ML20058M428

Special Rept 93-09:on 930920,notifies of Alarm Condition Showing Alert on Ground Water Level Outside 1A DG Room.Work Order 93063348 Initiated by Wc Personnel to Have Iae Personnel Check Operation & Calibr

ML20058M428
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire
Issue date:	09/27/1993
From:	Mcmeekin T DUKE POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
93-09, 93-9, NUDOCS 9310050217
Download: ML20058M428 (1)

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. Dae her Comparty T C Mcunus McGuire Nuclear Generation Department Vice President 12709 Hagen Terry Road (MG01A) . (704) Sis-4800

• Hmersntle, NC280it8985 (704)875-4809 fu DUKEPOWER

.w-September 27, 1993 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1 Special Report Number 93-09 Problem Investigation Process No.: 1-M93-0852 Gentlemen:

Special' Report Number 93-09 is being submitted to the NRC for.

information persuant to Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9-8. The incident concerned a failure to perform required. remedial action as specified by a Selected Licensee Commitraent. This event is considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours, Y[e$ w T.C. McMeekin TLP/bcb Attachment xc: Mr. S.D. Ebneter INPO Records Center Administrator, Region II Suite 1500 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1100 Circle 75 Pa;kway 101 Marietta St., NW , Suite 2900 Atlanta, GA 30339 Atlanta, GA 30323 Mr. Victor Nerses Mr. George Maxwell U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC Resident Inspector Office of. Nuclear Reactor Regulation McGuire Nuclear Station Washington, D.C. 20555 9310050217 930927 F) gDR ADOCK 0500

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McGUIRE SAFETY REVIEW GROUP SPECIAL REPORT

1. REPORT NUMBER: 93-09 ,

2. DATE OF REVIEW September 1 - September 23, 1993

3. SUBJECT DESCRIPTION: This review is submitted as a special report pursuant to selected Licensee Commitment (SLC) 16.9-8, remedial action a(2). Problem Investigation Process (PIP) 1-M93-0852 describes an incident in which an alarm condition existed from August 20, 1993 until September 3, 1993, showing an " Alert" Ground Water Indicating (WZ) system level outside the Unit lA Diesel Generator Room. The SLC e commitment remedial action requires that if the inoperable monitor (s)  !

I are not returned to operable status within 7 days, a special report documenting the results of the investigation of such an event be  !

I submitted to the NRC within 30 days.

4. EVALUATION AND COMMENT:  !

I Abstract f l

A Technical Specification Action Item Log (TSAIL) entry was made at 1900  ;

on August 20, 1993, indicating that an alarm condition exisced showing ,

an " Alert" ground water level outside the 1A Diesel Generator Room.  !

Receipt of this alarm requires verification of whether a high groundwater level exists, and remedial action be performed as specified 3 by SLC commitment 16.9-8. Operations (OPS) personnel generated Work Request (WR) 93028578 to determine the cause of the alarm and take l appropriate remedial action. However, at the time the WR was generated, no reference was made on the WR to the TSAIL entry or the SLC commitment ,

associated with the alarm. Work Control (WC) personnel received WR 93028578 on August 23, 1993, but did not recognize any special commitment associated with the request. On August 30, 1993, OPS personnel noted that the TSAIL item was still outstanding and the 7 day commitment had not been met. They proceeded to inform WC perconnel of the discrepancy. Work Order (WO) 93063348 was initiated by WC personnel l to have Instrumentation And Electrical (IAE) personnel check the operation and calibration of loop IWZLP5090, determine the cause for the alarm on the Groundwater Level Detector for lA Diesel Generator Room  !

(1WZPS5091), and calibrate / repair as necessary. On September 3, 1993, IAE personnel performed the required checks and found level transmitter i

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. l DPC/MNS SPECIAL REPORT No. 93-09 PAGE 2 1WZLT5090 to be out of calibration. The problem was corrected and the alarm cleared. Unit 1 was in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) at the time this ,

incident occurred. This incident is assigned a cause of Deficient  !

Communication because of the lack of communication of the SLC commitment ).

between the groups involved. The Work Management System computer l program will be modified to require notation of Technical Specification l (TS) or SLC associated items on the front of the-WR. Also, specifics of i this incident will be covered with appropriate personnel, i

i Background l The Reactor and Auxiliary Building complex for McGuire incorporates a l permanent groundwater dewatering system that is designed to preclude groundwater from rising above a structural distress level of elevation j 732 ft. mean sea level (MSL), or 28 ft. below the site grade level of ,

760 ft. ISL.

The groundwater drainage system incorporates a grid system beneath the {

I Reactor and Auxiliary Building base mats, 3 sumps in the Auxiliary Building (each with pumps and level alarms), a peripheral exterior drain  !

system, and 11 groundwater level monitors. Originally, McGuire 4 incorporated all 11 level monitors as TS monitors.

subsequently, an analysis performed by Design Engineering personnel demonstrated that the Reactor and Diesel Generator Buildings were

! designed to withstand groundwater stresses up to 760 ft. MSL. ,

Therefore, a TS revision was sought and obtained (Amendment Nos. 93 and

74) that removed all but 5 of the level monitors from TSs. The other 6 ,

i 1evel monitors were placed in Chapter 16 of the McGuire Final Safety  ;

Analyses Report (FSAR) as SLC commitments. These 6 monitors, having ,

locations listed in Table 16.9-6, are to be retained in administrative procedures for the groundwater monitoring program and utilized as an

indication of any localized groundwater increases that may be indicative of increase due to ruptured pipes, etc..., and as an indication of a i problem with the underground grid system. This commitment was made as I part of the justification for relaxing the groundwater monitoring TS.

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The commitment states that the groundwater level monitors listed in  ;

Table 16.9-6 for the Reactor and Diesel Generator Buildings shall be operable at all times.

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SPECIAL REPORT No. 93-09 l PAGE 3 j J

Description Of Event i I

On August 20, 1993, at 1900, OPS personnel made a TSAIL entry indicating I that an alarm condition existed on the groundwater panel located on 750' i elevation of the Auxiliary Building. The alarm indicated that there was  :

I an " Alert" groundwater level indication outside the 1A Diesel Generator >

Room. As a result of the alarm OPS personnel verified that a high  !

groundwater level did not exist and initiated WR 93028578 to have .

appropriate personnel investigate the reason for the alarm. Also, at that time, an entry was made in the TSAIL denoting the alarm condition.

However, at that time no contact was made with WC personnel to alert them of the fact that the equipment involved had been logged in the j TSAIL or that a 7 day SLC commitment was associated. No notation or j identifier was placed on WR 93028578 to denote the TSAIL entry or the SLC commitment.  !

On August 23, 1993, WR 93028578 was received by WC personnel as a f routine / control room indication problem (CRIP) task. The SLC association of the equipment involved was not recognized by WC personnel who j It was placed in a file of work waiting to be planned. i screened the WR.

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On August 30, 1993, OPS personnel reviewing the TSAIL recognized the 7 f day SLC commitment had been missed. They informed WC personnel in the ,

Work Control Center of the discrepancy. WC personnel in the Work Control Center investigated and discovered the WR had not yet been j planned. Appropriate WC personnel were informed of the 7 day SLC  ;

commitment associated with the WR. Immediate action was taken to plan j and schedule the task as a high priority item. Consequently, WO {

l 93063348 was initiated to have IAE personnel check the operation and calibration of the associated groundwater loop (lWZLP5090), determine the cause for the alarm on the groundwater level detector for lA Diesel Generator Room, and calibrate / repair the equipment as necessary. No  ;

1 notation or step was placed on the WO denoting the associated TSAIL l i

entry or the need for IAE personnel to clear it once the problem was resolved. The WO was then scheduled for IAE shift personnel to be performed on September 3, 1993.

i On September 3, 1993, IAE personnel performed the required checks and found level transmitter 1WZLT5090 to be out of calibration. The problem was corrected and the alarm cleared. The remainder of the equipment was j i

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. 1 DPC/MNS SPECIAL REPORT No. 93-09 l PAGE 4 l

verified to work properly. However, at the time the work was performed, )

i neither the IAE nor the OPS personnel involved recognized the TSAIL ,

i entry existed and the entry was not cleared.

On September 7, 1993, the Safety Review person investigating the incident discovered the TSAIL entry had not been cleared. Appropriate WC personnel were informed and; consequently, the TSAIL entry was cleared.

Conclusion This incident is assigned a cause of Deficient Communication because of  ;

the lack of communication of the SLC commitment associated with the  ;

equipment involved on the WR sent to WC personnel and later on the WO sent to IAE personnel.

The WR initiated by OPS personnel should have denoted the SLC $

association of the equipment involved and the associated time clock which had been started with the TSAIL entry. irir could have been ,

accomplished by a notation on the Special Inscruction field of the WR or more appropriately the Technical Specification Related field of the WR  ;

e at the time it was generated. With no notation or " Flag" on the WR, WC l personnel did not recognize that a 7 day clock had been started. 1 l

This type of notification had been accomplished in the past by use of a red stamp denoting a TSAIL entry ant' associated time requirements on the front of a WR when it was initiated or whenever an associated TSAIL entry was made. However, with the advent of the Work Management System (WMS) computer program, a paper copy of the WR up front was eliminated. J With no paper copy to stamp, this means of communication has been lost l on the initiation of WRs associated with TSAIL entries. The personnel involved must take responsibility to identify TS or SLC related items on 1

the electronic fields designated for those purposes or the information will not be transmitted. This discrepancy with the WMS computer program had been noted prior to this incident and will be rectified by changes already proposed to WMS. An entry into a data field on the front of the WR will be automatically required for items recognized by the computer program as TS or SLC related. This change to the WMS program should be j

4 in place by February 28, 1994. In the interim, the TSAILs will be reviewed daily and WC personnel will insure WOs exist and are scheduled 1

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SPECIAL REPORT No. 93-09 l PAGE 5 i appropriately to meet timeframes as specified by the TSAIL entries.

Also, OPS personnel will evaluate the flow of WR for review after they

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V are originated. Appropriate changes will be made to insure proper f notations are made to reflect TS or SLC related items and associated j committed actions required. 1 The WC personnel involved should also have included a note or step on l

the associated WO, to cause the IAE personnel performing the work to j recognize the TSAIL entry associated with the equipment'and the need to j clear it. The lack of any such note or step led to the TSAIL entry remaining open from September 3, 1993 to September 7, 1993, even though  !

the alarm was cleared. This could have caused unnecessary delays and f uncertainty of the validity of the alarm status by OPS personnel.  ;

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5. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: t Immediate: None PIP l-M93-0852 was initiated to investigate the -i Subsequent: 1) circumstances surrounding the incident, determine the cause or causes, and appropriate  !

l resolutions for problems identified. i e

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2) Specifics of the incident were discussed with appropriate OPS and WC personnel.

Planned: 1) Changes will be made to the WMS computer program that will cause recognition of TS and SLC associated components and require entry of appropriate data on the front page of WRs when ,

they are initiated.

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2) OPS personnel will evaluate the flow of WR which ,

involve TS or SLC related equipment and take ,

appropriate steps to insure that these WRs receive proper review prior to approval.

3) OPS Shift Managers will perform a daily review of TSAIL entries and include all outstanding' ,

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DPC/MNS SPECIAL REPORT No. 93-09 PAGE 6 L identified items in the associated Shift Manager  :

Unit Logbook.  ;

t 4} WC personnel will review the Shift Managers Unit  ;

Logbooks once per day, insure that all TSAIL [

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items listed as outstanding have an associated- ,

WO, and that the WOs involved

• e scheduled in a l time frame and with the prop r , 'ority to i insure the specified time fra.m.- are met.

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