IR 05000454/1987040

Insp Repts 50-454/87-40 & 50-455/87-34 on 871013-15.No Violations,Deficiencies or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness Exercise,Including Key Functions & Locations During Exercise.Related Info Encl

ML20236J984
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	11/02/1987
From:	Christoffer G, Patterson J, Ploski T, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236J970	List: IR 05000454/1987040 ML20236J968
References
50-454-87-40, 50-455-87-34, NUDOCS 8711090046
Download: ML20236J984 (19)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-454/87040(DRSS); 50-455/87034(DRSS) Docket Nos. 50-454; 50-455 Licenses No. NPF-37; NPF-66 h Licensee: Conimonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Byron Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Byron Site, Byron, Illinois Inspection Conducted: October 13-15, 1987 Inspectors: W. Patterson /O/1o/87

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Team Leader Date T '/S#/S? Date ll . victL / 4L

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G. Christoffer // [[ Date Approved By: Wi ///2-/s2 Emergency Preparedness Section Date Inspection Summary Inspection on October 13-15, 1987 (Reports No. 50-454/87040(DRSS); No. 50-455/87034(DRSS)) Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the Byron Nuclear Generating Station's emergency preparedness exercise involving observations by four NRC representatives of key functions and locations during the exercise. The inspection was conducted by three NRC inspectors and one consultan Results: No violations, deficiencies or deviations were identified as a result of this inspectio PDR ADOCK 050'00454 G PDR

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DETAILS

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 . Persons Contacted-NRC Observers and' Areas Observed J. Patterson, Control: Room (CR), Technical Support Center (TSC), Operational-Support Center (OSC), and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) 3 T. Ploski, Fire Brigade Responses and E0F-G. Christoffer, OSC G. Arthur, CR and TS Commonw gi,ih Edison R.- Plen.cwicz, Production Superintendent D. Scott,' Senior' Administrative Engineer, Corporate T. Gilman, Supervisor of Emergency Planning, Mazon M. Whitemore, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
  'D. Drawbaugh, Radiation Protecticn Foreman   ,

J. Yesinowski, Shift Foreman JJ.' Bowman,= Emergency P1anner, Mazon

  ' Harman,: Training Instructor T. Oracki, .Traini_ng Instructor T. Lechton' Emergency Planner, Mazon
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The.above personnel attended the October 15, 1987 exit intervie . Licensee Action on'Previously Identified Items (Closed): Open Item Nos. ' 454/86013-01 and 455/86011-01: During the 1986 exercise, the NRC was not notified of the Site Area Emergency (SAE) ! declaration within one hour. Also, the NRC was not notified of any major-change in events during the' exercise,. including the radioactive release and Protective Action Recommendations (PARS). As' indicated in Section , of this report, the licensee utilized a " response cell" of several ' controllers located at the Mazon Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) to simulate personnel at the NRC Headquarters Operations Center and Region III Incident Response Center. In the EOF, a dedicated Emergency Notification System (ENS) communicator kept the " response cell" adequately informed of changing accident conditions and emergency response efforts, including: q

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the times and reasons for the SAE and General Emergency reclassifications- 4

  :the status of onsite protective actions; offsite PARS; release rate
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  ~information and some offsite dose projection results; most recent inventory information available for the gas decay tanks' contents; copies of press, releases; . status of the spent fuel pool abnormal situation; and a preliminary I list of high and lower priority onsite repair task This item is closed, l (Closed) Open-Item Nos. 454/86013-02 and 455/86011-02: During the 1986 exercise, EOF staff did not consider evacuation time estimates when I

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i = making the sectad and final PAR for the public within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). Also, this PAR was issued minutes after an unmonitored release began and included a 0-2 mile radial evacuatio As indicated in Section 5.e.of this report, the E0F staff adequately considered computerized evacuation time estimate data, estimated release rate, release duration, and forecast meteorological information when formulating the initial PAR and when considering revisions to this PA This item is close . General An announced, daytime exercise of the licensee's Generating. Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP) was conducted at the Byron Station on October 14, 198 The exercise involved the partial participation of the State of

'llinois and full participation by Ogle Count The exercise tested the i'censee's capability to respond to a hypothetical accident scenario
.itivolving the simulated release of radioactive material to the environment. An attachment to this report contains the scope and objectives for the exercise and the scenario narrative summary and timelin . General Observations Procedures This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E requirements in the GSEP, Byron Emergency Plan Annex, and the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) used by the    j Station and the E0 Licensee Response The licensee's overall response was coordinated, orderly, and timely. If the events had been real, actions taken by the licensee would have been sufficient to allow State and local authorities to take appropriate actions to protect public health and safet i Observers        I Licensee observers and four NRC observers monitored and critiqued the exercis Exercise Critique The licensee held critiques following the exercise on October 14, 1987. The NRC critique and exit interview was conducted on October 15, 198 l

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. 5. Specific Observations Control Room (CR) The initial plant operating conditions were presented to the CR exercise crew at 0745. The first significant event was the detection of an earthquake by seismic equipment actuation at 0.02 The crew quickly identified the correct EAL and declared a Notification of Unusual Event (NUE). Notifications were made first to the State of Illinois which in turn, notified Ogle Count The NRC was also notified. All notifications were made in a timely manne The Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) form was completed properly by a dedicated communicator. The Operations Duty Supervisor came to the Control Room shortly after the NUE was declared and was well briefed by the Shift Engineer (SE). With the onset of the crane operator dangling from the crane in the turbine building; smoke coming from the crane's electric motor; and other structural plant damage, the SE quickly ordered the activation of the OS This made available several maintenance teams that could investigate these areas and evaluate the damag At approximately 0824 the SE conservatively directed his crew to shut down the Unit I reactor based on his best judgement as determined from the initial earthquake damag However, the CR Lead Controller prevented him from doing this to maintain the scenari This Controller action was justified according to the NRC observe Good troubleshooting was demonstrated by the CR staff after the l discovery of the water leak from the Spent Fuel Pit. Discussions included ways to replenish the water with water hoses and other means to solve the problem. The Station Control Room Engineer (SCRE) was used effortively in identifying proper procedures to use, ' and in leading distunions on the stuck fuel assembly in the transfer canal upender and in other emergency events. He later provided guidance to two maintenance teams on how to get water from the spent fuel pool.to makeup for the essential service water being los The transfer of command and control from the CR to the TSC was not readily observable. A later review of information confirmed that there was a telephone conversation between the SE and the Station Director in the TSC during which they reviewed plant conditions and the current emergency status before the latter assumed the command of emergency response efforts. The Alert was declared at 0838 in the TSC based on EAL No. 31, which was the Station Director's judgment of degrading conditions occurring up to that time. The scenario called for an Alert at 0845 based on a seismic alarm registering above 0.099. The controllers permitted the earlier Alert declaration. However, the Alert declared at 0838 was not announced in the CR until 0909. This was by telephone from the TSC. No public address announcement was heard in the CR. This delay was excessive. The SE should also have made an announcement to his crev _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ -

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) l The'SE, as initial Station Director, demonstrated overall good command and control; however, his-staff briefings could have been more frequent and should have included more details on the various events occurring, especially in the first hour of the exercis Initially, the exercise crew reporting to the SE were not well coordinated in their efforts; however, as~the exercise progressed, more involvement and teamwork were demonstrate A chronological log of events was well maintained by the recorder i for the SE. Communications with the TSC and the OSC were adequat Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable, b. Technical Support Center (TSC) Upon arrival in the TSC, the NRC observers noted that the plant status board listed as an information event that, the SE had shut the reactor down at 0815. In reality, as reported in the previous Section 5.a., he had only considered this action. The Lead Controller instructed him not to shutdown Unit 1 because of the scenario. There were other significant events, such as the status of the fires, that were not posted until 1000, some time after the fires were controlle The TSC was partially activated at the NUE level, which is an option under the licensee's Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP). The Environ Status Board was not updated from 1045 to 1145. During this time a G1neral Emergency was declared and radiation monitoring teams were dispatched. These examples of tardy or incorrect posting on key status boards indicate a lack of communications which could misinform TSC participants. However, management team logs were maintained and the key TSC support staff were aware of'these event ' At 0958 the Station Director'(SD) announced that command and control v was shifted to the E0F. Following the SAE declaration at 0958, l accountability was reported as being completed by 1007. This was

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followed by an announcement at 1030 that all non-essential personnel s would be evacuated to the E0F. Evacuation routes were specifie ! 1 The assembly / accountability and later evacuation were well handled, a although the evacuation instructions were somewhat delaye ' Briefings on plant status and other related conditions were held

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frequently by the SD. They could have included more input from his support directors. The EOF requested that the TSC retain control of the offsite teams because of poor radio communications between the EOF and the offsite teams, for a period after the EOF had assumed overall command and contro ' The support directors pursued many methods to replenish water in the spent fuel pool and also were involved in the damage assessment for the Gas Decay Tanks. These were two of the more prominent incidents in which the support groups demonstrated their emergency response

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capabilitie The TSC staff reported to the 50 at 3.110 that conditions for the SAE no longer existad, based on'their review of EAL No. 25. Radiation levels in the Fuel ~Haiidling Building had decreased to about 86 mR/ hou The EOF management chose to remain in the SAE because of the multiple plant problems still existin This was a conservative decision by the E0F's Manager of Emergency Operations (MEO).

A multiple page message form was used as a written intra-TSC form of communications, and was distributed to all key participants. Logs were maintained by the Station Director and each of his support-director Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable, j c. Operational Support Center (OSC) The OSC was staffed and operational in a timely manne The OSC ! Director, shortly after arrival, identified himself by title to the OSC personne All emergency personne'l assigned.to the OSC were . required-to sign the OSC Dispatch Log. One of the two doors to the ! OSC.was blocked to control and limit acce'ss to the OSC room. A , frisker and step-off pad were placed outside the one access door to the OS Participants were required to. frisk before entering the . OS All inplant teams were well briefed by the Radiation-Chemistry (Rad-Chem) Foreman or the Health Physicist (HP) regarding the radiological conditions and hazards of the areas they were enterin A Rad-Chem technician accompanied each team to monitor radiation levels and provide guidance on personal dosimetry readings. The personal dose history of each individual was reviewed prior to dispatching any teams. Appropriate dosimetry was ' assigned to each individual before leaving the OS The OSC Director gave frequent plant status briefings to the OSC staf There was no public address (p.a.) announcement stating

 "This is a Drill," prior to the actuation of the fire alarm at 081 Habitability surveys of the OSC were conducted at sufficient interval The OSC Director did not make an announcement when the !

Alert was declared by the TSC. While accompanying one of the inplant ' teams, the inspector observed the Controller giving a flashlight to a team member, after the team had entered the dark, gas decay tank valve aisle room on the 346' level of the auxiliary building. In a real emergency the Controller would not have been present and the team member would have been unable to start his tasks, without a flashligh The maintenance team should have had a flashlight with them, especially since they were familiar with that particular roo _ _ _ _

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. During the setup of the OSC, it appeared that time was wasted in determining how the furniture should be arrange Additionally, the arrangement of the OSC led to noisy and crowded conditions in the area surrounding the tables where the OSC Director, OSC Supervisor and the Communicators were seate l The OSC participants expressed interest in having an EPZ map mounted in the OSC so they could determine where the plume initiated from and in what direction it was goin There was always a possibility that additional radiation monitoring teams could be dispatched around the periphery of the plant buildings or inside where a release could be taking place. Also, the map would give the OSC personnel a larger, more accurate portrayal of the release, so that OSC personnel could then relate more objectively to release condition Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable; however the following items should be considered for improvement:

    * An EPZ sector map should be mounted in the OSC to use by the OSC staff as a reference point for locating the release and plume direction when applicabl * A diagram should be posted in the OSC which defines the optimum layout of furniture, to reduce crowding and noise levels near supervisory personne Onsite Rescue, Owner Controlled Area Fire, Field Survey Team Deployment The scenario began with an earthquake which resulted in a simulated l rescue situation on the Turbine Deck. A dummy was utilized to simulate an overhead crane operator who had fallen out of the crane's cab due to the earthquake, and was now suspended beneath the cab by a safety harness. Controllers stopped the first two persons they saw on the Turbine Deck, pointed out the accident scene, and then let rescue efforts commenc The two Station employees who were shown the accident scene separated, so that one person went for help while the othe stayed at the scen When no assistance had arrived after several minutes, the individual who had stayed at the accident scene stopped a passing security guard, who then radioed for help. The first members of the rescue team arrived at the scene about ten minutes after the two Station employees had first been shown the situation. Within another five minutes, the Station Fire Chief, several Shift Foreman, and three Radiation Chemistry Technicians (RCTs) had arrived at the scene. A number of mechanical maintenance personnel also arrived to assist as neede The chief stated that he had already called an offsite rescue squad for assistance; activated the Station Fire Brigade due to a report that the crane's electric motor was smoking; and ordered the electrical power to the crane to be shut of . ___   _ _ _ _ _

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l , The licensee had arranged'for extra Fire Brigade members to be ' onsite for purposes _of the exercise, in addition to the onshift Fire Brigade. The extra Fire Brigade reported to the accident scene in full firefighting gear with two equipment carts, within eight minutes of being activated. The Station Fire Chief was kept adequately informed of the delay (intentional, for purposes of the scenario) of the offsite rescue squad in reaching the Turbine Deck. Meanwhile, the chief described three reasonable methods of safely lowering the ; victim to the Turbine Deck. Two members of the offsite rescue squad 1 arrived at the scene with adequate security escort, at about 084 After being briefed on the situation by the Station Fire Chief, the rescue was terminated, as Station personnel had demonstrated the capabilities of formulating multiple ways to lower the victim and ! initially briefing the offsite rescue squa Shortly before 9:00 a.m., a large wood pile was set on fire in the north laydown area near several railroad cars,_ to simulate a fire in these cars. The purpose of this fire drill was to demonstrate the

,  interface of the Station Fire Brigade with offsite fire department '

personnel. The drill was unsuccessful, largely due to simulation problems, since the Station Fire Brigade did not reach the scene until 9:30 a.m., when the fire drill was essentially ove The fire was reported to a Shift Engineer (SE) who was an exercise participant in the Control Room. However, the fire was readily visible from the fourth floor of the Service Building and was also i reported by Station personnel to the onshift SE who was in the SE's Office. Thus, there was some confusion regarding whether or not the fire was intended to be a part of the exercise scenari No controller in the Control Room /SE Office area was able to resolve this important point to the satisfaction of the onshift S Meanwhile, three vehicles from the Byron Fire Protection District (FPD) had reached the fire scene. They were soon joined by two units from the Stillman Valley FPD. Although there was ample fire fighting capability at the scene, controllers, in an effort to urge the extra onsite Fire Brigade to respond to the fire, told the Byron FPD's senior official to radio the Station that more supplies were needed'to fight the fir The onshift SE had the onshift Fire Brigade respond to the fire scene. They were briefed on the situation and the drill was terminate Between the Alert and Site Area Emergency declarations, two offsite survey teams were formed in the OSC. Between about 1010 and 1045, . both teams obtained their survey equipment at the Gatehouse, loaded their vehicles, efficiently inventoried their equipment, and left the Station to begin their first assignment The radioactive l release began about 30 minutes late , m_____ _ . _____ _ _ _

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Team members functionally checked their survey instruments and air ! sampler motors, all of which had current calibration sticker ; There was no missing, damaged, or inoperable equipment in the field ! survey kits used by either team. Prior to leaving the Station,'both teams established radio communications with the TSC's Onsite i Environs Director and verified their initial assignment ' Each member of the three person teams was issued adequate' personal dosimetry-prior to the teams' departure. The serial numbers of i dosimetry items issued to each person were adequately documente Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable; however, the following items should be considered for improvement:

* The fire drill should not be considered as a successful demonstration of the Station Fire Brigade's capability to interface with offsite firefighting personnel, as the drill was essentially over when the Brigade arrived at the scen * Controllers should anticipate and be prepared to inform the onshift SE whether abnormal situations are intended to be a  j part of an exercise scenario, e. Emergency Operations Facility (E0F)

The General Emergency was correctly classified in a timely manner at 1117. The initial Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) was formulated in accordance with procedures. This PAR was for evacuation for 0-2 miles radius and sheltering 2-10 miles in the downwind sectors. Participants utilized a computer to obtain current weather data to simulate information from the plant's meteorological-(met) tower. Due to an error in the computerized met data, the initial PAR was given for the wrong downwind sectors beyond two miles (F, G, H). The error in the computerized wind direction data was corrected, and another NARS message was issued about ten minutes later to indicate the proper downwind sectors (C, D, E).

The Manager of Emergency Operations (MEO) and the Protective Measures staff were aware that the State modified their initial PAR to direct sheltering in sectors R thru H from two to ten miles, rather than the licensee recommended sectors, C, D, and The State had a different weather forecast on changing wind direction and preferred to use that forecas The dose assessment staff did a good job in monitoring the release rate and comparing dose projections based on the vent stack monitor to those based on back calculations derived from field team reading They correctly evaluated the probability of revising the PAR to evacuate additional i downwind areas beyond two mile They cont!uded that no changes in I the protective actions being implemented by the State were warrante l

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w r I This conclus. ion was based on plant conditions, the declining measured < release rate, and theLdeclining ARM readings from the Gas' Decay Tank i

 '(GOT) area. By 1200, the ME0 and his key staff recognized the need   i L  for an inplant. team to visually' assess the damage to.the GDTs. However, E  no. damage assessment report was available in the EOF before the' scenario
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time advance at 1345.

' From approximately 1000 to the end of the exercise, the EOF , Communicator demonstrated the capability to provide the NRC with . H adequately detailed information regarding the licensee's emergency }

 . response' efforts. -Information was telephoned or telecopied tc a Response Cell of controllers located at the Mazon EOF, who sirulated...
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the NRC, both-at Region III and Headquarters. Information transferred included: the reasons for emergency classifications; PARS; press- , releases; dose projection results and assumptions; release rate .. l

 'information; GDT inventory data; and the status of onsite protective
, actions. These actions satisfy the particulars of an Exercise
 ' Weakness. identified in the 1986 exercise. Computerized evacuation   '
 . time estimates,- forecast weather conditions, and release duration   ,

estimates for formulating PARS were all adequately _ considered by the

 ~ dose assessment staff. 'These actions close the second Exercise Weakness from the 1986 exercis The. Field Team Communicator kept adequately detailed logs of field survey-results and radiation exposures for the teams. The' State'was kept adequately informed of the licensee's emergency response efforts through a combination of NARS messages, periodic followup messages on plant status, and other response efforts that were communicated to the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IDNS).

Also,' periodic briefings held by the ME0 and his support staff could , be easily heard by the IDNS and Illinois Emergency Services l Disaster Agency (IESDA) representathes present in the EOF. In general, log keeping and administrative support were adequate in the , E0 Periodic briefings by the ME0 to his staff were well done and adequately detaile Although the ME0 and protective measures staff were sufficiently I aware of what PARS were being implemented by the State, no available'

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status boards were utilized to display either the licensee's PAR or the PARS being implemented by the' Stat Such a status board was l available but not used. Also, the ME0 seemed unaware of the completion status of the 0-2 mile evacuation. Shortly before the scenario time. advance, the ME0 and his key aids discussed the possibility of downgrading from a General Emergency, due to the decreasing release rate. They correctly decided not to downgrade because of the possibility of other GDTs depressurizing, the need to , physically inspect the GDTs; and the desirability of having Unit 1 1

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in cold shutdown to avoid a potential significant degrading of other i plant condition i 10 , I

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! By the end of the exercise, the dose assessment staff had performed an integrated dose calculation with conservative assumptions on the noble gas source term. This calculation confirmed the adequacy of

 .the PAR to only evacuate the 0-2 mile radius and shelter further downwin Until about 1300, the EOF seemed unaware that a second earthquake had occurred at 0945, which was of a magnitude sufficient to have warranted an Alert declaration. By the time the ME0 was told this information, it was somewhat irrelevant to emergency response efforts already being take The reason for the Alert declaration was never posted on an EOF status board. The reasons for the Site Area Emergency and for the General Emergency were posted on status board Planning agendas for the recovery stage were developed and recovery i actions were discussed among the ME0 and his support directors. This aspect of the exercise was adequately demonstrate :

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable; however, the following item should be censidered for improvement:

 * Protective Action Recommendations as recommended by the licensee as well as those actually implemented by the State ;

should be posted on status boards in the E0F. Current j information on the status of evacuation and sheltering should 1 also be poste ] l Exit Interview )

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On October 15, 1987 the inspectors met with the licensee representatives ) listed in Paragraph 1 to present their preliminary findings. The J licensee agreed to consider the items discussed, and indicated that none of the matters discussed were proprietary in natur . Attachment: Exercise Scope, Objectives and Narrative Summary l

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j - I l-BYRON NUCLEAR POWER STATION GSEP EXERCISE I October 14, 1987 SCOPE OF PARTICIPATION The.0ctober 14, 1987 Byron GSEP Exercise is a daytime event to test the capability of the basic elements within the Commonwealth Edison Company GSE The Exercise will include mobilization of CECO personnel and resources adequate to verify their capability to respond to a simulated emergency. The ; exercise will also include partial mobilization of the Illinois Plan for Radiological Accidents to verify their capacity to respond to a simulated ) emergenc ] j Commonwealth Edison will participate in the Byron Station Exercise by , activating the on-site emergency response organization and the offsite i emergency response organization, as appropriate, subject to limitations that may become necessary to provide for safe, efficient operation of the Byron )

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Station and other CECO nuclear generating stations. The Corporate Command l' Center at the General Office in Chicago will not be activated for this Exercis Activation of the TSC and other on-site participants will be conducted on a real time basis. The Exercise shif t will receive the initial scenario information and respond accordingl The Nuclear Duty Person and the balance of the Recovery Group will be repositioned close to Byron to permit use of Recovery Group personnel from distant location Commonwealth Edison will demonstrate the capability to make contact with contractors whose assistance would be required by the simulated accident situation, but will not actually incur the expense of using contractor services to simulate emergency response except as prearranged specifically for the Exercis Commonwealth Edison will arrange to pro /ide actual transportation and communication support in accordance with existing agreements to the extent specifically prearranged for the Exercise. Commonwealth Edison will provide ' unforeseen actual assistance only to the extent that the resources are available and do not hinder normal operation of the Compan (3315A) I

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BYRON 1987 GSEE_EXERCTSE October 14, 1987 OBJECTIVES PRIMARY OBJECTIVE 1 l l Demonstrate ~the capability to implement the Commonwealth Edison Generating. Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP) in cooperation with the Illinois Plan for Radiological Accidents (IPRA) to protect the pubile in the event of a j major accident at the Byron Nuclear Power Statio SRP_0RTING OBJECTIVES:

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1) intidant Assessment and Classification Demonstrate the capability to assess the accident-conditions, to determine which. Emergency Action Level (EAL) ! has been reached, and to classify the accident level correctly in accordance with GSE '(EOF, TSC, CR) I 2) Notification and' Communication l 1 Demonstrate the capability to notify the principal offsite j organizations within fifteen (15) minutes of declaring an l I accident classificatio (EOF, TSC, CR)

  '      ! Demonstrate the capability to notify the NRC within one (1)-

hour of the initial inciden (CR) Demonstrate the capability to contact organizations that i would normally assist in an emergency, but are not participating in this exercise (e.g., INPO, Murray & Trettel, Westinghouse, etc.)

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   - (CR, E0F, TSC) Demonstrate the ability to provide accurate and timely information so that reports may be made to the Emergency News Center for Press release (EOF, TSC, JPIC) Demonstrate the ability to provide follow-up information to the State in a timely manne (EOF, TSC) Demonstrate the capability to provide timely and accurate on-site personnel assembly and accountability in accordance with procedures.-(TSC)
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l . BYRON 1987 GSEP EXERCISE i October 14, 1987 OBJECTIVES i 3) EdioloRicalAssessment Demonstrate the capability of Environmental Field Teams to conduct field radiation surveys and collect air, liquid, vegetation and soil samples, when neede (TSC, EOF) Demonstrate the capability to conduct in-plant radiation protection activitie (OSC). Demonstrate the ability to perform calculations with radiological survey information, trend this information, and make appropriate recommendations concerning protective , actions utilizing procedure ED24 and table 6.3.1 and figure f 6.3- (E0F, TSC) Demonstrate the ability to collect and conduct analysis of air or liquid samples on-site, via HRS (OSC, RAD CHEM)

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4) Emergency Facilities Demonstrate the capability to activate the emergency organization and staff the nuclear station emergency j response facilities in accordance with procedures during the daytim l

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5) Emergency Direction and Control Demonstrate the ability of the new GSEP Revision 6 organization to manage and direct a simulated emergency Exercis (EOF, TSC, OSC, JPIC) l Demonstrate the ability c,f the Managers / Directors to manage the emergency organizations in the implementation of the I GSE (EOF, OSC, TSC, JPIC, CR)

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. BYRON ANN 0UNCED GSEP EXERCISE OCTOBER 14, 198T , NARRATIVE SUMMARY' 11!1TJAL SITUATI9E (0730-0800) i Unit 1-Plant Status: 1. Mode 1 - Steady state operation at 89% power- for last 135 days with equilibrium Xeno RCS boron concentration is 10 pp . RCS Iodine 131 equivalent.at 1.5E-02 microcuries per gra . RCS leakrate calculation is 0.56 gpm unidentified and 1.6 gpm identified with no s/g tube leakag .-Positive Displacement Pump (ICV 02P) is out of ' service for sea replacement. Repair time-is 8 day ) 5. The 1B CD/CB pump is out of service for bearing replacemen Repair time is 3 day . The IB CC pump is out of service for bearing replacemen Repair time is 2 hour . Radiation Monitor 1PR003J .is inoperabl LCOAR was initiated at 2000 on 10-10-8 l

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1. Mode 6 - Six days into a refueling outage caused by indications ~of possible fuel cladding damag Twenty-one fuel assemblies have been removed to the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP). Tuel assembly #22 is at present entering the Transfer Canal in the upender to be placed in the STP. The 2B RH pump is in operation in the shutdown cooling mod . RCS Iodine 131 equivalent at 3.0 microcuries per gra . The following pumps are out of service for administrative control: 2A and 2B SI pumps, 2A CV pump, 2A and 2B CS pump . The 2A Rii pump is out of service for rebuilding the pum Repair. 1 time is 7 day . 2A SI Pump is out of service for lube oil pump replacement. Repair time is 3 day I 6. The U-2 CST is drained for heater replacemen Repair time is 5 days, 7. The U-2 main turbine is out of service for bearing inspectio Repair time is 10 day . The main turbine oil . reservoir is out of service to clean the reservoi Repair time is 3 day . The accumulators are drained and 00S for chemistry control, (3395A/1)

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  . 1. The' OC Gas Decay Tank. (GDT) release has been' initiated at-0745 on-10-14-87. The OPR002J '(both A & B) radiation monitor is ~ inoperable e    so. two samples have . been independently verified. LCOAR entered.at     .
   . 0800 on 10-10-87. - The(02 analyzers for - GW '(OGW8003 and 0GW8004)      !

are inoperabl Samples. are being analyzed per LCOAR.. LC0AR-entered at'2200 on 10-8-8 j

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2. The ; 0B: W pump is out . of service for electrical determinatio Repair time is 5 hour . The',SX blowdown valve OSX161A is stuck in a variable open position ., due to a severed stem. ' Repair time is 2 days, j

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  ' 4. The OA .demin ' flushing pump is out      of service for a motor l alignment. Repair time is 8 hour .I h

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. e i I (3395A/2)

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 ,. IRGLSJAL EVENT ~(0800-0845)

45 minute' duration EAL #3 Seismic eaulement is actuated at level of 0.02x At 0800 (-0), The seismic actuation alarm annunciated in the control room. Level is verified at 0.02g and the shift begins to shutdown Unit One per  :

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procedur SJstem walkdowns are initiated and the fuel assembly #22 is to be transferred to the SP *

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he following abnormal conditions are caused by the earthquak . The U-2 turbine building crane is partially derailed with the operator dangling from the escape harness. The fire brigade assembles to rescue the crane operator. Outside assistance is requeste . The station north entrance at the gua rdhouse is blocked by the toppled flagpol . Numerous leaks begin in the fire protection outside ring heade . The U-1 Condensate storage tank (CST) is structurally deforme . The OA deepwell (W) pump casing is collapse . I

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6. The fuel assembly #22 becomes stuck in the upender in the transfer canal near its fully withdrawr.' positio The Rockford Load Dispatcher requests that the station maintain the 345KV  ! ring bus intact for system stabilit ;

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 (3395A/3)       '

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...~, I iALERI (0845-1006) I B.Lminute duration

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EAL_gj Stigmic eagirment is activated at a level areater than the QP1.rA1.ina_EeAla_EAI.1hluAk e 40 . 09 a ) At 0845 (t-45) The second seismic alarm annunciated in the control room with level I verification >0.09 As a result, the following events occur:

1. Unit 1 main turbine vibration is 20 mil _ The turbine is manually l tripped and the reactor verified trippe l 2. A fire starts in the north laydown are l 3. The Byron Bridge over the Rock River (Route 72) collapse i l 4. The essential service water and the cire water makeup line from the river screen house to the plant ruptures. (SX/CW) The OA and OCCW l makeup pumps trip. SC basin level drops to the low-low level. The OA and OB SX makeup pumps autostart (or are started manually) and tri This requires that action be initiated within 1 hour to I place Unit 1 in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours, HOT SHUTDOWN i' within the following 6 hours, and COLD SHUTDOWN within 24 hours after tha .

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5. The Unit 1 CST catastrophically rupture Level indication at the main control board (MCB) is 0%. I

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6. The fire protection ring header fails in many location . The transfer canal develops a leak. Level begins decreasing. The Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) low level alarm annunciated in the control room (level is < 423.5'). The shift initiates the procedure to find the.cause and initiate makeu . Due to GW piping vibration, several cracks appear resulting in the intake of 02 to the on-line GDT (OA) via the on-line compresso This results in the buildup for an explosive mixture in the OA GD l i,

  (3395A/4)
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_ _ _ _ _ . _ - -_ - _- - ______ - _ - _ - _ - - - _ - - L, - o h HIE EMERGENCY (1006-1116) 70 minute duration O EAL #25. Radiation levels in__the Fuel Handlina Buildini (FHB) are > 1AQ mrem / hour as observed on the RM-11 display console for ORE-AROS$ or ORE-AR056

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At.1006 (t-126) . 1The radiation monitors ORE-AR055 and ORE-AR056 alarm high radiation at the

.RM-11 console in the control room. Radiation level is > 100 mrem /houriper

the RM-11 indicatio The fuel assembly #22 becomes unstuck from the -upender and level is L maintained in the SFP by either makeup 'or isolation to resolve the site-emergenc An explosion occurs . at the 346' auxiliary building GDT are Radwaste

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panel indications show the OA and OB GDT is completely depressurized :and the OC and OD GDT's are slowly depressurizing. No fire is in progress.

l As a result 'of the RM-11 console in the control roos indicates high , radiation alarms for 2PR028J, 2PR030J, and various area radiation monitor GD ERAL EMERGENCY.1116-1336) 140 minute duration EAL #27, Instantaneous release rate e.xceeds the level corresponding to LRem/ hour whole body at the site boundary under actual meteoroloa This condition exists when 0 > 1.3 X 108 XU

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Where 0 = release rate in microcuries/second and U = wind speed in meters /secon At 1116 (t-196) The A-Model report shows that the instantaneous release rate exceeds 1 Rem / hour whole body exposure at the site boundary under actual meteorolog ] The release path is from the GDT area 346' auxiliary j building via the aux building ventilation system out the vent stack and from stuck open GDT relief valve (s) line to downstream of the OGWO14 valve {

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and out the ventstack (bypassing the aux building ventilation charcoal I filters). The release will be terminated when all GDT's have blown down and the ventilation system clears the radiation level in the auxiliary building (>2 hour release).

RECOVERY'(1336-1426) 50 minute duration l At 1336 i i The radiation release is terminated (within limits of the site boundary). 3

- Survey teams continue both in and outside the plant. Long-term makeup has been established to the SX basins. Construction activity has begun on the SX/CW makeup line OB W pump has been restored to operable statu Radchem is' monitoring transfer canal radiation levels and potential
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airborne radiatio (3395A/1)

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