IR 05000454/1986013

Insp Repts 50-454/86-13 & 50-455/86-11 on 860429-0502.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness Exercise

ML20198A059
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	05/15/1986
From:	Patterson J, Matthew Smith, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20198A046	List: IR 05000454/1986013 ML20198A040
References
50-454-86-13, 50-455-86-11, NUDOCS 8605200319
Download: ML20198A059 (16)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-454/86013(DRSS); 50-455/86011(DRSS)

Docket Nos. 50-454; 50-455 Licenses No. NPF-23; CPPR-131 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Byron Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Byron Site, Byron, IL Inspection Conducted: April 29 through May 2, 1986 Inspectors: P sn 6Ai/s Team Leader Date

%.dasL M. Smith S// 5~/8/c Date Approved By: . ne ief rA r/a Emergency Preparedness Date Section Inspection Summary Inspection on April 29 through May 2, 1986 (Reports No. 50-454/86013(DRSS);

No. 50-455/86011(DRSS))

Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection of the Byron Nuclear Generating Station's emergency preparedness exercise involving observations by four NRC representatives of key functions and locations during the exercis The inspection was conducted by two NRC inspectors and two consultant Results: No violations, deficiencies, or deviations were identified; however, two exercise weaknesses were identified as summarized in Enclosure 1 of the cover letter to this repor g[2hD G

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DETAILS l l

l 1. Persons Contacted l l NRC Observers and Areas Observed J. Patterson, Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC) and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

M. Smith, TSC and EOF G. Bryan, Control Room and TSC G. Stoetzel, Operational Support Center (OSC) and Radiological and ,

Environmental Monitoring Team (REMT) I Commonwealth Edison Personnel j R. Querio, Station Manager, Byron Station, Observer

• R. Bax, Station Manager, Quad Cities Station, Recovery Manager

• R. Ward, Services Superintendent, Station Director (TSC)

• D. Draubaugh, Radiation Chemistry / Emergency Planning (EP) Instructor, TSC Lead Controller

• T. Blackman, Controller EOF K. Weaver, Rad / Chem Director, TSC R. Carson, Environmental / Emergency Coordinator, EOF J. Schock, Shift Engineer, Control Room L. Bunner, Shift Foreman, Control Room Controller

• D. Vestal, Control Room Controller

• M. Whitmore, Generating Station Emergency Plan (GSEP) Coordinator

• F. Krowzack, Emergency Planning Supervisor

• K. Klotz, GSEP Coordinator, LaSalle Station

• Colglazier, Health Physicist

• P. Harmon, Superintendent Services, Lead Instructor

• McNeill, Lead Health Physics Foreman-Controller, OSC

• Boyer, Assistant Training Supervisor, Training Department

• Hawks, Training Instructor, Environs Controller

• D. Heurmann, Station Chemist

• F. Hornbeak, Technical Staff Supervisor K. Hall, Environs Director, E0F

• Indicates those who attended the exit interview on May 2, 198 . Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Item (Closed) Open Item No. 50-454/85015-01 and 50-455/85010-01: During the June 1985 annual exercise an inadequate parformance was demonstrated by the offsite radiation monitoring team in the following areas: inadequate contamination control practices, uncertainty in operating the SAM II instrument, and failure to follow Procedure EG-3 in taking radiation measurements. Status of training related corrective actions were reviewed in the September 1985 routine inspection. Remedial training was completed on schedule by September 30, 1985. The licensee has decided not to use the

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SAM II for counting air samples in the field. An HP-210 probe is being i used instead per Procedure EG-1 Observations of the offsite monitoring

team's performance in this exercise indicated that all areas in question

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were satisfactorily demonstrated, including the new use of the HP-210 probe, and use of a frisker at the rear end of the GSEP van to check team members hands and feet and any equipment that passed through. This item is close . General An unannounced exercise of the licensee's GSEP and the Byron Emergency Plan Annex was conducted at the Byron Station on May 1, 1986. The exercise tested the licensee's capability to respond to a hypothetical accident scenario resulting in a major release of radioactive material to the environmen This was a utility only exercis An attachment describes the scope and objectives for the exercise and includes a narrative summary of the scenari . General Observations Procedures This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E requirements using the GSEP, Byron Emergency Plan Annex, and the emergency plan implementing procedures used by the Station, the EOF, and the Corporate Command Center (CCC). Coordination The licensee's response was coordinated, orderly, and timely. If the events had been real, actions taken by the licensee would have been sufficient to permit the State and local authorities to take appropriate actions to protect public health and safet Observers Licensee observers monitored and critiqued this exercise along with four NRC observer Critique The licensee held a critique immediately after completion of each group's performance in the exercise. The NRC critique, identifying two exercise weaknesses, was held on May 2, 1986 as detailed in this repor . Specific Ob.ervations Control Room The designated exercise shift, which was in training, reported to the Control Room as requested by the Shift Engineer (SE) at about 0930 for the exercise. The SE, as initial Station Director (SD), demon-strated good leadership in working with his emergency support tea Use of a flip chart to display plant data was helpful, although it was difficult to refer to past data sheets as the messages changed. The SE was provided with a printed message sheet for his us The number of personnel in the Control Room made it difficult at times to tell

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the players from other on-duty staff, even though the exercise

. individuals wore player badges. A better method of identifying players such as colored arm bands, would have been more helpful in monitoring _

the actions of the Control Room exercise players and to help tell them apart from the normal-on-shift personne The SE recognized the degrading equipment conditions of the Component Cooling (CC) system and declared an Alert at 1224 based on EAL-1 Although this EAL was correct, a more specific EAL would have been EAL-12. The latter EAL was based on complete-loss of any function needed to maintain cold shutdown (both CC trains). The Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) notifications were made on a timely basis-to the State, the load dispatcher and the NRC' Headquarters for the Alert classification. Uncontrolled copies of the Critical Safety Function Status Trees which were used as part of the symptomatic Emergency Operating Procedures-(EOPs) during the exercise, was not a good policy. The copies could not indicate the color coded pages of the status trees and could be misunderstood in communications with the TSC, CCC, EOF, or the reactor contractor as a support entit Because of the unusually large number of contractors and other non-Byron personnel onsite, the Team Leader agreed to a licensee request not to use the Public Address (PA) for exercise announcements. The transfer of command from the SE to the TSC SD took place after a short briefing on plant conditions, and it was satisfactor Communications between the Control Room and the TSC were satisfactory with a few exceptions. One exception was that the Control Room did not inform the TSC Maintenance Director that the IB reactor coolant pump seal filter had been replaced. This kept the Maintenance Director busy trying to solve a problem that had already been solve The Site Area Emergency (SAE) was declared at approximately 1100, about five minutes before the TSC SD relieved the Control Room SE, the initial SD. The NARS notifications were made to the State and the Load Dispatcher who in turn notified the Nuclear Duty Person who was responsible for initiating staffing of the CC These notifications were made within the required times, however the NRC was not notified of the SAE at that tim The TSC SD decided to allow the Control Room personnel ta complete the notifications before assuming command and control of the emergenc During this short transfer period between the Control Rool and the TSC, notification of the SAE to the NRC was overlooked by both Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs). The error was not corrected until approximately four hours and 47 minutes later when an E0F staff person asked when the last NRC notification was made. The llRC notifi-cation was then made from the E0 ._- .,- - _ . . . _

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j' In addition.the NRC was not informed of any major change of emergency cvents throughout the exercise. These events included a release of

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' radioactive material at approximately 1355 and issuance of two protective. action recommendations (PARS) for residents within the

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10 mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). This lack of notifying the  !

NRC after an emergency classification change has occurred and lack of periodic briefings to the NRC on changes in the emergency is an exercise weakness and contrary to 10 CFR 50.72(a)(3) and Procedure BZP 310-1, Initial Notifications and GSEP Response (50-454/8601L-01 and 50-455/86011-01). Also by these omissions the licensee failed to meet Exercise Objective 2.b., of Notification and

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Communicatio e

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The TSC was fully activated and operational in less than one hour after the SAE was declared. The activation process went well. All i- TSC staff personnel established telephone contacts and received

briefings from their counterparts in the Control Room before the SD

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assumed command and control of the emergency. The omission of-contacting the NRC following the SAE declaration has been described in the preceding Section (5.a.). Assembly and accountability was

.promptly initiated by the SD following the SAE declaration, although r

it was simulated as agreed to by the NRC prior to the exercis The Environs Director performed dose assessment calculations to obtain dose projection values based on containment radiation level These containment radiation level' data were trended by the Rad / Chem Director. These activities were meaningful and contributed valuable information to the SD prior to the actual release at approximately 1355. During this period there were conflicting radiation level data between the primary computer and the terminal displaying process radiation monitoring data in the TSC. The prime computer was discovered to be one hour ahead of real time because of a shutoff and restart the. day before the exercise. Scenario data from the prime computer was stopped and adjusted back one hour. Data from the-scenario exercise manual was used until the containment radiation levels began increasing. The Environs Director Controller and Rad / Chem group thus demonstrated how to adjust to this potentially serious computer data misalignment. PARS were only displayed on an EPZ map at one end of the main TSC room in the Environs Director's work area. These PARS should also be displayed on one of the large status boards near the SD and his supporting managers for ready accessibility to assist in decisionmakin The SD gave frequent and meaningful status briefings. His support directors, when called by the SD, also gave good briefings. The TSC staff kept track of the applicable EALs, even when the classification did not change, as a method of auditing requirements which must be addressed prior to deescalation of the emergency classification. The observer noted that some entities on the TSC status boards did not

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agree with actual time the of the event listed, e.g. , the NRC was actually contacted following the Alert classification at 1033, while the status board listed 1027, and the SAE was declared at 1100, while the status board listed the time as 1049. The Administration Director maintained the message flow in an orderly manner and also maintained a master chronological log of major GSEP activitie After 1205 the CCC took over the command and control of the emergency from the TSC as an interim function until the EOF was fully activated and functional at about 1335. From 1205 the TSC's role was one of support and advice to the CCC and E0F. The TSC continued to try to mitigate the accident. Trending of reactor operational data was done where applicable using a computerized display near the SD's des c. Operational Support Center (OSC) and Offsite Radiation Monitoring Teams The OSC was staffed and operational in a timely manne The OSC Director identified himself as the person in charge shortly after his arriva All emergency personnel assigned to the OSC were required to sign a roster list. A frisking station was established at the OSC entrance to better ensure that radioactive contamir.ation was not brought into the OSC from personnel returning from inplant assignment This was an improvement item recommended by the NRC from the 1985 exercise. After the SAE was declared, the first offsite team was activated by the Health Physics (HP) foreman. A good briefing to the team was given by the HP foreman, based on an update from the TSC Environs Director. They made a good equipment check for operability and also made a complete inventory check of all their items. Exposure rate readings were taken correctly when they arrived at their first checkpoin Soil, vegetation, and background air samples were properly taken following the correct procedure as noted by the NRC observe Contamination control was good throughout the exercise. All exits and entrances went through the rear of the van. A frisker was placed at the rear exit. All team members surveyed their hands and feet and any equipment removed, e.g., an air sampler, prior to reentering the va The offsite teams were not kept up to date on plant conditions, status of the release, and meteorological conditions. On several occasions one of the teams had to request this information. In addition the teams were not informed of the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> time advance in the exercise at 1630. The responsibility for providing this information rests with Environs Director and/or team dispatcher, whether in the CCC, TSC, or E0F. The procedure which requires transfer of the offsite monitoring teams from the TSC to the CCC until the EOF was activated was questionable for this exercis Better control of the offsite teams could have been maintained if the TSC kept control until the EOF was fully activate The CCC Environs Director did not appear to be very knowledgeable about radiological matters. The Director was not able to convey plant status information to the teams. gentheBlackteam reported the results of one air sample as <1.73x10 uci/cc (background

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1evel), the CCC response was to don respirators. Within about five minutes, this mistake was realized and the team was instructed to remove the respirator ,

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The Black team was not used effectively by the EOF during the releas At about 1405 the Black team started seeing elevated radiation levels at Q-1. .Then the EOF instructed the team to proceed to sample point R-2,'where the team reported only background radiation levels. Still the-EOF wanted them to draw an air sample. It took the team approxi-mately 30 minutes' to collect and analyze the air sample. This time could have been better spent traversing the plume to define the plume boundary and centerline. Another better alternative would have bee .to take an air sample in an elevated radiation are Some confusion resulted from having the same identity for one onsite and offsite sample point (Q-1). The licensee should emphasize to the team dispatcher that he should preface each location number with

"offsite" or "onsite" to avoid confusion on locations. The inspector learned after the exercise that it would be difficult to change these sampling point location numbers, since the maps incorporated into Environmental Procedure EG-2 were made by the State of Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety and are used by both partie Based on the above findings, the following items should be considered for improvement:

• Those responsible for the direction, guidance, and radiation protection of the offsite radiation monitoring teams should be more cognizant of this responsibility and provide better infor-mation on a more frequent basi * Instruct the offsite team dispatchers and Environs Directors to preface their sample point locations with "onsite" or "offsite" each time they are communication instructions to the offsite monitoring team Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

A breakdown of some communications, including the GSEP telephone and the three way telephone link with the CCC and TSC, delayed the transfer of command and control from the CCC to the E0 Communications with these ERFs were maintained on a separate telephone until the other lines were made operational. The Recovery Manager (RM) decided not to assume the emergency authority until these key telephone lines were operable. This resulted in a transfer of command and control from the CCC to the EOF about 90 minutes after the decision was made to activate the E0F. The goal is to complete this transfer within 60 minutes. Minimum shift staffing for the E0F was met, however there were three positions which were never filled:

Health Physics Director; the Administration / Logistic Manager; and the Assistant Communications Director. The E0F was officially activated at approximately 1335.

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The RM effectively managed emergency response activities, approved press releases, and conferred with his support managers before giving status briefings. -Good communications were maintained between the RM and his counterparts in the TSC~and EOF throughout the balance of the exercise. Key plant parameters were trended by the technical support groups, and information obtained was used to project the probable consequences of the condition. The technical staff contacted offsite support groups to obtain information on the availability of replace-ment operating equipment as well as technical information. These actions. adequately demonstrated the mechanics of contacting offsite support groups and interacting with them under emergency condition Notifications were made to State organizations within 15 minutes using the NARS. However, notifications of changing plant conditions were not made to the NRC within one hour (Reference Section 5.a.) Dose assessment capability was demonstrated in the EOF by the Environs Director and her staff. The initial PAR based on projected values from containment radiation levels was made at 1242 i.hrough the CCC but in coordination with the TSC. This PAR was for sheltering 0-2 mile The uncontrolled release occurred at 1400, and at 1408 the second PAR was issued. This PAR recommended evacuation 0-2 miles, shelter 2-5 miles downwind and prepare 5-10 miles downwind. This PAR was transmitted over.NARS to Illinois Emergency Services Disaster Agency (ESDA) and Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (DNS).

As observed by the inspector there was no discussions or log records of any kind relating to evacuation time estimates prior to issuing either PAR. With the release occurring eight minutes before issuing a PAR requesting evacuation in all directions up to two miles, there was a, strong possibility that some residents would be evacuated into and through the plume. The downwind sectors involved were P, Q, and The licensee failed to follow implementing Procedure BZP 300-A2, Revision 4, Recommended Protective Actions for Actual or Imminent Gaseous Release Conditions, which states that evacuation shall be the recommended PAR only when weather conditions permit and an evacuation time analysis confirms it. For these reasons as described, these actions constitute an exercise weakness which did not entirely meet the requirements of Exercise Objective 3d, Radiological Assessmen (50-454/86013-02; 50-455/86011-02)

Recovery was thoroughly addressed following a special message issued by the Chief Controller asking the EOF staff to prepare a list of actions which should be performed in the next two weeks, A project organization structure was developed to include various scientific, engineering, health physics, administrative, and public relations specialists. A task force would determine dose assessment values for any of the public possibly exposed to radiation as a result of the release. The public relations group would provide objective information and help re-establish public confidence. The recovery aspects of the exercise were well demonstrate Attachment: Exercise Information & Scenario

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COMMONVEALTH EDISON GSEP EXERCISE r. .

XXVI CONTROLLER'S MANUAL Exercise Information

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Scenario

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BYRON EMERGENCY RESPONSE EXERCISE III UNANNOUNCED FAY 1986 5468E/4

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BYRON 1986 GSEP EXERCISE

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s,- "SCdPE OF PARTICIPATION"

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Commonwealth Edison will participate in the Byron Station exercise

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by activating _the on-site emergency response organization and the off-site emergency response orgag 3ation as appropriate, subject to' limitations that "

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/ Activation of the.TSC and other on-site participants will be

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conducted on'eJeal time basis during the day time hours. The shift on duty  :

will receive th'r initial scenario inf5rmation and respond accordingl .

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' The Nuclear Duty Pe'rson, the Corporate ccomand Center, and the balance of the Recovery Group.will be notified and, respond on a real time basis to their designated post The Byron Station May 1986 Exercise is an unannounced event to test the integrated capability of Ccam>nwealth Edison preparedness plans and to assure adequate resources.to verify Ceco's capability to respond to a simulated emergenc >

Commonwealth Edison will demonstrate the capability to make contact with contractors whose assistance would be required by the simulated

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accident situation, but will not actually incur the expense of using contractor servges to simulate emergency response except as prearranged specifically for the exercis ,

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, Commonwealth Edison will arrange to provide actual transportation g and~ communication support in accordance with existing agreements to the extent specifically prearranged for the exercise. Commonwealth Edison will provide -

. unforeseen actu)1 assistance only to the extent that the resources are l available and do'not hinder normal operation of the compan ,

'/ On-site assembly and accountability will be simulated during this exercise. This vill be demonstrated at a date and time selected to minimize

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of construction work in progress, h

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BYRON 1986 GSEP EXERCISE OBJECTIVES Primary Objective:

Demonstrate the capability to implement the Commonwealth Edison Generating Stations Emergency Plan to protect the public in the event of a e, major accident at the Byron Station. Demonstrate this capability during the hours to qualify as a day-time exercise in accordance with NRC guidanc Supporting Objectives:

1) Incident Assessment and Classification Demonstrate the capability to assess the accident conditions, to determine which Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been reached, and to classify the accident level correctly in accordance with GSE (EOF, CCC, TSC, CR)

2) Notification and Communication Demonstrate the capability to notify the principal offsite organizations within 15 minutes of declaring an accident classificatio (EOF, CCC, TSC, CR) Demonstrate the capability to notify the NRC within one

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hour of the initial inciden (CR) Demonstrate the capability to contact organizations that

would normally assist in an emergency, but are not

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participating in this exercise (e.g. INPO, Murray &

Trettel, Westinghouse, etc.)

- (CR, CCC, EOF, TSC) Demonstrate the ability to provide follow-up information to the State in a timely manne (EOF)

3) Radiological Assessment Demonstrate the capability to calculate off-site dose projections.

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-2- Demonstrate the capability of environmental field teams to conduct field radiation surveys and collect air, liquid, vegetation and soil samples when neede (ENV) Demonstrate the capability to conduct in-plant radiation protection activitie ce

- (OSC, HP) Demonstrate the ability to perform calculations with radiological survey information, trend this information, and make appropriate recommendations concerning protective action (EOF, CCC, TSC, HP) Demonstrate the capability to collect and simulate analysis of air or liquid samples on-sit ) Emergency Facilities Demonstrate the capability to activate the emergency organization and staff the nuclear station emergency response facilities in accordance with procedures during a day time perio (EOF, TSC, HP, CHEM) Demonstrate through discussion and staff planning, the ability to perform a shift change in the TSC, EOF and control roo (EOF, TSC, CCC)

5) Emergency Direction and Control , Demonstrate the ability of the directors to manage the '

emergency organizations in the implementation of the GSE (EOF, CCC, OSC, TSC, CR)

6) Recovery and Re-entry Demonstrate the capability of the emergency response personnel to identify requirements, programs, and policies governing damage assessments and implementing procedures for recovery and re-entr (EOF, CCC, TSC)

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BYRON UNANNOUNCED GSEP EXERCISE MAY 1986 NARRATIVE SUMMARY INITIAL SITUATION Byron Unit one is at 100% steady state power. It has maintained this condition for 73 consecutive days. RCS boron concentration is 453 ppm. RCS c, chemistry is within specification and the activity level is 0.8 microcuries per gram dose equivalent I-131. The latest RCS leak rate calculation is gpm unidentified and 1.3 gpm identified with no S/G tube leakag Unit Two-is nearing completion of the construction phase with various pre-op tests in progres SERVICE REPORT Unit One equipment outages and repair times are listed belo PD charging pump - failed lube oil pump - I week 1A FW pump - seal replacement - 4 days lA CC pump - breaker maintenance - 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> Unit Two CC system including both pumps and the Unit Two SX is out of service and drained for construction work on the pump suction lines. The estimated time for returning the system to service is 3 days. Both Unit Two D/Gs and 2A SX pump and flowpath are available for use on Unit One as require PRECURSOR EVENTS At 1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br /> the 1A RCP seal injection filter becomes plugged as

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indicated by high DP and decreased injection flo B seal injection filter is placed on lines and 1A seal injection filter is removed from servic .

At 1007 hours0.0117 days <br />0.28 hours <br />0.00167 weeks <br />3.831635e-4 months <br /> a leak from the CC system is reported at 364' M-17 ALERT (1020 - 1105) - (45 minute duration)

EAL #12 Complete loss of any function needed to maintain cold shutdown (ie both CC trains)

At 1020 hours0.0118 days <br />0.283 hours <br />0.00169 weeks <br />3.8811e-4 months <br /> both CC pumps automatically trip due to low level (13%) in the CC surge tank. The reactor and RCP's are manually tripped and a natural circulation cooldown is begu At 1035 hours0.012 days <br />0.288 hours <br />0.00171 weeks <br />3.938175e-4 months <br /> the IB RCP seal injection filter plugs and seal injection flow to the RCPs is lost. The hot reactor coolant begins flowing up past the RCP thermal barrier (which has no CC flow) to the RCP seals. The hot fluid warps and degrades the seals such that coolant starts leaking to the containment atmospher __

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l Page 2 At 1037 hours0.012 days <br />0.288 hours <br />0.00171 weeks <br />3.945785e-4 months <br /> the CC system has drained down to the break elevation terminating the CC leak and making the general area accessible. The faulted CC pipeline is located between valves ICC9459A and ICC9459B at 364' +8' M-1 At 1045 hours0.0121 days <br />0.29 hours <br />0.00173 weeks <br />3.976225e-4 months <br /> the leakage past the RCP seals exceeds 50 gpm (>65 gpm) as indicated by the VCT level recorder, en The investigation of the CC system pipeline break identifies ICC9459A and ICC9459B as isolation points for the break. Upon closing these valves, refilling the venting of the system begin SITE EMERGENCY (1105 - 1630) - (5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> 25 minute duration)

EAL #16 Loss of primary coolant beyond the capability of both charging pumps At 1105 hours0.0128 days <br />0.307 hours <br />0.00183 weeks <br />4.204525e-4 months <br /> a manual Safety Injection is initiated due to decreasing PZR pressure and level. All ECCS equipment actuates as designed. The RCS is rapidly cooled down and depressurized to reduce the leakage from the seals and to recover PZR leve At 1110 hours0.0128 days <br />0.308 hours <br />0.00184 weeks <br />4.22355e-4 months <br /> the 1A CV pump trips on overcurrent. The ems are

. contacted to initiate the investigatio The CC system is testarted and flow to the RCP thermal barriers is gradually restored such that the cooldown rate on the RCP radial bearings doesn't exceed 1 F/ mi The 1A RCP seal injection filter has been changed ou Seal injection flow to the FCPs is reestablished slowly so as not to exceed the 1 P/ min cooldown limi ^

At 1235 hours0.0143 days <br />0.343 hours <br />0.00204 weeks <br />4.699175e-4 months <br />, containment radiation levels exceed 400 R/hr as indicated by 1RE- AR020 and 1RE- AR02 .

The cooldown and depressurization of the RCS reduces the break flow to the extent that both RH pumps and SI pumps can be shutdow At 1320 hours0.0153 days <br />0.367 hours <br />0.00218 weeks <br />5.0226e-4 months <br /> both channels of the Source Range Audio Count Rate drawer fail. No audible counts are received in the control room. The IMs are contacted to initiate an investigatio vW teube\k1 At 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br /> an uncotro Hed release from containment begins. The transfer tube flange on the inside of containment is not installed properly and is leaking by profusely. An investigation in the fuel building reveals a vapor leak coming from the transfer tube gate valve which is partially ope The release path is from the containment through the fuel building ventilation system and aux building exhaust system through the vent stack. At 1510 hours0.0175 days <br />0.419 hours <br />0.0025 weeks <br />5.74555e-4 months <br />, the release is terminated by manually closing down on the gate valv _ _ _ _______

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Page 3 At 1430 hours0.0166 days <br />0.397 hours <br />0.00236 weeks <br />5.44115e-4 months <br />, the RH system is placed into service for continuation of the cooldown to Mode The 1A cv pump investigation reveals a failed motor bearing on the shaft side. This bearing is not available from the storeroom, however, Braidwood Station has one available. The estimated time for obtaining the bearing and repair of the motor is 30 hour3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> The audible counts in the control room is restored after a defective decoder / oscillator card is replace RECOVERY (1630)

At 1630 hours0.0189 days <br />0.453 hours <br />0.0027 weeks <br />6.20215e-4 months <br />, the plant condition is stable. The RCS temperature is 150 F and pressure is 150 psig. The CC system has been restored to normal operating status. The seal injection flow to the RCPs is also normal and the leakage from the RCP seals is now minima .

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BYRON UNANNOUNCED GSEP EXERCISE MAY 1986 TIMELINE OF EVENTS FUEL HANDLING EXERCISE RS SR AUDIO TRANFER TUBE TO CC LEAK LOSS OF COUNT VALVE LEAK RECOVERY (0930) l SEAL IN SITE FAILURE l 70 MIN l l l SEAL INJ. l ALERT l EMERGENCY SITE l RELEASE - - - RELEASE l~e l FLTR AP HIGH l EAL #12 l ALERT EAL #16 CVPp EMERGENCY l INITIATION TERMINATION l l l l l(1020) l EAL #16 l(1105) TRIP EAL 824 l l l l l 1 I I I l(1045) l I l(1235) I 240 l l l l 7 I I I I I I I I l-30 0 20 35 45 65 10 155 200 310 390 Summary of Events:

ALERT Canplete loss of any function needed to maintain cold shutdown EAl#12 (i.e. both CC trains)

ALERT - Loss of primary coolant >50 gpn in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> r ML #16 SITE EMERGENCY - Loss of prirr.ary coolant beyond the capability of both EAL #16 charging purp SITE EMERGENCY - Contairrent radiation levels greater than 400 R/h EAL 824 RELEASE - Uncontrolled leakage from the fuel transfer tube through the fuel ,

building ventilation system and auxiliary building exhaust system through the vent stack. (70 minute duration)

DSV/lpt/6586E/10

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