ML20043G769

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Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-482/90-16.Corrective Actions:Movement of Spent Pool Bridge Toward Location FF06 Halted & Bridge Crane Returned to Location DD02
ML20043G769
Person / Time
Site: Wolf Creek Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation icon.png
Issue date: 06/13/1990
From: Withers B
WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORP.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
WM-90-0102, WM-90-102, NUDOCS 9006210109
Download: ML20043G769 (3)


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WQ1.F CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION Bewt D. Withos emeena one i

cw en cune omeer June 13,1990 WM 90-0102 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:

Document Control Desk Mail Station Pl.137 Washington, D. C.

20555 c

Reference:

Letter dated May 14, 1990 from S. J. Collins, NRC to B. D. Withers WCNOC

Subject:

Docket No. 50-482: Response to Violation 482/9016-01 9

Gentlemen:

l Attached is Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation's (WCN00) response to violation 482/9016-01 which was documented in the Reference.

Violation 1

482/9016-01 involved _a failure to follow procedure.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me or Mr. H. K. Chernoff of my staff.

Very truly'yours, s

Bart D. Withers President and-l Chief Executive Officer i

BDW/aem l

1 Attachment 1

cci R. D. Martin (NRC), w/a D. V. Pickett (NRC), w/a M. E. Skow (NRC), w/a k

J. S. Wiebe (NRC), w/a i

7006210109 coo 613 l

PDR ADOCA 05000482 O

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t;i P.O. Box 411/ Burtmgion, KS 66639 / Phone: (316) 364-8631 q

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Attachment to WM 90-0102-Page.1 of 2 Violation (482/9016-01): Failure to Follow Procedure Findinn Technical Specifications requires that written procedures shall be established.

implemented, and maintained covering those activities recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33 Revision

'2, February 1978.

RG 1.33 required, in part, that there be procedures covering performing maintenance.

l Procedure FHP 03-012. Revision 3, ' Rod Cluster Control Change Tool Operating Instructions' paragraph 7.2.4,

' Recovery',

specifies the steps to perform to disengage the tool from a rod cluster control assembly (RCCA) prior to moving the bridge crane.

Contrary to the above, on March 30, 1990, with the reactor in Mode 6, the i

operators moved the spent fuel pool bridge crane while the rod cluster control change tool was attached to an RCCA in a test location.

Reason For Violations On March 29, 1900 during performance of oddy current testing on the rod cluster control assemblies (RCCAs),

RCCA R-96 had been placed in its final.

location (DD02) in the_ spent fuel pool.

A scheduled operator change ocurred and the oncoming operator raised the RCCA change tool and moved the i

spent fuel pool bridge crane approximately 20 inches toward location FF06.

The operator did not verify by use of the load cell or movement of the RCCA l

change tool that the RCCA was disengaged.

Refueling crew personnel then i

observed that RCCA R-96 had not be disengaged.

Evaluation of this event determined. that the reason for the failure to follow procedure FHP 03-012,

" Rod Cluster Control Change Tool Operating Inscructions' was inattention to-1 detail and inadequate turnover by refueling crew personnel.

Corrective Stece Which Have Been Taken And Results Achieved Movement of the spent fuel pool bridge crane toward location FF06_was halted.

when personnel observed that RCCA R-96 had not been disengaged from the RCCA change _ tool.

The bridge crane was returned to location DD02 and the RCCA change tool lowered onto the fuel assembly in this-grid location.

R",CA R-96

-was. then raised and reinserted into the assembly with no visual damage or binding being observed.

Operations management discussed the event with the i

operators involved and stressed the need for attention to details including-the need to monitor disengagement by use of the installed load cell as well as ~ the indicating lights.

The need for complete and thorough turnovers to oncoming personnel was emphasized to the involved operators.

Additionally, one operator was removed from fuel handling activities and letters of reprimand were placed in the involved individuals' personnel file. During subsequent eddy current testing a member of the refueling crew was assigned as a spotter to observe operation and disengagement of the RCCA change tool.

Attachment to WM 90-0102 Page 2 of 2 lua Operations Event Report was initiated to investigate this event.

RCCA R-96 was replaced with a new RCCA and a corrective work request was-generated to. evaluate the condition of RCCA R-96.

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Corrective Stoos Which Will Be Taken To Avoid Further Violations:

Procedure FHP 03-012 has been revised to require an individual to observe operation and disengagement of the RCCA change tool.

Additionally, the revision requires a refueling Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) to be' present during use of the RCCA change tool.

Date When Full Comoliance Will-Be Achieved:

Full compliance has been achieved.

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