TXX-3534, Forwards Description of Plant Conformance W/Reg Guide 1.97, Revision 2.Documentation Will Be Reflected in Next Revision to FSAR
| ML20054L102 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 06/30/1982 |
| From: | Schmidt H TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC) |
| To: | Burwell S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TXX-3534, NUDOCS 8207070153 | |
| Download: ML20054L102 (51) | |
Text
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TEXAS UTILITIES SERVICES INC. Log # TXX-3534 m ,niin wn .w ,.iuna.w. na w m.i -, File # 10010 l
l June 30, 1982 l 1
1 Mr. Spottswood Burwell l Licensing Project Manager l U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Washington, D.C. 20555
SUBJECT:
COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION -
njd E I REF: (1) NUREG-0797
Dear Mr. Burwell:
The purpose of this letter is to submit a description of the information systems important to safety at Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES) and a description of CPSES conformance with U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2, " Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident", issued in December 1980. These descriptions are attached to this letter and satisfy Licensing Condition (3) as listed in Section 1.9 of reference (1).
This documentation is provided for your information and will be reflected in the next revision to the CPSES FSAR.
Sincerely, H. C. Schmidt DRW:tls Attachments 0
$0 L
guaraajh A
CPSES/FSAR 7.5 INFORMATION SYSTEMS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY 7.
5.1 DESCRIPTION
OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS m
The plant safety analyses and evaluations define the design basis -
accident event scenarios for which pre-planned operator actions are required. Accident monitoring instrumentation is necessary to permit the operator to take required actions to address these analyzed situations. However, instrumentation is also necessary for unforeseen situations (i.e., to ensure that, should plant conditions evolve differently than predicted by the safety analyses, the control room staff has sufficient information to monitor the course of the event).
Additional instrumentation is also needed to indicate to the operator whether the integrity of the in-core fuel clad, the reactor coolant system pressure boundary, or the reactor containment has degraded beyond the prescribed limits defined as a result of the plant safety analyses and other evaluations.
Five classifications of variables have been identified to provide this -
instrumentation. These five classification supercede the "PAMS" classification previously required by U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.97, revision 1. Operator manual actions identified in the operating procedures, associated with design basis accident events are pre-planned. Those variables that provide information needed by the operator to perform these manual actions are designated Type A. The basis for selecting Type A variables is given in Section 7.5.1.2.1.
Those variables needed to assess that the plant critical safety functions are being accomplished or maintained, as identified in the plant safety analysis and other evaluations, are designated Type B.
Variables used to monitor for the gross breach or the potential for gross breach of the in-core fuel clad, the reactor coolant system pressure boundary, or the primary reactor containment, are designated 7.5-1
CPSES/FSAR Type C. Variables used to monitor the potential breach of containment have an arbitrarily determined extended range. The extended range is chosen to minimize the probability of instrument saturation even if conditions exceed those predicted by the safety analysis. The response eq characteristics of Type C infonnation display channels allows the l control room staff to detect conditions indicative of gross failure of any of the three fission product barriers or the potential for gross failure of these barriers. Although variables selected to fulfill Type C functions may rapidly approach the values that indicate an actual gross failure, it is the final steady-state value reached that is important. Therefore, a high degree of accuracy and a rapid response time are not necessary for Type C information display channels.
Those variables needed to assess the operation of individual safety systems and other systems important to safety are designated Type D.
The variables that are required for use in determining the magnitude of the postulated releases and continually assessing any such releases of radioactive materials are desigrated Type E. -
The five classifications are not mutually exclusive, in that, a given variable (or instrument) may be included in one or more types. When a variable is included in one or more of the five classifications, the equipment monitoring this variable will meet the highest category as noted on Table 7.5-7.
Three categories of design and qualification criteria have been identified. The differentiation is made in order that an importance of information hierarchy can be recognized in specifying accident monitoring instrumentation. Category 1 instrumentation has the highest pedigree and should be utilized for information which is essential to the control room operating staff in order for them to detennine if the plant safety functions are being performed. Category 2 and Category 3 instruments are of lesser importance in detennining the state of the plant and do not require the same level of operational assurance.
7.5-2
CPSES/FSAR Category 1 displays located on the Main Control Boards will be uniquely identified.
The primary differences between category requirements are in qualification, application of single failure, power supply, and display requirements. Category 1 requires seismic and environmental qualification, the application of a single failure criteria, i
utilization of emergency standby power, and an immediately accessible display. Category 2 requires qualification commensurate with the required function but does not require the single failure criteria, emergency standby power, or an immediately accessible display.
Category 2 requires, in effect, a rigorous performance verification for a single instrument channel. Category 3 does not require qualification, single failure criteria, emergency standby power, or an immediately accessable display.
7.5.1.1 Definitions 7.5.1.1.1 Design Basis Accident Events _
Those events, any one of which could occur during the lifetime of a .
particular unit and those events not expected to occur but postulated because their consequences would include the potential for release of
- significant amounts of radioactive gaseous, liquid, or particulate material to the environment are Design Basis Accident Events. Excluded are those events (defined as " normal" and " anticipated operational occurrences" in 10 CFR 50) expected to occur more frequently than once during the lifetime of a particular unit. The limiting accidents that were used to determine instrument functions are: 1) LOCA, 2) Steamline Break, 3) Feedwater Line Break, and 4) Steam Generator Tube Rupture.
7.5-3 l
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CPSES/FSAR 7.5.1.1.2 Safe Shutdown The safe shutdown condition is completely defined in CPSES/FSAR Section 7.4.
7.5.1.1.3 Controlled Condition The state of the unit that is achieved when the " subsequent action" portion of the plant emergency procedures is implemented and the critical safety functions are being accomplished or maintained by the control room staff.
7.5.1.1.4 Critical Safety Functions ,
Those safety functions that are essential to prevent a direct and immediate threat to the health and safety of the public. These ar<a the accomplishing or maintaining of:
- 1. reactivity control, _
- 2. reactor coolant system pressure control
- 3. reactor coolant inventory control
- 4. reactor core cooling
- 5. heat sink maintenance i 6. containment environment 7.5.1.1.5 Immediately Accessible Information Information that is visually available to the control room operator l
l immediately af ter he has made the decision that the information is needed.
7.5-4 l
CPSES/FSAR 7 . 5.1.1. 6 Primary Information Information that is essential for the direct accomplishment of the pre-planned manual actions necessary to bring the plant into a safe r-condition in the event of a Design Basis Accident Event; it does not include those variables that are associated with contingency actions.
7.5.1.1.7 Contingency Actions T;1ose manual actions that address conditions beyond the Design Basis Accident Events.
7.5.1.1.8 Key Variables ..,
Those variables which provide the most direct measure of the information required.
7.5.1.1.9 Backup Information That information, made up of additional variables, that provides supplemental and/or confirmatory information to the Control Room Operating Staff. -
7.5.1.2 Variable Types 1
The accident monitoring variables and information display channels are those that are required to enable the Control Room Operating Staff to perform the functions defined by Types A, B, C, D, and E below. .
7.5.1.2.1 Type A t
Those variables that provide the primary information required to permit l
the Control Room Operating Staff to:
7.5-5
CPSES/FSAR
- 1. Perform the diagnosis specified in the CPSES reference Emergency Operating Instructions,
- 2. Take the specified pre-planned manually controlled actions, for u which no automatic control is provided, that are required for safety systems to accomplish their safety function in order to ,
recover from the Design Basis Accident Event, and i
- 3. Reach and maintain a safe shutdown condition.
Consistent with the definition of Type A in Regulatory Guide 1.97 Revision 2, the verification of the actuation of safety systems has been excluded from the definition of Type A. The variables which provide this verification are included in the definition of Type D.
Variables in Type A are restricted to pre-planned actions for Design Basis Accident Events. Contingency actions and additional variables which might be utilized will be in Types B, C, D, and E.
7.5.1.2.2 Type B Those variables that provide to the Control Room Operating Staff information to assess the process of accomplishing or maintaining critical safety functions, i.e., reactivity control, reactor coolant system pressure control, RCS inventory control, reactor core cooling, heat sink maintenance, and containment environment.
i 7.5.1.2.3 Type C 1
Those variables that provide to the Control Room Operating Staff information to monitor (1) the extent to which variables, which indicate the potential for causing a gross breach of a fission product barrier, have exceeded the design basis values and (2) that the in-core fuel clad, the reactor coolant system pressure boundary or the primary 7.5-6 l
CPSES/FSAR reactor containment may have been subject to gross breach. These variables include those required to initiate the early phases of the emergency plan.
Type C variables used to monitor the potential for breach of a fission product barrier have an arbitrarily-determined extended range.
L 7.5.1.2.4 Type D Those variables that provide to the control room operating staff sufficient information to monitor the performance of:
- 1. plant safety systems employed for mitigating the consequences of an accident and subsequent plant recovery to attain a safe (
shutdown condition. These include verification of the automatic actuation of safety systems, and
- 2. Other systems normally employed for attaining a safe shutdown condition. _
7.5.1.2.5 Type E Those variables that provide to the control room operating staff information to:
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- 1. Monitor the habitability of the control room, 1
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- 2. Monitor the plant areas where access may be required to service l
l equipment necessary to monitor or mitigate the consequences of an accident and the post accident radiation environment warrants continuous monitoring.
- 3. Estimate the magnitude of the radiation source available for potential release,
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CPSES/FSAR
- 4. Estimate the magnitude of release of radioactive materials through identified pathways, and
- 5. Estimate the magnitude of unplanned releases of radioactive -
material from unidentified pathways. 3 7.5.1.3 Variable Categories i
The qualification requirements of the Type A, B, C, D and E accident monitoring instrumentation are subdivided into three categories (1, 2, 3). Descriptions of the three categories are given below. Table 7.5-1 briefly summarizes the design and qualification requirements of the three designated categories.
7.5.1.3.1 Category 1 7.5.1.3.1.1 Selection Criteria for Category 1 The selection criteria for Category 1 variables have been subdivided _
according to the variable type. For Type A, those key variables used for diagnosis or providing information for necessary operator action have been designated Category 1. (This does not include all Type A variables). For Type B, those key variables which are used for monitoring the process of accomplishing or maintaining critical safety functions have been designated Category 1. For Type C, those key variables which are used for monitoring the potential for breach of a fission product barrier have been designated Category 1.
7.5.1.3.1.2 Qualification Criteria for Category 1 The instrumentation is environmentally and seismically qualified in accordance with Sections 3.11 and 3.10, respectively, of the FSAR.
Instrumentation shall continue to read within the required accuracy following but not necessarily during a seismic event. At least one 7.5-8
CPSES/FSAR redundant instrumentation channel for each Category 1 variable is qualified from sensor to display. For the balance of instrumentation channels, qualification applies up to and includes the channel isolation device. (Refer to Section 7.5.1.3.4 in regard to extended -
range instrumentation qualification).
7.5.1.3.1.3 Design Criteria for Category 1 g
- 1. No single failure within either the accident-monitoring instrumentation, its auxiliary supporting features, or its power sources, concurrent with the failures that are a condition of or result from a specific accident, will prevent the operator from being presented the required information. Where failure of one accident-monitoring channel results in information ambiguity (e.g., the redundant displays disagree), additional information is provided to allow the operator to reduce the actual conditions in the plant. This may be accomplished by providing additional independent channels of information of the same variable (addition of an identical channel), or by providing independent .
channels which monitor different variables which bear known relationships to the multiple channels (addition of a diverse channel (s)). Redundant sensor checking through the Emergency ,
Response Facilities Computer System may also be a method to determine sensor failure. Redundant or diverse channels are electrically independent and physically separated from each other, to the extent practicable with two train separation, and from equipment not classified important to safety in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix A, Criteria 22 and 24, and derived regulatory guides consistent with the licensing basis for CPSES.
See FSAR Sections 1A(N) and 1A(B).
For situations such as isolation valves in series, the intent is generally to verify the isolation function. In such a situation a single indication on each valve is sufficient to satisfy the single failure criteria if those indications are from different trains (i.e., unambiguous indication of isolation).
7.5-9
CPSES/FSAR In the event that diversity is employed in lieu of redundancy, detailed procedures will be established to detect and resolve any ambiguity that may exist. These procedures recognizes such factors as electrical independence and physical separation of the ez channels enployed.
- 2. The instrumentation is energized from station emergency standby power sources, battery backed where momentary interruption is not tolerable.
- 3. The out-of-service interval is based on normal Technical Specification requirements for the system it serves where applicable or where specified by other requirements. -
Servicing, testing, and calibration programs are specified to 4.
maintain the capability of the monitoring instrumentation. For those instruments where the required interval between testing is less than the normal time interval between generating station shutdowns, a capability for testing during power operation is provided.
- 5. Whenever means for removing channels from service are included in l the design, the design facilitates administrative control of the -
access to such removal means.
- 6. The design facilitates administrative control of the access to all setpoint adjustments, module calibration adjustments, and test points.
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- 7. The monitoring instrumentation design minimizes the development of conditions that would cause meters, annuciators, recorders, alarms, etc., to give anomalous indications potentially confusing to the operator.
7.5-10
CPSES/FSAR
- 8. The instrumentation is designed to facilitate the recognitio.7, location, replacement, repair, or adjustment of malfunctioning components or modules.
- 9. To the extent practicable, monitoring instrumentation inputs will be from sensors that directly measure the desired variables.
- 10. Periodic checking, testing calibration, and calibration verification is in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix A, Criteria 18 and 21.
7.5.1.3.1.4 Information Processing and Display Interface Criteria for Category 1 ,
The interface criteria specified here provide requirements to be implemented in the processing and displaying of the information.
- 1. The operator has immediate access to the information from redundant or diverse channels in units familiar to the operator (i.e., for temperature reading degrees should be used, not vol ts) . Where two or more instruments are needed to cover a particular range, overlapping of instrument spans are provided.
- 2. A historical record of a minimum of one instrumentation channel for each process variable is maintained. The ERF computer system has capacity to handle the two hour pre-event and twelve hour post-event archival storage requirement at normal expected frequency of data acquisition. In addition graphs of critical
/*'
parameters during any immediately preceding thirty minute period -
will be available. '[
t 7.5-11 l
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CPSES/FSAR Category 2 t
7.5.1.3.2 Selection Criteria for Category 2 7.5.1.3.2.1 l are subdivided The selection criteria for Category 2 variab esFor Types A, B, and according to the variable type. i are designated Category 2.
which provide preferred backup informat on d d under Category 2.
For types D, and E, key variables have been inclu e Qualification Criteria for Category 2 7.5.1.3.2.2 l alified when it is Category 2 instrumentation is environmental y quDBA during the time subjected to adverse environments caused by theCategory 2 instr must serve its intended function. is a part of a safety related seismically qualified when the instrument system and its failure could degrade the system.
Design Criteria for Category 2 7.5.1.3.2.3 liable on-site 1.
The instrumentation is energized from a highly retandby power, t tolerable.
power source, not necessarily the emerge l Technical 2 The out-of-service interval is basedhereon norma Specification requirements fori the system it serves w ents.
applicable or where specified by other requ rem ecified to 3.
Servicing, testing, and calibration programs are instrumentation.
For sp maintain the capability of the monitoring l between testing is those instruments where the required interva ting station less than the normal time interval between generaoperation i shutdowns, a capability for testing during power provided.
7.5-12
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,CPSES/FSAR 7.5.1.3.2 Category 2 7.5.1.3.2.1 Selection Criteria for Category 2 The selection criteria for Category 2 variables are subdivided !
according to the variable type. For Types A, B, and C those variables which provide preferred backup information are designated Category 2.
For types D, and E, key variables have been included under Category 2.
7.5.1.3.2.2 Qualificatien Criteria for Category 2 Category 2 instrumentation is environmentally qualified when it is subjected to adverse environments caused by the DBA during the time it must serve its intended function. Category 2 instrumentation is seismically qualified when the instrument is a part of a safety related system and its failure could degrade the system.
7.5.1.3.2.3 Design Criteria for Category 2
- 1. The instrumentation is energized from a highly reliable on-site power source, not necessarily the emergency standby power, which is battery backed where momentary interruption is not tolerable.
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- 2. The out-of-service interval is based on normal Technical Specification requirenients for the system it serves where applicable or where specified by other requirements.
- 3. Servicing, testing, and calibration programs are specified to maintain the capability of the monitoring instrumentation. For those instruments where the required interval between testing is less than the normal time interval between generating station shutdowns, a capability for testing during power operation is provided.
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- 4. Whenever means for removing channels from service are included in the design, the design facilitates administrative control of the access to such removal means.
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- 5. The design facilitates administrative control of the access to all setpoint adjustments, module calibration adjustments, and test points. .
- 6. The monitoring instrumentation design minimizes the development of conditions that would cause meters, annuciators, recorders, alarms, etc., to give anomalous indications potentially confusing to the operator.
- 7. The instrumentation is designed to facilitate the recognition, location, replacement, repair, or adjustment of malfunctioning components or modules.
- 8. To the extent practicable, monitoring instrumentation inputs are from sensors that directly measure the desired variables. _
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- 9. Periodic checking, testing, calibration, and calibration verification is in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix A, Criteria E
18 and 21.
7.5.1.3.2.4 Information Processing and Display, Interface Criteria for Category 2 The instrumentation signal is, as a minimum, processed for display on demand. See Section 7.5.1.3.1.4 Item 2.
7.5-13
CPSES/FSAR 7.5.1.3.3 Category 3 7.5.1.3.3.1 Selection Criteria for Category 3 n
For all types, those variables which provide backup information are designated Category 3.
7.5.1.3.3.2 Qualification Criteria for Category 3 ,I The instrumentation is high quality commercial grade, selected to withstand its' service environment.
7.5.1.3.3.3 Design Criteria for Category 3
- 1. Servicing, testing, and calibration programs are specified to maintain the capability of the monitoring instrumentation. For .
those instruments where the required interval between testing is less than the normal time interval between generating station shutdowns, a capability for testing during power operation is provided.
- 2. Whenever means for removing channels from service are included in the design, the design facilitates administrative control of the access to such removal means.
- 3. The design facilitates administrative control of the access to all setpoint adjustments, module calibration adjustments, and test points.
- 4. The monitoring instrumentation design minimizes the development of conditions that would cause meters, annunciators, recorders, alarms, etc., to give anomalous indications potentially confusing to the operator.
7.5-14
CPSES/FSAR
- 5. The instrumentation is designed to facilitate the recognition, location, replacement, repair, or adjustment of malfunctioning components or modules.
- 6. To the extent practicable, monitoring instrumentation inputs is -
from sensors that directly measure the desired variables.
7.5.1.3.4 Extended Range Instrumentation Qualification Criteria The qualification environment for extended range information display channel components is based on the Design Basis Accident Events, except the assumed maximum of the value of the monitored variable shall be the value equal to the specified maximum range for the variable. The decay for this variable is considered proportional to the decay for this -
variable associated with the Design Basis Accident Events. No additional qualification margin needs to be added to the extended range -
variable. All environmental envelopes except that pertaining to the variable measured by the information display channel will be those associated with the Design Basis Accident Events. The environmental -
qualification requirement for extended range equipment does not account for steady-state elevated levels that may occur in other environmental parameters associated with the extended range variable. For example, a sensor measuring containment pressure must be qualified for the measured process variable range (i.e., 3 times design pressure for concrete containments), but the corresponding ambient temperature is not mechanistically linked to that pressure. Rather, the ambient temperature value is the bounding value for Design Basis Accident Events analyzed in Chapter 15 of the FSAR. The extended range ,<
requirement is to ensure that the equipment will continue to provide information if conditions degrade beyond those postulated in the safety <
analysis. Since extended variable ranges are non-mechanistically determined, as in the example of containment pressure and ambient temperature, extension of associated parameter levels is not justifiable and is therefore not required.
7.5-15
CPSES/FSAR 7.
5.2 DESCRIPTION
OF VARIABLES 7.5.2.1 Type A Variables Type A variables are defined in Section 7.5.1.2.1. They are the variables which provide primary information required to permit the Control Room Operating Staff to:
- 1. Perform the diagnosis specified in the CPSES reference E01's;
- 2. Take specified pre-planned manually controlled actions for which no automatic control is provided, that are required for safety systems to accomplish their safety function to recover from the 9 Design Basis Accident Event (Verification of actuation of safety systems is excluded from Type A and is included as Type D); <
- 3. Reach and maintain a safe shutdown condition Key Type A variables have been designated Category 1. These are the _
variables which provide the most direct measure of the information required. The KEY Type A variables are:
- 1. RCS Wide Range Pressure
- 2. Wide Range Hot Leg Reactor Coolant Temperature (T(Hot)
- 3. Wide Range Cold Leg Reactor Coolant Temperature (T(Cold)
- 4. Wide Range Steam Generator Level
- 5. Narrow Range Steam Generator Level
- 6. Pressurizer Level 7.5-16
CPSES/FSAR
- 7. Containment Pressure - Narrow range
- 8. Steamline Pressure
- 9. Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Level
- 10. Containment Water Level (WR)
- 11. Condensate Storage Tank Level
- 12. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow
- 13. Containment Radiation Level .i
- 14. Core Exit Temperature Preferred backup Type A variables have been designated Category 2. RCS Subcooling is designated as Type A, Category 2. CPSES recognizes that degree of subcooling can be obtained from system pressure and .
temperature using Type A Category i variable and a Steam Table.
However, we recognize that the Control Room Staff will also have access to their subcooling monitor (required by the NRC's post-TM1 Action Plan). Therefore, RCS Subcooling is considered a backup Type A which in turn requires as a minimum Category 2 Qualification. Secondary System Radiation is also designated as type A, category 2. Steam Generator tube rupture can be determined from Steam Generator water level Narrow range. Secondary system radiation monitors will provide preferred backup.
No Type A Variables have been designated Category 3. A summary of Type A Variables is provided in Table 7.5-2.
7.5-17
CPSES/FSAR j 7.5.2.2 Type B Variables Type B variables are defined in Section 7.5.1.2.2. They are the variables that provide to the Control Room Operating Staff information ,,
to assess the process of accomplishing or maintaining critical safety .
functions, i .e.:
- 1. Reactivity Control i
- 2. Reactor Coolant System Pressure Control
- 3. Reactor Coclant Inventory Control
- 4. Reactor Core Cooling
- 5. Heat Sink Maintenance
- 6. Containment Environment Variables which provide the most direct indication (i.e., Key variable) to assess each of the 6 critical safety functions have been designated Category 1. Preferred backup variables have been, designated Category
- 2. All other backup variables are Category 3. These are listed in Table 7.5-3.
7.5.2.3 Type C Variables Type C variables are defined in Section 7.5.1.2.3. Basically, they are ,
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the variables that provide to the Control Room Operating Staff
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information to monitor the potential for breach or: actual gross breach j-of- -
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- s 7.5"18 l j
sp. p? e R (
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, CPSES/FSAR
- 1. In-core fuel clad;
- 2. Reactor Coolant System Boundary; or
- 3. Containment Boundary.
(Variables associated with monitoring of radiological release from the i plant are included in Type E).
Those Type C key variables which provide the most direct measure of the <
POTENTIAL for breach of one of the 3 fission product boundaries have been designated Category 1. Variables which indicate actual breach have been designated as preferred backup information and are designated r Category 2. All other backup variables are designated Category 3. l Table 7.5-4 summarizes the selection of Type C variables.
7.5.2.4 Type O Variables Type D variables are defined in Section 7.5.1.2.4. They are those variables that provide sufficient information to the Control Room '
Operating Staff to monitor the performance of:
- 1. Plant safety systems employed for mitigating the consequences of an accident and subsequent plant recovery to attain a safe shutdown condition, including verification of the automatic actuation of safety systems; and i
- 2. Other systems normally employed for attaining a safe shutdown
- condition. a c- . ' Type D key variables are designated Category 2. Backup information is designated Category 3.
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CPSES/FSAR The following systems or major components have been identified as requiring Type D information to be monitored:
- 1. Reactor Coolant Pump (to assure RCS pressure boundary integrity --
by maintaining seal integrity) 4
- 2. Pressurizer Level and Pressure Control (assess status of RCS following return to normal pressure and level control under certain post-accident conditions)
- 3. Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) (employed for attaining a safe shutdown under certain post-accident conditions)
- 4. Secondary Pressure and Level Control (employed for restoring / maintaining a secondary heat sink under post-accident conditions)
- 7. Containment Systems ,
- 8. Component Cooling Water
- 10. Heating, Ventilation, Air Conditioning if required for ESF operation ;
- 11. Electric power to vital safety systems ,
- 12. Residual Heat Removal 7.5-20
CPSES/FSAR Table 7.5-5 lists the key variables identified for each system listed above.
7.5.2.5 Type E Variables --
Type E variables are defined in Section 7.5.1.2.5. They are those variables that provide the Control Room operating staff with
information to:
l
- 1) Monitor the habitability of control room,
- 2) Monitor the plant' areas where access may be required to service equipment necessary to monitor or mitigate the consequences of an accident and the post accident radiation environment warrants continuous monitoring.
- 3) Estimate the magnitude of the radiation source available for potential release,
- 4) Estimate the magnitude of release of radioactive materials through identified pathways, and
- 5) Estimate the magnitude of unplanned releases of radioactive material from unidentified pathways.
Key Type E variables have been designated Category 2. Backup Type E variables have been designated Category 3.
Table 7.5-6 lists the Key type E variables.
7.5-21
CPSES/FSAR 7.5.3 ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY 7.5.3.1 Compliance With General Design Criteria 2 All Category 1 instrumentation and that Category 2 instrumentation which is part of a safety related system and whose failure could degrade the system are seismically qualified as noted in Table 7.5-7.
I Compliance With General Design Criteria 4 I 7.5.3.2 All Category 1 instrumentation and that Category 2 instrumentation which is subjected to adverse environments when it must provide its intended function are environmentally qualified as noted in Table 7.5-7. See CPSES FSAR Section 3.11.
7.5.3.3 Compliance With General Design Criteria 13 The instrumentation identified in CPSES FSAR Table 7.5-7 monitors the proper variables over adequate ranges to assure adequate safety.
7.5.3.4 Compliance With General Design Criteria 19 The instrumentation provided allows for safe operation of the plant from the control room and allows the maintenance of a safe condition under design basis accident conditions. Adequate instrumentation is also provided outside the control room to allow for safe shutdown and cold shutdown (see CPSES FSAR Section 7.4).
7.5.3.5 Compliance With U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.47 The bypassed and inoperable status system (Safety System Inoperable Indication (SSII) is described in Section 7.1.2.6 under a discussion of conformance to U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.47. The SSII is in 7.5-22
CPSES/FSAR accordance with the Regulatory Guide as described in the referenced section. Also, see Figure 7.1-4 for typical implementation of SSII for an ESF System.
1 7.5.3.6 Compliance With U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.97 '
As described throughout CPSE3 FSAR Section 7.5, CPSES meets the intent ,
of U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.97.
7.5.3.7 Compliance With U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.105 1 1
i The accuracies and ranges of the instruments selected to monitor the variables specified are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analysis. See FSAR Section 1A(N) and 1A(B).
7.5.3.8 Other Information Systems and Human Factors Evaluations -
- Other information systems such as the safety parameter display system and the ERF (emergency response facility) data display systems (see -
FSAR Section III. A.1.2) are integrated with the CPSES instrumentation j described in this section. In order to provide the operator adequate information to prevent and cope with accidents, these displays have l
been included in human factors engineering reviews as discussed in CPSES FSAR Section I.D.1.
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7.5-23
CPSES/FSAR Table 7.5-1 Summary of Design, Qualification, and Interface Requirements Qualification Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Environmental Yes As appropriate No Seismic Yes As appropriate No Design Single Failure Yes No No Power Supply Emergency On-Site As Required Standby Channel out of Technical Technical No Service Specifications Specification Testability Yes Yes As Required Interface Minimum Immediately Demand Demand Indication Accessible -.
Recording CRT Trend As Required As Required e
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i CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.5-2 Summary of Type A Variables 5
Variable Type /
Variable Function Category RCS Pressure (WR) Key Al T(HOT) (WR) Key Al T(COLD) (WR) Key Al Steam Generator Level (WR) Key Al Steam Generator Level (NR) Key Al .
Pressurizer Level Key Al Containment Pressure (NR) Key Al Steamline Pressure Key Al RWST Level Key Al Containment Water Level (WR) Key Al CST Level Key A1 Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Key Al Containment Radiation Level Key Al Core Exit Temperature Key Al RCS Subcooling Backup (P) A2 Secondary System Radiation Backup (P) A2 WR - Wide Range NR - Narrow Range Backup (P) - Preferred backup r
, g, ,- - , - - - . . -
CPSES/FSAR Table 7.5-3 (Sheet 1 of 2)
Summary of Type B Variables Function Variable Type /
Monitored Variable Function Category ,
Reactivity Neutron Flux Key B1 Control Wide Range T(Hot) Backup (P) B2 Wide Range T(Cold) Backup (P) B2 Control Rod Position Backup B3 I
Reactor RCS Pressure (WR) Key B1 Coolant Containment Pressure (NR) Backup (P) B2 System Containment Radiation Level Backup (P) B2 Pressure Secondary System Backup (P) B2 Control Radiation Reactor Pressurizer Level Key B1 Coolant Reactor Vessel Water Level Backup (P) B2 Inventory Containment Water Level (WR) Backup (P) B2 Control Wide Range Steam Generator Backup (P) B2 Level Secondary System Radiation Backup (P) B2 Reactor Core Exit Temperature Key B1 Core Wide Range T Hot Backup (P) B2 Cooling Wide Range T Cold Backup (P) B2 ,
RCS Pressure (WR) Backup (P) B2 RCS Subcooling Backup (P) B2 Reactor Vessel Water Backup (P) B2 Level
CPSES/FSAR Table 7.5-3 (Sheet 2 of 2)
Function Variable Type /
Monitored Variable Function Category e
! i Heat Sink Narrow Range Steam Key B1 Maintenance Generator Level 2 Wide Range Steam Generator Key B1 Level Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Key B1 Core Exit Temperature Key B1 Steamline Pressure Key B1 Main Feedwater Flow Backup (P) B2 Containment Containment Pressure (NR) Key B1 Environment Containment Radiation Key B1 Level Containment Water Level (WR) Key B1 Containment Hydrogen Key B1 __
Concentration 4
CPSES/FSAR Table 7.5-4 Summary of Type C Variables Function Variable Type /
Monitored Variable Function Category In-Core Core Exit Temperature Key C1 Fuel Clad Wide Range T(Hot) Backup (P) C2 RVLIS Backup (P) C2 RCS Sampling Backup C3 RCS RCS Pressure (WR) Key C1 l Boundary Containment Pressure (NR) Backup (P) C2 Containment Water Level (WR) Backup (P) C2 Containment Radiation Level Backup (P) C2 Secondary System Radiation Backup (P) C2 Pressurizer Relief Tank Backup C3 Level -
Pressurizer Relief Tank Backup C3 Temperature Pressurizer Relief Tank Backup C3 Pressure Containment Containment Pressure (WR) Key C1 Boundary Plant Vent effluent Backup (P) C2 radioactivi ty Adjacent Building Radiation Backup (P) C2 Containment Isolation Backup (P) C2 Valve Status (Active)
Containment Pressure (NR) Backup (P) C2
CPSES/FSAR Table 7.5-5 (Sheet 1 of 3)
Type D - Variables m
Variable Type /
System Variable Function Category Reactor Coolant Seal Injection Flow Key D2 Pump CCW Isolation Valve Key D2 Pressurizer Level PORV status Key 02 and Pressure Safety Valve status Key D2 Control Pressurizer Level Key D2 RCS Pressure (WR) Key D2 Heater breaker Backup D3 position Chemical and Charging system Key D2 makeup flow Volume Control System (CVCS) Letdown flow Key D2 VCT level Key D2 CVCS valve status Key D2 ?
Secondary S/G PORV status Key D2 Pressure and MSIV and bypass Key D2 Level Control valve status S/G safety valve Key D2 status S/G blowdown Key D2 h isolation valve status l
l - .
! CPSES/FSAR Table 7.5-5 (Sheet 2 of 3)
Variable Type /
~~
System Variable Function Category AFW Pump Turbine Key D2 f Main Steam Header Isolation Valve Status Steamline pressure Key D2 Auxiliary Feedwater Key D2 flow S/G level (WR) Key 02 S/G level (NR) Key D2 '
MFW control and Backup D3 l bypass valve status MFW isolation valve Backup D3 status MFW flow Backup D3 Emergency Core RWST Level Key D2 Cooling System HHSI and LHSI flow Key D2 (ECCS) Containment Water Key D2 Level (WR)
ECCS valve status Key D2 SI accumulator tank Backup D3 Level SI accumulator tank Backup D3 press Auxiliary Feed Flow to each S.G. Key D2 Valve status Key D2 CST level Key D2
CPSES/FSAR Table 7.5-5 (Sheet 3 of 3)
Variable Type /
System Variable Function Category r:
I~
Containment Containment spray Key D2 flow Containment water Key D2 .c level (WR)
Spray system valve Key D2 status Containment Key D2 atmoshpere temperature Containment Pressure Key D2 .
I (NR)/(WR)
Componet Cooling Header Pressure Key D2 .
Water System Header Temperature Key 02 (CCW) Surge tank level Key D2 CCW flow Key D2 -
Valve status Key D2 Service Water Header Flow Key D2 System I
l Control Room A/C status Key D2 Ventilation Damper Position Key D2 Chilled Water Flow Key D2 -s d
System ,
Electric Power Vital bus (s) voltage Key D2 l Key D2 RHR Heat Exchanger discharge temp.
Flow Key D2 Valve status Key D2 RCS pressure (WR) Key D2
CPSES/FSAR YABLE 7.5-6 Type E - Variables ,
Variable Type /
Variables Function Category Containment Radiation level Key E2 Main Steamline Radiation Key E2 Control Room Radiation Key E2 .
Area Radiation in locations or Key E2 Areas where Access may be required Plant Vent Effluent Key E2 Radioactivity ,
,4 Concentration of Radioactive Key E2 Material discharged from liquid pathways Environs Radiation Key E2 Meterological Parameters Key E2
\
CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.5-6 Type E - Variables Variable Type /
Variables Function Category i
Containment Radiation level Key E2 Main Steamline Radiation Key E2 Control Room Radiation Key E2 Key E2 %
Area Radiation in locations or Areas where Access may be ,
required Plant Vent Effluent Key E2 Radioactivity Concentration of Radioactive Key E2 Material discharged from liquid pathways Environs Radiation Key E2 Meterological Parameters Key E2
CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.5-7 (Sheet 1 of 13)
Instrumentation Summary Data Type / R.G. 1.97 Instrument Tag Range Qualification
)
Variable Category Type / Cat. Quantity Numbers A1, B1, B2 B1, C1 2 per unit PT-403, 0-3000 psig EQ, SQ RCS Pressure (WR)
C1, D2 PT-405 0 EQ, SQ A1, B2, B1 1 per loop TE-413A 0-700 F T(HOT) RCS (WR)
C2 TE-423A TE-433A TE-443A l B1, B3 1 per loop TE-413B 0-700 F EQ, SQ T(COLD) RCS (WR) A1, B2 TE-423B TE-433B TE-443B i I
A1, B1, D1 1 per Steam LT-501 0-100% Note 1 Steam Gen.
D2, B2 Gen. LT-502 SQ(1)
Water Level (WR)
I LT-503 LT-504 l 4 per Steam LT-517 to 519 0-100% EQ, SQ Steam Gen. A1, B1, None Water Level (NR) D2 Gen. LT-527 to 529 LT-537 to 539 LT-547 to 549 LT-550 to 553 4 per unit LT-459 0-100% EQ, SQ Pressurizer A1, B1, D1 Level D2 LT-460 LT-461 LT-462 l
CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.5-7 (Sheet 2 of 13)
Instrumentation Sumary Data Type / R.G. 1.97 Instrument Tag Variable Category Type / Cat. Quantity Numbers Range Qualification Containment A1, B1, B1, C1 4 per unit PT-934 to 937 0-60 psig EQ, SQ Pressure (NR) B2, C2, D2 Steamline Pressure A1, B1, D2 3 per loop PT-514 to 516 0-1300 psig EQ, SQ D2 PT-524 to 526 PT-534 to 536 PT-544 to 546 A1, D2 D2 4 per unit LT-930 to 933 0-100% EQ, SQ RWST Level Containment A1, B1, (NR) B2, C2 2 per unit LT-4779 (WR) 808' - 817' 6" EQ, SQ Water Level (WR) B2, C2, D2 (WR) B1, C1 LT-4781 (WR) Note 2 CST Water Level A1, D2 D1 2 per unit LT-2478 0-45' EQ, SQ LT-2479 A1, B1, 2 per Steam PT-2463 A&B 0-550 gpm EQ, SQ Aux. Feedwater D2 Flow D2 Gen. PT-2464 A&B PT-2465 A&B PT-2466 A&B Containment Rad. A1, B1, El, C3 2 per unit RE-6290 A&B 100 - 10 R/hr EQ, SQ Lcvel (High Range) B2, C2, E2 Main Steamline A2, B2, E2 1 per steamline RE-2325 10 103 Ci/cc EQ(R)
Radiation C2, E2 RE-2326 Note 3 RE-2327 RE-2328 Steam Gen. A2, B2, None 1 per unit RF -4200 10 10-1 Ci/cc EQ(R)
C2 Note 3 Blowdown Rad.
. "- 1 .v .. I
CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.5-7 (Sheet 3 of 13)
Instrumentation Sumary Data Type / R.G. 1.97 Instrument Tag 3
Variable Category Type / Cat. Quantity Numbers Range Qualification Ccndenser Off-gas A2, B2, E2, C3 1 per unit RE-2959 10-5 _ 10-1 Ci/cc EQ(R)
Radiation C2 A1, B1, C1, B3 25 per train TE-001 to 050 0-2300 F EQ, SQ Core exit Temperature C1 RCS Subcooling A2, B2 B2 2 per unit TY-CCM-A&B -300 to 300 F EQ, SQ B1 2 IR & 2 SR NM-35B & 36B 10-11 g 10-3 amps Note 4 Neutron Flux B1 NI-31B & 328 1 - 10 cps B3 1 per control RB1 & RB2 0-100% None Centrol Rod B3 Position rod group Reactor Vessel B2, C2 B1 2 per unit LY-RVLS-A Later Later Water Level LY-RVLS-B 0
Main Feedwater B2, D3 D3 1 per Steam Gen. FT-511 0-4.8x10 None Flow FT-521 lb/hr FT-531 FT-541 4 per unit AE-5506 A thru D 0-10% EQ, SQ Containment B1 C1 Hydrogen Ccncentration Reactor Coolant C3 C3 1 per unit RCS Sampling N/A N/A Fission Product System Concentration
CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.5-7 (Sheet 4 of 13)
Instrumentation Summary Data Type / R.G. 1.97 Instrument Tag Variable Category Type / Cat. Quantity Numbers Range Qualification 1 per unit LT-470 0-100% None Pressurizer C3 D3 Relief Tank Level U
Pressurizer C3 D3 1 per unit TE-468 50-350 F None Ralief Tank Temperature Pressurizer C3 D3 1 per unit PT-469 0-100 psig None Relief Tank Pressure Containment C1, D2 B1, C1 2 per unit PT-933 0-180 psig EQ, S0 Pressure (WR) PT-939 Plant Vent C2, E2 C2, E2 1 per vent stack X-RE-5570 A&B 10 105 Ci/cc EQ(R)
Effluent Rad.
i Area Rad. Levels C2 C2 12 per unit RE-6259 A&B 10 104R/hr EQ(R)
Adjacent RE-6291 A&B Containment RE-6292 thru 6299 1 per unit RE-5637 10 100 Ci/cc EQ(R) 2 (shared) XRE-6273 10 10 4mR/hr EQ(R)
XRE-6275 1 per active See FSAR Figure N/A EQ, SQ
- Containment C2 B1 Isolation Valve valve 6.2.4-2 Status (Active) l l
l . . .. I
CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.5-7 (Sheet 5 of 13)
Instrumentation Sumary Data Type / R.G. 1.97 Instrument Tag Category Type / Cat. Quantity Numbers Range Qualification Variable N/A None CCW to RCP Valve D2 None 1 per valve HV-4699 HV-4780 )
Status HV-4709 HV-4708 HV-4701 HV-4696 N/A EQ, SQ Pressurizer PORY D2 D2 1 per valve PCV-455A PCV-456 Status N/A EQ, SQ RCS Safety D2 D2 1 per valve 8010A 8010B 8010C 1 per RCP FT-142 0-20 gpm None RCP Seal Water D2 None FT-143 Injection Flow FT-144 1
FT-145 1 per heater bank PCPR1 N/A None ,
Pressurizer D3 None i PCPR2 Hrater Breaker PCPR3 Position PCPR4 1
1 per unit FT-121 0-200 gpm None CVCS Makeup Flow D2 D2 0-200 gpm None CVCS Letdown Flow D2 D2 1 per unit FT-132 1 per unit LT-112 0-100% None Volume Control D2 D2 Tank Level l
I P
CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.5-7 (Sheet 6 of 13)
Instrumentation Summary Data Type / R.G. 1.97 Instrument Tag Variable Category Type / Cat. Quantity Numbers Range Qualification CVCS Valve Status D2 None 1 per valve 8100, 8112, 8160, N/A None 8152, 8146, 8147, LCV-459, LCV-460, 8145, 8149 A, B, C, 8153, 8154, 8143, HCV-123, TCV-129, PCV-131, TCV-381B D2 1 per valve PV-2325 thru N/A None Steam Gen. PORY D2 Status PV-2328 None 1 per valve HV-2333 A&B N/A None MSIV & Bypass D2 Valve Status HV-2334 A&B HV-2335 A&B HV-2336 A&B D2 1 per valve IMS-093 to 097 N/A None Steam Gen. D2 Safety Valve IMS-058 to 062 Status IMS-021 to 025 IMS-129 to 133 None 1 per valve HV-2452-1 N/A None AFW Pump Turbine 02 Main Steam Header HV-2452-2 Isolation Valve Status 1 per valve FCV-510, 520, N/A None Main Feedwater D3 None Control and 530, 540 Bypass Valve LV-2162, 2163, Status 2164, 2165 I '.. _J
CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.5-7 (Sheet 6 of 13)
Instrumentation Summary Data Type / R.G. 1.97 Instrument Tag Category Type / Cat. Quantity Numbers Range _0ualification Variable CVCS Valve Status D2 None 1 per valve 8100, 8112, 8160, N/A None 8152, 8146, 8147, LCV-459, LCV-460, 8145, 8149 A, B, C, 8153, 8154', 8143, HCV-123, TCV-129, PCV-131, TCV-381B D2 1 per valve PV-2325 thru N/A None Steam Gen. PORY D2 Status PV-2328 None 1 per valve HV-2333 A&B N/A None MSIV & Bypass 02 Valve Status HV-2334 AaB HV-2335 A&B HV-2336 A&B l
1 per valve IMS-093 to 097 N/A None Steam Gen. 02 D2 Safety Valve IMS-058 to 062 Status IMS-021 to 025 IMS-129 to 133 None 1 per valve HV-2452-1 N/A None AFW Pump Turbine D2 Main Steam Header HV-2452-2 Isolation Valve Status 1 per valve FCV-510, 520, N/A None Main Feedwater D3 None Control and 530, 540 Bypass Valve LV-2162, 2163, 2164, 2165 Status l
l l
l '. . ...I
CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.5-7 (Sheet 7 of 13)
Instrumentation Sunnary Data Type / R .G. 1.97 Instrument Tag Variable Category Type / Cat. Quantity Numbers Range Qualification None 1 per valve HV-2134 to 2131 N/A None Main Feedwiter D3 Isolation Valve FV-2193 to 2196 Status HV-2185 to 2188 High Head Safety D2 D2 1 per train FT-918 0-800 gpm None Injection Flow FT-922 Low Head Safety D2 D2 1 per train FT-618 0-6000 gpm None Injection Flow FT-619 FT-988 ECCS Valve Status 02 None 1 per valve LCV-112 B,C, 8105, N/A None 8106, 8479 A, B, 8808A, B, C, D, 8106, 8812A, B, 8811 A, B, 8809A, B, 8804A, B 2 per tank LT-950 to 957 0-100% None SI Accumulator D3 D2 Tank Level SI Accumulator D3 D2 2 per tank PT-960 to 967 0-100% None Tank Pressure S/G Blowdown D2 None 1 per valve HV-2397, 2398, N/A None Isolation Valve 2399, a 2400 Status Aux. Feedwater D2 None 1 per valve PV-2453A, B, N/A None Valve Status PV-2454A, B, HV-2459 to 2462 HV-2491A, B, HV-2492A, B, HV-2493A, B, HV-2494A, B,
_ . I _1
CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.5-7 (Sheet 8 of 13) ,
Instrumentation Sununary Data Type / R.G. 1.97 Instrument Tag 4
Variable Category Type / Cat. Quantity Numbers Range Qualification Centainment D2 D2 1 per pump FT-4772-182 0-400 gpm None l Spray Flow FT-4773-182 i None 1 per valve HV-4777, N/A None Containment D2 Spray Valve Status FV-4773-182,
- HV-4759, HV-4776, FV-4771-182, HV-4758 8
D2 5 per unit TE-5400 to 5404 0-300 F EQ, SQ Containment D2 Atmosphere Temperature CCW Header D2 None 1 per header PT-4520 0-200 psig None Pressure PT-4521 l CCW Header D2 D2 1 per header TE-4530 0-200 F None Temperature TE-4534 CCW Surge Tank D2 None 1 per train LT-4500 0-6' Level LT-4501 CCW Flow D2 D2 1 per train FT-4536A 0-20,000 gpm None FT-4537A None 1 per valve HV-4513, HV-4512, N/A None CCW Valve D2 Status HV-4572, HV-4573, HV-4574, HV-4576, HV-4575, HV-4537, HV-4536, HV-4514, HV-4515 i
CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.5-7 (Sheet 9 of 13)
Instrumentation Summary Data R.G. 1.97 Instrument Tag Type / Numbers Range Qualification Category Type / Cat. Quantity Variable 0-20,000 gpm None None 1 per train FT-4258 Service Water D2 FT-4259 Hrader Flow N/A None D2 None 1 per A/C unit WL-5847B CR A/C Units WL-5848B WL-5851 WL-5853 X-HV-5826, -5829, N/A None D2 D2 1 per damper CR Vent Damper -5837, -5838, -5839, Position -5840, HV-5847,
-5848, -5851,
-5853, PV-5855,
-5856 0-300 gpm None None 1 per train FT-6708 Chilled Water D2 FT-6709 Flow 1EB1, IEB2, N/A None D2 D2 1 per bus AC & DC Bus 1EB3, IEB4 Availability 1PC1, IPC2, IPC3, IPC4 1EC1, 1EC2, 1EC3, 1EC4 1EDI, IED2 50-400 F None RHR Heat Exchanger D2 D2 1 per train TR-612 Discharge Temperature 0-6000 gpm None D2 1 per train FT-618 RHR Flow D2 FT-619 i
_,_0
CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.5-7 (Sheet 10 of 13)
Instrumentation Sumary Data Type / R . G. 1.97 Instrument Tag Category Type / Cat. Quantity Numbers Range Oualification Variable 1 per valve HCV-606, -607, N/A None RHR Valve Status 02 None 8701-A&B, j 8702-A&B, 8716-A&B, FCV-610, -611, FCV-618, -619 E2 2 plus mobile XRE-6281 10 10 4mR/hr CR Radiation E2 monitor XRE-6282 E2 E2 1 per room RE-6260A 10 104R/hr EQ(R)
RHR Pump Room RE-6260B Radiation E2 E2 1 RE-6261 10 10 4mR/hr EQ(R)
Sample Room Radiation E2 1 RE-6259 10 10 4mR/hr EQ(R)
Plant Vent Stack E2 Sample Area Rad.
E2 1 X-RE-6283 10 10 4mR/hr EQ(R)
Hst Lab Area E2 Radiation None 1 X-RE-5253 10 10-1 Ci/cc EQ(R)
Liquid Waste E2 Effluent Rad.
Turbine Building E2 None 1 RE-5100 10 10-1 Ci/cc EQ(R) l Drains Radiation E3 As required N/A Portable As required None Evirons Radiation E2 l X-SR-4128 0-100 mph Hone j Wind Speed E2 E3 2 j
' X-SR-4129 l l
l , ,_ ;}
L------___----___.___ ________ __
l' , , , .
CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.5-7 (Sheet 11 of 13)
Instrumentation Summary Data x Type / R.G. 1.97 Instrument Tag Variable Category Type / Cat. Quantity Numbers Range Qualification Wind Direction E2 E3 2 X-ZR-4126 0-540 None X-ZR-4127 Atmospheric E2 E3 1 X-TR-4130 N/A None Stability l
l
! . 2 .I
CPSES/FSAR TABLE 7.5-7 (Sheet 12 of 13)
Instrumentation Sumary Data l
i Gen. - generator ECCS - Emergency Core Cooling System WR - wide range SI - Safety Injection NR - narrow range CR - Control Room A/C - air conditioning RCL - Reactor Coolant System
. . Aux. - auxiliary Vent - ventilation RWST --ReactorWaterStorageTank[- RHR - Residual Heat Removal CSTl - Condensste Storage-Tank -
EQ - Environmentaly Qualified Radl - radiation SQ - Seismically Qualified IR - intermediate range SQ(1) - Sensor only seismically qualified SR - source range y
'~
'. AFib " - Auxiliary feedwater ,Q N ,,e
. &~
i~ ~
CCW ,- Compon'ent Cooling Water q EQ(R) - Environmentally Qualified for Radiation Extremes 1 -
RCP -- Reactor Coolant Pump , ;
' . 4' ,
1 l '
CVCS - Chen.* cal and Volume Control System , ,, J, f
, N/A - not applicable ( ' ~ k^* '
g,
~
g r.
\~ f L
- f._
'A
/
bg MSIV - main steam isolation valve s -
., j 1
NT % ,l ?
w' z
l y% E ' ' } ) ;,
. ,p
~
6
~' ~
% ~~ ~ , s ,\ f%- y
,, s n, a ,
j'\ N i 9' f [*
, sl i s ,.# 'e
+ ~
, ; ' a-
- . g
+ ,3
$ N
- ,s =[ I ' ,' . . . . . ,
g>(
- l. 6 ~ ,
s , ,, t ,
lq 4'
> c :,
y: p y :p - g; ;
n,
s
,yc ' m. _ ~. ,,
i .
9
- , , I 'y\-
,y: < .:
.)6 N %
( _ '
~
C?SES'/FSAR ,
TABLE 7.,5-7 / ; .
s k s.'i p l .'/5'~b (Sheet13 of 13L 4 '
iy ~ .- . \'
Instrumentatio'n Summiry Data I (j </
[d y i
/j ,
^ f ~i 1 s 2 .,c*
,\ - , ')
NOTES
- 1. Steam generator water level (WR) is utilized in conjunctioh with AFW ffow for deternirling when ,fo terminate SI for secondary breaks outside containment. Steam generator water, level (WR) is pnly used for secondary breaks _' /
outside containment (the hostile environment that results from secondary breaks inside containment indueds . ', '
unacceptable errors). SI termination for secondary' breaks inside containrcent is based on AFW flow. ' .
- 2. The Containment Water Level (WR) covers the entire range of expected water level. in the Containment for post accident conditions. Therefore, Containment Water Level (NR) is not considered as required for accident j
monitoring.
- 3. Main Steamline Radiation and Steam Generator Blowdown Radiation are only required for (and qualified for) steam generator tube rupture detection.
- 4. The Source Range and Intermediate Range Neutron Flux detectors are not qualified for the accident environment inside containment. Qualified detectors are not available. Adequate determination of reactivity control can l be made using backup variables.
F
= - . . 84 y j l ,-.
CPSES/FSAR the operations phase to control major structural modifications will k comply with applicable guidance contained in Revision 1 (4/76) of this 8
regulatory guide for activities which are similar to construction Q421.19 activities. The application of the requirements of ANSI N45.2.5 -
1974, as endorsed by this regulatory guide, will be in accordance with the guidance provided in ANSI N18.7 - 1976.
Also refer to Section 17.2 Regulatory Guide 1.95 i
Protection of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Operators Against an Accidental Chlorine Release Discussion The CP'SES design complies with the intent of Revision 1 (1/77) of this
. regulatory guide as described in Sections 6.4 and 9.4.
i Regulatory Guide 1.96 Design of Main Steam Isolation Valve Leakage Control Systems for Boiling Water Reactor Nuclear Power Plants Discussion This regulatory guide is not applicable to the CPSES.
l l
i Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident l
l t
('
l '. 1A(B)-39 AMENDMENT 8 l NOVEMBER 30, 1979 I
CPSE5 /PSPf e Discussion A plant specific analysis of the information system requirements for CPSES was conducted. This analysis was based on the design basis accident event scenarios and required operator actions, using the guidance provided in U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2. As a result, specific variables were selected and specific design and qualification criteria developed to assure the safety of CPSES. These variables and criteria are described in detail in Section 7.5.
Regulatory Guide 1.98 Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Radioactive Offgas System Failure in a Boiling Water Reactor Discussion This regulatory guide is not applicable to the CPSES.
Regulatory Guide 1.99 Effects of Residual Elements on Predicted Radiation Damage to Reactor Vessel Materials Discussion Refer to Appendix 1 A(N).
Regulatory Guide 1.100 Seismic Qualification of Electric Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants lb(h ~ 40
CPSES/FSAR Regulatory Guid'e 1.97 Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess ,
Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident Discussion Refer to Appendix 1A(B).
Regulatory Guide 1.98 Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Radioactive Offgas System Failure in a Boiling Water Reactor Discussion This regulatory guide is not applicable to the CPSES.
I Regulatory Guide 1.99 Effects of Residual Elements on Predicted Radiation Damage to Reactor Vessel Materials Discussion The CPSES NSSS position with respect to each of the regulatory guide positions of Revision 1 (4/77) of this guide is as follows:
- 1. The basis as well as the scope of the regulatory guide for predicting adjustment of reference temperature, as given in Regulatory Position C.1, are inappropriate since the data base used was incomplete and included some data which were not applicable.
1A(N)-52
- _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _