IR 05000454/1990014

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Safety Insp Rept 50-454/90-14 & 50-455/90-13 on 900513-0630. Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety,Esf Sys,Onsite Event follow-up,current Matl Condition,Security,Radiological Controls & Self Assessment/Quality Verification
ML20055G333
Person / Time
Site: Byron  
Issue date: 07/16/1990
From: Farber M
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20055G331 List:
References
50-454-90-14, 50-455-90-13, NUDOCS 9007230055
Download: ML20055G333 (9)


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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION 111 l

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Report Nos. 50-454/90014(0RP);50-455/90013(ORP)

i Docket Nos. 50-454; 50-455 License Nos. NPF-37; NPF-66

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a Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690

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Facility Name:

Byron Station, Units 1 and 2

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Inspection At:

Byron Site, Byron, Illinois

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Inspection Conducted: May 13 through June 30, 1990 Inspectors:

W. J. Kropp R. N. Sutphin D. R. Calhoun W[,W 7-/6-fd Approved By: Martin J. Farber, Chief NReactorProjectsSectionIA

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Jn, spec, tion Summary Inspection from Ma 50-455/90013TDRP))y 13. through June 30,~ ~1990 (Report Nos.' 50-454/90014(DRP]~;

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Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced safety inspection by the resident -

inspectors of~ action on operational safety, engineered safety feature sys'tems, onsite event ~ follow-up, current material condition, radiological controls, security, safety assessment / quality verification maintenance activities,

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surveillance activities, TMI Action Plan requirement followup, and meetings and other activities.'

Results: In the area of plant operations the licensee's performance continues

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-to be good.' The' licensee took prompt action to shut down. Unit-1 for a maintenance outage when a leak was discovered at the -inlet flange of the'1A Pressurizer Safety Valve.

In another instance the licensee took immediate action to correct a deficiency in the testing of Steamline Isolation Control n

.Handswitches when it was identified by the plant technical staff.

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DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted i

Commonwealth Edison Compgy (C,Eco)

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  • R. Pleniewicz, Station Manager
  • K. Schwartz, Production Superintendent
  • R. Ward, Technical Superintendent

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  • J. Kudalis, Service Director D. Brindle, Operating Engineer, Administration T. Didier, Operating Engineer, Unit 0 J. Schrock, Operating Engineer, Unit 1 T. Gierich, Operating Engineer, Unit 2

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T. Higgins, Assistaat Superintendent, Operating

  • D. Berg, Nuclear Safety
  • W. Pirnat, Regulatory Assurance, OPEX Administrator

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D. St. Clair, Assistant Superintendent, Work Planning

  • T. Tulon, Assistant Superintendent, Maintenance

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  • A. Britton, Nuclear Quality Programs

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  • D. Wozniak, ENC Project Manager

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  • D. O'Neill, Assistant Technical Stoff Supervissr
  • E. Zittle, Regulatory-Assurance Staff
  • Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted on June 29, 1990, and at other times-throughout the inspection period.

The inspectors-also had discussions with other licensee employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs, reactor and auxiliary operators, shift engineers and foremen, and electrical,

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i mechanical and instrument maintenance personnel, and contract security

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personnel, i

2.

-Plant Operations o

Unit 1 operated at power levels up to 100%; however, due to a leaking flange gasket on the 1A Pressurizer Safety Valve, a Unit I shutdown commenced June 12,1990, for a 4 day maintenance outage. The: unit was-

-returned to service June 15, 1990, and has operated up to 100% in the load following mode until June 27, when the unit was shut down, due to the high temperature in containment, to Hot Standby (Mode 3).

The unit was returned to service on June 29, 1990.

Unit 2 operated at power levels up to 100% at the beginning of the report-period; however, the unit comenced coast down operations to the refueling outage. ' scheduled for September 1990, toward the end of the inspection perioC.

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OperationalSafety'(71707)-

During the inspection period, the inspectors verified that the facility was being operated in conformance with the licenses and

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regulatory requirements and the licensee's management responsibilities-

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were effectively carded out for safe operation.

Verification was based on routine direct observation of activities and equipment'

performance, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety system status and limiting conditions for operation action requirements'(LC0ARs),

corrective action, and review of facility records.

- On a sampling basis the inspectors daily verified proper control room staffing and access, operator behavior, and coordination of plant activities with ongoing control room operations; verified operator adherence with the latest revisions of procedures for.

ongoing activities; verified operation as required by Technical Specifications (TS); including (compliance with I' ARs, with emphasis on engineered safety features ESF) and ESF el.ctrical alignment and valve positions; monitored instrumentation recorder traces and duplicate channels for abnormalities; verified status of various lit

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annunciators for operator understanding, off-normal condition, and

compensatory actions; examined nuclear instrumentation and other protection channels for proper operability; reviewed radiation monitors and stack monitors for abnormal conditions; verified that onsite and offsite power was available as required; observed the frequency of plant / control room visits by the station manager, i

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superintendents, assistant operations superintendent, and other managers; and observed the Safety Parameter Display System for operability.

No problems were noted, Engineered Safe,tL eatpre_(ESF) Systems (71710)

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F During the inspection, the inspectors selected accessible portions of 'several ESF systems to-verify status. Consideration was given to the plant mode, applicable Technical Specifications, LC0ARs, and other applicable requirements.

Various observations, where applicable, were made of hangers and supports; housekeeping; valve position and conditions; potential

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ignition sources; major component labeling, lubrication, cooling,

.etc.; whether instrumentation was properly installed and functioning and significant process parameter values were consistent with expected values; whether instrumentation was calibrated; whether necessary support' systems were-operational; and whether locally and y

remotely indicated breaker and valve positions agreed.

During the inspection, the accessible portions of the following ESF

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systems were walked down:

Unit-1 Auxiliary Feedwater System Essential: Service Water System u

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Unit 2 Auxiliary feedwater System Essential. Service Water System Onsite Event Follogup (93702)

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On June 12, 1990, a Unit 1 reactor shut-down was initiated due to a leak at.the inlet flange of the 1A pressurizer safety valve-(1RY8010A).

The leak was small, and was detected by the unit

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operators during a panel walkdown.. In addition to the required repair of the safety valve, the licensee decided to perform and complete other maintenance work that included; the replacenent of:

a bearing on the IB rod drive motor-generator set and the repair of a leaking stop valve on the 18 main feedwater pump. The work was completed ahead of schedule and the unit was started up one shif t earlier than originally expected. The Unit 1 reactor went critical at 6:58 p.m. on June 15, 1990, and the main turbine generator was synchronized to the grid at 11:34 p.m. June 15, 1990.

On June 27 1990, another Unit I reactor shutdown was initiated due to high temperatures in the Unit 1 containment. The Technical Specification (TS) Part 3.6.1.5 requires that primary containment average air temperature should not exceed 120 degrees F.

The action requirement-is that "With the containnent average air temperature greater than 120 degrees F., reduce the average air temperature to within the limit within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, or be-in at least Hot Standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and_in Cold Shutdown within the following-30 hours".

The Unit 1B containment chiller had been out of service (00S) for maintenance when the 1A chiller developed a tube leak.

With both chillers 00S the unit containment temperature increased and the station entered _the action statement at-120.75 degrees F.

average temperature.

Repairs to the IA. chiller were initiated and additional-work was also started including replacement of the diaphragms in the pressurizer PORV's _and backflushing check.vaive 88180 to permit reseating of the check valve and pressure relief to

_t.% RHR ' discharge piping. The licensee exited the action statement-

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w%n the containment temperature reduced below 115 degrees F. and w continuing to drop.' When all repairs were completed the temperature had dropped to 109 degrees F.

The_ unit was restarted at-8:16 a.m. with the reactor going critical at 8:27 a.m.L on June 29, _

1990, without further problems..

d.

Current Material Condition (71707)

The inspectors performed general plant as well as selected system and component walkdowns to assess the general and specific material condition of the plant, to verify-that Nuclear Work Requests had been initiated for identified equipment problems, and to evaluate housekeeping. Walkdowns included an assessment of the buildings, components, and systems for proper identification and.

tagging, accessibility, fire and security door integrity, l

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scaffolding, radiological controls, and any unusual conditions.

Unusual conditions included but were not limited to water, oil, or other liquids on the floor or equipment; indications of leakage through ceiling, walls or floors; loose insulation; corrosion; excessive noise; unusual temperatures; and abnormal ventilation

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and lighting.

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l The material condition of Unit 1 and Unit 2 was considesed above

average.

The material condition of the conanon equipment-(Unit 0)

I remains average; however, the potential for improvement exists as

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increased management attention has been focused in this area.

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RadiologicalControls(71707)

The inspectors verified that personnel were following health physics procedures for dosimetry, protective clothing, frisking, posting, etc. and randomly examined radiation protection instrumentation for use, operability, and calibration.

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Security (81064)

m Each week during routine activities or tours, the inspectors monitored the licensee's security program.to ensure that observed actions were being implemented according to the approved security

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plan. The inspectors noted that persons within the protected area

displayed proper photo-identification badges and those individuals

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requiring escorts were properly escorted.

The inspectors also verified that checked vital areas were locked and alarmed.

Additionally, the inspectors also verified that observed personnel and packages entering the protected brea were' searched by appropriate equipment or by hand.

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Assessment of Plant Operatiog

The licensee's performance continues to be. good. The initiation of-a maintenance outage to repair the leaking inlet flange of-'the 1A D,I Pressurizer Safety Valve was an indication of the licensee's commitment-to operation in an effective and responsible manner. The completion j

of other important maintenance work at the same time, in a shorter time than expected, was indicative of continued management involvement, good outage planning and good-communication between the'various-departments at Byron.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

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Safety Assessment /gg_lity_ Verification (40500, 90712, 92700)

LicenseeEven1 Report (LER) Follow-up(90712,92700)

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Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, that l

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immediate corrective action was accomplished, and that corrective action to prevent recurrence had been or would be accomplished in accordance with TS:

(Closed) 454/90006 -LL:

Reactor trip and safety injection when a 5 ampere TDselai-'rejilaced in the Digital Electro-Hydraulic computer

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and a short circuit occurreo in a control panel pushbutton.

In addition to the foregoing, the inspector reviewed the licensee's Deviation Reports (DVRs) generated during the inspection period.

This was done in an effort to monitor the conditions related to

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plant or personnel performance, potential trends, etc.

DVRs were

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also reviewed to ensure that they were generated appropriately and-dispositioned in a manner ccasistent with the applicable procedures

and the QA manual.

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b.

Assessment of Safety / Quality Vgification The quality of licensee's performance in the preparation analysis, corrective actions and conclusions in LERs continues to be good.

No violations or deviations'were identified.

4.

Maintenance / Surveillance (62703&61726)

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MaintenanceActivities(62703)

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Station maintenance activities that affected the safety-related and associated systems and components were'obs'erved or reviewed to ascertain compliance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry Codes or standards, and in conformance With IS.

The following items were considered during this review: _the limiting conditions for operation (LCO) were met while components or systems were removed from and restored to service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were. accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicalle; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior ~ to returning components or systems to service;- quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished 'y qualified u

personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified;

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radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented. Work requests were reviewed to determine'the

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status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system-performance.

Portions of the following maintenance activities were observed and/or reviewed:

NWR B 73729 - Repair oil leaks around oil sump of Safety Injection

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Pump 2S101PA

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NWR B 75423 - Disassemble / inspect / clean the tube side of OCC01A Component. Cooling Heat Exchanger.

NWR B 75611 - Replace solenoid valve IFSV-FWO35C-A NWR B 76204 - Check for correct air start timing of Diesel Generator 1DG01XA NWR B 77591 - Investigate and repair the failure of the Unit 2 (28)

seal injector filter o-ring NWR 8 77630 - Replace bearing on 18 full length rod control generator MG set

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NWR 8 77690 - Repair / replace as necessary the flange leak at the IRY8010A safety valve inlet flange NWR 8 77782 - Replace faulty "B" current detector meter (INR-80418)

in power range B drawer N-41. B.

The inspectors periodicelly monitored the licensee's work in progress and verified performance was in accordance with proper procedures, and approved work packages, that 10 CFR 50.59 and other

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applicable drawing updctes were made and/or planned, and that operator training was conducted in a reasonable period of time, s No violations or deviations were identified, b.

Surveillance Activities (61726)

The inspectors observed or reviewed surveillance tests required by TS during the inspection period and verified that tests were performed; in accordance with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, LCOs were met, removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, results conformed with TS and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and any deficiencies identified during the tests were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.

The inspectors witnessed portions of the following activities:

1 BOS 2.1.1.b-1, Revision 52, " Axial Flux Difference (AFD) Mor,itor Alarm Inoperable Surveillance".

2 BOS 8.1.1.2.a-2, Revision 1, " Unit-2 28 Diesel Generator Operability Moathly (Staggered) and Semi-Annual (Staggered)

Surveillance".

1 BVS 5;2.f.3-2, Revision 8, "ASME Surveillance Requirements for Residual Heat Removal Pump 1RH01PB".

1 BVS 7.1.5-1, Revision 6, " Main Steam Isolation Yalves Operability Test", Unit-1.

2 BVS 7.1.5-1, Revision 3, " Main Steam Isolation Valve Operability Test",-Unit-2.

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SPP-90-39, "Special Procedure to test the Operation of the Main Steam Isolation Handswitch On-Line.

During a licensee's Technical staff review of the Main Steam isolation Valve Operability Test procedures,1 (2) BVS 7.1.5-1, the licensee discovered that steps for testing a Steamline Isolation Control Handswitch on panel 1(2) IPM06J had been inadvertently omitted during the last previous revision of the two test procedures.

As a result, the handswitches for Unit I and Unit 2 had not been tested during the last refueling outages. The licensee initiated action irrmediately upon discovery of this oversight, and entered the appropriate LCO, which allowed 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> to take corrective action rior to comencing a unit shutdown. A special test procedure p(SPP-90-39) was prepared to test the operation of the Main Steamline Isolation Handswitches on-line. The switches were successfully tested, and then returned to service before the expiration of the LC0AR on-June 13, 1990.

Test results indicated that no problems existed with the operability of the handswitches, c.

Asse,ssgent,oMlaintenanceLSurveillance

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The licensee's overall performance in-this area remains good.

However, a-potential weakness was self-identified in the review and approval of a revision to a test procedure.

Prompt and effective corrective action was taken in resolution of this item.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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TMI Action Plan Reguirement, Followup (25E 5)

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(Closed) TMI Item II.B.3.1 (Units.1 and 2): This item required the licensee to perform a design and operational review of the reactor coolant and containment atmosphere sampling line systems to determine the capability of personnel to promptly obtain a sample under accident conditions.

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NUREG-0876, " Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of Byron Station, Units 1 and 2," dated February 1982,- documented the acceptability of the post-accident sampling and analysis system in meeting TMI Item II.B.3 requirements given in NUREG-0737.

Based on the inspectors' review of the Safety Evaluation Report, TMI Action item II.B.3.1.(Units 1 and 2) is closed, b.

(Closed) TMI Item III.D.3.a.3 (Units 1 and 2):

This item required the licensee to review the control room habitability systems guidance of the Standard Review Plan and Regulatory Guides 1.78 and 1.95, to assure that operators in the control. room will be adequately protected against exposure to unacceptable levels ofl radiation during and after a design basis accident and to unacceptable levels of hazardous chemicals released on or in the vicinity of the site.

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NUREG-0876 "Saf ety Evaluation Report related to the operation of Byron Station, Units 1 and 2," dated February 1982, concluded that the control room emergency air satisfies the requirements ~of TMI Item III.D.3.4 given in NUREG-0737 and GDC 19.

Based on the-inspectors' review of the Safety Evaluation Reports, TMI Action item III.D.3.4 (Units 1 and 2) is closed.

Meetings and Other Activities a.

ManagementMeetings(30702)

(1) On June 8, 1990, W. D. Shafer, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 1; M.- D. Farber, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 1A; three NRC -

co-op students, and the resident ir spectors toured the Byron plant and met with licensee management to discuss plant -

performance and plant material condition.

(2) SALP Presentation to Lic9nsee On June 22, 1990, Messrs. A. B. Davis, Region Ill Administrator; W. L. Forney, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects Rill; M. J. Farber, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 1A; L. N. Olshan, Senior Project Manager NRR, III-2; T. II. Boyce, Project Manager NRR, III-2; W. J. Kropp, Senior Resident Inspector, Byron Station and R. N. Sutphin, Resident inspector, Byron Station toured the-Byron Plant and met publicly with licensee managers to present the results of the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance-9 Report at Byron Station, b.-

Ex3 Interview (30703)

The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in para 9raph I during the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection on June 29, 1990. The inspectors summarized the scope and results of the inspection and discussed the likely content of this inspection report.

The licensee acknowledged the information and did not indicate that any of the information disclosed during the inspection could be considered proprietary in nature.

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