ML20043G769

Responds to NRC 900514 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-482/90-16.Corrective Actions:Movement of Spent Pool Bridge Toward Location FF06 Halted & Bridge Crane Returned to Location DD02

ML20043G769
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	06/13/1990
From:	Withers B WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
WM-90-0102, WM-90-102, NUDOCS 9006210109
Download: ML20043G769 (3)

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WQ1.F CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION '

Bewt D. Withos emeena one i cw en cune omeer  :

June 13,1990 WM 90-0102 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Mail Station Pl.137 Washington, D. C. 20555 c

Reference:

Letter dated May 14, 1990 from S. J. Collins, NRC to B. D. Withers WCNOC

Subject:

Docket No. 50-482: Response to Violation 482/9016-01 9

Gentlemen: ,

l Attached is Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation's (WCN00) response to ,

violation 482/9016-01 which was documented in the Reference. Violation 1 482/9016-01 involved _a failure to follow procedure.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me or Mr. H. K. Chernoff of my staff.

Very truly'yours, s

Bart D. Withers President and- l Chief Executive Officer i

BDW/aem l 1

Attachment  !

1 cci R. D. Martin (NRC), w/a D. V. Pickett (NRC), w/a

, M. E. Skow (NRC), w/a k J. S. Wiebe (NRC), w/a i

7006210109 coo 613 l PDR ADOCA 05000482  !

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t;i P.O. Box 411/ Burtmgion, KS 66639 / Phone: (316) 364-8631 q

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Attachment to WM 90-0102-Page.1 of 2 Violation (482/9016-01): Failure to Follow Procedure Findinn Technical Specifications requires that written procedures shall be

• established. implemented, and maintained covering those activities recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33 Revision '2, February 1978. RG 1.33 required, in part, that there be procedures covering performing maintenance. l Procedure FHP 03-012. Revision 3, ' Rod Cluster Control Change Tool Operating Instructions' paragraph 7.2.4, ' Recovery', specifies the steps to perform to disengage the tool from a rod cluster control assembly (RCCA) prior to moving the bridge crane.

Contrary to the above, on March 30, 1990, with the reactor in Mode 6, the i operators moved the spent fuel pool bridge crane while the rod cluster control change tool was attached to an RCCA in a test location.

Reason For Violations  !

On March 29, 1900 during performance of oddy current testing on the rod cluster control assemblies (RCCAs), RCCA R-96 had been placed in its final.

location (DD02) in the_ spent fuel pool. A scheduled operator change ocurred and the oncoming operator raised the RCCA change tool and moved the i spent fuel pool bridge crane approximately 20 inches toward location FF06.

The operator did not verify by use of the load cell or movement of the RCCA l change tool that the RCCA was disengaged. Refueling crew personnel then i observed that RCCA R-96 had not be disengaged. Evaluation of this event determined. that the reason for the failure to follow procedure FHP 03-012,  ;

" Rod Cluster Control Change Tool Operating Inscructions' was inattention to- 1 detail and inadequate turnover by refueling crew personnel.

Corrective Stece Which Have Been Taken And Results Achieved Movement of the spent fuel pool bridge crane toward location FF06_was halted.  !

when personnel observed that RCCA R-96 had not been disengaged from the RCCA change _ tool. The bridge crane was returned to location DD02 and the RCCA change tool lowered onto the fuel assembly in this-grid location. R",CA R-96

-was. then raised and reinserted into the assembly with no visual damage or binding being observed. Operations management discussed the event with the i operators involved and stressed the need for attention to details including- .

the need to monitor disengagement by use of the installed load cell as well  !

as ~ the indicating lights. The need for complete and thorough turnovers to oncoming personnel was emphasized to the involved operators. -

Additionally, one operator was removed from fuel handling activities and letters of reprimand were placed in the involved individuals' personnel file. During subsequent eddy current testing a member of the refueling crew was assigned as a spotter to observe operation and disengagement of the RCCA change tool.

Attachment to WM 90-0102 Page 2 of 2 lua Operations Event Report was initiated to investigate this event. RCCA R-96 was replaced with a new RCCA and a corrective work request was-generated to. evaluate the condition of RCCA R-96. 1 I

Corrective Stoos Which Will Be Taken To Avoid Further Violations:

Procedure FHP 03-012 has been revised to require an individual to observe operation and disengagement of the RCCA change tool. Additionally, the revision requires a refueling Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) to be' present during use of the RCCA change tool.

Date When Full Comoliance Will-Be Achieved:

Full compliance has been achieved.

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