ML20214W063

Responds to Re Emergency Planning & Size of Emergency Planning Zone for Seabrook,Per Governor Dukakis Decision Not to Recommend Evacuation Plan for Portion of State within Plant Area.Served on 861208

ML20214W063
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	11/10/1986
From:	Parler W NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC)
To:	Simon P SENATE
Shared Package
ML20214W066	List: ML20214W063 ML20214W091
References
CON-#486-1804 OL, NUDOCS 8612100069
Download: ML20214W063 (3)

Text

_ __ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ .

/  %, UNITED STATES '

[

5 g

j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20655 SERVED DEC -819 y, .

% .. .. / November 10, 1986 T6 DEC -8 All :12

} -

Lii' , . -

.cThe." Honorable Paul Simon UE T United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510 l

Dear Senator Simon:

l Your letter of October 2, 1986 has been referred to me for response because in it you address some matters that may be presented to the Commission in the course of a formal adjudication.

Noting the leadership of your state of Illinois in the use -

of nuclear power, you sought responses to a number of generic questions with respect to emergency planning, including any Commission action in light of the accident at Chernobyl. You also asked a series of questions relating to the size of the emergency planning zone (EPZ) for Public Service Company of New Hampshire's Seabrook nuclear plant in light of Massachusetts Governor Dukakis' announcement that he will not recommend an evacuation plan for that portion of his state that lies within the Seabrook ten-mile EPZ. I will respond to these questions respectively in Parts I and II of this letter.

I. Response to generic emergency planning questions.

The size of the emergency planning zones for commercial nuclear power plants is established by NRC regulations. The EPZs are defined as the areas for which planning is needed to assure that prompt and effective actions can be taken to protect the public in the event of an accident. The choice of the size of the emergency planning zones (about 10 miles in radius for the plume exposure pathway EPZ and about 50 miles in radius for the ingestion pathway EPZ) represents a judgment on the extent of detailed planning which must be performed to assure an adequate response. In a particular emergency, protective actions might well be restricted to a small part of the planning zones. On the other hand, the response measures established within the 10-mile and 50-mile EPZ4 can and will be expanded if the conditions of a particular accident warrant it. Also, although an EPZ is generally circular, the actual shape is determined based on local factors such as demography, topography, access routes, and government jurisdictional boundaries at a particular site.

A license to operate a nuclear power plant at power levels in excess of 5% of rated power will not be issued unless a 8612100069 861110 DR ADOCK 05000 3 ]g ~l-

                     - ' ~ ~ n _-___ _         _

4 -

+

The Hon. Paul Simon 2 findia( is made by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that the state of onsite and offsite emergency preparedness J provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures, including evacuation, can and will be taken in the -

                          ,getent of a radiological emergency. The NRC bases its finding.on a review of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) findings and determinations as to whether              -

4 State and local emergency plans are adequate and capable of being implemented, and on the NRC assessment as to whether the onsite emergency plans are adequate and capable of being implemented. The acceptance criteria used as a basis for the review of emergency plans are specified in the planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47 (b) of the regulations, the requirements of Appendix E of 10 CFR 50 and the specific criteria of -

                      -      NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," dated November 1980.,.

The NRC is actively engaged in evaluating the consequences and implications of the Chernobyl accident. The first objective will be to systematically determine, in 4 coordination with other agencies and organizations, the facts concerning the Chernobyl accident including the Chernobyl plant design. The second objective will be to

determine the implications of the accident on U.S. nuclear i

regulatory policies and practices including emergency ! planning. Reviews of the accident and the Chernobyl plant design performed to date by the NRC staff have not . ! identified any aspects of the accident which show a need for l interim actions with respect to U.S. commercial nuclear l power plants. Chernobyl it, however, a " worse-case" accident than we have experienced and, as such, serves as a warning. Thus those characteristics associated with it are receiving priority attention to either confirm that our

                            . current regulatory, practices and policies are sound or identify improvements. These NRC studies are being coordinated with the many ongoing national and international activities. Any new requirements arising from these investigations, including emergency planning requirements,

will be carefully evaluated by the Commission. At this i time, it is too early to judge whether any changes to current emergency planning regulations will be required.

II. Response to questions related to the Seabrook plant.

Your specific question was directed to the legality, the regulatory compliance and the policy judgment on the

, acceptability of a possible proposal to decrease the Seabrook EPZ from a ten mile radius to a two mile radius.

  .-.+,.---.,,,.e,.--     C      '
                                .~--        v,

e o The Hon. Paul Simon 3 I Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Commission's regulations, the Commission's licensing decisions for nuclear reactors are made in on-the-record adjudications. It is of the utmost importa6ce that the Commission's Boards, as well as the ~

          .. Commission itself, serve as impartial judges in the adjudicatory proceedings over which they preside, approach contested safety questions with an open mind, and decide                                                               -

them carefully on the basis of the evidence in the adjudicatory record. In the event that the Public Service Company of New Hampshire proposes a change to the EPZ, the matter may be subject to litigation in the ongoing operating licensing proceeding for the Seabrook plant. As you may know, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts is represented in that proceeding along with other intervenors who have contentions - related to the emergency planning requirements at Seabrook. In light of the pending administrative litigation, any decision chat the Commission may make in this matter will be part of the formal adjudicatory process and after a full opportunity to consider the views of the parties to that litigation. In that light, I trust you will understand that no more specific response on the Seabrook matter can be provided at this time. Sincerely, l William C. Parler General Counsel t e

a PAUL SIMON m

            "'"**                                                                                            usos amo ave         u c.,
 ,                                                                                                                   mucwer N                  M hM(

WASHINGTON, DC 20510 October 2, 1986 Lando W. Zech, Jr. , Chair man Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20555

Dear Chairman Zech:

As you know, my state is a leader'in thits country in the use of nuclear power, with nine plants currently in operation and four more under construction. State legislative, regula' tory and citizen initiatives have also put Illinois on the leading edge of defining a state's role in addressing public safety concerns regarding those plants. - The accident at Chernobyl has drawn world-wide attention to the safety of nuclear plants, regardless of their design, and to the validity of our current working assumptions of public safety for those residents in the vicinity of nuclear plants. Current emergency evacuation plans focus on the area within a five- and ten-mile radius of a nuclear power plant. Are those limits established by law or by regulat.;;y action? What are the criteria for evaluating an acceptable evacuation plan? In light of the accident at Chernobyl, is the Commission taking action to reassess the adequacy of our evacuation plans and standards? Governor Dukakis of Massachusetts has recently announced that he cannot recommend an evacuation plan for that portion of his state within the ten-mile evacuation radius of the Seabrook l plant because he cannot be assured that any proposed plan will adequately protect the affected citizens of his state. I have l been told that Seabrook may, in response, propose a smaller i evacuation radius of two miles in order to put an approved plan I in place. How would that comply with the law and Commission ) standards? As Chairman, would you support or oppose such ) consideration? t I appreciate your attention to these questions, and I look pest wishes. forward to your prompt response. My

                                                        ,             Cc kN yally,                         .
                                                                                                          ~_
                                                                          \
                                    ~

l t Paul Simon PS/jdw U.S. Senator 230 5. Osaaeong 3 West Oto CA,stot PuaA 8787 STAtt St. 250 West Cwas Ktucivnsu Stee 38tw Ftoon Suite 1 Sutts 212 flocu 115-4 CmcAeo. IL 80004 Spamosists. IL 82701 East St. Louse. IL 82203 Cameo = oats. IL 6'

                , 3 {'S *      ?                217/402-4000                         818/398-7707                       s18/487-345

3) -, - ,.,(ux

                     .-}}