IR 05000454/1986019
| ML20197H184 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron  |
| Issue date: | 05/13/1986 |
| From: | Love R, Muffett J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20197H153 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-454-86-19, 50-455-86-14, IE-85-2, IEB-77-03, IEB-77-07, IEB-77-3, IEB-77-7, IEB-78-04, IEB-78-4, IEB-80-20, IEB-82-04, IEB-82-4, IEB-85-002, IEB-85-2, NUDOCS 8605190081 | |
| Download: ML20197H184 (16) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-454/86019(DRS); 50-455/86014(DRS)
Docket Nos. 50-454; 50-455 Licenses No. NFP-23; CPPR-131 l
Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company
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Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name:
Byron Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Byron Site, Byron, IL Inspection Conducted:
April 14-24, 1986 Inspector:
R. S. Love
[3 N Date
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dmd 3/00 Approved By:
J. W. Muffett, Chief i
Plant Systems Section Date
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Inspection Summary Inspection on April 14-24, 1986 (Reports No. 50-454/86019(DRS);
No. 50-455/86014(OR M Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of licensee's action on:
previous inspection findings; IE Bulletins; and 50.55(e) reports.
Also inspected licensee activities related to installation of electrical and instrument and control components and associated records.
During this inspection, Inspection Procedures 51053, 51055, 52053, 52055, 99020, 37051, 92701, 92702 and 92703 were utilized.
Results: Of the areas inspected, no violations were identified.
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8605190081 860513 PDR ADOCK 0S000454 G
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO,1 I
- G. Sorensen, Project Construction Manager E. L. Martin, QA Superintendent l
- R. B. Klingler, Project QC Supervisor
- J. O. Binder, Project Electrical Supervisor
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- E. T. Sager, Electrical Field Engineer
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- T. Lamb, Electrical Field Engineer
- H. Kaczmarek, QA Engineer
- E. Briette, QA Engineer
- J. Steinmetz, Field Engineer
- R. J. Moravec, Project Mechanical Supervisor
- J. L. Woldridge, QA Supervisor G. D. Contrady, Senior Construction Engineer (On loan from S&L)
M. V. Dellabetta, QA Supervisor L. E. Bihlman, QA Engineer Hatfield Electric Company (HFCo)
A. Smith, QA/QC Manager K. Higgins, Assistant Office Supervisor S. J. Bindenagel, Electrical Coordinator R. Farra11, QC Supervisor i
D. Vespa, Electrical Lead Inspector E. Tovo, Project Engineer Powers-Azco-Pope (PAP)
R. P. Larkin, QA Manager D. Nelson, QC Supervisor i
B. Buck, QC Inspector (Piping and Hangers)
T. Hartnett, QC Inspector (Piping and Hangers)
The inspector also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel during this inspection.
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- Denotes those present at the exit interview on April 24, 1986.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings a.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (454/84047-02):
During a previous inspection, it was observed that the environmental qualifications for pressure switches IPSL-AF051 and IPSL-AF055 had not been completed.
During this inspection, the inspector verified that the subject pressure switches had been tested by Wyle Test Laboratory (Report No. 17087-1, dated June 1, 1984) and that the test data had been found acceptable by Sargent and Lundy (S&L) (Reference:
S&L
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File No. CQD-014836, dated June 22, 1984).
Based on a review of the above data, the inspector determined that the pressure switches were qualified for their intended use in a mild environment.
This data also qualifies Unit 2 pressure switches 2PSL-AF051 and 2PSL-AF055.
b.
(Closed) Violation (455/85027-03a):
During the CAT inspection, it was observed that 4160 volt switchgear 2AP-05E and 2AP-06E and DC fuse panel 20C11J were not installed in accordance with the requirements for seismic mounting of Class 1E equipment.
This was exemplified by the fact that Drawing 0-3391C, Detail 47, required a
four sided weld on the mounting hold down plates for the 4160 volt switchgear and it was observed that the plates were only welded on two sides. With respect to 2DC11J, Drawing 0-3391K, Detail 158, requires the hold down welds be spaced at a maximum of 10 1/2" center to center and it was observed that seven of ten welds exceeded this spacing requirement.
HECo prepared NCR 1669, dated August 30, 1985, to document the deficient weld on switchgear 2AP-05E, 2AP-06E, 2AP-07E, and 2AP-08E.
On September 4, 1985, CECO prepared NCR F-1005 based on the information contained in HECo NCR 1669 which was forwarded to S&L for disposition. At S&L request, weld maps of the as welded condition were prepared for the subject switchgear and forwarded to S&L for analysis. On May 22, 1984 (prior to CAT inspection),
Westinghouse revised the seismic hold down requirements for the subjec+ switchgear.
Field Change Request (FCR) 26659, dated November 1, 1985, was issued to revise the mounting detail for 4160 volt switchgear and FCR 26662, dated November 15, 1985, was issued to provide an alternative to switchgear mounting Detail 47.
Based on the Westinghouse revision of the hold down requirement for the 4160 volt switchgear and their analysis of the as-welded condition, S&L determined that no additional welding was required to meet the requirements for seismic mounting of the Class 1E 4160 volt switchgear.
NCRs F1005 and 1669 were closed on December 14, 1985.
During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the above listed documents and found them acceptable.
With respect to the deficient welds on DC fuse panel 2DC11J, HEco
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prepared DR7373 to document the as-found condition.
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welds were added (and inspected) to meet the requirements of
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Drawing 0-3391K, Detail 158.
DR7373 was closed on September 9, 1985. To verify that the weld spacing problem was not generic to the other safety-related DC fuse panels, the licensee inspected panels 2DC10J, 20C12J, and 2DC13J.
All welds and weld spacing was in accordance with the design drawings.
c.
(Closed) Violation (455/85027-03c):
During the CAT inspection, it was observed that there were wiring errors in motor operated valves
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(MOV) 2RC-80010, 2RC-80028, 2RC-80020, and 2CC-9438.
The inspection report erroneously identified MOV 2RC-80010 as 2RL-80010 and MOV 2RC-8002B as 2RL-80020.
The licensee revised Drawings SE-2-4230B
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(2RC-80010), 6E-2-4230C (2RC-80028), 6E-2-42300 (2RC-8002D), and
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6E-2-4861 (2CC-9438) to show the as-built condition.
Utilizing the latest revision (All Revision E) of applicable drawings, the inspector verified that MOVs 2RC-8001D, 2RC-8002B, and 2RC-8002D were properly terminated.
Due to plant testing, MOV 2CC-9438 was not available for inspection.
No discrepancies were identified.
Inspection Report No. 455/85027 references a Tom Lamb (CECO) to Steve Bindenagel (HECo) speed memo dated January 23, 1984, that was utilized in conjunction with the applicable drawing to perform their (CAT) inspection.
The Region III inspector was able to verify that the MOV was wired per drawing without the aid of the speed memo, however, utilizing the terminal block terminal numbers contained in the subject speed memo, the inspector reduced the inspection time by approximately 50%.
Based on the inspector's inspection of the subject MOVs, this item is closed.
d.
(Closed) Open Item (455/85044-02):
During a previous inspection, it was observed that HECo Procedure 9A, " Class 1 Cable Pan Hanger Installation," was not compatible with Procedure 6, " Reporting of l
Damaged or Nonconforming Material or Equipment." Procedure 6 had l
been revised to update the reporting, tracking, and reinspection of deficiencies.
This charge was not reflected in Procedure 9A.
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During this inspection, the inspector verified that Procedure 9A had been revised so that it is now compatible with Procedure 6.
3.
Licensee Action on 10 CFR 50.55(e) Reports (Closed) 50.55(e) Report (454/82011-EE; 455/82011-EE):
On December 21, i
1982, CECO notified Region III of a potential reportable deficiency regarding the accuracy of Barton instrument transmitters being installed
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at Byron Station.
These transmitters may exhibit thermal non-repeatibil-
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ity and performance characteristics caused by leakage current paths from the electronic circuitry to the transmitter case ground under accident
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l environmental conditions.
The maximum extent of the possible combined zero and span error, as a percentage of calibrated span, was i 12.5% for
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the first five minutes at + 420 F.
After five minutes at + 420 F, the calibration span was within the published specification of i 10.0%.
The normal operating temperature for these transmitters is 3,130*F.
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l Westinghouse analysis determined that based upon the Byron setpoints, sufficient margin still exists for each transmitter to perform its intended safety function without modification or replacement.
CECO SNED has reviewed the Westinghouse data and shares this conclusion.
Based on a review of the above information, the inspector determined that the
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l subject Barton transmitters will meet their design intent.
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Licensee Action on IE Bulletins a.
(Closed) IE Bulletin (455/7707-BB):
This bulletin identified problem with electrical shorts between conductors within a containment low voltage penetration assembly manufactured by General Electric l
Company (GE).
The bulletin addresses all containment electrical penetrations that depend upon an epoxy sealant and a dry nitrogen pressure environment to ensure that the electrical and pressure characteristics are maintained so as to ensure the functional capability as required by the plant's Safety Analysis Report.
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the 49 electrical penetrations in Unit 2, 16 are safety-related.
Fourteen of these safety-related penetrations manufactured by Bunker
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Ramo depend upon a glass epoxy sealant and a dry nitrogen pressure environment to cnsure that the electrical and pressure characteris-tics are maintained.
The other two safety-related penetrations use Conax adapter modules.
The Conax design utilizes solid copper conductors which pass through the assembly without any internal splices.
The conductors are continuously insulated with a polyimide
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(kapton) film and mechanically sealed at both ends of the module using thermoplastic (polysulfane) sealants.
The Conax penetrations
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are designed with the provision of periodically monitoring the condition of all seals by internally pressurizing the assembly with
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nitrogen gas.
However, the nitrogen gas does not contribute to
the electrical function of these penetrations and as such, Conax j
penetrations do not fall under the auspices of IEB 77007.
As part of the licensee's corrective actions to IEB 77007 and IEB 82004, the licensee inspected the safety-related Bunker Ramo
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penetrations for integrity of conductor insulation at the entry
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into the epoxy modules.
No evidence of loss of conductor insulation integrity or cracks in the epoxy were observed.
In addition,
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three feed thrus were removed for inspection for loss of conductor insulation integrity and epoxy cracking where the conductors enter and exit the epoxy module.
No cracking or loss of insulation i
integrity was observed.
Installation records indicate that those attributes were also inspected at time of installation with no discrepancies identified.
In addition to the routine IE inspection program, a detailed inspection of six of sixteen Unit 2 electrical penetrations was performed by Region III for the closeout of
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IEB-82004 (Reference:
Inspection Reports No. 454/84069; No. 455/84047).
Based on the above information, this item is
closed.
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b.
(Closed) IE Bulletin (455/78004-BB):
This bulletin identified
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environmental qualification problems with NAMC0 Model D2400X or EA-170-302 SNAP LOCK switches utilized inside primary containment.
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Westinghouse Technical Bulletin No. NSD-TB-77-13 (Attachment to
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IEB-78004) provided four possible solutions to resolve the switch problem.
CECO identified 19 containment isolation valves and two
emergency core cooling system'(ECCS) valves that utilize the above listed NAMC0 switches.
The subject switches are mounted on the
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stems of air operated valves and are used as a lock-in/ lock-out
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feature in these valves.
It is possible to postulate a common mode failure in a post accident environment.
If the limit switch failed i
closed (shorted), an unsafe / unwanted position of the air operated
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valves will occur when resetting the safety injection (SI) signal, provided that the air supply is still available to the valves.
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For the 19 containment isolation valves, the Byron design incorporates a separate containment isolation reset signal; i.e.,
resetting SI will not reset the containment isolation signal
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(similar to Alternate No. 3 described in Westinghouse Technical Bulletin NSD-TB-77-13). This corrective action was verified by the inspector during this inspection by reviewing the applicable drawings and an inspection of the reset panel in the control room.
With respect to the two ECCS valves, the stem-mounted limit switches on these valves interlock the controls of certain safety related valves employed in the ECCS which permits the operator to align the valves for the recirculation mode.
The inspector verified corrective action by reviewing HECo Rework Requests 07336 and 07338 that installed, inspected, and accepted the installation of MANC0 Model EA-180-302 limit switches which are seismically and environmentally qualified in accordance with IEEE-382-1972.
c.
(Closed) IE Bulletin (455/80020-BB):
This bulletin identified intermittent contact operation of Type W-2 switches manufactured by Westinghouse.
The licensee also identified this problem on 10 CFR 50.55(e) Reports No. 454/80001-EE; No. 455/80001-EE.
The subject 50.55(e) reports were closed in Inspection Report No. 454/84023; No. 455/84017.
Based on the closure of the 50.55(e)
reports, this bulletin is closed.
5.
Review of Ceco Audits of HEco and PAP During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the last five CECO audits of HECo and PAP.
This review included looking at the hand written notes of the individual auditors that supported the audit report.
If a " finding" or " observation" was identified in the audit, the inspector reviewed the contractor's corrective action and CECO's action in closing out the item.
In general, the audits were well planned, indepth review of the contractor's work activities in the field as well as the supporting documentation.
In general, audits are scheduled a year at a time, however, special audits may be initiated by:
repetitive surveillance findings; lack of timely response to audit / surveillance findings; followup on independent design inspections / reviews; and by management direction.
Following is a listing of the CECO audits reviewed, a brief description of the audit, and findings, if applicable:
a.
Audit 6-86-106 of PAP was conducted January 13-16, 1986 with no deficiencies identified.
The scope of the audit was to review the implementation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria III, IV, V, VII, VIII, XI, XII, XV, and XVI.
Items inspected included:
41 PAP procedures, 107 PAP design drawings, 50 traveler packages, j
33 engineering change notices (ECN), 25 field change requests
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(FCR), 115 field drawings, four ASME Code Data Reports (N-5), ten hydrostatic test reports, inspected 18 pressure gauges, inspected
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13 therometers, 287 calibration reports for the pressure gauges and
therometers, nine open and eight closed NCRs, 30 fabrication /installa-tion surveillance (FIS) reports, and accompanied two QC inspectors on their final walkdown of an installed instrument system.
b.
Special Audit 6-85-206 of PAP was conducted October 11-21, 1985.
CECO Surveillance 7457 identified that PAP warehouse personnel were releasing material to other onsite contractors on a verbal approval
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of CECO Project Construction Department (PCD) personnel.
Procedures require the use of a " Request for Release of CECO Material" form be signed by Ceco PCD before any material is transferred from Ceco to a contractor or any transfer of material between contractors.
At Byron Station, all material is procured by Ceco.
Corrective action was to retrain PAP warehouse and CECO PCD personnel in the applicable material control procedures.
This audit verified that the corrective action to prevent recurrence (training) was effective.
c.
Audit 6-85-120 of PAP was conducted November 18-20, 1985. This audit addressed Criteria XV thru XVIII.
During the audit it was observed that the QC Supervisor was signing documents for the QA Manager.
However, there was no letter of authorization of file to permit the QC Supervisor to sign for the QA Manager.
A letter of authorization was prepared during the audit and no response was required from PAP.
d.
Audit 6-85-119 of PAP was conducted August 5-7, 1985.
This audit was to address Criteria XI thru XIV, however, Criterion XI, Test Control, was not covered during this audit in that no tests were being conducted during the audit time frame.
This criterion was addressed in Audit 6-86-106 (Reference:
Paragraph 5.a above).
No findings or observations were identified during this audit, e.
Audit 6-85-118 of PAP was conducted April 23, 1985.
This audit addressed Criteria II, III, VI thru X.
No findings or observations were identified during this audit.
f.
Audit 6-86-110 of HECo was conducted January 13-17, 1986.
This audit addressed Criteria III, VI, X, XVII.
During the audit, it was observed that the calibration records for two lug crimping tools were missing.
HECo prepared DR8392 to document the missing records.
In that the tools were found to be in calibration at the subsequent calibration check, no corrective action was required to reinspect / replace the electrical terminal lugs installed with the subject crimping tools.
It should be noted that there are no calibration adjustments on this type of tool.
If the tool is found out of calibration, the dies, at a minimum, have to be replaced to bring the tool back into calibration.
g.
Special Audit 6-85-154 of HEco was conducted March 22, 1985.
Ceco
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Surveillance 6951, dated February 14, 1985, identified 22 responses for " unit concept" and "overinspection" activities that were not prepared in a timely fashion.
Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory (PTL)
is under contract to CECO QA to perform overinspection and unit concept inspections at Byron.
Ceco transmits the deficiencies identified by PTL to the various contractors for written response as to corrective actions taken and/or plinned.
Corrective action was verified by Ceco and the audit was closed June 26, 1985.
Quarterly followups on this item continued through March 26, 1986.
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h.
Audit 6-85-153 of HEco was conducted November 18-22, 1985.
This audit addressed Criteria VI, IX, XVII, and XVIII and a followup on finding and observations identified in Audit 6-85-152.
During this audit it was observed that on five of 14 weld travelers requiring preheat, no date was entered next to the QC inspector's signature.
HECo conducted training on quality documentation requirements on November 26, 1985.
Corrective action was verified by CECO and the audit was closed.
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Audit 6-85-152 of HEco was conducted September 26 through October 4, 1985.
This audit identified one finding and three observations as follows:
(1) Finding:
It could not be verified that all corrected deficiencies identified during the unit concept inspection had been reinspected and accepted by HEco QC, This was exemplified by the fact that ten of 76 inspection reports could not be found by HECo.
Items were reinspected by HEco.
Audit followup was performed on October 17 and 19, 1985 to verify corrective action.
This item was closed October 19, 1985.
(2) Observation:
Training Records on procedure revisions could not be found for certain personnel (by name).
Training was conducted during the audit.
Filing system for training records was revised.
Corrective action was verified and this item was
closed on November 12, 1985.
(3) Observation:
It was observed that in accordance with Procedure 30, HECo does not inspect the A-325 thru bolt installa-tions for proper torque after Kellem Grips are installed.
The bolts were inspected during initial installation, however, these bolts must be loosened to install the grips.
Procedure 10 was revised to require reinspection of the bolts after the Kellem Grips were installed and a reinspection of previous installations l
were performed.
Corrective action was verified by Ceco and this item was closed on November *27, 1985.
j.
Audit 6-85-150 of HECo was conducted on May 20-23, 1985.
This audit addressed:
QC Record Credibility, Conduit and Hanger Installation, Procurement of Safety-Related Material, and Receiving and Storage of Material.
No finding or observations were identified during this audit.
Summary:
During the inspectors review of the above listed audits, the following observations were made:
(1) The scope of several of the audits referenced Criterion III, Design Control.
However, the audit check list indicated that all the questions on design control related to Criterion VI, Document Control.
In addition, neither HECo nor PAP perform design related activities on safety-related items.
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(2) The scope of the audits were not always addressed in the body
of the audit or in the audit checklists (questions) that supported the audit report.
During the inspection, on April 18, 1986, a QA training session was conducted on audit reports, audit checklists, and the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.
The Region III inspector attended approximately one hour of this training.
The training session was 11 formative, addressed the inspector's concerns, and participation by the attendees (15 QA personnel) was outstanding.
Based on the training provided, the inspector's concerns in this area were alleviated.
i No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
6.
Review of I&C Work Activities, Records and As-Built Drawings
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During this inspection, the Region III inspector selected five safety-related instruments and and their associated instrument racks, sensing lines, and supports for review.
This review entailed the verification
of sensing line size, material, slope, support and that the high and
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low pressure sensing lines were properly terminated at the instrument
and process line.
All installations and records reviewed were found acceptable.
Following are the details of this review:
l a.
Instrument - Pressure transmitter 2PT-545 is a locally mounted instrument utilized to measure Loop "D" Main Steaming Line i
i pressure.
The inspector used Drawing T683-2PT-545, Revision 0, to verify proper installation of the instrument, sensing line, and applicable supports.
The following records were reviewed
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and found acceptable:
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l (1) Final QC Walkdown and Review, dated April 8, 1986.
(2) Pipe (sensing line) bend inspection, dated February 25, 1986.
(3) Hanger Calculation Sheets for Hangers H-153-1, H-153-2, and H-153-3.
(4) Flex hose installation record.
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(5)
Instrument attachment record.
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(6) Hanger visual weld inspection records.
(7) CEA (concrete expansion anchor) final inspection records.
All CEA final inspections are performed by PTL.
(8) Pipe weld installation and inspection records.
(9) FCR No. F-36016, dated September 10, 1985, added a ik" hole in j
the local instrument rack to facilitate the mounting of the j
pressure transmitter.
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(10) Verified that the heat numbers etched / molded on the pipe and fitting matched the heat numbers noted on the drawing.
b.
Instrument - Pressure transmitter 2PT-535 is mounted on Panel 2PL-77JC and is utilized to measure Loop "C" Main Steam Line pressure.
The inspector used Drawing T686-2PT-535, Sheet 1, Revision 5 and Sheet 2, Revision 3, to verify proper installation of the instrument, sensing line, and applicable supports.
The inspector also performed a general inspection of Panel 2PL-77JC and the various instruments, piping, and valves mounted on the panel.
The inspector accompanied two PAP QC inspectors on their final walkdown of this system.
The same types of records discussed in Paragraph 6.a above were also reviewed for this and subsequent instruments reviewed.
All installa-tions and records reviewed were found acceptable.
c.
Instrument - Pressure transmitter 2PT-536 is utilized to measure Loop "C" Main Steam Line pressure.
This instrument is redundant to 2PT-535 and physical separation is maintained between the two instruments and their associated sensing lines.
The inspector used Drawings T632-2PT-536, Sheet 1, Revision 5 and Sheet 2, Revision 6, to verify proper installation of the instrument, sensing line, and applicable supports.
All installations and records reviewed were found acceptable.
d.
Instrument - Flow transmitter 2FT-C5011 is mounted on Panel 2PL-81JA and is utilized to measure flow in the containment spray system.
The inspector used Drawings T540-2FT-CS011, Sheet 1, Revision 10, Sheet 2, Revision 6, and Sheet 3, Revision 2, to verify proper installation of the instrument, high and low pressure sensing lines, and applicable supports.
All installations and records reviewed were found acceptable.
e.
During the walkdown of the above listed instruments, the inspector selected heat number (HT) FEN on 1/2" couplings and HT 406014 and HT 466198 on 1/2" pipe for review of procurement documents.
Following are the results of this review:
(1) Couplings - 1/2", SA182, S/S, 3000# fittings, HT-FEN Procured from Chicago Tube and Iron, ASME Certificate
No. QSC-236.
- Purchase Order No. 501922 Material Receiving Report (MRR) 60344
1000 couplings received July 17, 1985 on Receiving
Inspection Report (RIR) 1234.
Items were final accepted on July 25, 1985.
Fittings were manufactured by Camco Fitting Company.
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The Material Certification was compared to the
requirements of ASTM-SA182 and was found acceptable.
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(2) Pipe - 1/2", SA312, S/S, Schedule 40, HT 406014 Procured from Capitol Pipe and Steel Products,
Incorporated.
Pipe fabricated by Teledyne Columbia - Summerill.
- 12,210 feet received on MRR 51727, dated April 5, 1982.
- The Material Certification was compared to the
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requirements of ASTM-SA312 and was found acceptable.
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(3) Pipe - 1/2", SA212, S/S, Schedule 80, HT 466198 Procured from Guyon Alloys, Incorporated.
- Pipe fabricated by Sandvik, Incorporated.
- 9,902 feet received on MRR 50040, dated February 24,
1981.
The Material Certification was compared to the
requirements of ASTM-SA312 and was found acceptable.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
7.
Review of Electrical Work Activities and Records During this inspection, the Region III inspector selected two motor control centers (MCC), two Safeguards Test Cabinets, one Solid State l
Protection System Cabinet, and one ESF Switchgear Control Panel for l
review.
The review of the MCCs entailed the verification of circuit breaker size, type, and ampere rating, and the overload type, size, and setting (where applicable).
The review of the cabinets and panel entailed the verification that all identified deficiencies had been corrected prior to turnover to the licensee, following are the details of this review:
a.
ESF MCC 232X5 (2AP32E) located in the Auxiliary Building.
All circuit breakers are supplied by Westinghouse, Type-HFB,
Frame Size - 150A.
Drawing utilized - 6E-2-4008AD, Revision M.
- Cubicle B-4, Component Cooling Water Isolation Valve 2B-2CC9414,
1.2HP motor, 5A circuit breaker,15-45 magnetic overload (0L)
with a setting of 5, 3A control power fuse.
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Cubicle B-2, H2 Recombiner Containment Isolation Valve 20G082,
0.33HP motor, 3A circuit breaker, 7-22 magnetic OL with a setting of 1, 3A control power fuse.
Cubicle D-3, Diesel Generator 28 Starting Air Compressor
28-2DG015B-8, 15HP motor, 40A circuit breaker, fixed thermal and magnetic OLs, 3A control power fuse.
Cubicle D-5, H2 Recombiner Containment Isolation Valve 20G084,
0.33HP motor, 3A circuit breaker, 7-22 magnetic OL with a setting of 1, 3A control power fuse.
Magnetic OL setting calculations were reviewed and found acceptable.
b.
ESF MCC 232X4 and X4-A (2AP28E and E-A) located in the Auxiliary Building.
Drawing utilized - 6E-2-4008AB, Revision H.
- All circuit breakers are supplied by Westinghouse, Type - HFB,
Frame Size-150A.
Cubicle B-2, Steam Generator Auxiliary Feed Water Stop Valve
2E-2AF013E, 0.7HP motor, 5A circuit breaker, 15-45 magnetic OL with a setting of 5, 3A control power fuse.
Cubicle D-5, Safety Injection Pump 28 Suction Valve 2SI8923B,
1.0HP motor, 10A circuit breaker,35-110 magnetic OL with a setting of 1, 3A control power fuse.
Cubicle E-1, RHR Heat Exchanger 2B to SI Pump Isolation Valve
2SI8804B, 1.0HP motor, 10A circuit breaker,35-110 magnetic OL with a setting of LO, two 3A control power fuses.
Cubicle L-2, Safety Injection Pump Discharge Isolation Valve
2S188028, 1.9HP motor, 10A circuit breaker,35-110 magnetic OL with a setting of 3 (This setting should be 2.
Ceco 0AD has prepared Deficiency Report (DR) No. 65058.
The instantansous OL setting will be changed to 2 and the valve stroked, open and closed.
This DR was still open as of April 24, 1986),
3A control power fuse.
i Cubicle M-2, RWST to EHR Pump 2B Isolation Valve 25I88128,
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10.5HP motor, 40A circuit breaker, fixed magnetic and thermal OLs, 6A control power fuse (This fuse should be 3A per latest drawing revision.
The previous revision indicated the fase to be 6A.
Ceco 0AD has prepared DR No. 65010 to install the correct fuse.
As of April 24, 1986, this DR is still open).
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Solid State (Rx and ESF) Protection System Cabinet 2PA09J.
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HECo Electrical Panel Turnover Report No. 041, dated November 4, 1985, identified various deficiencies that had to be corrected
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prior to cabinet turnover to the licensee.
A.fter reviewing the deficiencies identified in Report No. 041,
I the inspector performed a physical inspection of the cabinet.
Utilizing the applicable drawings and Turnover Report, the
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j inspector determined that the deficiencies had been corrected
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and the cabinet had been wired in accordance with the
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applicable drawings.
Following are the types of deficiencies identified in the Report:
(1) Three cables needed to be terminated, (2) Four cables needed to be installed and terminated,
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(3) Internal jumper. missing (4) Relay K645 was not installed All deficiencies were corrected and CECO accepted Cabinet 2PA09J
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on January 27, 1986.
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Safeguards Test Cabinet, Train A, 2PA11J
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t HEco Electrical Panel Turnover Report No. 051, dated December 5,
i 1985, identified various deficiencies that had to be corrected
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prior to cabinet turnover to the licensee.
After reviewing the deficiencies identified in Report No. 051, l
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the inspector performed a physical inspection of the cabinet.
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Utilizing the applicable drawings and Turnover Report, the inspector determined that the deficiencies had been corrected
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i and the cabinet was wired in accordance with the applicable drawings.
Following are the types of deficiencies identified in the Report:
(1) Two lights missing (2) Switch K802 missing (3) Termination error
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(4) Deficient crimps of terminal lugs.
All deficiencies were corrected and CECO accepted Cabinet 2PA11J
on March 26, 1986.
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Safeguards Test Cabinet, Train B, 2PA12J
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l HEco Electrical Panel Turnover Report No. 052, dated December 6,
1985, identified various deficiencies that had to be corrected i
prior to cabinet turnover to the licensee.
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After reviewing the-deficiencies identified in Report No. 052,
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the inspector performed a physical inspeuiaii of the cabinet.
Utilizing the applicable ' drawings and Tr..nover Report, the
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inspector determined that,the deficiencies had been corrected and the cabinet was wired in accordance with the applicable drawings.
Following are the types of deficiencies identified in the Report:
(1)
Loose hold down bolts on a relay
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(2) Termination' error
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(3) Deficient crimps on terminal lugs.
All deficiencies were corrected and Ceco accepted Cabinet 2PA12J
on March 26, 1986.
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During the inspection of this panel, it was observed that the bottom sectionswas being used as a storage area by CECO Startup and Test personnel. The following types of items were identified.as being stored in the panel:
spray can containing freon, miniature light bulbs, spare registers, and a, container of plastic and metal screws.
The licensee took immediate action to have these items removed from the panel.
After identifying these items in Cabinet 2PA12J, the inspector perfornied a general inspection of approximately 15 additional s
cabinets in,the Auxiliary Electrical Equipment Room and found the housekeeping to be acceptable.
In that the housekeeping problems identified in Cabinet 2PA12J appears to be an isolated occurrence and,that the licensee took prompt corrective action to have the unauthorized material removed from the panel, the inspector's concern in this area has been satisfied.
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ESF Switchgeer RR Control Panel 2VX02J HEco Electrical Panel Turnover Report No. 072, dated March 12,
1986, identified,various deficiencies that have to be corrected prio'r to cabinet turnover to the licensee.
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As of April- '24, 1986, all of the deficiencies identified in
Panel 2VX02J have not been corrected.
Following are the types of deficiencies that remain open:
(1) Several nameplates >have to be replaced due to warping or
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wrong information on the name plate (on order).
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~(2) Drawings have to be revised to show as-built" conditions.
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(3) Relays missing (on order).
Although all the deficiencies in Panel 2VX02J have not been
corrected, the licensee / contractor has a program inplace and implemented to ensure that all discrepancies are corrected
prior to turnover to the license.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
8.
Exit Interview The Region III inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted under Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on April 24, 1986.
The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection and also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed during the inspection.
The licensee acknowledged this information and did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietary.
During the next exit interview, the inspector provided the licensee with a brief overview of the IE Bulletins, 50.55(e) Reports, Open Items, and mandatory Electrical and I&C inspections remaining to be performed at Byron Station prior to Unit 2 fuel load.
Following is a list of the items discussed with the licensee:
i a.
IE Inspection Module 37301, " Comparison of As-Built Plant to FSAR Description." Licensee is in the process of generating a FSAR, Chapter 8, Revision the delineates the electrical separation requirements.
b.
IE Bulletin 77003 discusses the online testing of the Westinghouse solid state protection system.
As of April 24, 1986, licensee action is required before this item is ready for NRC review.
c.
IE Bulletin 85002 discussed the failure of Westinghouse reactor trip breaker upon receipt of a trip signal.
The physical work required i
by this bulletin was expected to be completed the week of April 28, j
1986.
d.
10 CFR 50.55(e) Report 83009 that pertains to the adhesive failure on printed circuit boards.
As of April 24, 1986, licensee action is required before this item is ready for NRC review.
e.
Open SER Item 455/83002-15:
This item requires the licensee to perform certain calculations and tests in accordance with BTP PSB-1 J
to verify the adequacy of the station electrical distribution systems voltages.
A firm schedule has not been established for performing this test. The inspector requested that he be notified at least 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> prior to performing this test so that he can make travel arrangements to witness the test.
The licensee acknowledged the inspector's request.
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Open SER Item 455/83000-22:
This item requires the licensee to install permanent voltmeters for testing the P-4 interlocks. As of April 24, 1986, licensee' action is required before this item is ready for NRC review.
The licensee. acknowledged this information.
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