|
---|
Category:REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT (SEE ALSO AO LER)
MONTHYEARML20205C4171999-03-25025 March 1999 Special Rept 99-02:on 801027,Commission Approved for publication,10CFR50.48 & 10CFR50 App R Delineating Certain Fire Protection Provisions for Nuclear Power Plants Licensed to Operate Prior to 790101.Team Draft Findings Reviewed ML20207K2051999-03-0505 March 1999 Special Rept 99-01:on 990128,DG Tripped After 2 H of Operation During Loaded Operation for Monthly Test.Caused by Several Components That Were Degraded or Had Intermittent Problems.Parts Were Replaced & Initial Run Was Performed ML20196D4171998-11-24024 November 1998 Special Rept 98-02:on 981112,failure to Implement Fire Watches in Rooms Containing Inoperable Fire Barrier Penetrations,Was Determined.Repair of Affected Fire Barriers in Progress ML20151W3521998-09-0808 September 1998 Special Rept 98-01:on 980819,maint Could Not Be Performed on FPS Due to Isolation Boundary Leakage.Caused by Inadequate Info Provided in Fire Impairment Plan.Isolated Portion of FPS Was Returned to Svc ML20148A9881997-05-0101 May 1997 Special Rept 96-04-02:on 970429,groundwater Level at Well Mk GWA-2 Was in Alarm for 7 Days.Caused by Precipitation During Previous Week.Verified That No Other Groundwater Monitoring Instruments Were in Alarm ML20137P0711997-04-0707 April 1997 Special Rept 97-01:on 970226,Peak Accelerometer,1MIMT-5030, Removed Under WO 95092624 as Part of SG Replacement Project. Accelerometer Will Return to Svc Prior to Unit 1 Startup ML20133L6051997-01-0909 January 1997 Special Rept 96-04,Rev 1,groundwater Level at Well Mk GWA-2 Monitored by 2WZLS5060 Was in Alarm for 7 Days.Verified That No Other Groundwater Monitoring Instruments in Alarm ML20134N0261996-11-14014 November 1996 Special Rept:On 961006,groundwater Alarm Was Received & Entered in TS Action Item List for Tracking.Field Survey of Surrounding Areas Was Performed to Verify That No Water Was Percolating to Surface That Would Indicate Pipe Leak ML20116K0331996-08-0909 August 1996 Special Rept 96-03:on 960611,identified Broken Secondary Contact Blocks.Caused by Mishandling of Breakers or over- Torquing of Mounting Bolts.Breaker 2BYA Repaired,Tested & re-installed in Cabinet ML20086G9601995-07-12012 July 1995 Special Rept 95-002:on 950612,turbocharger Failed,As Detected by Excessive Noise & Vibration.Engine Subsequently Secured.Damaged Components Replaced & DG 2A Returned to Operable Status ML20080G4421995-02-0303 February 1995 Special Rept 95-01:on 950104,personnel on Unit 2 Operating in Solid Condition During Fill & Vent of Nc Sys ML20078R7651994-12-15015 December 1994 Special Rept 94-06:on 941012,fatigue Usage to SI Sys Piping by Manually Initiating Flow Through B Cold Leg from Fwst During Testing for Valve 1NI-71 Intentionally Increased. Startup of Facility Discontinued to Repair Valve ML20078L6571994-11-22022 November 1994 Special Rept SR-94-05:on 941024,Channel 3 of Vibration & Loose Parts Monitoring Sys Declared Inoperable Due to Noise.Channel 3 of V&Lpm Will Be Repaired Under WR 94043758 or Replaced by Nsm MG-12096 During Outage 1EOC10 ML20073C2451994-09-14014 September 1994 Special Rept 94-004:on 940821,valid Failure of DG 1A Occurred Due to Failure of Series Boost exciter-regulator (Voltage Regulator).Isolation Transformer T54 & Current Transformers CT1,CT2 & CT3 Will Be Inspected ML20065K2501994-04-15015 April 1994 Special Rept 94-03:on 940210,during Testing PORV Observed to Hang Open in Absence of air-assisted Closure.Caused by Incomplete Testing of Porvs.Compensatory Measures Reanalyzed & Reestablished Addressing Fire & Security Issues ML20064K0311994-03-15015 March 1994 Special Rept 94-01:on 940215,DG 2A Tripped W/Low Lube Oil Pressure Indication During Routine Surveillance Test.Caused by Pressure Too Low in Bldg Up in Sensing Lines.Test Satisfactorily Repeated ML20058M4281993-09-27027 September 1993 Special Rept 93-09:on 930920,notifies of Alarm Condition Showing Alert on Ground Water Level Outside 1A DG Room.Work Order 93063348 Initiated by Wc Personnel to Have Iae Personnel Check Operation & Calibr ML20056F8561993-08-23023 August 1993 Special Rept 93-06:on 930405,discovered Debris on Unit 1 Lower Core Plate.Four Other Unidentified Objects Noted During Video Insp of Lower Core Plate ML20126B5051992-12-15015 December 1992 Inplant Review Rept 92-20,special Rept Re Postulated Scenario That Could Introduce Air Into AFW Suction Piping. Caused by Functional Design Deficiency.Setpoints of Affected Pressure Switches Increased ML20106D7401992-10-0909 October 1992 RO 92-19:on 920804,discovered That Drive Shaft on Pump 1MNVPU0046 Was Rotating in Opposite Direction than Specified on Pump Casing.Caused by Mgt Deficiency.Motor Leads of Subj Pump Reconfigured to Provide Correct Pump Shaft Rotation ML20127E0191992-09-0909 September 1992 Special Rept:On 920421,unusual Event Declared Because Unit 1 Train B of Ssps Inoperable Due to Defective Circuit Card within Ssps.Failed Train B Ssps Circuit Board Replaced & Appropriate Procedures to Be Evaluated ML20101T9441992-07-13013 July 1992 Special Rept for Inplant Review 92-10:on 920610 No Mention Made on Work List of Vent Path Through SG 1B for Incoming SG Crews.Caused by Deficient Communication.Turnover Sheet Established to Document Existing Vent Path Status ML20101P5581992-07-0303 July 1992 In-Plant Review Rept 92-09:on 920619,setpoint Problems Noted W/Ts & Selected Licensee Commitment Values for Listed Field Data.Caused by Discrepancies W/Groundwater Level Monitoring Portion of Wz Sys.Ts Monitor Logged in Unit 2 Logbook ML20086Q1101991-12-20020 December 1991 Voluntary Special Rept 91-23:on 911008,reactor Vessel Lower Internals Contacted Reactor Vessel During Removal.Caused by Inappropriate Operator Action & Mgt Deficiency.Recovery Plan Developed Re Insp of Lower Internals & Refueling Canal ML20086H9431991-12-0404 December 1991 Special Rept 91-24:on 911104-29,concerns Noted Re Possible Leakage of Containment Spray Sys Check Valves Into Annulus, Causing Offsite Radioactive Dose.Caused by Design Deficiency.Check Valve Installed Downstream of Piping ML20091C0851991-08-0101 August 1991 Special Rept PIR 1-M91-0113:on 910616,diesel Engine Cooling Water Leak Discovered on Diesel Generator 1A at Discharge Flange on Intercooler End Bell Cover.Caused by Poor Casting Quality.New Covers Will Be Installed ML20081F7371991-06-0404 June 1991 Rev 1 to Special Rept 91-11 Dtd 910411:on 910215,turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Automatically Started. Caused by Deficient Communication & Lack of Attention to Detail.Pump Speed Reduced & Discharge Valves Closed ML20062E7991990-11-14014 November 1990 Special Rept:On 901011,turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Declared Inoperable W/O Having Made Security Notification.Caused by Inappropriate Action ML20055G2161990-07-12012 July 1990 Ro:On 900602,discovered That Channel 7 of Vibration & Loose Parts Monitor Sys Had Low Noise Level.Probably Caused by Bad or Damaged Sensor Cable.Definite Cause of Failure Undetermined.Sys Scheduled to Be Replaced ML20246F7081989-07-0303 July 1989 Special Rept:On 890601,diesel Generator 1A Shut Down Due to Lack of Oil Flow.Due to Test Being Performed,Normal Stop Would Not Shutdown Engine.New Oil Added & Pumps Primed. Turbocharger Mods Under Investigation ML20247N8841989-05-30030 May 1989 Special Rept:On 890418,vibration & Loose Parts Monitor Failed.Caused by Damaged Cables to Sensors on Each Affected Channel.Vibration & Loose Parts Monitor Will Be Repaired During Next Refueling Outage After New Replacement Received ML20244C6731989-04-0606 April 1989 Special Rept:On 890225,operations Personnel Discovered That Channel 8 of Vibration & Loose Parts Monitoring Sys Had Low Noise Level.Investigation Scheduled to Be Completed During Unit 1 Tube Leak Outage ML20196E8241988-12-0505 December 1988 Special Rept:On 881205,diesel Generator 1B Experienced Invalid Test Failure.Caused by Improper Adjustment of Voltage Regulator Due to Personnel Error.Operations Mgt Will Cover Incident W/Representative from Each Shift ML20196B5211988-11-29029 November 1988 Special Rept:On 881030,Diesel Generator 1B Experienced Invalid Test Failure During Start Attempt 602.Applicable Procedures for Diesel Generator Testing Reviewed & Revised If Necessary ML20195H4901988-11-16016 November 1988 Special Rept:On 881017,diesel Generator 1A Started for Operability Test & Subsequently Tripped.Caused by Loose Wire on Jacket Pump Discharge Pressure Switch.Wire Reterminated & Pressure Switch Calibr ML20205G3401988-10-24024 October 1988 Special Rept:On 880916,Tech Spec 3.7.14.a Violated.Caused by Standby Shutdown Facility Being Inoperable for More than 7 Days Due to Transfer Canal Isolating & Draining Utilizing Weir Gate.Special Order 88-13 Issued ML20151R0971988-07-27027 July 1988 Special Rept:On 880627,diesel Generator 1A Failed to Start within 11 S.Caused by Missing Drain Valve on Starting Air Filter Housing on Right Bank Side of Diesel Engine.Work Request Written to Replace Filter Housing ML20151F4911988-07-22022 July 1988 Special Rept:On 880519,diesel Generator 1A Started for Operability Test & After Operating for 10 Minutes, Automatically Stopped & Declared Inoperable.Caused by Failure to Maintain Lubricating Level in Valve 1LD-7 ML20195J3601988-06-22022 June 1988 Special Rept:On 880323,Train a Safety Injection & Main Steam Sys Isolation Signals Received from Unknown Fault Inside Train a Solid State Protection Sys Logic Cabinet.Cause of Fault Could Not Be Isolated.Cabinet Returned to Svc ML20195J6161988-06-20020 June 1988 Advises That Special Rept Re Diesel Generator 1A Incident on 880519 Will Be Submitted by 880708 Instead of 880620 Due to Unresolved Concerns ML20195G2171988-06-17017 June 1988 Special Rept:On 880518,diesel Generator 1B Experienced Valid Failure.Caused by Fuel & Vol of Trapped Air Shook Debris Loose from Engine Mounted Duplex Fuel Filter.Filter Cartridges Replaced.Preventative Maint Procedure Revised ML20151C7691988-04-0404 April 1988 Ro:Change of Commitment Submitted Re Diesel Generator Turbocharger Rotor Assembly Replacement.Turbocharger Inlet Casings Replaced on All Four Engines W/New Design.Dye Penetrant Testing Will Continue to Be Performed ML20147F4311988-03-0303 March 1988 Special Rept:On 880123,Channels 3,4 & 8 of Vibration & Loose Parts Monitor Had Unusual Noise Level.Cause Not Determined Due to Number of Possible Failures & Location of Components within Plants.Monitor Will Be Repaired During 1988 Outage ML20237D1341987-12-14014 December 1987 Special Rept:On 871108,safe Shutdown Facility RCS Wide Range Transmitter Out of Calibr.Instrument Could Not Be Calibrated.Requisition Initiated for Replacement Transmitter ML20236Q1621987-11-13013 November 1987 Special Rept:On 870816,malfunction of Main Turbine Generator Controls Caused Rapidly Decreasing Main Steam Line Pressure Triggering Safety Injection/Reactor Trip.Safety Injection & Unusual Event Terminated & Repairs Completed on 870821 ML20214S5421987-06-0808 June 1987 Special Rept:On 870503,pressurizer PORV 2NC-34A Automatically Opened Due to Pressure Transient in Rcs.Cause Not Determined.Charging & Letdown Flow Adjusted & Procedures Re Allowable Setpoint Range Revised ML20214G7301987-05-13013 May 1987 Special Rept:On 870407 & 08,complete 18-month Insp Required for Standby Shutdown Diesel Generator Determined Not to Have Been Performed on Time.Caused by Personnel Error.Work Request Will Be Issued Prior to 18-month Due Dates ML20213H0591987-05-0808 May 1987 Ro:On 870409,personnel Discovered Monthly Channel Checks on Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation Sys Wide Range Instrumentation Not Performed,Per Tech Specs.Ler Will Be Submitted by 870518 ML20214J1591986-11-21021 November 1986 Ro:On 861029,valves in ECCS Declared Inoperable.Caused by Rotork Motor Switch Settings.Ler for Incident Will Be Delayed Until 861219 to Allow Testing & Evaluation of Units ML20203J6551986-07-28028 July 1986 Ro:On 860626 & 27,small Cylindrical Objects Observed on Upper Core Baffle & in Vicinity of Upender,Respectively.On 860629,objects Confirmed to Be Spent Fuel Pellets.Pellets Vacuumed from Core & Upender 1999-03-05
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217G7951999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20217F3661999-09-22022 September 1999 Rev 18 to McGuire Unit 1 Cycle 14 Colr ML20212D1911999-09-20020 September 1999 SER Accepting Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10CFR50,App A,General Design Criterion 57 Closed System Isolation Valves for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20216E8851999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20211B1281999-08-31031 August 1999 Dynamic Rod Worth Measurement Using Casmo/Simulate ML20217G8101999-08-31031 August 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Unit 1 & 2 ML20211G5261999-08-24024 August 1999 SER Accepting Approval of Second 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Program Plan Request for Relief 98-004 for Plant,Unit 1 ML20211F3441999-08-17017 August 1999 Updated non-proprietary Page 2-4 of TR DPC-NE-2009 ML20210S2371999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20216E8951999-07-31031 July 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20209E4361999-07-0909 July 1999 SER Agreeing with Licensee General Interpretation of TS LCO 3.0.6,but Finds No Technical Basis or Guidance That Snubbers Could Be Treated as Exception to General Interpretation ML20196K6631999-07-0707 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee 990520 Position Re Inoperable Snubbers ML20209H1631999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20210S2491999-06-30030 June 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20209H1731999-05-31031 May 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206T4771999-05-31031 May 1999 Rev 3 to UFSAR Chapter 15 Sys Transient Analysis Methodology ML20196L1881999-05-31031 May 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 1 to DPC-NE-3004, Mass & Energy Release & Containment Response Methodology ML20195K3691999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206N3511999-05-11011 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Response to GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety- Related Movs ML20195K3761999-04-30030 April 1999 Revised MORs for Apr 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206R0891999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205L2341999-04-0505 April 1999 SFP Criticality Analysis ML20206R0931999-03-31031 March 1999 Revised Monthly Repts for Mar 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205P8991999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205C4171999-03-25025 March 1999 Special Rept 99-02:on 801027,Commission Approved for publication,10CFR50.48 & 10CFR50 App R Delineating Certain Fire Protection Provisions for Nuclear Power Plants Licensed to Operate Prior to 790101.Team Draft Findings Reviewed ML20207K2051999-03-0505 March 1999 Special Rept 99-01:on 990128,DG Tripped After 2 H of Operation During Loaded Operation for Monthly Test.Caused by Several Components That Were Degraded or Had Intermittent Problems.Parts Were Replaced & Initial Run Was Performed ML20204C8911999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205P9021999-02-28028 February 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20204C8961999-01-31031 January 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20199E0301998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20216F9931998-12-31031 December 1998 Piedmont Municipal Power Agency 1998 Annual Rept ML20198A4481998-12-11011 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Concluding That for Relief Request 97-004, Parts 1 & 2,ASME Code Exam Requirements Are Impractical. Request for Relief & Alternative Imposed,Granted ML20198D7561998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20199E0491998-11-30030 November 1998 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 Re Personnel Exposure ML20199E9651998-11-24024 November 1998 Rev 1 to ATI-98-012-T005, DPC Evaluation of McGuire Unit 1 Surveillance Weld Data Credibility ML20196D4171998-11-24024 November 1998 Special Rept 98-02:on 981112,failure to Implement Fire Watches in Rooms Containing Inoperable Fire Barrier Penetrations,Was Determined.Repair of Affected Fire Barriers in Progress ML20196G0581998-11-0606 November 1998 Rev 17 to COLR Cycle 13 for McGuire Unit 1 ML20196G0761998-11-0606 November 1998 Rev 15 to COLR Cycle 12 for McGuire Unit 2 ML20198D7771998-10-31031 October 1998 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20195E5961998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20154L6251998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20195E6021998-09-30030 September 1998 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20154B4131998-09-22022 September 1998 Rev 0 to ISI Rept for McGuire Nuclear Unit 1 Twelfth Refueling Outage ML20151W3521998-09-0808 September 1998 Special Rept 98-01:on 980819,maint Could Not Be Performed on FPS Due to Isolation Boundary Leakage.Caused by Inadequate Info Provided in Fire Impairment Plan.Isolated Portion of FPS Was Returned to Svc ML20154L6321998-08-31031 August 1998 Rev 1 to MOR for Aug 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Unit 1 ML20153B3741998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20236U1601998-07-31031 July 1998 Non-proprietary DPC-NE-2009, DPC W Fuel Transition Rept ML20237B2381998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20153B3931998-07-31031 July 1998 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Jul 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20236P0451998-07-0808 July 1998 Part 21 Rept Re non-conformance & Potential Defect in Component of Nordberg Model FS1316HSC Standby Dg.Caused by Outer Spring Valves Mfg from Matl That Did Not Meet Specifications.Will Furnish Written Rept within 60 Days 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
I
. . i
. p hg Duks En:rgy C:rporttirn
[8 ,
McGuire Nuclear Station 12700 Hagers Ferry Road Huntersville, NC 28078-9340 H. B. Barron . (700 8754800 om gg p,gg,,,, (704) 875-4809 nx
-November 24, 1998 I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:
McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1 and 2 Docket No. 50-369 and 50-370
.Special Report Number 98-02 ;
Problem Investigation Process No. 0-M98-2923, 0-M98-4051, and 0-M98-4052 Pursuant-to the provisions of McGuire Facility Operating License Conditions G { Unit 1} and F { Unit 2}, attached is Revision 0 of Special Report 98-02 describing a failure to implement the requirements of License Conditions C.(4) (Unit 1} and C.(7) (Unit 2}. These conditions require that McGuire Nuclear Station +
implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the plant Fire Protection Program. Contrary to these requirements, the station failed to comply with the Remedial Action of Selected Licensee !
Commitment 16.9-5, Fire Rated Assemblies. Specifically, fire watches were not implemented in rooms containing inoperable fire barrier penetrations as required by this remedial action. Upon discovery of this condition, continuous fire watches were implemented. Repair of the affected fire barriers is in progress.
The NRC was notified of this violation of the McGuire Facility operating License Conditions via phone and facsimile on November 12, 1998 (Event Report 35026). An update to this event was submitted on November 13, 1998.
Note that the plant remained within its design basis during this occurrence since the McGuire Nuclear Station Safe Shutdown
! Facility remained available to place the plant in a safe shutdown condition if required.
i l The planned corrective actions identified in this report are regulatory commitments.
l_ f l l l
l- Very truly yours, l
j H.B. Barron & f f, f'O i
Attachment 9812O20234 981124-PDR ADOCK 05000369 g PM .
l
. . .. . . _ _ . . _ . . _ _ _ . . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ . ..m._ . . . _ . . . _ . . - _ . . _ . _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ . _ .
, U.S. BhsclGar R gulctory Comuniccien Document Contr21 De:k Novennber 24, 1998 Page 2 cc: Mr. L. A. Reyes INPO Records Center U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comunission 700 Galleria Parkway Region II Atlanta, GA 30339 Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth St., SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, GA 30323 I F. Rinaldi Mr. Scott Shaeffer i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cosumission NRC Resident Inspector Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation McGuire Nuclear Station Washington, D.C. 20555 l
I 1
i l
l l
l l
l i
s
. . .- . .. . ~ . . _ . _ , . . _ - . _ . ~ . - . . . - . . _ . _ . . - - . _. - . - . -
l i
U.S. NuclcOr R gulctcry Comuniccien 1 Document Control Desk Novsaber 24, 1998 Page 3 1
bxc B.L. Walsh (EC11C) '
L.A. Keller (EC050)
J.I. Glenn (MG02ME)
'B.L. Peele (MG01VP) l J.E. Burchfield (ON01RC) I G.H. Savage (EC06E)
! G.B. Swindlehurst (EC11-0842)
C.M. Misenheimer (EC08I)
R.F. Cole (EC05N) l R.J. Freudenberger (EC05N) i T.G. Becker-(PB02L) l P.M.' Abraham (ECO8I)
R.B. White (MG01VP)
R.T. Bond (ONO3SR)
R.L. Bain (CN05SR)
K.L. Crane (MG01RC)
, G.D. Gilbert (EC05N)
J.A. Oldham (MG05EE)
NSRB Support Staff (EC05N)
EC050-ELL l
(
Attachment 1 Page 1 of 5 ,
Duke Energy Corporation McGuire Nuclear Station Regulatory Compliance Group Special Report 98-02 i Backcround McGuire Nuclear Station Facility Operating License (FOL)
Conditions C.(4) { Unit 1) and C. (7) { Unit 2} require that the i station implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the i plant Fire Protection Program as described in the Final Safety l Analysis Report. License Conditions G { Unit l} and F { Unit 2) +
directs Duke Energy to report any violations of the. requirements contained in License Conditions C.(4) { Unit 1).and C.(7) { Unit 2}
within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by telephone _and confirm by facsimile no-later :
than the first working day following the violation. A follow up .
written report is required to be submitted within 14 days.
Selected Licensee Commitment (SLC) 16.9-5 is part of the plant Fire Protection Program. This SLC requires that all fire rated assemblies separating: j 1
I
-* redundant analyzed post fire safe shutdown equipment or, j
- control complex (i.e. Control Room, Cable Rooms, and Battery l Rooms) from the remainder of the plant or, i
- containment from non-containment areas or,
- -safety from non-safety related areas i
and all sealing devices (fire doors, fire windows, fire dampers, cable, piping and ventilation duct penetration seals) in fire rated
, . assembly penetrations shall be operable. This commitment is ,
t l applicable at all times. The remedial action associated with SLC 16.9-5 states that with one or more of the above fire rated assemblies and/or sealing devices inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> either i
establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the-affected assembly, or verify the operability of fire detectors on at least one side of the inoperable assembly and establish an hourly fire watch patrol.
I
! Description of Occurrence Unit Status: Unit 1 and Unit 2 were in Mode 1 (Power Operation) at 100% Rated Thermal Power at the time this occurrence was discovered.
During an intrusive inspection of a representative sample of fire barrier penetration seals in the McGuire Nuclear Station Auxiliary Building, gaps and voids were observed in the foam sealant in five
- of the seven wall penetration fire barrier seals that were
- . inspected. The gaps are located at the top portion of the penetration seals and range in size from % to % inches. These gaps resulted from inadequate installation techniques, which caused settling of theofoam after the penetrations were sealed.
t-
l, Attachment 1 Page 2 of 5
\ !
i The voids exist at random locations in the foam sealant and are either."V-shaped" or circular in appearance. The "V-shaped" voids l were most likely caused by using insufficient quantities of foam and inadequate spacing of the sealant fill holes during l installation, which did not allow the foam to completely flow -
across the width of the. penetration opening. These voids. measure approximately 5 to 8 inches across the top of the "V" and around 3 inches high. Their depth ranges from approximately 50% to 100% of ;
the total length of the wall penetration seal. The circular voids were most likely formed during the foam sealant curing process when gases could not escape before additional foam was installed.
These voids have a circumference of around 3 to 4 inches and are ;
approximately 3 inches deep. i
- An evaluation of the affected wall penetration fire barrier seals i determined that they did not meet the applicable acceptance l
criteria and they were declared inoperable at 1730 hours0.02 days <br />0.481 hours <br />0.00286 weeks <br />6.58265e-4 months <br /> on ;
November 12, 1998. At the same time, given that five of the seven inspected wall seals had gaps and voids, all remaining wall ;
penetration fire barrier seals of a design similar to the l inspected seals were declared inoperable. Since these inoperable wall seals perform functions described in SLC 16.9-5, the site I implemented the remedial action of that SLC. These actions ,
satisfied the requirements of SLC 16.9-5 and the McGuire Nuclear Station FOL.
l No intrusive inspections of the affected wall penetration fire 1 barrier seals gaps have been performed since initial installation of the seals. It is assumed that the gaps and voids have existed since the wall seals were installed and that the seals have been inoperable for their service life. Since the remedial action I. required by SLC 16.9-5 for inoperable fire barrier assemblies was not implemented at all times prior to discovery of the inoperable wall seals on 12 November 1998, this represents a failure to implement the. requirements of License Conditions G { Unit l} and F
{ Unit 2} of the McGuire Nuclear Station FOL. The NRC was notified of this failure to implement the requirements of the McGuire FOL via phone and facsimile on November 12, 1998 (Event Report 35026).
This notification occurred within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> as required by the FOL.
At 1300 hours0.015 days <br />0.361 hours <br />0.00215 weeks <br />4.9465e-4 months <br /> on 13 November 1998, two additional wall penetration fire barrier seals were determined to be of similar design to those wall seals declared inoperable on 12 November 1998. These seals were overlooked during the initial review of affected wall seals on 12 November 1998. Those two seals were immediately declared inoperable and the remedial action of SLC 16.9-5 was implemented. j An update to Event Report 35026 was submitted to the NRC via phone and facsimile on 13 November 1998 describing this additional
! failure to implement the requirements of the McGuire FOL. This
! update occurred within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> as required by the FOL.
Note that the McGuire Nuclear Station Safe Shutdown Facility remained available during the above occurrences. In addition, based upon mitigating factors discussed elsewhere in this report, equipment in the affected rooms would.have also been available to perform their design function. Consequently, the plant was never
- - -- -.- - ~ - . -.-. - . - - . - - - - - -
t l L l l
- l . Attachment 1 j Page 3 of 5 i i
outside of its design basis or in an'unanalyzed or degraded condition. ,No technical specification requirements were violated ;
during this occurrence. Based upon the above, it was determined that the above occurrences do not meet the reportability l requirements of 10CFR50.72 "Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors" or 10CFR50.73 " Licensee Event >
Report' System".
l l Safety Sionificance i
l The failure to implement the remedial action of SLC 16.9-5 prior to discovery of the inoperable wall penetration fire barrier seals .
i represented a degradation of the McGuire Fire Protection Program.
i However, the safety significance of these occurrences was '
mitigated by:
l i e the relatively small size and numbers of the gaps and voids in the wall seals e the presence of fire and smoke detection systems in the affected areas a the availability of the Safe Shutdown Facility (SSF) with an i independent diesel generator and control room for mitigating ;
10CFR50 Appendix R fire events l
- other features of the plant Fire Protection Program such as control of combustible materials, hot work control, and the presence of an on-site Fire Brigade The plant Fire Protection Program provides measures for i controlling hot work activities and the amount and location of combustible materials in the plant. These features significantly-reduce the~ probability of a fire in the areas affected by the inoperable wall penetration fire barrier seals. In the event of a fire, the relatively small size and numbers of the gaps and voids in the affected wall seals would not have prevented the seals from providing a significant degree of separation between the areas and equipment identified in SLC 16.9-5. In addition, the fire and smoke detection systems in the affected~ areas remained operable )
for most of the time that the wall seals were inoperable. This, as well as the significant amount of separation still provided by i the wall seals, would have ensured that any fire in the affected i areas would have been detected by plant personnel before i significant damage occurred. Once detected, the on-site Fire
]
Brigade would have been available to control the extent of the '
fire and limit the severity of any damage. Finally, although some of the affected rooms contained equipment associated with the McGuire Nuclear Station SSF, the mitigating factors described
, above would have ensured that the SSF remained unaffected during L the'above occurrences and would be available to place the plant in
- a safe shutdown condition if required.
Based on the above, there were no significant safety consequences associated with the inoperable wall penetration fire barrier seals ;
and the_ failure to implement the remedial action of SLC 16.9-5.
l l
I
l l..' Attachment 1 l Page 4 of 5 McGuire's Response To Previous Information Notices I
NRC Information Notice 88-56 alerted addressees of the possibility
! that some installed fire barrier penetration seals may contain nonconforming conditions such as splits, gaps, voids, and lack of fill in the sealing material. It stated that these conditions may not be detected during routine inspection because the surface of the seal material is typically covered by a fire-resistant dam material. IN 88-56 indicated that the extent of the problem l appeared to be limited to fire barrier penetrations filled with l silicon foam material. In response to IN 88-56, Duke Power Company
- reviewed the installation procedures for silicon foam fire barrier penetration seals as well as the controls and verification process that ensures proper installation. This review determined that these procedures and processes were adequate to ensure that the silicon foam seals were installed properly.
\
NRC Information Notice 94-28 alerted addressees to potential j problems in installed fire-barrier penetration seals that may have 1 gone undetected as a result of inadequate inspection procedures, inadequate acceptance criteria, and the use of damming material which conceals the silicon foam. In response'to IN 94-28, a review !
determined that no changes were needed to Duke Power's existing i fire barrier installation and inspection program and the fire barrier penetration seal program.
Note that the above Information Notices indicated that McGuire's use of damming materials in fire barrier seals could render it i difficult to conduct adequate inspections and detect foam sealant '
problems. This concern could have been eliminated by implementing an intrusive inspection program at the McGuire Station. However, the internal reviews associated with these Information Notices did not recommend the implementation of such a program. Although this appeared to be a reasonable judgment based upon information available at that time, McGuire missed an opportunity to identify the voids and gaps in the affected wall penetration fire barrier
-seals.
Causes The gaps and voids observed in the affected wall penetration fire barrier seals were the result of inadequate foam sealant installation procedures. These deficiencies have existed since the original installation of the seals and remained undetected due to inadequate inspection procedures following installation of the seals.
l
. ~. _- -- . . _-
_ ~ . . - - . ..-.-- - - . . ~ . . - - - . .
i
,, Attachment 1
~
'Paga 5 of 5 Corrective Actions 1 Immediate:
- The affected wall penetration fire barrier seals were declared !
inoperable and the remedial action of SLC 16.9-5 was ;
implemented. This remedial action will' remain in place for each affected wall seal until they are returned to an operable condition.
Subsequent:
- A plan was developed to identify and implement the necessary- ,
repairs to-the affected wall penetration fire barrier seals. ,
t Planned (The below planned actions represent NRC commitments): ;
~
- The affected wall penetration. fire barrier seals will be repaired as needed to return them to an operable condition. ,
These repairs will be implemented and tracked by the plant l
. corrective action and work management programs. i I
- Fire barrier foam sealant installation and inspection procedures / processes will'be reviewed and changes implemented i as needed to help prevent the reoccurrence of the events !
described in this report. As part of this review, the need for '
implementing intrusive inspections will be evaluated.
- Bulletins and Information Notices related to Fire Barriers will be reviewed for applicability to McGuire and to identify any information that could be used to help ensure the requirements
-of the station Fire Protection Program are maintained.
j i
y i e-+-g--