ML20245K153
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UNITED STATES 3 '.
'e NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION M/I-j c' W) 5
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611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SulTE 1000
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ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011 nie ___
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JUL 151986 5
MEMORANDUM FOR: Sharon R. Connelly Director, Office of Inspector and Auditor FROM:
Robert D. Martin Regional Administrator
SUBJECT:
NRCM 0702 REFERRAL The sealed record in the civil litigation between Houston Lighting & Power vs.
Brown & Root was opened by the Court this past year upon settlement of the litigation by the parties. Region IV requested HL&P to conduct an extensive review of that record for the purpose of discovering any previously unreported safety-related information. As part of that review, HL&P turned up several very general references to perceived misconduct on the part of NRC employees.
While these references lack specificity, I am forwarding them to you for your information. The references are contained in the attached excerpts from interrogations taken before settlement of the civil suit. We have no additional information other than what is being furnished to youj
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Robert D. Martin Pegional Administrator
Attachment:
As stated l
cc: T. Rehm, OEDO l
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h9 B905040341 890425 PDR FOIA j
BAUMANB7-535 PDR
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LRP-1
- .3 Rev.'1 OCT.
3, 1985 STP LITIGATION REVIEW NRC CITINGS
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Document No.
D626 Document
Title:
'HL&P's 6th set to B&R Date Completed: 10/31/85 Page 3 of @-
1 Revision No.:
0
. k. KN Reviewer Name: KANG, C.M.
Reviewer Signature Sequence Vol. No. or Deposition Page No./
No.
Sec. No.
Date Line No.
22 12 10/31/83 83/28-31 23 13 10/31/83 88/26-89/29 24 13 10/31/83 90/12-17 25 13 10/31/83 91/19-26 26 14 10/31/83 95/12 15 10/31/83 NONE 27 16 10/31/83 105/15-19 28 16 10/31/83 107/12-108/13 29 17 10/31/83 112/37-42 30 17 10/31/83 113/19-115/15/
31 17 10/31/83 115/32-116/4 32 17 10/31/83 120/32-38 i
Updated: 11/05/85 l
Form _No. CIT-03 l
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caused a QCE supervisor to override the advice of his subordi-I nates that the area of the construction Joint was dirty.
11.
A former QCE supervisor stated that whenever construction falls behind in placing concrete, QC inspectors always seem to get the blame.
iii. A current QCE supervisor related that after QC had completed the peoplacesient inspection, the pour card had been signed and the concrete ordered, the QC personnel would find additional problems such as alterations to the forms or debris dropped into the forms.
iv.
In the summer of 1979, a QC inspector discovered three horisontal reinforcing steel bars missing from a well sec-tion which was being readied for concrete placement, whereupon he was verbally abused by a person from construction.
v.
Fifteen of 24 QC civil inspectors executed signed, sworn statements wherein they claimed that their supervisors had not supported their positions during confrontations with con-struction personnel.
vi.
A QC inspector refused to sign off on deficient cadwelds and initiated an NCR because cadwelder requalification was not performed as required by the specification. The con-struction supervisor ignored the QC inspector, his supervisor, and the NCR, and ordered his men to continue cadwelding.
vii. A high level QA/QC manager warned five civil QC inspectors not to talk to the ERC.
viii. A QC supervisor stated that after the NRC leaves QC inspectors will be dismissed.
I ix.
A concrete foreman stated that his crew was able to violate a concrete specification without the knowledge of a QC civil inspector.
x.
A QC supervisor indicated that a person in con-struction attempted to harass CA/QC program personnel by trying to remove air conditioning from the assigned office spaces.
xi.
A QC inspector admitted signing falso concrete curing records at the request of a lead QC person when he had not inspected the curing.
xii. A QC inspector signed of f on a minor cadweld defi-ciency because he felt his supervisors would not support him and would side with construction.
xiv (sic). A QC inspector was physically threatened by a construction general foreaan.
xv (sic). A QC inspector was physically threatened by a construction superintendent.
xvi (sic). A QC inspector was threatened by a con-struction general foreman.
xvii (sic]. In a January 4, 1980 lecture by Brown & Root I
Project CA Manager, Brown & Root site QA/QC personnel and con-I struction engineering and supervisory personnel were given the impression that the Brown & Root CA/QC organization was subor-dinate to pro oct cost and construction schedule considerations.
The lecture a so strongly emphasised the fact that at Brown s
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i Root, QC inspectors' decisions are subject to que'Jtion, challenge
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and supervisory review and reversal.
l e.
If Brown & Root contends that any of the above examples did not occur, was information concerning Brown & Root's posation cosumunicated to the NRC inspector or the NRC during the course of the NRC investigation?
d.
If the answer to (c) is yes, describe the information provided to the inspecto, including a specific citation to all documents provided to tho inspector and aufficient detailed descriptions of the information provided to show whether the inspector fairly described the information provided. Include in your answer a statement regarding whether and in what circum-stances Brown & Root advised the NRC inspector or other NRC personnel of its position regarding the independence of QA/QC inappropriate cost and schedule considerations.
e.
Did Brown & Root perform an investigation to determine the validity of the NRC finding regarding the independence of the quality assurance / quality control functions in the civil area?
f.
If the answer to (e) is yes, describe the investigation and identify (1) all documents which relate or refer to ths investigation or its results and (ii) all documents reviewed during the course of the investigation, (iii) all persons with personal knowledge of the investigation or its results, and (iv) all persons who provided information regarding the general subject matter to the NRC inspector during the course of the NRC investigation.
g.
Identify each document which records the opinions of Brown & Root personnel regarding the validity of NRC finding No.
1 of the Notice of violation, and the specific examples cited by the NRC as supporting its finding No. 1.
ANSWER:
a.
The Interrogatory selectively quotes from Finding No. 1 (the Finding), and contains typographical errors. Appendix A hereto, at pages 1-5, contains the complete and accurate text of Finding No. 1.
The Finding was unfounded, for the reasons set forth below.
Of all the items of noncompliance in the Notice of vio-lation, none was as unfair, or as damaging to the reputation of
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Brown & Root, as was Finding No. 1.
The NRC justified the Finding using biased, inaccurate summaries of confidential interviews with unidentified Brown & Root concrete inspectors and I,
concrete foremen. The Finding, which was unfounded, stated that concrete inspectors at STP were signing QC documentation "even j
though the procedural or specification requirements may not havs 1
been fully met."
Finding No. 1 also stated that concrete l
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inspectors performed these alleged improper sign-of fs because they were '(al subjected to production pressures, (b) not always supported by QC management, (c) harassed, (d) intimidated, and 4
(e) threatened." However, these statements in finding No. I were contradicted by (1) the NRC's and ML&P's close scrutiny of concrete placements, including concrete QC activitier, in the period prior to the 79-19 investigations (2) the reviews per-formed by Time 1 apse, Inc. in January and June 1920, pursuant to an HL&P consitment to perfom an independent review of "the cause of the perception of harassment or undue pressure on QC personnels" (3) the inspecto.s' own public repudiation of the NRC's charges during the August 1980 Show Cause public meetings (4) testimony in the NRC ASLD licensing hearings by NRC and EL&P-sponsored witnesses, drying that there was any pattern of harassment or intimidation, or lack of management support for QA/QC at STPs and (5) the high quality of concrete inspected and placed at STP (s,,ee, e.g., Brown & Root's Answer to Interrogatory f
No. 5 above).
Imdia,andNRCCommissione Brown & Root believes that the NRC inspectors and investiga-tors conducting the 79-19 investigation were under political, in response to Dan Swayse's highly publicised charges of harass-ment and intimidation.
Mr. Swayne's baseless and inflammatory allegations were the subject of letters from Congressman Gonzales to the NRC and the Justice Department written in April 1979, within weeks of the Three Mile Island accident.
Mr. Swayse's false charges were also the subject of a four month FBI inves-tigation which began in June 1979, and which found no criminal f
violations.
Mr. Swayne's allegations were, simultaneously, being exploited by the interveners in the NBC ASLS licensing hearings.
Although the NRC's special 79-13 sid-term inspection in August l
1979 showed good management access and support being provided to QC inspectors, and good QC-Construction relations, when CBS aired
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Mr. swayre's inaccurate and irresponsible charges to millions of viewers in october 1979, and af ter continued post-TMI pressura for stepped-up NRC enforcement actions, Mr. Stello launched the 19-19 investigation. In short, as acknowledpd in Inspection poport No. 79-19, the 79-19 investigation was, to a great degree, dictated by 'past allegations" Q.e., Swayne's), that " received considerable media interest which has generated inquiries from several Congressmen and the NRC Cossaissioners."
arown s Root believes that as a result of this politicized atmosphere, the NRC's investigation of conerste QC inspectors and
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foremen lacked objectivity. of the 54 concrete QC inspectors and forenen interviewed during the NRC's lengthy investigation, many were subjected to extensive leading questions and pressure from the investigator regarding, e_.g., whether those interviewed had
'ever been harassed, intimidated, threatened", etc.
Brown a moot management and supervision received numerous complaints from those interviewed regarding pressures that were felt during the I
interviews. QC concrete inspectors and foresen were called into
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these interviews with no idea of their purpose or context, usually no advance notice, and no explanation of their rights.
According to Inspection Report No. 79-19, NRC investigations prior to the 79-19 investigation "were conducted without the use of signed, sworn statements." During the 79-19 investigation, approximately 24
- signed, sworn statements
- were taken. These were prepared by an NRC inspector sitting in the roca with the NRC investigator and the interviewee. The NRC inspector took notes as the QC inspector or foreman answered numerous and often leading questions from the NRC investigator. At the conclusion of the interviews, scoe of those interviewed were asked simply to sign the NRC inspector's handwritten notes before leaving the room, with little opportunity to consider their accuracy. These, or typed versions thereof, became what the NRC referred to as
' signed, sworn statements." The statements, or the NRC's u
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-114 HLAP's Mk & %
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D fJ j summaries thereof, did not accurately reflect the intent or context of many of the answers and remarks made during these interviews, leading to inaccuracies and an apparent misunder-standing of comments and facts on the part of the NRC.
- Moreover, as noted in Report No. 79-19, the statements included in the
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1 Report were ' paraphrased and summarized," which askes the Report, i
in nany cases, difficult if not impossible to understand or
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verify.
Unobjective NRC investigation techniques and methods such as those experimented with during the 79-19 investigation subse-quently led to widespread complaints by the nuclear industry, and to the adoption by the NRC of significantly revised investigation policies, providing right to counsel or personal representative, right to tape an interview, and other rights not afforded during the 79-19 investigation.
I:. December 1979, pursuant to one of HL&P's " action itaas' Qae, EL&P letter to the NRC dated December 28, 1979,
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ST-HL-AIe401), EL&P committed to the NRC to p+fform an assessment "to determine the cause of the perception of harassment or undue pressute on QC personnel." As a result, in early 1980, G.
Howell, president of Timelapse Inc., conducted interviews and administered confidential questionnaires to all Brown & Root OC l
inspectors and to numerous Brown & Root construction workers.
Mr. Howell found no evidence of harassment or intimidation of QC inspa-tors by construction workers, and in fact found good OC-Cor.struction relationships.
Mr. Howell identified some QC inspector dissatisfaction with QA/QC management, mostly in the areas of cossaunications, pay and benefits, i.e.,
ir nontechnical areas.
Mr. Howell has characterized these findings as entirely typical for a large, complex construction project suct. as STP.
Brown & Root management quickly addressed and remedied these areas to the inspectors' satisfaction. In interviews of inspec-tors and in questionnaires, Mr. Howell was told by many of the oc i
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inepectors that they believed the NRC had taken their comments q
out of context during the 79-19 investigation and that the NRC and Ces had unfairly tt *ished the reputation of the QC inspectors and Brown & Root.
In a February 28, 1980 letter to the NRC (ST-NL-AZ-425), G.
Oprea of HLf>P misstated Mr. Nowell's findings, stating that the Timelapse survey concluded that the perception of harassment S QC
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personnel could have existed in the past because of instances of confrontation between construc-tion and QC personnel. Each of those instances in themselves were not especially significant, but taken together it was possible that site QC personn<si perceived there to be a pattern of harassment and confrontation."
During the August 1980 Show Cause public meeting, Mr.
Sing 1 sten (a Arown & Root concrete / civil QC supervisor, iden-tified only as individual A-35 in Inspectibn Report No. 79-19) read aloud a letter to Mr. Stello, dated August 12, 1980 signed by 71 Brown & Root CA/QC personnel (and furnished a copy for the record). The letter stated among other things:
It is my sincers oelief that I have always operated fre df to assure that the South Texas Project het oosa constructed in accordance with the appropriate design documents. I have never knowingly accepted anything that, in my judgement, was not in accordance with the design requirements. I believe that I am qualified to make these judgements and have never suc umbed to pressures from any management to accept any work that, in my opinion, did not meet the applicable design specifications. I offer this statement to you of my own free will, for your consideration and as a testimonial to my fellow citizens.
From the time the NRC's charges were apparently first pre-sented to LL&P as preliminary 79-19 investigation findings, in December 1979, EL&P acquiesced in the NRC's groundless charges i
that there were widespread harassment, intimidation and lack of management support for QC inspectors in the concrete area. It was not until sixteen months later in April 1981, when EL&P filed
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Attachr.ent C.3 O
A Rev. I
- OCT, 3,
1985 i
STP ' LITIGATIOf4 REVIEW Document
Title:
HL&P's amended 2nd Cocument No.
D620 set to B&R
) _
Date Completed: 10/18/85 Page of Revision No.:
0
/N C
Reviewer Name: DORMIDO, R.
Reviewer Signature
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Deposition Page No./
Vol. No. or Sequence Date Line No.
Sec. No.
No.
05/23/83 NONE 1
05/23/83 20/9-11 2
1 05/23/83 21/12-26 2
2 05/23/83 22/6-23/8 2
3 05/23/83 25/25-26/9 /
2 4
05/23/83 26/17-28 2
5 05/23/83 32/27-29 3
6 05/23/83 NONE 4
05/23/83 55/18-25 5
7 05/23/83 NONE 6
05/23/83 NONE 7
05/23/83 NONE 8
Updated: 11/05/85 Form No. CIT-03
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such person, all estra rateria!s applicable to each used ar such work and their costs rates (el The precise effect you claim the change had cost, and the full rettonale upon wh2ch you upon Projectclaim the change caused such effects you claim the change had impact if a
(f) The precise including the nun.ber of days, upon the Projectschedule allegedly was delayed and the partacular
- schedule, h
allegedly affected, and the full rationale upon whic any, the caused such delay or affected such tas5+ 'sim the change you in which you advised HL&P tes,
(g) Any communicationof the change on project cost concerning the alleged effect er schedules and you are unable to supply the th) To the extent of fa)-if) above, state inf ormation requested for any partfull basis upon which you contend that the regulataon n4asurably affected your performance.
the ANSWER:
50 Appendix B, Criterion I (ss)
(1) 10 C.F.R.
and regu-This rulemaking broadened the concept of CA organizational independence as applied 1 story intent More specifi-to such activities as design and procurement.
in conjunction with revisions cally, the regulatory change,significantly af fected Brown &
1.64, to Regulatory Guide
- function, design verification of the Root's pe rformance to dedicate many experienced, senior Root requiring Brown &
function and to make proce-engineering personnel to this The estimate of manpower resource commit-dural revisions.
3.
is presented in response to Interrogatory No.
ment 10 C.F.R. 50, Appendix I i
(2)
Appendix I provided the first numerical guidelines i
l for
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the ALARA concept l
design to meet to be used for plant the As part of this concept, radiological dose.
offsite l dose to rulemaking significantly reduced the cecepted annua the public resulting from radioactive affluent streams As a result of this rule-during normal plant operation.
to assure making, Brown & Root had to perform design reviews 9 I l
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a regulatory compliance and had to per f orm addat aonal ana;yses to confirm design. The cost / benefit numeracal threshcid U. Sumpteri to I was utilited by HI.6P included in Appendix justif y deletion of radioactive material processing compo-HEPA/ charcoal filter assemblies)
(MEAB NVAC exhaust nents the NRC.
This historically had been required by which Root's objection and advice action was taken despite Brown &
The NRC later required those component s to to the contrary.
This specific Hl.6P directive
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be included in the STP design.
and subsequent NRC action resulted in duplicate and unneces-and wasted manhours.
Root design effort sary Brown &
(3) 10 C.F.R. 51 1974, and subse-51, effective in August New part the promulgated to implement amendments thereto were quent of 196R provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act This regulation as applied to nuclear facilities,
("NEPA*)
2 for prepa-was used in conjuction with Regalatory Guide 4.
the STP Environmental Report
("ER*).
While ration of f
interim regulatory guidelines existed prior to issuance o amendments set 51 and subsequent 10 C.T.R. 51, the new Part This in for ER contents.
forth more detailed requirements to perform regulatory compliance Root turn caused Brown &
ion for reviews of the ER and to provide additional informat inclusion in the ER.
(4) 10 C.T.R. 73.55 In this 1977 rulemaking, in conjunction with lgated numerous Division 5 regulatory guides, the NRC promu he purpose specific design objectives and requirements for t facilities to susceptibility of nuclear of reducing the Unauthorized intrusion, sabotage and theft of special security was within while overall plant nuclear material, i d to HL&P's scope of responsibility. Brown & Root was requ re l
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4 corpitance reviews, cost and desagn perform regulatory Since plant layout was essen-and design changes.
- studies, the time of the rulemaking, S*P desagn tielly established at accommodate the new regulatory requirements.
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did not Root in studies Substantial work was performed by Brown &
f for the yard lighting system and and engineering design and associated power supply, security computer systemfencing, it e r at ive relocation of perimeter components, and vital area access design of the east-gate guard house, to perform evalua-NL&P also required Brown & Root for HL&P by schemes.
Plan as prepared Security tions of HL&P's TP In addition to the dif ficulties in adapting the S d securi-Ebasco.
layout and design as it existed in 1977 to the rigi n & Root's efforts ty requirement s mandated by the llRC. Brow licated by coinci-to achieve regulatory compliance were comp in some esses, dental fire protection requirements which, In these bjectives.
were diametrically opposed to security o to Brown &
cases, HL&p failed to provide adequate guidance f
i to resolve and to make the necessary timely decis ons This regulatory Root contradictory regulatory positions.
d abdication such action in combination with HL&P's omissions an responsibility resulted in substantial addi-of management inefficient and
- Root, tional engineering tasks for Brown &
increased engineering manheurs, engineering work, redundant Root 's manpower re-substantial drain on Brown and a sources.
10 c.T.P. 100, Appenf,,,g for use in the design of (5) f Appendix A required ti...,
to withstand seismic events, the seis-plant features determined based on mie-induced vibratory ground motion be This hquake potential.
the maximum historical regional eart established the maximum potential ground acceleration f - - - - - _ _ - _ _ _ _
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(*S$t*).
The magnitude of the safe shutdown dix A was 0.3Cg.
manimum ground seeeleratton allowed by Appen dix A, and based Using the conservative methodology of Appenand regional geologleal site location, on historical data, deterrined the maximum poten-Root characteristics, Brown &
for STP.
Neverthe-less than 0.079 tial earthquake to be SSE magnitude less, the NRC required STP design to assume an f
I realistically which could be greater than tablished I
some 40 percent While this regulatory requirement was es expected.
the NRC failed to recognise the i
fairly early in the project, listic large margin of safety prnvidec by this unrea rly conserva-inherent 0.10g earthquake and rigidly imposed other ovefor se tive requirement s
- STP, These
& Root's termination on the time of Brown imposed by the NRC via Standard Review and' requirements were 1 tory Guides, Plans, Branch Technical Positions, Requ s Relevant documents Information.
for Additional Reque st s includes 1.60, 1.61, 1.92, Regulatory Guides (1) 1.100, 1.122.
3.7.1, 3.7.2, Standard Review Plans (11) 3.7.3.
PSAR Questions and Answers 2.31, 3.7, 130.5, 130.6, 130.7, (111) 3.8, 3.9, 020.50, 130.8, 130.9, 130.10, 130.11, 130.12,130.23, 323.
FSAR Questions and Answers 130.11,130.15, 130.16, 1 (iv) 130.12, 130.13, 130.14, 130.18.
the technical papers and reports I
referenced in the material cited above.
(v) in the created uncertainty These NRC actions Root 's seismic design
'i regulatory acceptability of Brown & to perf orm design Root and caused Brown &
repeated seismic STP for the reviews for regulatory compliance, perform tings with the NRC, analyser., prepare for and attend mee increase and coordination, consultant interface constructability, increase complicate plant material quant it ie s,,
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cons t ruct ion efficiency, increase construction decrease duration, and increase equipment costs.
In the face of HL&P was unable or these changing regulatory requirement s,
unwilling to escalate the problem to NRC's upper managemer.t restoration of discipline for resolution and to insist on and management control of tne NRC staf f responsible for many See also response to of the arbitrary requirements.
Interrogatory No. 14.
50.48 and Aopendix R (6)
_10 C.F.R.
New Appendix R was the culmination of the fire protection requirement s which continuously evolving Appendix resulted from the Browns Ferry fire of March 1975.
R was only one in the litany of regulatory documents which i
set forth design requirements for fire protection.
In performed a detailed,'
Root response to Appendix R, Brown &
review at ML&P's direction extensive regulatory compliance 16, 1981). In addition, Brown (ST-HL-BR-5710. dated January began f actoring the Appen, dix R requirements into the
& Root This work was not tsepleted Safe Shutdown Hazards Analysis.
Additional due to Brown & Root's termination from the STP.issue information relative to the fire protection regulatory is presented in response to Interrogatory No. 3.
(7) 10 C.T.R. 50.55a Two changes to 10 C.F.R. 50.55a affected Brown &
First, in 1976, Part 50 was amended to Root's performance.
require-incorporate additional inservice inspection (*ISI')
ments for certain piping, valves, and associated assemblies.
Successful implementation of this ' augmented ISI program
- substantially increased access to the various required that included in plant design and layout.
inspection points be TP design the time this rulemaking was promulgated, the S At where these new re-had progressed to a point and layout The new readily ac ommodated.
could not be quirements
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R A
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l between HL&P a r. d requirements were discussed augrented ISI recommended t o Brown & Root for many months.
Brown & Rcot ML&P ignored to augmented ISI.
HL&P that the STP not commit d to the new this recommendation and unilaterally committe (see TSAR 6.6).
f requirements 50.55a occurred in I
The second change to 10 C.T.R, edition of the ASMI 1977 and allowed the use of the At the i
1979 Summer 1978 Addenda.
Code, Sections III and XI, d the 1974 the STP was committed to and had utilize By the regulatory change, use of the 1977 f
- time, edition of ASKI.
d continued edition of the Code was elective f or the STP an HL&P decided to edition was acceptable.
use of the 1974 to avail itself of edition of the Code the 1977 the 197*
invoke relaxation in the Section XI ISI requirements that failed to understand that,
However, HL&P edition of fered.
revised naterials the relaxed *ISI rules were based on The STP did not meet the in Section III.
requirements 1977 for pro-revised materials requirements of ASKI III, Therefore,ASdrXI, 1977 was not compati-cured equipment.
HL&P committed to the 1977 Code ble with ASKE %II, 1974, but edition anyway, d
In response to the changes to 10 C.F.R. 50.55a an Brown & Root expended considerable ML&P's commitments, requirements to HL&P personnel,
/
r explaining the cede tion points, i
effort performed design reviews to re-evaluate inspec Technical J
revised the ISI Eeception List, prepared a new ISI 4
and revised engineering drawings.
Reference Document, 4
(1) 10 C.F.R. 50.55fel_
l 50.55(e) to I
amended 10 C.F.R.
l In 1976, the NRC defi-HL&P notify the NRC of each reportable require that "promptly" as ciency " wit h in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />' rather than HL&P IDr. Sumpter) advised Brown &
previously required.
dated May of this ;;;ulatory change in ST-HL-BR-1504, Root l
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t 11,1976, and statedt This rule change will have ma;or irport c-I the deftetency reporting philosophy for STP.
However, HL&P provided no f urther de'init aon er gun dar.ee to or schedule implications on anticipated cost Brown & Root nature and magnitude of impact on or, indeed, on the exact HL&P's interpretation and Root's responsibilities.
Brown &
ture implementation of this rule change resulted in the prema items as and arbitrary notification to the NRC of dozens of d
reportable when further investigation and evaluation prove This capricious them not to be of safety significance.
to divert untold numbers action by HL&P caused Brown & Root f
from their and technical personnel of management, craft, the planned, productive work setivities in order to support investigations, ant.
multitude of meetings, evaluations, This additional, unanticipated,
reports required by EL&P.
work was created and directed by HL&P.
(9) 10 c.r.R. 50.70 This regulatory change' represented an admir.istra-Inspector and logistic followup to the NRC Resident tive initiated in mid-1978.
Through this program which was the NRC installed a full-time Resident Reactor
- program, Shannon Phillips was Inspector ("RRI*) at the ETP.
Mr. H.
from late and was assigned to the STP the designated RRI the STP, During his tenure at 1978 through Septeeber 1981.
d experience Mr. Phillips lacked the necessary education an h construction to adequately assess the acceptability of t e of which included the preponderance activities underway, Because civil-structural, mechaniesi and electrical work.
ion of his lack of technical understanding of these construct
. _ = = -
Phillips, through exercise of his federal used
---=c e-tivities, M".,
authority, individually or in conjunction with HL&P, ca to 10 C.T.R.
incidents to be arbitrarily reported pursuant d
80-01, 80-04, 80-18, an (see IE Inspection Reports 50.55(e) 4
.m______.
R O
evaluat sons t o be caused unnecessary and extensive 81-14),
80-21 and 81-14),
(see IE Inspection Report s pe r f ot1med caused extensive and unnecessary revisions to CA/QC programs (see IE Inspect ion Reports 81-01 and 81-231, impeded (see IE Inspection Repcrts 81-13, construction progress 81-30, 81-31 and 81-32), and, in general, imposed
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of codes, standards, and unreasonable interpretations commitments on the STP resulting in unanticipated manhour expenditures and increased construction efforts.
(10) 10 C.T.R.
50.71_
I This 1976 rulemaking amended the regulatory requirements for records retention. In response t'o this performed a procedure review to assure
'i change, Brown & Root project compliance with the regulatbry requirements.
(11) 10 C.T.R. 50.109 so The significance of this rulemaking was not reluctance rather the consistent much the change itself, but rules relative to the to it s own by the NRC to adhere l i imposition of new requirements on the STP design fol ow ng
(*CP").
After the CP issuance of the Construction Permit h
s and was granted in December 1975, the NRC required c ange l
d additions to design features which previously had receive These changes and NAC review and had been found acceptable. design, but the addititas represented 'backfits' to plant s
NRC systematically refused to acknowledge the requirement as backfits, thus avoiding their responsibility to demon-b tan-strate that the new requirements indeed represented su s health and tial, additional protection required for public Moreover, HL6P was unable or unwilling to insist safety.
d to the new requirements be classified as backfits an e
that the NRC provide such demonstration of substan-insist that Examples of backfit require-l tial, additional protection.
hot versus Isolation Valve Cubiele design, ments include f 1
+
a 6
These and interaction.
cold shutdown, and coil structuredescribed in the following are other backfit requirements and Answers 010.9, documents:
(1) FSAR Questions 022.1, 032.2 032.7, 010.25, 010.28, 010.13, 010.24, 110.8, 110.9, 110.13, 032.11, 032.15, 032.17, 040.26, 110.16, 110.17, 110.18, 110.19, 110.22, 110.24, 110.14, 110.26, 130.9, 130.12, 211.4.
16, 1977.
NRC letter dated March (11)
Root In response to these NRC actions, Brown &
supporting HL&P in its manhours o pended considerable Root had to In addition, Bruwn &
regulatory interaction.
and analyses: prepare studies, cost e st imat e s,
and change perform information for to fiRC requests responses designs.
(12) 10 C.F.R. 21 21 extended NRC requirements for report-New Part suppliers and ing defects and noncompliance to, contractors, I.
Previously, such reporting requirements were consult ant s.
i holders. In limited to licensees and construction perm t had to develop response to the new regulation, Brown & Root ISTP-FMO-0221 and and implement a new project procedure and other procedures as clari-prepared revisions to this issued or iden-fications to NRC intent were periodically Root to also required Brown &
21 tified. The new Part level reviews of potential safety perform many management specific notices concerns to assure regulatory compliance.and included in new l
were prepared and posted in work areas related equip-purchase orders and change orders for safety-audits of suppliers,
& Root The scope of Brown Addit ional ment.
d subcontractors, and consultants was increase.
i d by Brown CA documentation had to be prepared and mainta ne
& Root.
( l