to the NRC on December 12,1975 (CASE Exhibit 6). These were the only two reports made in writing to the NRC; there were no supplements to the December 12, 1975 report. (Fi ndings 90-92, 138-139.)

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OVEREXCAVAT10!( (ROCK OVEP3REAK) (continued):

APPLICANTS DIO NOT REPORT 'THE FULL EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE TO CATEGORY 1 FOUNDATIONS, EITHER IN THE FSAR OR IN WRITING TO THE NRC (continued):

335. Mr. Tolson stated that in his opinion Applicants fully and completely ful-filled the requirements of reporting to the NRC, that nothing was with-held from the NRC, that the inspector was.on site and observed all aspects of the overbreak. (Finding 95.)

336. He further testified that the intent of the two. letters reporting the overexcavation (CASE Exhibits 4 and 6)"was to report over-break in the Category I structure." (Finding 141.)

337. However, there is nothing in either of the letters to the NRC (CASE Exhibits- {

- 4 and 6) to the effect that the intent was to notify the NRC of over-break in any Category I building foundations other than . Units 1 and 2 338. reactor buildings. In_ fact, the February 4,1975, initial notification states that "in the interest of conservatism, we are submitting the follow-ing description of a possible deficiency which was observed during the base mat excavation for Units 1 and 2 Reactor Buildings." (Emphases' added.)

There was nothing else contained in that letter which referred to any other buildings except Units 1 and 2 Reactor Buildings.

339. Further, it is stated regarding the excavation for Unit No. 2:

"After the blasted material was removed, visual inspection revealed very little, if'any, damage. to the perimeter walls " although the damage to Unit 2 was about the sane as to Unit 1. (CASE Exhibit 4; Findings 43.

56, 58,196 and 216; see also Finding 131-132, discussion with Mr. Tolson ,

in this regard.) There is no mention of the-Safeguard or Fuel Buildings.

340. Clearly..the , implication of the February 4,1975, initial notification letter to the NRC is that there was probably nothing much wrong anyhow, but "in the interest of conservatism," Applicants were submitting this infomation about overexcavation of Unit 1 and of Unit 2 (which wasn't even as bad as Unit I and had "very little, if any, damage to the perimeter walls") . (See Findings 337-340.)

341. Similarly,' there is nothing in the December 12, 1975 final report to the NRC to indicate that there had been damage to the foundations of any buildings other than Units I and 2 reactor cavities (although there is some small mention of the Safeguard Building excavation: "The areas containing the most damage were amoved as part of the safeguard building excavation"; "All the fractures were tight and radiate out from the center of the containment excavation with the exception of those described below which occurred when the safeguard buildings were blasted"; "There is one i fracture in Unit No. 2 which is on the north side and runs from the north-  ;

east corner of the safeguard building, curving around from an easterly '

trend to a southerly trend, intersecting the containment excavation near the north-south centerline. This fracture is open 1/8 of an inch in the i referenced corner and tight at the excavation intersection. A grout pipe '

is to be installed and grout placed after placement of the Containment l No.- 2 foundation and the walls in the No. 2 safeguard building.").

(CASE Exhibit 6.)

342. There is no mention of any damage to the Fuel Building foundation although it waTprobably damaged most of all. (CASE Exhibit 6; Findings 195,239,252.)

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_ s t)VEREXCAVAT10'4 (ROCK OVEP3RE AK) (continued): 'l APPLICANTS DlD NOT REPORT THE FULL EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE TO CATEGORY l FOUNDATIONS, EITHER JN THE FSAR OR IN WRlllNG TO THE NRC (continued):

343. Mr. Tolson confirmed that there was no report to the NRC about the Fuel  !

Building foundation overexcavation. (Finding 141.)

344. Further, the Dec6mber 12,1975 letter to the NRC (CASE Exhibit 6) closely tracks the language of the internal memorandum from his geologist to Mr.

Mason (CASE Exhibit 5), with some notable exceptions, including the fact that the next-to-last paragraph of CASE Exhibit 5 was completely omitted ,

from the. letter to the NRC. That paragraph states, in part: "tiajor fractur- )'

ing also occurred in the Fuel' Building foundation area when the Service Water Intake Pipe Tunnel was blasted." (CASE Exhibit 5, emphasis added.)

345, in addition, the following sentence from the first paragraph of CASE Exhibit 5 (the geologist's letter to Mr. Mason) was also completely omitted:

"The removal of damaged rock from the Fuel Building foundation area is approximately 80^ complete and is scheduled to be completed immediately.

af ter completion of the placement of Containment #1 foundation." (Emphasis added.)

346. Thus, although the wording of the letter to the NRC (CASE Exhibit 6) closely tracks the language of the geologist's memorandum to Mr. Mason (CASE Exhibit 5), all references to the overexcavation of the Fuel Building foundation -- which was more badly damaged than any of the other foundations

-- were deleted from the letter to the NRC.

347. The true extent of the damage to the Unit 2 Containment foundation was not contained in' the December 12, 1975 letter to the NRC.

348. In the geologist's memorandun to Mr. Mason (CASE Exhibit 5), the second sentence of item 4 (top of page 2) states: "The horizontal fractures around Unit #2 Containment excavation were removed in the same manner as in Unit Pl . Photos were taken with 35 mm camera showing the referenced areas af ter the rework was complete (3) ." (Emphases added.)

j 349. The statement regarding the horizontal fractures around Unit #2 l- Containment excavation (see Finding 348 above) was completely omitted frcrn the December 12, 1975 letter to the NRC. (CASE Exhibits 5 and 6.)

350. Thus, the only information contained in the December 12, 1975 letter to the NRC regarding the horizontal fractures around Unit #2 Containment excavation are .in the second paragraph on the first page: "As previously reported, horizontal fractures were discovered when excavation of Units 1 and 2 reactor cavities were completed." (CASE Exhibit 6, emphasis added.) l 1

351. Since what was previously reported was that "After the blasted material a was removed, visual inspection revealed very little, if any, damage to i' the perimeter walls", the omission of the other reference to the horizontal fractures (see Finding 350 above) left the impression that there was very little damage to the Unit #2 Containment foundation; the only other reference to the Unit #2 is regarding one vertical fracture which is open 1/8 of an inch (CASE Exhibit 6, first paragraph of page 2).

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OVEREXCAVATION (ROCK OVERBREAK) (continued):

APPLICANTS DID NOT REPORT THE FULL EXTENT OF THE ON4 AGE TO CATEGORY I FOUNDATIONS, EITHER IN THE FSAR OR IN WRITING TO THE NRC (continued):

352. Applicants' failure to include any information regarding the over-excavation of the Fuel Building foundation (although it was probably damaged' most of all) and to give a false impression regarding the extent of damage to the Unit #2 Containment foundation would a

- statements. -(See also findings 328 and 329.)ppear to be material false L

TESTIMONY OF APPLICANTS' WITNESSES REGARDING OVEREXCAVATION OF SAFEGUARDS BUILDl!.3 FOUNDAT10f6 IS ] INCONSISTENT 353. Applicants' panel of witnesses was asked if any of-them had any knowledge of any over-excavation with respect to the control or safeguard building (Tr. 1066-1067); .the response was as follows, as shown in the transcript:

"(No response.)"

JUDGE MILLER: " Responses, please. I take it that was a question."

"(Panel members indicate 'no ')"

JUDGE MILLER: "Each of you has responded no, or no, sir. Thank you."

(Empnasis added.)

354. Mr. Mason was asked if he was aware of overexcavating related to the Safeguard Building or other Category I structures. He reiterated what he had stated the previous day regarding the Fuel Building foundation overexcavation. Then, as shown in the transcript (Tr. 1070-1075, Find-ing 195):

JUDGE MILLER: " Pardon me. You're not being asked to recapitulate.

Simply tell us what buildings, if any, other that those described, where there was an overbreak."

WITNESS MASON: "I have done that, sir. The reactors and fuel pumps."

(Emphasis added.)

355. Mr. McGrane testified regarding CASE Exhibit 17CC: "At the point where you see this lif t coming down in the front, the fore part of the photo-graph, is where a portion of the safeguard building was replaced."

(Finding 216, emphasis added.)

356. CASE Exhibits 19-36 were admitted into evidence (Finding 236.)

357. CASE Exhibit 34 is a 5/26/75 letter from Mr. Mason to TUSI discussing the condition of the " block" of rock adjacent to Reactor #1 location -

which was moved as a result of blasting operations (see Findings 308-309).

.4

.. D OVEREXCAVATION (ROCK OVERBREAK) (continued):

TESTIMONY OF APPLICANTS' WITNESSES REGARDING OVEREXCAVATION OF SAFEGUARDS BUILDING FOUNDATIONS 15 INCONSISTENT (continued):

358. CASE Exhibit 36 is DDR (Deficiency and Disposition Report, predecessor to NCR or Nonconformance Report) C-216, reported 2/9/76: " Blasting operations conducted on Feb. 4,1976, resulted in damage to implaced re-inforcing bar and possible damage to the Category 1 concrete in the south-west corner of the safeguards building. This occurred due to a distance violation of existing specifications; the southwest face of the safeguards building excavation being cut off above its floor dropping large amounts of rock directly on the seal slab concrete and steel. It is noted that similar pipe ditches a.re proposed in the future and it is requested that an evaluation be made to prevent future damage. See attached photos.and -

drawings." (Emphases added.)

( Attached drawing shows location, but not clear exactly where it is in regard to Safeguard Building. Attached letter (page 4) gives details of blasting tests. Gibbs & Hill inspected, observed no indication of-c"acking which would be expected had the slab been damaged (page 21).)

359. CASE Exhibit 21 is a February 19, 1976 letter from Mason-Johnston &

Associates (MJA) geologist Herbert C. Crowder to TUSl (with copy to Mr. Mason), containing a sketch of the Category I section of the plant, with a colored and numbered breakdown of the areas which require some type of repair and/or protective concrete and the location, elevation, and rework required. Mr. Mason testified regarding this Exhibit (Find-ings 237-239), which included details about overexcavation of Safeguard Buildings #1 and #2.

dated 2/19/76:

360. CASE Exhibit 20 is a Field Interpretation / Clarification Requestf " Con-tractor requests approval to pressure grout fractured rock in the Safe-guard Building (Unit 1) as noted on FDCR No. 0169 (attached) ." (Emphasis added.) Approved by MJA geologist (with copy to Mr. Mason). Attachment shows fracture lines.

361. CASE Exhibit 19 is a Design Change-Design Deviation Request dated 2/25/76:

" Request waiver of protective concrete slab in Safeguard Bldg. ( A1) areas designated on attached FDCR-0188...The geologist has stated, per MJF-GH-5 (attached),'that the areas in question have not been damaged by weathering or construction traffic and concurs that protective concrete may be de l e te d . " Design engineer's (Mr. McGrane's) comments: " Request is accept-able per the geologists certification but we do not understand how placing of rebar could progress without noting the absence of the specified mud mat. Before placing concrete G&H field engineer should confirm adequacy of rebar supports on rocks."

362. CASE Exhibit 35 is a 5/6/76 letter from MJA geologist Crowder to TUSI (with copy to Mr. Mason) requesting "that plantsite coordinates of the presently installed grout pipes, in Category 1 Structures, be supplied to me for documentation purposes." Included in the list were pipes in Safequard Buildina el and 42.

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- SB - l 0VEREXCAVATION (ROCK OVERBREAK) (continued):

TESTIMONY OF APPLICANTS' WITNESSES REGARDING OVEREXCAVATION OF SAFEGUARDS

BUILDING FOUNDAT ION 515 INCONSISTENT (continued):

20 363. CASE Exhibitjnad attached to the back of it (pages 8 and 9) two documents which probably should have been separate exhibits. One was a 5/12/76 Request for Information or Clarification from Brown & Root to TUS1, stating, in part: "During inspection of rock in SG #1 (Safeguard #1)

.. .two fractures were detected by the Geologist of M-J today.. ."

(emphases added). The second of the two documentstwas a 5/13/76 letter from MJA geologist Crowder to TUSI: "By copy of this letter to Brown

& Root, I am infoming them that two fractures have been found in the rock exposed at elevation 778'-4", ref. sheet 2 of FDCR #0188, in Unit 1 Safeguard Building during final cleanup. The repair called out in FDOR 8

1. 0189 is to be followed in this case also."- (Emphases added; see Ex. 23 )

364. CASE Exhibits 22-27, 29, and 32 are letters and memos regarding grouting, grout pipe locations, etc. for Category I structure foundations, includ- i ing Safeguard Buildings #1 and #2.

365. CASE Exhibit 28 is a .5/12/77 memo from Gibbs & Hill to TUSl (with copies to Messrs.Tolson and Mason): "In response to the referenced letter request- ,

ing engineering concurrence with the proposed pressure to be used in grout-  !

ing fractures in thf Unit 1 Safeguard Building, be advised.that the design engineer, (R. E. McGrane) visually inspected the area in question and agrees that the minimum head pressures noted are acceptable." (Emphases added.) -

366. CASE Exhibit 30 is an 8/2/77 letter from MJA geologist Crowder to John '

Merritt (with ropies to Messrs. Tolson and Mason), asking that Brown &

Root's QA group monitor the grout pipes installed in various Class I i foundations. Attached sketch shows locations of grout pipes, including j Safeguard Buildings #1 and a2.

367. CASE Exhibit 31 is a 2/23/78 letter from MJA geologist Crowder to John Merritt (with copy to Mr. Tolson), notifying TUSI of completion of grout-ing of Safeguard #1 and #2 and Fuel Building pipes. Attached 2/23/78 letter f rom Mr. Crowder to Mr. Merritt (with copies to Messrs. Tolson I

and Mason) includes table and drawings of locations in Fuel Building and Safeguard Buildings #1 and #2. ,

1 368. CASE Exhibit 33 is an office memorandum to John Marshall (TUSI) from J. T. Merritt Jr., Manager. Engineering & Construction, attaching inspection reports by Brown & Root QC Department "to document completion of pressure grouting at the following grout pipe locations: S_GI-F G G, and H. Cl-A; S_G2_-A, G B , C , and 0; and FBC- A, B , C, and D. This completes all pressure grouting of fractured rock at the plantsite and should provide the docu-mentation you need, (when added to the infomation you have on hand) to close out the referenced HRC question. .." (Emphases added.) Attach-ments show list and drawings of locations.

--_- - - _ _ _ _ _a. _ _. . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - - . _ _ _ .__ ___-___2_ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _

4-3 .

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OVEREXCAVATION (ROCK OVERBRE AK) (continued):

TESTIMONY OF APPLICANTS' WITNESSES REGARDING OVEREXCAVATION OF SAFEGUARDS BUILDING FOU'.DATIONS 15 INCONSISTENT (continued):

- 369. Af ter CASE's Exhibits 19 through 36 were admitted into evidence (see Find-

-ing 236), Judge Cole discussed the matter of Mr. Mason's previous testimony regarding overexcavation of buildings other than Containments 1 and 2.

Mr. Mason's testimony appears to be inconsistent with his previous testi-mony (Finding 254), as does the testimony of Mr. Merritt (Finding 255).

370. CASE was not able to complete its analysis of all of the witnesses' testimony regarding the overexcavation; however, it appears that there are several inconsistencies in the testimony of Applicants' witnesses and the documents admitted into evidence. It appears that most of Appli-cants' witnesses (contrary to their testimony discussed _in Finding 353) dd have knowledge of (or should have had) of over-excavation with respect to the safeguard buildings.

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I THE CRACK IN THE BASE MAT /RADI ATION SHIELD /WHEREVER 371. No one can say with certainty exactly what and where the crack was (or is), whether it was adequately repaired, and whether Comanche peak can be operated so that it will not pose an undue and unacceptable risk to the public and/or (if the crack actually is in the radiation shield) to workers at the plant.

372. Nowhere in any of the documents introduced into evidence is there doc-umentation that the crack in question was not a vertical crack that extended cunpletely through the seven (7) foot thick mat near the center

~

of its midspan across the reactor cavity.

373. Nowhere in any of the documents introduced in'.o evidence is there doc-umentation that the crack is in the radiation shield and not in the base mat. In fact, although there was an original and four revisions of the NCR (C650), covering a period of about two years, the wording on that NCR was .never chanced to show that the original wording was not correct and that the cracks were actually in the radiation shield instead. (See CASE Exhibits 8-12.)

374. Applicants had not planned for this type of crack, although it was allegedly only a shrinkage crack and a very common occurrence, it was stated that the job specifications do not address cracks relative to any acceptance cri teri a . (CASE Exhibits 8-12.)

375. This was an unusual situation in that a copy of the memo was hand-carried to Mr. R. G. Tolson, the TUSI Site QA Supervisor on 4/26/77. (CASE Exhibits 8-12.)

376. A review of NCR's and their predecessors, DDR's, reveals that usually a drawing is made of the problem area, even on relatively minor items.

There was no drawing or photograph made of the crack (s). (CASE Exhibits 305-570.) -

377. It is also most unusual, based on a review of NCR's and DDR's, that no other dimensions other than those as indicated on the documents CASE in-troduced into evidence were indicated anywhere on any documents intro-duced into evidence.

378. No study or analysis was introduced into evidence regarding this crack (s).

379. The original concrete pour card for the pours in question (101-2812-001 and -002) was lost and another card replaced it. (CASE Exhibit 13.)

380. There was an allegation before that there was general cracking of floor slab concrete in the plant buildings (CASE Exhibit 253, I&E Report 79-26/

79-25; see also CASE's 10/18/82 Response to Board's Directive Regarding CASE Exhibits, at page 14, for further details).

381. The allegations made about the cracking of the floor slab concrete in plant buildings was never investigated by the NRC. The 1&E Report states:

"Without specifics, the alleger was advised that these could not be pur-sued...The search (for data by Applicants) was not posyible due to the lack of specificity." (CASE Exhibit 253.)

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- 61 ' - .l THE CRACK IN THE BASE MAT / RADIATION SH] ELD /WHEREVER (continued): j 382. A seven-foot crack would not normally be considered a hairline surface crack or a shrinkage crack," as defined by the NRC. The Resident Reactor  !

Inspector (RRI) States his definition of cracks that he would consider significant in terms of possible structural failure, then his definition ,

of hairline surface cracks: " ... caused by thennal expansion...usually )

very tight... extends only into the concrete to the most exterior layer l of reinforcing steel, typically one to' two inches below the surface..." (

(CASE Exhibit 253, item (4.a), emphasis added.) .;

383. There is no indication in the NCR's on the crack to indicate that proper th {

i ,-

measures nearly two-year were period taken to keeptomoisture it took repair thefrom damaging crack .

(s)e Exhibits (CASE rebar during .the "

8-12.)

384. Based on the documentation which is in the record, it is impossible-to prove the horizontal extent of the crack, the width of the crack,'that the crack was properly repaired, that the rebars were not damaged by moisture )

prior to sealing the crack, or that the QA/QC program was functioning properly with regard to this matter.

385. The quality of the concrete around and under the Unit I reactor itself is indeterminate.

386. Testimony in the record (which CASE does not have time to look up at . .

the moment insofar as giving a citation) indicates that there is at this time no method by which the true extent, location, and adequacy of repair of the crack (s) can be detennined.

387. The crack in the foundation could not be repaired until the building mat had been completed. (See Finding 150.)

308. See also CASE Exhibits 529, 533, 479, and 534 (NCR's regarding the same area as the crack (s) in the base mat). We do not have time here to dis-cuss them at length, but see CASE's 10/18/82 Response to Board's Directive Regarding CASE Exhibits, at pages 27, 28, 32, 33, and 34.

389. There is nothing in the record to indicate that anyone has ever done any analysis of the possible tie-in between CASE Exhibits 479 and 534 and the crack in the base mat. Neither is there any indication that anyone has ever done a comprehensive stress or seismic analysis based on the deletion of rebar, etc. , in various locations, especially Containment #1. (See CASE's 10/18/82 Response to Board Directive Regarding CASE Exhibits, at 34.)

CASE'S DOCUMENTS 390. We do not have time here to discuss at length what we expect to prove with our documents. However, see tr. 724/24-729/17,726/23-727/3 and CASE's 10/18/82 Response to Board's Directive Regarding CASE Exhibits for further details, which sets forth many of our goals and concerns.

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CREDlBillTY OF THE fiRC 391. The NRC's ability and/or willingness to adequately investigate allega-tions of whistleblowers has been called into strong question by events and testimony in these proceedings. (See CASE's 12/21/82 Brief in Oppo-sition to the NRC Staff's Exceptions to.the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board's Order Denying Reconsideration of September 30, 1982; CASE's 1/11/83 Written Argument on issues; CASE's 1/18/83 letter to Appeal Board under Subject of Affidavit of Jack Doyle; CASE's 1/24/83 Motion for protective Orders for Roy Combs, Lester Smith, and Freddy Ray Harrell; and CASE's 2/3/83 Supplement to that motion; and CASE's 2/21/83 Motions to (1) Re-spend to Applicants' Charges of Misconduct by CASE; (2) Strike Applicants

February 8,1983 Answer to CASE Motion (and Supplement) for Protective Orders; and (3) Impose Sanctions Against Applicants.)

392. NRC inspector Stewart saw the damage to the containments for Units 1 and 2 and the fuel Building foundations, and apparently was well aware of the extent of damage to the Category I foundations (Tolson testimony, Finding 93; Stewart testimony, Finding.268-269.)

393. In addition to the preceding, CASE will have further findings of fact following the close of the record. The Licensing Board in its January 4,1983, P.emorandum and Order has stated that " Clearly further evidence on these issues will be required when the evidentiary hearing resumes.,/,_9/

Footnote L9/ Tr. 2669-70."

CASE regrets that we were unable 'to complete the impossible task of preparing provisional proposed findings of fact in time to meet the Licens og Board's deadline of having them in the hands of the Board by February 25.

We believe the infonnation contained in the instant pleading and which will be contained in future pleadings should the Board allow it, is significant and of such i 1portance that the record should not be deprived of it.

Respectfully submitted, Adv.i 6D

's.) Juanita Ellis, president ASE (Citizens Association for Sound Energy) 1426 5. polk Dallas, Texas. 75224 214/946-9446

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January 6, 1984 MEMORANDUM FOR: Office Directors Regional Administrators FROM: William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

POLICY IN REGARD TO DEALING WITH THOSE WHO PROY10E INFORMATION TO THE NRC Our policies in dealing with persons bringing irregularities and deficiencies in safety performance to our attention require clarification and emphasis in order to assure that they are dealt with properly and the issues they raise are correctly treated.

NRC resources must be utilized in ways which maximize our ability to key on safety related problems. Citizens who voluntarily step forward with information regarding safety matters must be looked on as a valuable adjunct to our programs. Moreover, a part of.NRC's effectiveness and credibility with the public is a function of our relationships with these people, in this regard we should be professionally courteous in our interfaces, complete in our technical reviews of issues they raise and i observant of procedures which recognize the special problems faced by '

persons who come to us with allegations regarding improper safety conditions and practices.

I am asking IE to take the enclosure of this memo and translate it into Manual Chapter format. I will expect them to coordinate the MCM with you once more, although I am aware many of your coments have been incorporated. In the meantime, it will serve as interim guidance with one exception; before directing. that citizens must be advised of their privilege of anonymity. I wish to. clear this point with the Commission and will do se when IE provides.me the MCM for. approval.

William f.' Dircks Executive Director for Operations

Enclosure:

As stated dM

=64.p( M y/*f( 4 -@ [ m ys PN2. gy Attachment 14

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S g POLIC) IN REGAFD TO DEAllhE WITH THDSE WHO PROCDE INr0RMAT10N TO THE NRC General' Issues.

1. .Those who. provide allegations to NRC staff must be treated with respect, consideration and tact. Under no circumstances should they be dealt with brusquely or under an atmosphere of interrogation.

2. When a number of allegations point to or reinforce indications of a

. broader problem .it is appropriate to assume that such a problem'may_

exist. Prompt action to broaden the scope of our inquiry should then be

.taken to determine whether or not such is the case.

3. While the safety significance of an allegation is an important factor in detenining the extent and promptness of staff resources conunitment, it should not affect the staff treatment of the person making the allegation as given in item 1 above.

NRC Procedural Practices 1, When allegations are received in writing, a prompt attempt to make When received personal contact must ordinarily be made in each case.

telephonically, complete details siiould be acquired along with availability of the person making the allegation to meet with NRC.

-If documents are involved, they should be identified and acquired by NRC

-- the person making the allegation should not nonnally be required to f obtain them.

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2. Contact, when made, should draw' an interested and professional response from NRC. I am directing IE to prepare a simple package that can be provided to individuals making allegations and will make clear to them  ;

how NRC deals with allegations.

3. Follow-up on allegations, whether they are general or specific, should focus not only on the specific allegation but on the overall area of concern, including the potential for generic implications.

4. Allegations should be screened for importance and the more serious addressed first. Serious or not, all. allegations should be addressed as promptly as resources will allow;

5. When a plant visit with a person making the allegation is necessary to find the exact location of a problem and the individual is willing to make such a visit, it should be nde. Access issues should be addressed on a case by case basis. Travel cos*.s for the individual can be offered if necessary. Care should be taken to avoid embarrassment or abuse of the individual, e.g., visit can be scheduled for an off-shift / weekend, licensee accompaniment prohibited, etc.

6. When raponsibility for the handling of an allegation is transferred from one organizational unit to another the person making the allegation i

should be notified by the individual who is relieved as contact in order 1

' to assure continuity. A single ooir.t of contact should be the rule, l

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7. Follow-up of allegations shoJ1d be professional in scope-and depth. If it is appropriate that an inspection be made, it should be made.

8. Without exception, the individual making the allegation should be promptly advised of the results of inspection follow-up action so that they are aware that their problems were addressed. If for some reason there is unusual delay in providing the results, the person should be advised so that he does not feel his allegations are being ignored.

g. An " audit trail * - to include personal interview records - should be established so that NRC actions can be properly justified if necessary.

All allegations should be entered in the allegation tracking system.

10. The final report should set forth the facts clearly, dispositively, and in a style that does not belittle or disparage the person who brought a safety matter to our attention.

Licensee Actions

1. Licensees should be encouraged to take allegations seriously. Programs such as interviews of all employees who terminate should be encouraged.

Such programs should be monitored by NRC . Licensee actions do not relieve us of our responsibilities, but effective licensee actions may reduce somewhat the number of allegations we receive.

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2. It should oe advantageous under some circumstances to have the licensee address the validity of allegations to the NRC. If so, confidentiality a l

must not be breached. . Licensees can be asked to address the validity of allegations only if in so doing the person making the allegation is not exposed. On'e vehicle for accomplishing this is a 50.54(f) tatter.

The person making the allegation must be informed that this is not handing the issue over to the licensee, but that NRC will review the licensee's report. Such a review should, of course, not be peremptory.

Confidentiality

1. Staff should recognize that in many cases individuals making allegations feel that they lay their jobs on the line when they approach the NRC.

All our activities must be , sensitive to this, even when no explicit confidentiality agreement has been executed. Identities of sources will not be voluntarily exposed by the NRC unless it is clear that the individual concerned has no objection. As a general rule, the 'need to know' approach should be used when dealing with the protection of an person's ider.tity.

2. Staff should assure that it is clear to all concerned if and on what tenns anonymity of a person making an allegation is to be protected. , In every case the individual shall be asked if anonymity is desired. A clear record should be maintained for the files to preclude later mis-understandings. A Confider,tiality Agreement (see attachment) should be executed with the individual, if ne:essary and possible.

4 R R

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3. If at any time for any reason confidentiality is breached or jeopardized, the person should be so advised, the re: son explained and remedial measures taken, if possible. i

Attachment:

Confidentiality Agreement I

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13 JAN Il FH l: 52 $ '

. .u.:,- (f, i:. !', r" ; January 10, 1985 /

. Note to: Ben B. Hayes h- k From: Joseph F. Scinto .

Deputy Chief Hearing Counsel

SUBJECT:

ALLEGAT.?0N OF IMPPOPER DISCLOSUPE OF CONFIDENTIAL INF0PMATION BY 01 INVESTIGATOR - DEPOSITION OF EVERT M0l'SER 4

During the January 5,1985 deposition of Mr. Evert Mouser, a former $ / -

OC inspector at Comanche Peak, Mr. Mouser alleged that Mr. Donald Driskill .

of your offite improperly disclosed confidential information to the Appli-cants. See T r. 22,936-939, 9',n90-100. Copies of these pages of Mr.

Mouser's transcript are attached. Complete copies of the transcript for Mr. Houser's January 3 and 5, 1985 deposition will be transtnitted to you in the near future. , , ,

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Attachment:

As stated scoig. mePost.it" Rouung Request Pad ', ,

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Please ROUTING - SEQUEST ,

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' 8 . O* 22936 1 O When you had your conversation with Mr. Driskill 2 in November of '83, did -- was it a recorded conversation?

3 ,Did someone tr.anscribe it in some way? Or tape it?

4 A, No, it was not. It was just between him and 5 myself.

6 O Did you feel comfortable in answering all the 7 questions that he asked you without any reservation?

8 A Well, I knew Mr. Driskill and I was hesitant to 9 talk to the gentlemen.

10 0 Why is that?

11 A I don't trust the gentlemen.

12 O Trust in what sense?

13 A That he was doing the job that he was hired to 14 do.

15 0 were you concerned that --

)

16 JUDGE BLOCH: I'm sorry. What did that mean?

17 THE WITNESS: That he was indeed an investigator  !

18 and that, indeed, from prior experience with the man, that  !

19 what you told to him in confidence did indeed not stay in 20 confidence.

21 BY MR. ROISHAN:

22 O And had you had an experience like that with him 23 before?

24 A Yes, I did.

25 0 Would you recount it for us, please?

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215h8.0 22937

.BRT * .

1 A It was when I was in the design change authority 2 group up on the hill, working with some other gentlemen, 3 who were -- two other gentlemen and myself, that talked to 4 ,M r . Driskill during an audit that they did on the site.  !

5 And some of what the one gentleman brought up was 6 questioned a few days later by the supervisor, t

7 0 You mean somebody from the plant raised 8 questions about a subject that this man had mentioned as .

I 9 far as you and he knew, only to the NRC investigator?

10 A Yes. And then also at that meeting one of the 11 gentlemen -- I should say after the meeting, one of the 12 gentlemen said that Mr. Driskill had been talk -- had 13 talked to many of the inspectors on-site at different 14 times and that -- like I say, this is hearsay from this 15 gentleman -- and that the information that they talked 16 about was immediately general information of the utility.- i 17 And being an NRC man e that was not supposed to be the way 18 it was. What yet, told them in confidence was to be kept 19 in confidence.

20 0 Do you think that was fairly common knowledge 21 among the people that you had contact with at Comanche 22 Peak? That is, that if you told something to Mr. Driskill 23 you should expect'that it would ultimately get to the 24 company?

25 A It wasn't so much to Mr. Driskill. It was told --

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9 21578.0 22939

.BRT*

1 O In your job in the design change area, did you 2 have occasion to come in contact with lots of different 3 inspectors from different disciplines?

4 A Yes, I'did. Like I say, we are all a family.

5 We knew each other from different jobs. I worked with 6 them in Idaho, Washington, places like this.

7 0 When you say "we" you are new talking about QC 8 inspectors as the "we"?

9 A Yes.

10 JUDGE BLOCH: With respect to the people who 11 worked with you when you were the supervisor, you told us 12 that all but three of them had spoken to the NRC. Did you 13 have any feeling from what they told the NRC at that time 14 that their confidences were not kept?

15 THE WITNESS: I think the inspectors felt that 16 the reason why the -- the feelings management had was 17 because of the information that was getting back to them 18 through a source, which they all tabbed as being the NRC 19 man.

20 Like I say, these are all fee' lings and thoughts from 21 these inspectors.

22 .MR. ROISMAN: I have no further questions at 23 this time. j 24 EXAMINATION 25 BY JUDGE BLOCH:

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1 3Y MR . TREBY:

2 0 Mr. Mouser, I would like to-take you bach :: the 3

1983 interview, I believe it was in November, with [

4 Mr. Driskill, when you were at the Midland site.

5 .A Yes.

6 Q I think you've previously testified that the 7 trip report matter was not his principal purpose for 8 interviewing at that time, but rather it came up rather 9 casually during the interview; is that correct?

10 A I seem to recall that; yes.

11 O Have I properly characterized your testimony?

12 A I felt as though -- I got this feeling from him 13 that he was there more in the Dunham case, but he did not 14 tell me specifically it was for' the Dunham case.

15 0 okay. And when he discussed the trip report, 16 did he show you a copy of it?

17 A I don't recall seeing it; no.

j 18 C Did he indicate how he had come to know about l

19 the trip report?

20 A No. I don't think he told me how he did come to 21 know about it; no.

22 Q Did he indicate in any way that he was

)

23 conducting any investigation with regard to the trip 24 repor ?

25 A No, he did not. A: least I don't recall it.

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r. R 21576.0 23091 B'RT.

1 O Well, what, if anything, do.you recall about the 2 conversation between you and him, about the trip report?

3 A That it did exist and he made indication that he --

4 I think he asked me: Do you know of the Lipinski trip 5 report? I told him yes, I did.

6 O And was that the end of the conversation? Did 7 he ask you -- well, was that the end of the conversation?

8 A I don't recall much more than that; no.

9 0 You don't recall whether he asked you how you 10 became aware of the trip report?

11 A No, I don't.

12 O And he didn't indicate in any way how he had 13 become aware of it?

14 A No, he did not say anything about that.

15 0 With regard to the discussions you and he had 16 about the Dunham matter, did he ask you whether you wanted 17 any confidentiality with regard to those matters?

18 A I don't recall him saying anything about that 19 no.

20 0 Did you request any confidentiality?

21 A No, I don't think I did. "

I don't recall.

22 O Do you recall signing any document with regard 1

23 to the question of confidentiality?

l 24 A No, I don't. I don't recall anything like that.

l 25 0 In the course of his discussing the Dunham l

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• 21578.0 O D 23093

-BRT- 1 L l' A Yes, he was. .i 2 O Did Mr. Ambrose have'anyth ng to do with the 3 Dunham. matter, as'it related to the Department of Labor? i

~4 A Not to my knowledgei no.

5 O Do you think there was'any -- we51, at the time, 6 do you recall any concern that Mr. Ambrose' name was

- 7- . mentioned to you?

8 A No, I don't.

9 O' Had you ever had any other discussions with 10 Mr. Driskill?

11- A I had talked to him at the plant if you mean 12 that?

13 0 Yes. .

14 A I talked to him down at Comanche Peak.

15 Q How many times had you talked to him down at 16 coma;che Peak?

I I

17 A It was not so much myself. 'I was in with a

.18 group of three of us that talked to him. There was one i

19 gentleman that did all the talking. And that was the one 20 time he came -- or, I guess twice he came up there. Two 21 days in a row, I should say.

22 O And what was the subject matter of that 23 discussion?

24 A The subject matter of that discussion centered 25 around the design change documents we were w>rking on.

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21578.0 BRT 23095 1 0 Do you know whether the other two people who 2

were with you recuested confidentiality in your hearing?

3 A .Th a t I don't have any way of knowing.

4 0 Did you observe them signing any documents?

5 A No, I did not.

6 O And during that conversation you provided 7

Mr. Driskill with whatever information the three of you i

8 had to provide to him?

9 A Yes.

10 0 During that conversation, did he raise any 11 information that he had heard on that subject from any 12 other people at the Comanche Peak site?

13 A. .

I don't think he did. I doa't recall anything.

14 O Did you have any or do you have any reason to 15 believe that any of the information that you or the two 16 other people gave him became known to other persons?

17 A By talking with other inspectors and by talking 18 to this other gentleman who was with us, the third man in 19 the group, he said that some of the things that he had 20 thoughts -- was in the as-built group, I had nothing to de 21 with the as-built group -- some of the things that he had 22 brought to Mr. Driskill's attention were, indeed, brought 23 to management personnel's attention also.

24 O But was that the same information that occurred 25 during your meeting with Mr. Driskill?

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. 21578.0 23097 i BRT-4 IL any passage of money.

2 BY MR. TREBY:

3 0 When Mr. Driskill discussed that matter with you, 4 did he indicate that there had been an investigation done 5 by the NRC's Office of Investigation?-

6 A Yes, he did. He indicated that there had been a 7 very thorough investigation done and that, indeed, the NRC 8 had -- was giving them a penalty, and that Mr. Williams 9 had, indeed, signed an affidavit indicating intimidation.

10 0 Did he indicate that during the course of thia  !

11 investigation they had spoken to QC inspectors?

12 A Yes, he did.

13 0 Did he give you any idea of how many QC 14 inspectors they had spoken to?

15 A No, he did not.

16. O Did he indicate that --

whether it was one or 17 two or a larger number than that?

18 A I took it that it was a large number. ,

i 19 0 Given that information, do you find it 20 surprising that QC inspectors at --

in the coatings 21 d6partment, indicated they had had conversations with the 22 NRC7 23 A I feel that they did.

l. 24 O Do you know whether those conversations related 1

25 te that investigation or related to ct'aer discussions they l

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1 The same thing -- basically the same thing,I told -- you 2 know -- that we talked about.

3 O And did you have any further conversations with 4 Mr. Watkins?

5 A No. I did not have any conversations with 6 Mr. Watkins but there was a gentleman from Mr. Watkins' 7 firm called and told me that, I guess it's after -- this 8 is af ter I talked to you. And told me that they were 9 still looking for some -- for a lawyer. And at that time 10 I indicated that I had selected Mr. Sims.

11 0 Did you ever have tny conversations with 12 Mr. Gallo?

13 A No. I never met the man before.

14 MR. GALLO: Yesterday.

15 THE WITNESS: Excuse me; Thursday.

16 BY MR. TREBY: )

17 O Did you have any conversations with Ms. Garde or 18 Mr. Roisman after that -- after you selected Mr. Sims as 19 your atsorney?

20 A I think Mr. Roisman placed a couple of calls to i

21 my house but I was not there. And I don't recall having 22 any conversations with Ms. Garde. If I did, I probably 23 indicated to her to talk to my lawyer also. j i

24 O There was an indication that a transcript was I

{

25 sent to you by Ms. Garde? )

i i

i

n n The Light  ;

i Company so, ion ugsog noe, m 3 3700 sosio,reo,77003 <733,228-9211 June 5, 1985  ;

.Mr Robert D. Martin Regional Director, Region IV Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 188 Arlington, Texas 76811

SUBJECT:

THE SOUTE TEXAS NUCLEAR PROJECT REVIEW OF LITIGATION RECORDS As you are now aware, the Matagorda County District Court Judge, J. P. Hardy Jr. has lifted his gag order which has  !

sealed the litigation documents that have been developed by both Brown & Root, Ba111 burton, and the owners of the South Texas Project in preparation for the litigation. The litigation as,you airo are aware has been settled out of court.

Now that these deve',opments have occurred, it is now possible for Houston Lighting & Power Company to undertake an appropriate. review of these documents to assure itself that  ;

they do not contain any matters that may fall in the category that would make them reportable to the NRC in accordance with the requirements of 18CFR58.55e, i (

In approximately the next two or three weeks I hope to have both our program and our schedule of execution for the {

review of these documents. I plan further to document our '

l L program record.

docketed with your office and make it an official part of the i I

i I will keep your office advised should there be any developments action.

that will bear on our anticipated course of I

l l

Very truly yours, I

J. U. Goldberg Group vice President, Nuclear i m

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p Houston Lightmg 1: Pwer Compan) cc:

Hugh L. Thompson, Jr., Director Division of Licensing Brian E. Berwick, Esquire Assistant Attorney General for Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation the State of Texas U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission P. O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Washington, DC 20555 Austin, TX 78711 N. Prasad Kadambi, Project Manager Lanny A. Sinkin U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3022 Porter Street, N.W. #304 7920 Norfolk Avenue Washington, D.C.

~Bethesda, MD 20814 20008 Claude E. Johnson Oreste R. Pirfo, Esquire Senior Resident Inspector /STP Hearing Attorney c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the Executive Legal Director P. O. Box 910 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Bay City, TX 77414 Washington, DC 20555 M. D. Schwa:z, Jr., Esquire Charles Bechhoefer, Esquire Baker & Botts Chairman, Atomic Safety & Licensing Board One Shell Plaza U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Houston, TX 77002 Washington, DC 20555 J. R. Newman, Esquire Dr. James C. Lamb, III Newman & Holtzinger, P.C. 313 Woodhaven Road )

Chapel Hill, NC 27514 1615 L Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20036 Judge Frederick J. Shon Director Office of Inspection Atomic Safety and Licensing Board and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D. C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, DC 20555 Mr. Ray Goldstein, Esquire 1001 Vaughn Building E. R. Brooks /R. L. Range 807 Brazos '

Central Power & Light Company Austin, TX 78701 P. O. Box 2121  ;

Corpus Christi, TX 78403 Citizens for Equitable Utilities, Inc.

c/o Ms. Peggy Buchorn H. L. Peterson/G. Pokorny Route 1, Box 1684 City of Austin Brazoria, TX 77422 P. O. Cox 1088 Austin, TX 78767 Docketing & Service Section J. B. Poston/A. vonRosenberg Office of the Secretary Cit U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission P. yO.Public Box 1771 Service Board Washington, DC 20555 San Antonio, TX 78296

/N 2/c _ _-_ __-- _ - MMMN

F n m dV SEP 0 51985 In Reply Refer To:  !

Dockets: 50-498 50-499 i

Houston Lighting & Power Company ATTN: J. H. Goldberg, Group Vice President P. O. Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

HoustonLihhtinghPowerCompany(HL&P)ReviewofLitigationRecord On July 31, 1985, I met with you and members of your staff in an open meeting  !

at the NRC, Region IV offics. Your agenda and the attendance list for the j meeting are attached (Attachments A and B, respectively).

The purpose of the meeting was to allow HL&P to provide the NRC with a I conceptual overview of HL&P's prcgram for review of the HL&P versus Brown and Root litigation record. This record was prepared for a lawsuit between HL&P and Brown and Root and had been sealed by court order until recently released pursuant'to an out-of-court settlement of the case.

I understand that your review plan is to be formally submitted to the NRC in the near future.

The plan, as I understand it, provides for screening the approximately 32 million pages of information looking for safety significant issues that may not have been previously reviewed by HL&c or the NRC. Certain records will not be reviewed if it is determined that the record is not likely to contain safety-related information, such.as financial records or the repositioning of nontechnical individuals on nontec' n nical atters.

It is expected that this formal review effort, which is to be conducted with l

coverage by the HL&P corporate QA department, is to be conducted by S. Levy, Inc., of Camp ell,' California, and is expected to involve approximately 6 man-years effort Your schedule generally calls for the review of the documents between August and December of this year to identify assertions and project documents. A '

draft report is expected to be available in February 1986 with the final ap, ort scheduled for April 1986.

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. l J. H. Goldberg, HL&P -2 I feel that the goal of the meeting was met in that your presentation and answers to our questions was very informative. As I stated during the meeting, this was not a decision-making meeting and no concurrence or approval of your review program was given.

I understand that you intend to start the formal training of the records reviewers and begin your review in the near future. We look forward to receiving your review program and intend to monitor your activities in this area.

If your plans change significantly let me know.

Sincerely, originai signed ay Paul S. Check Robert D. Martin Regional Administrator Attachments:

As stated cc: wo/ attachment (Seenextpage) bec to DMB (IE45) j bec distrib. by RIV: '

RPB R. P. Denise, DRSP Resident Inspector-OPS R. D. Martin, RA Resident Inspector-CONST.

Section Chief (PS/C)

R&SPB RIV File I

f l

I l

A m ATTACHMENT A HL&P/USNRC Meeting July 31, 1985 - Arlington, Texas Review of HL&P vs. B&R Litigation Record Agenda INTRODUCTION J.H. Goldberg, Group Vice President, Nuclear 1

PROJECT OVERVIEW M.R. Wisenburg, Manager, Nuclear Licensing ,

I SCOPE OF REVIEW  !

J.E.B. Ecker (Newman & Holtzinger, PC)  !

I MF.CHANICS OF REVIEW l C.B. Johnson (S. Levy Incorporated)

GENERAL DISCUSSION All Participants i

_ - 1

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__ ,, _ 8@ p g ' $ g, Pg HW VS B&R LITIGATION REVIEW SCHEMLE t.

DATE

- MILESTONE _,,

ACTIVITY HL&P INITIATED PLANNING MAY JUNE o

~

HL&P INSTRUCTED SLI TO T PREPARE INSTRUCTIONS, PRO-BEGIN DETAILED PLANNING JULY CEDURES, ASSOCIATED DATA l BASE STRUCTURE, TRAINING NRC & HL&P MEETING - ^~~

MATERIALS. ASSEMBLE DOCUMENTS.

MOBILIZE MANPOWER.

HL&P AUTHORIZES FULL AUG IMPLEMENTATION o SEPT

~~

IDENTIFY ASSERTIONS AND OCT IDENTIFY PROJECT DOCUMENTS KOV DEC FINISH DEPOSITION & EXPERT REPORT %_ o

. . o REVIEWS & IDENTIFICATION OF JAN PREPARE DRAFT REPORT.

PROJECT DOCUMENTS o  !

o COMPLETE DRAFT REPORT &-

OPEN ASSERTION LIST FEB HL&P REVIEW AND COMMENT.

~~ CLOSE OPEN ASSERTION LIST ITEMS.

FINALIZE REPORT.

MARCH o o

"~ ~

ISSUE REPORT WITH ALL_

I ASSERTIONS CLOSED APRIL l

NRC REVIEW.

MAY o -

JUNE (BJ

//31/85 l

6 m HL&P VS B&R LITIGATION REVIEW MANPOWER RAW STATISTICS 145 DEPONENTS i 660 VOLUMES 99,000 PAGES 4 EXPERT REPORTS 1000 PAGES 1

14 --

o 12 --

10 - -

w b

w 8- -

6 MAN YEARS 6- -

4--

2- -

o I l l l l l l l 1 JULY AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MARCH APRIL MAY 1985 1986 CBJ 7/31/85 l

- _ - _ - - _ _ _ - - - - _ _ - i

, HL&P vs. B&R LITIGATION REVIEW MECHANICS

. ISSUE a sTRUCTIONS, PROCEDURES

. CONDUCT FORMAL ORIENTATION AND TRAINING SESSION

REVIEW DEPOSITION OR REPORT SECTION (REVIEWER) 4 RECORD PREPARE ASSERTION DESCRIPTION (REVIEWER)

KEEPING AND ASSIGN CLASSIFICATION ENTER INTO DATA BASE (DATA CLERK) 4

. INSTRUCTIONS

_ <r VERIFY ENTRY AND CHECK (REVIEWER AND

. PROCEDURES ASSERTIONS TEAMLEADER)

. TRAINING RECORDS SORT ASSERTIONS BY CATEGORY (DATACLERK)

DEPOSITIONS 4

. EXPERT .

REPORTS PREPARE ASSERTION CLOSURE

. SITE PROJECT DOCUMENT

. ASSERTIONS . DETERMINE ASSERTION IS NOT A (SPECIALIST)

SAFETY ISSUE

= ASSERTION . REFER TO STP PROJECT ENGINEER CLOSURES '

COMPUTER DATA BASE ENTER INTO DATA BASE (DATACLERK)

. STP 4 i DOCUMENTS

, 9 VERIFY ENTRY (SPECIALIST)

COMPILE ASSERTIONS AND CLOSURES (DATACLERK) 4 t PREPARE REPORT (PROJECT TEAM) n END CBJ 7/31/85

l l

l ATTACHMENT B l i

July 31, 1985 MEETING ATTENDEES Name Title / Organization NRC F D. Martin Regional Administrator, NRC J. M. Taylor Director, Inspection & Enforcement, NRC P. S. Check Deputy Regional Administrator, NRC R. P. Denise Director, Division of Reactor Safety and Projects,NRC E. H. Johnson Chief, Reactor Project Branch, MRC R. F. Heishman Chief, Reactor Construction Program Branch, NRC G. W. Knighton Chief, Licensing Branch 3, NRC i E. J. Reis Assistant Chief Hearing Counsel,'NRC W. L. Brown Chief Counsel, RIV, NRC  !

G. L. Constable Section Chief, NRC N. P. Kadambi Project Manager, NRC D. A. Powers Acting Enforcement Officer, NRC HL&P f J. H. Goldberg Group Vice President-Nuclear, HL&P f J. E. Geiger Manager, Nuclear Assurance, HL&P i M. Wisenburg Manager, Nuclear Licensing, HL&P J. Newman Newman & Holtzinger l J. Ecker Newman & Holtzinger i C. Johnson Vice President, S. Levy, Inc.

Others l R. L. Fouke CASE I

4

_m____._ _ _ - _ _ _ _ . _ . _ - . . _ _ -

n The Light Company sonsmn tigniing & rower v.o. sos ivon souunn.Tes 77oni <7is.es2ii  :

August 30, 1985 j ST-HL-AE-1346  ;

.cile No.: G25, G4.2 )

Mr. Robert D. Martin Regional Administrator, Region IV -

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 I Arlington, Texas 76011 T " - 3 E35 i South Texas Project -

Units 1 & 2 Docket Nos. STN 50-498, STN 50-499 Review of the HL&P v. B&R Litigation Record

Dear Mr. Martin:

Enclosed for your information and comment is a program document describing Houston Lightina & Power ~ Company's (HL&P) review of the litiaation record in the lawsuit by the Owners of the South Texas Pro.iect (STP) aaainst Brown & Root, Inc., (B&R) and its parent. Halliburton. Inc., which was tentatively settled on May 30, 1985. I advised you of the settlement and our intent to conduct such a review in my letter of June 5, 1985 and subsequent discussions.

The enclosed document describes the scope and methodology of the program which we have initiated this week. We welcome NRC involvement in this work to the maximum degree consistent with the Commission's resources, including attendance by NRC Staff at one or more of the training sessions for participants in the review. In addition, program procedures, criteria, and guidelines will be available for review by the NRC, as well as qualification '

statements for the engineers involved in the review program.

The objectives of the review are: (1) to examine the litigation record (portions of which were under seal by protective order of the trial court prior to the settlement) to detennine whether it discloses any previously unidentified safety-related deficiency in the systems, structures or components (SSC) of the STP or their associated design or quality documents; and (2) to docurr.ent the review process and its results in an auditable form.

It is important that this review program be considered in light of the history of the STP. Design work was begun by B&R in 1972; the Owners of the STP executed a contract in 1974 with B&R to perfonn architect / engineering, s

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^ File k .: G25, G4.2 Hounon Ughting & Power Cc ,any Page 2 construction management and construction services for the Project. Initial construction activities under a Limited Work Authorization began in 1975 and construction permits were issued later that year. Initial work, mostly of a civil / structural nature, progressed satisfactorily. By 1979, however, significant questions arose regarding the ability of B&R's engineering to support construction. Later that year the NRC began an investigation of the STP construction QA/QC activities (the "79-19 investigation") which culminated on April 30, 1980, in an Order to Show Cause why construction should not be suspended, as well as the imposition of civil penalties in the amount of

$100,000.

The NRC's enforcement action, and certain construction related QA problems identified earlier by HL&P and B&R, resulted in the shutdown of essentially all safety-related construction work in late 1979 and early 1980. Little safety-related construction work was perfomed in the period thereafter until August, 1982. Design work was also essentially brought to a halt when B&R was replaced as architect / engineer in September, 1981. Production scale engineering and construction work did not resume until mid-1982. B&R was teminated as architect / engineer in September,1981; it withdrew as constructor in November, 1981. Bechtel assumed responsibility for architect / engineering and construction management in September,1981, and Ebasco Services took over construction in February,1982.

In the period 1980 to mid-1981, STP was subjected to exhaustive con-struction reviews and inspections. The bulk of the construction work in place - soils, concrete, and welding - was scrutinized by separate engineering task forces and in each area a panel of " blue ribbon" third-party experts oversaw and evaluated the work. Where repairs were needed, they were made in accordance with approved procedures. Significant measures were undertaken to establish and correct the root causes of these construction and construction-related QA problems. After reviewing this record, The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board concluded that "there is reasonable assurance that the structures in place at the STP are in conformity with applicable regulatory requirements."

Further reviews of in-place construction were undertaken by Bechtel and 3 Ebasco after they assumed their responsibilities, including "walkdowns" to check l installed construction against drawings and related examinations of QC records. 4 They also re-examined accessible safety-related welds and their associated quality documentation (radiographs, etc.). ,

In addition, a comprehensive review of the STP design was undertaken when Bechtel replaced Brown & Root as architect / engineer in late 1981. Bechtel divided the design into about 200 " work packages" which contain relevant I design descriptions., drawings, diagrams, vendor data, specifications and calculations. Depending on the nature of the package, Bechtel evaluated design assumptions, methods of aralyses, checked on the adequacy of design verification and reviewed design drawings and calculations for accuracy. NRC resident engineers oversaw Bechtel's work.

I

ST-HL-AE-1346 Houston Ughting A: Power mpin) * *

• I In short, the Project was placed under the closest scrutiny for about two years while its hardware and documentation were thoroughly evaluated by third-party experts and new contractor personnel. It is fair to say that no conenercial nuclear power facility in the United States has been subjected to greater and more intensive review. An understanding of these facts is essential 1 l

in considering the review being undertaken by HL&P of the litigation record in HL&P v. B&R.

The litigation record in the custody of the court and released as a result of the lifting of the protective order in HL&P v. B&R includes three major categories of documents containing factual information related to issues in the lawsuit: (1) interrogatory responses; (2) expert reports; and (3) {

depositions and related exhibits. HL&P will examine these three categories of j 1

documents to the , extent they bear on the design and construction of the STP to j search for any safety-related deficiencies in SSC (or their associated design or quality documents) which might have escaped detection during the intensive two-yeardiscussed experts review process above. performed by Bechtel. Ebasco, HL&P and third-party i The relevant interrogatory responses, expert reports, and depositions will be reviewed, line-by-line, in accordance with ,

procedures, criteria and guidelines by experi'enced, professional engineers. I Exhibits to depositions will be reviewed to the extent necessary to understand j the depositions.

The review will be conducted by S. Levy, Inc., (SLI) under contract with  !

HL&P. Approximately 40 engineers will work as Reviewers, Discipline {

Specialists, Overview Specialists Team Leader or Team Leader designees. HL&P j engineers will participate in the review effort by monitoring the work as well i as providing assistance to the SLI engineers in obtaining necessary 1 infonnation from the Project.

{

Engineers who are designated as Reviewers will review the relevant litigation materials to identify assertions of deficiency in STP SSC.

Assertions will be recorded and passed on to more senior Discipline i Specialists who will identify those which are safety-related and determine J

whether Project. they have been corrected or have been identified for correction by the If they are unable to make that determination and the assertion cannot be shown by positive evidence to be erroneous, it will be transmitted to HL&P on a Deficiency Evaluation Fonn (DEF) for evaluation in accordance with the applicable Project procedure (PLP-02) pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55(e).

Each' assertion determined by a Discipline Specialist not to be safety-related will be referred to a multi-disciplinary Overview Specialist who will review the assertion or group of assertions to detennine whether, in light of possible systems interactions or multi-disciplinary characteristics, the asser-tion should be treated as safety-related. If the Overview Specialist determines that an assertion is safety-related, it will be subject to the same additional screening process described above.

The SLI Team Leader and his designees will perform supervisory reviews of approximately 10% of the work of each Reviewer, Discipline Specialist, and Overview Specialist for procedural compliance and substantive correctness.

The Team Leader shall have the authority to assign and reassign documents I

i

n ST-HL-AE-1346 Houston Ughdng & Power C,unpany File No.: G25, G4.2 Page 4 being reviewed; to require, as necessary, that further reviews of documents be performed; to correct errors in the preparation of review documents; and to order that work being perfonned incorrectly be halted. The Team Leader will also review the DEFs to be transmitted to the Project to ensure that they are correctly prepared and to be cognizant of the nature of the deficiencies j l

reflected on the DEFs.

j j

Both SLI and HL&P will corduct surveillance of the review work using QA personnel. l Day-to-day surveillance of the review will be provided by SLI QA personnel who do not report to the SLI Team Leader for this review. They will check on the qualifications of personnel, the processing and control of documents, records collection and storage, and compliance with applicable SLI litigation review procedures. The HL&P Nuclear Assurance Department will have at least one full-time representative at the SLI offices to conduct continuous surveillance; observations and reports will be recorded in accordance with HL&P's STP QA procedures. '

A three-member Senior Advisory Panel will also monitor the work to provide independent judgment as to whether the program is proceeding in accordance with its procedures and objectives. ,

Personnel working on the review will receive orientation and training by SLI, HL&P technical staff, and HL&P legal counsel. A training manual setting forth applicable review procedures. criteria, guidelines, and QA requirements is being distributed and reviewed at these training sessions.

Data developed in the review will be maintained in hard copy and also be computerized, and will be fully auditable by NRC and others.

Given the extraordinary review to which B&R work was subjected over a period of two years, it is not likely that previously unidentified safety-related deficiencies will be found. Nevertheless, the program will be pursued vigorously. All of the individuals performing the review will be engineers experienced in the nuclear industry. Reviewers examining documents for assertions of deficiency will have at least 3 years experience in the industry. Discipline and Overview Specialists will have at least 7 and 10 years of such experience, respectively. The SLI Team Leader and his designees will have more than 10 years of technical management experience related to nuclear plant engineering, design, or construction.

We estimate that these experienced personnel will require approximately -

26,000 man-hours of effort, exclusive of HL&P review, surveillance, and oversight activities, between September,1985, through March,1986, to complete the review. The SLI review will be completed by December 31, 1985.

A-draft report will be produced by SLI in January,1986. We expect to submit a final report to the NRC not later than March 1, 1986.

___-____-___A

ST-HL-AE-2346

. ,' n Homn Lighting & Power G,.npany ' File Noo: G25, G4c2 Page 5 l

The review team will also be instructed to note any judgmental references to NRC and its performance. In addition, an index to the pleadings will be prepared to facilitate review by NRC legal personnel.

Again, we welcome NRC's comments. This litigation review program will be i managed by Mr. M. R. Wisenburg, Manager of the Nuclear Licensing Department.

Questions and coments may be directed to him at (713) 993-1330. .

i Ver truly yours.

. e-[( )

J. H. Goldberg Group Vice Preside t, Nuclear JHG/MRW:as -

Enclosure:

South Texas Project Litigation Review Program i ec: H. R. Denton, Director NRR  !

/ J. M. Taylor, Director, OI&E  ;

G. M. Cunningham, Director, OELD l

I i

i l

e I

i

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - -I

.' ST-HL-AE-1346 l

^ ^

< Msuston Lighdng & Power Co...pany File No: G25, G4.2 Page 6 3 cc:

Harold R. Denton, Jr., Director J. B. Poston/A. vonRosenberg Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation City Public Service Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission P.O. Box 1771 Washington, DC 20555 San Antonio, TX 78296 4 James M. Taylor Brian E. Berwick, Esquire Director Office of Inspection Assistant Attorney General for i and Enforcement the State of Texas i U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission P. O. Box 12548 Capitol Station Washington, DC 20555 Austin, TX 78711 .

Guy H. Cunningham, Director Lanny A. Sinkin Office of Executive Legal Director 3022 Porter Street, N.W. #304 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D. C. 20008 Washington, DC 20555 i

Oreste R. Pirfo, Esquire N. Prasad Kadambi, Project Manager Hearing Attorney U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission (

Office of the Executive Legal Director l 7920 Norfolk Avenue U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission '

Bethesda, MD 20814 Washington, DC 20555 Claude E. Johnson Charles Bechhoefer, Esquire Ser'or Resident Inspector /STP Chairman, Atomic Safety & Licensing Board c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission P. O. Box 910 Washington, DC 20555 Bay City, TX 77434 Dr. James C. Lamb, III M. D. Schwarz, Jr., Esquire 313 Woodhaven Road Baker & Botts Chapel Hill, NC 27514 One Shell Plaza Houston, TX 77002 Judge Frederick J. Shon Atomic Safety and Licensing Board J. R. Newesn, Esquire U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Newman & Holtzinger, P.C. Washington, D. C. 20555 1615 L Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20036 Mr. Ray Goldstein, Esquire 1001 Vaughn Building E.-R. Brooks /R. L. Range 807 Brazos Central Power & Light Company Austin, TX 78701 P. O. Box 2121 Corpus Christi, TX 78403 Citizens for Equitable Utilities, Inc.

c/o Ms. Peggy Buchorn H. L. Peterson/G. Pokorny Route 1, Box 1684 City of Austin Brazoria, TX 77422 P. O. Box 1088 Austin, TX 78767 Docketing & Service Section Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, DC 20555 g

.7 m ^

Enclosure k ST-HL-AE-1346 i

i SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT LITIGATION REVIEW PROGRAM i TABLE OF CONTENTS Pace I. INTRODUCTION . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 I II.

HISTORY OF THE SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 A. Background Information

................... 3 B. Previous Reviews of STP En i

and Construction. . . . . gineering

.................. 4 f

1) The NRC 79-19 Investigation and Related Reviews. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 a.

Soils . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6' b.

Concrete. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

c. Welding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

2) Reviews Related to the Transition of Responsibilities from B&R to j

)

Bechtel and Ebasco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

a. Bechtel's Review of Engineering . . . . . . . . . 10  !

b.  !

Review of In-place Construction by 4 Bechtel and Ebascu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 C. Summa ry o f His tory of STP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 III. THE LITIGATION BETWEEN THE OWNERS OF STP AND B ROWN & ROOT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 l A. Brief History of the Case {

.................15  !

B. Issues in the Litigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 i C. The Parties' Major Activities in the I Litigation. . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

1) D i s co ve ry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

^[L} Q )!YJ Y l

PD9

s

'~5 Enclosure L

ST-HL-AE-1346

- ii -

Pace

a. Interrogatories. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

b. Depositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

c. Requests for Production of '

Documents ....................20

2) Experts and Expert Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

3) Litigation Interface with Project . . . . . . . . . . . 23 IV. THE STP LITIGATION REVIEW PROGRAM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 A. Overview . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . 24 B. The Litigation Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

1) Complaint and Answer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

2) Motions . . .

.....................25

3) Court Hearing Transcripts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

4) Interrogatory Answers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

5) . Deposition Transcripts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

6) Expert Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

7) . Requests for Production of Documents . . . . . . . . . . 27

~C. Scope.of the Litigation Review Program . . . . . . . . . . . 28 D. Methodology of the Litigation Review Program . . . . . . . . 29

1) Stage One: Screening ................30

2) Stage Two: Detailed Review of Selected Litigation Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

a. Purpose of the Detailed Litigation Review . . ..............30

b. The Litigation Review Team . . . . . . . . . . . 31 u___-________-__--_- -_ _ -

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m o i Enclosure '

ST-HL-AE-1346

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Pace

c. Litigation Review Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 d.

Documentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

- E. Training Program . .. .. . . .. . . . . . . . ........37 I F. Management Oversight of Litigation Review / Senior Advisory Panel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 -

G. Quality Assuranc,e . .. . . .. . . ... . . . ........39 H. Ma npower and Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 e

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1. INTRODUCTION In December, 1981, the Owners of the South Texas Project (STP) filed suit against Brown & Root, Inc. (B&R) and its parent, Halliburton, Inc., based on non-performance by B&R of its contractual obligations to provide architect /engir.eering and construction management services and its refusal to fulfill its obligations as constructor of the STP (HL&P v. B&R). B&R was replaced by Bechtel as architect / engineer and construction manager in September, 1981. Ebasco Services took over construction in February,1982.

An agreement to settle the litigation prior to trial was reached among all parties except the City of Austin on May 30, 1985. 1/ In preparation for the trial of the lawsuit in Matagorda County, Texas, the parties pursued extensive discovery including depositions, interrogatories, document production and the preparation of a number of expert reports. With the exception of the  !

documents furnished in response to production requests, the discovery materials were filed with the Court. All discovery materials were covered by a protective order. That order was dissolved by the Court upon execution of the settlement agreement.

Houston Lighting & Power Ccmpany (HL&P), as the co-applicant responsible for the licensing of the STP, is undertaking a review of the litigation record as reflected in the discovery materials filed with the Court to determine j whether such materials identify safety-related deficiencies in the systems,

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structures or components of the STP or their associated design or quality i documentation.

1/ The settlement is contingent on approval by the Texas Public Utilities Commission.

f m ~ ST-HL-AE-1346 page g The review will be conducted by approximately forty experienced engineers employed by S. Levy, Inc., (SLI) who will follow detailed procedures, guidelines and criteria in screening the data. They will be assisted by a select group of HL&P engineers. The entire process will be under the surveillance of SLI and HL&P personnel and will be conducted in accordance with the SLI QA program and monitored by HL&P in accordance with its QA program.

The review will focus on the identification of potential safety-related deficiencies in construction and design work done by B&R during its tenure on the job (1972-81) which may not have been identified during the extraordinary effort between early 1980 and mid-1982 to benchmark and check the quality of safety-related construction and design work at the STP. It is important that the reader review the history of the STP (pp. 3-15); it demonstrates that no nuclear power project in the United States has received closer or more extensive inspection, testing and scrutiny than the STP. Over a period of two years virtually all safety-related construction was checked by special '

engineering task forces and expert consultants, and the entire design was

• eviewed by Bechtel under rranitoring by the NRC Staff.

This program will seek to determine whether the litigation record to be reviewed in HL&P v. B&R discloses some safety-related deficiency in the design or construction of STP systems, structures or components not identified by the extraordinary reviews of design and construction conducted between 1980-82.

The program will consume about sixteen man-years of engineering effort.

It will result in a completely auditable record consisting of hard copy files, a computerized database and a report to NRC on or about March 1,1986.

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• ' ST-HL-AE-1346 R ^ Page 3 II.  !

HISTORY OF THE SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT i A. Backoround Information i

t The South Texas Project (STP or the Project) is a two unit nuclear

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generating station located approximately 15 miles southwest of Bay City, on I the west side of the Colorado River, in Matagorda County, Texas. Each unit is a Westinghouse pressurized water reactor with a rated electrical outpet of

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1250 megawatts.

STP is owned jointly by Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P), Central Power & Light Company, the City of Austin and the City of San 1 Antonio. HL&P, as the Project Marsger, supervises the construction of STP and is the lead applicant in the operating license proceedings for the facility, i i

Fuel loading at STP is sch'eduled to take place in December 1986 for Unit I and l in December 1988 for Unit 2, with Unit 1 expected to begin commercial operation in June 1987.

B&R was engaged as architect / engineer and constructor for STP in 1972,.

and design work for the Project commenced that same year. HL&P submitted an application for construction permits for STP on May 19, 1974 A Limited Work Authorization (LWA) for site preparation activities was granted on August 12, 1975, and work within the scope of the LWA comenced in September 1975. The construction permits for both units were issued on December 22, 1975.

B&R remained the architect / engineer and constructor at STP from the commencement of work until September 1981, when it was terminated as architect / engineer by HL&P and the other Owners because of its inability to perform design and engineering work for the Project in a timely fashion.  ;

Bechtel was hired to replace B&R as architect / engineer and construction '

3 manager, and transition of Project engineering work from B&R to Bechtel began i i

in October 1981. Although HL&P and the other Owners wished to retain B&R as i

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O m Page 4 constructor for STP, B&R declined to remain in that capacity. On February 15, 1982, HL&P announced that Ebasco had been selected to replace B&R as constructor.

B&R's replacement as architect / engineer and constructor effectively shut down all work at STP for several months. Bechtel did not resume engineering work on a production scale until the end of April 1982, and design work in some areas was not resumed until several months later. Most safety-related construction had already been halted in late 1979 and early 1980 (See pp. 4-10 below). Although a limited amount of safety-related work was released for construction while B&R was still on the job, full scale safety-related construction was not resumed until August,1982, after Bechtel and Ebasco had started work. Nonsafety-related construction resumed in June 1982.

On August 4, 1982, Bechtel issued a Project Completion Forecast based on To fuel load for Unit 1 in December 1986 and for Unit 2 in December 1988.

date, engineering and construction for STP have proceeded generally in accordance with this schedule.

B. Previous Reviews of STP Encineerino and Construction The design, engineering and construction of STP have received unusually close scrutiny. In addition to normal inspections by the NRC, construction of the Project was thoroughly reviewed as an outgrowth of an NRC enforcement The action anc voluntary stop-work orders confirmed by the Commission Staff.

change of contractors in 1981 entailed further independent reviews of the ,

It is fair to adequacy of construction as well as design and engineering.

state that no nuclear project in the United States has been subjected to greater or more intensive review, t

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1) The NRC 79-19 Investigation and Related Reviews l

On November 10, 1979, the NRC undertook an intensive investigation i of QA/QC and related construction activities at STP. This investigation was l carried out over three months by one NRC investigator and five inspectors, at j least one from each of four NRC regional offices. The investigation included 1

observations, document reviews, witnessing of tests and over 100 interviews  !

with HL&P, B&R and subcontractor personnel working at STP.

Much of this investigation was directed at construction-related QA/QC programs at STP, especially in the areas of structural backfill, concrete placement and welding. The results of the investigation were documented in Investigation Report 79-19 which described 22 inadequacies at STP. Based on the results of the investigation, the NRC's Office of Inspection and Enforcement issued a Notice of Violation and Notice of Proposed Imposition of Civil Fenalties on April 30, 1980, accompanied by an Order to Show Cause why safety-related construction at STP should not be stopped ninety days from the date of the Order. Prior to the issuance of the Show Cause Order, HL&P had voluntarily stopped work on placement of complex concrete (Dec. 28, 1979) and safety-related welding (April 14,1980) in response to problems identified by the NRC as well as observations by HL&P and B&R QA/QC personnel. These stop work orders were confirmed by Confirmatory Action Letters from NRC Region IV.

The Show Cause Order required substantial reexamination of completed construction work and improvement in the Project QA/QC program, but did not require any additional stop work orders.

Extensive corrective actions were taken by HL&P to resolve the problems noted in the NRC's investigation and concurrent HL&P and B&R QA/QC audits. In January 1980, HL&P retained Bechtel Power Corporation to conduct sn in-depth

l a -, w -m.- a s n A Page 6 audit of the QA/QC program'at STP. Other consultants were hired to review and advise management on issues related to harassment and intimidation.

Special emphasis was placed on soils, concrete and welding, which were three areas where it was thought that deficiencies might exist. At the time of the 79-19 investigation and report, structures in these three areas i

represented the overwhelming majority of the then-completed safety-related construction work. HL&P devised extensive review programs to determine the adequacy of the work in each area and to describe and schedule any necessary repairs.

a. Soils HL&P and B&R initiated a soil test boring program in January 1980 to assess and verify the adequacy of the in-place Category I structural backfill at STP. This program was conducted by geotechnical engineers from Woodward-Clyde Consultants (WCC). This soils program verified the overall i adequacy of the Category I backfill, but WCC reconsnended further confirmatory investigations in four specific locations. This program was completed in  !

April 1980.

After the issuance of the Show Cause Order on April 30, 1980, HL&P established a special Task Force to perform a second verification of previously piaced backfill. This Task Force consisted of geotechnical and QA l engineers from B&R, HL&P and WCC. In order to further guarantee the accuracy of its-structural backfill analysis, the Project also hired Shannon and Wilson, Inc., to establish an independent Expert Review Committee of L geotechnical experts to examine Category I structural backfill construction at STP and to review the work of the special Task Force. This Expert Review Committee consisted of three recognized experts on soils, backfill and soil 4

q n Page 7  ;

compaction. 1/ Both the Task Force and the Expert Review Committee performed reviews of backfill' placement at STP. These reviews included examination of the materials used for backfill, backfill placement practices, documentation reflecting how compaction of backfill was inspected and tested during placement, and the results of subsequent tests and borings. In addition, the L

Expert Review Committee examined the methods used and analyses performed by the Task Force. Both the Task Force and the Expert Review Committee concluded' that in-place backfill at the Project met applicable Project and regulatory requirements. The NRC Staff, after reviewing the work of the Task Force and the Expert Review Committee, concurred.

i b.. Concrete A similarly extensive series of reviews was performed with respect to (

concrete placement. At the time the Order to Show Cause was issued, HL&P was already in the midst of a concrete verification and inspection program

. stemming from the discovery of voids in Lifts 8 and 15 of the Unit 1 Reactor Containment Building. 3/ This verification and inspection program covered 80 percent of the reactor containment building shell walls, and cor sisted of visual inspections, soundings, test borings and core drill ngs. All significant voids discovered were mapped and filled.

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2/ These experts were: 1) Dr. A.J. Hendron, Professor of Civil Engineering, University of Illinois; 2) Dr. H. Bolton Seed, Professor of Civil Engineering, University of. California at Berkeley; and 3) Stanley D.

Wilson, an international consultant on embankment dams and on the behavior and properties of compacted soils.

3/ The walls of each reactor containment building are constructed in circumferential rings called " lifts". Each lift is composed of a 10' ,

deep pouring of reinforced concrete around the circumference of the RCB.

Voids are created when concrete fails to completely fill the spaces into which it is poured.

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-~ -~ Page 8 Upon issuance of the Order to Show Cause, HL&P and B&R formed a Task  !

I Force to perform an assessment of the remaining safety-related concrete j i

structures at STP. This Task Force included more than twenty full-time HL&P  !

l and B&R engineers. In addition, a special group of expert consultants was '

retained to ensure that the Task Force program was conducted properly. 4/

The Task Force's review covered nearly 70 percent of all safety-related I concrete placed at STP, Much of the remaining 30 percent was in structures, such as the reactor containment buildings and the essential cooling water intake and discharge structure, that had already been subject to review.

l Within the structures reviewed, a sample of concrete placements was select 7d )

i by conservative, statistically valid methods for examination. The Task Force review proceeded in four phases: 1) a review of all documentation related to each selected concrete placement; 2) a field survey to verify that the "as-built" condition of the selected structures corresponded to documentation;

3) a visual inspection of each placement; and 4) a random se.cction of three sample areas in each placement upon which to perform several specialized tests, including test borings, ultrasonic examination of consolidation and verification of the location of embedded steel. At the end of this review, it was concluded that the quality of safety-related concrete at STP was adequate and that the performance of concrete structures would meet design requirements. After examining the work of the Task Force and expert consultants, as well as the results of a number of other tests, inspections 4/ These included Joseph S. Artuso, President of Construction Engineering, Inc., an expert on concrete inspection and testing; Thcmas J. Reading, a materials expert formerly with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; and Dr.

Richard C. Meilenz, an expert on the application of petrography to civil engineering problems and materials and past president of the American Concrete Institute.

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Page 9 and repairs performed on safety-related concrete at STP, the NRC Staff agreed that no internal honeycomb or void areas remained unrepaired in the structures.

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c. Weldino Safety related welding at STP was aisc subjected to a thorough verification program. In response to Investigation Report 79-19, HL&P and B&R formed a Task Force, similar to those for soils and concrete, to examine safety-related welding on the Project. An Independent Review Comittee, consisting of three experts, was retained to review and approve the work of I

the welding Task Force. 5/

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Initially, the welding Task Force examined randomly selected  !

safety-related piping and structural welds made by B&R. After this initial

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investigation revealed a significant percentage of nonconforming welds, the ,

I Task Force recommended reexamination of safety-related welds, and where i required, repair of these welds. Accessible safety-related structural (AWS i

Code) welds were reexamined and repaired as necessary to bring them into {

compliance with specifications. (

Furthermore, an evaluation of inaccessible j

structural welds demonstrated that each would perform its intended function.

Radiographs of ASME welds were reviewed according to a detailed examination '

and repair plan approved by the NRC Staff. All welds discovered to be defective during the course of the Task Force examination were repaired, and l new procedures were put in place after the issuance of the Show Cause Order te l

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5/ The welding Independent Review Comittee consisted of: Roger F. Reedy, Chief Consultant at Nutech, an expert experienced in nuclear-related welding and a chairman of the Subcommittee on Nuclear Power of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Comittee; Daniel P. Hegglin, also of Nutech, an engineer experienced in nuclear welding and procedures; and Samuel A.

Wenk, an engineer at the Southwest Research Institute and a former director of both the ASNT and ASTM.

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n n Page 10 ensure that' welding deficiencies would not recur. The NRC Staff, which continuously monitored the efforts of the welding Task Force, concluded that HL&P had met its commitments relative to the safety-related welding program at STP and therefore, in December 1981, closed out the welding item in the Show Cause Order..

In sum, almost two years of effort were devoted to establishing the adequacy of safety-related construction at STP. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board conducting the STP operating license proceeding, after hearing the tc:timony of the Applicants, the experts who reviewed the wor 4 of the soils, concrete, and welding Task Forces, and the NRC Staff witnesses, and after examining all other aspects of the record related to the quality of i construction at STP, stated: "We find that, as of the close of the Phase I record, there is reasonable assurance that the structures in place at the STP are in conformity with applicable regulatory requirements."

Houston Lighting & Power Compa'ny, et al. (South Texas Project Units I and 2),

LBP-84-13, 19 N.R.C. 659, 702 (1984).

2) Reviews Related to the Transition of (

Responsibilities from B&R to Bechtel and Ebasco l 1

The termination of B&R and the subsequent takeover of the engineering and I construction of STP by Bechtel and Ebasco, respectively, promptet review of all aspects of the engineering and construction at the Project. In both scope and level of detail, this review was unprecedented in the nuclear industry.

a. Bechtel's Review of Engineering Under the terms of the contract between HL&P and Bechtel, Bechtel is obligated to assume design responsibility for the entire Project, including work completed by B&R, Before Bechtel could accept responsibility for the adequacy of the existing design and resume design production, the pecise

m , Page 11 status of all engineering and design work had to be ascertained. Therefore, upon assuming its role as architect / engineer for STP in the fall of 1981, Bechtel undertook an in-depth review of the entire STP design directed toward evaluating the adequacy of the existing design as well as determining what 1

work remained to be done.

In order to accomplish this review, Bechtel with the assistance of

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engineering personnel from HL&P and B&R, divided the engineering and design for STP into approximately 200 individual sections called " work packages." i Most work packages r' elated to discrete physical structures or plant systems, such as particular buildings, piping or electrical systems. Other work packages covered inter-disciplinary matters such as licensing documentation, ,

pipe break analysis and safe shutdown crite:ria. Again with the assistance of HL&P and B&R, Bechtel assembled all of the Project documentation pertinent to each work package. The number and type of documents in each work package varied depending on its subject matter. Typical work packages might irclude system design descriptions, logic diagrams, flow diagrams, piping and instrument diagrams, equipment specifications, calculations, vendor drawings, .

isometric drawings and other documents. Bechtel did not commence review of a work package until it was determined that sufficient documentation had been assembled to allow a complete review of the design embodied in the package.

Once a work package was assembled, Bechtel thoroughly examined all design documents in it. In doing so, depending on the nature of the work package, Bechtel evaluated the design assumptions and methods of analysis used by B&R, checked to see if applicable design criteria and technical reouf rements were 1 met, assessed the adequacy of design verification, reviewed design drawings and calculations for accuracy, and checked that the latest revisions of

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m documents were being used by all disciplines. In its review of the work packages, Bechtel particularly-considered Quadrex report 6/ findings which

related to the various work packages, and collected the results of that review in a separate interdisciplinary work package.

Bechtel generated a report on each work package and solicited correents as appropriate from cognizant engineers within B&R and HL&P. Each report included discussions of any technical problems identified by Bechtel, as well as a description of work necessary to complete the design. After meetings at-which the comments on each work package report were reviewed, the work package l

reports were revised accordingly and transmitted to HL&P.

These work package reports remain part of the Project documentation, and were the basis from which Bechtel resumed design production for STP in the spring and summer of 1982.

Bechtel's engineering review effort was overseen by the NRC. In January 1982, the NRC assigned a resident engineer to Bechtel's Houston offices tn monitor on a full-time basis the transfer of engineering documents and I Bechtel's review of these documents. The resident engineer performed reviews of selected work package reports, and engineers from the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation assigned to aid the resident engineer, reviewed additional selected work package reports. This unusual degree of scrutiny of

.Bechtel's work by the NRC provides significant assurance that any defects in the STP design were detected by Bechtel's review.

As a result of Bechtel's review, many changes were made in the design for

.STP and were fully documented.in Project Records. Although some constructed I

6/ The Quadrex Report was performed in the Spring of 1981. It was l corrinissioned by HL&P in order to benchmark the status of B&R's engineering and its capability to complete the design in accordance with j Project schedules. Quadrex reviewers also examined selected design  !

products and identified several matters determined to be reportable to i the NRC under 10 CFR 50.55(e).  ;

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p q Page 13-work had' to be removed (e.g. large amounts of HVAC duct work and cable tray supports), the extent of alteration of in-place components at STP was limited, because at the time Bechtel became architect / engineer in September of 1981, ,

only about 1/3 of the construction at STP had been completed. In addition, j the majority of the work in place at that time had already been thoroughly inspected and where defective was repaired or corrected as a result of the J l

79-19investigationandrelatedreviews.Z/ -

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b. Review of In-place Construction by Bechtel.and Ebasco Bechtel's take-over o': architect / engineer and construction mr. egement

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functions also necessitated that STP be physically examined to dete n.ne the i

exact status of all construction at the Project. The limited extent of safety-related construction activities between late 1979 and mid-1982 '

facilitated a detailed, systematic review.

, Among the key aspects of Bechtel's review of plan't construction was a series of "walkdowns" which collectively covered all completed construction at the plant. During these walkdowns, Bechtel and B&R personnel visually checked the installed sections of the plant against applicable design drawings.

Ebasco also provided manpower to aid during the walkdowns. The drawings were

. marked up to reflect the extent to which construction of the items represented on the drawings had been completed. The walkdowns also assured that construc-tion had proceeded according to the design or alternatively recorded.the extent of any deviation from the design. Following each system walkdown, Bechtel audited the quality control records for completed construction on that Z/ See pp. 5-10, supra.

m n Page 14 e

system to verify that these records had been properly generated and main-tained. Thus, Bechtel's review not only provided for a physical check of completed work but also assured that documentation existed which provided objective evidence that work had been done properly.

In addition to the walkdowns and general document verification effort, Bechtel and Ebasco conductea special reviews of safety-related ASME welding at STP to verify that all such welds met code standards. During these reviews, all accessible safety-related welds were visually inspected, and the documents and radiographs pertaining to these welds were examined to determine whether documentation for each weld was complete. Any welds found to be defective ~or to lack acceptable documentation were either radiographer to verify their adequacy or were repaired.

The NRC monitored both the general transition of construction work and the special welding reviews. An NRC resident inspector was on the site full-time during this transition, and reviewed various aspects of Bechtel's and Ebasco's transition activities. In addition, select teams of NRC personnel monitored the special welding reviews. The NRC's oversight thus provided additional assurance that Bechtel and Ebasco performed their examination of in-place construction of STP in a thorough, consistent manner.

C. Summary of History of STP STP is one of the most intensively scrutinized commercial nuclear facilities in the United States. The design, construction and associated I

documentation for the Project in place at the time Bechtel and Ebasco replaced 1 B&R underwent a more far-reaching and detailed review than is customary in the nuclear power industry. The NRC has overseen all major reviews of work on the

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m m Page 15 Project, and has examined the results of these reviews. Thus, there is a high level.of certainty that any defects in the design or in-place construction of STP as they existed prior to the resumption of safety-related work in 1982 have been discovered and corrected.

III. THE LITIGATION BETWEEN THE OWNERS OF STP AND BROWN & ROOT A. Brief History of the Case HL&P and the other STP Owners filed suit against B&R and its parent  !

corporation, Halliburton, Inc., in December 1981, in the District Court of  ;

Matagorda County, Texas (the Court), some three months after B&R was removed as architect / engineer and about six weeks after B&R finally announced that it j would not remain as constructor. Activities in the litigation continued for almost 31/2 years, during which the primary activities of the parties were discovery by means of depositions, interrogatories, examination of documents and the preparation of reports by experts expected to testify in the litigation. In addition, the Court held a number of pre-trial hearings, most of which related to discovery and scheduling matters.

In May 1985 a tentative settlement was reached between all the parties to the litigation with the exception of the City of Austin. 8/ The settlement, which is contingent upon approval by the Texas PvM :c Utilities Commission (TPUC), will be reviewed by the TPUC in early 1986. One further ramification of the settlement should be noted. During the pendency of the lawsuit, the Court had imposed a protective order preventing the parties from making 8/

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The City of Austin also has filed a separate lawsuit against HL&P. The suit is pending in Travis County, Texas, w______ -_

a n n Page 16 available to the public information learned during the discovery process.

When the parties arrived at a settlement, the Court ordered this protective order dissolved. Thus, all of the interrogatory answers, deposition transcripts and exhibits and expert reports filed in the case have become publicly available. Documents exchanged between the parties in respcnse to requests for production are not generally available because they were not filed with the Court.

i B. Issues in the Litigation The primary issues in the litigation related to B&R's performance on the Project from its inception in 1972 until September 1981. The plaintiffs'  ;

central theory was that B&R had breached its obligation to the STP Owners by failing to perform the architect / engineering and construction for the Project in the manner contemplated by the contract. B&R had completed less than 50%

of the engineering and about one-third of the construction for both units at the date of its termination. The plaintiffs particularly focused on B&R's i inability to complete' the engineering and design of the Project, and on certain inadequacies in those portions of B&R's design that had been completed. By and large, the perfomance of B&R as constructor at STP was I

acceptable; the Owners had in fact desired to retain B&R as constructor. They were unable to do so because of B&R's refusal to continue on the job without major modifications to its contract.

In defense of its performance, B&R contended that it had performed as well at STP as other architect / engineers and construction managers had at

m Page 17 other facilities being built during the same time period. B&R contended that regulatory circumstances, vendor problems, the actions of HL&P as Project Manager, and other factors prevented them from achieving Project schedules.

Many issues in the case were unrelated to plant safety or operability.

For example, the Owners claimed that B&R incorrectly stated the amount of engineering completed at various points in time. While relevant to B&R's performance of its obligations to the Owners, this question is not germane to whether the plant was properly engineered and constructed. Other issues were similarly unrelated *to plant safety. For example, substantial discovery was devoted to whether Halliburton, Inc., could be held liable for B&R's breach of contract and to questions concerning B&R's scheduling techniques, the. amount of damages suffered by the Owners, the costs of comparable plants, and the history.of the negotiations of the contract between the HL&P and B&R.

The allegations regarding deficiencies in. B&R's performance were, of course, developed by HL&P and the other plaintiffs. They are identified with particularity in the plaintiffs' " Specification of Claims and Issues". B&R's position is contained in its " Specification of Claims and Defenses". Both documents were-transmitted by HL&P to the NRC and the service list in the STP Operating License proceeding by letter of April 22, 1985.

C. The Parties' Major Activities in the Litigation

1) Discovery The parties on both sides of the litigation spent most of their energies  ;

conducting discovery to establish the facts relevant to the case. This )

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n m Page 18 discovery was conducted primarily by means of interrogatories, 9_/ depositions, and requests for production of documents.

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a. Interrogatories -

Interrogatories are written questions propounded by one party to an opposing party or parties in a lawsuit. Parties to whom interrogatories are propounded are required to answer them unless they call for legally privileged

-information or are otherwise objectionable. All parties to the STP litigation made extensive use of interrogatories to extract information from opposing parties. The plaintiff Owners filed more than 60 sets of interrogatories, I 4

each consisting of a number of individual questions; B&R and Halliburton also made liberal use of this discovery technique. By the time the litigation was settled in May 1985, most of these interrogatories had been answered.

i Many of the interrogatories addressed to the various parties concerned '

technical issues that could possibly relate to the safety of design or i construction at STP. Particularly noteworthy in this regard were interrogatories propounded by B&R to HL&P which required HL&P to list for each Bechtel work package all of.the technical deficiencies found in the B&R i

engineering work included in the work package. However, almost half of the interrogatories and answers in the case'related only to issues having no bearing on plant safety, such as cost, scheduling, Halliburton involvement and damages.

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9/ A limited number of requests for admissions were filed during the course ,

of discovery. Requests for admissions are written requests by one party I that an opposing party or parties admit or deny specified factual statements. For the purposes of this litigation review effort, all requests for admissions will be treated the same as interrogatories.

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b. Depositions Depositions were used extensively to discover information related to issues in the litigation. B&R, Halliburton and the plaintiffs took deposition testimony from more than 200 witnesses during the course of discovery, cover-ing all of the major issues in the case. Depositions of individual witnesses ranged in length from a few hours to more than twenty-five days of testimony.

Documentary exhibits were often used as a basis for much of the questioning, and these exhibits were filed in the Court with the transcripts of the oral depositions.

The depositions taken were of four types. First, there were personal i depositions. To commence a personal deposition, a party would file a notice 1

requiring a named individual to appear on a given date and answer questions. I At these depositions, the witnesses could be asked questions on any subject related to the litigation. I The second type of deposition was the so-called " Rule 201" deposition.

g/ To commence a Rule 201 deposition, a party would serve another party with l a notice stating that it desired to take the other party's deposition on a particular subject (e.g., pipe whip restraint design, IVC design). The other party would then provide a witness knowledgeable about that subject to I testify. In Rule 201 depositions, the questions and testimony related only to '

the particular subject described in the notice of deposition.

The third type of deposition was the " segmented" personal deposition.

l The notice of deposition for a segmented deposition named a specific individual to be deposed, but, as with a Rule 201 deposition, limited the scope of the questioning to a particular subject. The deposition testimony was thus correspondingly limited to that subject.

-10/ The reference is to Rule 201 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for such depositions.

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m m Page 20 Finally, there were depositions upon written questions. These depositions involved questions propounded in writing and answered either.

orally or in writing. Depositions upon written questions were often used to  !

I obtain information from persons not parties to the litigation. For example, i B&R propounded an extensive set of written deposition questions to Bechtel I concerning the nature and extent of changes made to the B&R design after l l

Bechtel took over as architect / engineer for the Project. Bechtel filed l

written responses to these questions with the Court.

Of the hundreds of depositions taken by the parties during the

. litigation,onlyaportioncontainedquestionsortestimonyrelatedtoplan$

safety. As with interrogatory answers, much of the deposition testimony I concerned issues that did not relate to plant safety such as cost, schedule, i Halliburton involvement and damages. Many of the witnesses who gave testimony i

were not involved with any of the design or construction work for the plant, ano did not have the background to understand techrical issues related to such matters.

c. Requests For Production Of Documents A third means of discovery employed by the parties was the request for production of documents. By serving a request for production of documents, one party could compel another to produce for inspection and copying all documents fitting a certain description or relating to a particular topic.

l Usually, the party requesting the documents would not copy all documents produced but would screen the documents to select those to be copied.

Extensive use of documents received in response to requests for production was made in depositions taken by the parties. In preparing for 1

l ._ \

- ' .. .. ... aa,w n p Page 21 depositions, the attorneys on both sides of the litigation, often in consultation with knowledgeable engineers, would attempt to gather documents related to issues to be addressed in the deposition and these were often incorporated as deposition exhibits.

2) Experts and Expert Reports In preparation of their case for trial, the parties to the STP litigation retained experts to testify at trial on various issues in the lawsuit. These experts made detailed inquiries into the issues that were to be the subject of their eventual testimony had the case gone to trial. Experts that the parties planned to have testify in the lawsuit were required to prepare reports summarizing their findings on the issues they were to testify upon so that the opposing parties would have the opportunity to prepare their case on those issues.

Of the reports prepared by these experts, the one most relevant to the technical. adequacy of STP engineering and construction is the Report on B&R Engineering on the South Texas Project, prepared by S. Levy, Inc.

(SLI), issued on October 1, 1984. This report was the culmination of an extensive and detailed review of B&R engineering documents, engineering-related correspondence, Bechtel work packages, deposition transcripts and some Bechtel design documents, carried out by highly trained engineers experienced in the nuclear field who were aware of their obligation to report any uncorrected safety deficiencies. The SLI review covered a majority of the safety-related systems engineered by B&R and evaluated the STP design as of l

Page 22 the time B&R was terminated as architect / engineer. M/ In addition, during the time it was preparing its report, SLI reviewed all but a few of the remaining Bechtel wnrk packages in assisting HL&P prepare responses to interrogatories propounded by B&R. The SLI engineers were aware of their obligation to report any potential deficiencies having possible current ramifications to the Project; in fact, SLI notified the Project of three such items, all of which were found to have been resolved. In its Report, SLI i

presented its findings as to B&R's performance as architect / engineer for STP and the adequacy of its design for the Project as of September 1981. The {

Report included descriptions of the deficiencies found by SLI in the course of its review. However, SLI also noted in its Report that "SLI has not i

independently identified any deficiency reportable under NRC regulations, and has not identified any deficiency, reportable or non-reportable, not currently being addressed by Bechtel." The report was reviewed by STP licensing and engineering personnel to determine whether it reflected any safety deficiencies reportable under 10 C.F.R. 9 50.55(e) which had not been previously reported to the NRC. The review did not disclose any such .

deficiencies.

Other expert reports, related to more limited areas of STP design and i Engineering, include tWO reports by Cygna (a B&R consultant) on QA and one by James R. Wells (a Plaintiffs' consultant) on concrete work at STP. As with SLI, the work of these consultants was directed toward evaluating work performed prior to September 1981. None of these reports revealed any deficiency not remedied by B&R, Bechtel, Ebasco, or HL&P. Finally, a number l

l

-11/ The SLI review covered systems, structures and components such as HVAC, piping, cable tray layout and supports, AC power, DC power, residual heat removal, containment spray, radiation monitoring, the mechanical electrical auxiliary building and reactor containment building.

I . _ . _

Page 23 l

of expert repnrts do not pertain at all to the safety of STP design or construction, but to issues such as project cost and schedule, impact of l I

regulatory change, accounting, and Halliburton control of B&R.

3) Litication Interface with Project During the course of the litigation, the lawyers and experts preparing the plaintiffs' case were assisted by HL&P engineers familiar with various aspects of Project design. These engineers helped ensure that the lawyers and i experts understood t,he significance of the different STP design documents and they assisted in obtaining complete documentation for experts working on technical issues. In March 1984, a formal Project Interface Team was created consisting of engineers knowledgeable about the STP design. The Project Interface Team reviewed many of the more significant technical interrogatory answers for accuracy including drafts of answers to the most detailed and extensive set of technical interrogatories filed in the lawsuit. The Team also reviewed several of the deposition transcripts on technical subjects to determine which portions of these transcripts contained significant information. These engineers, most of whom had been involved with Project engineering or QA, understood their obligations to notify the Project of any deficiencies in STP design or construction bmught to light by the litigation that were not being addressed by Bechtel, Ebasco or HL&P. The involvement of these engineers in 'the litigation effort thus not only provided for technical accuracy in the plaintiffs' preparation of their case, but provided added assurance that any hitherto undiscovered deficiencies brought out in preparing for the litigation would be identified to the Project and resolved. No such deficiencies were identified.

n 'Page 24 IV. THE STP LITIGATION REVIEW PROGRAM A. Overview The issues and discovery process in the litigation between the STP Owners, B&R and Halliburton were focused on activities and events which l

occurred prior to September, 1981. To that date, only about one-half of the design and 30% of the total construction for the plant had been completed.

Accordingly, work performed prior to September, 1981 has only limited relevance to the Project today. As discussed above, the STP design and construction in existence at the time B&R was termineted underwent intensive scrutiny prior to and during the transition of responsibilities from B&R to Bechtel and Ebasco. STP design has also been substantially modified since Bechtel assumed responsibility as architect / engineer. Thus, it is not likely that deficiencies in design or construction during B&R's term on the job have gone undetected.

Nonetheless, a substantial record was generated during the litigation, pnrtions of which are concerned with the technica.1 adequacy of STP systems, structures and components as designed and constructed by B&R. In order to assure that the materials prepared for the litigation do not disclose any safety-related deficiencies which have not already been identified by HL&P or Bechtel, HL&P will review such materials in the manner described below.

B. The Litication Record The litigation record in HL&P v. S&R consists of several types of documents which have widely differing levels of relevance to the technical aspects of STP design and construction. Each type is described below. l

p m Page 25

1) Comolaints, Counterclaims and Answers Perhaps the most basic documents in the litigation record are the plaintiffs' complaints and the defendants' counterclaims and answers. M/

These documents contain general, broadbrush descriptions of the various' claims and defenses made by the parties to the litigation. They are probably best viewed as an index or broad sumary of the parties' legal and factual positions. While the complaints, counterclaims and answers may contain a degree of information related to asserted deficiencies in STP systems, structures and components, the style and level of detail in which they are written does not lend itself to meaningful technical review. Furthermore, the claims made in the complaints, counterclaims and answers are reiterated in fer more detail in interrogatory answers, deposition transcripts, and expert reports filed by the parties.

2) Motions A second group of documents in the record consists of the various motions and responses thereto filed by the parties. These motions deal with such matters as scheduling discovery, setting a trial date, regulating the scope of the lawsuit and compelling parties te produce documents or answer interroga-1 tories. In general, they relate to the legal theories and positions of the parties and not to the facts underlying the lawsuit. They <io not contain i

testimony and were not filed for the purpose of providing information about facts related to issues in the lawsuit; in those rare instances where such j facts are provided, the motion or response thereto almost invariably l references a deposition transcript, interrogatory answer. or expert report as the source of these facts. i i

g/ Each of these documents underwent several revisions.

i.

_; . Page 26

3) Court Hearing Transcripts During the course of the litigation, the Court held a number of hearings to consider motions filed by the parties and matters related to readying the case for trial. Most hearings were open to the public. These hearings typically concerned such matters as the schedule for discovery, setting of a trial date, narrowing the inues in contention and compelling parties to produce documents, answer interrogatories or produce witnesses. Because the case never got to trial, the Court nade no findings of fact, with the sole exception of the Court's finding that the proposed settlement of the lawsuit

' ~

is satisfactory.

4) Interrogatory Answers Interrogatories were used by all parties to the STP litigation to discover the facts behind the various claims cnd defenses made by the parties.

The answers to these interrogatories usually provided factual information, although at varying levels of detail, Many interrogatories sought no information related to the design or construction of STP; accordingly, the answers are not relevant to this review.

Other interrogatories, however, sought information on STP design or construction, and the anfwers therefore provided such information, often in considerable detail.

I

5) Deposition Transcripts Transcripts of the deposition testimory of a large number of witnesses were made and filed with the Court. Many of the persons deposed, because of their position (e.g., accountant, financial executive, attorney), had no knowledge of the technical aspects of STP design or construction. Other

, Page 27 depositions _ are not of interest because STP design and construction was outside their scope. J_3/ However, the testimony of some deponents, most notably those of engineering personnel who had worked on STP, contains substantial relevant information on design and construction.

6) Expert Reports Experts expected to testify on various subjects in the litigation prepared reports describ'ng their findings on the issues that were to be the I

{

subject.of their testimony. Many expert reports dealt with issues such as l plant cost and schedule, financial constraints, personnel turnover and Halliburton control of B&R, which had no bearing on the adequacy of STP design 1 and construction. A few of the expert reports, especially the report on B&R engineering prepared by S. Levy, Inc., are focused on various aspects of STP design and construction.

7) Reouests for Production of Documents Parties to the STP litigation filed requests for production of documents to compel opposing parties to produce documents on various issues for inspection and copying. Usually, a formal response to a request for production of documents would be filed with the Court. This fermal response would include any objections to the request and would state the extent to which the party would comply with the request. However, the actual documents requested were not filed with the Court, but were simply made'available to the party that requested 'nem for inspection and copying.

. The requests for  !

productio' and the formal responses thereto contained no assertions related to l

the adequa y of STP design or construction. ,

I

~ 13/ Such depositions would be among the Rule 201 and segmented personal depositions; see p. 19, supra.

. . Page 28 C. Scope of the Litiaation Review Procram HL&P will review documents in the following categories that were gener-rated for purposes of the litigation and were in the custody of the Court M /

prior to dissolution of the protective order: 1) interrogatory answers; 2) deposition transcripts; and 3) expert reports. Based on the preliminary screening, it is estimated that there are approximately 100,000 pages of docu-ments to be reviewed on a line-by-line basis. Because they contain new documents created during the cot.rse of the litigation which convey substantive factual information, these are the categories of documents most likely to l

contain new information or insights, if any, with respect to potential I safety-related deficiencies in STP systems, structures or components.

Review of the remaining litigation materials would serve no constructive l purpose. For the reasons discussed above, neither the complaints nor the counterclaims, answers or motions will be reviewed; to the extent they advert to design or construction issues, the relevant details are disclosed in the f

interrogatory answers, depositions, and expert reports which will be reviewed. ]

i y / The transcripts of Court hearings deal with the mechanics of the discovery process, rather than substantive technical matters; accordingly, l they will not be reviewed. Neither the requests for production of documents nor the responses contain factual information themselves. Documents furnished in response to such requests (with the exception of expert work papers) were not

~ 14/ Because the litigation was tentatively settled prior to trial, some documents that ordinarily would have been filed with the Court, including certain deposition transcripts, had not yet been signed and l filed with the Court as of the settlement date. However, such documents are treated for purposes of this review as having been in the custody of the Court and, as such, will be reviewed.

~ 15/ HL&P will prepare an index to the complaints, counterclaims and answers to assist the NRC and other reviewers in understanding the relationship of the materials to be reviewed to the issues in the litigation.

Page 29 prepared for purposes of the litigation and, therefore, will generally not be reviewed. Many such documents, however, formed the basis for questions posed in depositions and became exhibits to those depositions. Exhibits will be reviewed to the extent necessary to understand the dispositions. Although expert work papers will not be reviewed, the salient information contained in them is reflected in the expert reports themselves which are to be reviewed.

D. Methodology of the Litigation Review Program The review of the litigation record will be a two-stage process. First,

.the interrogatories, deposition transcripts and expert reports will be screened to determine which of ther are likely to contain technical information on STP design, construction or QA/QC. Those which are not screened out will be reviewed line-by-line to identify any assertions of deficiencies in STP systems, structures or components or their associated design or quality documents. Each assertion identified will then be further examined to determine:

1) whether the substance of the assertion is safety-related; or

2) if the assertion is determined to be safety-related, whether the Project has already resolved the matter covered by the assertion or identified it for resolution; or i

3) whether the assertion is factually erroneous. I If the assertion is determined to be safety-related, but has not been resolved or identified for resolution by the Project, and cannot be shown to be factually erroneous, a Deficiency Evaluation Fom covering the substance of the assertion will be prepared and transmitted to HL&P's STP Project Engineering for consideration in accordance with the applicable Project procedure (PLP-02) pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55(e). (A flow chart showing tha basic organization of the overall review process appears in Attachment 1).

(

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- . Page 30

]

1) Stage One: Screening The screening process will determine which interrogatory answers, deposition transcripts and expert reports must undergo detailed line-by 'ine review.- A preliminary screening to identify the relevant deposition transcripts and expert reports for review has been performed. However, a formal screening of interrogatories, depositions, and expert reports will be performed in accordance with the Criteria and Methodology guidelines appended as Attachments 2, 3 and 4, respectively. Screening will be performed by a team of one attorney and one engineer familiar with the STP design and issues in the STP litigation. Applying the appropriate Criteria and Methodology guideline to each interrogatory, deposition, or expert report, the attorney and the engineer will determine whether it should be included for detailed review. For each interrogatory answer, deposition transcript, or expert report that the attorney and the engineer determine should be excluded from j detailed review, a short, signed statement will be prepared explaining why detailed review is unnecessary. In addition, master lists of all screened documents included and excluded from detailed review will be generated.

Another attorney / engineer team (s) will independently verify the judgment of the initial screening team, applying the same Criteria.

2) Stage Two: Detailed Review of Selected Litigation Documents

a. Purpose of the Detailed Litigation Review Those parts of the litigation record selecttd for detailed review by the screening process described in 1) above will be reviewed in their entirety to determine whether they contain information about any previously unidentified safety-related deficiencies in the design or construction of STP I

. t g g Page 31 l

systems, structures, or components. A " deficiency" for the purposes of this i

l review is a defect that will or may impair the ability of a system, structure or component (SSC) to perform its intended function. Deficiencies may exist i

in the SSC itself or in its associated design documents (e.g., design drawings, calculations or specifications) or in documents establishing the quality of the SSC (e.g., QA/QC documentation). j

b. The Litigation Review Team i

The review of the litigation record will be cond.ucted by a select group 1 of about 40 engineers. The review team will consist of a Team Leader, Reviewers, Discipline Specialists, Overview Specialists and various administrative and clerical employees. j The litigation review team will consist of amployees or subcontractors of S. Levy, Inc. (SLI). The Reviewers will be engineers with a minimum of three f years of engineering experience in their respective di.sciplines. The Discipline Specialists inust have at least seven years of, experience working in their respective disciplines on nuclear plant engineering, design or construction. The Overview Specialists must have at least ten years of experience doing multi-disciplinary engineering work or overseeing engineering work in different discipe'nes on nuclear power plants. The Team Leader and anyone the Team Leader designates to perform tasks assigned to the Team Leader must have a minimum of ten years of technical management experience related to nuclear plant engineering, design or construction.

HL&P engineers will participate in the review effort by monitoring the l

work as well as providing assistance to the SLI engineers in obtaining i necessary infomation from the Project.

n g Page 32

c. Litigation Review Procedures A complete list of all depositions, expert reports, and interrogatory answers to be reviewed will be prepared based on the results of the screening

. described in 1) above. The review Team Leader will assign groups of review material from this list to individual Reviewers according to the subject matter of the material and the Reviewer's education and experience.

Each Reviewer will read every line of his assigned review material. As he reads, he will make notations in the margin as to the subject matter of the material he is reading. For each assertion of deficiency in the design or

~

construction of an STP SSC that is contained in the review material, the Reviewer will complete an Assertion Form, including the exact location of the l assertion of deficiency in the -eviewed document and a description of the assertion. The criteria the Reviewers will use to identify assertions of deficiency are specified in Attachment 5. The Reviewers will also record the location of every substantive reference to NRC competence or performance.

Listings of these substantive references will be provided to the NRC for their infomation and use.

The Assertion Forms will be collected by the Team Leader and sorted according to discipline category for assignment to the various Discipline Specialists. The Discipline Specialist will first group the assertions so that identical assertions from different sources can be identified for treatment together. For each different assertion, the Discipline Specialist will determine whether the substance of the assertion is safety-related.

Assertions of deficiency that are not safety-related need not be reviewed further by the Discipline Specialists. Specific criteria to be used by the Discipline Specialist in determining whether an item is safety-related are specified in Attachment 6.

m vage u For assertions of deficiency that are determined to be safety-related, the. Discipline Specialist will establish whether the Project has previously identified that item for resolution by referencing the appropriate Project documentation evidencing that fact. The types of Project documentation that may be referenced for this purpose will be identified in a letter from HL&P's Manager of Nuclear Licensing to S. Levy, Tnc. Assertions of deficiency that are addressed in Project documentation will be considered closed for purposes of this review of the litigation record. The criteria that will be used by the Discipline Specialist to make this determination are listed in Attachment 7.

Finally, the Discipline Specialist will review any assertions of deficiency not disposed of in the manner described above to determine whether the assertion is factually erroneous. In making this detennination, the Discipline Specialist will apply the decision criteria in Attachment 8.

Discipline Specialists will be encouraged to communicate wich one another, as well as with the Overview Specialists and the Team Leader (and his designees) to resolve potential interdisciplinary concerns.

The Discipline Specialist will record the disposition of each assertion of deficiency on a Disposition Form.

Any assertions of deficiency that are safety-related, are not identified for resolution in Project documentation, and are not shown to be factually erroneous will be documented on an HL&P Deficiency Evaluation Form. All Deficiency Evaluation Forms will be sent to the HL&P Project Engineering for evaluation in accordance with existing Project procedures.

Each. assertion found not to be safety-related by a Discipline Specialist will be subject to a second level of review by an Overview Specialist. Using l the criteria in Attachment 9, the Overview Specialist will determine whether

n n Page 34 the assertion presents concerns arising from systems interaction or from.the possibility that the substance of the assertion crosses discipline lines.

Where such concerns are determined to be present, the Overview Specialist further examines the substance of the assertion to determine whether, taking such concerns inte account, an assertion found by the Discipline Specialist not to be safety-related should be treated otherwise.

The Overview Spec'alists will perfonn further analyses of each assertion they have determined to be safety-related, to determine whether the substance of the assertion has already been identified by the Pro;!ect or whether it is factually erroneous, using the criterie in Attachments 7 and 8.

The Overview Specialists are encouraged to consult with other Overview Specialists, Discipline Specialists or the Team Leader to maintain awareness of the various types of asserted deficiencies being examined during the review process. Any assertions that are determined to be safety-related, but are not referenced in Project documentation and are not shown to be factually erroneous will be documented on a Deficiency Evaluation Form and sent to the HL&P Project Engineering for evaluation in accordance with existing STP procedures. ,16/

The Litigation Review Procedures that govern the work of the Reviewers, Discipline Specialists and Overview Specialists are summarized in the Litigation Review Flow Chart in Attachment 10.

The work of the participants 4n the STP litigation review will be reviewed on a sample basis by supervisory level personnel in accordance with written procedures. The Team Leader will appoint designees who will be

' 16/ Assertions determined not to be safety-related but which nevertheless may affect plant availability and/or reliability will be referred to the STP Engineering Manager.

---

.-__________--.a- a-- - _ . - . . _ . - -

g n Page 35 assigned samples of the work of each of the Reviewers, Discipline Specialists i

and Overview Specialists and will conduct an independent review of these samples. It is estim i that an average of 10% of the work of each Reviewer, Discipline Specialist and Overview Specialist will be reviewed by the Team Leader or one of his designees for procedural compliance and substantive correctness, Documentation of these supervisory level reviews and records of the disposition of items discovered during these reviews will be retained.

I

(

The Team Leader will assign assertions to the Discipline Specialists and l Overview Specialists based on the type of deficiency asserted and the l

backaround and experience of the Specialists. The Team Leader will distribute these assignments so that types of assertions that have the potential for raising interaction questions and those that may cross inter-disciplinary lines are examined by personnel capable of recognizing and addressing such concerns. The Team Leader will have the authority to reas:;ign documents or assertions to other members of the review team, to require further reviews of assertions disposed of, and to halt any ongoing review work as he deems appropriate. The Team Leader will review all Deficiency Evaluation Forms prior to their being transmitted to the Project to ensure that they are correctly prepared and to be cognizant of the types of potential deficiencies being identified to the Project.

The Team Leader (and his designees), through the review of Assertion and Disposition fonns and meetings with the Discipline and Overview Specialists and R' eviewers, will monitor the review process to assure that combinations of assertions ( afety-related or not) which may suggest deficiencies in SSCs not otherwise disc 19 sed in the review, are identified and dispositioned in accordance with Project procedures. The Senior Advisory Panel will monitor the Team Leader's work in this regard. '

l

=-_ _ - _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ .. _ _

Page 36-During preparation of the final report, the Team Leader and the other 1

-review team' members will also consider.whether the dispositions of assertions i

arrived at during the review indicate any further, previously unrecognized  ;

i

' deficiency in any STP SSCs.

l

d. Documentation L S. Levy,.Inc., will issue procedures describing the methods and criteria j for. conducting the litigation record review. The procedures will describe the steps the Reviewers, Discipline Specialists and Overview Specialists must

~

follow in performing their assigned tasks. Directions for completion and use of the Assertion and Disposition Forms and Deficiency Evaluation Forms will l also be included. Each procedure will be issued with a revision designation and reviewed and approved by the Team Leader at SLI, the HL&P Manager of Nuclear Licensing, and a representative from HL&P's Nuclear Assurance

' Department. Any subsequent revisions to the procedures will be issued with a new revision designation to identify the currently applicable revision to the procedure. All procedures and revisions to procedures must be approved by I

HL&P.

The forms, data and reports developed during the litigation record review  ;

I will provide an auditable record of the entire review process for the use of  !

l both HL&P and NRC reviewers and auditors. The SLI Librarian will maintain l I

copies of each deposition transcript, expert report- and interrogatory answer j that has been reviewed and marked by a Reviewer, al<'g with the Assertion and Disposition Forms, and reference documents pertaining to each disposition.

Data from the Assertion and Disposition Forms will be entered into e ispecial computerized data base for litigation review information. In

Page 37 n

addition, entries will be made to the data base indicating those assertiens of deficiency for which the review team completed Deficiency Evaluation Forms. <

--The data base will have the capability to generate current listings of asser-tions and their dispositions during the course of the litigation review.

Monthly progress repopts will be sent to HL&P's Manager of Nuclear Licensiny. These reports will document the progress of the review work

~

against the projected schedule. If problems arise.in the conduct of the i review, they will be orally reported to HL&P's Manager of Nu .e Licensing and documented in th,e monthb progress report.

A final report documenting the results of the entire review will be  !

generated after completion of all reviews. This report will contain listingt of all material reviewed, listings of all assertions of deficiency and their resolutions, and the documentation on assertions of deficiency referred to the Project for resolution.

i E. Training Program  !

Prior to beginn.ing any detailed review work, each member of the litigation review team will attend an orientation and training session. The orientation and training sessions will be conducted by the SLI Team Leader and his designees, members of HL&P's Nuclear Licensing Department and HL&P's Nuclear Assurance Department and HL&P's legal counsel for the review. Topics covered in the training sessions include a detailed review of the SLI Litigation Review Procedures, including the criteria to be applied during the course of the review work, the HL&P procedure.for completion of Deficiency Evaluation Forms and detailed working guidelines and examples developed by the Team Leader.

I I

i l

l Yage a p

l In addition to the orientation and training session, each litigation I review team member will receive a training manual containing Litigation Review 1

Procedures, Litigation Revier Guidelines and general STP information. Each l

)

litigation review team member will keep his training manual up to date by inserting current revisions to the procedures and guidelines as they are l' issued. The litigation review team members will refer to their training manuals for guidance during the course of their review work.

)

i F. Management Oversight of Litigation Review / Senior $

Advisory Panel i

HL&P management will oversee the litigation review program. The HL&P-manager who will be primarily responsible for the litigation review is the Manager of the Nuclear Licensing Department. He will have a designated representative who will closely monitor the progress of the review work as it {

is conducted. In addition, the Manager of the Nuclear Assurance Department-and the Group Vice President for Nuclear will be kept infc,emed of the progress and-results of 'the litigation review program.

HL&P will select a Senior Advisory Panel, each member of which will be knowledgeable about the design and construction of STP, and have over twenty years of nuclear pcwer plant experience. The Panel will meet periodically to monitor the progress of the litigation review and ensure that the procedures are followed and the objectives achieved., This will be done through discussions with Reviewers, Discipline Specialists, Overview Specialists and the Team Leader. All documentation generated during the litigation review, i including the Final Report, will be available for the Panel's oversight.

During the course of the review, the Senior Advisory Panel may also provide j suggestions to HL&P Management end the Team Leader whenever appropriate to l

t Page 39 n n  ;

l ensure the effectiveness of the review in achieving its objectives. After the conclusion of the litigation review and issuance of the- Final Report, the Senior Advisory Panel will prepare a statement containing its conclusions as to'whether-the objectives of'the review have been achieved and any other relevant observations.

G. Quality Assurance The detailed review program will be conducted in accordance with the SLI Quality Assurance Program Manual. Therefore, the SLI Corporate Quality Assurance (QA) Manager will be responsible for assuring that the detailed review program is conducted in accordance with SLI QA Program requirements and l Litigation Review Procedures. The primary method SLI QA will use to perform its work will be continuous substantive surveillance of the litigation review work on a sample basis. All QA surveillance will be conducted by personnel who have experience in performing QA work and who are not responsible for any of the litigation review work. SLI QA will assure compliance with all provisions and criteria of the Litigation Review Procedures. In addition, SLI QA surveillance will assure the consistency and completeness of the review team participants' work. Areas that will be checked in the course of the surveillance include the selection and qualification of personnel, the processing and control of program documents, and records collection and storage. Furthermore, SLI QA wil7 conduct or arrange appropriate auditing of-the litigation review program to provide additional assurance that the continuous surveillance effort has not failed to identify any deviations from programmatic requirements.

HL&P's Nuclear Assurance Department will assign at least one full-time representative to the SLI offices to conduct continuous surveillance of the i

,m. Page 40 n

litigation review work being done by the litigation review team. The HL&P representative will structure his surveillance to cover every type of litigation review document generated, as well as every documented decision point-in the review process. By this means, compliance with the procedures and review criteria will be assured and any problems in performing the review l

work will be identified as they occur. All records of surveillance performed and deficiencies identified will be maintained in accordance with HL&P STP QA procedures. Any deficiencies identified by the surveillance effort will be ,

1 resolved in accordance with HL&P STP QA procedures. The HL&P representative will submit a monthly report to the HL&P Manager of Nuclear Assurance reporting the surveillance effort results to date and providing an assessment of the quality of the review program. Any deficiencies which require immediate corrective action will be discussed immediately witn SLI management.

The documentation generated during the course of the litigation review will be an auditable record available for NRC inspection and review on either a continual or periodic basis. If periodic off-site review is necessary, listings from the litigation review data base can be generated and provided to the NRC as required. The final report of the litigation review will also be provided to the NRC for review.

H. Manpower and Schedule Based on the scope of the litigation review program as described, approximately 26,000 manhours of effort will be required of the litigation review team from September, 1985 through March, 1986. This estimate includes the work of the SLI review team members and is exclusive of the HL&P review, assistance, surveillance and oversi;ht activities.

.Page 41 L-l. ~

^ '

The Reviewers' and Specialists' work is scheduled for completion by

. December,1985. During January of 1986', the review team will generate a draft-of the final: report. HL&P intends to file the final report with the NRC by March'1, 1986.

t l

l l

1

-.____-.-..-.-.-.___.n __ ---

FLOW CHART t

SUMMARIZING ENTIRE LITIGATION REVIEW PROCESS l

j Identification of litigation record materials

\/

Selection of relevant categories of litigation record materials

\/

Selection of individual documents to be reviewed based on relevance to STP engineering or l construction products l

\/

Line-by-line review of individual documents for assertions of deficiency in STP_ systems, structures or components

\/

Disposition of assertions of deficiency as:

1) nonsafety-related;

2) previously identified ,

for resolution by STP, I or

3) factually erroneous

\/

1 Transmittal of any remaining assertions of deficiency to STP for resolution End O

O O i

CRITERIA AND METHODOLOGY FOR SELECTION OF INTERROGATORY ANSWERS FOR REVIEW This document sets forth the guidelines to be followed to ensure that all interrogatory answers possibly containing information related to the design or construction of STP systems, structures, or components are reviewed.

I. Criteria .

A. When there is any reasonable doubt as to whether an interrogatory or !

set of interrogatories should be included, it should remain on the list of interrogatories to be reviewed.  !

B. If an interrogatory requests information on the following subjects, f that interrogatory must be included for review:  !

1. Engineering for STP, including engineering analysis and the design of any systems, structures, or components for the Project;

2. Construction work at STP;

3. QA or OC activities or programs for STP; j 4

4 Reviews or reports on engineering or construction for STP.

C. If an interrogatory or entire set of interrogatories reauests <

information only about the following subjects, the interrogatory or j set of interrogatories may be excluded from review unless the '

reviewers are aware that the answers or set of answers contains information relating to the design or construction of STP systems, structures,orcomponents.JJ

1. Halliburton control over Brown & Root;

2. Accounting, economics, and the financial ability of the Owners to complete the Project;

3. Brown & Root personnel qualifications, turnover, and staffing levels;

4. Project schedule and the percentage of engineering or construction work completed, i l

5. Allen's Creek Nuclear Generating Station; j l

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1/ If an interrogatory or a set of interrogatories req . ts information on these topics and on any of the topics listed in B. above, the answers corresponding to those interroga- 1 tories must be reviewed.  !

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6. Brown & Root's history and experience as an architect / engineer outside its performance on STP;

7. HL&P's or the other Owners' experience in design and construction of facilities other than STP; 1

, 8. Brown & Root's and Halliburton's affiliation with NUS, Ebasco, or other Halliburton subsicisries.

l II. Methodology l A. Persons conducting the screening.

The initial screening to identify the interrogatory answers to be reviewed will be performed by a team of one attorney and one engineer familiar with the design of STP and with issues in the litigation.

B. Steps in screening.

Each set of interrogatories will be examined under the criteria set forth in I above. If any interrogatory within a set is determined to be reviewable, that set will be put aside for a second level of review. For each entire set of answers determined not to be reviewable, a short statement will be prepared explaining the reasons why that set should not be reviewed, signed by the engineer and the attorney.

Sets of interrogatories that include questions requesting information potentially related to the design or construction of STP systems, structures, or components will be further examined to identify the particular questions that request such relevant information. Each question will be examined under the criterie set forth in I, above. All questions whose answers require review will % marked as such and recorded. For each question determined % . to require review, a short statement {

7 explaining why no review is required will be prepared and signed by 4 the engineer and attorney. For questions containing multiple subparts, if any subpart merits review, the entire answer to the question will be reviewed, i The screening team will prepare a list of all interrogatories that will be reviewed. In addition, the screening team will prepare a ,

list of all interrogatories and sets of interrogatories that will not be reviewed and attach to that list the signed short statements explaining the reasons why each listed interrogatory or set of interrogatories will not be reviewed. j 1

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n m CRITERIA AND METHODOLOGY FOR THE SELECTION OF DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPTS FOR REVIEW 4

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This document sets forth the guidelines to be followed to ensure that all deposition transcripts possibly containing information related to the design or construction of STP systems, structures or components are i

l reviewed.

1. Criteria A. When there is any reasonable doubt as to whether a deposition should be reviewed, it must remain on the list of depositions to be reviewed. {

l B. If the witness held any of the following positions on STP, the 1 deposition must be included for review:

q Engineer, Designer, Draftsman or any Engineering Management position; Quality Assurance Inspector, Supervisor or Manager; Quality Control Inspt<ctor, Supervisor or Manager; Construction Manager, Laborer or Craft Worker; Licensing Engineer, Supervisor or Manager;  !

Pur. chasing / Procurement Personnel.

C. Depositions of witnesses in the following categories can be excluded from detailed review, unless the screener knows that any of the deposition testimony.related to the technical adequacy of STP design i or construction:

Department of Justice employees and former employees; Persons deposed solely because of their involvement in DOJ v. Halliburton; Halliburton Board Directors and Executive Officers; Nuclear Regulatory Commission employees and former employees;

. Scheduling and project controls witnesses; Accounting, economics and financial witnesses; Brown & Root Board Directors and Executive Officers; CP&L Board Directors and Executive Officers;

HL&P Board Directors and Executive Officers; l City of Austin officials; City Public Service Board of San Antonio officials.

D. If the' deposition is a Rule 201 deposition or a segmented personal deposition, it can be excluded from detailed review if the subject )

of the deposition is one of the following, unless the deponent held j

one of the positions listed in B. above, or unless the screener knows that any of the deposition testimony related to the technical adequacy of STP design or construction:

Helliburton control of Brown & Root; Halliburton, Brown & Root, or HL&P accounting; Financial constraints on completion of the Project; Brown & Root Personnel qualifications, turnover, and staffing levels; i

Project Control (tracking progress of work on STP against published schedule);

Negotiations and Terms for the contract between the STP Owners and Brown & Root; Brown & Root's and Halliburton's affiliation with NUS; Administrative matters concerning document collection and production in the litigation; Project' Cost Estimates; The Department of Justice v. Halliburton antitrust suit; Public Relations and Marketing; Site Access for Construction.

E. Rule 201 or personal segmented depositions may not be excluded from detailed review if the subject of the oeposition concerns any of the following:

Any STP system, structure, or component;

. QA/QC activities or documentation which relate to any STP system, structure or component; Reports or reviews concerning the quality of STP '

engineering, construction or QA/QC of any STP system, structure or component. ,

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> CRITERIA AND METHODOLOGY FOR SELECTION 0F EXPERT REPORTS FOR REVIEW This document sets forth the guidelines to be followed to ensure that all expert reports possibly containing information related to the design or construction of STP systems, structures, or components are reviewed.

I. Criteria A. When there is any reasonable doubt as to whether an expert report should be included, it should remain on the list of .

documents to be reviewed.

B.

If an expert report contains information on the following subjects, that expert report must be included for review:

1. Engineering for STP, including engineering analysis and the design of any systems, structures, or components for the Project;

2. Construction work at STP; 3.

QA or QC findings that indicate deficiencies in STP engineering or construction products; C. If an expert report reonests infomation only about the following subjects, the expert report may be excluded from review unless the reviewers are aware that the expert report contains I information relating to the design or construction of STP systems, structures, or components. 1/

1. Halliburton relationship with Brown & ' Root;

2. Accounting, economics, cost estimates, and damages quantification;

3. Brown levels; & Root personnel qualifications, turnover, and staffing 4

Evaluation of processes or procedures such as procurement or deficiency trend analyses;

5. General nuclear industry information not specifically related to the STP.

~

1/ If an expert report contains information on these topics and on any of the topics listed in B. above, the expert report must be reviewed.

_ - - _ --- _ _ _ _ __A

m n II. Methodology A. Persons conducting the screening.

The screening to identify the expert reports to be reviewed will be i performed by a team of one lawyer and one engineer familiar with the design of STP and with issues in the litigation.

B. Steps in screening. }

)

Each expert report will be examined under the criteria set forth in 1 I. above. All expert reports that require review will be marked es-  ;

such and recorded. For each expert report determined not to require review, a short statement explaining why no review is required will be prepared and signed by the engineer and lawyer.

The screening team will prepare a list of all expert reports that will be reviewed. In addition, the screening team will prepare a list of all expert reports that will not be reviewed and attach to  ;

that list the signed short statements explaining the reasons why each listed expert report will not be reviewed. '

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n R II. Methodology A. Persons conducting the screening.

The-screening to identify the depositions to be reviewed will be performed by a team of one attorney and one engineer familiar with the design of STP and with issues in the litigation.

B. Each deposition will be examined under the criteria set forth in I.

above. For each deposition determined not to be reviewable, a short 1 statement will be prepared explaining the reasons why that set should not be reviewed, signed by the engineer and the attorney.

The screening team will prepare a list of all depositions that will be reviewed. In addition, the screening team will prepare a list of all depositions that will not be reviewed and attach to that list the signed short statement' explaining the reasons why each listed deposition will not be reviewed.

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CRITERIA FOR IDENTIFICATION OF ASSERTIONS OF DEFICIENCY In order to be recorded, an assertion must satisfy each of the following criteria:

1. The assertion must pertain to at least one of the following or to their associated design or quality control documents:

1.1 STP systems, structures, or components (SSC).

1.2 Classes of.'STP SSC (such as valves, reinforced concrete walls,electricsystems).

1.3 Processes relating to specific STP SSCs (such as welding, coatings).

4 1.4 The overall STP site (data or studies on meteorology, seismology, demographics,etc.).

2. The assertion must either:

(a) ' describe a deficiency. A deficiency is a defect which will or may impair the ability of an SSC to perform its intended function; or (b) If the assertion does not include any specific defi-ciency, as defined under (a), it must pertain to documents providing objective evidence of the quality of design or construction for specific SSCs at STP.

(Absence of calculations for system X, lack of verifi- .

cation. documents for component Y, incomplete Q/C records for weld N, etc.)

3. The assertion must satisfy one of the following criteria:

4.1 It was made by a witness in a deposition.

4.2 It was confirmed by a witness accepting a statement by a lawyer.

4.3 It was included in an expert report.

4.4 It was made by a party in an interrogatory answer.

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• _' p p CRITERIA FOR SAFETY DETERMINATION 1.

An assertion of deficiency that involves system (s), structure (s) or component (s) which have been classified by the South Texas Project as one-of the following is a safety-related assertion:

Safety Class 1 Safety Class 2 Safety Class 3 -

Class 1E Seismic Category 1 2.

An assertion of deficiency that involves systems (s), structure (s) or component (s) that are. listed in the STP FSAR Section 3.2 or in the Bechtel Energy Corporation Design Criteria for the South. Texas Project as sa .ty-related items is a safety-related assertion.

3.

An assertion of deficiency that involves a systera(s), structure (s) or component (s) with a Total Plant Numbering System (TPNS) number that.

designates a safety-related item. (1, 2, 3, 4 or 5) is a safety-related assertion.

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p n CRITERIA FOR DEMONSTRATING, PROJECT IDENTIFICATION

1. The STP documents cited by the Specialist as evidence of prior identification of the substance of an assertion by the Project must completely cover the specific assertion of deficiency.

2. The STP documents cited by the Specialist must show:

a. That the deficiency asserted has been corrected; or

b. That the deficiency asserted is in the process of being corrected; or

c. That the deficiency asserted has been identified fer resolution.

3. Documents cited as reflecting corrective action or identi-fication for resolution of the asserted deficiency must appear on the list of documents epproved for reference on Disposition Forms.

4. The reasons why Project documentation shows adequate identification or corrective action must be clearly stated by the Specialist.

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m n CRITERIA FOR DETERMINATION ON FACTUAL BASIS

1. Project documentation must provide positive evidence showing the assertion to be factually erroneous. Unless Project documentation provides such positive evidence, the Specialist may not classify the assertion as factually erroneous.

2. 'The referenced Project documentation must describe the system, structure, or. component as designed or constructed at or after the time the deficiency is asserted to have existed.

3. The reasons why the documentation shows the assertion to be factually erroneous must be clearly articulated by the Specialist.

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O m CRITERIA FOR INTERDISCIPLINARY and SYSTEMS INTERACTION DETERMINATION

1. An assertion of deficiency that involves disciplines other than that of the Discipline Specialist who initially determined that the substance of the assertion is not safety-related must be reviewed by the Overview Specialist to determine whether it is safety-related.

2. An assertion of deficiency that involves system (s), structure (s) or components (SSC) other than those considered by the Discipline Specialist in his initial disposition of the assertion as not safety-related must be reviewed by the Overview Specialist to determine whether it is safety-related. .

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3. If the SSC considered by the Discipline Specialist shares a component or j a process or has physical supporting connections to another SSC,-the j assertion must be reviewed by the Overview Specialist to determine j whether it is safety-related.

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If the functional or physical failure of the SSC considered by the Discipline Specialist in dispositioning an assertion could propagate to other SSCs the assertion must be reviewed by the Overview Specialist to determine whether it is safety-related.

'OTIGATIONREVIEW-FLOWCHA'RT tag:rasa deposittens, port ccettens, and t:Frofitory answers, t?L1 se cagn estegerased s: sat 3 to

+aewer. ITL1 1P ed revaev material d r:sord all sortions of deficaency engr. and sonst. of:

?. (R) gr

.tagn grsups of certions to Discipline estalist by sategory. ,

(TL1 tr cup ad utical 23rtion2 for disposi=

en together. (DS) 1r the estartion of Assign groups of ficiency safety- no m assertions to istid? (DS) r Overview g Specialist. (TL)

LO ra pre 3ect W Identify prefect

'Does assertaen in.

eussentsties on the yes deementation that volve more than one no IsrD Lotatas at the addresses embetance discipline, systen W certaen? (281

$lofassertion. (DS) structure, or responent? 108).

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cos:rtisa Identify profeet , considering the inter-etually crren. yes . geeusentation show. disciplinary nature of no EstD

• ES? IRS) v tag assertion to be assertion, is it 0 factually erroneous, safety-related? 108)

, or 4

. , don't kaav m , ,

yes cpera DEP.-(DS) 2s there prefect Identify pre $eet desmentation en yes ,

documentation i substanee of the , that addresses assertien? 105) substanee of

, assertion. 108) w 1r , OO view cad send Is assertion Identify pre 3ect 7 42 STP. (TLI factually erree- yes u documentation show-

_eous? (Ost  ? ing assertion to be i factually arren-I eeus. 105)

EMD qr se, er ,

p 't knew END l prepare DEP. (08) esend f or Activity messonsibility E

. Taam imeder Rovaew and send beviewer DEP to STP. (TL) 3 Diteipline Specialist i s overview specialist e EED

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m n HL&P vs. B&R Litigation Record Review Schedule Scheduled Actual HL&P notified NRC of lifting of gag order June 5, 1985 and of intent to conduct review Meeting--HL&P and NRC--Conceptual overview July 31, 1985 of program Meeting--HL&P and NRC--Followup of prior August 23, 1985 meeting HL&P submitted " South Texas Project August 30, 1!%5 Litigation Review Program" 4

NRC review of program Sep./0ct. 1985 NRC inspection of SLI* training activities September 11, 1985 SLI began litigation record review October 1985 NRC inspection of program implementation Nov. 12-15, 1985 Complete open assertions list January 1986 NRC inspection of implementation (cont.) January 1986 NRC inspection of resolution of assertions February 1986 HL&P close remaining assertions March 1986 HL&P issue final report April 1986 NRC review of final report April 1986

• HL&P has contracted S. Levy, Inc. (SLI) to perform the review of the litigation record to identify assertions.

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.. , p m MAR 0 71996 In Reply Refer To:

. Dockets:. 50-498/85-23 50-499/85-20 Houston Lighting & Power Company ATTN: J. H. Goldberg, Group Vice President, Nuclear P. O. Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001 Gentlemen:

This refers to inspections conducted by Messrs. G. L. Madsen, B. A. Breslau, G. L. Constable and D. A. Powers of this office during the period September 11 through December 20, 1985, of activities authorized by NRC Construction Permits CPPR-1?8 and 129 for the South Texas Project. Units 1 and 2, and to the discussion of cer findings with members of your staff at the conclusion of the inspections.

Areas examined during the inspections included the applicant's policies,

. procedures, and implementation relating to the identification and dispositioning of assertions associated with the Houston Lighting & Power Company vs. Brown & Root Litigation Record. Within these areas, the

, inspection consisted of selective examination of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observations by the inspectors. These findings are documented in the enclosed inspection report.

Within the scope of the inspection, no violations or deviations were identified.

Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

. Sincerely, Dr!ginal Signe'd By' J. E. Gcgilardo J. E. Gagliardo, Chief Reactor Projects Branch

Enclosure:

Appendix - NRC Inspection Report 50-498/85-23 50-499/85-20 cc w/ enclosure: (cont.onnextpage) ,,

RIV:RPB/ RPB EO RP / RC RPB BABreslau:sj GLM(dsen DAPbwers GL stable WLBrown JEGag o \

LJI2JB6 f /fvf86 dl /13/86  %/qtf/86 3 /U /86 sH 5 f

s i n - - ani og m, & N a vy n yr ,-,

an.

^ 6 Houston Lighting & Power Company Houston Lighting & Power Company ATTN: M. Wisenberg, Manager, Nuclear Licensing P. O. Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001 Brian 3ervick, Esquire

1. 5 t. Attceney General Edi:ronmental Protection Div.

P. O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711 Lanny Alan Sinkin -

Citizens Concerned About Nuclear Power, Inc.

Christic Institute 1324 North Capitol Street Washington, D.C. 20002 Charles Bechhoefer, Esquire Chairman, Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Connission

. Washington, DC 20555 Dr. James C. Lamb, III 313 Woodhaven Road Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514 Frederick J. Shon Administrative Law Judge 1 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board j U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Concission i Washington, DC 20555 Ray Goldstein, Esquire 1 1

Gray, Allison and Becker 100 Vaughn Building 807 Brazos i Austin, Texas 78701 l

'exas Radiation' Control Program Director bec distrib. by RIV:

• RPB DRSP *B. A. Breslau, RPB/C

• Resident Inspector-OPS R. D. Martin, RA W. L. Brown, RC

• Resident Inspector-CONST. *SectionChief(RPB/C) D. A. Powers, E0

• R&SPB

• MIS SYSTEM . L. Madsen, RPB

• RIV File *D. Weiss,LFMB(AR-2015) RSB RSTS Operator R. Pirfo, ELD R. G. Taylor, RPB/C

• w/766

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APPENDIX U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV I

NRC Inspection Report: 50-498/85-23 CP: CPPR-128 and 129 50-499/85-20 Docket: 50-498 and 50-499 Licensee: Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P)

P. O. Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001 '

Facility Name: South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: S. Levy Inc., Campbell, California Inspection Conducted: September 11 through December 20, 1985 Inspectors: A// L!ffe-B~. A. Breslau, Reactor Inspector, Project Ddte '

SectionC,ReactorProjectsBranch 1

$0 mw D. A. Powers, Enforcement Officer 2hslu Date '

YO$40%/ A fist /8G 1 . L. Madsen, Reactor Inspector Date Comanche Peak, RIV Group

. } Q,. 4h~ '}'

/

y lq g r

G. L. Cbnstable, Chief, Project Section C, Date '

Reactor Projects Branch 1

______-_-________-________A

A o 2

e .

Approved: 2 7 I G. L. Constablt, Chief, Project Section C, Date Reactor Projects Branch Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted Between September 11, 1985 and December 20, 1985 (Report 50-498/85-23; 50-499/85-20)

~

Areas Inspected: Reactive, unannounced inspection of applicant:i; policies, procedures, and implementation relating to the identification and dispositioning of assertions associated with the Houston Lighting & Power Company vs.

Brown & Root Litgation Record. The inspection involved 172 inspector-hours at the SLI facility located in Campbell, California, by four NRC inspectort.

Additional inspector hours were spent reviewing documentation in Region IV offices.

Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS 1.. Persons Contacted

• D. F. Bednarczyk, Project QA Supervisor. HL&P

• J. B. Anderson, Senior QA Specialist HL&P

• S. Levy, President S. Levy Inc. (SLI)

• C. B. Johnson, Team Leader SLI (Manager)

• G. J. Walke, QA Manager, SLI

• M. R. Wisenburg, Manager, Nuclear Licensing, HL&P

• W. E. Baer, Attorney, Newman & Holtzinger, HL&P

• F. A. White, Lead Engineer HL&P E. Duke, QA Specialist, SLI M. McKenna, Computations Manager 3LI V. Jones, Records Management SLI R. Brugge, Training-Instructor, SLI J. Kjembrup, Project Coordinator (Team Leader), SLI A. Engler, Reviewer, SLI G. Roy, Disposition Squad Leader, SLI In addition to the above personnel, the NRC inspectors held discussions with various technical and administrative members of HL&P's and SLI's staff.

• Denotes those present at exit interview.

2. Introduction On August 30, 1985, Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P) submitted the South Texas Project (STP) Litigation Review Program to the NRC. During October 1985. S. Levy, Inc. (SLI) began the review of the litigation ,

record for HL&P. The NRC has reviewed the review program and has I completed three inspections of this review effort. 1 Training September 11, 1985 Program Implementation November 12-15, 1985 Resolution of Assertions December 16-20, 1985 The results of these inspections are documented below.

The purpose of this inspection effort was to ascertain the effectiveness of the HL&P/SLI review effort and to determine if the review was being .

conducted in at.ordance with the review program and to review HL&Ps resolution of NRC coments on their review program. To date, the review ]

i has identified approximately 5,600 assertions (potential deficiencies in '

systems, structures or components or their associated design or quality documents), many of which are redundant. The dispositioning of these assertions is in progress and is expected to be completed during January 1986. HL&P will issue a final report shortly after the completion of the review.

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3. Organization The NRC inspectors reviewed the litigation review organization to ascertain how the various elements of the organization implement the program. 1 The organization includes approximately 58 people. Many of the technical specialists are retired General Electric employees with many years of nuclear experience. The SLI QA organization consists of a QA manager and three QA specialists The NRC inspectors interviewed individuals from the following organizational elements:

Lead Engineer (HL&P)

Project QA Supervisor (HL&P)

Team Leader Project Manager (SLI)

QA Manager (SLI)

QASpecialist(SLI)

Reviewer '

Computations Manager i Training Records Management Project Coordinator / Team Leader (SLI)

The NRC inspectors observed that SLI management was heavily involved with the overall review. The review team leader (SLI manager) had personally reviewed the work of each reviewer and had acted to change his organization as necessary to achieve the objectives of the review. The NRC inspectors observed that all the work of some individuals was re-reviewed because of unsatisfactory results which had been identified by various evaluations.

The management and QA organizations have each identified weaknesses in program implementation. When identified, the problems were promptly and thoroughly resolved by stopping work, managing the reviewers and causing re-reviews and retraining to be conducted as necessary.

Ne violations or deviations were identified.

4. Qualification of Personnel The NRC inspectors reviewed the resumes of the participants involved in i the review process. The review indicated that the individuals met the managerjal/ technical experience and educational levels for the positions they were certified to perform. SLI had noted that one reviewer did not I 4

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1 L - - - - _ - . - _ . - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - . - - - -_ _- _----- _ --- J

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5 possess an engineering degree. SLI requested and received a waiver from HL&P for this individual based upon the years of experience this individual possessed. Subsequently, this individual and two others were removed from the project because of inadequate document reviews. SLI has conducted a re-review of those documents which were previously reviewed by the individuals removed from the project.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Training The NRC inspectors' reviewed training course material for individuals utilized for identifying assertions in the litigation records and identifying project documents which show the? the issues have been properly addressed. On September 11, 1985. an NRC inspector attended a ,

SLI training session for personnel who were scheduled to perfonn the HL&P i vs. Brown & Root litigation review. The training session was conducted at the SLI facilities in Campbell, California. Approximately a dozen people were in attendance as students or trainers. Classroom instruction was complemented by vide tape presentations and two notebooks; one on the lesson plan and one on historical infonnation, purpose of the project, work procedures, position descriptions, policies, etc. All personnel who will be working under the HL&P/SLI contract were informed of the mechanics of the work to be accomplished, admonished on the need to produce quality work, and infonned of the incentive awards to be given at the conclusion of the contract's performance period. Also, 'j during the training session )ersonnel were instructed on the SLI and HL&P >

quality assurance program, witch will run concurrently with the review )

effort. These programs oversee and randomly sample work products from all disciplines involved.

1 The quality of training, prepared material, and various steps that were '

taken to ensure reviewer alertness to assertions was deemed adequate for the purposes intended. .Those in attendance as students and trainers appeared appropriately responsive to the guidance given. 4 An NRC inspector's review of trairang records revealed that all participan:.s have received the required training and were certified to er p(a)fonn one or more of the following litigation review functions: Reviewe (d)TeamLeader. HL&P and SLI QA coverage of the initial assertions review process noted items which were not being identified. The review process was stopped and all participants received a refresher training course.

Litigation material that was reviewed prior to this time was re-reviewed.

These training sessions appear to have provided adequate guidance for the identification of potential safety-related deficiencies in the design and construction work for STP.

No violations or deviations were identified. i l

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1

6. Review of Procedures The NRC inspectors reviewed the following Litigation Review Program implementing procedures. The purpose of the review was to detemine, on a sample basis, that the implementing procedures provided adequate guidance when used in conjunction with the training program to assure that the overall program would be properly implemented.

Title Revision SLI Project Plan 0 SLI Review of HL&P vs. B&R Litigation Record 0 SLI Review of HL&P vs. B&R Litigation Record - Subject Groupings O SLI QA Audits, Surveillance and Reviews O SLI Deviation Reporting and Action Item Requests O SLI Guidelines for Review at HL&P vs. B&R Litigation Record 0 The NRC interviews (see paragraph 3 above) with selected project personnel revealed that each displayed a comprehensive knowledge of the procedures and were confident in Each member maintains a personal (performing control copy)their various of the functions.

procedures. The NRC inspector reviewed twenty individuals' procedure books and found each to be an up-to-date copy. Additionally, the NRC inspectors reviewed detailed memoranda and instructions which were issued as supplements to the project procedures.

The NRC inspectors concluded that the procedures, as written, provided adequate guidance to implement the program. Revisions to procedures were reviewed during the course of the inspection. These revisions provided clarification on details of the program.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. NRC Review of the Litigation Record  :

1 Initial screening of the litigation record was conducted by HL&P. The interrogatories, deposition transcripts and expert reports were screened to determine which of them are likely to contain technical information on '

STP design, construction or QA/QC. Those which were not screened out were sent to the SLI offices. Once the records were received by SLI, they were assigned document numbers. In some cases, individual documents were assigned multiple document numbers when the documents were too large to facilitate the review.

A few documents were forwarded to SLI in error and were not subsequently reviewed by SLI. The NRC inspet..or selected one of these documents (D-165) for NRC review in order to detemine the basis for SLI not reviewing the document. This particular document was the deposition of J. B. Webb, Project Superintendent in the Power Division Maintenance Group.

n -n 7

t 1 The deposition was conducted on August 17. September 7-9. and October 17, 1983. The NRC inspector observed that Mr. Webb's job was described in the deposition as preparing proposals for maintenance and capital improvements and that he occasionally supervised maintenance projects. The NRC review of the deposition revealed that questions dealt with Mr. Webb's work as overall Lead Scheduler in 1974, 1975 and 1976. The subject of the deposition was limited to questions on planning and scheduling involving schedule milestones and progress reports.

The NRC inspector concluded that the decision not to perform a detailed review of this deposition was appropriate and in accordance with the intent of the review program.

No violations or deviations were identified.

8. Identification of Assertions As of December 16, 1985, SLI records indicate that the review and identification of assertions had been completed for 593 of 595 HL&P vs. B&R litigation records. SLI records also indicate that about 17 percent of the document reviews have received an independent evaluation, each reviewer had received at least one evaluation, and the work of five reviewers was subject to a less than ten percent evaluation.

During the intitial phases of assertion identification SLI and HL&P concluded that additional training was needed. The initial 20 documents were placed in a control group and received a 100 percent evaluation and review.

The NRC inspectors perfonned an independent review of ten litigation documents for which the reviews and evaluations had been completed and concluded that SLI is meeting the program objectives relative to the identification of assertions contained in the HL&P vs. B&R litigation record.

During the evaluation of the review identification records, the NRC inspector noted that some reviewers received limited evaluations beyond that which was conducted in association with the initial control group.

The inspector indicated that the evaluation requirements of the program procedures had been met; however, the pcrfonnance of additional evaluations for a limited number of reviewers would enhance the confidence factor for the evaluation of these reviewers. The NRC inspector was told that additional evaluations would be performed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

9. Disposition of Assertions The NRC inspectors reviewed the documentation associated with six disposition numbers (representing 20 assertions). The inspector noted that the documentation was readily retrievable and supported the dispositioning of the assertions.

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i 8 J 1

The NRC inspectors also reviewed SLI's QA evaluations of completed disposition forms and reviewed the evaluations conducted on 12 of 49 completed dispositions and 3 dispositions which had not received a QA review or an evaluation review. .

i The NRC inspectors noted 160 dispositions, which addressed 374 assertions, had been determined to be classified as nonsafety (NS) Not An Assertion (NOA), or factually erroneous (FE). Three of those classified as (NS) were determined by the overview specialist as being safety-related and will receive further evaluations.

The NRC inspectors determined from Se review of selected assertion closure information that the identified assertions are being adequately -

dispositioned.

10. Management Oversight and Quality Assurance Programs HL&P assigned a full time project manager, a project QA supervisor and a senior QA specialist to monitor the review effort at the SLI offices in Campbell, California. In addition, a Senior Advisory Panel was established to provide a management overview of the progress of the litigation review program.

HL&P began their oversight activities in August 1985 which included direct j observation of SLI activities. 3 The NRC inspector reviesea the following documents:

SLIMonthlyStatusReport(August 1985)

SLI Monthly Status Report (September 1985)

HL&P QA Monthly Status Report (October 1985)

HL&P QA Interim Report (October 18, 1985 HL&P QA Monthly Report (September 1985) )

In addition, as noted above, the NRC inspectors interviewed various managers and QA personnel during the course of the inspection.

The NRC inspectors observed that HL&P QA had reviewed the SLI procedures to verify that the program procedures adequately implemented the Litigation Review Program.

The NRC inspectors consider that the HL&P QA program is effectively performing its intended function.  !

The SLI QA program is tailored to ensure a comprehensive control is maintained throughout the short duration of the litigation review project.

SLI has established a requirement to conduct two audits and approximately four surveillance per week.

SLI QA conducted the first audit early in the litigation review process to establish a base line and to determine potential problem areas. The scope 2

m n

- 9 of the audit was to verify that the tasks described in the SLI litigation review 1985 Project Plan Manual were being implemented. This included the Project Plan, Project Procedures LRP-1 through LRP-6, LRP-1 Guideline and working level instructions. The SLI audit teams audited tasks that had been or were being perfomed.

The audit identified three deviations and five observations which addressed concerns of the auditors. Project management was responsive in addressing and dispositioning these items, no adverse impact on the quality of the project was observed by the NRC inspector.

The NRC inspector' reviewed 29 completed SLI QA " Surveys" and 145 completed

" Reviews." These were reviewed for thoroughness and degree of objectivity towards obtaining an adequate evaluation of the work being accomplished by the reviewers. Additionally, the NRC inspector reviewed the related inspection check lists and found them to be thorough and comprehensive.

Based on these observations, the NRC inspector has determined that an adequate QA program is being maintained on this project.

11. Conclusion The litigation review effort appears to be progressing smoothly and may be ahead of schedule. HL&P and SLI seem to be committed to conducting substantive reviews and the QA organizations appear to be perfoming indepth technical evaluations and not merely limiting their effort to paper work reviews.

The NRC inspectors conclude that the litigation review program is being implemented as intended.

12. Exit Exit interviews were conducted on November 15 and December 20, 1985, with personnel as indicated in paragraph 1 of this report.

I I

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,, 3 2 A S March 21, 1986 ST-HL-AE-1628 File No.: G25, G4.2

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Mr. Robert D. Martin Regional Administrator, Region IV U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76011 South Texas Project Units 1 & 2 Docket Nos. STN 50-498, STN 50-499 Review of HIAP v. B&R Litigation Record

Reference:

J. H. Goldberg (HIAP) letter to R. D. Martin (NRC) dated August 30, 1985 (ST HL-AE-1346)

Dear Mr. Martin:

Houston Lighting & Power Company's (HL&P) review of the litigation record in the lawsuit by the owners of the South Texas Project (STP) against Brown & Root, Inc. (B&R) and its parent company, Halliburton, Inc., which was described in the referenced letter, has been completed. The review disclosed no safety-related deficiencies which had not already been identified by HL&P.

Enclosed for your review are the S. Levy, Inc. " Report for the South Texas Project Litigation Record Review Program" dated February 1986 and the report of the Senior Advisory Panel which was commissioned to monitor the Litigation Record Review Program to assure that the objectives of the review were achieved. The Panel has concluded that the review methodology and performance were successful in generating complete and accurate results and that the results of the review are supported by documents organized in a retrievable and auditable fashion.

As pointed out in the reference letter,the object of the review was twofold: (1) to examine the litigation record to determ'ne whether it contained any evidence of previously unidentified deficiencies in the safety-related systems, structures, or components of the STP or their associated design or quality documents; and (2) to document the review ,

process and its results in a retrievable form. l l

i L1/NRC/rr I

\

L/LLAY )

3 q yv i 1 -

,m n SL HL- AE 1628 I Houston Lighting & Power Company File No.: C25, C42 i Page 2 l l

l The review was conducted in two stages. First the litigation record was screened to determine which record docuaents (i.e., depositions, interrogatories and expert reports) might contain information about technical aspects of the STP design or construction. The second stage of the review process consisted of a detailed line-by-line review by S. Levy, Inc. of all ,

documents identified by the screening process. S. Levy, Inc, recorded each t assertion in these docunents which described a deficiency in any of the STP  ;

systems, structures or components or related design or quality documents. A total of 5151 assertions were identified. These assertions were then analyzed and evaluated to determine whether (1) they could adversely affect the safety of plant operations; (2) hed already been identified by the STP; or (3) were factually erroneous. i The 5151 assertions were dispositioned as follows: 482 were determined to have no bearing on the safety of plant operations, 4662 were shown to have already been identified by the STP, and 7 were determined to be factually erroneous.

The complete files of the review effort are available for your review at the S. Levy, Inc. offices in Campbell, California.

Should you have any questions regarding the performance of the review please get in touch with Mark Wisenburg at (713) 993-1330.

_Very truly yours,  ;

Y. k J. H. Goldberg Group Vice President, Nucicar MRW/yd Attachments: (1) S. Levy, Inc. " Report for the South Texas Project Litigation Record Review Program" dated February 1986 S. Levy Report (2) Statement of the Senior Advisory Panel for the South Texas Project Litigation Record Review Program L1/NRC/rr

n n' .

a Houston Lighting & Power Company ST-HL-AE-1628 l File No.: C25, C4.2 l Page 3 cc:

Hugh L. Thompson, Jr. , Director Brian E. Berwick, Esquire Division of PWR Licensing - A Assistant Attorney General for Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation the State of Texas U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station

!. Washington, DC 20555 Austin, TX 78711 N. Prasad Kadambi Project Manager Lanny A. Sinkin U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission- Christic Institute 7920 Norfolk Avenue 1324 North Capitol Street i

Bethesda, MD 20814 Washington, DC 20002 Claude E. Johnson Oreste R. Pirfo, Esquire Senior Resident Inspector /STP Hearing Attorney c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Office of the Executive Legal Director Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 910 Washington, DC 20555 Bay City, TX 77414 Charles Bechhoefer, Esquire M.D. Schwarz, Jr., Esquire Chairman, Atomic Safety &

Baker & Botts Licensing Board One Shell Plaza U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Houston, TX 77002 Washington, DC 20555 J.R. Newman, Esquire Dr. James C. Lamb, III Newman & Holtzinger, P.C. 313 Woodhaven Road 1615 L Street, N.W. Chapel Hill, NC 27514 Washington, DC 20036 Judge Frederick J. Shon Director, Office of Inspection Atomic Safety and Licensing Beard and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 20555 Mr. Ray Goldstein, Esquire T.V. Shockley/R.L. Range 1001 Vaughn Building Central Power & Light Company 807 Brazos P.O. Box 2121 Austin, TX 78701 Corpus Christi, TX 78403 Citizens for Equitable Utilities, Ir.c .

H.L. Peterson/G. Pokorny c/o Ms. Peggy Buchorn City of Austin Route 1, Box 1664 P.O. Box 1088 Brazoria, TX 77422 Austin, TX 78767 Docketing & Service Section J.B. Poston/A. vonRosenberg Office of the Secretary City Public Service Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 1771 Washington, DC 20555 San Antonio, TX 78296 (3 Copies)

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street Washington, DC 20555 Revised 12/2/85 Ll/NRC/rr j!

O' SEP 181986 O

In Reply Refer To-Dockets: 50-498/86-03 l 50-499/86-03 Houston Lighting & Power Company ATTN: J. H. Goldberg, Group Vice President, Nuclear P. O. Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001 Gentlemen:

This refers to the inspection conducted by Mr. R. G. Taylor of this office during the period January 13 through July 25, 1986, of activities authorized by NRC Construction Permits CPPR-128 and CPPR-129 for the South Texas Project, and to the discussion of our findings with Mr. Scott Head, and other members of your staff at the conclusion of the inspection.

Areas examined during the inspection included action on previous inspection findings; followup on allegations, construction deficiencies, and IE Information Notices; review of the Quality Class 7 program; and containment mechanical penetrations.

Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examination of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observations by the inspector. The inspection findings are documented in the enclosed inspection report.

Within the scope of the inspection, no violations or deviations were identified.

We have also examined actions you have taken with regard to previously identified inspection findings. The status of these items is identified in paragraph 2 of the enclosed report.  !

Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely, Original Signed By J. E. Geg!!ardo J. E. Gagliardo, Chief Reactor Projects Branch

Enclosure:

(see next page)

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B :RP C C:RPB [ ACU lor /cg onstable JEGagli do MEEmerson y 4 / 11'/8 6 4/d/86 f/j7/ I h/% /86 gpquebL fPP

O O-Houston Lighting & Power Company

Enclosure:

Appendix - NRC Inspection Report 50-498/86-03 50-499/86-03 cc w/ enclosure:

Houston Lighting & Power Company ATTN: M. Wisenberg, Manager, Nuclear Licensing

.P. O. Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001 Brian Berwick, Esquire Asst. Attorney General Environmental Protection Div.

P. O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711 Lanny Alan Sinkin Citizens Concerned About Nuclear Power, Inc.

Christic Institute

'1324 North Capitol Street Washington, DC 20002 Charles Bechhoefer, Esquire Chairman, Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Dr. James C. Lamb, III 313 Woodhaven Road Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514 Frederick J. Shon Administrative Law Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Ray Goldstein, Esquire Gray, Allison and Becker 100 Vaughn Building 807 Brazos Austig, Texas 78701

I i m m. l l-1" Houston Lighting & Power Company '

Alvin H. Gutterman l Newman & Holtzinger, P.C.

1615 L St., N.W.

• Suite 1000

Washington, DC 20036 Texas Radiation Control Program Director bectoDMB(IE01) ,

bec distrib. by RIV:

• RPB DRSP

• Resident Inspector-0PS R. D. Martin, RA

• Resident Inspector-CONST. *SectionChief(RPB/C)

• R&SPB

• MIS SYSTEM

• RIV File *D. Weiss, LFMB (AR-2015)

• RSTS Operator R. Pirfo, ELD

• R. G. Taylor, RPB/C *RSB

'*B. A. Breslau, RPB/C M. E. Emerson

• w/766 I

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A O l

l APPENDIX U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV

, NRC Inspection Report: 50-498/86-03 Construction Permits: CPPR-128 i 50-499/86-03 CPPR-129 Dockets: 50-498 50-499 Licensee:

Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P)

P. O. Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001 Facility Name: South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: South Texas Project, Matagorda County, Texas Bechtel Power Corporation, Houston, Texas Houston Lighting & Power Company, Houston, Texas Inspection Conducted: January 13 through July 25, 1986 Inspector: -r

& c/[2 R G. Taylor > Project Inspector Dan / ~

Project Section C, Reactor Projects Branch Approved: 9 c/0/

G. L. TcnT5tatue, Chief, Project Section C, Dat'e

Reactor Projects Branch Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted January 13 through July 25, 1986 (Report 50-498/86-03:

50-499/86-03)

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of licensee action on previous inspection findings; followup on allegations; review of litigation records; followup on significant construction deficiencies; IE Informatio.n Notices; mechanical containment penetrations; and Quality Class 7 inspection programs.

Results: No violations or deviations were identified. {

1. f7/M37P'(y

)

A Q i I

l l

DETAILS ,

1. Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Employees 1

• J. Westertneir, Project Manager  ;

• T. Jordan, Project QA Manager '

• C. McIntrye, Project Engineer

• S. Head, Compliance Engineering, Supervisor i

• H. Wisenburg, Manager Licensing j

~

The NRC inspector also interviewed other personnel of Bechtel Power  !

I Corporation, EBASCO Services, Inc., and the licensee.

2. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings The following items refer to paragraphs of NRC NUREG-0948 which was a special NRC inspection report of the Quadrex Corporation Report on Design Review of Brown & Root Engineering Work for the South Texas Project.

Appendix A of the report listed a number of items that the special inspection team recocinended further followup when more information became available. NRC Inspection Report 50-498/84-11; 50-499/84-11 discussed the findings regarding many of the items designated by Appendix A to be the responsibility of Region IV. This report discusses the findings on the balance of the items in the Region IV scope.

(Closed) Quadrex paragraph 4.2.2.1(e): Quadrex paragraph 4.2.2.1(e) expressed a concern that computer generated design calculations were not subject to the same level of control as manually generated design calculations. NRC Inspection Report 50-498;499/84-11 documented NRC review of a substantial number of calculation and verification packages and found compliance with Bechtel Engineering Department Procedure 4.37 titled, " Design Calculations." The NRC inspector reviewed the above procedure, including change notices 7 through 11, and found the procedure provided the same controls to both manual and computer generated calculations. No additional calculation packages were reviewed. This item is considered closed.

(Closed) Quadrex paragraphs 4.1.2.4(v) and 4.6.4.4(f): These Quadrex paragraphs expressed concerns with Brown & Root's staffing continuity for performing seismic evaluation and for considering valve performance qualification requirements. The NRC inspector reviewed Bechtel Design Criteria document 4E019NQ1009 " Equipment Qualification," Revision 5 dated September 12, 1985, and Project Engineering Directive 015 Revision 4 dated March 5, 1986. The former document provides technicaT c'riteria for seismic, environmental, and operability evaluations. The latter document provides the administrative and interface controls to implement the former 1

A A document. The NRC inspector detemined that these items should be closed since Brown and Root is no longer involved with the STP site, the Bechtel documents appear to be adequate and the area of equipment qualification is now subject .o stringent review by the NRC under 10 CFR 50.49 and continued, separate followup via these Quadrex items would be redundant.

These items are, therefore, considered closed.

l (Closed)Quadrexparagraph4.4.2.1(c): This item expressed a concern by the Quadrex reviewers that Brown & Root had not properly examined the reactor containment building for possible locations of hydrogen gas concentrations following a design basis accident. It was also noted Brown & Root had used an allowable hydrogen gas concentration in the battery rooms higher than recommend by the NRC. By review of flVAC and building drawing, Bechtel has established that there are no areas in the containment building that would allow hydrogen to locally concentrate.

Bechtel calculation package 3V-11-0-M6-5143 indicates that greatest hydrogen gas concentration in any of the battery rooms will be 0.4 percent of volume, weil below the maximum of 2 percent recomended by the NRC.

This Quadrex item is considered closed.

(Closed) Quadrex paragraph 4.1.2.4(r): This item expressed a concern that the Bro 3., I Root methodology for analysis of the load capacities of walls in various buildings might not be sufficiently rigorous.

Bechtel had committed to perform a review of the designs as part of the standard design evaluation process. The NRC inspector was infomed that all scheduled calculations had been completed except for the Mechanical-Electrical Auxiliary Building which was 50-60 percent complete.

The NRC inspector selected the calculation package for the fuel handling building as typical of the design process. This calculation package, C-8010 Revision 1, was reviewed and found to be thorough in its treatment of seismic loading of the walls in the building. The methodology being used appeared to be consistent with the requirements of ACI-318-71 and the NRC Standard Review Plan. This item is considered closed.

(Closed)Quadrexparagraph4.3.2.1(m): This item addressed a concern that the Brown & Root methodology for assessing the manual operability of various items of equipment in a post-accident environment appeared inadequate. The NRC has provided guidance and requirements addressing this concern via item II.B.2 of HUREG-0737. The licensee has responded via amendment 45 to Section 7A of the FSAR. Bechtel has developed and implemented Project Engineering Directive 011. "ALARA Directive" which also requires a design review to assure operability and maintainability of systems and components under all operational conditions for compliance to 10 CFR 20. Since both the NUREG 0737 and ALARA conformance are subject of ongoing NRC inspection and review culminating prior to operating licensee issuance, no further examination of this Quadrex item is considered necessary and the item is, therefore, considered closed. **

(0 pen) Quadrex paragraph 4.1.2.3(m): This Quadrex item contains two essentially separate concerns. Concern a. was relative to the interface between Brown & Root engineering and vendors in regard to equipment

O n seismic qualification while concern b. involved a perceived problem with the Brown & Root review of the selection of materials and welding processes. The NRC inspector determined that concern a. should be closed for the same reason noted above relative to paragraph 4.1.2.4(v) and 4.6.4.4(f)above. Based on the Quadrex report and on NUREG 0948, it appears the primary Quadrex specific concern was in the selection of materials for the spent fuel pool liners and that the materials actually used were not adequately reviewe'i by Brown & Root engineering for compliance to requirements. The NRC inspector was provided with documentation that indicated the vendor prepared certified material test reports and welding procedures had been reviewed by Bechtel and had been found acceptable. The Bechtel work package (EN-619) also committed to performing a visual inspection of the pool liners as part of the resolution of this izem. The NRC inspector reviewed a report of a special inspection of the liner by personnel of the Materials and Quality Services organization of Bechtel National, Inc. The report indicates that they found no evidence of cracking or detrimental heavy oxide in the area of interest. This Quadrex item is considered closed.

3. Followup on Allegations (Closed) Allegation 4-86-A-025 (inadequate training and supervisory,, overview)

On March 7,1986, the NRC Headquarters Duty Officer received a telephone call from the alleger. The allayr indicated that: (1)hewas laid off his job as an inspector with EB/SCO because of a personality conflict, (2) he had received no training regarding his required papemork and that interpretation of QC procedures was left up to the individual inspector, and (3) the supervisors did not conduct surveillance in the field and did not adequately check papemork prior to sending it to the vault.

The Headquarters Duty Officer referred the above allegations to Region IV personnel who, in turn, recontracted the alleger. The alleger then stated that he had already reported his concerns to the E8ASCO headquarters in New York and that he also desired to advise HL&P (the licensee) of his ,

allegations. He indicated that he had no objections to being contacted by the STP Safeteam personnel. The alleger was advised during the contact

[ with the Region IV person that he could report his layoff and the reason l 1

for the layoff to the Department of Labor for review and investigation if i he chose since the NRC had no immediate jurisdiction. i In a letter dated April 21, 1986, Region IV referred allegations (2) and (3)tothelicenseeforinvestigationbytheirSafeteaminaccordancewith l

the alleger's wishes and NRC policy. The licensee responded with a letter dated June 2,1986, stating that their investigation had rev.ea. led that the alleger had not attended any of three scheduled classroom training sessions regarding one specific procedure that the alleger had informed the Safeteam was the core problem. The licensee stated that a review of quality data for a period prior to and after implementation of the new I procedure, which was a consolidation of other long used procedures, 1

O O revealed no discernable differences in the deficiency rates. The licensee did find that improvements could be made in the training program that would make it more meaningful. In regard to the third allegation, the licensee stated that while there was no procedural requirement for supervisory surveillance or for paperwork reviews, other than for completeness, an informal program in the surveillance area had been implemented in March 1986, as a response to the NRC construction appraisal team inspection. The licensee stated that they had found that there were no safety concerns uncovered during their investigation of these allegations.

The NRC inspector reviewed both a preliminary and final Safeteam investigation report concerning these allegations and had the benefit of discussions with the Safeteam investigators involved. The investigators found that the alleger had, in fact, missed the scheduled training class on the site procedure involved, in part, through his own fault and, in part, because of his work day assignments. The investigators also found that there was no provision in the training program that would identify personnel who had missed scheduled training and provide them with the necessary training. The investigators also found that some of the training given was, in part, inadequate since the instructors were in some cases ill prepared to answer questions from the trainees. Based upon a survey of a significant number of inspectors, the investigators found that 56 percent of the inspection personnel felt the training given was adequate while 44 percent felt that it was inadequate. The survey also indicated that training in procedures, other than the one of concern, was generally considered adequate by the inspectors. Since the training given the alleger had only been to complete reading assignments of revisions to the procedure after the initial procedure training and that the alleger had not received any formal classroom training, the allegation was considered substantiated by the Safeteam.

Regarding the allegation concerning supervisory surveillance, the Safeteam found that while there was no procedural or program requirement for such surveillance, the EBASCO QC group had initiated such an activity. The Safeteam also found that the various supervisors were not consistent with each other in their approach to or thoroughness in conducting the surveillance. The investigators found that the surveillance program is under review by quality management both in EBASCO and Bechtel. Based upon the absence of any written program requirement for the surveillance, the investigators concluded that the allegation was not substantiated.

Regarding the allegation relative to the inadequacy of supervisory review of records prior to sending chem to the vault, the investigators found that the supervisory reviews were only for correctness and completeness in the view of the supervisors. This view was confirmed by review of the applicable site procedure. The investigators also found that,the licensee's QA group had found problems with the supervisory review, apparently independent of the investigation, and was requiring some as yet unidentified corrective action. Based upon the licensee's QA concern, the Safeteam concluded that the allegation was substantiated.

A O Based upon the interview with the investigators, the NRC inspector concluded that the investigation by the Safeteam had been thorough. The NRC inspector also agreed with the investigators conclusions as to whether the allegations were substantiated or not with one exception. In the allegation concerning the lack of supervisory field surveillance of their subordinates, the conclusion was that the allegation was unsubstantiated because of no procedural requirement. The report indicates that there was an informal supervisory surveillance program albeit inconsistently and apparently infrequently implemented. The NRC inspector concluded this allegation was also substantiated. The NRC inspector also concluded that there are limited safety implications inherent in the allegations on the basis that if the training given inspectors was inadequate and supervisory overview was poorly applied, it could indicate that inspectors performance could be less than desired which, in turn, could lead to deficient installations. In the absence of any known situation of deficient quality arising that is directly connected to the allegations, the NRC inspector can only conclude that no NRC requirements have been violated.

This allegation is closed.

(Closed) Allegation 4-85-A-061 (pipe design specifications)

The NRC received allegations, first by telephone in May 1985, which was followed up by a letter in February 1986, to the effect that piping design specifications were being misused and that piping in the Primary Process Sampling System (PPS) could be overstressed in terms of ASME code >

allowables. The NRC inspector utilized the following documents during the course of his review of the allegation. The marked

• was specifically referenced by the alleger in his letter.

a.* Criteria for Piping Design, 5L01P5004, Revision 7

b. Criteria for Piping Design, 5L01P5004, Revision 9

c. Piping and Instrumentation Diagram, Primary Sampling System, 5Z329Z00045, Revision 2

d. Design Criteria for Process Sampling System, 5Z32921017, Revision 3

e. Specification for Process Sampling System, 9232920110, Revision 5

f. Primary Sampling System Isometric Drawing, SM369PPS285, Revision 1

g. Primary Sampling System Isometric Drawing, 2C369PPS485, Revision 4

h. Penetration M85 and M86, drawing 802185, Revision 3

i. ASME Code,Section III, Subsection NC-1974 'I

j. Piping Minimum Wall Thickness Calculation 2LO10PC5208, dated August 5, 1986

A o The allegation indicated that sheets UB and UD of reference a. showed that pipe sizes ranging from 1/2 to 24 inches could be used in the PPS which has a pressure rating of 2485 psig at a temperature of 650"F. The alleger stated that his calculations indicated that any pipe over 1 inch would be overstressed at these pressure / temperature combinations. The NRC inspector made calculations in accordance with reference 1. which confirmed the allegers statement. The alleger implied that he believed piping larger than 1 inch had been used in the PPS, particularly in containment penetration area. References c. through h. indicated, however, that all piping is 1 inch in size except for extensive use of tubing specified to be 3/8 i:.;h by .065 inch wall thickness. ,

The NRC inspector also found that reference b., a more current version of the document referenced by the alleger, no longer indicated that class UB pipe would be used in the applicable portion of the PPS. Based on reference j., references c., g., and b. have now all been revised to require the use of BB pipe. The effect of these changes has been to change the piping from 1 inch schedule 40 (UB) pipe to 1 inch schedule 160 (BB) pipe. Discussions with design engineering personnel revealed that even though the schedule 40 pipe wa. cceptable for the pressure / temperature combination, there wt. so little margin, only about

.001 inch in wall thickness, that if the site used dot impression stamping for traceability marking of the pipe, there would not be sufficient wall thickness. Further, since the penetration pipe per reference h. was already schedule 160, using the same size and schedule on both sides of the penetration would somewhat facilitste field installation.

The alleger was also concerned that any 150 lb pressure clas's flanges allowed by pipe class sheets UB and UD would be operating well beyond the allowables of ANSI B16.5. The NRC inspector verified by review of references c. and g. that no flanges of any pressure rating are utilized in the PPS.

The alleger further appeared concerned that reference a. (or b.) was being used as the primary vehicle to communicate design requirements relative to piping. The NRC inspector found that this reference is one of two middle level design documents utilized. The top level document for the PPS is the Westinghouse NSSS design criteria. The next lower level would be of the calculation type documents, one of which was reference j. The two middle level documents were references a. and c. The final output document for site use would be reference f. (or g.) and a bill of materials for fabrication. The only possible application of reference a.

in the field would be where the engineer in preparing the isometric drawings and bill of material might specify a particular pipe schedule and material by one of pipe class sheets such as BB. Each of the sheets is organized to deal with a full range of pipe sizes of one schedule and of one type of material such SA-312 stainless sieel pipe. Thu's,'in the class of BB, the engineer would be specifying the use of a given size of pipe as displayed on the face of the isometric, of schedule 160 and that the

^ O material would be SA312 stainless steel. If flanges were involved as shown on the isometric, they would be of the 2500 lb class, also of stainless steel.

By way of perspective, the pipe involved in each of the four process lines of the PPS working at the pressure / temperature combination of concern is about 13 feet in each run of which 5 feet are a part of flued-head forged penetration. The balance of each run is made up of the tubing previously mentioned and amount to 70-80 percent of the total of each run.

The concerns expressed by the alleger were not substantiated by the NRC

~

inspector.

This allegation is closed.

4. Inspection of Litigation Review Program The licensee, by letter dated August 30, 1985, forwarded a document titled

" South Texas Project Litigation Review Program," for review and comment by NRC Region IV. The purpose of the program was to review a substantial volume of records that were generated in the course of the litigation to identify any safety issues that might not have been otherwise identified.

Any such issues identified by the review rising to the level of 10 CFR 50.55(e) would be reported to the NRC. The_ program referenced above was divided into two stages. Stage one was an initial screening to eliminate any documents from stage two review that were unlikely to contain any technical information. Stage two was the review by S. Levy.

Inc. personnel of the documents containing technical information for safety issues. The NRC inspection of stage two has been documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-498/85-23;50-499/85-20. The inspection discussed herein was for the purpose of evaluating the licensee's implementation of stage one. The NRC inspector initially interviewed the attorney and the engineer who had performed the stage one screening for the most part. A second attorney-engineer team had perfonned a small part of the initial review subject to a reverification by the first team. The second team perfonned the reverification overview when the first team was the primary reviewer. _The NRC inspector reviewed the informal procedure utilized by these teams for conducting and documenting the reviews.

The procedure required that for each document reviewed, the initial review team would generate a sumary document describing the reason a record did not require S. Levy, Inc. review and was signed by the teem. The overview team also signed the summary to denote their concurrence. The NRC inspector examined these records pertaining to each of the documents rpviewed during this inspection.

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The NRC inspector selected documents from each of the three citegories of documents filed with the court during the litigation. In the category titled " Expert Witnesses" the inspector reviewed: )

a. Trend Analysis of Brown & Root Deficiency Nonconformance Reports l

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-g-

b. Damages to STP

c. Report of Project Management and Project Controls In the category of depositions, the NRC inspector reviewed the depositions taken of two high ranking officers of Brown & Root, two high ranking officers of NUS Corporation (an engineering consultant to Brown & Root) and an engineer employed by Central Power and Light who had an involvement in the early phases of STP. In the category of interrogatories, the inspector selected for review only the responses by Brown & Root (B&R) to l the interrogatories directed to B&R by the other parties on the basis that only B&R could reasonably have the technical information pertinent to stage two. This group of 56 interrogatories were summary reviewed to verify that most had been sent to S. Levy, Inc. The 13 fully excluded interrogatories were completely reviewed. Some questions and answers in i eight additional interrogatories were partially excluded with all exclusions again fully reviewed by the inspector. -

Based on the sample described above of the documents excluded in whole or in part from the S. Levy, Inc review by stage one screening teams, the NRC inspector concluded that stage one teams had been conservative in the performance of their reviews. It is considered unlikely that any documents, or portions thereof, were improperly excluded from the stage two review.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Followup on Licensee Reported Significant Construction Deficiencies (10 CFR 50.55(e))

(Closed) Incident Review Committee Item No. 23 This item, originally reported to the NRC on October 25, 1979, related to findings during a design review that a weld in the containment recirculation sump penetrations could be overstressed under certain loading combinations and could cause safety systems to malfunction. The original designer, B&R, redesigned the sump to pipe connection and that design was implemented as reported to the NRC in May 1980. W en Bechtel Power Corporation assumed design responsibilities from B&R , reassessment of the entire sump and isolation valve enclosure system indicated that there wruld be serious future maintenance and inspection problems with the then 4 place installation. A redesign w' mdertcken and implemented which obviated both the original issue and subsequently discovered potential maintenance problem. The present design is described in Chapter 6.2 of the FSAR. The NRC inspector had no further questions and yhisitemisconsideredclosed.

(Closed) Incident Review Committee Item No. 170 1

This item involved a finding during a stress analysis of containment penetration assemblies M85 and M86. It was found that the fillet welded l connections between the carbon steel penetration header plate and the penetration pipe passing through the plate could be overstressed in

A n operation due to temperature cycling. A second problem was also l identified wherein the concrete of the containment wall surrounding these '

penetrations could be heated above ASME code allowables by heat radiating from the pipe. The solution to the first problem was to redesign penetration assemblies. The redesign utilizes a flued-head forged single unit system where there are no bimetallic welds at points of high temperature cycling. The second problem was corrected by providing forced flow cooling air to the interior of the penetration to remove the excess heat. By review of design drawings for the penetration assemblies and the HVAC system, the NRC inspector determined that the changes have been implemented and had no further questions.

(Closed) Incident Review Committee Item No. 204 This item involved a finding that NPSI had supplied rear brackets for snubber assemblies that tended to interfere with the paddles of the snubber. The rear bracket is the trace name for "u" shaped bracket that is fixed to the building or other structure into which the snubber will then be attached such as to allow loads imposed on the snubber to be transmitted to the building or structure. Snubbers are either mechanical or hydraulic devices that can lengthen or shorten at very slow rates but lockup when sudden loads are applied and thus serve to restrain movement in seismic or comparable events. The interference was such as to prevent design movements of the snubber within the bracket. Incorrect brackets l were identified and replaced with acceptable units. Action was also taken to prevent recurrence by restructuring the source inspection effort at NPSI. The NRC inspector had no further questions.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Review of Licensee Actions Regarding IE Notices (Closed) IE Information Notice 83-020: Mechanical Snubber Attachment Interference This notice concerned the interference of snubber rear brackets with snubber padc'les similar to that described in paragraph 5 above relative to Incident Review Committee Item 204. Since the licensee had used only brackets suppled by NPSI, the corrective actions taken satisfy the intent of this Notice.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Inspection of Containment Mechanical Penetrations The NRC inspector selected the following mechanical penetrations for inspection of this area of construction activities, all inilnjt 1.

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a. Equipment Hatch

b. Safety Injection System penetration M-10

c. Auxiliary Feedwater penetration M-83

d. Main Feedwater penetration M-5

e. Containment Spray penetration M-9 Equipment Hatch A review of installation records for this component revealed that it had been field installed into the unit 1 containment liner during the period of May to October 1977, by the Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Company (PDM).

A review of NRC inspection reports during the period 1976-77 indicated NRC personnel had reviewed the PDM quality program including welding procedures and welder qualification. These reports indicate that while problems were identified, they were quickly and effectively corrected.

NRC Inspection Reports involved are 50-498/76-05, 76-07, 77-04, 77-05, and 77-09. The NRC inspector examined to the extent possible the installed barre; assembly that penetrates the containment wall for any evidence of damage or mishandling since installation. The important barrel to head sealing surface was found to be adequately protected. The factory fabricated closure door for the hatch was hoisted well above the opening and was not accessible for examination. The NRC inspector reviewed the factory fabrication records for the closure door including certified material test reports and radiographs of five of the welds that were used to fabricate the dished head and surrounding ring of the door assembly.

The materials were either SA-516 Grade 70 or SA-537 Class 1 as required by specification 2C269550006, all revisions through 5. The records reviewed indicated the door had been fabricated in full accordance with the applicable ASME code,Section III, Subsection NE-1971 through the winter 1973 addenda.

Penetration M-10 This penetration consists of a flued-head type one piece forging of SA-182 F-304 stainless steel. The forging was furnished by National Forge to Gulf & Western Company who finish machined the forging and performed i the nondestructive tests of the component except for the volumetric ultrasonic examination which had been accomplished by National Forge. The l

NRC inspector examined the certified material test report, the ultrasonic test report and liquid penetrant inspection report. All complied with the ASME Code. The forged component was welded to the penetration sleeve via FW-0041A as shown on isometric 4C69 PSI 472, sheet 7, Revision 5. This and the balance of the field welds to be discussed later were all made under the licensee /EBASCO ASME pipe welding quality program. The NRC inspector examined the radiographs for this weld and found them to comply ~with code l requirements.

(

L A O Penetration M-83 The penetration is a flued-head forging of SA-350 LF-2 carbon steel with an SA333-6 pipe welded to the outer diameter of the forging which effectively extends the containment sleeve. The forging to pipe weld was accomplished by the vendor. The rough forging was furnished by Earle M.

Jorgenson Co. to Gulf & Western for final finish while the pipe was furnished by Phoenix Steel. The certified material test reports for both components were found to comply with the Code requirements. The radiographs for the factory weld described fully complied to requirements.

The penetration component was welded to the containment sleeve via FW-0021 shown on isometric 2C369PAF402. The radiographs and other welding records were examined anf found to be satisfactory.

Penetration M-5 This penetration is also a flued-head single piece forging of SA-350 LF-2 material but has no extension pipe attached. The forging was made by National Forge which also performed the ultrasonic examination. Gulf and Western finish machined the forging. It was found after receipt of the component at the site that forging had been furnished oversized at the outside perimeter which connects to the penetration sleeve. Gulf &

Western had failed to remove enough material from the inside to the outer rim of the forging which would create an unacceptable inside diameter mismatch at the welded interface to the sleeve. Records indicate the component was returned to the vendor for correction. Radiographs of the field weld, FW-001 on isometric 2C369PFW433, indicate the correction was satisfactory. Certified material test reports for the forging material also indicated compliance with SA-350 requirements.

Penetration M-9 This penetration is again a single piece flued-head forging of SA-182 F304 stainless steel material as furnished by National Forge who also performed the ultrasonic examination. The component was welded to the penetration sleeve via FW0053 of isometric 2C369PCS415. The radiographs and other records indicate that this weld is in compliance with requirements.

In addition to the data reviewed as described above, the NRC inspector examined four each mainstream, main feedwater, and auxiliary feedwater penetrations as installed for any indication of damage or mishandling.

The field attachment welds had been ground essentially flush with the forging and connecting pipe which facilitates any future inservice inspection. The penetrations did not indicate any evidence of mishandling at any time during the erection process. Examination beyond that .

described was limited by access to the components necessary for a more -

detailed inspection. , ,

No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

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8. Quality Class 7 Quality Inspection Activities i Based upon discussions with other NRC inspectors, this NRC ini.pactor reviewed the. quality program instituted by the licensee for what is described as Quality Class 7. In accordance with Bechtel specification 7A050GS1006, Revision 2, this quality class encompasses the quality program requirements for design, fabrication, installation, and inspection of:

a. Fire Protection Systems

b. Radioactive Waste Management System

c. Seismic II/I Items

d. Post-Accident Monitoring System Category 2 Instrumentation Items a, b, and d, above are in response to NRC Branch Technical Positions i and/or Regulatory Guides which include quality program requirements of l their own and do not reference Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50. These programs generally do not require implementation of.a rigorously documented quality program and give the licensee considerable. latitude, particularly in the area of inspection and process controls. Item c,

. however, stems from Regulatory Guide 1.29, position C.2. Position C.4. of this Regulatory Guide also requires that pertinent requirements of Appendix B be applied to activities related to Position C.2. The licensee has committed to comply to Regulatory Guide 1.29 without exception. It would appear then that the licensee's quality program should comply with Appendix B in the manner that is described in the licensee's NRC approved Quality Assurance Program Description. The Quality Assurance Program Description indicates by words and organization charts that all inspection activities under Appendix B will be accomplished by quality control inspection groups independently managed within each of the site contractors. The licensee is committed to maintenance of an overview function for all quality activities. The above referenced specification while generally describing program requirements, essentially leaves the method of implementation up to the Bechtel Construction Management organization. The Bechtel Project Quality Program Manual, Appendix C-Part 3 indicates that Construction Manager, but not Quality Assurance, shall have procedures, instructions and/ specifications implementing the inspection aspect of the quality program. Based on discussions with licensee personnel, including the Project QA Manager, it has been confirmed that the actual inspection work has been assigned to the constructor's (EBASCO) field engineering force rather than to his QC group. Organizationally, these field engineers are an integral part of construction organization and assist the craft superintendents in obtaining installation materials from the warehouse and providing technical assistance at the worker level. The program does require that ,

the field engineers document their inspection in much the same way that a' QC inspector would have to. The assignment of this inspection activity to 4

>. n m field engineer is not described in the FSAR or in the Quality Assurance Program Description. This does not imply that the licensee is in noncompliance since Appendix B allows considerable freedom in the structuring of organizations. To avoid confusion the licensee has committed to clarifying his commitments in this area either by revision to the FSAR or the Quality program Description as appropriate.

9. Exit Interviews The NRC inspector met with appropriate licensee representatives several times during the course of this inspection to discuss the findings applicable to each phase. The persons denoted in paragraph 1 attended one or more of the meeting's.

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3 MAR 1 MBS 'lY.

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Ms. Billie Pirner Garde Citizens Clinic Director IN RESPONSE REFER Government Accountability Project TO FOIA-84-426 AND 1555 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 202 F0!A-84-449;84-A-55(84-449)

Washington, DC 20036 AND84-A-65(84-426)

Dear Ms. Garde:

This is in response to your l'etters dated May 23,1984, and May 31,1984,in which you requested, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), records related to the supplemental safety evaluation report (NUREG-0787) regarding the Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit- 3.

The records that are identified on the enclosed Appendices A, B and C have been determined to be subject to your FOI A requests. The records that are identified on Appendix A have already been made available at the NRC Public Document Room (PDR) for public inspection and copying; the records identified on Appendix B are now being placed into the PDR and will be filed in PDR folders F0!A-84-426/449 under your name.

The NRC is withholding certain information in records identified on Appendix C pursuant to Exemptions 5, 6, and 7(a), (c) and (d) of the FOIA (5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3),

(6), and (7)(1), (iii) and (iv) of the Comission's regulations for reasons noted in the description of deletions on Appendix C.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 9.9 and 9.15 of the Comission's regulations, it has been determined that the information withheld is exempt from production or disclosure, and that its production or disclosure is contrary to the public interest. The persons resp 6nsible for the denials of the information, as noted on the enclosure, are Mr. Ben B. Hayes, Director, Office of Investigations; Ms. Sharon R. Connelly, Director, Office of Inspector and Auditor; and the undersigned and Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

The denials by Mr. Harold R. Denton and myself may be appealed to the Executive Director for Operations within 30 days from the receipt of this letter. Any

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Sincerely, Ned) l. M. F&

J. M. Felton, Director i Division of Rules and Records Office of Administration

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Ms. Billie Pirner Garde Citizens Clinic Director IN RESPONSE REFER Government Accountability Project TO FOIA-84-426 AND 1555 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 202 F01A-84-449;84-A-55(84-449)

Washington, DC 20036 AND84-A-65(84-426)

Dear Ms. Garde:

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This is in response to your l'etters dated May 23, 1984, and May 31, 1984, in which you requested, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), records related to the supplemental safety evaluation report (NUREG-0787) regarding the Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3.

The. records that are identified on the enclosed Appendices A, B and C have been determined to be subject to your FOI A requests. The records that are identified on Appendix A have already been made available at the NRC Public Document Room (PDR) for public inspection and copying; the records identified on Appendix B are now being placed into the PDR and will be filed in PDR folders F01A-84-426/449 under your name.

The NRC is withholding certain infomation in recoeds identified on Appendix C pursuant to Exemptions 5, 6, and 7(a), (c) and (d) of the FOIA (5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5), l (6), and (7)(1), (iii) and (iv) of the Comission's regulations for reasons l noted in the description of deletions on Appendix C.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 9.9 and 9.15 of the Comission's regulations, it has been determined that the information withheld is exempt from production or disclosure, and that its production or disclosure is contrary to the public interest. The persons responsible for the denials of the information, as noted on the enclosure, are Mr. Ben B. Hayes, Director, Office of Investigations; Ms. Sharon R. Connelly, Director, Office of Inspector and Auditor; and the undersigned and Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

The denials by Mr. Harold R. Denton and myself may be appealed to the Executu Director for Operations within 30 days from the receipt of this letter. Any c-/d D e~ L t O9 JWIM n cA At 1I L )'

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Ms. Garde such appeal must be in writing, addressed to the Executive Director for Operations, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Com.ission, Washington, DC 20555, and should clearly state on the envelope and in the letter that it is an " Appeal from an Initial F0IA Decision." The denials by Ms. Sharon R. Connelly and Mr. Ben 'B. Hayes may be appealed within 30 days to the Comission and should be addressed to the Secretary of the Comission.

i Sincerely,

"(signed; i. x, yg J. M. Felton, Director Division of Rules and Records Office of Administration

Enclosures:

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