ML20151W352

Special Rept 98-01:on 980819,maint Could Not Be Performed on FPS Due to Isolation Boundary Leakage.Caused by Inadequate Info Provided in Fire Impairment Plan.Isolated Portion of FPS Was Returned to Svc

ML20151W352
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, McGuire
Issue date:	09/08/1998
From:	Barron H DUKE POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
98-01, 98-1, NUDOCS 9809150271
Download: ML20151W352 (5)

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Duk2 Energy Ctrpor: lion

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McGuire Nuclear Station 12700 Hager: Ferry Road Huntersville, NC.28078-9340 (704) 875-4800 OFFICE

'y (704) 875-4809 FAX Dates September 8, 1998 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Connaission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1 and 2 Docket No. 50-369 and 50-370 Special Report Nmaber 98-01 Problem Investigation Process No.: 0-M98-2975 Gentlemen:

Attached is Revision 0 of Special Report 98-01 , describing a failure to comply with the Remedial Actions of Selected Licensee Comunitments 16.9-2 SPRAY AND/OR SPRINKLER SYSTEMS and 16.9-4 FIRE HOSE. STATIONS associated with the McGuire Fire Protection Systems.

This report is being suhanitted under the requirements of McGuire Facility Operating License Conditions C. (4) (Unit 1} and C. (7)

(Unit 2). The plant remained within design basis during this cccurrence.

Planned Corrective Actions identified in this report are regulatory commitments.

Very truly yours, N

H.B. Barron

-MTC/bcb Attachments cca Mr. L. A. Reyes INPO Records Center [,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 700 Galleria Parkway Region II Atlanta, GA 30339 /

Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth St., SW, suite 23T85 7 g

Atlanta, GA 30323 g j,1 F. Rinaldi Mr. Scott Shaeffer U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comunission NRC Resident Inspector Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation McGuirc Nuclear Station Washington, D.C. 20555 9909150271 990908  ?

PDR ADOCK 05000369 R S PDR 4

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l bxc: B.L. Walsh (EC11C) l M.S. Kitlan (CNO3RC)

L.A. Keller (EC050)

J.I._Glenn (MG02ME)

B.L. Peele'(MG01VP)

L.S. Davis (MG05SE) l J.E. Burchfield (ON01RC) '

l G.H. Savage (EC06E) l G.B. Swindlehurst (EC11-0842)

C.M. Misenheimer (EC08I)

R.F. Cole (EC05N)

R.J. Freudenberger (EC05N)

T.G. Becker (PB02L)

P.M. Abraham (EC08I)

R.B. White (MG01VP)

R.T. Bond (ONO3SR)

, K.L. Crane (MG01RC) ,

I G.D. Gilbert (EC05N)

P.R. Newton (PB05E)

L.F. Vaughn (PB05E)

P.R. Fowler (PB01J)

R.C. Birmingham (MG01VP)

W.A. Evans (MG01SC)

NSRB Support Staff (EC05N) i

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l Duke Energy Corporation McGuire Nuclear Station Regulatory Compliance Group Special Report

Background

This Special Report is submitted to document a failure to comply with the Remedial Actions of Selected Licensee Commitments 16.9-2 SPRAY AND/OR SPRINKLER SYSTEMS and 16.9-4 FIRE HOSE STATIONS.

These requirements are specified for the McGuire Fire Protection System when a portion of the system is removed from service for maintenance or becomes inoperable due to equipment failure.

Description of Occurrence Unit Status: Unit 1 and Unit 2 were in Mode 1 (Power Operation) at 100% Rated Thermal Power at the time of the occurrence.

On August 17, 1998, Operations personnel removed a portion of the McGuire Fire Protection System from service for maintenance. The Fire Protection Engineer made a determination that no compensatory measures were needed during this maintenance.

On August 19, 1998, Maintenance personnel reported to Operations that the work could not be performed due to isolation boundary leakage. Operations personnel contacted the Fire Protection Engineer again to inform the individual of a change in boundary valves. The extended boundaries resulted in isolation of a i portion of the Fire Protection System for sprinkler systems associated with the Unit 2 KC pumps and the Unit 1 Diesel Generator Fire Hose Stations. The Fire Protection Engineer recommended the use of a fire protection system impairment plan which did not contain complete compensatory measures. At 0530 on August 19, 1998, Operations personnel placed additional Red Tags to extend the isolation boundary and initiated hourly fire watches in the area of the Unit 2 Component Cooling Water (KC) pumps.

Continuous fire watches are required per SLC 16.9-2 for this area  !

when the sprinkler system is out of service. Also at this time, l additional fire hoses were placed near the Unit 1 Diesel Generator >

rooms for backup fire protection support. The attachment of gated wyes and hanging signs identifying the correct hose to use in case of fire in the specific area is also required by'SLC 16.9-4. The incomplete compensatory actions were specified in the fire protection system impairment plan.

Following completion of maintenance, Operations personnel returned the isolated portion of the Fire Protection System to service and i eliminated compensatory actions.

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e Conclusion This occurrence was a result of inadequate information provided in the Fire Impairment Plan. A contributing factor was inadequate review of the McGuire Selected Licensee Commitments.

On August 24, 1998, Regulatory Compliance personnel reviewed the condition report (PIP 0-M98-2975), from this occurrence and determined it was reportable under conditions of the Facility Operating License.

This occurrence was reported to the NRC via the Emergency Notification System under the requirements of McGuire Facility Operating License Conditions C. (4) { Unit l} and C. (7) { Unit 2}.

The event number is 34675, and was reported as non-compliance with Remedial Actions of Selected Licensee Commitments 16.9-2 and 16.9-4. A written follow-up report is required within 14 days.

This occurrence does not meet the reportability requirements of 10CFR50.72 "Immediate notification requirements for operating nuclear power reactors" or 10CFR50.73 " Licensee event report system".

Safety Significance The Compensatory measures taken associated with the isolated portion of the Fire Protection System near the Unit 2 KC pumps should have been continuous rather than hourly fire watches. '

However, fire / smoke detection systems in this area remained operable throughout the occurrence to alert control rcom operators '

to a possible fire.

The Compensatory measures taken associated with the isolated portion of the Fire Protection System affecting the Unit 1 Diesel Generator Fire Hoses should have included attaching gated wyes and hanging signs identifying the correct hose to use in case of fire in the specific area. However, fire detectors and the primary fire suppression system (Halon) for the Diesel Generator rooms remained operable throughout this occurrence.

Therefore adequate fire detection and suppression capability existed throughout this occurrence. The Compensatory actions were not in compliance with the Fire Protection Selected Licensee Commitments.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Immediate:

i The isolated portion of the Fire Protection System was returned to service eliminating the need for compensatory measures.

Subsequent:

None 2

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Planned: -

1. Operations management will emphasize to all operations personnel, the importance of compliance with plant Technical .

Specifications and Selected Licensee Commitments associated with Fire Impairment Plans.

2. Engineering management will emphasize to all Fire Protection Engineering personnel, the importance of reviewing plant Technical Specifications and Selected Licensee Commitment requirements prior to providing to Operations or development of impairment plans.

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