ML20235J180

Responds to Notice of Violation & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in Amount of $205,000.Corrective Actions: Temporary Variation Revoked & Vacuum Breaker Valves Restored to Operable Status.Penalty Paid

ML20235J180
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	09/22/1987
From:	Fiedler P GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To:	Lieberman J NRC OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT (OE)
References
NUDOCS 8710010340
Download: ML20235J180 (11)

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GPU Nuclear Corporation l

. ,, Nuclear  ;;;ggrae8 i Forked River, New Jersey 08731-0388 i 609 971-4000 i Writer's Direct Dial Number: )

September 22, 1987 Mr. James Lieberman, Director Office of Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7940 Norfolk Avenue, Phillips Bldg.

Bethesda, MD 20014

Subject:

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket No. 50-219 Reply to Notice of Violation-IE Inspection Report No. 50-219/87-16 and Proposed Imposition of ..

Civil Penalty  !

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.201, the enclosure provides the GPU Nuclear Corporation (GPUN) reply to the Notice of Violation (N0Y) and Imposition of Civil Penalties enclosed in your letter of August 24, 1987. The enclosed check in the amount of $205,000.00 represents GPUN's payment of the imposed civil penal ty.

In your letter, a statement is made regarding the unacceptability of manual action as a substitute for automatic capability. GPUN does not question the specific application to the NOV; however, we would like to discuss the circumstances and conditions under which this applies. We will contact the ,

staff in the near future to arrange a meeting for this purpose.

If you should have any questions, pertaining to this response please contact Mr. George W. Busch at (609)971-4909.

Very truly yours, i

P. e Vice President & Director Oyster Creek SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME THIS M SEPTEMBER 1987 DAY OF A

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' NOTARY PUBLIC OF NEW JERSEY

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DIANA M. DeBLASIO p Enclosures NOTARY PUBLIC 0F NE My Commission Expiree Y

SW gW ER g4-See Page 2 for cc's / / # @4 GPU Nuclear Corporation is a subsidiary of the General Pubhc Utilities Corporation h 8 W

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.cc: Mr. W1111am' T. Russell, Administrator; Region U;S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of. Prussia, PA 19406 >

Mr. Alexander,W.. Dromerick, Project Manaser U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Division of Reactor Projects I/II-7920 Norfolk Avenue, Phillips Bldg.

Bethesda, MD 20014 Mail Stop No. 316 ~

Document Control Desk U.S. . Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 NRC Resident Inspector. .

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station J

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3 ENCLOSURE 1 1

REPLY TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION j l

I. VIOLATIONS ASSOCIATE 0 WITH INOPERABLE SUPPRESSION CHAMBER-DRYWELL V/CUUM i BREAKERS A. 10 CFR 50.59(a)(1) allows a licensee to make changes in the facility or procedures as described in the safety analysis report, without prior Commission approval, unless the proposed change involves a  !

change in the technical specifications incorporated in the license or an unreviewed safety question. l The Oyster Creek Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 6.2.1, describes that for a design basis loss of coolant accident, the reactor coolant discharged into the drywell is vented through vent tubes to the suppression chamber (torus) where it is effectively  :

condensed for pressure reduction purposes by the suppression pool.

Technical Specification limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.5. A.3 requires that primary containment integrity be maintained at j all times when the reactor is critical or when the reactor water I

temperature is above 212'F and fuel is in the reactor vessel, except for certain limited conditions. Technica? Specification LC0 3.5. A.5 l requires that, whenever primary containment is required, all ,

suppression chamber - drywell vacuum breakers be operable except in '

certain conditions. Technical Specification LC0 3.5. A.5.2 specifies that one of the conditions required for operability of the vacuum breakers is that the valve disk close by gravity when released after l being open by remote or manual means.

Contrary to the above, between 3:30 AM and 7:15 AM on April 24, 1987, a change was made at the Oyster Creek facility as described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report which resulted in a condition that was contrary to the technical specifications and involved an unreviewed safety question, and the change was made without prior Commission approval. Specifically, during that time, two suppression chamber-drywell vacuum breakers (Nos. V-26-9 and V-26-10) were tied open at the direction of the Group Shift Supervisor while the reactor was at 23% power with all vacuum breakers required to be operable.

This condition was contrary to the description in the Updated Safety Analysis Report and Technical Specification LCO 3.5. A.5 and also involved an unreviewed safety question in that opening of these breakers resulted in bypassing of the suppression pool and the degradation of the pressure suppression capability provided by the suppression chamber required in the event of a loss of coolant accident. This degradation would cause a possible rupture of the containment structure and thus created the possibility for increased consequences of an accident analyzed in the safety analysis report.

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i RESPONSE: GPUN concurs with the cited violation.

The cited violation occurred as a result of a cognitive error by shift operations personnel and the shift technical advisor in failing to properly evaluate the nuclear safety implication of blocking open the torus to drywell vacuum breakers while primary containment was required. As a result of GPUN's investigation of this event, a number of contributing factors were identified as follows:

1. The operating shift personnel did not fully understand the 1 function of the vacuum breaker valves with regard to primary i containment integrity.

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2. There was a general interest in using this temporary variation to meet schedular requirements. In the past, the torus to drywell vacuum breakers had been opened to allow a more rapid exchange of 1 air between the torus air space and the drywell to assist l deinerting the torus._ However, on those previous occasions, this  !

action was not initiated until reactor coolant temperature was i below 212*F at which point primary containment integrity is not i required. The previous history of blocking open the vacuum '

breaker valves under these conditions contributed to the I

operator's error in not fully evaluating all pertinent aspects of this action.

3. Some conflict existed between the temporary variation procedure (0yster Creek Procedure 108) and the safety review procedure (0yster Creek Procedure 130) in that procedure 108 allowed review s and approval of temporary variations by the Group Shift Supervisor )

and did not require a review by independent individuals as does  !

procedure 130.

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4. A lack of the expected independence between operations supervision I and the shift technical advisor.

Upon discovery of the violation, immediate action was taken to restore the vacuum breaker valves to full operability. The operators who installed the temporary variation realized their error during discussions of plant status with oncoming operations management. The l temporary variatfor, was revoked and the vacuum breaker valves were restored to operable status.

Full compliance was achieved on April 24, 1987 approximately 45 minutes following the identification of the violation.

Subsequently, prior to restart, other corrective actions were taken to address the contributing factors leading to the operators error.

Operations personnel were reinstructed on the importance of the >

vacuum breakers and their function in assuring primary containment integrity. Significant procedural revisions, as discussed below (Section II response), were made to strengthen the safety review process and the control of temporary variations. The importance of independence was discussed with Operations and shift technical advisor personnel.

3 B. 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(ii) requires that the licensee notify the NRC Operations Center within one hour of the occurrence of any event or condition during operation that results in the plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly compromises plant safety, a condition outside the design basis of the plant, or a condition not covered by the plant's operating and emergency procedures.

Contrary to the above, after . identification on April 24, 1987 of the event in which the suppression chamber-drywell vacuum breakers were tied open while the reactor temperature was above 212*F, notification of the NRC Operations Center was not made until April 27,.1987,. f significantly exceeding the one hour reporting requirement. This event was required to be reported within one hour since it resulted-in the plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly ,

compromised primary containment integrity in the event of a loss of

• coolant accident, was outside the design basis of the plant, and.was a condition not covered by the plant's operating and emergency procedures.

RESPONSE

GPUN concurs with the violation in that the event did compromise primary containment integrity in the event of a loss of coolant accident. ,

3 Operations management notified the Oyster Creek NRC Resident Inspector of this event immediately following his arrival (approximately 8:0C AM) at the site. Although operations personnel had evaluated the event with regard to 10 CFR 50.72 reporting criteria, it was not deerred, at that time, to constitute an immediate i (one hour) report.

As a result of GPUN and NRC investigations of this ' event, it was determined that reporting pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 was necessary and the reqeired report was made. Station management, both verbally and in writing, have re-enforced the need to evaluate conditions and 1

, events with respect to both 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73 to determine deportability. Personnel have been directed to adopt a philosophy of "when in doubt-report". It has been noted that since l this event and the subsequent management direction, personnel are i more sensitive regarding deportability evaluations.

1 It should be noted that plant emergency operating procedures are

" symptom based" and cover events outside the plant design basis.

Emergency operating procedures direct operator actions in the event of a degradation in the pressure suppression function.

Full compliance was achieved April 27, 1987.

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II. ' VIOLATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH TEMPORARY VARIATION PROCEDURES L Technical. Specification 6.8. requires that written procedures be 1 established implemented and maintained that meet or exceed the -

. requirements of Appendix A of. Regulatory Guide 1.33, which specifies the -

need for procedures for' control lof equipment and modifications of the facility.

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A. Station Procedure 108, Equipment Control, Section 6.3.3, requires that the Group Shift Supervisor. perform a safety. evaluation before  ;

authorizing installation. of a temporary Lvariation. Station Procedure . j 130, Conduct of' Independent Safety Reviews and Respor.sible Technical 'l Reviews by Plant Review Group, used to- perform the safety' evaluation,.

specifies in Section 5.1.1 that the signature'of- the Responsible l Technical Reviewer (RTR) . signifies concurrence that (1) an unreviewed safety questions does.not _ exist; (2) a technical specification change-is not required; (3) technical and safety considerations have been - 4 properly addressed; (4) any associated safety determinations or safety evaluations are accurate and completed; and -(5) the RTR was appropriately independent of the originator. Section : 5.1._2 specifies  ;

that the signature of the IndependentLSafety Reviewer signifies I concurrence _that safety considerations have been. adequately evaluated:

and are properly _ addressed in any associated safety determination or safety evaluation and that the reviewer is appropriately. independent -

of the originator.and RTR.

(- Contrary to the above, temporary variations were made between September 1986 and April 1987, for which the safety evaluations were not performed as required by Station Procedure 108. .Specifically, (1) for Mechanical Temporary Variations Nos. 87-7,- 87-12 ' and 87-33, the safety evaluations documented on Form 130-3 indicated that written safety evaluations were not required when they were in fact required in that unreviewed safety questions did exist and/or a 1 change to technical specifications were reqcired; (2) for Mechanical .

Temporary Variations No.s86-508, 86-510, 87-7, 87-8, 87-12, and 87-13, the Form 130-3s had the same signature as preparer and _RTR indicating that the RTR was not-independent of the originator; and (3) for Mechanical Temporary Variations Nos.86-455, 86-456,86-472, ,86-480, 86-482, 87-15, and 87-17, the written safety evaluations did not have the appropriate reviews performed as demonstrated by the l presence of only'one or two signatures rather than the three required signatures. -

L' . Station Procedure 108, Equipment Control, Section 6.3.1, requires that, prior to installation of a temporary variation' , the Group.

Shift Supervisor (GSS) review.the function and effects of the temporary variation and the method of installation ~ with the-epropriate maintenance supervisor and Shift. Technical AdvisorJ '

(STA). Steps 17 and 18 of. the Instructions for Preparing' Temporary -

Variation Checkoff Sheets of Station Procedure-108 require that the- . i maintehence supervisor and Shift._ Technical Advisor sign the check-off sheet to 'iMicate that the requirements of Section 6.3.1 have been met to review the functions and effects of the variation.

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q Contrary to the above, on several occasions between August 1986'and April 1987, for Mechanical Temporary Variations' Nos.86-508, 86-510,.

87-7, 87-8, 87-12, 87-13, 87-14, 87-17, and 67-33,- the GSS did not have a review of temporary variations performed by the appropriate maintenance supervisor. Instances were noted where the GSS signed' for the maintenance supervisor. In addition,.the STA signed and.

thereby app' roved the check-off. sheet' for Mechanical. Temporary -

Variation 87-33 even though.it resulted in a. violation of technical specification requirements.

C. Station Procedure 108; Equipment Control, Section' 6.4.2, requires' the originator of.a temporary variation obtain from~'the Plant. Engineering -

Department, either before insta11ation'or as soon as practical after installation, various determinations' relating to checks and testing :

to be performed on temporary variations.

Contrary to the above, between ' August 1986 and April _1987, for Mechanical Temporary Variations Nos.86-404,-86-448,86-473, 86-482,86-484, 86-508, 87-6,87-10, ~ 87-12, 87-23, 87-24 . and 87-33,_ the Plant-Engineering Department had not completed thel requirements specified in Section .6.4.2 in that requirements ,for. post-installation, periodic, and post-restoration checks, and testing- af ter-temporary .

Variations were not provided, or commented upon,by the Plant Engineering Department.

D. Station Procedure 108, Equipment Control, Section 6.19, requires that the Operations Department forward a copy of the applicable temporary variation check-off sheet to the safety review manager who shall initiate any follow-up action he deems necessary.

Contrary to the above, between September 1986 and April 1987,. for Mechanical Temporary Variations referenced in Violations II. A II.B.

l and II.C., the safety review manager did not' adequately review these-check-off sheets, identify procedural deficiencies, and initiate needed follow-up action. The applicable check-off sheets were ,

improperly completed with regard to procedure requirements, including the requirement for responsible technical reviews.

E. Station Procedure 107, Procedure Control, Section 5.1.3 requires -l that, should any procedure prove to be inadequate, it shall be

' revised temporarily if necessary, so that the station is operated in i compliance with approved procedures at all times.

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Contrary to the above, Station Procedure 108, Equipment Control, had. l' not been revised to reflect that, for. temporary variations ~since i September 1986, the safety determinations and reviews were documented

) using Station Procedure.130 and Form 130-3 rather than the previous L

. specific requirement for a safety evaluation.

RE'SPONSE:

GPUN concurs with the violation, although there appears to be some misunderstanding with regard to several of the specific temporary variations cited.Section II.C of the Notice of Violation states that temporary variations86-448, 86-482,86-484, 87-23, and 87-24 were not reviewed by the Plant Engineering Department. This is incorrect since these temporary variations were reviewed and approved by Plant Engineering personnel. The other temporary variations cited in this section were deficient as stated in the Notice of Violation.

The procedural noncompliance described above were a result of inadequate implementation of the safety review process with respect to temporary .

variations and inadequate management review of temporary variations. In l September 1986, the corporate procedure (Procedure No.1000-ADM-1291.01) establishing the safety review requirements was revised to implement a two step process for conducting safety reviews. The first step requires an initial determination of safety significance and the second step requires a written safety evaluation for safety significant issues. Oyster Creek Station Procedure 130 was revised to include the requirements of procedure 1291.01. At that time, it was recognized that station procedure 108 also required revision, however, GPUN management had previously directed that the number of existing temporary variations be reduced and that procedure l 108 be revised to establish more definitive control of such variations.

Since this would require substantial revisions of procedure 108 in addition to changes reflecting the requirements of procedure 1291.01, operations personnel were directed to implement the requirements of procedure 130 when conducting rev.ews of temporary variations and to attach the procedure 130 review form to the temporary variation until such time as all revisions to procedure 108 could be implemented. It should be noted that procedure 108 required a safety evaluation and it was viewed that procedure 130 was a more complete way of documenting the required safety evaluation. It was expected that procedure 108 would be revised and implemented expeditiously and that management direction in the interim would result in proper reviews being conducted. The expected revisions and implementation of procedure 108 were delayed due to the volume and complexity of comments received during the review process. As a result, incersistencies between plant procedure 130 and 108 led to misunderstanding and errors in the evaluation and deposition of temporary variations.

In view of the Technical Specification violation which occurred and the procedural violations which were identified, GPUN management directed the plant remain in a shutdown condition until corrective actions were implemented. These corrective actions consisted of the following:

1. A Temporary Variation Task Force consisting of shift technical advisors and management personnel was established to review documentation associated with all existing temporary variations.

These personnel were retrained prior to performing this review.

Where deficiencies were identified, safety evaluations were prepared where appropriate and where safety evaluations were not required, documented justification for this determination was developed.

. '. 2. Oyster Creek Responsible Technical Reviewers (RTR) and Independent Safety Reviewers (ISR) involved in the safety review process for temporary variations were retrained prior to performing any l further reviews. J

3. Procedure No. '108 (Equipment Control) was revised as follows: j

a. Temporary variations prior to installation must be prepared or reviewed by a qualified individual who is not assigned to Control Room shift duties.

b. The procedure was revised to be compatible with Procedure 130 (Conduct of Independent Safety Reviews and Responsible 1 Technical Reviews by Plant Review Group).

c. Additional guidance was provided to restrict the use of a temporary variation when a procedure change is more appropriate.

d. The temporary variation form was revised to explicitly require a technical review of the temporary variation package including j the procedure 130 " Nuclear Safety Environmental Determination l Review" (NSEDR) form, which identifies the safety significance and the written Safety Evaluation (SE) when one is required.

4. Procedure No.130 (Conduct of Independent Safety Reviews and Responsible Technical Reviews by Plant Review Group) was changed to require a written justification for "no" answer:: given to questions 3 through 6 on the NSEDR.

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5. Management personnel procedurally responsible for reviews have been retrained as to what is expected and what their

responsibilities include. Examples were provided illustrating a lack of pertinent information and, in some cases, incorrect determinations on documentation associated with temporary variations and their associated safety reviews. These personnel now better recognize their responsibility to provide greater attention to documentation to assure proper content, control of interim measures with regard to testing and recovery, and to assure accurate determinations regarding safety.

Full compliance was achieved on May 14, 1987.

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o. , l III. VIOLATION ASSOCIATED WITH INOPERABLEEREACTOR BUILDING - SUPPRESSION- I CHAMBER VACUUM BREAKEP.S 10 CFR 50;59 (a)(1): allows a licensee to make changes in tha' facility or procedures as' described in'the safety analysis report, without prior '

Commission approval, unless the proposed change. involves a change in the. ]

' technical specifications incorporated in the ifcense or an unreviewed  ;

safety. question. '

l The Oyster Creek Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.Section 6.2.1.1 describes' the. reactor building-suppression chamber.(torus) vacuum relief  ;

. system as permitting gas: flow only inward from the atmosphere to the q containment.

Technical Specification limiting condition for operation (LC0) 3.5.A.3 requires .that: primary containment integrity be maintained at all times when the reactor is critical.or when the reactor water temperature-is 3 above 212*F and fuel is in the, reactor vessel, .except for certain conditions. Technical Specification LC0 3.5. A.4 requires the two reactor  ;

building . suppression chamber vacuum breakers inleach line be operable- 1 at all times when primary containment integrity is required. ' Further,-if. 4

a vacuum breaker is inoperable, it shall be locked closed. j l i Contrary to the above, during numerous deinerting' evolutions conducted' l

since April 1977 while the reactor; temperature was greater than 212*F and primary containment integrity was required, a change was made to the facility as described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report.

Specifically, during deinerting of the suppression chamber, a Reactor Building-Suppression chamber vacuum breaker was manually' tied open to permit air flow into the suppression chamber. This created the potential for containment air to flow to the atmosphere, contrary to the description in the Updated Safety Analysis Report, and resulted in a condition that was contrary to the technical specification and . involved

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an unreviewed safety question, and the change was made without prior-Commission approval. This condition was< contrary to Technical.

Specifications and involved an unreviewed safety question since it'  !

l resulted in a loss of redundant isolation capability to assure that '

radioactivity would not be released from primary containment'through this pathway in the event of a loss of coolant accident, and thus created the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than evaluated previously in the safety analysis report.

RESPONSE: ,

GPUN concurs with the violation.

Plant procedure 312 (Reactor Containment' Integrity and Atmosphere Control) was changed in 1977 to allow opening of the. reactor building to toras vacuum breakers in order to establish a pathway to provide faster 1 air exchange' during containment deinerting. At the time, the proposed change was reviewed and approved by the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) in accordance with technical specifications.

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~ The reviews' conducte'd'during thi.s period did identify the concern that these ' valves were required to be operable while primary containment was required,; therefore, specific provisions were' made to establish administrative controls and a dedicated operator.'to assure' operability. in-response to an accident situation. It'was. felt'that these controls in conjunction with the functioning of a single automatic. isolation valve

-were' sufficient to; assure system operability.

Plant procedure 312 has.been revised to preclude opening .of reactor--

building to torus vacuum breaker valves while primary containment integrity is required. Additionally changes'in the-safety review process.

since 1977 have specifically: identified operating procedures' as ' requiring independent' reviews to determine the safety implications.'of revisions as

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well as documented evaluations pursuant to 10CFR50.59, as requ1 red. -

Full compliance was achieved May. 8,1987.

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