ML20237H169

Forwarda Quarterly Rept Consisting of Brief Summaries of Changes to Procedures & Plant Mods Which Change Plant as Described in Fsar,Per 10CFR50.59 & 861209 Commitment

ML20237H169
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	08/28/1987
From:	Watson R CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
HO-870480-(O), NUDOCS 8709030144
Download: ML20237H169 (16)

Text

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i CP&L Carolina Power & Light Company imensammstimummmmmmzumiss HARRIS NUCLEAR PROJECT P.O. Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562

.AUG 2 81987 File Number: SHF/10-13510C 10CFR50.59 Letter Number: H0-870480 (0)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET No. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 QUARTERLY REPORT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10CFR50.59 Centlemen:

In accordance with 10CFR50.59 and CP&L Letter (NLS-86-454) of commitment dated December 9, 1986, the following report is submitted for the second quarter of 1987. This report contains brief summaries of changes to procedures and plant modifications, which change the plant as it is described in the FSAR. There were no tests or experiments conducted during this interval, which are not described in the FSAR which require reporting in this report. Changes to FSAR Chapter 14 have been previously submitted by separate letters.

Very truly yours, R. A. Watson Vice President Harris Nuclear Project RAW:acm Enclosure cc: Dr. J. Nelson Crace (NRC - RII)

Mr. C. Maxwell (NRC - SHNPP) 8709030144 070828 PDR ADOCK 05000400 PDR R ,

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CHANCE TO FACILITY AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE: PCR-000153, Demineralized Bypass Around the Condensate Storage Tank I (CST) and Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tank (RMWST)

FUNCTIONAL

SUMMARY

This plant modification adds a demineralized water bypass line around the CST and the RMWST. This change was made to decrease the probability of power reductions due to chemistry excursions.

SAFETY

SUMMARY

The portions of the Condensate Storage and Reactor Makeup Systems affected by this change do not serve a safety function. This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a dif ferent type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR. Thus, no unreviewed safety question exists.

FSAR

REFERENCE:

Figure 9.2.3-2, 10.1.0-4, and Section 9.2.6 I

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MEM/H08704800/3/0S1

P CHANGE TO FACILITY AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE: PCR-000362, Tubing Reroute From Gross Failed Fuel Detector (CFFD) to Primary Sample Panel FUNCTIONAL

SUMMARY

This plant modification rerouted RCS sample tubing outside of containment to put the CFFD and the Primary Sample System (PSS) in parallel. Previously, the CFFD and the PSS were connected in series and the GFFD had to be manually bypassed when a Reactor Coolant System hot leg sample was taken. This tubing reroute eliminates the need to manually bypass the CFFD to take samples from the primary system, thus reducing manpower to obtain the sample. This modification also reduces the sample transport time from the RCS to the containment penetration. The minimum decay time was reduced from '

40 seconds to 28 seconds.

SAFETY

SUMMARY

Neither the GFFD or the Primary Sampling System are required to function following an accident. This plant modification makes use of the Primary Sampling Panel easier. The change does not impact on the availability of the GFFD. The modification does not change the containment isolation capability or quality class of the installation. Thus, there is no impact on the safety design basis for the plant.

FSAR

REFERENCE:

Figure 9.3.6-1, Section 9.3.6 and 9.3.2 k

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CHANGE TO FACILITY AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR )

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l TITLE: PCR-000388, Condenser Off-Cas Flow Measurement Access FUNCTIONAL

SUMMARY

This plant modification provides a test connection in condenser vacuum pump exhaust line 7AE 12-9-1 above isolation valve 7AE-B3-1 to allow measurement of the condenser off gas flow. Previously, no permanent l method existed for. measuring air-in leakage greater than 30scfm. i 1

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SAFET(

SUMMARY

The condenser vacuum pump exhaust line is a nonsafety related f line located in the Turbine Building. The addition of a flow test connection on line 7AE12-9-1 will have no effect on any FSAR Chapter 15 accident analysis. This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident er equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR. Thus, no unreviewed safety question exists.

FSAR

REFERENCE:

Figure 10.1.0-4 l

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CHANCE TO FACILITY AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE: PCR-000667, Containment Spray System Pump Miniflow Lines FUNCTIONAL

SUMMARY

The original CT system design was such that the containment spray pump would start on Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) and run in the dead head miniflow recirculation mode until a Containment Spray Actuation Signal (CSAS) (Hi-3) was received to open the isolation valve. In this operation, it was necessary to provide overpressure protection on the suction side by the existence of relief valves (2CT-R6SA and 2CT-R7SB).

During construction, the system design was revised such that both the pump and valve receive a CSAS to actuate. This results in the situation where the pumps are not subject to run in the dead head recirculation mode and thus require no overpressure protection. Therefore, valves 2CT-R6SA and 2CT-R7SB have been locked closed and abandoned in place.

SAFETY

SUMMARY

The relief valves abandoned per this plant modification were not needed as part of the original system design during licensing. The relief valves are no longer required for overpressurization protection. This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a'different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR. Thus, no unreviewed safety question exists. j l

FSAR

REFERENCE:

Figure 6.2.2-1 i

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MEM/HO-8704800/6/051

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CHANCE TO FACILITY AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE: PCR-000755, Filter Backwash Tank Vent Lines FUNCTIONAL

SUMMARY

This plant modification installs check valves in the Liquid Waste Processing Systems filter backwash transfer tanks overflow lines' vacuum breakers. As previously designed, during filter backwash the transfer tank overflow line vacuum breakers could blow water into the tank rooms which caused a contamination problem in the area.

SAFETY

SUMMARY

The purpose of this modification is to limit the spread of contamination. The modification will not contribute to the failure of a backwash transfer tank. In any event, the failure of a filter backwash storage tank is bounded by the failure of the' entire Liquid Waste Processing System as described in FSAR Section 15.7.2. Therefore, no unreviewed safety '

question exists.

FSAR

REFERENCE:

Figure 11.4.2-5, 11.4.2-6, and 11.4.2-9 f

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TITLE: PCR-001197, Volume Reduction Sys ter< (VRS) DemineEalired Water Pressure N

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FUNCTIONAL

SUMMARY

This plandinodificatien insta11ed es prEdsure regulat big '

valve in the demineralized wate/y supply line to E-6 lbt Wster Heater. Ptsor ,

to this modification demineralized water supp1 A te K 6 Hot, Water Heatdr was approximately 200 PSIG. The heater is rated ut 160 psig and has a relief ,

valve setting of 125 psig. The .new pressure reghla, ting valve has a pressure setting of 100 psig. g; j -

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i SAFETY

SUMMARY

The modification .'as made to sup;so rt pro;mr cvera:. r,n of the '

VRS. The Demineralized Water System is y nonsafdy system. This c'llange' does ,

not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor i introduce a different type of accident or equipren( malfunction O.an aircady '

evaluated in the FSAR. Thus, no unteviro6 safety 'questj on, exists.  ;

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REFERENCE:

Figure 9.2.3-1 s N- N

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CHANGE TO FACILIT'f AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE: PCR-001235, Main Steam Drip Legs at Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater l (SDAFW): Pump

( FUNCTIONAL

SUMMARY

This plant change supplements the two drip legs. at the SDAFW pump with steam traps. The modification was initiated due to sporadic trips of the SDAPW pump on overspeed apparently due to condensation in the  !

s'.eam supply line. The design was changed, prior to OL issuance, to isolate the steam supply at the main steam lines when the SDAFW pump was in standby. l TMis lineup did not provide a way for condensation to return to the condenser dt e to the elevation difference between the drip leg and the condenser. The situation oss compounded due to steam leakage past the stesia supply isolation

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valves. The. previous design included drip legs which relied on steam supply p' essure and dondenser vacuum to draw the water out. This modification added arditional piping and drain traps; this allowed condensation to be directed to a ic:al floor drain. .

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SAFETY

SUMMARY

This modification decreases the chance of condensate buildup when the isolation valves leak-by and therefore decreases the chance of Turbine overspeed trips or water slugging damage. This modification does not f increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce I a dif ferent. type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated )

in the FSAR. Thus, no unreviewed safety questien exists. {

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REFERENCE:

Figure 10.1.0-4

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l CHANGE TO FACILITY AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE: PCR-001286, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Check Valve Back Leakage FUNCTIONAL

SUMMARY

This plant modification adds additional check valves in the AFW piping. This modification was necessitated by the leakage of main feedwater back through the existing check valves (e.g., valves 3AF-V8SA-1,  !

3AF-V31SB-1, 3AF-V175A-1, 3AF-V37SB-1, 3AF-V21SA-1, 3AF-V34SB-1 on FSAR Figure 10.1.0-3) in the AFW system. The back leakage caused excessive AFW pipeline temperatures and presented the possibility of steam formation in the lines and AFW pump steam binding.

FAFETY

SUMMARY

The integrity of the AFW system has been increased by the additional check valves. The additional check valves were installed using the same design and installation requirements for the original design. The performance of the AFW system was determined to be acceptable based on a functional test. Furthermore, the addition has eliminated a problem which required extensive personnel actions to maintain the operability of the AFW system. The modification does not increase consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR. The modification does provide a small increr.se in the probability of AFW system failure because of increased numbers of check valves. However, the increase in probability was calculated to be less than the probability of other single component failure in the AFW system. This small increase when balanced against the increased reliability '!

of the AFW due to the prevention of back leakage results in no increase in the l probability of AFW system failure. Thus, no unreviewed safety question exists.

PSAR

REFERENCE:

Figure 10.1.0-3, Section 10.4.9A 1

MEM/HO-8704800/10/OS1 ,

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CHANGE TO FACILITY AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE: PCR-001370, Condensate Booster Pump Hydraulic Coupling Control FUNCTIONAL

SUMMARY

This plant modification relocates pressure transmitters PT-2307 and PT-2308 from condensate booster pump discharge piping to the suction piping of the feeduster pumps. The purpose cf the modification was to reduce the condensate booster pump discharge pressure so that the pressure drop across the feedwater regulating valves is reduced. Reducing the pressure drop across the feedwater regulating valves was necessary to improve valve stability and performance.

SAFETY

SUMMARY

The relocation of PT-2307 and PT-2308 involves nonsafety related condensate controls. These controls affect the performance of the Main Feedwater System; however, the Main Feedwater System is not assumed to operate for any FSAR Chapter 15 accident. This modification will improve the reliability of the Main Feedwater System and therefore this change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR. Thus, no unreviewed safety question exists.

l FSAR

REFERENCE:

Figure 10.1.0-4 MEM/H08704800/11/OS1

. 1 CHANGE TO P.'.CILITY AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR l

TITLE: PCR-001547, Condenser Vacuum Pump Reservoir Supply f FUNCTIONAL

SUMMARY

This plant modification to the Main Condenser Evacuation System (MCES) adds piping and valves to allow demineralized water to be used as a reservoir supply source for the Condenser Vacuum Pumps. This modification was to reduce condenser vacuum pump discharge temperatures and thereby increase the reliability of the Condenser Vacuum Pump.

SAFETY

SUMMARY

floth the MCES and the Demineralized Water :iys tems are non-nuclear safety, nonseismic Category I systems. Neither of these systems are required to function for a design basis event as described in FSAR Chapter 15. Loss of condenser vacuum is an analyzed accident (refer to FSAR Section 15.2.5). This accident assumes the complete loss of condenser vacuum. Since the modification is to increase the reliability of the vacuum pump, this modification does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR, thus no unreviewed safety question exists.

FSAR

REFERENCE:

Figure 10.1.0-4 l

MEM/H08704800/12/OS1

e CHANCE TO FACILITY AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR

Title:

PCR-001771, Condenser Vacuum Pump Air Release FUNCTIONAL

SUMMARY

This plant modification installed traps / separators on the condenser vacuum pump water reservoir overflow drains, which return air to the monitored discharge line. As previously designed, the overflow drains were releasing some pump discharge air which was not being monitored by the vacuum pump ef fluent radiation monitor or the Turbine Building vent monitor. The modification routes the liquid to a Turbine Building drain and the air /

noncondensable gaseous to the vacuum pump discharge line.

SAFETY

SUMMARY

This modification provides assurance that noncondensable W I

gases discharged from the vacuum pump is monitored for radiation. The air evacuation system is non-nuclear safety clasi, and nonseismic Category I. This change does not impact any safety related equipment required for safe shutdown of the plant. No unreviewed safety question exists.

FSAR

REFERENCE:

Figure 10.1.0-4 l

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. l CHANGE TO PROCEDURE AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR I

TITLE: OP-120.03, Rev. 1, Advance Change 1, Chemical Drain Operating Procedure FUNCTIONAL

SUMMARY

This procedure change adds steps which will allow liquid wastes from the chemical drain tanks to be pumped directly to the Laundry and flot Shower Tanks for processing. Previously, the procedure only allowed liquid wastes from the chemical drain tanks to be sent to the reverse osmosis (RO) concentrates evaporators via the RO concentrates tanks.

SAFETY

SUMMARY

This change in procedure does not affect equipment which performs a safety function. This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR. Thus, no unreviewed safety question exists.

FSAR

REFERENCE:

Section 11.2.2.2 l

MEM/1108704800/14/OSI

CHANGE TO PROCEDURE AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE: OP-135, Rev. 1, Advance Change 2, Condensate Polishing Demineralizing System (CPDS)

FUNCTIONAL

SUMMARY

The CPDS consists of six mixed bed demineralizers. '

Normally, only five of the units are in operation. The FSAR states that the sixth demineralized will be kept in the standby mode ready for automatic change out. This procedure change allows the spare demineralized to be kept in the "off" position; it will be manually placed in service when needed.

SAFETY

SUMMARY

The CPDS is not required for safe shutdown of the reactor and is designed as non-nuclear safety equipment. This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR. Thus, no unreviewed safety question exists.

l FSAR REFERE" E: Section 10.4.6 1

NEM/H08704800/15/OS1

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CHANGE TO PROCEDURE AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR l

TITLE: PLP-106, Rev. 2, Advance Change 2, Technical Specification Equipment List Program FUNCTIONAL

SUMMARY

This procedural change introduces a delay in Volume Control Tank (VCT) isolation on a Safety Injection Signal (SI). Review of the Safety Injection System sequencing logic by Westinghouse identified that upon receipt of an SI, the VCT outlet isolation valves do not begin to close until the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) isolation valves are fully open. This results in an additional 15 second delay in the delivery of borated water to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) not previously described in the FSAR.

SAFETY

SUMMARY

An additional 15 second delay in the delivery of borated water to the reactor core by the Emergency Core Cooling System is introduced. This has been evaluated by Westinghouse (Letter FCQL-465). They determined that the impact on calculated values for mass and energy releases for FSAR Chapter 15 accident scenarios is insignificant. The limiting transient is a secondary piping break, and for this event the design DNB basis is still met. The analysis results for accidents analyzed in the FSAR have thus remained bounded with the 15 second delay included. Thus, no unreviewed safety issue exists.

FSAR

REFERENCE:

Section 6.3.3, 15.1.5, and 16.3 f '?J

. , i i t g MEM/H0-8704800/16/0S1

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