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NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000482/2018002 and Assessment Follow-Up Letter
	ML18226A175
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	08/12/2018
From:	Taylor N H; NRC Region 4
To:	Heflin A C; Wolf Creek
References
	Download: ML18226A175 (60)
	v • d • e

August 12, 2018

Mr. Adam C. Heflin, President and Chief Executive Officer Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation P.O. Box 411 Burlington, KS 66839

SUBJECT: WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION

- NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000482/2018 00 2 AND ASSESSMENT FOLLOW

-UP LETTER

Dear Mr. Heflin:

On June 30, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Wolf Creek Generating Station. On July 17, 2018, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. C. Reasoner, Chief Nuclear Officer and Senior Vice President , and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report. NRC inspectors documented two findings of very low safety significance (Green) in this report. Both of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. Additionally, NRC inspectors documented one Severity Level IV violation with no associated finding. The NRC is treating these violation s as non-cited violation s (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. If you contest the violations or significance of these NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555

-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC resident inspector at the Wolf Creek Generating Station

. If you disagree with a cross

-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555

-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC resident inspector at the Wolf Creek Generating Station

. In the 2017 Annual Assessment Letter for Wolf Creek Generating Station (Report 05000482/2017006, Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) ML18052A345), the NRC identified a cross

-cutting theme in the safety conscious work environment (SCWE) area.

On August 8, 2018, the NRC documented an assessment of the licensee's progress in addressing the SCWE theme in NRC Inspection Report 05000482/201800 7 (ADAMS ML18218A265). The inspectors determined that while the licensee had taken some corrective actions to address the work environment challenges on site, these actions had not yet been effective to improve the SCWE in the maintenance support group. Based on this conclusion and the previously documented finding with a cross

-cutting aspect related to the inconsistent implementation of SCWE policy (S.1)

, as discussed in NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2017004 (ADAMS ML18043A114), the NRC determined that a theme in the SCWE area continues to exist. The NRC will continue to monitor your staff's progress in implementing corrective actions for this theme.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading

-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

"

Sincerely,

/RA/ Nicholas H. Taylor, Chief Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50

-482 License No. NPF-42 Enclosure:

Inspection Report

05000482/2018002 w/Attachment s: 1. Documents Reviewed 2 Request for Information Inservice Inspection 3. Request for Information Occupational Radiation Safety Inspection 4. Request for Information Quarterly Baseline Inspection

1 Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Inspection Report

Docket Number:

05000482 License Number:

NPF-42 Report Number:

05000482/2018002 Enterprise Identifier:

I-2018-002-0012 Licensee: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation Facility: Wolf Creek Generating Station Location: Burlington, Kansas Inspection Dates:

April 1, 2018 to June 30, 2018 Inspectors:

D. Dodson, Senior Resident Inspector F. Thomas, Resident Inspector C. Alldredge, Health Physicist I. Anchondo, Reactor Inspecto r J. Melfi, Project Engineer J. O'Donnell, CHP, Health Physicist Approved By:

N. Taylor Chief, Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects 2

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee's performance by conducting an Integrated Inspection at Wolf Creek Generating Station in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

NRC-identified and self-revealed findings, violations, and additional items are summarized in the table below.

List of Findings and Violations Announcement of an NRC Inspector's Presence by Station Personnel Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV 05000482/2018002

-0 1 Closed Not Applicable 71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.70(b)(4), "Inspections," associated with the licensee's failure to ensure the arrival and presence of NRC Inspectors, who had been properly authorized facility access as described in 10 CFR 50.70(b)(3), were not announced or otherwise communicated by its employees or contractors to other persons at the facility without a specific request by the NRC inspector.

Specifically, a contract radiation protection technician entered the spent fuel pool buildin g where the resident inspector was present and observing core offload activities

, and the technician informed members of a work crew of the whereabouts of an NRC radiation protection inspection team without being requested to do so; this impacts the NRC's ability to regulate and perform unannounced inspections. Failure to Maintain Adequate Pressurization of the Control Room Envelope Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000482/2018002

-0 2 Closed [H.3] - Human Performance , Change Management 71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution A self-revealed Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion III, "Design Control," was identified when the licensee failed to adequately recognize that the cable spreading room floor was a control building ventilation isolation boundary. Specifically, the licensee cut openings in the floor/ceiling between the 2

,032 foot and 2

,016 foot elevations of the control building and the impact on the control room envelope's ability to pressurize was not recognized. This was a primary contributor to the train B control room emergency ventilation system being unable to maintain the appropriate pressure in the control room envelope.

3 Failure to Adequately Implement Instrumentation and Controls Surveillance Procedures Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green NCV 05000482/2018002

-0 3 Closed [H.2] - Human Performance , Field Presence 71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution A self-revealed Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion V , "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," was identified when the licensee failed to adequately implement surveillance procedures that affected safety-related equipment and plant stability. Specifically, the licensee failed to adequately implement testing and calibration procedures for pressurizer level instrumentation. This resulted in two letdown isolation signals, securing of pressurizer heaters , and a pressurizer level transient on March 29, 2018.

4

PLANT STATUS

Wolf Creek Generating Station began the inspection period shutdown for Refueling Outage 22. The reactor was restarted on May 17, 2018, and power ascension was commenced. The unit was returned to approximately rated thermal power on May 21, 2018, and remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/

reading-rm/doc-collections/insp

-manual/inspection

-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter 2515, "Light

-Water Reactor Inspection Program

- Operations Phase." The inspectors performed plant status activities described in Inspection Manual Chapter 2515 Appendix D, "Plant Status

," and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, "Problem Identification and Resolution." The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

Summer Readiness (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated summer readiness of offsite and alternate alternating current (AC) power systems

.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown (2 Samples) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Essential service water train B on June 20, 2018

(2) Auxiliary feedwater train B on June 26, 2018

. Complete Walkdown (1 Sample) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the spent fuel pool cooling system April 8 through April 15, 2018

.

71111.05AQ - Fire Protection Annual/Quarterly

Quarterly Inspection (6 Samples) The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:

(1) Volume control tank and volume control tank valve compartment, fire area A

-8 on April 21, 2018

(2) Reactor building, elevation 2,000 feet, fire areas RB

-1 and RB-2 on May 16, 2018

(3) Reactor building, elevation 2,026 feet, fire areas RB

-2, RB-3, RB-4, RB-7, and RB-8 on May 16, 2018

(4) Reactor building, elevation 2,047 feet, fire areas RB

-5 and RB-10 on May 16, 2018

(5) Reactor building, elevation 2,068 feet 8 inches, fire areas RB

-6 and RB-10 on May 16, 2018

(6) Fuel pool heat exchanger rooms and general area, elevation 2,000 feet, fire areas F

-1, F-2, and F-3 on May 31, 2018

.

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures

Cables (Partial Sampl e) The inspectors evaluated cable submergence protection in essential service water electrical manhole MHE1A on June 18, 2018

.

71111.08 - Inservice Inspection Activities

Main article: IP 71111.08

(1) Nondestructive Examination Activities and Welding Activities The inspector directly observed the following nondestructive examinations:

SYSTEM WELD IDENTIFICATION EXAMINATION TYPE Reactor Vessel Head Control Rod Drive Mechanism Penetration Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 14, 17, 18, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 32, 33, 35, 38, 43, 54, 66, 71, and 74.

Visual (VE)

The inspector reviewed records for the following nondestructive examinations:

SYSTEM WELD IDENTIFICATION EXAMINATION TYPE Feedwater System Weld Number AE F015 and AE-04-S010-C (Data Sheet Number AGF_012) Ultrasonic

6 SYSTEM WELD IDENTIFICATION EXAMINATION TYPE Feedwater System Steam Generator "A" Inner Radius

- Weld Number EBB01A IR (Data Sheet Number AJS_010) Ultrasonic Steam Generator Steam Weld Number EBB01A-STEAM-3-W (Data Sheet Number RAL_002) Ultrasonic Steam Generator Steam Weld Number EBB01A-STEAM-6-W (Data Sheet Number RAL_003) Ultrasonic Steam Generator Weld Number EBB01A W (Data Sheet Number RAL_004) Ultrasonic Steam Generator Steam Weld Number EBB01A-STEAM-2-W (Data Sheet Number RAL_005) Ultrasonic

(2) Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspection Activities The inspector reviewed the results of the licensee's bare metal visual inspection of the reactor vessel upper head penetrations. The inspector also reviewed whether the required inspection coverage was achieved and whether limitations were properly recorded.

The inspector reviewed whether the personnel performing the inspection were certified examiners to their respective nondestructive examination method.

On May 10, 2018, the licensee was granted verbal approval for performing an alternative volumetric examination and leak path assessment in lieu of the visual examination requirements of Note 1 of Table 1, American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code Case N-729-4. Although not indicative of possible nozzle leakage, the licensee was not able to perform the required visual examination of penetration number one due to a hard substance obstructing the annulus. At the time of the inspection, the licensee had satisfactorily completed the ultrasonic inspection and leak path assessment. The licensee had also cleaned the annulus of penetration number one.

(3) Boric Acid Corrosion Control Inspection Activities The Inspector evaluated the licensee's boric acid control program performanc e.

(4) Steam Generator (SG) Tube Inspection Activities The inspector reviewed the SG tube eddy current examination scope and expansion criteria to determine whether these criteria met technical specification requirements, Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) guidelines, and commitments made to the NRC.

The inspector also reviewed whether the eddy current inspection scope included areas of degradations that were known to represent potential eddy current test challenges such as the top of tube sheet, tube support plates, and U

-bends. The inspector confirmed that no repairs were required at the time of the inspection and that the licensee's inspection scope was appropriate.

(5) Identification and Resolution of Problems (71111.08

-02.05) The inspector reviewed 14 condition reports

, which dealt with inservice inspection activities

, and found the corrective actions for inservice inspection issues were appropriate

.

71111.11 - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Operator Requalification (1 Sample) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator simulator requalification exams on May 31, 2018

. Operator Performance (1 Sample) The inspectors observed and evaluated operator performance during energization of the XNB01 transformer and NB01 safety

-related bus on May 2, 2018, and performance of STS AE

-211, "Main Feed Reg Valve Inservice Valve Test," during startup activities on May 17, 2018.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Routine Maintenance Effectiveness (1 Sample) The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system level instrumentation reading erratically on May 24, 2017

.

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Main article: IP 71111.13

The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities

(1) Elevated risk during lowered inventory and preparations for reactor head lift on April 6, 2018, and refueling water storage tank unavailability on April 7, 2018

(2) Elevated spent fuel pool cooling risk while defueled on April 19 and April 21, 2018

(3) Elevated risk during Mode 5 while implementing low temperature overpressur e protection controls and emergency core cooling pump testing on May 8 and 9, 2018.

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Main article: IP 71111.15

The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) Operability evaluation of safety injection and accumulator to loop 1 check valve bonnet bolting issues on April 22, 2018

(2) Operability evaluation of start-u p transformer XMR01 power factor testing on April 25, 2018 8

(3) Operability evaluation of thermal sleeve inspection results on May 8, 2018

(4) Operability evaluation of train A safety injection pump for motor current reading higher than name plate rating on May 11, 2018

.

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Main article: IP 71111.18

The inspectors evaluated the s pen t fuel pool alternate decay heat removal permanent modification

.

71111.19 - Post Maintenance Testing

Main article: IP 71111.19

The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:

(1) Start-u p transformer XMR01 testing after switchyard modification and transmission line modification on April 27, 2018

(2) Emergency diesel generator train B 24-hour testing following outage maintenance on May 1, 2018

(3) Centrifugal charging pump train A testing after completion of seal maintenance on May 9, 2018

(4) STS EM-100A, "Safety Injection Pump 'A' Inservice Pump Test," following A safety injection pump replacement work on May 11, 2018

(5) Train B spent fuel pool cooling pump testing after boric acid cleaning and oil sample on May 31, 2018

(6) STS IC-503B, "Channel Calibration Pressurizer Level," following emergent bistable card replacement on June 19, 2018

.

71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Main article: IP 71111.20

The inspectors evaluated Refueling Outage 22 activities from April 1 to May 18 , 2018.

The inspectors completed inspection procedure Sections 03.01.d and 03.01.e.

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:

Routine (1 Sample)

(1) STS KJ-001B, "Integrated D/G and Safeguard Actuation Test

- Train B," on May 11, 2018 In-service (1 Sample)

(1) STS EM-003A, "ECCS (CCP) Flow Balance and CCP Comprehensive Test," on May 2, 2018 Reactor Coolant System Leak Detection (1 Sample)

(1) STS BB-006, "RCS Water Inventory Balance Using the NPIS Computer

," on June 27, 2018 Containment Isolation Valve (1 Sample)

(1) STS PE-128, "Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT) of Penetration P-29 ," on April 24, 2018

RADIATION SAFETY

71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Radiological Hazard Assessment (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated radiological hazards assessments and controls

. Instructions to Workers (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated worker instructions

. Contamination and Radioactive Material

Control (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated contamination and radioactive material controls

. Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated radiological hazards control and work coverage

. High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated risk

-significant high radiation area and very high radiation area controls. Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated radiation worker performance and radiation protection technician proficiency

.

71124.02 - Occupational As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls

Implementation of ALARA and Radiological Work Controls (1 Sample)

The inspectors reviewed ALARA practices and radiological work controls by reviewing the following activities:

(1) RWP 180021, "Cartridge Filter Change

-Out in Aux and RW Buildings"

(2) RWP 182601, "Routine Outage Access (No Locked High Radiation Areas)"

(3) RWP 182300, "Maintenance Support" 10

(4) RWP 183220, "Primary S/G Eddy Current RWP"

(5) RWP 184207, "RCP Team Seal Replacement on C & D RCP's"

(6) RWP 184420, "Scaffolding Activities RF22"

(7) RWP 184482, "Canopy Seal Clamp Activities Disassembly" Radiation Worker Performance (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance.

==OTHER ACTIVITIES

- BASELINE==

71151-Performance Indicator Verification (4 Samples) The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

(1) BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (04/01/2017-03/31/2018)

(2) BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (04/01/2017

-03/31/2018)

(3) OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (04/01/2017

-3/30/2018)

(4) PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample (04/01/2017

-03/30/2018

).

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution

Semiannual Trend Review (1 Sample)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective action program for trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.

Annual Follow

-up of Selected Issue s (2 Samples) The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) On March 5, 2018, Condition Report 120056 documented that the required control room pressurization could not be developed

.

(2) On March 29, 2018, Condition Report 120807 documented that incorrect test switches were operated during a performance of STS IC

-503B, "Channel Calibration Pressurizer Level."

INSPECTION RESULTS

Announcement of an NRC Inspector's Presence by Station Personnel Cornerstone Severity Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV 05000482/2018002

-0 1 Closed Not Applicable

71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities

The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.70(b)(4), "Inspections," associated with the licensee's failure to ensure the arrival and presence of NRC Inspectors, who had been properly authorized facility access as described in 10 CFR 50.70(b)(3), were not announced or otherwise communicated by its employees or contractors to other persons at the facility without a specific request by the NRC inspector.

Specifically, a contract radiation protection technician entered the spent fuel pool building where the resident inspector was present and observing core offload activities

, and the technician informed members of a work crew of the whereabouts of an NRC radiation protection inspection team without being requested to do so; this impact ed the NRC's ability to regulate and perform unannounced inspections.

Description

On April 10, 2018, the resident inspector was in the spent fuel pool building observing fuel movement activities in support of core off

-load for Refueling Outage 22. NRC radiation protection inspectors were also onsite conducting inspection activities. At approximately 11: 00 a.m., the resident inspector observed a BHI contractor enter the spent fuel pool building and announce to members of a work crew that NRC inspectors had entered the radiologically controlled area (containment) and to be "mindful and careful."

The resident inspector spoke with the visiting NRC radiation protection inspectors later that afternoon and confirmed they had entered containment at approximately 10

30 a.m. on April 10, 2018, and had not requested that their presence be announced. The resident inspector noted that his location in the spent fuel pool building

, where the announcement of NRC inspectors had occurred

, was in close proximity to where the other NRC inspectors were entering containment.

Corrective Actions: On April 25, 2018, the licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program. Additional corrective actions included the performance of a stand down with all BHI employees to inform them that conduct that alerts workers to the presence of the NRC, or any oversight group, is prohibited; the licensee also published an article in a site newsletter explaining the requirements of 10 CFR 50.70. The article informed site personnel that a violation had occurred and described site management expectations regarding appropriate conduct.

Corrective Action References: Condition Reports 122359 and 122375.

Performance Assessment:

The inspectors determined this violation was associated with a minor performance deficiency.

Enforcement:

The Reactor Oversight Process's significance determination process does not specifically consider the regulatory process impact in its assessment of licensee performance. Therefore, it is necessary to address this violation, which impedes the NRC's ability to regulate, using traditional enforcement to adequately deter non

-compliance.

12 Severity: The finding was evaluated in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy. The finding was reviewed by NRC management and because the violation was of very low safety significance, was not repetitive or willful, and was entered into the corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a Severity Level IV NCV, consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy.

Violation: Title 10 CFR 50.70(b)(4), "Inspections," requires, in part, that the licensee shall ensure that the arrival and presence of an NRC inspector, who has been properly authorized facility access as described in 10 CFR 50.70(b)(3), is not announced or otherwise communicated by its employees or contractors to other persons at the facility unless specifically requested by the NRC inspector.

Contrary to the above, on April 10, 2018, the licensee failed to ensure that the arrival and presence of NRC inspector s, who had been properly authorized facility access as described in 10 CFR 50.70(b)(3), were not announced or otherwise communicated by its employees or contractors to other persons at the facility unless specifically requested by the NRC inspector s. Specifically, a radiation protection technician entered the spent fuel pool building and informed members of a work crew of the whereabouts of NRC radiation protection inspectors without being requested to do so.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a n NCV , consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Observation

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's progress in addressing the cross-cutting theme in the SCWE area, as discussed in the 2017 Annual Assessment Letter for Wolf Creek Generating Station (Report 05000482/2017006, ADAMS ML18052A345). The NRC's review of the licensee's progress in addressing the SCWE theme was accomplished within the scope of the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection, which was completed on June 28, 2018. NRC Inspection Report 05000482/201800 7 (ADAMS ML18218A265), dated August 8 , 2018, discusses the results of this inspection, which concluded that actions taken to address the work environment challenges in the maintenance support group had not yet been effective.

The inspectors also considered whether there was an emerging trend associated wit h impacting the regulatory process. The inspectors noted NCV 05000482/2018002

-01, as documented in this report, which involved announcement of an NRC inspector's presence by station personnel. The inspectors also noted that the announcement of an inspector's presence was not an isolated event. Specifically, the presence of an NRC inspector was announced by a Wolf Creek employee to a state official during a drill on February 27, 2018. However, the inspectors determined that no violation occurred in this case because the announcement, which was not requested by the inspector, was not made to licensee personnel and was thereby outside the NRC's regulatory authority. These issues and other reportability questions being evaluated by ongoing inspections were considered, and no emerging trend has been identified at this time.

13 The inspectors noted that four NCVs that occurred within an approximate 1 year time period relate to the licensee's understanding of the design basis and design basis implementing documents. Specifically

NCV 05000482/2018002

-02, "Failure to Maintain Adequate Pressurization of the Control Room Envelope

," involved a failure to ensure an implementing document

-the boundary matrix

-identified all boundary functions; this led to a failure to control a boundary and was a primary contributor to the failure to pressurize the control room envelope.

NCV 05000482/2018001

-01, "Inadequate Functionality Assessment Associated with the Emergency Excess Letdown Flowpath," involved discrepancies between th e Technical Specification Bases, procedures, and the updated safety analysis report

these discrepancies contributed to an inadequate functionality assessment

.

NCV 05000482/2017003

-02, "Failure to Ensure the Design Basis was Adequately Represented in the Technical Specification Bases

," involved discrepancies between the auxiliary feedwater Technical Specification Bases and the updated safety analysis report; as a result, inoperability of an auxiliary feedwater train was not recognized

.

NCV 05000482/2017002

-02, "Failure to Declare Train A Component Cooling Water Inoperable," related to the Technical Specification Bases not specifically identifying specific valves' importance to the safety

-related design functions as outlined in the updated safety analysis report; as a result, inoperability of safety

-related equipment was not recognized.

In each of these cases the inspectors observed that the updated safety analysis report was not consistently being referenced when questions about the adequacy or completeness of the Technical Specification Bases were identified

. The inspectors also observed that each of these NCVs represented some organizational knowledge gap concerning the design basis as outlined in the updated safety analysis report

. Failure to Maintain Adequate Pressurization of the Control Room Envelope Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000482/2018002

-0 2 Closed [H.3] - Human Performance , Change Management

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution

A self-revealed Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion III, "Design Control,"

was identified when the licensee failed to adequately recognize that the cable spreading room floor was a control building ventilation isolation boundary. Specifically, the licensee cut openings in the floor/ceiling between the 2

,032 foot and 2

,016 foot elevations of the control building and the impact on the control room envelope's ability to pressurize was not recognized. This was a primary contributor to the train B control room emergency ventilation system being unable to maintain the appropriate pressure in the control room envelope.

Description

On March 5, 2018, the licensee performed Procedure STS PE

-004, "Aux Building and Control Room Pressure Test," Revision 16, and the train B control room emergency ventilation system's ability to pressurize the control room envelope and maintain pressure greater than or equal to 0.25 inches water gauge failed. Readings varied from 14 nearly no measurable differential pressure

-relative to outside air

-to approximately 0.15 inches water gauge. During this test, control building doors were not controlled.

Later tests on March 5, 2018, which maintained control of control building doors, had results that varied between 0.18 and 0.26 inches water gauge, with an average of 0.2258 inches water gauge. Troubleshooting was performed and

, on March 6, 2018, an interim configuration associated with Design Change Package 14269, "SGK05 Tech Spec Addition and Compensatory Modifications," was found to be impacting readings. Specifically, between September 17, 2017, and January 17, 2018, four approximately 2 foot by 2 foot openings were cut in the floor/ceiling between the 2

,032 foot and 2

,016 foot elevations of the control building to support ongoing ductwork installation

.

On January 17, 2018, after penetrations for the modification were completed, compensatory measures consisting of steel plates covering the four floor openings were in place until ductwork installation began on February 19, 2018. These compensatory measures were put in place for fire, flood, and other functional concerns. On February 12, 2018, while t he compensatory measures were in place, the train A control room emergency ventilation system successfully pressurized the control room envelope to 0.38 inches water gauge , demonstrating that the compensatory measures were adequate for maintaining control room envelope pressurization capability when in place.

Surveillance testing was performed for trains A and B of the control room emergency ventilation system on March 15, 2018, and the control room envelope was pressurized to 0.3448 and 0.3695 inches water gauge, respectively, which met surveillance requirements. The system was restored to operable on March 16, 2018.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's cause evaluation, which determined that the probable causes of the issue were inadequate identification of control building ventilation isolation boundaries in WCRE

-35, "Boundary Matrix," Revision 0, and control of conditions during STS PE-004. Specifically, the inspectors also determined that the 2

,016 foot to 2

,032 foot elevation breaches were a primary contributor to the failure of the control room emergency ventilation system to maintain adequate control room envelope pressure. The inspectors noted that WCRE

-35, which was referenced during modification work for Design Change Package 14269, did not identify the barriers between the 2

,016 and 2 ,032 foot elevations of the control building as control building ventilation isolation boundaries.

WCRE-35 was a new document that was first approved on November 30, 2016, and was created from Attachment A, "Boundary Matrix," of AP 10-104, "Breach Authorization," Revision 35. WCRE-35 notes, "The information in the attachment has been copied directly from the procedure Attachment A, but when there were discrepancies identified the information has been verified and updated." The inspectors determined that the creation of the new WCRE-35 document was an opportunity for the licensee to recognize the subject boundary's importance and categorize the barrier as a control building ventilation isolation boundary.

Corrective Actions: The licensee completed Revision 3 of WCRE

-35 on April 16, 2018, which reflects additional control building ventilation isolation boundaries, essential reading was issued, and other actions were performed to improve control room envelope pressurization margin. Corrective Action Reference

Condition Report 120056.

15 Performance Assessment

Performance Deficiency: The failure to recognize control building ventilation isolation boundaries and meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion III, "Design Control," is a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the design control attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the control room emergency ventilation system's ability to maintain adequate pressurization of the control room envelope was adversely impacted after an ongoing ventilation modification breached the floor with out compensatory measures in place.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Exhibit 3, "Barrier Integrity Screening Questions," of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At

-Power," issued June 19, 2012, and determined this finding represents a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the control room and represents a degradation of the barrier function of th e control room against smoke or a toxic atmosphere.

Thus, a detailed risk evaluation is required. The senior reactor analyst evaluated the subject performance deficiency and resulting plant conditions to determine the risk impact on the plant. The analyst identified that the control room emergency ventilation system is not a significant risk contributor, because it does not directly affect the core damage frequency, provided operators have a habitable environment. Although the control room boundary was significantly degraded in the as

-found condition, either train of the control room emergency ventilation system was capable of maintaining the control room envelope with some level of pressurization, based on multiple test results. Therefore, while some deterioration of the control room environment could be expected, the control room emergency ventilation system appeared to be capable of maintaining a habitable environment throughout the relatively limited exposure period of the performance deficiency.

As a result, the increase in risk caused by the degraded condition of the control room envelope was negligible, and the finding was of very low safety significance (Green).

Cross-cutting Aspect: The inspectors determined that the finding has a human performance cross-cutting aspect in the area of change management in that leaders did not use a systematic process for evaluating and implementing change so that nuclear safety remains the overriding priority.

Specifically, managers did not ensure that individuals understood the importance of, and their role in, the change management process when WCRE

-35 was recently revised and implemented

. As a result, WCRE

-35 did not identify all control building ventilation isolation boundaries

. Enforcement

Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," requires, in part, that for those structures, systems

, and comp o nents to which this appendix applies, measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in 50.2 and as specified in the license application, are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions.

16 Contrary to the above, until April 16, 2018, for quality

-related components associated with the control building, to which 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B

, applies, the licensee failed to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in 50.2 and as specified in the license application, are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that all control building ventilation isolation boundaries were adequately identified in WCRE

-35, "Boundary Matrix," which the station uses to identify boundary functions, such that the control room envelope could be adequately pressurized in accordance with design basis requirements.

Disposition:

This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Failure to Adequately Implement Instrumentation and Controls Surveillance Procedures Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green NCV 05000482/2018002

-0 3 Closed [H.2] - Human Performance , Field Presence

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution

A self-revealed Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion V , "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,"

was identified when the licensee failed to adequately implement surveillance procedures that affected safety

-related equipment and plant stability. Specifically, the licensee failed to adequately implement testing and calibration procedures for pressurizer level instrumentation. This resulted in two letdown isolation signals, securing of pressurizer heaters , and a pressurizer level transient on March 29, 2018.

Description

On March 29, 2018, the licensee was performing Procedure STS IC

-503B, "Pressurizer Level Instrumentation Channel Calibration," Revision 12. This surveillance procedure performs calibration and testing activities associated with three pressurizer level channels, one

-at-a-time. To perform calibration of each channel, a control room operator selects away from the channel to be tested, which ensures the controlling pressurizer level channels are not being tested. This allows maintenance technicians to perform calibration and testing activities associated with the desired channel. Following calibration and testing of each channel, the channel is restored and actions are taken to select away from the next desired channel to be tested, which again ensures the controlling pressurizer level channels are not being tested.

During the testing on March 29, 2018, station personnel successfully completed the calibration of channel 459, which is located in the SB038 cabinet. The technician s then informed the control room operator t hey were moving to the next section of the procedure associated with channel 460, and the operator selected away from channel 460 in accordance with procedure. The technicians had flagged a switch to be manipulated in cabinet SB038, but had incorrectly flagged the switch for channel 459.

As a result, channel 459 was again taken to the test position, but this channel was now a controlling pressurizer level channel since channel 460 was to be tested next. The instrument failed low, which resulted in an actual pressurizer level transient

-level got as high as approximately 63 percent from a normal level of approximately 56.6 perce nt-isolation of letdown, and automatic de

-energization of the pressurizer back

-up heaters.

17 Step 8.3.3 of Procedure STS IC

-503B stated, "At C2

-0847 (LS/460), PLACE BS

-1 (LS/460A) to TEST position." This procedure step was not followed and the technicians did not adequately use human performance tools to ensure they were in the appropriate cabinet and flagging the appropriate channel, and supervision was not present when the inappropriate cabinet was flagged.

Operators responded to the transient using Of f-Normal Procedure OFN SB

-008, "Instrument Malfunctions," Revision 45, reselected channel 460 as the controlling pressurizer level channel in accordance with the off

-normal procedure, and an operator stated to the technician that they had received the 459 loop alarms. The technician then restored channel 459 from the test position without supervision and proceeded on in Procedure STS IC

-503B. Procedure OFN SB

-008 had ensured that the alternate pressurizer level channel on the pressurizer level control selector switch was selected.

The technician did not re

-perform Step 8.3.1.b, which states, "Place BB LS

-459D, PZR LEV CRTL SEL switch to L459/L461 position," before proceeding with channel 460 testing. Thus, when channel 460 was taken to the test position, this caused a second actual pressurizer level transient

-level got as high as 63 percent

-a second letdown isolation signal (though it had not yet been restored), and a second automatic de

-energization of the back

-up heaters signal was received. Operators again responded to the transient and stabilized the plant. Additionally, following the second actual pressurizer level transient operators provided the order to the technician to, "stop work." The licensee's evaluation determined that because of the risk associated with this task, supervisory oversight was required. Specifically, the qualitative risk screening performed for the task identified the need for "leadership team member implementation oversight" as a risk mitigating action. However, the oversight had not yet made it to the control room.

The inspectors agreed with the licensee's conclusions that the lack of oversight was the most significant contributor to both failures to follow procedures.

Corrective Actions: The transient was stabilized, work was stopped following the second event, an event review was conducted, a stand

-down was initiated, technician qualifications were removed, communications were made to operations and the site, and an interim action was created to have an operations individual present during two

-minute drills for any work performed in the cabinets in the back of the control room.

Corrective Action Reference

Condition Report 120807. Performance Assessment

Performance Deficiency: The failure to adequately implement the testing and calibration procedure for pressurizer level instrumentation on two occasions and meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," was a performance deficienc y. Specifically, procedures for pressurizer level instrumentation calibration were not followed on two occasions

(1) when an instrumentation and control technician failed to take the appropriate channel to test in accordance with procedure

and

(2) when the individual failed to adequately verify the appropriate channels were selected in accordance with procedure on March 29, 2018. These actions failed the 459 level transmitter channel low inappropriately and then subsequently failed the 460 level transmitter channel low inappropriately, respectively

. Screening:

The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the human performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and 18 adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the performance deficiency resulted in two separate actual pressurizer level transient s, letdown isolation signal s, and signals for automatic de

-energization of the pressurizer back

-up heaters.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Exhibit 1 , "Initiating Events Screening Questions," of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At

-Power," issued June 19, 2012, and determined th is finding was not a deficienc y that caused a plant trip and did not cause the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of a trip to stable plant shutdown (e.g. loss of condenser, loss of feedwater). Furthermore, there were no other events such as a high energy line break, internal flooding, or fire. Therefore, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green).

Cross-cutting Aspect: The inspectors determined that the finding has a human performance cross-cutting aspect in the area of field presence in that senior managers did not ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities

. Specifically, managers and supervisors did not practice visible leadership in the field and during safety significant evolutions like performance of Procedure STS IC

-503B by placing "eyes on the problem," coaching, mentoring, reinforcing standards and reinforcing positive decision making practices and behaviors, which led to the multiple examples of failure to follow procedures.

Enforcement

Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be accomplished in accordance with documented instructions, procedures, or drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstances.

(1) Procedure STS IC

-503B, "Pressurizer Level Instrumentation Channel Calibration," Revision 12, an Appendix B quality related procedure, provides instructions for performing pressurizer level instrument calibration testing. Procedure STS IC-503B, Step 8.3.3, requires that BS

-1 (LS/460A) be placed in the test position. Contrary to the above, on March 29, 2018, BS

-1 (LS/460A) was not placed in the test position. Specifically, the 459 channel was placed in the test position inappropriately.

(2) Procedure STS IC

-503B, Step 8.3.1.b, requires, in part, verification that BB LS

-459D, the pressurizer level control selector switch, be placed in the L459/L461 position for channel 460 testing and calibration. Contrary to the above, on March 29, 2018, verification that BB LS

-459D, the pressurizer level control selector switch, was placed in the L459/L461 position for channel 460 testing and calibration was not performed. Specifically, testing and calibration of channel 460 occurred while channel 460 was selected as the controlling channel.

Disposition:

This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

19 EXIT MEETIN GS AND DEBRIEFS On April 13, 2018, the inspector presented the occupational radiation safety inspection results to Mr. C. Reasoner, Chief Nuclear Officer and Senior Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

On May 8, 2018, the inspector presented the inservice inspection results to Mr. C. Reasoner, Chief Nuclear Officer and Senior Vice President , and other members of the licensee staff.

On July 17, 2018, the inspector presented the quarterly resident inspector inspection results to Mr. C. Reasoner, Chief Nuclear Officer and Senior Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report

.

1

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

71111.01-Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures

Number Title Revision OFN AF-025 Unit Limitations

Drawings Number Title Revision KD-7496 One Line Diagram

Condition Reports

23867 123954 123955 123956 123957 123958 123959 123961 123962 123963 123968 123969 Miscellaneous

Documents Number Title Date Temporary Operating Guide

Waverly-LaCygne 345 kV line outages

Expires December 31, 2018 Transmission Operating Directive 0300

Outage of the Wolf Creek

-Benton 345 kV Line

February 28, 2018 Transmission Operating Directive 0301

Outage of the Wolf Creek

-Rose Hill 345 kV Line

February 28, 2018 Transmission Operating Directive 0306

Outage of Wolf Creek 345 kV Breaker 345

-40 or 345-60 February 28, 2018 Transmission Operating Directive 0307

Outage of the Wolf Creek

-Waverly 345 kV Line

February 28, 2018 Transmission Operating Directive 0308

Outage of the Waverly

-LaCygne 345 kV Line

February 28, 2018

71111.04-Equipment Alignment

Procedures

Number Title Revision CKL AL-120 Auxiliary Feedwater Normal Lineup

CKL EC-120 Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Normal Valve Lineup/Breaker Checklist

CKL EF-120 Essential Service Water Valve, Breaker and Switch Lineup

Drawings Number Title Revision E-13EC09 Schematic Diagram Spent Fuel Pool Alternate Power Supply Motor Controller

E-13GG02 Schematic Diagram Spent Fuel Pool Pump Room Coolers

KD-7496 One-Line Diagram

M-12AL01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater System 28 M-12EC01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Fuel Pool Cooling

and Clean-up System 23 M-12EC02 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Fuel Pool Cooling and Clean-up System 7 M-12EF01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Essential SVC Water System 29 M-12EF02 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Essential Service Water System 42 M-K2EF01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Essential Service Water System 70 M-K2EF01A Abandoned ESW Equipment

M-K2EF03 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Essential Service Water System 19 M-K2EF03A Abandoned ESW Equipment

Condition Reports

2669 121872 122213 122233 124453

71111.05AQ

-Fire Protection Annual/Quarterly

Procedures

Number Title Revision AP 10-106 Fire Preplans

18A Drawings Number Title Revision E-1F9905 Fire Hazard Analysis

Condition Reports

21946 122915 122944 123429 123446 123920 123921 71111.06-Flood Protection Measures

Drawings Number Title Revision C-K201 E.S.

W.S. Yard Pipelines & Elect. Duct Banks Plan, Sections & Schedules SHT.1

C-K201 E.S.

W.S. Yard Pipelines & Elect. Duct Banks Plan, Sections

& Schedules SHT.1

C-K202 E.S.

W.S. Yard Pipelines & Electrical Duct Banks Plan, Sections & Schedules SH

T.

-2 10 C-K202 E.S.W.S. Yard Pipelines & Electrical Duct Banks Plan, Sections & Schedules SHT.

-2 11 C-K209 E.S.W.S. Electrical Manholes Plans Sections

& Details 9 C-K212 E.S.W.S Yard Pipelines & Elec. Duct Banks Plan & Sections

Condition Reports

24380 124381 124382 124383 124397 124409

71111.08-Inservice Inspection Activities

Procedures

Number Title Revision 54-ISI-603-009 Automated Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Pressure Vessel Closure Head Penetration Containing Thermal Sleeves 9 AP-16F-001 Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program

I-ENG-023 Steam Generator Data Analysis Guidelines

LMT-08-PDI-UT-1 Ultrasonic Examination of Ferritic Piping Welds

LMT-08-PDI-UT-11 Ultrasonic Examination of Nozzle Inner Radius Area at Wolf Creek Generating Station

LMT-08-UT-004 Ultrasonic Examination of Vessel Welds and Adjacent Base Material > 2.0" in Thickness

SG-SGMP-15-4 Wolf Creek Generating Station RF20 Condition Monitoring and Operational Assessment

SG-SGMP-16-18 Wolf Creek Generating Station RF21 Condition Monitoring and Operational Assessment

SG-SGMP-18-9 Wolf Creek Generating Station RF22 Condition Monitoring and Operational Assessment for

Cycle 23 and Cycle 24

STS PE-040E Reactor Pressure Vessel

Head Visual Inspection

WCRE-30 Inservice Inspection Program Plan Wolf Creek Generating Station Interval 4

Condition Reports

93748 93749 107686 108888 109175 111055 112584 113666 114073 117639 117827 121438 121439 71111.11-Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Procedures

Number Title Revision STS AE-211 Main Feed Reg Valve Inservice Valve Test

SYS NB-201 Transferring NB01 Power Sources

SYS NB-320 Deenergizing and Energizing ESF Transformers

Condition Reports

23853 12395 0 123951 Miscellaneous

Documents Number Title Revision/ Date 17-01 (IC342) 2018 Biennial Requalification Exam Scenario

18-01 (340) 2018 Annual Requalification Exam

STS AE-211 Main Feed Reg Valve Inservice Valve Test

Completed May 17, 2018

SYS NB-201 Transferring NB01 Power Sources

Completed May 2, 2018

SYS NB-320 Deenergizing and Energizing ESF Transformers

Completed May 2, 2018

71111.12-Maintenance Effectiveness

Condition Reports

113227 122957 Work Orders

17-428387-001 Miscellaneous

Documents Number Title Date System Health Report: Fuel Pool Cooling

April 1, 2015 through June 30, 2015

System Health Report: Fuel Pool Cooling

October 1, 2015 through December 31, 2015 System Health Report: Fuel Pool Cooling

April 1, 2016 through December, 2016 System Health Report: Fuel Pool Cooling

July 1, 2016 through June 30, 2017

System Health Report: Fuel Pool Cooling

January 1, 2017 through June 30, 2017

Miscellaneous

Documents Number Title Date System Health Report: Fuel Pool Cooling

July 1, 2017 through December 31, 2017

EC Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:

Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup

- EC-01 EC Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:

Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup

- EC-02 EC Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:

Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup

- EC-03 EC Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:

Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup

- EC-04 EC Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:

Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup

- EC-05 EC Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:

Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup

- EC-06 EC Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation:

Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup

- EC-07 71111.13-Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Procedures

Number Title Revision AP 21C-001 Wolf Creek Substation

AP 21D-004 Control of Containment Penetrations During Shutdown Operations

11A AP 22C-008 Qualitative Risk Management

4B FHP 02-001 Refueling Operations

FHP 02-007A Reactor Vessel Closure Head Removal

2A FHP 05-001 Equipment Hatch Operations

GEN 00-008 RCS Level Less Than Reactor Vessel Flange Operations

STS GP-001 Containment Purge Valves Actuation Test

STS GP-006 CTMT Closure Verification

24A SYS BB-215 RCS Drain Down With Fuel In Reactor

Drawings Number Title Revision M-12BB01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant System 36 M-12BB02 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant System 28 M-12BB04 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant System 23 M-12EJ01 Piping and

Instrumentation Diagram Residual Heat Removal System

M-12EM01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant Injection System

M-12EM02 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant Injection System

M-12EM03 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant Injection System Test Line

Condition Reports

21353 Miscellaneous

Documents Number Title Date APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary Shift: Nights, Mode: 5

April 5, 2018 APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary

Shift: Days, Mode 6

April 6, 2018

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary Shift: Nights, Mode 6

April 7, 2018

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary Shift: Nights, Defueled

April 12, 2018

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary Shift: Nights, Defueled

April 19, 2018

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary Shift: Days, Defueled April 24, 2018

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary Shift: Nights, Mode: 6

May 8, 2018

ET 88-0193 Docket No. 50

-482: Generic Letter 88

-17 - Loss of Decay Heat Removal

December 23, 1988

Miscellaneous

Documents Number Title Date ET 92-0001 Docket No.

50-482: Change in Commitment Associated with Generic Letter 88

-17 January 2, 1992 STS CR-002 Shift Log for Modes 4, 5, and 6

Completed May 9, 2018

WM 89-0041 Docket No. 50

-482: Generic Letter 88

-17 - Loss of Decay Heat Removal

February 2, 1989 71111.15-Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Procedures

Number Title Revision AP 22A-001 Screening, Prioritization and Pre

-Approval 21 AP 26C-004 Operability Determination and Functionality Assessment

AP 28-001 Operability Evaluations

Drawings Number Title Revision Westinghouse Drawing 1464F11

M-703-00055 Closure Head (SAP) General Assembly

W02 M-709-00099 Control Rod Mechanism Housing Details

- Sheet 1 W01 Condition Reports

2207 122351 122581 123083 123084 123567 123902 123903 123905 123906 123907 123908 123914 Work Orders

18-438919-000 18-438984-000 18-439282-000 Miscellaneous

Documents Number Title Revision/Date APF 05-013-01 M-721-00096 - Instruction Manual for Safety Injection Pump W25

Miscellaneous

Documents Number Title Revision/Date APF 05C-004-01 WCNOC - Basic Engineering Disposition

- DPEM01A Current Reading Higher Than Name Plate Rating

- CR 122518 May 1, 2018

APF 05C-004-01 WCNOC - Basic Engineering Disposition

- DPEM01A Current Reading Higher Than Name Plate Rating

- CR 122581 May 3, 2018 APF 05C-004-01 WCNOC - Basic Engineering Disposition

- PEM01A RF22 Rework Hydraulic Performance Impact

May 9, 2018

MRP 2018-010 Electric Power Research Institute

- Notification of Recent PWR CRDM Thermal Sleeve Flange Wear and Control Rod Motion Stoppage Operating Experience and Recommended Plant Actions

April 20, 2018

XX-E-006 Calculation XX

-E-006 AC System Analysis Rev. 7

- Appendix 31

- Scenario L1 (LOCA) Motor Starting Analysis - Output Report

71111.18-Plant Modifications

Drawings Number Title Revision/Date E-13GG02 Schematic Diagram Spent Fuel Pool Pump Room Coolers

E-13EC09 Schematic Diagram Spent Fuel Pool Alternate Power Supply Motor Controller

M-084A-00010 8539 SGG45 Wiring Diagram

January 31, 2018 WIP-E-12EC09-000-A-1 Schematic Diagram Spent Fuel Pool Alternate Power Supply Motor Controller

WIP-E-IR0211A-002B-1 Raceway Plan Plant Site Southwest Quadrant Underground Duct Bank EL. [Elevation] 2000'

-0" 00 WIP-M-1X6906-000-A-1 Fuel Building Penetration Closure Wall Elevations

WIP-M-1X6906-001-A-1 Fuel Building Penetration Closure Wall Elevations

WIP-M-13EG29-000-A-1 Piping Isometric Drawing Alternate Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Fuel Building

Condition Reports

2629 122684 122959 123060 123146 123193 123195 123259 123584 123592 Miscellaneous

Documents Number Title Date 14403 Field Change Notice: Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation System April 30, 2015

14496 Field Change Notice: Fukushima Spent Fuel Pool Makeup

August 30, 2016 15241 Change Package Engineering

Disposition: Spent Fuel Pool Alternate Cooling Modification

November 29, 2017 15273 Field Change Notice: Spent Fuel Pool Alternate Cooling Electrical

March 3, 2018 71111.19-Post Maintenance Testing

Procedures

Number Title Revision STN EC-201 Fuel Pool Cooling and Clean

-Up System Valve Test

STN XMR-001 XMR01 Control Alarm and Trip Circuit Verification

STS BG-100A Centrifugal Charging System "A" Train Inservice Pump

STS CR-002 Shift Log for Modes 4, 5, and 6

STS EM-100A Safety Injection Pump "A" Inservice Pump Test

STS IC-503B Channel Calibration pressurizer Level

2A STS KJ-015B Manual/Auto Fast Start, Sync & Loading of EDG NE02

SYS EC-120 Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Startup

Drawings Number Title Revision E-0033.3-009-03 Power Tran

sformer, Class, OA/FA/FOA, Shell Form, Outdoor, Three Phase, KVA 60000/80000/100000,

H. V. 345000,

L.V. 13800,

Y. Y., 13800, 60 Hertz

E-003.3-00008 CA/FA/FOA Transformer Control Schematic Wiring Diagram

W10

Drawings Number Title Revision E-003.3-00022 Power Transformer, Class OA/FA/FOA, Shell Form, Outdoor, Three Phase, KVA 60000/80000/100000,

H. V. 345000, L

V. 13800,

Y. Y. 13800, 60 Hertz

W09 E-11MR01 Startup Transformer Single Line Metering and Relaying Diagram 7 M-12EM01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant Injection System

M-761-00076-06 Process Control Block Diagram SNUPPS

Condition Reports

2520 122524 122526 122527 122784 122954 124387 124400 124405 Work Orders

13-366290-005 15-403582-002 17-427200-023 17-432721-000 17-432722-000 18-438909-000 18-438919-001 18-438923-001 Miscellaneous

Number Title Date APF 29B-003-01 Surveillance Test Routing Sheet (STRS)

- Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Valve Test

April 23, 2018 STN EM-100A SI Pump A Reference Pump

Completed April 29, 2018 STS EM-100A Safety Injection Pump "A" Inservice Pump Test

Completed May 11, 2018

STS KJ-015B Manual/Auto Fast Start, Sync & Loading of EDG NE02

Completed May 1, 2018

71111.20-Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Procedures

Number Title Revision AI-07B-024 Instructions For Containment Purge Permits

FHP 05-001 Equipment Hatch Operations

GEN 00-002 Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby

101

Procedures

Number Title Revision GEN 00-003 Hot Standby to Minimum Load

101 GEN 00-008 RCS Level Less Than Reactor Vessel Flange Operations

INC C-0044 Functional Check of 7300 Process Power Supply

RXE 01-002 Reload Low Power Physics Testing

STS CR-002 Shift Log for Modes 4, 5, and

84 STS GP-006 CTMT Closure Verification

24A SYS BB-112 Vacuum Fill of the RCS

SYS BB-215 RCS Drain Down With Fuel In Reactor

47A SYS BB-215 RCS Drain Down With Fuel In Reactor

SYS SB-300 Deenergizing SB Protection Sets

Drawings Number Title Revision E-13NN01 Class IE Instrument AC Schematic

E-13SB09 Schematic Diagram Process Protection Cabinets 1,2,3,4 Safeguards Test Cabinets and Fire Isolation Cabinets

M-12BB01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant System 36 M-12BB02 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant System 28 M-12BB04 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant System 23 M-12EJ01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Residual Heat Removal System

M-12EM01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant Injection System

M-12EM02 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant Injection System

M-12EM03 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant Injection System Test Line

Condition Reports

20865 120906 120917 120934 120963 121467 121469 121507 121575 121710 121779 121825 121881 121901 121938 121953 122359 122375 122571 122593 122787 122798 122837 123075 123087 123221 123429 123434 123440 123444 123446 123448 123488 123500 123517 123752 123767 Work Orders

17-426098-000 18-437026-000 Miscellaneous

Documents Number Title Revision/Date Foreign Material Inspections During Wolf Creek RF 22 Failed Fuel Mitigation

- Presenter Daljit Mand

OPS RF-22 Rotation Schedule

Refuel 22: Failed Fuel Action Matrix for Completion Core Testing January 4, 2018 RF22 OCC Shift Update

- Nights April 6, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update

- Days April 11, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update

- Nights April 11, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update

- Nights April 12, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update

- Nights April 13, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update

- Day s April 15, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update

- Night s April 16, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Day s April 17, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update

- Night s April 18, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update

- Nights April 19, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update

- Day s April 25, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update

- Night s April 26, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update

- Day s April 29, 2018 RF22 OCC Shift Update

- Night s April 29, 2018

Miscellaneous

Documents Number Title Revision/Date RF22 OCC Shift Update

- Day s April 30, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update

- Night s April 30, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update

- Day s May 1, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update

- Night s May 1, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update - Day s May 2, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update

- Night s May 2, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update

- Day s May 3, 2018 RF22 OCC Shift Update

- Night s May 4, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update

- Night s May 4, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update

- Day s May 6, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update

- D ay s May 7, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update

- Night s May 7, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update

- Day s May 8, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update

- Night s May 8, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update

- Day s May 9, 2018 RF22 OCC Shift Update

- Night s May 9, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update

- Night s May 10, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update

- Day s May 13, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update

- Day s May 14, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update

- Night s May 14, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update

- Day s May 15, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update

- Night s May 15, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update

- Day s May 16, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update

- Day s May 17, 2018

RF22 OCC Shift Update

- Night s May 17, 2018

RF2[2] FIN Team Schedule

AIF 21-016-02 Time Verification Form

- Days - Credited April 3, 2018

AIF 21-016-02 Time Verification Form

- Nights - Credited April 3, 2018

AIF 21-016-02 Time Verification Form

- Nights - No Credit Taken

April 3, 2018

AIF 22D-008-02 Mode 2 (M2U)/Mode 1 (M1U) Restart Checklist

Completed

May 17, 2108

Miscellaneous

Documents Number Title Revision/Date APF 15C-002-01 Procedure Cover Sheet

- Vacuum Fill of the RCS

Completed

May 11, 2018

APF 21-001-02 Control Room Turnover Checklist

- On-Coming CRS/WC SRO/RO/BOP Review

May 7, 2018

APF 22B-001-08 Shutdown Risk Assessment

Mode 6 Refueling Operations

>23 Ft. Above Vessel

Flange 12 APF 22B-001-09 Shutdown Risk Assessment No Mode

- Defueled April 4, 2018

APF 22B-001-09 Shutdown Risk Assessment

No Mode - Defu eled April 7, 2018

APF 22B-001-09 Shutdown Risk Assessment No Mode

- Defueled April 11, 2018

APF 22B-001-09 Shutdown Risk Assessment No Mode

- Defueled April 14, 2018

APF 22B-001-09 Shutdown Risk Assessment No Mode

- Defueled April 15, 2018

APF 22B-001-09 Shutdown Risk Assessment No Mode

- Defueled April 17, 2018

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status

& Assessment Summary - Shift: Days, Mode 5

April 1, 2018

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary - Shift: Days, Mode 5

April 3, 2018

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary - Shift: Days, Mode 5

April 4, 2018

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary - Shift: Nights, Mode: 5

April 5, 2018

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary - Shift Days, Mode 6

April 6, 2018

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary - Shift: Days, Mode: 6

April 7, 2018

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary - Shift: Nights, Mode: 6

April 7, 2018

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary - Shift: Nights, Mode: 6

May 8, 2018

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary - Shift: Days, Mode: Defueled

April 11, 2018

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary - Shift: Nights, Mode: Defueled

April 14, 2018 APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary - Shift: Days, Mode: Defueled

April 15, 2018

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary - Shift: Nights, Mode: Defueled

April 15, 2018

Miscellaneous

Documents Number Title Revision/Date APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary - Shift: Days, Mode: Defueled

April 17, 2018

APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary - Shift: Days, Mode: Defueled

May 8, 2018

APF 25A-401-01 ALARA Review Package

- RWP Number 181102 January 18, 2018 APF 25A-401-01 ALARA Review Package

- RWP Number 182602

APF 25A-401-01 ALARA Review Package

- RWP Number 183000

March 7, 2018

APF 25A-401-01 ALARA Review Package

- RWP Number 182602

March 8, 2018

APF 25A-401-04 Pre-Job Briefing Form

- RWP Number: 182601

10A BGV0365 Mixed Bed Demins Inlet Line Upstrm Drain

C22: R-EN-A-002A Clearance Order

April 2, 2018

C22: R-EN-B-002A Clearance Order

March 31, 2018

C22: R-OP-S-001B Clearance Order

May 4, 2018

C22: R-OP-S-002A Clearance Order

May 9, 2018

C22: R-OP-S-002B Clearance Order

May 11, 2018

C22: R-OP-S-003A Clearance Order

May 6, 2018

ET 88-0193 Docket No. 50

-482: Generic Letter 88

-17 - Loss of Decay Heat Removal

December 23, 1988 ET 92-0001 Docket No. 50

-482: Change in Commitment Associated with Generic Letter 88

-17 January 2, 1992 GTRE 32 Wolf Creek Generating Station Chemistry Department Radiochemistry Lab

Report Created April 18, 2018, 02:36 GTRE 32 Wolf Creek Generating Station Chemistry Department Radiochemistry Lab

Report Created April 18, 2018, 08:43 GTRE 32 Char

Wolf Creek Generating Station Chemistry Department Radiochemistry Lab

Report Created April 15, 2018, 14:59

Miscellaneous

Documents Number Title Revision/Date GTRE 33 Wolf Creek Generating Station Chemistry Department Radiochemistry Lab

Report Created April 18, 2018, 07:04 GTRE 33 Wolf Creek Generating Station Chemistry Department Radiochemistry Lab

Report Created April 18, 2018, 07:05 K04-013 Gas Effluent Release Report

April 16, 2018

RA 18-0032 Minor Corrections to Refuel 22 Risk Assessment Team Report RA 18

-0021 - Schedule Level 1 Rev. C 2/1/2018

March 20, 2018

RPF 02-105-01 Radiation Work Permit

- 181102 000 RPF 02-105-01 Radiation Work Permit

- 182601 000 RPF 02-105-01 Radiation Work Permit

- 182602 000 RPF 02-105-01 Radiation Work Permit

- 182602 002 RFP 02-105-01 Radiation Work Permit

- 184206 000 RPF 02-210-01 WCGS Radiological Survey Map

- Survey M-20180225-3 February 25, 2018 RPF 02-210-01 WCGS Radiological Survey Map

- Survey M-20180320-15 March 20, 2018