IR 05000454/1987033

Safety Insp Repts 50-454/87-33 & 50-455/87-31 on 870801-31. No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Operations Summary,Training,Surveillance,Maint,Operational Safety & ESF Walkdown,Headquarters Request & Event Followup

ML20238E140
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	09/10/1987
From:	Hinds J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20238E135	List: IR 05000454/1987033 ML20238E133
References
50-454-87-33, 50-455-87-31, NUDOCS 8709140168
Download: ML20238E140 (13)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report Nos. 50-454/87033(DRP);50-455/8703' ;RP)

Docket Nos. 50-454; 50-455 License Nos. NPF-37; NPF-66 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Byron Station, Units 1 and 2 i Inspectiun At: Byron Station, Byron, Illinois Inspection Conducted: August 1 - 31, 1987 Inspectors: P. G. Brochman J. H. Neisler R. M. Lerch G. A. VanSickle J. A. Gavula  !

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Approved B - J. M. Hinds, ief c9.to.87 eactor Projects Section 1A Date Inspection Summary Inspection from August 1 - 31, 1987 (Report Nos. 50-454/87033(DRP);

50-455/87031(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced safety inspection by the resident ,

inspector and region based inspectors of licensee action on previous I inspection findings; operations summary; training; surveillance; maintenance; operational safety and ESF system walkdown; headquarters requests; and event followu Results: No violations or deviations were identified, nor were any items identified which could affect the public's health and safet ]

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company R. Querio, Station Manager

• R. Pleniewicz, Production Superintendent

• R. Ward, Services Superintendent W. Burkamper, Quality Assurance Superintendent L. Sues, Assistant Superintendent, Operating G. Schwartz, Assistant Superintendent, Maintenance

• T. Joyce, Assistant Superintendent, Technical Services D. St. Clair, Assistant Superintendent, Work Planning T. Higgins, Operating Engineer, Unit 0 J. Schrock, Operating Engineer, Unit 1 D. Brindle, Operating Engineer, Unit 2 T. Didier, Operating Engineer, Rad-Waste

• M. Snow, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor F. Hornbeak, Technical Staff Supervisor

• R. Flahive, Radiation / Chemistry Supervisor P. O'Neil, Quality Control Supervisor W. Pirnat, Regulatory Assurance Staff

• E. Zittle, Regulatory Assurance Staff /

• J. Snyder, Quality Assurance Inspector

• A. Chernick, Training Supervisor

• D. Berg, Nuclear Safety

• W. Kouba, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor The inspector also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of this inspectio * Denotes those present during the exit interview on August 31, 198 . Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)

(Closed) Open Item (454/87007-03(DRS); 455/87024-01(DRS)): Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) paragraph 3.5.1.1, concerning internally generated missiles, appears to be inconsistent with recent industry' event Based on the recent Zion and Palo Verde failures, Cooper-Bessemer diesel engines are capable of generating missilts which can penetrate an engine's crankcase. The licensee, in a letter from K. A. Ainger to the NRC, dated July 8, 1987, submitted an advance copy of FSAR changes that describe the above situation and its previously documerited re-evaluation of the impact of potential missiles. Based strictly on the submittal of this proposed amendment, this h :n is considered close However, closure of this item does not constitute acceptance of the proposed amendmen ._ . . . -.

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. Summary of Operations Unit 1 operated at power levels' up to 98% until 1015 on August 11, 1987,

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when a reactor trip due to the loss of a feedwater pump occurred (see paragraph 10.c). The unit was taken critical at 1944.on the same da During preparations for synchronizing-the turbine to the grid at 0105 on

- August 12, a safety.' injection, reactor trip, and st'eamline isolation occurred due to problems with the turbine control system (see' paragraph-10.e). The unit was taken critical at 1630 on August.13 and was synchronized to the grid at 1851 the same day.- The unit operated:at power levels up to 100% for the rest of the report' perio Unit 2 operated.at power levels ~ up to 100% until 0320 August:27, when the unit was shut down. The unit remained shutdown for the rest of.the report period. An Unusu'al Event was' declared at 1108.on August 2, when shutdown required by Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 was commenced, due to an inoperable diesel generator (see paragraph 10.b). The' Unusual Event was terminated at 1509 on the same day,-and the power reduction was stopped prior to the completion of the shutdown.- An Unusual Event was-

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declared at 1157 on August 11, when a shutdown required by Technical Specification 3.8.3.1 was commenced due to an inoperable instrument inverter (see paragraph 10.d). The Unusual Event was terminated at 1502 on the same day, and the power reduction was stopped prior to the completion of the shutdown. Unit 2 was declared in commercial service on August 21, 198 . Training (41400 & 41701)

The effectiveness of training. programs for licensed and nonlicensed personnel was reviewed by the inspectors during the witnessing of th licensee's performance of routine surveillance, maintenance, and operational activities and during the review of the licensee's response to events which occurred during August 1987. Personnel appeared to be knowledgeable of the tasks being performed,- and nothing was observe which indicated any ineffectiveness in trainin No violations'or deviations were identifie . Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

Station surveillance activities of the safety-related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved. procedures and.in conformance with Technical Specification B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Monthly Test The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while' affected components or systems were removed from and restored to service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the testing; testing was accomplished in accordance with approved procedures; test instrumentation was within its calibration

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. interval; testing was accomplished by qualified personnel; test results '

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conformed with Technical Specifications and procedural requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; and any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly documented, reviewed, and resolved by appropriate management personne During the test, the inspector observed that the test engineer had to i open the door to the battery charger, to install test instrumentatio ]

The inspector recommended that the licensee. consider installing permanent  ;

test jacks in the battery charger door, rather than opening the cabinet door. and directly connecting to the circuitry, as this test is required to be performed once a month for the next 40 year !

The inspector identified two concerns with the starting batteries. The I diesel for the auxiliary feedwater pump has two separate' starting batteries, only one of which is in service at a time. The. inspector )

asked if there was any guidance provided on which battery bank to select for service, or which battery bank on which to perform the monthly test, to ensure that one battery did not have undetected degradation. The engineer stated that there was no policy to rotate the battery bank usage  :

or testing, but that revisions to the surveillance procedure were bein I developed to address this concern. The inspector will review these l procedure changes after they are issued; this issue will be followed )

as an open item (454/87033-01(DRP); 455/87031-01(DRP)). ]

q Each battery bank consists of two batteries, which connect through separate relays to a starting motor. The inspector noted that the batteries for different b wks were immediately adjacent to each other and questioned if this was consistent with electrical separation cri teria. The inspector will follow up on this question as an open item (454/87033-02(DRP);455/87031-02(DRP)).

No other violations or deviations were identifie i Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703) I I

Station maintenance activities of the safety-related systems and t components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with Technical Specification i Replacement of the 2B Diesel Generator Turbocharger Following completion of maintenance on the diesel generator, the inspectors verified that it had been returned to service properl The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were i removed from and restored to service; approvals were obtained prior to '

initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved

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procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented. Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs and to assure.that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performanc No violations or deviations were identifie . 1erational 0 Safety Verification and Engineered Safety Features Systen Walkdown (71707, 71709, 71710, & 717881)

The inspectors observed control room operation, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during August 198 )

During these discussions and observations, the inspectors ascertained I that the operators were alert, cognizant of plant conditions, and l attentive to changes in those conditions, and that they took prompt i action when appropriate. The inspectors verified .he operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified the proper return to service of affected component Tours of the auxiliary, fuel-handling, rad-waste, turbine, and Unit 2 containment buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations, and to verify that ,

maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of I maintenanc The inspectors verified by observation and direct interviews that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security pla The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. The inspectors also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with rad-waste shipments and barreling. During the month of August 1987, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the Unit 1 and 2 component cooling water system to verify operabilit The observed facility operations were verified to be in accordance with the requirements established under Technical Specifications,10 CFR, and administrative procedure No violations or deviations were identifie . Startup Test Witnessing and Observation (72302)

The inspectors witnessed performance of portions of the following Unit 2 startup test procedures in order to verify that testing was conducted in accordance with the operating license and procedural requirements, that test data was properly recorded, and that the performance of licensee

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, l personnel conducting the tests deinonstrated an understanding of assigned l duties and responsibilitie I 50% Load Rejection Test Performance of this test, the last test for the Unit 2 program, was completed on August 11, 1987. No violations or deviations were identifie . Byron Unit 2 Declared in Commercial Service

Following successful completion of the startup test program, Byron Unit 2 was placed in commercial service on August 21, 1987, with a net output of 1120 MWe. All required testing, as described in chapter 14 of the FSAR, l had been completed and evaluated by the licensee to verify that all acceptance criteria have been successfully demonstrated and all deficien-cies acceptably dispositione ,

l 10. Onsite Followup of Events at Operating Reactors (93702) l

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The inspectors performed onsite followup activities for events which occurred during July and August 1987. This followup included reviews of operating logs, procedures, Deviation Reports, licensee Event Reports j (where available), and interviews with licensee personnel. For each j event, the inspector developed a chronology, reviewed the functioning of safety systems required by plant conditions, and reviewed licensee actions to verify consistency with procedures, license conditions, and the nature of the event. Additionally, the inspector verified for each event that the licensee investigation had identified root causes of equipment malfunctions and/or personnel error and had taken appropriate corrective actions prior to plant restart. Details of the events and the licensee's corrective actions, developed through inspector followup, are provided in paragraphs a through g below: Unit 1 - Lightning Strikes During severe thunderstorms on July 29 and July 31, 1987, the Byron facility was affected by nearby lighting strikes. On July 29, 1987, nine overvoltage protection circuits on +24VDC power supplies in the Unit 1 control rod drive (CRD) power cabinets actuated, and on July 31, 1987, three circuits actuated in Unit 1 CRD power cabinet The power supply overvoltage protection circuit actuation shuts down the power supply when output voltage exceeds the set point of 27VD This results in loss of power to the CRD system, de-energizing the control rod gripper coils and causing the associated control rods to fall into the reactor cor L _ - . _ _ _

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The lightnit g strikes on both nights apparently created voltage surges in th? +24 VDC output of the CRD power supplie Each voltage surge actuated the overvoltage protection circuits on several of the power supplies, which isolated the power supplies'

and interrupted the power supply output. The loss of output voltage to the control rod drives caused the rods to fall. The falling control rods caused the nuclear instrumentation system to trip the reactor on a power range high negative flux rate tri The inspector reviewed the results of the licensee's investigation and corrective actions. The control rod drive power supply overvoltage protection was reset and verified to be operabl Voltage monitoring equipment was placed on the CRD cabinet grounds and outputs. No abnormal spikes or perturbations were identified, even when simulated disturbances were injected into the generator systems.

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The licensee has contacted the supplier, Westinghouse, and the power supply manufacturer, Lambda Manufacturing, Inc., for recommendations on CRD power supply improvements' at Byro The Unit 1 CR0 power supply cabinets were inspected by the electrical, instrument and operation analysis departments. The inspections revealed P at each CRD cabinet is independently grounde Byron Unit 2 CRD cabinets have a common ground. Unit 2 does not have 6 history of problems caused by lightning. The Unit 1 CRD cabinets have been modified to use a common ground to minimize the possibility of circulating currents affecting the +24VDC power supplie At the exit interview, the licensee representatives agreed to obtain the services of a contractor specializing in lightning protection to develop methods to eliminate or mitigate the effects of lightning strikes on plant systems or components at Byro b. Unit 2 - Unusual Event due to an Inoperable Diesel Generator l At 1108 on July 30, 1987, with reactor power at 80%, the 2B diesel generator (DG) failed to start within the 10-second time limit of Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 and was declared inoperabl Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 requires that with a DG inoperable, the affected DG be returned to service within the next 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, or l else the plant must be in hot standby (mode 3) within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown (mode 5) within the following 30 hour3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> The licensee commenced troubleshooting and repair activities, and a vendor representative (Cooper Bessemer) was dispatched to Byro The repair activities were completed in the afternoon of July 31, and the DG was successfully started within 10 seconds; however, 10 minutes after reaching rated load the DG tripped due to turbocharger thrust bearing wear. This problem was determined to be unrelated to the slow starting time problem. The slow starting time was due to

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l an improperly set regulator which. controls air flow to the fuel control cylinder. The regulator was improperly set due to a zero shift on a pressure indicato i Troubleshooting activities were again initiated, with the vendor representative present. A wear detector was obtained from Zion 3 Station, and the turbocharger clearances-were checked. Based on l these clearance checks, and following discussions between'the i licensee, the vendor representative and the vendor home office, a decision was made that the turbocharger did not need.to be replace On August 1,.1987, the DG was started, gradually loaded and run for l approximately 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. The diesel was shut down and an oper-ability test was commenced at approximately 1900. The DG tripped again shc-tly af ter reaching rated output, again due to turbocharger thrust bearing wear. The licensee began efforts to replace the turbocharger. The licensee estimated that the DG would be returned to service by 1600 on August I At 1108 on August 2, the licensee commenced a' shutdown to place the unit in mode 3 and declared an Unusual Event. The 72-hour time clock had started on the initial failure because the DG had not been proven operable, even though the slew starting problem and the turbocharger problem were not related. At approximately 1200 on August 2, the licensee requested that the NRC grant enforcement discretion on implementing the plant shutdown required by action i statement a of Technical Specification 3.8.1.1. The licensee ;

requested that the unit remain online for several reasons: (1)

system load forecasts for August 3, based on projected hot weather, were 16,400 + 200 megawatts (MWe); (2) several of the licensee's other generating units were not_available, including three nuclear units; (3) extended hot weather had elevated the temperature of cooling water, which increased the probability that other generating units would be derated, due to decreased thermal efficiency and approaching thermal pollution limits; and (4) the licensee had already purchased all the available firm power from the Mid-America Interpool Network, and the outlook'for further purchases was very doubtful due to the peak demands on neighboring utilities, wnich were also affected by the hot weather. The licensee requested that it be allowed to defer implementation of action statement a of Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 until after the system load started to decline from the afternoon peak on August 3'(estimated to be approximately 1800). ,

Enforcement discretion is a policy wherein the NRC may decide not to take any enforcement actions against a licensee which has failed to follow Technical Specifications. Enforcement discretion is l'mited to extraordinary circumstances (e.g., impending brownouts or blackouts), for short time periods, and for which the licensee has requested prior approval. When considering enforcement discre-tion, the NRC evaluates the safety significance of the continued operation of the unit and determines whether this continued operation will adversely affect the public's health and safet E_-__----_--__---_---

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i Following discussions among the NRC regional and headquarters staffs, the Region III administrator approved the licensee's request at approximately 1424 on August The reduction in load was stopped, and the unit returned to rated power. The Unusual Event i was terminated at 1507. On August 3, the licensee requested that the enforcement discretion be extended until 0600 on August (

The request was approved by the Region III administrator. The i turbocharger was replaced and the diesel was successfully tested and returned to service by 0555 on August 4. The cause of the turbocharger failure has not been determined. The turbocharger I has been sent to the manufacture for failure analysi- c. Unit 1 - Reactor Trip on Lo-Lo Steam Generator Level At 1015 on August 11, 1987, with reactor power at 97%, a reactor trip on Lo-Lo steam generator (SG) level in the ID SG occurred following a trip of the 1B main feedwater pump. Following the  !

pump trip, control room operators ran back the turbine to approxi- 1 mately 50% of rated load, after a 30-second delay. The 30-second i delay was caused by the need for the control room operator to reprogram the DEHC computer, as a small load change was in progress )

t when this event happened. The level in the 10 SG was stabilized (

at 44%; however, when the SG relief valve closed, the level shrank  !

to the Lo-Lo reactor trip setpoint (40.8%). All systems functioned  !

normally after the trip, and the unit was stabilized in Mode 3. At I 1129 a feedwater isolation _on Hi-Hi SG 1evel occurred in the 1C S Heatup of cold auxiliary feedwater in the SG caused the level to swell, and even though operators had closed all feedwater control valves, the level rose to the Hi-Hi setpoint. Operators restored level within 10 minute The feedwater pump tripped on high thrust bearing wear. The licensee's investigation determined that the thrust bearing wear trip was caused by by a broken wire to the thrust bearing senso The wire was not securely fastened to the wire bundle and was caught j by a rotating gear and cut. The licensee replaced the broken wire  !

and added additional tie wraps to the wire bundle. The licensee inspected the other feedwater pumps for similar problems and repaired any loose wires. As the unit can be operated at rated output without the 1B feedwater pump, the licensee decided to restart the unit in parallel with repair activities. The unit was taken critical at 1944. During preparations to synchronize the generator, a safety injection occurred; this event is discussed in paragraph e belo ;

d. Unit 2 - Unusual Event due to an Inoperable Instrument Inverter At 1157 on August 11, 1987, with reactor power at 95%, an Unusual  !

Event was declared and a shutdown was commenced due to an inoperable instrument inverter. The 211 instrument inverter had failed at 1157 on August 10, and Technical Specification 3.8.3.1 requires that the i inverter be restored to operability within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, or else the plant must be in hot standby (Mode 3) within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and

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in cold shutdown (Mode 5) within the following 30 hour3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> '

Licensee-maintenance personnel had commenced troubleshooting of the failed inverter and had determined that the main transformer should be replaced. Maintenance personnel were unable to. complete replacement i of the transformer.before 1157 on August 11; consequently,'a shut- j down was commenced and an Unusual Event was declared. ~By 1501 on i

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the same day, the repair work had been completed and the. inverter satisfactorily tested.. The load reduction was stopped before

, completion of..the shutdown the Unusual Event was terminated, and the unit was returned to rated power. The licensee has started an investigation into the multiple failures of. instrument. inverters j which have occurred within the last year, to determine if the.causes- i of failures are relate e .- Unit 1 - Safety Injection, Reactor Trip, and Main Steam Line-Isolation on Low Steam Line Pressure At 0105 on August 12, 1987, with reactor power at 6%, a safety injection, reactor trip, and main steam line isolation occurred on low steam line pressure from the ID SG, due to a failure in the turbine control system (DEHC). The main turbine speed was 1700 rpm, and operato the throttle-stop were valves in the (TVs) process.of to the governortransferring (controlLfrom valves GVs). The

"moog" valve for the #2 TV mechanically failed to the bypass-position, causing the #2 TV to fully shut. The moog valve.is _

solenoid updated, 4-way, pilot valve which admits . hydraulic fluid to the TV valve, causing the TV to'open or shut. During turbine startup, the GVs are fully open and the TVs are shut, with only small flow rate poppets open. During the transfer from TV control to GV control, the GVs close until the DEHC computer senses a 10 rpm l drop in speed (typically GVs are 1% open). This indicates to the j DEHC computer that the GVs are now controlling turbine speed, and  ;

the TVs then go fully ope j The GVs had closed to approximately 10% open, when the #1, 3, and 4 TVs started to open. The closing of the #2 TV (moog valve-failure) j caused a 10-rpm drop in turbine speed and deceived the DEHC 1 computer into believing that the GVs were controlling turbine spee )

The turbine increased speed to the electrical overspeed setpoint (103% of rated speed); the operators then went to manual control of the GVs and returned turbine speed to 1730 rpm, and then took i turbine control back to automatic. The DEHC. computer manufacturer, I Westinghouse, believes this confused the computer, which  ;

reinitialized the TV-GV subroutine and caused the GVs to go fully

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open with TVs #1, 3,'and 4 still open. Steam pressure immediately dropped to 1040 psig, which initiated a main steam line isolation and safety injection. Recorded steam flow went to 92.5% of rated thermal output during the transient. The setpoint for main steam line isolation and safety injection is 640 psig, but this setpoint '

is rate compensated. The operators stabilized the unit.in mod and all safety systems functioned normally after the tri .

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By 0339, all four main steam line isolation valves had been reopened, reactor coolant temperature was being controlled by the steam dumps and the steam generator atmospheric relief valves were close The reactor was restarted at 1650 on August 13, and the unit was synchronized to the grid at 1851 on the same da As corrective action the licensee has revised operating procedures to require that the turbine be tripped and restarted if it is necessary to take manual control before synchronization. If it is necessary to take manual control of the turbine after it has been synchronized, then operators are directed to leave the turbine in manual, until assistance from the vendor can be obtaine Unit 2 - Feedwater Isolation At 0156 on August 29, 1987, with the reactor in Mode 4, a feedwater isolation on Hi-Hi level in the 2D SG occurred. Instrument mechanics (IM) were performing a calibration of level channel 55 in the 2D SG. In accordance with the surveillance procedure, an IM tripped all the bistables associated with level channel 559, including the one for feedwater isolation. The coincidence logic for the Hi-Hi level trip is 2 of 4. With one channel already tripped the coincidence logic became 1 of 3 on the remaining channels. A second IM in the Unit 2 containment was directed to isolate and equalize the level transmitter for channel 559, to allow installation of a calibration test rig. The IM, in error, isolated and equalized the transmitter for level channel 549. With the transmitter equalized, the indicated level in channel 549 failed high, meeting the 1 of 3 logic coincidence on Hi-Hi SG 1evel and causing a feedwater isolation. By 0209 the control room operators had reset the feedwater isolation. The licensee's investigation was still in progress at the end of the report period, Unit 2 - Safety Injection At 0920 on August 31, 1987, with the reactor in Mode 4, a safety l

injection (SI) occurred. Licensee operator.s were performing a

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surveillance test of the A train of the solid state protection system (SSPS) (2BOS 3.1.1-20). Step F.8 requires that the mode selector switch be placed in the test position and the " operate" lamp be verified off. When the operators got to step F.8, they-observed that the light bulb for the operate lamp was burned ou They stopped the procedure and replaced the bulb. When they restarted the procedure, they did not' place the mode selector switch in the tast position. When the fourth position on logic A, test switch 1, was reached, the SI occurred. Only A train equipment actuated, as the error left the SSPS output relays unblocked but the SSPS input relays were inhibited. All required train A equipment started, except for the 2A diesel generator, which was out of service for maintenance. Approximately 1890 gallons were injected within four minutes into the reactor ccolant system (RCS) before the operators secured the equipment and reset the SI signa Pressurizer level rose from 25% to 39%; RCS

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temperature fell approximately 6 F; and RCS pressure rose from I 345 to 355 psig. The licensee's investigation was still in progress at the end of the report perio The inspector will review these events in a subsequent report, after the LERs are issued. No violations or deviations were identifie . Open Items .,

en Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which

, will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action ' ?

on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. Open items disclosed during ,

the inspection are discussed in Paragraph >

1 Exit Interview (30703) ,

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TheinspectorsmetwiththelicenseerepresentativesdenotedinparagrAph I at the conclusion of the inspection on August 31, 1987. The inspecEors summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and the finding The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report, with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietar i

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