ML20202B993
| ML20202B993 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron  |
| Issue date: | 02/03/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20202B965 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-454-97-24, 50-455-97-24, NUDOCS 9802120137 | |
| Download: ML20202B993 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000454/1997024
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U. 8. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION lll
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Docket Nos: 50-454;50-455
License Nos: NPF 37; NPF 66 l
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Report No: 50-454/97024(DRP); $0-455/97024(DRP)
Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Compar'y
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Facility: Byron Generating Station, Units 1 and 2
Location: 4450 N. German Church Road
Byron,IL 61010
Dates: December 2,1997 - January 12,1998
Inspectors: N. Hilton, Resident inspector
J. Adams, Braidwood Station Resident inspector
C. Thompson, Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety
approved by: Michael J. Jordan, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 3
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9002120137 990203
PDR ADOCK 05000454
G PDR
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Byron Generating Station, Unitt 1 and 2
NRC Inspection Report No. 50-454/g7024(DRP), 50 455/g7024(DRP)
This inspection included aspects ..isee operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant
support. The report covers a six w. k period of resident inspection.
Operations
- Routine control room operations were conducted safely and conservatively Good
annunciator alarm response was observed and the operators were knowledgeable of the
states of all the annunciator alarras. Operators were aware of activities that could affect
the safe operation of each unit. Good communication between the unit operators and
good supervisory oversight by the unit supervisors were also noted (Section 01.1). .
+ The housekeeping for Unit 2 was very good. Unit 2 structures, systems, and components
were easily accessible to operators. General area housekeeping was good given the
amount of outage activities that were in progress during the inspection period.
Equipment was staged app,opriately and carts property secured. The control of outage
related material was good except for two failures to control transient combustible material
(Section 01.1).
- The shutdown risk program and its implementation were excellent, A detailed licensee
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review of the outage schedule was conducted. The licensee deiermined the risk level for.
each key safety function based on plant configuration and equipment Lvailability and used
safety system functional assessment trees (SSFATs). A core damage frequency (CDF)
was included in the risk profile. The shutdown nsk review board (SRRB) approved all
changes to the shutdown risk models. Shutdown risk was communicated to all station
personnel. Contingency plans provided additional guidance for operators and existed for
most higher risk conditions (Section 08.1).
- The Plan of the Day (POD) meeting was an effective communication tool and helped
identify key performance measures at the site (Section 08.2).
Maintenance / Surveillance
- Observed maintenance and surveillance activities were conducted well. Maintenance
procedures were used and personnel were knowledgeable of the associated activities.
Surveillance testing was performed well with prope* authorizations, good procedure
adherence, and effective communications and coc.anation (Section M1.1 and M1.2).
- Based on procedure usage, supervisory oversight, and adequate protection of Unit 2
systems, the observed Unit i steam generator removal and replacement activities were
conducted appropriately (Section M1.3).
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Ennineerina
- The steam generator replacement crojec- (SGRP) lead civil engineer and civil
engineering staff were actively l'.. olved it the oversight of contractor personnel and were
knowledgeable of the evolutions il ey obs irved (Section E1.1).
- A process for the identification, traceung, and resolution of nonconformances for the
SGRP was successfully implemented and appeared to be effective. A potential
weakness existed in that operations personnel were not involved in the nonconformance
repori review process (Section E7.1).
Plant Support
- During the transport of an old steam generator (SG) to the old SG storage facility, a
moving radiological area existed. The radiologleal protection (RP) technicians controlled
both the number of personnel near the old SG and the distance between nonessential
personnel and the old SG. Radiation Protection Supervision also ensured that the
transport evolution was properly controlled (Section R1.1).
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The inspectors concluded that the methods for controlling the use of a drinking water
station in a high radiation / contaminated area on December 24,1997, created a potential
problem. Although there had not been any known contamination events attributable to
the manner in which the drinking water station was controlled, an individual could
potentially be contaminated due to the lack of direct control by RP technicians, the
general access to the water station, and the lack of personal surveys.
- The security force properly controlled the fence penetration during the transport of an old
SG on December 17,1997. Good access control of personnelleaving and retuming to
the protected area through the fence penetration existed. Security supervisicn was
present. The protected area penetration was well controlled (Section Si.1).
- The increased amount of transient combustibles during the refueling outage was not
always aggressively controlled. Two instances of poorly controlled combustibles were
identified. A 55-gallon barrel containing oil soaked rags and 13 containers of a flammable
liquid were both identified by the inspectors. Two violations of a failure to follow Byron
Administrative Procedure (BAP) 1100-9, " Control, Use, and Storage of Flammable and
Combustible Liquids and Aerosols," were cited (Section F1.1).
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Romort Details
Summary of Plant Status
Unit i remained shutdown for a steam generator replacement outage for the duration of the
inspection period. During the pedod, all four old steam generators were removed, and all
replacement steam generators were set in place. Welding the new steam generators in pison
continued at the 6nd of the inspection period, and the containment hole was being restored.
Unit 2 operated at or near full power for the entire inspection period.
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l. Deerations
01 Conduct of Operations
01.1 General Comments (71707)
During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted several observations of control
room activities.- The inspectors routinely observed good annunciator alarm response and
the operators were knowledgeable of the status of all the annunciator alarms. Operators
were aware of activities that could affect the safe operation of each unit. The inspectors
also observed good communication between the unit opemtors and good supervisory
oversight by the unit supervisors. The inspectors concluded that routine control room
. operations were conducted safely and conservatively.
The inspectors also made routine inspections of the auxiliary and fuel handling buildings -
during the inspection period. Due to the steam generator replacement outage in progress
on Unit 1, the inspectors focused on Unit 1 activities that potentially affected Unit 2. The
inspectors considered the housekeeping for Unit 2 very good. Unit 2 structures, s, . ems,
and components were easily accessible to operators. General area housekeeping was
good given the amount of outage activities that were in progress during the inspection
period. The inspectors routinely observed equipment staged appropriately and carts
= properly secured. The inspectors considered the control of outage related material good
except for two specific failures to control transient combustible material, discussed in
Section F1.1.
04' Miscellaneous Operations issues (71707)
08.1 Shutdown Risk Proaram
a. Inspection Scope
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During the inspection eriod, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's shut down risk
program. The review ncluded discussions with the shutdown risk coordinator, a review
of BAP 1750-6, " Shutdown Risk Program Summary," Revision 3, and a review of the
licensee's shutdown risk manual for refueling outage B1R08. The inspectors also
routinely observed shutdown risk postings and discussions of shutdown risk at daily briefs
and meetings.
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b. Observations and Findinat
The licens .e's shutdown risk program provided control of components and systems
important to safety during unit outages. The control was provided through heightened
awareness of plant status during oute, ss, a committee review process for the scheduling
of risk significant activities during an outage, and contingency plans for risk significant
activities.
The inspectors routinely observed a heightened awareness of plant risk status during
outages. The licensee used posters, daily outage summaries, closed circuit television,
and discussions during both the operating crew brief and plan of the day meeting to
emphasize the shutdown risk associated with Unit i activities. The inspectors found that
station personnel awareness of the shutdown risk status wab excellent.
The licensee used a computer p*ogram colled Outage Risk Assessment Models (ORAM)
to assist in the review of risk significant activities. The shutdown risk coordinator
reviewed the outage schedule, identified risk significant activities, and then used the risk
significant outage schedule for the outage risk profile development. Both deterministic
and probabilistic approaches were included in ORAM. The deterministic portion allowed
the shutdown risk coordinator to include a defense in depth concept, Technical
Specification (TS) requirements, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)
information and engineering judgement when safety system functional assessment trees
(SSFATs) were created. The licensee determined the risk level for each of seven key
safety functions based on plant configuration and equipment availability and risk level was
identified by color coding. Since the original outage risk profile was developed from a
schedule, the actual status of equipment was compared twice dally to the expected
equipment status and any discrepancies resolved. A probabilistic approach was also
included. The core damage frequency (CDF) profile was created for the outage and
included as an indicator of risk.
The licensee used a Shutdown Risk Review Board (SRRB) to review and approve all
changes to the shutdown risk models. The SRRB also reviewed and approved risk
profiles before the licensee began an equipment outage. The SRRB consisted of the
shutdown risk coordinator (either a licensed operator or a person having completed
license certification), at least one currently licensed operator, an outage management
representative, and a qualified nuclear engineer for reactivity issues. Senior station
management conducted a final review and approval of the outage risk profile,
Contingency plans were developed to mitigate challenges to key safety functions. A
cuntingency plan was required for higher risk activities. The plans were written to use
. Installed or temporary equipment and procedures. Typically contingency plans also
included increased monitoring of affected equipment.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the licensee's shutdown risk program and its
implementation were excellent. A detailed review of the outage schedule was conducted.
The licensee determined the risk level for each key safety function bas 3d on plant
y configuration and equipment availability using SSFATs. A CDF was included in the risk
profile. The SRRB approved all changes to the risk models. Shutdown risk was
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communicated to all station personnel using several methods. Contingency plans
provided additional guidance for operators end existed for most yellow conditions.
08.2 1Q,pFR 50,54ff) Letter Commitment Review
e. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the status of selected commitments pertaining to the
licensee's March 28,1997, response to the NRC's request for information pursuant to
10 CFR 50.54(f). The commitment numbers correspond to those used by the licensee in
their response,
b. Observations and Find: 31
Commitment 266: "The Plan of the Day meeting is being restructured to communicate
and discuss key performance measuras and current issues at the site."
The inspectors periodically attended the Plan of the Day (POD) meeting. The POD was
structured to communicate recent events, present plant status, and discuss planned
work. Each day a presentation was made by different department representatives,
discussing current issues, typically including performance measures.
c. ponclusions
The inspectors concluded that the POD was an effective communication tool and helped
identify performance measures at the site,
ll. Maintenance
M1 Conduct of Maintenance
M1.1 Maintenance Obsgrvations (62707)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed all or portions of activities associated with the following work
re quests (WR). When applicable, the inspectors also reviewed TS and the UFSAR for
potential issues.
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WR 9600117057 01 Preventive Maintenance on 1 A chemical and volume
control (CV) pump lube oil cooler
- WR 970009549 Replace rotating assembly on 1 A CV pump
b. Observations and Findinas
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The inspectors observed that the maintenance activities were conducted according to
approved procedures and in conformance with TS. The inspectors observed
maintenance supervisors and system engineers monitoring job progress. When
applicable, appropriate radiation control measures were taken by maintenance personnel.
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c. Conclusions
During the inspectors observations, procedures were used and maintenance personnel
were knowledgeable of the associated activities. The inspectors concluded that observed
maintenance activities were conducted well.
M1.2 Surveillance Observations (61726)
a. Inspection ScoAt
The inspectors observed the performance of all or parts of the following surveillance
tests. The inspectors also reviewed plant equipment and surveillame testing activities
against the UFSAR descriptions.
- 2BOS 3.1.121 Unit 2 Train B Solid State Protection System Bi monthly
Surveillance (Staggered)
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2BVS 5.2.F.3-2 American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Surveillance
Requirements for the Residual Heat Removtsi(RH) Pump
- 2BVS 7.1.5 2 Main Steam Isolation Valves Partial Stroke Test
- 2BOS 3.2.1810 Engineered Safety Feature (EST1 Instrumentation Slave Relay
Surveillanca
- 1BVS 8.1.1.2f 8 1B Diesel Generator ESF Actuation Test and Non Emergency
Trip Bypass Test, and Generator Differential Trip Test
b. Qbservations and Findinos
The inspectors noted that proper authorization was routinely obtained from the control
room senior reactor operator (SRO) before the start of each surveillance test. At the
completion of the surveillance test and after independent verification of system
restoration, the TS action requirement was cleared. The inspectors observed the
communications between operators in the control room and the auxiliary building, and
observed the coordination between the nuclear station operators and nonlicensed
operato+s Test instruments used were verified to be calibrated as applicable. The
inspectors reviewed completed surveillance tests and verified the surveillance tests met
the acceptance criteria.
ASME Surveillance Reauirements for the 2B Residual Heat Removal (RH) Pumo
The inspectors observed the second attempt by the licensee to perform an ASME
surveillance on the 2B RH pump. Due to over ranging the suction ressure gauge, the
first attempt to perform the surveillance had been unsuccessful. The surveillance test
required the suction gauge to read within 80 percent of full scale. During the first attempt,
the gauge read greater then 80 percent of full scale cue to RH system check valve
leakage (discussed in inspection Report No. 50-454/97022; 50-455/97022, Section M2.1).
The licensee performed a temporary procedure change and installed an additional suction
pressure test gauge. The test was repeated and test data gathered with no further
problems identified.
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c. Cor.clusions
The inspectors concluded that, based on proper authortzation, good procedure
adherence, effective communication and coordination, and proper verification that the
surveillance test acceptance cdteria were met, the observed surveillance testing was
performed well.
M1.3 Steam Generator Replacement Frolect (50001)
a. Inspection Scope
Steam generator removal and replacement activity observations were conducted in the
Unit 1 containment and spent fuel pool area. The inspector observed the general
activities and the following specific work activities:
- A40232MM Containment / Equipment Hatch Removal for the Transfer of
Equipment into the Containment.
b. Observations and Findinos
The inspectors observed construction activities during the SG replacement outage. The
inspectors observed procedures in use during work activities. The new SGs were stored
according to the manufacturers recommendations to prevent degradation during storage.
The installation of temporary services (welding equipment, power supplies, and lighting)
was completed as described in the procedures. The inspectors also frequently observed
supervisors observing the work activity.
Work activities did not affect the operability of common systems required to support
Unit 2 full power operation. During SG removal and replacement activities, the inspectors
verified that safety related equipment and systems required to be operable per TS and
the UFSAR wers not impaired by the activities,
c. Conclusion
Based on procedure usage, supervisory oversight, and adequate protection of Unit 2
systems, the inspectors concluded that the observed Unit i SG removal and replacement
activities were completed appropriately.
Ill. Enoineerina
E1 Conduct of Engineering
E1.1 Steam Generator Replacement Project (SGRP) Contrector Control and Oversiob.t
a. Inspection Scope (50001)
The inspectors observed SGRP civil engineering staff oversight of'he horizontal rotation
of a new SG, the lowering of two old SGs, the operation of the outside lift system, and the
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transport of an old SG. The inspectors conducted interviews with the SGRP site project
manager, the SG construction lead engineer, and the SGRP lead mechanical engineer.
The inspectors also accompanied the SGRP lead civil engineer and civil engineering staff
on field inspections.
b. Observations and Findinas
From December 17 through ig,1997, inspectors performed an assessment of licensee
oversight of contractors involved in the SGRP The inspectors were told by the SG
construction lead engir,eer that field engineers physically monitored all major evolutions
associated with the SGRP. The field engineers typically verified that the contractors
followed the approved work packages, that acceptance criteria were met, and that quality
control requirements were satisfied. The SGRP lead engineers for each discipline (civil,
electrical, and mechanical) were also involved with problem resolution.
The inspectors accompanied the SGRP lead civil engineer and civil engineering staff on
field inspections. The inspectors observed the horizonta, otation of a new SG, the
lowering of two of the old SGs, the operation of the outside lift system, and the transport
of an old SG During the rotation of the new SG, the inspectors observed the SGRP lead
civil engineer review the work package. The engineer also verified that the work package ,
documentation reflected the physical condition of the SG, verified quality control
requirements had been completed, and discussed the status of the job with the
responsible foreman.
The inspectors accompanied the SGRP lead civil engineer and civil engineering staff as
they observed the lowering of the two old SGs. The lowering of each SG from the runway
to the transport vehicle by the outside lift system was performed without problems. Prior
to the transport of each SG to the old SG storage facility, the SGRP lead civil engineer
verified that all prerequisites were completed. The transport of the SGs to the old SG
storage facility also was performed without any problems,
c. Conclujlons
The Inspectors concluded that the licensee's oversight of contractors during the
hotontal rotation of a new SG, the lowering of two old SGs, the operation of the outside
lift system, and the transport of an old SG was effective. The SGRP lead civil engineer
and civil engineering staff were actively involved in the oversight of contractor personnel
and were knowledg6able of the evolutions.
E7 Qualiti assurance in Engineering Activities
E7.1 identificEion. Trackina. and Resolution of SGRP Nonconformances
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a, inspection Sgspa (50001)
The inspectors conducted interviews with the SG construction lead engineer and the
s SGRP lead mechanical engineer to discuss the process for identification, tracking, and
resolution of nonconformances. The inspectors reviewed NSWP A 15," Comed Nuclear
Division Integrated Reporting Program," Revision 1; Construction Procedure CP 7,
" Byron /Braidwood Power Stations SG Replacement Project Deviation Control,"
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Revision 2; and "Bechtel Engineering Department Project instruction for Nonconformance
Reports," Revision O.
b. Observations and Findinas
The inspectors discussed the Pacess for identifying, tracking, and resolving
nonconformances with the SG construction lead enginear and the SGRP lead mechanical
engineer. The inspectors were tesid that identification and the disposition of
nonconformances were accomplished by a nonconformance report (NCR). The NCR was
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reviewed by the contractor's quality control personnel and project ugineering personnel
with copies of the NCR pmvided to Comed SGRP site quality verification (SQV) and
Comed SGRP engineering groups. The licensee's problem identification forms (PIFs)
were not used unless the nonconformance was outside the scope of the contiactor's
work.
c. Conclusions
The inspectcis concluded that a process for the identification, tracking, and resolution of
nonconformances for the SGRP was successfully implemented and appeared to be
effective. A potential weakness existed in that operations personnel were not involved in
the nonconformance report review process.
IV. Plant Support
R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls
R1.1 Radiolooical Control of Old SG Durina Tra7 sport (71750. 50001)
The inspectors observed the removal of an old SG from the Unit 1 containment on
December 17,1997. While the old SGs were lowered to the ground and during transport
to the old SG storage faciiity, a moving radiological are : existed. The licensee ensured
the entire SG was encapsulated with an extra coating to prevent any possible spread of
con * amination. The radiological protection (RP) technicians also controlled both the
number of personnel near the old SG and the distance between nonessential personnel
and the old SG. Active participation by RP supervision was also noted by the inspectors.
The inspectors concluded that the transport evolution was properly controlled.
R1 ? Control of Drinkina Water inside a Radioloaically Posted Area (71750. 50001)
a. Inspection Scope
On December 24,1997, during a routine inspection of th3 auxiliary and fuel handling
buildings, the inspectors noted a 5-galloq water fountain inside the radiologically
posted area (RPA). The inspectors reviewed Byron Radiation Protection Procedure
(BRP) 5000-7," Unescorted Access to and Conduc,t in Radiologically Posted Areas,"
Revision 7, and Station Policy 12, " Drinking Water in the RPA," Revision 2.
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- b. Observations and Findinas
~ The inspectors observed that the drinking fountain was placed such that a person coming
out of the Unit 1 containment could obtain a drink of water while still in an area posted as
a high radiation area (HRA) and corataminated area. A hole was cut in the plexiglass
boundary of the HRA, and the water bottle was located in the RPA such that the spigot
penetrated into the HRA and contaminated area. A procedure was posted on the bottle
indicatir:g that to get a drink, a worker should remove an outer glove, take a paper cup,
get a drink, and then crush the cup and place it in a potentially clean trash barrel. No
personnel were in the HRA, and the inspectors did not identify any RP personnel in the
immediate area of the water bottle.
The inspectors discussed the availability of drinking water in the RPA with the Radiation
Protection Manager (RPM). The RPM stated that the purpose of having water s.vailable i
was to prevent heat stress and that the water was controlled by RP personnel as stated
in the station policy. On December 24,1997, the inspectors noted that the water station
was not directly controlled. The inspectors also noted that no method to perform a hand
contamination survey, cr frisk, before using the drinking water station existed; however,
RP personnel routinely surveyed the area for contamination, and no personnel
contamination events occurred related to drinking the water.
Following the inspectors' observations, the licensee stated the controls for the use of the
drinking water facility were improved. Changes included posting the water bottle for heat
stress relief use only and requiring that RP personnel only dispense the water. The -
licensee also moved the water bottle such that it was under direct RP personnel control.
The inspectors considered the improvements appropriate.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the methods for controlling the use of a drinking water
- station in a high radiation /cor,taminated area on December 24,1997, created a potential
problem.' Althoug5 there had not been any known contamination events attributable to
the manner in which the drinking water stations was controlled, an !ndividual could
potentially be contaminated due to the lack of direct control by RP technicians, the
general access to the water station, and the lack of personal surveys.
-81 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities (71750,50001)
S1.1 Removal of Old SG from Protected Area -.
The inspectors observed the removal of an old steam generator from the protected area
on December 17,1997.- The inspectors observed the security control of the fence
penetration and access control of personnelleaving and retuming to the protected area
through the fence penetration. Security supervision was present. The inspectors
considered the penetration well controlled.
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F1 Control of Fire Protection Activities (71750)
F1.1 Transient Comtstible Material Control
a. Inspection Scope
Curing routine inspections of the auxiliary building, the inspectors observed the licensee's
control of comt ustible material. The inspectors also reviewed BAP 1100-9, " Control,
Use, and Storage of Flammable and Combustible Liquids and Aerosals," Revision 4.
b. Observations and Findinas
On December 3,1997, the inspectors observed mechanical maintenance personnel
performing planned maintenance on the 1 A chemical and volume control (CV) pump.
The inspectors noted a 55-gallon barrellocated outside the CV pump room that contained
oil soaked rags. The inspectors also observed the mechanics working on the 1 A CV
pump using the SS-gallon barrel as storage for oil soaked rags.
During the review of BAP 1100-9, the inspectors noted that paragraph C.6.c stated that
flammable / combustible liquid soaked rags , , . shall be disposed of by using an approved
waste can with a self closing lid. The inspectors identified the discrepancy to the Fire
Marshall and the SS-gallon barrel was removed and replaced with an appropriate
self closing lid container. The Fire Marshall also stated that the 55 gallon barrelwas not
an approved container. The inspectors concluded that the use of a 55-gallon barrel to
store oil soaked rags was a failure to follow BAP 1100-9 and a violation of TS 6.8.1 as
described in that attached Notice of Violation (50-454/455-97024-01(DRP)).
On December 8,1997, the inspectors identified 13 containers of Carboline staged near
the Unit 2 fuel transfor canal control panel. The inspectors noted that the buckets were
labeled as flammable.- The inspectors did not notice a Transient Fire Load tag and
confirmed that a Transient Fire Load Permit had not been issued. After the inspectors
identified the discrepancy to the operating crew, a Transient Fire Load Permit was
prepared.
Byron Administrative Procedure 1100-9, paragraph C.2.a stated that all flammab!s and
combustible liquid containers transported into plant areas which will be left unattended
shall have prior authorization by the Station Fire Marshal / designee. Authorization shall be
accomplished by completing a Transient Fire Load Permit and submitting it to the Station
Fire Marshal / designee for approval. An approved Transient Fire Load tag will then be
issued upon Fire Marshal approval. The inspectors concluded that the failure to obtain a
Transient Fire Load Permit was a failu'e tv, follow BAP 1100-9 and a violation of TS 6.8.1
(50-454/455-97024-02(DRP)).
c. Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the licensee did not always aggressively control the
increased amount of transient combustibles during the refueling outage. Two
independent cases of poorly controlled combustibles were iden'ified by the inspectors
during the inspection period. On separate occasions, a 55-galk, i barrel of oil soaked
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rags and 13 containers of a flammable liquid were observed. Two violations for failure to
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follow a procedure were cited.
V. Mananoment Meetinos
X1 Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors presented the inspection results 'o members of licensee management at
the conclusion of the inspection on January 12,1998. The licenseo ncknowledged the
findings presented. The inspec. ors asked the licensee whether any materials examined
during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was
identified.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
K. Kofron, Byron Station Manager -
-J. Bauer, Health Physics Supervisor
D. Brindle, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor
E. Campbell, Maintenance Superintendent
T. Gierich, Operations Manager
B. Israel, Site Quality Verification Supervisor
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- T. Schuster, Manager of Quality & Safety Assessment
M. Snow, Work Control Superintendent
B. Kouba, Engineering Manager
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 50001: Steam Generator Replacement inspection
IP 61726: Surveillance Observations
IP 62707: Maintenance Observations
IP 71707: Plant Operations -
IP 71750: Plant Suppo1
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
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50-454/455-97024-01 VIO Oil soaked rags found in a 55-gallon carrel without a self
closing lid.
50-454/455-97024-02 VIO "ailure to obtain a Transient Fire Load Permit.
Closed
None
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LIST OF V.,MONYMS USED
ASME Americati Society of Mechant;al Engineers !'
BAP Syron Administrative Procedure
BMP- Byron Mechanical Maintenance Procedure
BOP Byron Operating Procedure
BRP_ Byron Radiation Protection Procedure
- CDFT Core Damage Frequency -
CV Chemical and Volume Control
DG Diesel Generator
DRP- Division of Reactor Projects
DP9 Division of Reactor Safety
- ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System.
ECN - Equipment Component Number.
ESF- Engineered Safety Feature
FME - Foreign Material Exclusion
- HLA Heightened Level of Awareness
HRA_ .High Radiation Area
LCO Limiting Condition for Operation
LCOAR Limiting Condition for Operation Action Requirement -
LER Licensee Event Report
h- MHS Material Handling System
/ NCR Nonconformance Report -
- NSO Nuclear Station Operator
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NSWP Nuclear Station Work Procedure
OOS Out-of-Service
ORAM Outage Risk Assessment Models
PDR Public Document Room
- PlF' Problem Identification Form--
POD Plan of the Day .
- PSIG . Pounds per Square Inch Gage
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RP Radiological Protection
RPA: Radiologically Pcated Area
RPM - Radiation Protection Manager
3
SFP- Spent Fuel Pool '
SG- - Steam Generator
SGT Steam Generator Replacement
SGRP- Steam Generator Replacement Project
SPP. Special Plant Procedure -
- SQV:- Site Quality Verification -
y _SRO Senior Reactor Operator
SRRB- Shutdown Risk Review Board
SSFAT _ Safety System Functional Assessment Trees
-SSPS ' Solid State Protection System
SX Essential Service Water System
TS Technical Specification
UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
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