IR 05000454/1986028

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Insp Rept 50-454/86-28 on 860801-0902.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Lers,Operations Summary,Headquarters Request,Surveillance,Maint,Operational Safety,Event Followup & Mgt Meetings
ML20210B056
Person / Time
Site: Byron Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 09/10/1986
From: Forney W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20210B045 List:
References
50-454-86-28, IEB-85-001, IEB-85-1, NUDOCS 8609170437
Download: ML20210B056 (7)


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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report N /86028(DRP)

Docket N License N NPF-37 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Byron Station, Unit 1 Inspection At: Byron Station, Byron, IL Inspection Conducted: August 1 - September 2, 1986 Inspectors: J. M. Hinds, J P. G. Brochman J. A. Malloy Approved By: L y f 940/M Reactor Projects Section 1A Datt Inspection Summary Inspection on August 1 - September 2, 1986 (Report No. 50-454/86028(DRP))

'- Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced safety inspection by the resident inspectors of LERs; operations summary; headquarters request; surveillance; maintenance; operational safety; Event followup; management meetings; and other activities.

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Results: No violations or deviations were identified nor were any items

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identified which could affect the public health and safety.

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DETAILS Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company

    1. R. Querio, Station Manager
    1. R. Pleniewicz, Production Superintendent
  • R. Ward, Services Superintendent
    1. W. Burkamper, Quality Assurance Supervisor, Operations
  • L. Sues, Assistant Superintendent, Operating
    1. G. Schwartz, Assistant Superintendent, Maintenance
  • T. Joyce, Assistant Superintendent, Technical Services
  • D. St. Clair, Assistant Superintendent, Work Planning W. Blythe, Operating Engineer, Unit 0 T. Tulon, Operating Engineer, Unit 1 D. Brindle, Operating Engineer, Unit 2 J. Schrock, Operating Engineer, Rad-Waste
    1. A. Chernick, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor F. Hornbeak,. Technical Staff Supervisor
  • R. Flahive, Radiation / Chemistry Supervisor P. O'Neil, Quality Control Supervisor
  1. E. Zittle, Regulatory Assurance Staff 4 #K. Yates, Nucleary Safety, Onsite
  • A. Britton, Quality Assurance Inspector
  • J. Snyder, Quality Assurance Inspector
  • T. Schuster, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor
  • J. Langan, Regulatory Assurance Staff
  • D. Robinson, Onsite Nijclear Safety The inspector also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of this inspectio # Denotes those present during the management meeting on August 28, 198 * Denotes those present during the exit interview on September 2, 198 . Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (90712 & 92700) (Closed) LERs (454/86024-LL): An in-office review was conducted for the following LERs to determine that the reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specification LER N Title 454/86024 Control Room Ventilation Actuation due to Radiation Monitor Spike No violations or deviations were identifie (Closed) LERs (454/86023-LL): Through direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records the

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following LERs were reviewed to determine that the reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specification LER N Title 454/86023 Installation of a Defective Pressurizer Code Safety Valve This event is discussed further in Inspection Report 454/86029(DRP).

3. IE Bulletin (IEB) Followup (92703)

(Closed) IEB (454/85001-88): Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater (AF)

Pumps. The inspector reviewed Byron Abnormal Operating Procedure 1B0A SEC-7, Revision 51, " Auxiliary Feedwater Check Valve Leakage-Unit 1,"

and verified that recovery instructions had been provided for both trains of AF. The inspector interviewed several reactor operators and senior reactor operators to verify their understanding of this procedure. The inspector also reviewed Byron Operating Procedure B0P 199-A40, "AF Readiness /U-1," and verified that the AF system was periodically monitored for steam binding. Based on these actions this IEB is considered closed. Additionally, the requirements of Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/69 are completed and this TI is also considered close No violations or deviations were identifie . Summary of Operations The licensee completed Phase I of the Hot Leg Temperature (T-Hot)

reduction program this month. This program will allow operation of the reactor at powgr levels up to 94%, for the remainder of Cycle I, without exceeding 600 F in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Hot Le This reduction is designed to prevent cract initiation in the roll transition zone of the steam generator U-tubes r;ue to primary water stress corrosion. The unit had been in a discretionary load reduction to 74%

power since May 17, 1986. Following completion of Phase I on August 22,

! 1986 the unit operated at power levels @ to 94% for the remainder of i the month, l

l 5. Followup on Headquarters Requests (25581)

Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/81 was issued to provide additional guidance during the inspection of IEB 86002, " Problems with Static 0 Ring (SOR) Differential Pressure Switches." The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to IEB 86002 in Inspection report 454/86025(DRP).

The licensee's response stated that no S0R series 102 or 103 differential pressure switches are installed or planned to be installed as electrical equipment important to safety in Byron 1. Based on this response this TI is considered close No violations or deviations were identified.

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6. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspector observed Technical Specifications required surveillance testing on the Moderator Temperature Coefficent and Power Range Nuclear Instrument N42 to verify that testing was-performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were. accomplished, that test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne :

The inspector identified a concern related to the identification of surveillances which had used measuring and test equipment (M&TE) for which the M&TE had subsequently failed a calibration check. The specific equipment in question was a strip chart recorder and the use of it as a time measuring device. This concern will be followed as Unresolved Item (454/86028-01(ORP)).

' Maintenance Program Implementation (62700)

The. inspectors commenced a detailed review of the maintenance program to determine whether the program was being implemented in accordance with

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regulatory requirements; to determine the effectiveness of the maintenance

. program on important plant equipment; and to determine the ability of the maintenance staff to conduct an effective maintenance program. This review is an ongoing inspection and its completion will be documented in a subsequent inspection repor . Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specifications.

l The following items were considered during this review: the limiting

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conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were

performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by

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qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented. Work requests were reviewed to determine status of ,

outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performanc ,

The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:

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Main Control Board Outside Air B 34036 Intake "A" Ground Straps IB AF Diesel Generator BIP 2500-099 Tachometer, 1ST 1AF 8002 Following completion of maintenance on the Hain Control Board and the IB Diesel Generator, the inspectors verified that these systems had been returned to service properl No violations or deviations were identifie . Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors observed control room operation, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the month of August 1986. During these discussions and observations, the inspectors ascertained that the operators were alert, cognizant of plant conditions, attentive to changes in those conditions, and took prompt action when appropriate. The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the auxiliary, turbine and rad-waste buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks and excessive vibration and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenanc The inspectors verified by observation and direct interviews that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security pla The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the month of August 1986, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the DC electrical power system to verify operability. The inspectors also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with rad-waste shipments and barrelin Facility operations observed were verified to be in accordance with the requirements established under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, and ~

administrative procedure No violations or deviations were identifie . Onsite Followup of Events at Operating Reactors (93702) General The inspector performed onsite followup activities for an event which occurred during August 1986. This followup included reviews of operating logs, procedures, Deviation Reports, Licensee Event Reports (where available) and interviews with licensee personne .

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For the event, the inspector developed a chronology, reviewed the functioning of safety systems required by plant conditions, reviewed licensee actions to verify consistency with procedures, license conditions and the nature of the event. Additionally the inspector verified that licensee investigation had identified root causes of equipment malfunctions and/or personnel error and had taken appropriate corrective actions prior to plant restart. Details of the event and licensee corrective actions developed through inspector followup are provided in Paragraph b belo b. Unusual Event on August 31, 1986 An Unusual Event was declared on August 31, 1986 due to the 1C Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) being declared inoperabl At 1042 C.D.T. on August 31, 1986 at 93% reactor power, the 1C MSIV Accumulator Pressure Low alarm initiated. An equipment attendant was dispatched to verify the alarming condition locally. The active accumulator nitrogen precharge pressure was verified to be indicating below the minimum specified gauge pressure and at 1100 C.D.T. the IC MSIV was declared inoperabl Technical Specification 3.7.1.5, " Main Steam Isolation Valves" requires that each MSIV be operable for Modes 1 (Power Operations);

2 (Startup); and 3 (Hot Standby) and the Limiting Condition for Operation Action Requirement (LOCAR) for Mode 1 allows Power Operations to continue with one MSIV inoperable, but open, provided the inoperable valve is restored to operable status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />; otherwise the plant must be placed in Hot Standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in Hot Shutdown within the following 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> At 1456 C.D.T. the IC MSIV active accumulator nitrogen precharge pressure remained below the minimum pressure limit, and in accordance with the station General Site Emergency Plan (GSEP) an unusual Event was declared. A unit ramp down (turbine load reduction) was initiated as required by the LOCAR to place the unit in Hot Standby within the next 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Station personnel completed the 1C MSIV nitrogen precharge procedure on the active accumulator by 1544 C.D.T. and continued with operations to charge the hydraulic side of the accumulator. During the attempt to charge the hydraulics, the air motor driven hydraulic pump failed at 1630 C.D.T. and replacement was require Based on the air motor failure, the Shift Engineer increased the turbine load reduction rat By 1730 C.D.T. station mechanics had replaced the air motor of the 1C MSIV accumulator hydraulic charging system. At 1814 C.D.T. the accumulator was charged to the specification pressure band and the functional check of the 1C MSIV accumulator system using Byron Station procedures was begun. At this point the turbine load reduction was placed in hold pending the outcome of the accumulator system functional chec ..

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The' functional check of the accumulator was completed at 1900 C.D.T., the IC MSIV was declared operable, and the station terminated the Unusual Event at 1903 C.D.T.. At 1911 C.D.T. the Shift Engineer ordered a load increase and the unit was subsequently returned to 93%_ reactor powe No violations or deviations were identifie . Management Meetings (30702)

On August 28, 1986, Messr's. R. F. Warnick, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 1, W. L. Forney, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 1A, R. M. Lerch, Byron Project Inspector, and the flRC resident inspector staff met with licensee management and supervisory personnel denoted in Paragraph 1 of this report. This meeting was held to review the Conduct of Maintenar.ce Improvement Prcgram, which the licensee was developing as corrective action following the installation of a defective pressurizer code safety valve, as described in Inspection Report 454/86029(DRP).

1 Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph . Exit Interview (30703)

The inspectors met with licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on September 2, 1986. The inspectors summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and the finding ~

The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to document.s or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietar