IR 05000454/1986033

Insp Rept 50-454/86-33 on 860903-30.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Lers,Operations Summary,Surveillance,Maint Program,Operational Safety & 10CFR21 Repts

ML20215E642
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	10/08/1986
From:	Forney W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20215E633	List: IR 05000454/1986033 ML20215E630
References
50-454-86-33, IEB-86-002, IEB-86-2, NUDOCS 8610150418
Download: ML20215E642 (7)

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V. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-454/86033(DRP)

Docket No. 50-454 License No. NPF-37 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Byron Station, Unit 1 Inspection At: Byron Station, Byron, IL Inspection Conducted: September 3 - 30, 1986 Inspectors: J. M. Hinds, J P. G. Brochman R. M. Lerch J. A. Malloy R FU)A &

Approved By: W. L. Forney, Chief /o/5/#4 Reactor Projects Se:: tion 1A Date Inspection Summary Inspection on September 3 - 30, 1986 (Report No. 50-454/86033(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced safety inspection by the resident inspectors and a regional inspector of 10'CFR 21 reports; LERs; operations summary; surveillance; maintenance program; maintenance; operational safety; Region III reciuests; event followup; licensec actions concerning suspected drug use; and other activitie Results: No violations or deviations were identified nor were any items identified which could affect the public health and safet f< IB 661008 -

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company

• R. Querio, Station Manager

• R. Pleniewicz, Production Superintendent R. Ward, Services Superintendent W. Burkamper, Quality Assurance Supervisor, Operations

• L. Sues, Assistant Superintendent, Operating

• G. Schwartz, Assistant Superintendent, Maintenance

• T. Joyce, Assistant Superintendent, Technical Services D. St. Clair, Assistant Superintendent, Work Planning W. Blythe, Operating Engineer, Unit 0 T. Tulon, Operating Engineer, Unit 1 J. Schrock, Operating Engineer, Rad-Waste

• A. Chernick, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor F. Hornbeak, Technical Staff Supervisor

• R. Flahive, Radiation / Chemistry Supervisor P. O'Neil, Quality Control Supervisor

• J. Pausche, Regulatory Assurance Group Leader

• J. Snyder, Quality Assurance Inspector

• K. Yates, Nuclear Safety Group, Onsite The inspector also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of this inspectio * Denotes those present during the exit interview on September 30, 198 . Followup of 10 CFR 21 Reports (92716)

(Closed) 10 CFR 21 Report (454/85004-PP): Problems with the IEEE qualification of terminal blocks in Anchor / Darling Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV). By letter dated September 5, 1985, Anchor / Darling

notified the NRC and the licensee of problems with the terminal blocks furnished with the hydraulic actuators for MSIVs, which are installed at Byron. The problem relates to the use of terminal blocks made of nylon vice polysulfore. The licensee had removed all terminal blocks in the

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MSIVs by September 1, 1985 and spliced all leads using Raychem qualified splices. Based on this corrective actions this item is considered close . Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (90712)

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(Closed) LER (454/86025-LL): An in-office review was conducted for the following LERs to determine that the reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specification .

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LER N Title 454/86025 Failure to meet REMP reporting requirements of

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Technical Specification 3.12.1 due to personnel error No violations or deviations were identifie . -Summary of Operations The unit cperated at power levels up to 94% for the entire month until September 21, 1986, when power was reduced to 30%, due to the rupture of a main condenser tube. This tube rupture caused an increase in Steam Generator cation conductivity, sulfates, and pH, which necessitated the power reduction. The leaking tube was plugged and the unit returned to rated power. At 0911 on September 30, 1986, the reactor tripped due to a turbine trip. The trip was caused by a damaged cable in the Solid State

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Protection System, which actuated two slave (output) relays. The unit remained shutdown at the end of this report period. See Paragraph 1 . Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspector observed Technical Specifications required surveillance testing on Refueling Water Storage Tank Level channel IL-931 and 1C Steam Generator Pressure channel 1P536A and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne No violations or deviations were identified.

Maintenance Program Implementation (62700)

The inspectors continued a detailed review of the maintenance program to determine whether the program was being implemented in accordance with regulatory requirements; to determine the effectiveness of the maintenance program on important plant equipment; and to determine the ability of the maintenance staff to conduct an effective maintenance progra This review is an ongoing inspection and its completion will be documented in a subsequent inspection report.

l Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with Technical Specifications.

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The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the

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work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls

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were implemented. Work requests were reviewed to determine'the status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performanc The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:

Installation of Temporary Alteration LL-1-167 to the Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation Panel CPA02J

Following completion of maintenance on the seismic monitoring instrument, the inspectors verified that this system had been returned to service properl Prior to entry into containment the inspector reviewed Type II Radiation Work Permit (RWP) #60547 to identify protective equipment and maximum dose limits required for the job. The inspector identified to the rad-chem technician on duty that no maximum dose was specified on the RWP. The rad-chem foreman then reviewed the RWP and entered a limit of 100 mrem per day on the RWP. The RWP had been reviewed by rad-chem supervisory and operations supervisory personnel and signed off as being satisfactory prior to the inspector's review. The inspector discussed this matter with the rad-chem supervisor and expressed concern with the

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completeness of the RWP and the attention to detail of the supervisory personnel. Byron Radiation Procedure BRP 1210-2 requires that whole body exposures above 100 mrem per day shall be approved, in advance, by individual. The rad-chem supervisor or other designated individual is

, required to approve any anticipated exposures over 100 mrem per day in advance. Therefore, personnel are limited to 100 mrem per day unless they have specific prior authorizatio The licensee is planning to hold training i

sessions in preparation for the refueling outage scheduled for February 1987 and will include a review of the limits on personnel exposure and required administrative controls in these training session ,

No violations or deviations were identifie '

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8. Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors observed control room operation, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the month of September 1986. During these discussions and observations, the i inspectors ascertained that the operators were alert, cognizant of plant i conditions, attentive to changes in those conditions, and took prompt

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act1;n when appropriate. The inspectors verified the operability of

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L . selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified proper

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. return to service of affected components. Tours of the containment,

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auxiliary, turbine,:and rad-waste buildings were conducted to observe

, plant equipment. conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, i excessive vibrations, and to verify that maintenance requests had been

. initiated for equipment in need of maintenanc The inspectors verified by observation and direct interviews that the

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physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the

[ station security plan.

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The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and

verified implementation of radiation protection controls. The inspectors also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls ~

associated with rad-waste. shipments and barrelin Facility operations observed were verified to be in accordance with the requirements established under. Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

! Followup on Region III Requests (92701) The inspector received a request from Region III, memo from E. G. Greenman, dated September 4, 1986, to obtain information

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related to the performance of the Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation. This information was obtained from the licensee and forwarded to Region III as requested.

f j The inspector received a request from Region III, memo from C. E. Norelius, dated September 3, 1986, to rereview the licensee's

! response to IE Bulletin (IEB) 86002 to verify that the response did address electrical equipment important to safety, as defined

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in 10 CFR 50.49(b), rather.than safety ralated equipment. The

! inspector discussed this matter with licensee management and

! verified that the response was for electrical equipment important i to safety. This IEB is still considered closed.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

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1 Onsite Followup of Events at Operating Reactors (93702) General

The inspector performed onsite followup activities for events which occurred during-September 1986. This followuo included reviews of

, operating logs, procedures, Deviation Reports', Licensee Event Reports (where available), and interviews with licensee personnel.

! For the each event, the inspector developed a chronology, reviewed the functioning of safety systems required by plant conditions, and reviewed licensee actions to verify consistency with procedures,

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license-conditions, and the nature of the event. Additionally

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the inspector verified that licensee investigation had identified root causes of equipment malfunctions and/or personnel error and

had taken appropriate corrective actions. prior to plant restar Details of the events and licensee corrective actions developed through inspector followup are provided in Paragraphs b and c belo '- Load Reduction due to Condenser Tube Failure on September 21, 1986 '

While.in Mode 1, with reactor power at 90%, steam generator cation conductivity increased above 2.0 micrombos/cm (Action Level 2).

The licensee began to reduce the turbine power to less that 25%,-

in accordance with Byron Abnormal Operating-Procedure 1 BOA SEC- The licensee's investigation indicated that a tube had failed in the B water box of the main condenser. This failed tube allowed river water to enter the condenser and caused the steam generator to

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exceed its chemistry limits for cation conductivity, sulfates, and

.. pH. The condensate polishers were placed on line to clean up the

! : condensate system; and the B water box was isolated and the leaking tube was identified and plugge l" During the rapid power reduction the Axial Flux Difference (AFD) and

. Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio-(QPTR) limits of Technical Specifications 3.2.1 and 3.2.4 were exceeded. The AFD and QPTR are used to measure

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the axial and radial tilting of the flux profile in the reactor core during power operation. The operators experienced difficulties in

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maintaining,AFD and QPTR within their respective' limits during the power reduction. These difficulties were a combination of the natural buildup of Xe-135 in the reactor core following an earlier plant transient, the rate at which power had to be reduced, and the i flux profile existing in the core at this time in lif Technical Saecification 3.2.1 requires that reactor power be reduced to less

t1an 50% when more than 60 penalty deviation minutes are accumulated

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and that the reactor be maintained at less than 50% for the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />

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following the deviation accumulation minute of greater The reactor powerthan was60 cumulative reduced to lesspenalty than 50%

power within the required time limit.

! By 0850 on September 22, the steam generator chemistry levels had returned to values less than Action Level 2 and the unit was

increased to 49% powe At 1950 on September 22, AFD had been i within its limits for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and the unit was returned to rated

powe Reactor Trip due to Turbine Trip on September 30, 1986 l While in Mode 1, with reactor power at 93%, the reactor tripped due i to a turbine trip. The licensee's investigation determined that the i j turbine tripped due to actuation of the K640 and K630 slave (output) -

L relays in the Solid State Protection System (SSPS). A contractor

! was removing fire barrier material from the bottom of the SSPS test

! cabinet 1PA12J. During this process the insulation on cable 1EF007 l

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s-was penetrated, thereby exposing several conductors. The bare conductors shorted to ground and energized the K640 and K630 relays, causing a turbine trip / reactor trip and a feedwater isolatio Cable 1EF007 is not used during normal operation of the SSPS, but is only used to test the slave (output) relays during the SSPS bi-monthly surveillanc Cable 1EF007 was disconnected at cabinet 1PA12J and at the slave (output) relay cabinet 1PA09J. The licensee intends to replace the cable after returning to power. The licensee performed the bi-monthly surveillance on SSPS to verify that no other components were damaged and also tested the feedwater-isolation valve During the test of feedwater isolation valve 1FW0090 the licensee identified that a solenoid on the hydraulic /peunmatic actuator had failed. The failed solenoid was replaced and the valve tested satisfactoril The unit remained shut down at the end of this report period. The unit restart and reactor trip on October 2, 1986 will be discussed in Inspection Report 454/86040(DRP). This trip and the licensee's corrective actions will also be reviewed, after the LER is issued, in Inspection Report 454/86040(DRP).

No violations or deviations were identifie . Licensee Actions Concerning Suspected Drug Use (99014)

On September 24, 1986, the licensee notified the Senior Resident Inspector of a concern related to suspected drug use by a station employee. The individual in question was a non-licensed, non-supervisory employee.

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In keeping with the licensee's established Drug Awareness Program and based on licensee observations and past discussions with the individual

related to job performance, the employee was relieved of all duties and site access was revoked pending the outcome of drug testing and further evaluation. Following urinalysis testing which indicated drug useage, and interviews by station management and union representatives the employee was terminate This item is considered close . Exit Interview (30703)

The inspectors met with licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on September 30, 1986. The inspectors summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and the findings. The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietar !

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