IR 05000454/1986039

Safety Insp Repts 50-454/86-39 & 50-455/86-33 on 860922-26 & 1030.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Procedures,Records,Observations & Unit 2 App R Compliance. Unresolved Item Re post-fire Safe Shutdown Noted

ML20213F682
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	11/07/1986
From:	Coppola T, Muffett J, Parkinson K, Sullivan K, Ulie J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20213F680	List: IR 05000454/1986039 ML20213F678
References
50-454-86-39, 50-455-86-33, NUDOCS 8611140387
Download: ML20213F682 (15)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-454/86039(DRS); 50-455/86033(DRS)

Docket Nos. 50-454; 50-455 License No. NPF-37; Construction Permit No. CPPR-131 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 69690 Facility Name: Byron Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Byron Site, Byron, Illinois Inspection Conducted: September 22-26 and October 30, 1986 Inspectors:

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T. Coppola "'7'%

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%m.ULkta UK. Parkinson II- 7 ' f4 Date

% A \$it ktn O K. Sullivah is -7- 26 Date W. ukt U J. Ulie II- 7-?4 Date A ON James W. Muffett, Chief " ' 66 Approved By:

Plant Systems Section Date Inspection Summary Inspection on September 22-26 and October 30, 1986 (Reports No. 50-454/86039(DRS);

50-455/86033(DRS))

Areas Inspected: An announced special safety inspection by a Region III based inspector and their consultants to continue NRC review of Byron Station Unit 2 for compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R and a followup of items opened during previous NRC inspection visits for both Byron Station Units 1 and Results: No violations or deviations were identified at this tim However, additional NRC review is necessary regarding an unresolved item for Unit 1 discussed in Paragraph 3 of the report to determine final categorization of the item. This inspection was conducted in accordance with Inspection Procedures No. 30703, 37301, 41700, 42700, 70329, 92701 and 9271 PDR ADOCK 0500

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I DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted i

Commonwealth Edison

, *D. Brindtl, Unit 2 Operating Engineer

• A. J. Cherinick, Regulatory Assurance Specialist

• S. D. Device, Maintenance Coordinator

• C. J. Diaz, Fire Protection Engineer

• J. Langan, Regulatory Assurance Staff

• R. G. Linboom, Fire Marshal

• D. M. Meier, Assistant Station Fire Marshal

• J. J. Pausche, Regulatory Group Leader

• M. Pietraszerski, Project Engineer

• R. Pleniewicz, Production Superintendent

• R. E. Querio, Station Manager

• B. Rybak, Station Nuclear Engineering

• K. A. Sullivan, Technical Staff

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• K. E. Yates, Nuclear Safety

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Sargent and Lundy

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• E. R. Crass, Licensing Project Engineer

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• J. P. Kish, Electrical Engineer

• J. D. Ragan, Electrical Project Engineer

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M & M Protection Consultants

• R. J. Smith, Jr. , Fire Protection Consultant USNRC Personnel

• P. Brochman, Resident Inspector

• J. Hinds, Senior Resident Inspector ,

The inspectors also contacted other plant personnel including plant operations staff, construction, and licensee consultants.

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• Denotes persons attending the exit meeting on September 26, 1986.

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2. Actions on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item (455/83-42-09): Numerous fire protection

, isolation valves were not electrically supervised or locked in the

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open position as committed to by the licensee in the Fire Protection Report.

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An inspector using the licensee's monthly fire protection valve lineup surveillance Procedure No. OBOS 7.10.1.1-C-1, Revision 7, dated September 23, 1986, verified that eight fire protection valves located in the Auxiliary Building, Elevations 426' and 451', and the Turbine Building, Elevation 401', are installed and locked in the proper position. This item is considered close b. (0 pen) Unresolved Item (455/83-42-10): Five concerns were raised regarding the Remote Shutdown Panel rooms fire protection features as follows:

(1) No procedure was provided to verify local manual operations that are to be performe (2) Penetration openings in designated fire barriers were observed unseale (3) A fire detector was not installed in the high ceiling area at the rear of the remote shutdown pane (4) No emergency lighting was provided in these areas.

, (5) No automatic fire suppression was provided in these area Followup review during the September 22-26, 1986, inspection visit determined the following:

(1) Procedures No. 2ZBOA PRI-5, Revision 52, undated and ZBOA ELEC-5, Revision 52, were reviewed. These procedures contain the instruction required for local operation (manual) of all pumps and valves required for safe shutdow This portion of the item is considered close (2) A tour of the Unit 1 and 2 Remote Shutdown Panel rooms showed that the as-installed fire barrier condition to be as reflected in the Fire Protection Report. This portion of the item is considered close (3) An inspection verified that a detector is now installed in the ceiling area at the rear of Unit 1 Remote Shutdown Panel roo However, the Unit 2 room has not had a fire detector installed yet. Although the licensee had initiated Modification Package No. M-6-0-86-0128, dated June 2, 1986, to add a fire detector in the Unit 2 Remote Shutdown Panel room. This portion of the item remains open pending installation of a fire detector in the Unit 2 Remote Shutdown Panel roo (4) Emergency lighting has been provided and is sufficient for reading instruments and labels at the remote shutdown panels, and for operating switches at the panel. This portion of the item is considered close _

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(5) According to SSER No. 5, if a fire of significant magnitude occurs and damages both shutdown divisions, an alternate shutdown method is available which is outside of these location Consequently, no loss of shutdown capability and, therefore, a fixed fire suppression system is not necessary. Based on the above, this portion of the item is considered close (Closed) Unresolved Item (455/83-42-15): The licensee had no procedure developed for the calibration of protective relays and a complete analysis of associated circuits and their affects in post fire safe shutdown was not provide The licensee has established the following procedures:

Procedure Number Date Revision Title BHP 4200-2 05/15/85 5 Preventive Maintenance Inspection of 6.9 KV and 4 KV Breakers Westinghouse

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DHP BHP 4200-5 08/27/85 7 Preventive Maintenance Inspection of 480 V Sub Breakers Type DS 2 BHS 8.4.1.6-1 04/22/86 2 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices From Medium Voltage Switchgear 2 BHS 8.4.1.a.2-1 02/20/86 1 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices From 480 Volt MCCs 2 BHS 8.4.1.a.2-2 07/28/86 2 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices From 480 Volt Switchgear The licensee's associated circuit analysis has been included in the May 1986 Amendment 8 to the Byron /Braidwood Fire Protection Report in response to Appendix A of BTP APCSB 9.5-1. Based on the above, this item is considered close (Closed) Unresolved Item (455/83-42-16): Licensee analysis for spurious operation of RHR motor operated valves No. RH 8701A and RH 8701B was not reviewed by NR Amendment 8 to the Byron /Braidwood Fire Protection Report dated May 1986, includes discussion of spurious operation of RHR motor operated valves No. RH 8701A and RH 8701 This report has been submitted to NRR. Based on the above, this item is considered closed.

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e. (Closed) Unresolved Item (455/83-42-17): A procedural walkdown of the licensee's safe shutdown procedures determined the following five concerns:

(1) Procedures were not developed for achieving and maintaining safe shutdow (2) Operators had received no training in achieving and maintaining safe shutdown in the event of a fir (3) The number of operations personnel exclusive of the fire brigade required to accomplish safe shutdown had not been determine (4) Repair procedures were not develope (5) No evidence of procedures were developed to operate support

equipmen Followup review during the September 22-26, 1986, inspection visit determined the following

(1) Procedures No. 2 B0A-PRIS, Revision 52; No.' 2 BOA-ELOC 3, Revision 51; and No. 280A-ELEC 5, Revision 51; were reviewed and steps required to establish stable hot shutdown were walked through satisfactorily. The procedures are capable of achieving and maintaining safe shutdown, with applicable steps capable of attaining cold shutdown. This portion of the item is considered close (2) Walkdown of procedures indicated in (1) above demonstrated that the personnel involved had received adequate training to perform the actions required in the procedures. This involved a Shift Supervisor, two Nuclear Shift Operators (NS0s), one Equipment-Operator (E0), and two Equipment Attendant's (EAs). This portion of the item is considered close (3) Based on the guidelines discussed below, the number of operations personnel required for safe shutdown had now been determined and minimum shift coverage is determined to be adequate. Those guidelines include the following:

(a) Although for a control room fire, both units are shutdown outside of the control room, only one unit's controls are affected by fire. The other can be shutdown with only one operator (NS0), at the remote shutdown panel for that uni The affected unit requires six people. The minimum shift crew available for two unit operation is twelve which is sufficient to provide four personnel for the five person fire brigade while a fifth person is taken from health ;

physics or the security cre !

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(b) The boric acid pump repair is no longer required for achieving safe shutdown and any repairs required can T be accomplished after.approximately nine hours, when additional personnel will be available. -Based on the

above, this portion of the item is considered closed.

I (4) Repair Procedure No. BHP 4200-33, Revision 4, dated December 30, 1985, was presented for review. This procedure outlines the

! electrical repairs necessary for cold shutdown with a listing of cable sizes and lengths to be kept onsite. No discrepancies were

noted during this review. Based on the above,.this portion of the item is considered close (5) Support equipment such as ventilation and essential services water system will be operated locally.at individual breakers per existing plant procedures. -Based on the above', this portion of the item is considered closed.

f (Closed) Open Item (455/83042-19): The licensee's proposed operatin technical specifications for fire protection were inconsistent-with NFPA design requirements and existing standard technical specification As discussed in Paragraph 2.m of Inspection Report-(454/84-60) covering l Unresolved Item (454/83-62.41), the inspector indicated that the licensee's proposed operating technical specifications were revised to

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be consistent with existing standard technical specifications. During the September 1986, inspection visit discussions between the NRR-LPM and one member of the inspection team indicated that since i the original licensee technical specification submittal included fire protection systems for both Units 1 and 2, this item can be closed based on the original inspectors closure of this concern for Unit 1. As a. reverification, an inspector and resident inspector verified Unit 2 fire protection systems are included in the current 1 plant operating technical specifications. Based on the above, this-

item is considered closed.

i (Closed) Open Item (455/84-51-01): The licensee failed to provide i an instruction, procedure, or drawing to ensure the timely review of radiation seal substitutions. For Byron-Unit 1, an inspector reviewed-Engineering Change Notice (ECN) P-33, applicable caly to Unit 1 dated January 3,1985, which revised Note 12 of Drawing No. 6E-0-3600

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indicating that if radiation seals can not be installed, those seal numbers shall be submitted to the A/E for resolution, which satisfied l

this concern for Unit Consequently, ECN P-33 has been updated in ECN P-33-1 applicable to both Units 1 and 2, dated January 9, 1986, in Note 6 of Drawing

No. 6E-0-3600A having the same statement as mentioned in Note 12 for i ECN P-3 Therefore, the licensee does now have in place instruction

for the craft installers to follow to ensure' adequate review of radiation seal substitutions. This item is considered closed based on i the above review.

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., (Closed) Open Item (454/85-05-01): The inspector performed a plant tour of the Fire Hazards Panel area observing that only one lighting unit having one lamp was in the area. The inspector requested the licensee to perform a review to determine the emergency lighting ,

illumination adequacy at the Fire Hazards Panel and routes theret t Subsequently the licensee's staff initiated Work Request No. 6LL083 to add emergency battery unit light (s) to improve illumination in the Fire Hazards Panel (1PL10J) area. This work request initiated Modification Package No. M6-1-85-0427 dated March 20, 198 An inspector toured the Fire Hazards Fanel (1PL10J) area Elevation 383'

area on September 23, 1986, showing that additional emergency lighting units and lamps have been installed. This resolves the inspector's concern and is therefore considered close (0 pen) Open Item (455/85034-02): The hose station for column-row K-17 on Elevation 451' of the Turbine Building is located in an inaccessible location inside the electrical instrumentation lab'in thetAuxiliary Building. Over 300 feet (number believed to be a typo) exist between hose stations located at column-row J-12 and column-row L-26 on the south wall at Elevation 451' of the Turbine ,

Buildin On September 23 and 24, 1986, an inspector toured the Turbine. Building and portions of the Auxiliary Building on Elevation 451' mentioned above. The inspector requested and the licensee performed fire hose reach tests on four fire hose stations No. 14, 16, 17, and 28 to

' determine the fire hose length adequacy. The inspector was provided Drawings No. M-52, Revision P; and M-52, Revision V; entitled " Diagram of Fire Protection Manual Hose Station," identifying hose reel number, location, elevation, nozzle class, hose length, building, and other pertinent information. Each hose station was verified to be as indicated on the drawings except hose reel No. 14 having a 100'

instead of 75' length of hose attached to the standpipe statio According to the licensee's staff this hose station and others located on the Unit 2 side of the Turbine Building have not been turned over to plant operations staff from construction yet. This item will mmain open pending further review by the NRC at a subsequent inspectio (Closed) Open Item (454/85-49-01; 455/85-34-01): An inspector observed a welding and grinding operation in progress in which no one was performing fire watch duty nor was a cutting and welding permit present. In addition, the following observations were made:

(1) personnel failed to notice a plastic five gallon pail of wood scraps within ten feet of the welding and grinding operation, (2) the Shift Engineer's office had no knowledge of welding and grinding

&ctivities being conducted in this area, and (3) no procedure is established to require the shift engineer's office to track welding and cutting activitie . . - . - - . -- - . _ ..

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During the September 22-26, 1986, inspection visit an inspector observed a grinding operation in progress in Unit 1. The inspector's observations included the following: (1) an individual was stationed at the work site as a fire watch, (2) a grinding permit was issued by the Shift Engineer's office and was being maintained at the work site, (3) no combustibles were observed in the work site area, and (4) a review of Procedure No. BAP 1100-20, Revision 1, dated March 5,1986, indicated that the Shift Engineer must be notified prior to any cutting, welding, and grinding to be performed in designated areas of the plant. Based on the above, this item is considered close . Post Fire Safe Shutdown i Systems _ Requ, e rired __for_ Safe Shutdown The inspectors examined systems required for safe shutdown as related to Section III.G and L of Appendix R. The systems are grouped under the headings of the goals established for PWR safe shutdown for both hot standby and cold shutdown. Those goals include the following:

Reactivity Control i Reactor Coolant Makeup (Level and Pressure Control)

Decay Heat Removal Support Systems Process Monitoring (Instrumentation)

Cold Shutdown i

No discrepancies were noted in the above areas except for the Process Monitoring are This discrepancy identified by the inspectors is the lack of direct indication of the CST level at either the remote shutdown panel or locally at the tank. Nor is adequate assurance provided by procedures to verify CST level . This is of concern since the suction for the auxiliary feedwater pump may have to be aligned from the condensate storage tank to the essential service water system prior to the depletion of the CST volume. This item is considered an Open Item l (455/86033-01) pending inspector review of the licensee's review of this concern.

I Alternate Shutdown i

The inspectors examined plant areas requiring alternate shutdown capability including the Control Room, Radwaste and Remote Shutdown, Control Room, and the Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room. No inspector discrepancies were noted in these area . . . .

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i c. Procedural Review The inspectors examined three licensee procedures related to post fire safe shutdown of the plant including a procedural walkdow (1) Procedure Review The procedures reviewed during this inspection visit were as follows:

• 280A PRI-5, Revision 52, Control Room Inaccessibility Unit 2 )

• 280A ELEC-3, Revision 51, Local Start of a Diesel Generator Unit 2

• 280A ELEC-5, Revision 51, Local Emergency Control of Safe Shutdown Equipment 280A PRI-5, Revision 52 is an undated draft revision which differs from Revision 51 (similar to Braidwood procedure) by the addition of Attachment K. This attachment details the steps required to prevent an unwanted safety injection occurrence by local manual operation of valves. It avoids the requirement of pulling fuses and providing jumpers at the control breakers in the auxiliary electric equipment room, which is considered a hot shutdown repair and therefore not allowable for Appendix R purposes. The repair steps are still incorporated in Attachment E of the procedure to allow for blocking, resetting, and manual SI actuation for scenarios that do not involve a fire in the auxiliary electric equipment room. This is acceptable, since the procedure is a general procedure handling all cases requiring control room evacuatio The procedure was reviewed in total and is essentially the same as previously reviewed for Byron Unit 1, with the addition of Attachment K and much more detailed instructions throughout the procedure (i.e., more caution notes and more detailed location notes for valves and equipment). It was noted that there was no provision for ensuring that either the MSIV's or steam dumps to the condenser would close, thereby adding a path for inadvertent or uncontrolled blowdown of the steam generator The licensee agreed to add a Step No. 8c (presently hand written revision Page 8a of procedure) which would close the steam dump isolation valves if the MSIV's or the steam dump valves were ope The procedure as modified will satisfy the requirements of Appendix R and can be used to bring the plant to stable hot shutdown, and if required to cold shutdow This item is considered an Open Item (455/86033-02) pending review of the final approved procedure incorporating the additional step mentioned abov .-. , - _ - _ - - - . - - . - . . , .. .

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Regarding Procedures No. 280A, ELEC-3 and 5, they were essentially the same as those reviewed for Unit 1, and are considered adequate for Appendix R purposes. They are referred to in 180A-PRIS and the essential parts of these procedure, (i.e., start and loading diesel, start of charging pump) were demonstrated during the walkdown of 2B0A-PRI (2) Procedural Walkdown The Procedure No. 280A PRI-5 walkdown was initiated on September 25, 1986, using six people from the licensee's operating staff with the proper labor categories, and the entire team of four NRC/BNL inspectors. Since the procedure is symptom oriented, the following conditions were assumed in order to obtain the required response from the operating crew:

• Fire in control room, coincident loss of offsite powe * Instrumentation on RSP not affecte * Spurious SI signa * AF pumps not running. Valves not open, and controls not functionin * Charge pumps not running. Valves in wrong position. Pump discharge and throttles closed. Let down ope * Diesels not running. Loads of * Component cooling not availabl One inspector was stationed at the Remote Shutdown Panel (RSP),

and observed communications, crew direction and leadership, training and familiarity with the procedure. He also made choices simulating spurious operation and equipment unavailability as appropriate throughout the exercise. The other three inspectors followed shutdown crew members throughout the plant and witnessed operations such as local starting of diesel generators, local starting of charging and AFW pumps, local manual valve operation such as AFW throttling, etc. These inspectors paid particular attention to the feasibility of operations, lighting at the operating locations and paths required throughout the plant, communications, and also observed operator training and familiarity with the procedure The exercise was halted at Step No. 29 in the procedures which demonstrated the attainment of stable hot shutdown and cooldown in preparation for transferring to RHR (2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> total elapsed)

for long term decay heat removal. The operators exhibited adequate training and familiarity with the procedure throughout the demonstration. One operation, requiring the opening and closing of a valve located over the charging pumps, appeared difficult but not impossible to perform because of its proximity to hot piping runs. An alternate to this operation, also contained in this procedure was demonstrated after the exercis This alternative involved the use of an existing ladder and is acceptabl .

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Two areas of insufficient emergency lighting were detected during this walkdown. They are as follows:

• Containment lighting required for a path to the letdown isolation valves and at the valve * AFW throttle valves (005 valves) area in auxiliary buildin These concerns are cor.sidered an Open Item (455/86033-03) and should be rectified prior to exceeding five percent powe It was also noted that the hydraulic pump handles required for local operation of the Steam Generator Pressure Operated Relief Valve were not secured and could be misplaced or unavailable during an emergency. The licensee committed to securing these handles in a proximity to the pump d. Protection for Associated Circuits The inspectors reviewed the protection of associated circuit The associated circuits requirements have three parts. These are as follows:

• Common Bus Concern

• Spurious Signals Concern

• Common Enclosure Concern (1) Common Bus Concern The common bus associated circuit concern is found in circuits, either non safety-related or safety-related, where there is a common power source with shutdown equipment and the power source is not electrically protected from the circuit of concer The common bus concern is made up of two items:

• Breaker Coordination

• High Impedance Fault Analysis (a) Breaker Coordination Breaker Coordination is audited by reviewing the time current curves developed during the licensee's bus coordination study. At the Byron Unit 2 Nuclear Plant the following circuits were randomly selected for review:

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Circuit 4160V BUS 241 4160V BUS 242 480V MCC 231X1 480V MCC 232X2 125VDC FUSE PANEL 20C11J 125VDC BUS 211 '

120V INST BUS DIST PANEL 211 120V INST BUS DIST PANEL 214 The licensee's breaker coordination was found to be satisfactor (b) High Impedance Fault Analysis The high impedance fault concern is found in the case where multiple high impedance faults exist as loads on a safe shutdown power supply and cause the loss of the power supply prior to clearing the high impedance fault The licensee's analysis for high impedance faults was included in the breaker coordination study. Breaker trips were selected to protect the safe shutdown power supply if either high or low impedance faults existe No discrepancies were noted during this revie (2) Spurious Signals (a) High/ Low Pressure Interfaces The licensee has identified the following high/ low pressure interface * RHR Suction Valves

• PORV's and Block Valves

• Reactor Head Vent

• Excess Letdown The RHR pump suction line high/ low pressure interface consists of two motor operated valves in series. Each valve is powered from a redundant train. The applicants analysis determined that the spurious cpening of both valves could only occur if the control switch, located in the control room, was closed and the reactor pressure interlock circuits were closed. Since the control switch is remotely located from the pressure interlock circuits and redundant cabling has adequate separation, this method was found to be satisfactor For the PORV interface the licensee's analysis determined

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that control is possible from either a hand switch located in the control room or by closing, in case of a fire in the

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control room, a transfer switch, located at the MC Closing this switch for each block valve would isolate control from the control room and permit local control of the block valves, using the open/close switch at the MC Alternate indication of pressurizer pressure is provided at the fire hazards panel and at the remote shutdown pane This method was found to be satisfactor Subsequent to this inspection visit, the licensee completed an analysis of the reactor head vent high/ low pressure interface concern for the Braidwood plant. The analysis determined that spurious opening of this interface would be precluded by de-energizing the reactor head vent circuits prior to evacuation of the control room. Required actions necessary to accomplish this task would be included in the control room evacuation procedure (PRI-5). This methodology is acceptable for the Byron plant provided it can be demonstrated that separation of the reactor head vent control cable routing is equivalent to the separation that exists at the Braidwood plant. In addition, the inspectors identified the excess letdown interface as an area that also requires analysis by the licensee. The above two high/ low pressure interface concerns are considered an Unresolved Item (454/86039-01) for Unit 1 and an Open Item (455/86033-04) for Unit (b) Current Transformer Secondaries The licensee has analyzed for potential current transformer open circuit secondaries which could induce fires. The licensee's analysis demonstrated that the maximum potential in the current transformer open secondary will be limited to approximately 30 volts. This potential will not present a hazard for inducing secondary fire (c) Isolation of Fire Instigated Spurious Signals The licensee has provided isolation for fire instigated spurious signals by various methods, including:

• Administrative controls

• Rerouting of cables

• Wrapping cables

• Isolation switches

• Dedicated sensors

• Dedicated power supplies The licensee's methods for isolating fire instigated spurious signals are satisfactor .

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(3) Common Enclosure Concern The common enclosure associated circuit concern is found when redundant circuits are routed together in a raceway or enclosure and they are not electrically protected, or fire can destroy both circuits due to inadequate fire protection mean Licensee representatives stated that:

• All circuits are electrically protected by breakers or fuse * Cables for redundant safe shutdown divisions were not routed in common enclosur * Non safety-related cables routed in common enclosure with safety-related cables are never routed between division Physical in plant inspection did not identify any exceptions to the above statements.

Cable Routing Documentation (cable routing) review and physical in plant inspection were performed on the following:

Function Component Type C Power Operated Relief "A" 2RY455A Control Power Operated Relief "B" 2RY389 Control Pressurizer Level 2LT-459 Instrument Pressurizer Level 2LT-460 Instrument Pressurizer Level 2LT-461 Instrument Pressurizer Pressure 2PT-455 Instrument Pressurizer Pressure 2PT-456 Instrument Pressurizer Pressure 2PT-457 Instrument Pressurizer Pressure 2PT-458 Instrument Charging Pump "A" 2CV01PA Power Charging Pump "B" 2CV01PB Power Component Cooling Water Pump "A" 2CC01PA Power Component Cooling Water Pump "B" 2CC01PB Power Component Cooling Water Pump " SWING" OCC01P Power Essential Service Water Pump "A" 2SX01PA Control Essential Service Water Pump "B" 2SX01PB Control Diesel Generator Control Panel "A" 2PLO8J Control Diesel Generator Control Panel "B" 2PLO7J Control Auxiliary Feedwater Pump "A" 2AF006 Control Auxiliary Feedwater Pump "B" 2AF168 Control Except as noted below, the cabling for the above companents were found to meet the Appendix R,Section III.G.2. Twenty foot separation requirements, or were protected by fire wrap, or were covered by deviation request .- . . - . - -. . .

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The Auxiliery Building General Area (elevation 383 feet) was found not in compliance with Section III.G.2 separation requirements. Cabling for the redundant diesel driven auxiliary feedwater pump remote start switch is routed through the area with less than 20 feet separation (without fire wrap protection)

from the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump cables. The diesel driven auxiliary feedwater pump remote start capability is required in the event of a fire in Fire Zone No.11.4-0. During the inspection, the licensee initiated corrective action via the Design Change Process to reroute the remote start switch cabling outside of Fire Zone No. 11.4-0. This item is considered an Open Item (455/86033-05) pending inspector review of the licensee's corrective actio . Control of Combustibles / Housekeeping During plant tours of September 23, 24 and 25, 1986, the inspectors observed assembled and disassembled scaffolding materials located in numerous safety-related and safe shutdown areas. In addition, numerous fifty-five (55) gallon drums and containers of debris were also observed during these tours including other debris scattered on the floor in numerous plant safety-related and safe shutdown area Followup of these concerns are being tracked as part of violation (455/86031-02).

5. Open Item _s Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involves some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. Open items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraph 3 of the repor . Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or deviations. An unresolved item disclosed during this inspection is discussed in Paragraph 3 of the repor . Exit Inte_rv_i_ew l The inspectors met with the licensee representatives at the conclusion of the inspection on September 26, 1986, and sunmarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee acknowledged the statements made by the inspectors. The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents as proprietary. Additional status information

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concerning the inspection findings were discussed on October 30, 1986, during a telephone exit between a member of the licensee's staff and a member of the Region III inspection tea ,

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