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| {{Adams | | {{Adams |
| | number = ML20244A899 | | | number = ML20247D580 |
| | issue date = 03/29/1989 | | | issue date = 05/15/1989 |
| | title = Insp Repts 50-413/89-05 & 50-414/89-05 on 890204-25. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Review of Plant Operations,Surveillance Observation,Maint Observation & Review of Nonroutine Event Repts | | | title = Ack Receipt of 890427 Ltr Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-413/89-05 & 50-414/89-05 |
| | author name = Lesser M, Orders W, Shymlock M | | | author name = Herdt A |
| | author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) | | | author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| | addressee name = | | | addressee name = Tucker H |
| | addressee affiliation = | | | addressee affiliation = DUKE POWER CO. |
| | docket = 05000413, 05000414 | | | docket = 05000413, 05000414 |
| | license number = | | | license number = |
| | contact person = | | | contact person = |
| | document report number = 50-413-89-05, 50-413-89-5, 50-414-89-05, 50-414-89-5, NUDOCS 8904180259 | | | document report number = NUDOCS 8905250484 |
| | package number = ML20244A894
| | | document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, NRC TO UTILITY, OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE |
| | document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS | | | page count = 1 |
| | page count = 8 | |
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| * | | . 8 e w gg 151989 / |
| .g | | L . Docket Nos. 50-413, 50-414 i License Nos. NPF-35, NPF-52 Duke. Power Company ATTN: Mr. H. B. Tucker, Vice President Nuclear Production Department 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Gentlemen: |
| ' | | SUBJECT: REPORT NOS. 50-413/89-05 AND 50-414/89-05 Thank you for your response of April 27, 1989, to our Notice of Violation issued on March 29, 1989, concerning activities conducted at your Catawba We have evaluated your response and found that it meets the |
| s gaOCECu 4' UNITED STATES 3 @' .
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| j , j- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
| | facilit requirements of 10 CFR 2.201. We will examine the implementation of your corrective actions during future inspection We appreciate your cooperation in this matte |
| * REGION 11 o
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| 101 MARIETTA ST,, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 4,,f, L
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| , Report Nos. 50-413/89-05 and 50-414/89-05'
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| i< Licensee: Duke Power Company h 422 South Church Street Charlotte, N.C. 28242 Docket'Nos.: 50-413 and 50-414 ,
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| License Nos.: NPF-35 and NPF-52 h, Facility Name:-Catawba 1 and 2
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| ~ Inspection Conducted:' February.4, 1989 - February 25, 1989 _
| | Sincerely, |
| Inspector- //d j J[Ud9
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| /D'at( Signed W. T. Ord~ers
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| / t InspectorpM ?S. Te'se~r, ~
| | Alan R. Herdt, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects cc: T. B. Owen, Station Manager 2enior Resident Inspector - McGuire State of South Carolina bec: K. N. Jabbour, NRR NRC Resident Inspector Document Control Desk |
| A/2 J- <@/DN9
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| / Irate / Signed 7 Approved by . //fd/
| | R RI B on er My glock |
| M B."Sh'fml'o~ck, Sectiogl Chief
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| / J df/h ate 41gn'ed Projects Branch 3 -
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| Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine, resident inspection was conducted on site inspecting in the areas of review of plant operations; surveillance observation; maintenance observation; review of licensee nonroutine event reports; and followup of previously identified items and part 21 report Results: In the areas inspected one violation was identified involving an | |
| ' inadequate' test procedure to ensure that auxiliary feedwater piping was vented after filling, paragraph One unresolved item was
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| ; identified involving personnel errors associated with two safety injections on Unit !
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| 8904180259 890329 3 DR ADOCK O
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| REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Emplo,Utes
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| *H. Barron, Operations Superi?tendent W. Beaver Performance Enginee
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| R. Charest, Station Chemistry Supervisor T. Crawford, Integrated Scheduling Superintendent W. Deal, Health Physics, Supervisor
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| *J. Forbes, Technical Services Superintendent
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| *R. Glover, Compliance Engineer T. Harrall, Design Engineering R. Jones, Maintenance Engineering Services Engineer F. Mack, Project Services Engineer W. McCollough, Mechanical Maintenance Engineer W. McCollum, Maintenance Superintendent
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| *T. Owen, Statior Manager .
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| J. Stackley, Instrumentation and Electrical Engineer D. Tower, Shift Operating Engineer R. Wardell, Station Services Superintendent Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personne NRC Resident Inspectors
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| *W. Orders M. Lesser
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| * Attended exit interview.
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| , Unresolved Items An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation. There was one unresolved item identified in this repor ]
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| , Plant Operations Review (71707 and 71710)
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| i The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, Technical Specifications (TS), and administrative controls. Control room logs, danger tag logs, Technical Specification Action Item Log, and the removal and restoration log were routinely reviewed. Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with j approved procedures.
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| The inspectors : verified by. observation and interviews, that the measures taken to assure physical protection- of. the-facility me current requirement Areas inspected included the securit organization, the establishment'and maintenance'of. gates, doors, and isolation zones in the proper conditions, and that access. control and badging were proper and procedures followe In addition to the areas discussed above, the; areas toured were~
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| observed .for fire prevention and protection' activities. These included such things as combustible material control, fire protection systems. and materials, and fire protection associated with mainte-nance activities. . The inspectors reviewed Problem Investigation Reports to determine if the licensee was appropriately documenting problems and implementing corrective actions, Unit 1 SummaryL Unit 1 began the . report period in Mode 2 performing zero power physics testing (ZPT) associated with the completion of the end of cycle (E00) 3 refueling outage. By February 6, ZPT testing was complete and the outage was essentially over. The outage duration was-74 days, and was originally targeted for'60 days. On February 7 when the turbine was rolled, it was found that the B low pressur turbine rotor was. slightly bowed which had given rise to a high vibration indication.' The . turbine was manually tripped and efforts began to "unbow" the turbine which had apparently bowed as the result of uneven heating. .By the following day, the rotor had been repaired and 'the unit was at 17% power. On February 13, with testing continuing, the unit reached 82% power and the following. day the unit achieved 100% power where it remained throcghout the remainder of the report perio Unit 2 Sunmary Unit 2 began the report period at 94% power, limited to that power level by the previously reported problems of main feedwater flow to the C steam generator (S/G). The unit operated at this power level with no major problems until February 21, when at 1:15 instrument technicians were attempting to determine why the 90% open test light was not illuminating on main steam isolation valve (MSIV)
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| 2SM-3 when performing surveillance procedure PT-2-A-4250-01A, " Main
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| Steam Isolation Va~1ve Movement Test." The MSIV closed when the technicians placed an improper electrical jumper which short circuited the power supply to the MSIV control circuity. When the MSIV closed, the unit suffered a reactor trip on low low level in the C S/G due to the resultant pressure increase, and void collaps Three steam line code safeties and one S/G power operated relief
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| valve (PORV) opened due to the pressure transient which in turn lead L
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| to a safety injection on steam line negative pressure rate,'
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| Preliminary inspection findings indicate that the transient-was the result of inappropriate trouble . shooting / maintenance techniques' associated with placing the above referenced jumpe Inspection efforts were inccmplete at the end of the report perio The inspector's have requested completed work request 42768 OPS to determine actual work performed and procedures in use at the tim This item will be carried as unresolved pending completion of revie At 1:26 p.m. on February 21, unit 2 was in mode 3 recovering from the above referenced safety injection and reactor trip, when a second safety injection occurred on low steam line pressure. The unit was at approximately 530 degrees F and 800 psig steam pressure. A cooldown had been initiated earlier in the day when the unit entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 based on information in post trip data which indicated both diesel generator sequencers were degrade Preliminary indications are that the operating crew was in the process of terminating the cooldown, thought that steam generator pressures / temperatures had stabilized and diverted their attention to other duties when pressure in the A steam generator began decreasin The rate of decrease was sufficient to cause a icw steam line pressure safety injectio Inspection efforts relative to this event are incomplete. A review of the data generated during the trip, procedures being employed during the cooldown and discussions with the operators will be completed and documented in report 89-07. Until that review is complete, this issue will be carried as Unresolved Item 414/89-05-01:
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| Personnel Errors Causing Two Safety Injections No violations or deviations were identifie . Surveillance Observation (61726) During the inspection period, the inspector verified plant operations were in compliance with various TS requirements. Typical of these requirements were confirmation of compliance with the TS for reactor coolant chemistry, refueling water tank, emergency power systems, safety injection, emergency safeguards systems, control room ventila-tion, and direct current electrical power source The inspector verified that surveillance testing was performed in accordance with the approved written procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met, appropriate removal and restoration of the affected equipment was accomplished, test results met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne !
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| 4 The inspectors witnessed or reviewed the following surveillance:
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| PT/2/A/4350/02B Diesel Generator 2B Operability Test PT/0/A/4200/02 Standby Shutdown Facility Diesel Test No violations or deviations were identifie . Maintenance Observations (62703) Station maintenance activities of selected systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they- were conducted in accordance with the requirements. The inspector verified licensee conformance to the requirements in the following areas of inspection:
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| the activities were accomplished using approved procedures, and functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities performed were accomplished by qualified personnel; and materials used were properly certified. Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may effect system performanc The inspectors witnessed or reviewed the following maintenance activities:
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| 44660 OPS Inspect Why ISV-19 Failed to Indicate Open 44716 OPS Inspect Why 1SV-13 Will Not Open 5545 MNT Repa.k Valve ISV-13 44717 OPS Inspect Why ISV-1 Will Not Open No violations or deviations were identifie . Review of Licensee Non Routine Event Reports (92700) The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed to determine if the information provided met NRC requirements. The l determination included: adequacy of description, verification of
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| compliance with Technical Specifications and regulatory requirements, i corrective action taken, existence of potential generic problems,
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| reporting requirements satisfied, and the relative safety significance of each even Additional inplant reviews and i discussion with plant personnel, as appropriate, were conducted for j those reports indicated by an (*). The following LERs are closed:
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| *413/88-26 Engineered Safeguards Features j Actuation Caused by Momentary Inverter 1 Low Voltage
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| *414/88-26 Technical Specification Required !
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| Shutdown due to an Inoperable Chemical .i and Volume Control Centrifugal Charging pump No violations or deviations were identifie l 7. Follow-up on Previous Inspection Findings (92701 and 92702) (OPEN) Unresolved Item 413/88-38-01: Gravity Drain of FWST to Refueling Cavity. On January 7, at approximately 4:00 p.m. it was i determined that the deep end of the refueling canal had been i overfilled allowing water to flow around the vertical missile shields to the reactor vessel. Water was approximately one inch deep at vessel flange and flowed through the temporary nozzle covers and cavity seal to . lower containment. Water level was subsequently lowered in the deep end of the canal and the vessel flange area was flushed with demineralized water. The cavity was cleaned /deconta-minated and a visual inspection of the vessel flange area showed areas of rust and slight traces of boron on five studs. These areas were recleane Discussions with operations personnel indicated that the incident may have been caused by inadequate procedural guidanc Procedure OP/1/A/6200/13 which controls the filling, draining and purification of the refueling cavity does not appear to adequately tcke into '
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| consideration the possibility of having the Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST) in the purification mode. This in turn led the operators to overlook the fact that valve FW-23 was ope This valve is a bypass around the refueling water recirculation pump and provided a gravity drain flowpath from the FWST to the refueling cavit The review of this event is incomplete. An analysis of the interface between all applicable procedures in force at the time of the event, and an evaluation of the safety significance of the equipment which was wet by the event and discussions with the operating staff has begun, but is not complete. The licensee's review of the event which is being carried as Problem Investigation Report (PIR) 1-C89-0067 is also incomplete. Efforts will continue in this area and results will be documented in report 89-0 (OPEN) Unresolved Item (413/88-38-03): Turbine drive CA Pump Pressure Seal Failure. On January 27, 1989, the licensee attempted to start the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (CAPT) on unit 1 for the first time since the refueling outage. The unit had entered mode 3 at 2:41 a.m. on January 26 and was in a 72 hour action statement per TS 3.7.1.2 until the CAPT could be tested. Operators stopped the pump when the turbine reached 2000 rpm with no corre-sponding indicated fl7w. A second start resulted in pump seizur The inspectors reviewed activities which had recently been performed on the pump. On January 18 the licensee drained portions of the pump
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| L. , ! suction piping per _ PT/1/A/4200/55, "CA- Check Valve _ Leak Rate ' Test,"
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| N to perform a leak rate test on ICA-8. The inspectors reviewed this procedure'and determined that the system restoration, performed later ie that day, failed'to vent the piping after. filling it._ Specifically .
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| high point vents 1CA-141 and ICA-195 were closed in steps 12.20.2 and zy - 12.20.9 prior to the'11ne being filled in step 12.20.10 A review of the system isometric elevation drawings' and a walkdown of-the piping revealed the potential for air to be trapped after fillin .the system. .It cannot as' yet be concluded whether or not this
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| contributed to the pump seizure, however, the fact that the procedure =
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| was inadequate 'to ensure the piping was vented is identified as -
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| violation 413/89-05-02: Inadequate Test Procedure to Ensure
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| - Auxiliary Feedwater Piping is Vented After Filling. Portions of the unresolved item remain open until. the failure mechanism of the pump b is determined by the license c; (OPEN) Unresolved Item 413/88-38-04: Valve stroke program inadequacie The licensee's valve stroke test program was reviewed in order to assess their current practice of testing motor operated valve stroke times from limit switch to limit switc The licensee requested and was granted relief from measuring full stroke time of these valves. When a valve is timed from limit switch to limit switch " full" stroke'+ime is not. measured as is required by 10CFR50.55 a(g) Realistically, only 90' to 95% of valve stroke is measured. Further, this method does not account for the time between initiation of the actuating signal and the start of valve motio Finally, the licensee has in place, per procedure IP-0-A-3820-04 a mechanism through which the OPEN limit switch can be adjusted to'95%-
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| of full stroke on motor operated gate and butterfly valves which do'
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| not meet response time requirement In essence, this shortens the-stroke time . Identified on enclosure 11.5 of that procedure are 20 valves which have required the OPEN limit switch setting to be adjusted in order to meet response time requirements. During this report period, this matter was forwarded to NRR for review, and will remain Unresolved pending completion of that revie One violation was identified in paragraph 7b abov . Part 21 Inspections (36100)
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| (OPEN) P2188-08 Defective Intercooler Inlet Adapter Provided as Part of IMO Declared Standby Diesel Engine Generato <
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| The 10CFR21 involved a report on the air diffuser plate in a Delaval diesel engine's intercooler inlet adapter which had broken loose due to failure of the weld heat affected zone on September 15, 1988. The broken 1 piece ruptured intercooler tubes. Catawba Nuclear Station had observed broken welds on its diffusers (air distribution vane) as early as 198 The licensee initially suspected the problem to be localized to the right bank intercooler due to previously discovered vibration problems. The
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| -licensee-modified the welds'on the right bank intercoolers to correct the | |
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| problem. On August 18, 1986 a failure of the air distribution vane to the left bank -intercooler occurred on the IB Diesel which resulted in a rupture of a cooling tub Non-Conforming Item (NCI) CN-457 documented-the event and corrective action which included repairs made similar to those on the right bank. .This failure was the same as that experienced in the 10CFR21 repor i
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| I In 1986, the licensee determined their failures to be not reportable under-10CFR21. The inspectors requested the licensee to provide the basis for the evaluation, considering the repetitive weld ' failures experienced at Catawba from-1984-198 This item remains open pending NRC review of the licensee's evaluatio . Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February. 27, 1989 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspector described - the areas inspected and discussed .in detail the inspection findings listed below. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did ~not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this
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| inspectio Item Number- Description and Reference Unresolved Item 414/89-05-01 Personnel Errors causing Two Safety Injections Violation 413/89-05-02 Inadequate Test Procedure to Ensure Auxiliary Feedwater Piping is Vented After Fillin __ - _ - - - _
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