ML20203C566

Forwards Insp Rept 50-344/85-39 on 851117-860103 in Response to Concerns Re Min Operating Shift Coverage Practices.Issue Re Lack of Firm Criteria for Availability of Fire Brigade Members Response to Fire Will Be Followed Up

ML20203C566
Person / Time
Site:	Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date:	04/15/1986
From:	Kirsch D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:	Wade D AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
References
NUDOCS 8604210192
Download: ML20203C566 (1)

See also: IR 05000344/1985039

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Mr. Dieryel L. Wade ,

1820 8th Street

Columbia City, Oregon 97018 APR 151986

Subject: Minimum Operating Shift Coverage (RV85A050)

Dear Mr. Wade:

This letter refers to a request that our inspectors look into your concerns

regarding minimum operating shift coverage practices at Trojan's nuclear power

plant site.

Our inspection regarding this matter has been completed, and our findings are

documented in the enclosed report number 85-39. The inspectors questioned the

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lack,of ' firm criteria for determining the availability of fire brigade members

for response to a fire. The inspectors will followup this issue in a future

inspection. This concludes the Regional Staff's activities egarding this

matter.

We appreciate your informing us of your concerns. We feel that our actions in

this matter have been responsive to those concerns; however, should you have

further questions regarding this matter, please feel free to contact me.

Please be assured that we will continue to perform inspections to ensure that

minimum operating shift coverage procedures are properly followed at nuclear

power. plants to protect the health and safety of the public.

Sincerely,

Wat s'yney s,, -

Dennis Fe: Kirsch, Director

Division of Reactor Safety and

Projects

Enclosure:

(1) Inspection Report 85-39

cc w/ enclosure:

Allegation File RV85A050

D. B. Pereira

S. Richards

B. Dodds

bec w/ enclosure:

RSB/ Document Control Desk (RIDS); Resident Inspector; Project Inspector;

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Greg Cook; B. Faulkenberry; J. Martin

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Docket No. 50-344 JAN 2 41986

Portland General Electric Company

121 S. W. Salmon Street

Portland, Oregon 97204 .

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Attention: Mr. Bart D. Withers

Vice President Nuclear

Gentlemen: l

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Subject: NRC Inspection of the Trojan Nuclear Plant

This refers to the inspection conducted by Mr. S. A. Richards and

Mr. G. C. Kellund of this office on November 17, 1985 - January 3, 1986, of

activities authorized by NRC License No. NPF-1, and to the discussion of our-

findings held by Mr. Richards and Mr. Kellund with Mr. Orser and other members _

of your staff periodically during the inspection. -

Areas examined during this inspection are described in the enclosed inspection

report. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective

examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews with

personnel, and observations by the inspectors.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a copy of this letter and the enclosures

will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be glad to

discuss them with you.

Sincerely,

UM.41 t'yed by

R. J P: t

D. F. Kirsch, Director

Division of Reactor Safety & Projects

Enclosures:

Inspection Report No. 50-344/85-39

cc w/ encl:

State of Oregon (Dixon)

W. S. Orser, PGE

J. W. Durham, Esq., PGE

bec w/ enclosure: RSB/ Document Control Desk (RIDS); Project Inspector;

Resident Inspector; J. Martin; B. Faulkenberry; G. Cook

bec w/o enclosure: LFMB

REGION V/ dot

KE 'D DODDS

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO.TilSSION

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REGION V

Report No. 50-344/85-39

Docket No. 50-344 License No. NPF-1

Licensee: Portland General Electric Company

121 S. W. Salmon Street

Portland, Oregon 97204

Facility Name: Trojan

Inspection at: Rainier, Oregon

Inspection conduct  : ove ber , 19 - January 3, 1986

Inspectors: # >M_ S % M/ /

. A. Richard 5' '

Da'te' Signed -

S or es * eat spec

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.f . Kellund ' . Da'te ' Signed

de I pect r .

Approved By: Fag _ / /

T. Ddddsf Chief Date 'S'igned

eactor Projects Section 1

Summary:

Inspection on November 17, 1985 - January 3,1986 (Report 50-344/85-39)

Areas Inspected: Routine inspection of operational safety verification,

corrective action, maintenance, surveillance, followup on a reported potential

act of sabotage, review of modification testing, and inspection of various

aspects of plant operation. The inspection involved 212 inspector-hours by

the NRC Resident Inspectors. 35 hours4.050926e-4 days <br />0.00972 hours <br />5.787037e-5 weeks <br />1.33175e-5 months <br /> of inspection were during back shift

hours. Inspection procedures 30703, 40700, 61726, 62703, 71707, 71710, 72701,

93702 and 94703 were used as guidance during the conduct of the inspection.

Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

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NRC representatives concluded that the actions taken by the licensee are {

a positive step towards minimizing errors in technical work. l

No violations or deviations were identified.

8. Shift Crew Manning

The inspectors reviewed the information associated with the Possible

Reportable Occurrence (PRO) report dated June 25, 1985. This PRO

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concerns potentially inadequate shift crew manning on the day shift of

i June 25, 1985. On this date, the plant was in Mode 5 and in a solid

plant condition. Technical Specification 6.2.2 and Administrative Orders

1-4, 3-1 and 3-8 require a minimum shift crew of six operators in Mode 5.

In addition, Administrative Order 3-8 requires that during solid plant

operations, one operator will monitor RCS parameters and have no other

concurrent duties.

The inspectors discussed this event with the initiator of the PRO and

with the Operations Planner / Scheduler. Based on these discussions and

review of the associated records, the inspectors determined that the

, shift was adequately manned. The inspectors did, however, question the ,_

lack of firm criteria for determining the availability of fire brigade

members for response to a fire. In this instance, one of the fire

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brigade members was inside the containment building for a portion of the  ;

shift, and his ability to respond to a fire in the uncontrolled areas of .

, the plant in a timely manner was in question. The Operations  !

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Planner / Scheduler agreed to investigate this issue to determine if  !

additional guidance on fire brigade member availability is necessary.

, This issue will be followed up in a future inspection (344/85-39-01).

9. Potential Sabotate Event

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On December 9,1985, while in the process of performing a semi-annual

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preventative maintenance inspe: tion on the 'A' emergency diesel generator

j (EDG), a licensee mechanic discovered an 8 ounce ball peen hammer under a

rocker-arm cover on the east unit of the EDG. The engine was operating

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at the time and the worker immediately removed the hammer from the

engine. The hammer had not caused any damage to the engine. Its

location was such that the probability for damage to occur should the

hm==*r have shifted its position due to engine vibration appeared very

low. The licensee initially thought that the hammer had been

! inadvertently left in the engine by a maintenance worker, however, a

review of maintenance records indicated that during the time frame in

question, no work had been performed on the engine which could account

for the hammer. Because the licensee was unable to determine how the

hammer came to be placed in the engine, the licensee reported the event

to the NRC and the FBI as a potential act of sabotage.

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4 A special agent from the Portland office of the FBI commenced an

' investigation into the circumstances surrounding this event. The

licensee initiated action to survey the plant for other evidence of

tampering. These actions included detailed visual examinations of

i electrical panels, rotating equipment, and other selected vital

equipment; sampling of oil from selected safety equipment; a visual

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