ML20211P200
| ML20211P200 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron  |
| Issue date: | 09/08/1999 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211P189 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-454-99-15, 50-455-99-15, NUDOCS 9909130162 | |
| Download: ML20211P200 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000454/1999015
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U.S' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGIONlli
Docket Nos.
50 4 54; 50-455
License Nos:
Report No:
50-454/99015(DRS); 50-456/99015(DRS)
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Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company (Comed)
Facility:
' Byron Generating Station, Units 1 and 2
Location:
4450 N. German Church Road
Byron,IL 61010
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Dates:
August 24-26,1999
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Inspectors:
J. Foster, Sr Emergency Preparedness Analyst
R. Jickling, Emergency Preparedness Analyst
D. Funk, Emergency Preparedness Analyst
B. Kemker, Resident inspector
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Approved by:
Gary L. Shear, Chief, Plant Support Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
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9909130162 990908
ADOCK 05000454
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Byron Generating Station Units 1 and 2
NRC Inspection Report 50-454/99015(DRS); 50-455/99015(DRS)
This inspection consisted of evaluating the licensee performance during an exercise of the
Emergency Plan. It was conducted by three regionalinspectors and a Resident inspector. No
violations of NRC requirements were identified.
Plant Sucoort
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Overall licensee performance during the 1999 Emergency Plan exercise was very good
and performance in the Emergency Operations Facility was excellent. (Section P4.1.c).
Performance in the Simulator Control Room was effective. (Section P4.1.c)
The Technical Support Center staff's overall performance was excellent. (Section
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P4.1.c)
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Overall performance of Operational Support Center management and staff was good.
(Section P4.1.c)
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Self-critiques following termination of the exercise were thorough and in close
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agreement with the majority of the inspectors' observations. Licensee critique findings
were consistent with the NRC evaluation team's findings. (Section P4.1.c)
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Report Details
IV. Plant Support
P3
Emergency Preparedness Procedures and Documentation
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P3.1
Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenario (82302)
The inspectors reviewed the1999 exercise's objectives and scenario and determined
that the exercise would acceptably test major elements of the licensee's emergency
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plan. The scenario provided a very challenging framework to cupport demonstration of
the licensee's capabilities to implement its emergency plan. The scenario included a
radiological release and several equipment failures.
P4
Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness
P4.1
1999 Evaluated Biennial Emeraency Preparedness Exercise
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a.
Insoection Scope (82301)
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Appendix E to 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50 requires that power
reactor licensees conduct biennial exercises that involve participation by offsite
authorities. On August 25,1999, the licensee conducted a biennial exercise involving
partial participation by the State of Illinois, and full participation by Ogle County
responders. This exercise was conducted to test major portions of the licensee's onsite
and offsite emergency response capabilities. Onsite and offsite emergency response
organizations and emergency response facilities were activated.
The inspectors evaluated performance in the following emergency response facilities:
Simulator Control Room (SCR)
Technical Support Center (TSC)
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Operational Support Center (OSC)
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Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
The inspectors assessed the licensee's recognition of abnormal plant conditions,
classification of emergency conditions, notification of offsite agencies, development of
protective action recommendations, command-and-control, the transfer of emergency
responsibilities between facilities, communications, and the overall implementation of
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the emergency plan. In addition, the inspectors attended the post-exercise critiques in
each of the above facilities to evaluate the licensee's initial self-assessment of exercise
performancs.
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b,
Emeraency Response Facility Observations and Findinas
b.1
Control Room Simulator
Exercise performance of shift personnel in the control room simulator was effective.
Operators effectively controlled and stabilized plant parameters, utilizing the appropriate
alarm and emergency response proceoures. The shift manager and Unit 1 Senior
Reactor Operator (SRO) demonstrated strong command and control throughout the
exercise event. The Shift Technical Advisor and Unit 2 SRO were effectively utilized to
assist the Unit 1 SRO.
Communications were generally a strength. Routine briefings provided necessary
information to operations personnel and were appropriate in scope and duration. The
inspectors noted that on at least two occasions, proper use of three-way " repeat back"
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communications prevented operators from potentially acting on incorrect information.
The inspectors also noted, however, that three-way communications were not
consistently utilized during later portions of the exercise. Radio communications were
often difficult to understand because of poor quality transmissions. Cnmmunications
between communicators in the control room simulator and the Technical Support Center
(TSC) were dependable.
The shift manager correctly classified events at the Unusual Event and Alert levels in a
timely manner. Event notification message forms and verbal notifications to the State
and NRC were completed in sufficient detail and well within required time limits.
Transfer of command and control of emergency responsibilities from the control room
simulator to the TSC was completed smoothly.
The Unit 2 SRO made a very early assessment of a containment release based upon a
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slight containment building pressure decrease. When the actual release occurred, the
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control room staff readily identified it.
Operatcrs diligently monitored the control panels following the loss of annunciators. A
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- reactor operator promptly identified that the 1 A centufical charging pump tripped by
noting the trip indicating lamp. However, operators could have made better use of the
alarm printout to monitor alarm conditions during the time that the annunciators were out
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of service. Operators were slow to recognize that the 1CC0685 valve failed closed
isolating component cooling water flow to the thermal barrier heat exchangers. The
condition was not recognized until 15 minutes after the valve failed and upon return of
the annunciators to service, which prompted operators to walkdown the control panels to
evaluate alarming annunciators.
b.2
Technical Suocort Center
Overall performance in the TSC was excellent. Personnel were focused on their
emergency response, and teamwork and communications were very good. The TSC
staff promptly staffed and activated in an orderly manner following the Alert declaration.
Transfers of command and control of event response to and from the TSC's Station
Director (SD) were done in a timely and well coordinated manner and effectively utilized
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the turnover briefing form. The SD made good use of TSC staff and ensured the staff
was informed of the current status of communications and forthcoming notifications. An
Assistant SD provided excellent support to the SD.
Briefings of the TSC staff were effectively and efficiently performed by utilizing a
cordless microphone circulated among the directors. Those periodic briefings kept all
TSC personnel wellinformed of changing plant conditions, major decisions and revised -
plant priorities. The initial briefing conducted by the SD was especially effective in
providing the proper focus for the TSC staff and assigning specific responsibilities to key
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individuals.
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Status boards were effectively used to accurately display information on major events,
key decisions, current priorities and the status of in-plant team activities. Status board
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information served as a good backup information source to the verbal briefings.
The Operations and Technical directors were pro-active in tracking plant conditions and
comparing emergency action levels for possible event paths leading to potential
emergency classification upgrades. Tasks and priorities were effectively identified for
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OSC repair teams by the Maintenance, Operations, Technical, and Radiation Protection
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Directors and quickly communicated to the OSC.
Individuals assigned to participate as the " mock NRC" site team could have been better
integrated into TSC activities. These individuals arrived and immediately began to
interact with TSC personnel before being briefed and introduced. After TSC staff
recognized that the mock NRC team was present they were appropriately briefed by the
Assistant SD and introduced during the next facility briefing.
Simulated dose rates in the TSC were monitored. The SD and Radiation Protection
Director kept TSC staff adequately informed of the TSC's simulated radiation levels. A
radiation protection technician was observed conducting habitability monitoring every 30
minutes after elevated radiation levels were identified.
Two offsite radiation survey teams were activated following the Alert declaration. Their
initial deployment strategy was reasonable. The TSC kept command and control of
these teams until an expanded EOF activation was accomplished at the Site Area
Emergency classification. The TSC then appropriately completed transfer of command
and control of these radiation survey teams to the EOF, monitored the communications
between these teams and the EOF and continued to compare survey data in case a
discrepancy in data was observed.
b.3
Operational Support Center and Emeraency Response Teams
The overall performance by OSC personnel was good. Personnel were professional
and focused on their emergency response. The OSC activation was rapid and efficient.
The facility was fully staffed and operational within 30 minutes after the Alert declaration.
The TSC's staff was promptly notified when OSC personnel were ready to accept
assignments. The inspector noted, however, that plant announcements for the
emergency and facility activations were not heard in the OSC.
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The OSC Director provided good command and control of the facility and personnel.
Facility briefings were periodic and concise. However, some personnelin the facility
were not attentive to the briefings as discussions and phone conversations continued as
the OSC Director and OSC Supervisor provided updates to the staff. Also, it was noted
that when the OSC Supervisor and RP Director spoke during some of the initial facility
briefings, some information could not be heard in all locations of the OSC.
Status boards were continuously maintained and included indication of the TSC's priority
assigned to the plant response teams. Team personnel's information was effectively _
transferred from the OSC Staffing board to the Team Tracking Status Board which
provided a good means of tracking personnel availability. The teams' deployment times
and results were promptly communicated to TSC staff. One ad hoc flip chart was used
to track emergency events. The Station Priority Log was available and used in the
OSC. The Station Priority Log's wall projected information was not focused tightly and
. was difficult to read from certain locations in the facility; the screen saver activated
periodically, resulting in a black screen.
Personnel selected for response teams were adequately briefed prior to dispatch.
During the emergency hatch repair team briefing, team members were checked to verify
whether they were qualified to use respirators. The Security Guard appropriately
identified that he was not qualified to wear a respirator. Respiratory protection
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equipment requirements were later removed for the emergency hatch leak repair team
when dose estimates were performed. The requirement for full protective clothing was
retained.
OSC habitability monitoring, which included dose rates, contamination, and airborne
surveys, was periodically performed. A step off pad was conservatively set up at the
OSC entrance in the event of an unmonitored radiological release. Later in the
- exercise, participants appropriately determined whether issuance of potassium lodide to
environmental teams and an OSC response team was warranted.
- The inspector accompanied two OSC response teams. A plant survey team was
requested to survey the Turbine Building after the General Emergency was declared.
The radiation protection technician (RPT) accompanying the team was professional,
demonstrated effective radiation practices, and demonstrated appropriate exercise
drilismanship.
The unit one emergency hatch inspection / repair teams requested dispatch from the
OSC was delayed more than one hour and 27 minutes while the licensee evaluated the
emergency conditions and the team prepared to respond. A radiological release to the
environment was thought to be from a leaking emergency hatch on unit one
containment. An " urgent" priority team was requested at approximately 11:37 a.m. to
inspect and later, at 12:30 p.m., to repair the suspected leaking emergency hatch. At
1:04 p.m., the exercise objectives had been met, the exercise was terminated, and the
emergency hatch repair team was not yet fully prepared for dispatch. The licensee's
evaluation of the process to request, prepare, brief, and dispatch " urgent" OSC
response teams will be tracked as an Inspection Followup Item (IFl 50-454/99015-01;
455/99015-01).
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~ b.4 E Emeroency Ooerations Facility
Overall performance of the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) staff was excellent.-
The facility was efficiently activated and assigned personnel performed their duties
. effectively throughout the exercise?
Procedures and associated checklists were observed to be extensively used.- Status
~ boards were generally well maintained, with few exceptions. Periodic and as-needed
- briefings kept the EOF staff aware of current status and concems. Tumover of
command and control from the TSC was smoothly accomplished.' Availability of a -
- former Byron SRO appeared to significantly enhance familiarity with sation equipment.
Event classifications were accurate and timely. A list of events or parameter changes
. which would lead to a higher level classification were posted on a status board.
Parameters which would lead to classification changes were trended. Notification forms
were quickly generated when classifications changed, and communicated to offsite
authorities within required timeframes.
Protective action recommendations were developed per the applicable procedure and
promptly communicated to state of Illinois authorities. Periodic communication between
the Manager of Emergency Operations and Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety
officials effectively kept offsite authorities aware of plant status and event mitigation
activities. The EOF staff was aware of protective actions implemented by the State of
lilinois. Minor errors made in several Illinois Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS)
forms were quickly detected and corrected by verbal communication or re-issuance of
the NARS form.
The Protective Measures staff performed well, utilizing available information to make
decisions on dose extensions and issuance of potassium iodide. Communication
problems with one environs team developed immediately after the decision to issue
potassium iodide. Environs team communicators coped well with this problem,
requesting the other environs team to communicate with the team which was out of
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communication, or search for and directly communicate with the other team.
Priorities for response activities were well tracked by the " Station Priorities Log", and
events were tracked by the "Significant Events" electronic system.
b.5
Scenario and Exercise Control
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The exercise scenario was very challenging and exercised the majority of the licensee's
emergency response capabilities.
The inspectors identified no significant controller performance concems related to the
plant response teams that were evaluated. Controllers ensured that team members
asked appropriate questions before providing them with information sought, such as
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current radiological conditions. Simulation for obtaining parts from stores was noted by
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the inspectors.
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The control room ventilation system was not initially aligned for operation in the make-up
mode (which would have been normal with the diesel driven auxiliary feedwater pump in
operation) by the drill controllers prior to starting the exercise. Operators promptly
recognized this in the simulator, and properly aligned the control room ventilation
system.
b.6
Licensee Critiaues
The inspectors attended the licensee's self-critiques in the SCR, TSC, OSC, and EOF
which occurred immediately after the exercise. Exercise controllers solicited verbal and
written inputs from the participants in addition to providing the participants with the
controllers' initial assessments of personnel performance. The inspectors concluded
that these initial self-critiques were thorough and in close agreement with the majority of
the inspectors' observations.
c.
Summary of Conclusions
Evaluation of the license's exercise performance was as follows:
Overall licensee performance during the 1999 exercise was very good.
Performance of shift personnel in the Simulator Control Room was effective.
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The Technical Support Center staff's performance was excellent.
Overall performance of OSC management and staff was good.
Performance in the Emergency Operations Facility was excellent.
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The participants and controllers initial critique following termination of the
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exercise was self critical and detailed. The critiques included inputs from
controllers and exercise participants. Licensee critique findings were consistent
with the NRC evaluation team's findings.
P8
Miscellaneous EP lasues
P8.1
(Closed) Insoection Followuo item No. 50-263/97016-01: Exercise Weakness: During
the 1997 exercise, personnel in the simulator control room did not classify the initial
events properly (an Alert was classified as an Unusual Event). During the current
exercise, the shift manager correctly classified events at the Unusual Event and Alert
levels in a timely manner. Event notification message forms and verbal notifications to
the State and the NRC were completed properly. This itern is closed.
P8.2 (Closed) Insoection Followuo item No. 50-263/97016-02: Exercise Weakness: During
the 1997 exercise, the Acting Station Director failed to utilize the Acting Station Director
procedure and checklist. During the current exercise, the procedure and checklist were
appropriately utilized. This item is closed.
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V. Manaaement Meetinas
X.1
Exit Meetina Summary
The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the
conclusion of the inspection on August 26,1999. The inspection team leader stated that overall
exercise performance was very good, a single Inspection Followup Item had been identified,
and the licensee critiques were effective. The licensee acknowledged the preliminary findings
presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the
inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
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Licensee
- B. Adams, Regulatory Assurance Manager
T. Burns, Emergency Planner ,
R. Colglazier, NRC Coordinator
D, Drawbaugh, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
M. Jurmain, Maintenance Manager
B. Kouba, Engineering Manager -
'J. Kramer, Work Control Manager
R. Karthelser, Communicatoins
S. Kuczynski, Nuclear Oversight Manager -
W. Levis, Site Vice President
R. Lopriore, Station Manager
W. McNeill, Radiation Protection Manager
S. Merrell, Assistant Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
M. Snow, Operations Manager
D. Stobaugh, Coordinator
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P. Sunderland, Lead Scenario Developer
M. Vonk, Corporate Emergency Preparedness Manager
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E. Cobey, Senior Resident inspector
B. Kemker, Resident inspector
Illinois Deos,b.e ,t of Nuclear Safety
C. Thompson, Resident Engineer
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors
Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenarios for Power Reactors
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
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Opened
50-454/455/99015-01
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Difficulty in dispatching " urgent" inplant team.
ClQfed
.50-454/455/97016-02
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Exercise Weakness: Failure to classify properly during the
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1997 evaluated exercise.
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' 50-454/455/97016-01
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Exercise Weakness: Failure to utilize the Acting Station
Director procedure and checklist.
Discussed
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None.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
CFR
Code of Federal Regulations
Division of Reactor Projects
- DRS
Division of Reactor Safety
EAL.
Emergency Action Level
Emergency Director.
Emergency Manager
Emergency Operating Procedure -
Federal Emergency Management Agency
IFl
inspection Follow up Item
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Potassium lodide
lilinois Nuclear Accident Reporting System
NPF
' Nuclear Power Facility
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Nuclear Reactor. Regulation
NUE.
Notification of Unusual Event
OSC-
Operational Support Center -
Public Address
- PAR
Protective Action Recommendation
NRC Public Document Room
Public Reading Room
Radiation Protection Technician
Simulator Control Room
Station Director
SRI '
Senior Resident inspector
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