IR 05000455/1986016

Safety Insp Rept 50-455/86-16 on 860516-0715.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings,Ie Bulletin Followup & Preoperational Test Witnessing

ML20212A291
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	07/22/1986
From:	Forney W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20212A264	List: IR 05000455/1986016 ML20212A258
References
50-455-86-16, IEB-86-001, IEB-86-1, NUDOCS 8607280154
Download: ML20212A291 (6)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-455/86016(DRP) j

Docket No. 50-455 License No. CPPR-131 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company )

Post Office Box 767 l Chicago, IL 60690 l Facility Name: Byron Station, Unit 2

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Inspection At: Byron Station, Byron, IL l

Inspection Conducted: May 16 through July 15, 1986 Inspectors: J. M. Hinds, J P. G. Brochman J. A. Malloy Approved By: L y 6 7/a.u/PG Reactor Projects Section 1A Da~te Inspection Summary

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Inspection on May 16 through July 15, 1986 (Report No. 50-455/86016(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced safety inspection by the resident inspectors of licensee action on previous inspection findings; 50.55(e)

reports; IEBs pre-operational testing; hot functional testing; housekeeping; non-routine events; and other activitie Results: No violations or deviations were identified nor were any items identified which could affect the public health and safety.

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company R. Querio, Station Manager V. Schlosser, Project Manager

• R. Tuetken, Startup Superintendent R. Pleniewicz, Production Superintendent

• E. Martin, Quality Assurance Superintendent R. Ward, Services Superintendent T. Joyce, Assistant Superintendent, Technical Services

• Klinger, Project Quality Control Supervisor W. Blythe, Operating Engineer, Unit 0 D. Brindle, Operating Engineer, Unit 2 A. Chernick, Compliance Supervisor E. Falb, Unit 2 Testing Supervisor

• G. Grabins, Unit 2 Assistant Testing Supervisor

• R. Moravec, Project Mechanical Supervisor

• J. Binder, Project Electrical Supervisor

• E. Briette, Quality Assurance Engineer

• E. Zittle, Regulatory Assurance Staff

• M. Robert, Technical Staff The inspector also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of this inspectio * Denotes those present during the exit interview on July 15, 198 . Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701 & 92702)

The licensee submitted responses to the findings of the NRC Construction Appraisal Team (CAT), which were dated January 24 and April 9, 198 Paragraphs a, b, and c below are the results of the CAT team's review of these submittal (0 pen) Unresolved Item (455/85027-01a(DRP)): FSAR and Construction Code commitments concerning splicing of Class 1-E wiring in panels not translated into appropriate procedures. This item was previously a violation, but based on the licensee's proposed FSAR change, Amendment No. 47, this item has been converted to an Unresolved Item. The licensee has submitted a proposed change to the FSAR to correct this problem. Pending completion of the staff review of Amendment No. 47 to the FSAR, this item will remain ope (Closed) Violation (455/85027-01b(DRP)): A490 bolts found below pre-tension required by AISC. Based on the licensee's corrective actions (further investigations and engineering evaluations), the CAT team concluded that the licensee has satisfactorily resolved this issue.

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. (Closed) Violation (455/85027-02c(DRP)): Deficiencies in vendor supplied radiographs. Based upon additional information supplied by the licensee the CAT team agrees with the licensee that these i

concerns have been satisfactorily resolved and are not examples of deviations; therefore, this violation is being withdrawn, (Closed) Open Item (455/85045-02(DRP)): Licensee to explain differing tolerance values in expected values section for 1500 gpm point in Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHR pre-operational tests. The licensee explained that the Unit 2 tolerance (1500+500-0 gpm) was obtained from the NSSS Vendor (Westinghouse) who provided acceptance criteria for Residual Heat Removal (RHR) test procedures on December 23, t

1981. Westinghouse later provided a revision to these acceptance criteria on July 12, 1984 and provided the setpoint of 1500 gpm with no tolerance listed. Project Engineering assigned a standard 10%

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tolerance. Based on these explanations, the inspector has no further concerns regarding this matter and this item is considered

close . Followup on 10 CFR 50.55(e) Reports (92700)

(Closed)50.55(e) Report (455/86001-EE): Spot welds on cable tray unistrut members, type P-1004a, have inadequate bonding. The inspector reviewed nonconformance report F-1045 and verified the results of the wa'kdown of cable tray hangers. Based on these actions, the inspector has no further concerns regarding this matter and this item is considered close No violations or deviations were identifie . IE Bulletin (IEB) Followup (92703)

(Closed) IEB (455/86001-BB): Minimum Flow Problems that could disable both RHR Pumps. Although this IEB is only addressed to General Electric (GE) Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs), it does include reference-to IE Information Notice 85094 which was addressed to all operating license (OL) and construction permit (CP) reactors, therefore the licensee was requested to review the Byron systems for applicability. The licensee's response indicated that the two RHR minimum flow bypass valves, (one on each pump) are controlled by independent flow transmitters, powered from independent, safety related electrical buses, and motor operated (vice air driven). In addition, a review of the system shows that no single active failure will render both RHR trains inoperable, the Final Safety

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Analysis Review (FSAR) does not take credit for recirculation flow, and the single mode failure criteria is satisfied with one pump remaining operable. Based on this review, the postulated single failure problems

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described in this IEB are not applicable to Byron and this IEB is considered close No violations or deviations were identified.

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,- Preoperational Test Witnessing (61720,70313,70317,70434,70438,70447)

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The inspectors witnessed portions of the below listed preoperational test procedures to verify that testing was conducted in accordance with approved procedures; that all test equipment was properly installed; that test data was collected and recorded properly; and that test deficiencies were documented and test changes were processed in an approved manne AF 2.03.60, " Auxiliary Feedwater" EF 2.26.60, "ESF, Time Response" EF 2.26.62, "ESF, Logic"

. PC 2.58.60, " Local Leak Rate Test" RC 2.63.62, "RCS Instrumcnts & Interloc'(s" RP 2.68.60, " Reactor' Protection"

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RY 2.69.60, " Pressurizer"

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No violations or deviations were observe . Integrated Hot Functional Test (IHF) (70314)

i On May 10, 1986, the licensee commenced IHF testing on Unit 2, completing

this testing on June 13, 1986. Through observations of records, witnessing tests, and interviews with licensee personnel, the inspectors observed the conduct of the tests, acceptability of results, and performance of personnel. The inspectors observed shift crew personnel and management controls, verified that properly approved procedures were available and used, crew requirements were met, test prerequisites were met, proper plant systems were in service, special test equipment was calibrated and in service as needed, crew actions were timely and correct, that deficiencies and test problems were documented, test

! changes were processed in an approved manner, and data was collected for final analysis by proper personnel.

. The inspectors noted that the licensee had taken extra effort to assure

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proper access control in the control room and other affected spaces in the plant. IHF testing appeared to be handled by well qualified personnel as the licensee stayed on the planned schedule, and activities in general were conducted in a professional manner.

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The inspectors witnessed portions of the following Byron Unit 2 hot functional tests:

FW 2.34.67, " Main Feedwater - Tempering Flow" FW 2.34.68, " Steam Generator Level Alarm & Setpoint Verification LM 2.133.67, " Loose Parts Monitoring" i MS 2.51.67, " Main Steam PORVs"

, RC 2.63.60, " Integrated Hot Functional Sequence" RC 2.63.67, " Reactor Coolant System" RY 2.69.67, " Pressurizer" SI 2.73.63, " Safety Injection - Check Valve Back Leakage d

VP 2.93.61, " Containment Ventilation" I

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No violations or deviations were identifie . Housekeeping / Care and Preservation of Safety-Related Components (71302)

The inspectors conducted plant tours of Unit 2 between May 16 and July 15, 1986. Areas of the Unit 2 plant observed during the tours included the containment, fuel handling and storage areas, auxiliary building areas including the Unit 2 portion of the control room, and the turbine buildin Areas were inspected for work in progress, state of cleanliness, overall housekeeping, state of fire protection equipment and methods being employed, and the care and preservation of safety-related components and equipment. The inspectors were accompanied by licensee personnel on portions of the tours for the purpose of identifying areas where additional housekeeping efforts should be concentrated to improve the overall cleanliness of Unit 2. Inspector concerns were related to the license Observations of work in progress included: Witnessing of tendon testing

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of Unit 2 containmen No violations or deviations were identifie . Review of Non-Routine Events (90712)

The inspector conducted an in-office review of a special report (letter from R. E. Querio to J. G. Keppler, dated May 29,1986) which detailed a valid test and failure of the 2A Diesel Generator (DG). This report was submitted under the requirements of Unit 1 Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.3. The 2A DG is required to be " capable of being manually started and crosstied to electrical bus 141" for Unit 1 operation per Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.8.1.3.

i On May 5, 1986 an increased crankcase oil level was observed and sampling

of the oil indicated that diesel fuel oil had contaminated the crankcase l oil. The 2A DG was declared inoperable and the unit 1 Limiting Condition i for Operation (LCO) was followad. Investigation into the fuel oil leak identified a loose fitting on the fuel oil return line connection on the eight right (8R) cylinder. Bro.'en rocker arms were also discovered on the seven left cylinde g On February 12 and 17,1986 similar rocker arm failures were experienced

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on the five left (5L) and seven left (7L) cylinders. Copper Bessemer,

! the diesel generator vendor, concluded the cause for these failures was a l misalignment of the cylinder head and cylinder line The root cause of this event was determined to be the lack of detailed procedures for the inspection of the Diesel Generator Crosshead Following the February 12 and 17 failures, during the crosshead inspection, the method of checking the crossheads for full freedom of l movement deformed the rocker arm retaining rings which led to the failure I

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of the 7L cylinder rocker arms. The cause of the contaminated lube oil was determined to be the broken rocker arms.

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The licensee tightened the loose fitting on the fuel oil return line and replaced the bent retaining rings, broken rocker arms and collapsed lifter on the 7L exhaust rocker arm. On May 14, 1986 the licensee successfully completed the surveillance test on the 2A DG and it was declared operable. Following discussions with Region III management the licensee agreed to run the 2A DG for an additional 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> at rated load to ensure a satisfactory level of confidence in the DG repair This 100 hour0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> run was completed satisfactorily. The licensee has cmnmitted to temporarily change operational procedures to alert the operator of the DG on how to detect rocker arm failure, and the proper actions to take if a failure occurs. The vendor has been requested to provide detailed procedures for crosshead inspection. The licensee is tracking completion of these items by Action Item Records (AIR) 6-86-069 and 6-86-143. Based on these actions the inspector has no further concerns regarding this matter, and this item is considered close . Exit Interview (30703)

The inspectors met with licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on July 15, 1986. The inspectors summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and the finding The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietary.

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