IR 05000454/1986001

App & Errata to SALP Repts 50-454/86-01 & 50-455/86-01 for May 1984 - Oct 1985

ML20210N432
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	04/30/1986
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20210N430	List: IR 05000454/1986001 ML20210N426
References
50-454-86-01, 50-454-86-1, 50-455-86-01, 50-455-86-1, NUDOCS 8605050038
Download: ML20210N432 (6)

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APPENDIX SALP 5 SALP BOARD REPORT U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE 50-454/86001; 50-455/86001 Inspection Report N Commonwealth Edison Company Name of Licensee Byron Nuclear Station Name of Facility May 1, 1984 through October 31, 1985 Assessment Period

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Byron Nuclear Station Facility A. Summary of Meeting with Commonwealth Edison Company on February 3,198 The findings and conclusions of the SALP Board are documented in Reports No. 50-454/86001; No. 50-455/86001, and were discussed with the licensee on February 3, 1986, at the Byron Nuclear Plant, 4446 German Church Road, Byron Illinoi The licensees regulatory performance was presented in each functional area. Overall regulatory performance was considered to be acceptable but does warrant improvement in each of the areas rated as Category 3. Your programs to improve operations, surveillance, security, and radiation protection will be followed closel B. While this meeting was primarily a discussion between the licensee and NRC, it was open to members of the public as observer The following licensee and NRC personnel were in attendance on February 3,1986. Media representation is also note Commonwealth Edison Company N. E. Wandke, Assistant Vice President T. Maiman, Manager of Projects B. Thomas, Executive Vice President K. Graesser, Division Vice President, Nuclear Divisor C. Reed, Vice President, Nuclear Operations R. E. Querio, Byron Station Manager R. Ward, Services Superintendent E. Fitzpatrick, Braidwood Station Manager

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A. J. Chernick, Compliance Supervisor L. E. Gerner, Superintendent, Regulatory Assurance W. J. Shewski, Manager, Quality Assurance J. S. Bitel, Operations QA Manager D. Farrar, Director of Nuclear Licensing S. L. Turbatch, Legal Department and other staff members Nuclear Regulatory Commission James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator E. G. Greenman, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects R. F. Warnick, Chief, Projects Branch 1 J. Hinds, Senior Resident Inspector P. Brochman, Resident Inspector R. Lerch, Project Inspector L. N. Olshan, Project Manager, NRR R. J. Marabito, Public Affairs Officer Media and Members of the Public R. McLaughlin, WKRC-TV B. Simms, WREX-TV i

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L. Maye, WIFR-TV N. Wells, NCAP-Tempo E. McGreenry, Rockford League of Women Voters P. Morrison, HWV-Rockford B. Johnson, HWV-Rockford P. Gerson S. Person G. Jaeotsey K. Tation, SAFE D. Chavez, SAFE S. Campbell, SAFE M. Buntaine, DeKalb Area Alliance for Responsible Energy E. Peterson V. Hutcherson, Rockford Register Star

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ERRATA SHEET Facility: Byron Nuclear Station SALP Report No.: 50-454/86001; 50-455/86001 Page Line Now Reads Should Read 29 Paragraph 1.b., 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> (Report four hours (Report Line 4 No. 454/84085). No. 454/85012).

Basis for Change: A typographical error was identified.

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strength of the emergency preparedness training program, as evidenced during walkthroughs and exercises; the licensee's ability to monitor its own activities and take timely, appropriate corrective actions; and the timely and accurate reporting of emergency plan activations to the NRC and State agencie . Board Recommendations Non I. Security Analysis During this assessment period, eight inspections were conducted by region bases inspectors. Three routine preoperational inspections were conducted by regional based prior to license issuance. Two routine and three special inspections were conducted subsequent to licensee issuance. The assessment in this functional area was divided into two phases - those issues of the security program required to be completed prior to fuel load, and the full implementation of the security plan after license issuanc Three violations, subsequent to the issuance of the license were identified as follows: Severity Level IV - Adequate protected and vital area access controls in the form of physical barriers were not provided (ReportNo. 454/84085). Severity Level III - The locked status of vital area doors was not properly verified following a computer outage, resulting in two unlocked doors for approximately four hours (Report No. 454/85012). Severity Level IV - Failure to provide adequate access controls to two vital areas because of inadequate physical barriers (ReportNo. 454/85046).

Violation a. represented a significant breakdown in the security system that occurred prior to initial reactor startu Due to the status of the plant, an act of radiological sabotage was not possible; consequently, enforcement actions were not escalated. Violation b. represented a personnel error that led to the inadequacy of two of the three elements of access control for the affected vital area. A proposed imposition of civil penalty in the amount of $25,000 was issued. At the close of the assessment period, the NRC was evaluating the licensee's response to the Notice of Violation. Violation represented a disregard for security procedures by both station and contractor employees. These three violations were

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strength of the emergency preparedness training program, as evidenced during walkthroughs and exercises; the licensee's ability to monitor its own activities and take timely, appropriate corrective actions; and the timely and accurate reporting of emergency plan activations to the NRC and State agencie . Board Recommendations Non I. Security Analysis During this assessment period, eigh spections were conducted by region based inspectors. Thre tine preoperational inspections were conducted by r g nal based prior to license issuance. Two routine and t special inspections were conducted subsequent to li issuance. The assessment in this functional area was ded into two phases - those issues

of the security program uired to be completed prior to fuel load, and the full i 1 entation of the security plan after 4 . license issuanc *3 Three violations, ubsequent to the issuance of the license were identified as f lows: Severi Level IV - Adequate protected and vital area accje controls in the form of physical barriers were no provided (Report No. 454/84085). Severity Level III - The locked status of vital area doors was not properly verified following a computer outage, resulting in two unlocked doors for approximately 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> (Report No. 454/84085). Severity Level IV - Failure to provide adequate access controls to two vital areas because of inadequate physical barriers (Report No. 454/85046).

Violation a. represented a significant breakdown in the security system that occurred prior to initial reactor startu Due to the status of the plant, an act of radiological sabotage was not possible; consequently, enforcement actions were not escalated. Violation b. represented a personnel error that led to the inadequacy of two of the three elements of access control for the affected vital area. A proposed imposition of civil penalty in the amount of $25,000 was issued. At the close of the assessment period, the NRC was evaluating the licensee's response to the Notice of Violation. Violation represented a disregard for security procedures by both station and contractor employees. These three violations were

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