ML20235S589

Forwards Response to NRC 870818 Request for Addl Info Re Snupps Main Steam Line Break Superheat Analysis.Info Identical to Union Electric Co Response for Callaway Plant

ML20235S589
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	10/02/1987
From:	Withers B WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
WM-87-0253, WM-87-253, NUDOCS 8710090051
Download: ML20235S589 (13)

Text

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' W4$LF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION Bart D. Withers l President and Chief Executive Officer October 2,1987 WM 87-0253

\

l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Docket No. 50-482: Response to Request for Additional Information Concerning Hain Steam Line Break Superheat Analysis

Reference:

Letter dated 8/18/87 from P0'Connor, NRC, to BDWithers, WCNOC Gentlemen:

The enclosure to this letter provides the information requested in the Reference concerning the SNUPPS Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment with Superheated Steam Release Analysis. The information is applicable to both Wolf Creek Generating Station and the Callaway Plant. As such, the information is identical to Union Electric Company's response to the same subject.

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please contact me or Mr. O. L. Maynard of my staff.

Very truly yours, 8710090051 071002 fDR ADOCK 0500 2 Bart D. Withers President and Chief Executive Officer BDW/jad Enclosure cc: P. O'Connor (2)

R. Martin I J. Cummins phi L

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i PO. Box 411/ Burlington, KS 66839 / Phone: (316) 3644831 An Equal opportunity Ernpk yer M THC YET

. Enclosure to WM 87-0253

.e WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION DOCKET No. 50-482 RESPONSE TO NRC QUESTIONS CONCERNING SNUPPS MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK SUPERHEAT ANALYSIS

e RESPCNSE 'IO NRC QUESTIONS MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK SUPERHEAT ANALYSIS QUESTION 1: For all instances where the qualification temperatures of various pieces of equipnent (e.g . , Main Stean Pressure Transmitter, Main Steam Isolation Valve, etc.) may be exceeded as a result of a design basis accident and you have determined that alternate equipnent is available to accomplish the function of the failed equipnent, discuss q the environmental qualification status of the alternate equipnent.

RESPONSE: In the Beforence 1 evaluation of main stean line break (MSW) superheat effects, the need to rely on alternate equipnent is discussed with respect to two post-accient indication functions, i.e., steam generator pressure monitorirg and verification of stean generator isolation.

We alternate equipnent used to provide post-accident stean generator pressure indication consists of four pressure transmitters (one for each stean generator) , AB-PT-01, 02, 03 and 04. Because of their location outside of the main stean tunnel, these transmitters are not subjected to the harsh environmental corditions followirg a postulated MSG in the tunnel. %ese transmitters are Class lE and are fully qualified for the environmental corditions pastulated for their locations in roans 1304 and 1305 of the Auxiliary Building.

Verification of stean generator isolation usiry alternate equipnent may be required if valve position indication (limit switches and connected circuits) were to fail in the superheated MSLB environment. Steam generator isolation involves not only the Main Stean Isolation Valves (MSIVs) but the Main Feedwater Isolation valves (MFIVs) and several J-601A, air-operated valves, such as the MSIV Bypass Valves and Stean Line Drain Valves. %e alternate equipnent, mentioned on page 7 of Reference 1, consists of steam generator level indication, steam generator pressure indication, auxiliary feedwater flow irdication, reactor coolant temperature irdication, ard main stean flow irdica-tion. The equipnent associated with these alternate indicatirg circuits is located outside of the main steau tunnel and, therefore, would not be exposed to the MSLB superheat conditions. With the exception of the main stean flow indicatirg circuits, all of the alternate equipnent is Class lE ard fully qualified for environmental conditions postulated at their respective locations. W e main steau flow transmitters are high quality, canmercial grade equipnent and are powered fran buses supplied by standby power sources so that their availability is assured even in the event of a loss of offsite power.

QUESTION la: Is the criteria for using the alternate equipnent contained in the plant emergency operating procedures?

RESPONSE: Specific steps for use of alternate indication, following a j postulated MSIB with superheat in the main stean tunnel, are not currently incitried in plant operatirg procedures.

We primary reason for this is that the review of this issue is - ongoing, and incorporating the results of the review into procedures is considered premature. Ibwever, the lack of specific procedural guidance is not considered of concern because the plant operators are trained to use alternate indication in the course of accident mitigation and the alternate indication available for stean generator pressure and stean generator isolation verification are well known to the operators.

In response to a recent NRC inspection finding, Union Electric (bmpany has incorporated a change into the emer-gency operating procedures at Callaway Plant addressity the use of AB-PT-01, 02, 03, and 04 for alternate steam gener-ator pressure monitoring.

QUESTION 2: In your evaluation, it is stated that the Main Steam Isolation Valves and the Main Feedwater Isolgtion Valves are both qualified to a temperature of 450 F; however, the appurtenances have various qualification temperatures.

Our review has found that somg of these qualification temperatures are as low as 300 F. Note that the staff considers the qualification status of any piece of equip-ment to be based on its weak link. Please explain why you consider this its to be qualified to 450 F when some of its gappurtenances are qualified tg temperatures less an 450 F (e.gd , Terminal Blocks 3 0 F, Limit Switch 34 F, Wiring 346 F, Terminal Ings 352 and (bnax Seals 42 F) .

RESPONSE: %e statement regarding the 450 F qualification tempera-ture was not intended to be applied to all the actuator appurtenances. %e actuatgr was qualified by the vendor (Anchor-Darling) using 450 F steau. However, as identi- )

fled in the Reference 1 evaluation, various appurtenances ]

(limit switches, wiring, wiring ltgs, etc.) were qualified  !

under separate prograns to different temperatures. It is noted ig more recent submittals (References 2 and 3), that the g50 F has itself been reduced to a lower tmperature (328 F) because of the manner in which Anchor-Darling exposed the actuator to stean during testing. 'Ibe evalu-ation of equipnent performance during exposure to super-heated stean took into account the various temperatures to )

which the actuator and appurtenances had been qualified. I For exanple, Reference 1 identified the min Stean Isola- l tion Valve (MSIV) actuator terminal blocks as a " weak link" canponent and required a special thermal lag analysis of the MSIV tenninal blocks to be performed.

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5 I QUESTION 3: Explain why the (XLPE) Control g cable, identified in your submittal as qualified to 385 F, is expected to perfom its function when its qualification temperature is exceeded.

RESPONSE: his question is not applicable to Callaway Plant. Ebr Wolf Creek Generating Station, credit is not taken for cable that is not qualified for its environmental cordi-l tions. %e discussion in Reference 1 is intended to note that, because of the insulating material used, the cable would most likely perform acceptably durirg the short time that the qualification temperatures were exceeded. %e discussion goes on to explain and ultimately relies on the fact that, even if the cable failed such that the affected MSIV would not close, the effect on plant resp 3nse would be I no different than the FSAR Chapter 15 analysis of the MStB event. %is is based on the plant design which incitdes main steam lines in the tunnel designed and maintained as

' "superpipe" (i.e., a no break zone as defined in Reference 1 4) and cn the NRC position, stated in Paference 5, that an additional single active failure need rot be postulated if a break is assumed in a no break zone. Therefore, the failure of one MSIV to close because of environmental effects results in identical conditions (the uncontrolled blowdown of one stean generator) postulated in the FSAR accident analysis.

QUESTION 4: In the subnittal provided by letter dated April 1,1987,*

you have compared various equipment items to establish similarity. Althotgh all items may be similar as pu have stated, you did not always provide sufficient information for a reviewer to reach that conclusion (e.g., on page 6 of 27 it is stated, in part, that a thermal lag curve was not l specifically developed for a limit switch) . It was assuned that a limit switch housing thermal response would be similar to the response of the solenoid valve solenoid housing (Equipnent 1) . It is further stated that this I

assumption is appropriate because the thickness of the limit switch body is equal to the molded colenoid valve rolenoid housing. You also referred the rea3er to a sketch.

Fbr EquiFnent 1 (solenoid housing) , you have provided sane l detail information that is appropriate for comparison I purposes such as the fabrication material of the housing, l density, thermal conductivity, specific heat, thicknens and I a sketch. Ibwever, similar information was not provided I for the limit switch.

l i Consequently, for all instances where you have made compar-l isons similar to the above exanples, you must provide all information necessary to reach an independent conclusion (i.e., information such as that provided for E4uignent 1 in the above exanple) .

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[*This date applies to the Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation subnittal; the correspondity Union Electric Cbmpany submittal is dated ,

March 24, 1987.]

RESPONSE: The sole instance of extrapolating calculated thermal lag ,

paraneters frm one equipnent type to another is the use of j a solenoid housing calculation to approximate a limit switch as identified in the response to question IF in References 2 and 3. The requested data for empariry the solenoid housing to a limit switch are provided below:

Solenoid Limit Switch Housing

• Limit Switch Cover Housing EA170 EAlBO Top Bottm Material stainless zine alloy bronze alloy stainless nickel-plated steel steel steel Thickness, 1/8 3/16** 3/16** 1/8 1/8 inches Density 488 446 540 488 490 lbn/ft Specific Heat, 0.11 0.091 0.082 0.11 0.11 Ettvlbn gF 3

Thermal 9 64 15 9 26 Conductivity, BttVhr-f t- F

• Density, specific heat and thermal coMuctivity values are taken frm Principles of Heat Transfer, F. Kreith,1958, AppeMix III for zine and bronze. ,

• • Approximate average thickness - refer to Figure 1.

Based on the above paraneters, the lunped-capacity surface tmperature response of the limit switches would be similar to the response of a solenoid valve solenoid housing.

QUESTION 5: In accordance with IEEE Standard 323-1974, a margin of 15 F is required when qualifying for temperature in a harsh environment. According to information provided for MSIV/MFIV control cable agd MSIV/MPIV wiring and l'ugs, margins of only 2 F and 6 F respectively, are indicat-ed. Discuss the rationale for your determination that this is acceptable.

RESPONSE: The 15 F margin from IEEE-323-1974 are appropriate for qualifying equipnent when environmental taperature condi-tions are known. However, as in the case of the MSLB

4 superheat issue, when a. newly defined enviruinental condi-tion, that exceeds the licensing basis for the plant, is identified, the need to canply with ~ standard margin require--

ments should not be a rigorous requirement. We evaluation l of the MSIB superheat condition involves a dynanic situation j with time-dependent paraneters, ne goal of the analysis is /

to demonstrate that the required equipnent will actuate to j perform its safety function prior to exceeding its qualifi- i cation temperatures or, barring that, that environmentally-  !

induced faults occurring either prior to or subsequent to ,

actuation, will neither prevent the safety function fran 1 being - performed nor mislead plant operators. Under these l conditions, more credit should be given to the conservatism inherent in the analysis, such as:

a. We Beference 6 Westinghouse mass / energy release calcu- (

1ations do not contain factors that muld reduce super- { '

heat, e.g., froth, entrainment and compressibility.

b. The ' Westinghouse calculations are based on a more conservative stean generator design (mdel D4) than used in the SNUPPS plants (2 del F) .

c. %e Westinghouse calculations use several conservative assumptions listed on page 3 of Beference 1, e.g., core decay heat, single failure of one safety injection train, steam generator level, etc. .

d. The temperature analysis assumed worst case, non-spatially varying conditions throtshout the main stean tunnel. No credit was taken for buoyancy effects in the tunnel atmosphetce cooling the equipnent via natural circulation.

e. The thermal lag calculations assumed heat transfer based on fluid velocities well in excess of those expected to occur in the vicinity of the equipment modelled.

f. Margin requirements for equipnent pstulated to perform its function early in the event were discussed in Section 4.0 of Beference 1.

In the case of the margins identified in Question 5 for the MSIV/MFIV wiring and lugs, these canponents are located inside the terminal boxes on the MSIV/MFIV. Their thetmal lag temperature is based on a one-dimensional analysis of the box itself (see discussion of iten IF in References 2 and 3) . A more detailed two-dimensional analysis of these canponents would provide additional margin similar to the case of the MSIV/MFIV terminal blocks.

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Based on the discussions in Reference 1 and .in the response to Question 1 above, the failure of MSIV/MFIV limit switches would not result in a safety concern .since alternate Indic-ations are available to assgre that valves are in their safe positions; therefore, the 2 P margin for the limit switches i is not a safety issue. In addition, it is noted that Westing-house Electric (brporation has qualified the NAMCO model EA180 limit switcheg used cn the MSIVs and MFIVs to a temperature in excess of 400 F.

Regartling the margins for MSIV/MFIV control cable discussed in Question 5, all MSIV/MFIV control cable meets the margin recommended in IEEE-323-1974 with the exception of the cable for one MSIV at Nblf Creek Generating Station. We implica-tions of this were evaluated in Reference 1 and further discussed in the response to Question 3 above.

QUESTION 6: ' We analysis conducted for main stean line break with super- j heat inticated that the qualification temperatures of four itms of equipnent will be exceeded, and an additional two items (identified in Question 5 above) does not need the margin requirment of IEEE-323-1974. %ese six items are j identified in Table 3.4 of your subnittal as: {

l. Main Stean Pressure Transmitter Instrtment Cable

2. MSIV/MPIV Wiring and Lugs 1

3. MSIV/MFIV Control Cable

4. MSIV/MFIV Limit Switch

5. MSIV/MFIV Limit Switch Instrtnent Cable

6. J-601A Oantrol Cable -

Discuss the consequences of the simultaneous failure of all l six itens. )

RESPONSE: We main steam pressure transmitter instrtment cable carries the low steamline pressure signal from the 12 pressure  !

transmitters (3 per steam line) to initiate a Steam Line l Isolation Signal (SLIS). We consequences of failure of I these cables in the superheated MSIB environment has been ]

discussed, in Section 3.3.A of Reference 1, for the SLIS i function as well as the post-accident stean generator pressure monitoring function. As noted in Reference 1, the SLIS function would not be adversely affected by the cable failure 3 modes. %e longer term steam generator pressure nonitoring l function was also a3 dressed in Beference 1 and in the response j to Question 1 above. )

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The MSIV actuators must receive an electrical signal to close the MSIVs, whereas the MFIV actuators fail closed on a loss of electrical signal. Werefore, the following discus-sion will focus on the MSIV actuators. he signal required to close the MSIVs is transmitted via MSIV control cable and MSIV wiring and Itgs to the MSIV solenoid valves. Were are two, redundant electro-pnetsnatic-hydraulic actuators on each MSIV; one receives a signal from safety train A (separation group 1) and the other, from safety train B (separation group 4) . Actuation of solenoid valves on either of the redundant actuators (designated " active" and " standby") will result in closure of the MSIV. The active solenoids and terminal boxes (containing the MSIV wiring and lugs) are located on diametrically opposite sides of the actuator (see Figure 2). %erefore, the .asstznption regarding fluid velocity used in thennal lag heat transfer calculations, discussed in the respanse to Question 5 above, contains Mditional conser-vatism; because it is unlikely that the same high fluid velocity would be present on opposite sides of the actuator.

Additional discussion of temperature margin for MSIV closure circuit cmponents was provided in the response to Question 5.

Based on that information, the MSIV closure circuits are expected to perform acceptably to close the valves (with the exception of the sirgular MSIV addressed in Question 3 above at mlf Creek whose failure to close does not result in an unanalyzed condition) . Af ter the MSIVs and MFIVs are closed, environmentally induced failures of the actuators and/or appurtenances and control cable will not result in the valves reopening.

%e loss of valve position indication resultirg frun limit switch or limit switch cable failures for each MSIV/MFIV or J-601A valve would not result in valve repositioning nor  ;

cause the plant operating staff to take any actions adverse to safety because the operators would not be expected to take q actions based on those failures other 'than to verify valve i position. If valve position needed to be verified, the I alternate methods previously discussed in Question 1 would be  !

available to the operators.

We postulated failure of J-601A control cable is addressed via failure modes and effects analysis in Reference 1, Sections 3.3.C, E, and F. The analysis concluded that {

control circuit failures would either cause the valve to i acturte to its safe position or not prevent a safety signal  ;

from actuating the valve to its safe position. In addition, l

once actuated the valve would not reposition if an errviron- l mentally-induced control circuit failure occurred.

Based on the above discussion, the simultaneous failure of j the equipnent identified in NRC Question 6, with the excep-tion of the MSIV closure circuit components, would not pose l

any significant difficulty for the operators in controlling l

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4 the plant and mitigating the' MSIB. In addition, the tenper-ature margin applicable to the .MSIV closure circuit ccupo-nents could be increased through additional analysis with' less conservative assumptions. However, the additional information regarding margins in the above discussion and in

c the response to Question 5 provides adequate assurance that.

the equipnent required to close the MSIVs will perfoon its i safety function.

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REFERENCES:

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1. " Evaluation of Environmental Qualification of Equipment Considering Superheat Effects of High Ehergy Line Breaks for  !

ll Callaway Plant and Elf Creek Generating Station", forwarded I

by SNUPPS letter SWRC 86-06, dated 4/4/86.

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l 2. Union Electric Cbmpany letter. (D. Schnell) to NRC, UWRC-1473, J l-dated 3/24/87.

3. hbif Creek Nuclear Operating Corp. letter (B. Withers) to NRC kW 87-107, dated 4/1/87. - ,

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4. NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for. Nuclear Power Plants, 7/81 (Branch Technical Position MEB 3-1).

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5. NBC Memorandte H. Denton, ONRR to V. Stello, DEDROGR, dated j 4/29/85: Position on a MSIB in Superpipe (bncurrent with a i Single Active Failure.

6. WCAP-10961-P, Steanline Break Mass / Energy Releases for E4ui 1>- ,

ment Environmental Qualification Outside Containment, October, 1985.

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