IR 05000354/1986012

Insp Rept 50-354/86-12 on 860210-21.No Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Followup of Insp 50-354/86-10 Findings & Actions on Previous Insp Findings & Preoperational Test Results Review Evaluation

ML20140J153
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek
Issue date:	03/26/1986
From:	Briggs L, Eselgroth P, Florek D, Wink L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20140J131	List: IR 05000354/1986012 ML20140J127
References
50-354-86-12, NUDOCS 8604040269
Download: ML20140J153 (12)

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-U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /86-12 -

Docket N License No. CPPR-120 Category B Licensee: Public Service Electric & Gas Company 80 Park Plaza Newark, New Jersey 07101 Facility Name: Hope Creek Generating Station, Unit 1 Inspection At: Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspection Conducted: February 10-21, 1986 Inspectors: wh 8 fg

. 8 iggs lpQVReactorEngineer ate s4 & Ak D. El ek L4dB Reactor Engineer date

//dd Lpink,ReactorEnieer wa

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d' ate Approved by: .

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. $selgr , Chief Test Programs Section '

da t'e Inspection Summary: Inspection on February 10-21, 1986 (Inspection Report No. 50-354/86-12).

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by three region based inspec-tors of follow-ups of Inspection 50-354/86-10 findings, followup of licensee actions on previous inspection findings, preoperational test results review evaluation, power ascension test program, QA/QC interface with the preoperation-al test program, preoperational test witnessing, independent verification and plant tour Results: No violations were identifie NOTE: For acronyms not defined refer to NUREG-0544 " Handbook of Acronyms and Initialisms."

8604040269 860331 PDR O ADOCK 05000354 PDR

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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted Public Service Electric Gas (PSE&G} personnel and contractors

• V.-Blenx, Assistant Project Manager B. Butler, Startup Test Engineer

• J. Carter, Startup Manager N. Champion, Lead-QA Engineer G. Chew, Power Ascension Technical Support

• D. Cunningham, Atlantic Electric Representative

• R. Donges, Lead QA Engineer

• J. Duffy, Site Engineering

• N. Dyck, Chairman, Response Coordination Team M. Farshon, Power Ascension Manager

• A. Giardino, Manager Station QA

• Goebel, OA Engineer

• R. Griffith, Principal QA Engineer

• C. Jaffee, Startup Engineer

• S. LaBruna, Assistant General Manager ,

C. McNeill, Jr. , Vice President-Nuclear

• G' Moulton, Principal QA Engineer

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• R. Salvesen, General Manager, Hope Creek Operations R. Schmidt, Senior Reactor Superviso W. Schell, Power Ascension Technical Director L. Zull, Lead STD&A Engineer U.S.' Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• D. Allsopp, Resident-Inspector

• R. Borchardt, Senior Resident Inspector P. Eselgroth, Chief, Test Programs Section, Division of Reactor Sa4ty H. Kister, Chief, Project Branch No.1, Division of Reactor Projects

• J. Lyash, Resident Inspector The inspector also contacted other members of the licensee staff including Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisors, reactor operators, test engineers and members of the technical staf * denotes those present at the exit interview on February 21, 1986 2.0 Followup on Inspection 50-354/86-10 Findings During the period February 12-14, 1986, NRC concerns relative to the pre-operational test program deficiencies reported in Inspection 50-354/86-10 were discussed on site with senior licensee management. During this

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period, senior licensee management identified corrective actions for these deficiencies which should improve the effectiveness of the licensees pre-operational test program. These corrective actions, which the licensee is in the process of 'mplementing, are as follows:

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The Test Review Board (TRB) will use checklists to ensure specific review aspects will not be overlooke The TRB will conduct an additional review subsequent to Preoperational Review Committee (PORC) reviewer's comments to ensure that comments have been properly addressed and incorporated prior to final PORC approva The Quality Assurance (QA) Organization will be involved with initial i Startup Manager revie The QA Organization will increase emphasis concerning procedural quality and compliance during actual conducu of the tes Management of each organization involved with preoperational test procedure (PTP) results review will stress the importance of a thorough, quality minded review, instead of schedule demand All parties involved in results review will be advised ~ by memoranda of the specific details of the identified violations and the response provided during the week of February 17, 1986 with emphasis on quality of work and attention to administrative detai In. addition, corrective actions being taken to correct the identified violations, in particular the functional testing of acoustic monitors and rewitnessing of required mandatory witness points will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC inspection. Also, the effectiveness of the licensee's modified PTP results review program will be evaluated during routine NRC results~ evaluation review inspections.

3.0 Licensee Actions on Previous Inspection Findings

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(Closed) Circular (354/80-CI-21), this circular. deals with the duties and responsibilities of the Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) during re-fueling operations. This item was also reviewed in insp'ection report 50-354/86-1 The inspector reviewed SA-AP.ZZ-049 " Conduct of Fuel Handling and Core Alterations," Revision I dated February 7, 1986 and verified that the duties and responsibilities of the refueling SRO were specified. This item is closed.

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(0 pen) Circular (354/77-CI-12), this circular deals with steps and measures to be considered to prevent fuel assemblies from being drop-ped during refueling. The inspector reviewed letter CB-77-246 dated November 2, 1977, RE-FR.ZZ-001 " Fuel Handling Controls," Revision 2, OP-FT.KE-001 " Functional Test of Refuel Platform" Revision 0, MD-PM.KE-002 " Refuel Platform Crane Preventive Maintenance," Revision 0, MD-PM.KE-003 " Refueling Platform Operational Check" Revision ~1, OP-ST-KE-001 " Refuel Interlock Operability Functional Check" Revision 0, and OP-IO.ZZ.009 " Refueling Operations," Revision 0. These proce-dures were found to satisfy the items in the circular except for the following which the licensee indicated would be satisfie ~

The licensee will add steps in the daily log OP-DL.ZZ-026 to conduct shiftwise and daily inspections of selected refueling equipment cri-tical components such as cables, fasteners, hoists and brakes when the equipment is in use. The licensee will revise OP-ST.KE-001 to assure that the interlocks 2, 6,11 and 16 of FSAR table 7.3-3 are included as part of the interlocks verified to be operable. This item will remain open pending the satisfactory completion of the abov (Closed) Circular (354/78-CI-11), Recirculation M-G Set Overspeed Stops. The inspector reviewed the following licensee procedures:

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TE-SU.BB.352(Q), Recirculation System Maximum Flow limit Veri fication ,

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IC-FT.BB-031(Q) and (IC-FT.BB-032(Q)), Reactor Recirculation System - Channel A, (Channel B) Positioner S001A (S0018) MG Set A(B) Scoop Tube Electrical and Mechanical Stop, and,

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RE-50.RJ-006(Q), Verification of NSSS Computer Constants 'and 00-12 Operation.

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The i.nspector determined that appropriate measures had been taken by the licensee to satisfy the circular's' guidance. The. inspector dis-

. cussed setting of the Recirculation MG Set mechanical overspeed stops during scheduled-startup testing. The GE representative was familiar with possible MG. set loss of. speed control problems and the need to maintain low mechanical overspeed stop settings to limit the conse-quences of such events. This item is close .0 Preoperational Test Results Evaluation Review

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4.1 -Scope

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The completed test procedures below were reviewed during this inspec-tion ~ to verify that adequate testing had been conducted to satisfy i- regulatory guidance, licensee commitments and FSAR requirements and i

to verify that uniform criteria are being applied for evaluation of j completed test results in order to assure technical and administra-i tive adequacy.

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. 5 The inspector reviewed the test results and verified'the licensee's evaluation of test.results by review of test changes, test.excep-tions, test deficiencies, "As-Run" copy of test procedures, accept-ance criteria, performance verification, recording conduct of test, QC inspection records, restoration of system to normal after test, independent verification of critical steps or parameters, identi-fication of personnel conducting and evaluating test data, and verification that the test results have been approve PTP-SV-1, Remote Shutdown Panel, Revision 0, Results PORC i Approved January 31, 1986;

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PTP-GU-1, Filtration, Recirculation and Ventilation System (FRVS),

Revision 0, Results PORC' Approved January 28, 1986; and

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PTP-SM-2, Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff and Primary Containment Isolation Systems Equipment Actuation, Revision 0, Results Approved January 28, 198 .2 Discussion PTP-SV-1 The inspector noted that four test exceptions associat'ed with SV-1, Remote Shutdown Panel, identified that RHR valves BC-HV-F009 and BC-HV-F022 had logic which permitted the valves to open at high pres-sure and required closure at low pressure. This is the opposite to that required for these valves. They should not be permitted to be open at high pressure. The inspector inquired if previous preopera-tional " yellow line" testing had failed to discover this error. The inspector reviewed RHR Electrical Schematic Diagrams E-6108-0 Revision 4 and Revision 7 and TPR-BCE-246 and TPR-BCE-118 and verified that testing was performed as required. However, the drawing utilized to perform the " yellow line" test contained the logic error which was properly discovered th~ rough the preop test SV- No test dificien-cies were noted. Open test exceptions are included in the SDR list belo ,

PTP-SM-2 Sixty six (66) test exceptions were identified of which fifteen (15)

remain open. These open test exceptions are included in the SOR listing below with the exception of SDR-SM-0086 which is discussed in the following paragrap ;

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. 6 SOR-SM-0086. involves the failure of the arming collars of the Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System (NSSSS) manual initiation pushbuttons

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(821H-528A, B, C and D) to function properly. The NSSSS manual ini-tiation pushbuttons were designed to require the rotation of the arming collar to enable the pushbutton. During the preoperational test it was discovered that the pushbutton function was active when the arming collar was in either the armed or disarmed position. The test engineer. determined that a Field Change Request (FCR-J50136) had modified these switches to remove a " redundant" wire to the 2B con-t_ acts and that this change had inadvertently defeated the function of-the arming collar. A new Field Change Request (FCR-J50397) was then issued to return the switches to their original configuration. Since the required rework has the potential for invalidating previous test-ing of these switches, the adequacy of the NSSS Manual Initiation Pushbuttons to perform their intended function will remain an unre-solved item (354/86-12-01) pending rework of the switches per FCR-J50397; retesting of the switches; and NRC review of the scope and results of the retest to insure proper operation of the manual ini-tiation functio PTP-GU-1 During review of PTP-GU-1 the inspector had several questions concern-ing performance of this procedure. These questions were discussed with'the system test engineer (STE). All' questions except one were satisfactorily answered. One question concerned test exception (TE)

55, which stated that fan AV206 tripped on low flow. The inspector-questioned how subsequent data, which required the fan to be running, had been taken and dated the same day. The STE informed the inspector that the original sheet of TEs which included TESS had been lost or damaged such that a new page was written._ The new page did not iden-tify the fact that the low flow switch had been disabled to allow the fan to run. The STE noted that similar testing had been conducted on BV206 under exception No. 61. This TE did state that the low flow'

switch had been disabled, but did not specify-the method, to allow testing to continue. During further discussion the inspector asked the method by which the two low flow switches were disabled. The STE, although not positive, thought a lead had been.-lifted. The inspector noted that modification of the procedure in_both cases required a change notice or an on-the-spot (OTS) change and that if leads had been lifted a QA mandatory witness point (MWP) for each low ilow switch should have been added to verify system restoration in accord-ance with Startup Administrative Procedure (SAP) No. 24. SAP-24 is somewhat confusing in the use of TE's since it states that a TE is to be initiated to correct procedure errors, etc. (Paragraph 7.5.2.7.c).

SAP-24 also requires an OTS or change notice to be issued to modify the procedure or clear a T.E. The inspector noted that the changes

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. 7 did.not violate the intent of the procedure since proper damper post-tioning was being tested in.both cases. However, Administrative re-quirements had been circumvented and two MWP's may have been bypassed if leads had been lifted. The inspector considered this to be.a' fur-ther example of the findings identified.in Inspection Report 50-354/

86-10. However, the inspector also noted that the PORC approval date of January 28, 1986 was prior to the licensee's implementation of corrective action as discussed in Paragraph 2 of this report. The above was- discussed in detail with the . licensee prior to and during the exit meetin This item is unresolved-(354/86-12-02) pending QA verification of sys-

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MWP's and subsequent NRC revie .3 Findings-No violations were identified in the above review. Ho. wever, several open test exceptions require resolution by the licensee. -The inspec-tor routinely assigns an unresolved item number to open test excep-tions.that are desired to be tracked. The following open test excep-tions identified in previous NRC reports along with those open test exceptions identified in the above review are being consolidated into-one unresolved item (354/86-12-03). Unresolved item 354/86-10-04 is-close Procedure N Short Title SDR N PTP-AN-2 Demin. Wtr Storage & Transfer AN-0039 PTP-PK-1 125 VDC Class IE PK-0117, 0119 and 0120 PTP-PJ-1 250 VDC Class IE .PJ-0026, 0033 and 012 PTP-BC-1 RHR BC-915, 1042, 1043, 1143, 1144, 1146, 1147, 114 RL-736, 73 . - . - - .

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. 8 Procedure N Short Title SDR N PTP-SV-1 Remote Shutoown Panel 88-1011 and '

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.BC-1046, 1080, 1141 and 1142;80-411, 482 and~496; EG-562,577, 665 and 666; FC-17; GJ-129, 185 and 195; RL-942, 944 and.950; SV-36, 39, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55 and 57; ZZ-996 PTP-SM-2 NSSS and PCIS AB-0470, Equipment Actuation BB-1011 and 1019, BG-0367, GS-0459, HB-829, KL-259 RJ-129,.

SK-113, SM-0096,-0100, 0101, 0102, 0106, 0107, 0108 and 0109 PTP-GV-1 FRVS GU-528, 529, 558,574, 576, 572,.530, 575, 573, 577, 574,

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!- 581 5.0 - Power Ascension Test Program (PATP)

5.1. References

Regulatory Guide 1.68, Revision 2, August 1978, " Initial Test i- Programs for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants"

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• ANSI N18.7. - 1976, " Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance for the Operational Phase of Nuclear Power Plants"

• Hope Creek Generating Station (HCGS) Technical Specifications, Proof and Review Copy

HCGS Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Chapter 14, " Initial Test Program"

• HCGS Safety Evaluation Report, Chapter 14, " Initial Test Program"

• Station Administration Procedure, SA-AP.ZZ-036, Revision 1,

" Phase III Startup Test Program"

Specification NE80 23A4137, Revision 0, " Hope Creek Startup Test Specification"

• HCGS Power Ascensi.on' Test Matrix, Revision 3 5.2 Overall Power-Ascension Test Program (PATP)

Discussion The inspector held dis'cussions with the Power Ascension Test Director and discussed activities that have been utilized to improve the quality of the PATP procedures. The licensee has begun _to utilize a Technical Review Board (TRB) coni.ept to assure proper integration of the PATP procedures. The TRB reviews the procedure and holds dis-cussions with the test procedure writer to assure that FSAR commit-ments and Regulatory Guide commitments are satisfied, that the test procedu're is consistent with the GE Test Specification and technical specifications and that it properly interfaces with the station administrative and technical procedures. The inspector witnessed a portion of the TRB review of the Fuel Loading Procedures and observed that the above attributes were being verified by the.TRB. The TRB was observed to be quite probing in their questions and appeared to be doing a thorough revie The licensee representative also discussed the in process changes being made to the initial criticality procedures to address NRC inspector concerns identified in inspection report 50-354/86-0 The licensee also utilized the TRB to review this procedure. The licensee will have issued a revision to the initial criticality procedure by the next inspectio T

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. 10 5.3 Fuel Channel Adapter Plates The inspector held discussions with the licensee and contractor personnel and performed field observations of the fuel channel adapter plates on one of the two spare fuel channels. During the discussions, the purpose and analysis of .the fuel channel adapter plates were discussed. The licensee also summarized the analysis and testing performed in letter GP-86-40 dated February 13, 1986, at the request of the inspecto The~ purpose of the adapter plates is to maintain the bundles vertical in the core due to the use of the C lattice core-design and D lattice top guide design. The licensee performed sizing analysis, loose parts analysis, scramability analysis, weld and. crevice corrosion testing, and assessment of seismic capability and flow induced vibra-

. tion. In addition, the fuel channel adapter has been demonstrated operationally at an overseas plant. During fuel inspections at the end of the third cycle, the channels were visually examined with no observed wear or corrosion of the adapter plate The licensee response satisfied the inspector and he had no

' additional questions at this tim .0 ~ QA Interface with the Preoperational Test Program The inspe'ctor reviewed several randomly selected Quality Assurance Surveil-lance Reports (QASR) dealing with the licensee's preoperational test pro-gram. The reports were reviewed to verify direct QA/QC monitoring of activities affecting the quality of testing of plant equipment and compo-nents. The following QASR's were reviewe QASR-6904, Surveillance of cooling water flow to drywell cooler BP-400, conducted to complete SDR-GT-0254. The QC inspector witnessed

. proper setting of valve position and-desired flow on January 5, 198 QASR-6914, Surveillance of final air balance of Auxiliary Building (Diesel Generator Area) HVAC, completed on January 7,1986. The QC inspector witnessed various flow measurements performed under Test Package Release (TPR) GMM-0059 which included General Test Instruc-

~ tion (GTI)-25M-ZZ02. No discrepancies.were noted by the QC inspecto QASR-6915, Surveillance of Part A of PTP.BB-3 (Loss of Power), con-ducted on January 7, 1986. the QC inspector noted that the B diesel generator trip was listed as TE # It was also noted that OTS

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changes were not also being listed as TE's as required. This surveil-lance was cleared by a response from the STD Principal Test Engineer on January 10, 198 I

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QASR-6924, Surveillance of PTP-BD-1, RCIC, retest No. 14-conducted on January 7,1986. Testing was conducted to verify receipt of the RCIC turbine trouble alarm in the control roo No deficiencies were note QASR-7094,-Surveillance of PTP-SA-1, Redundant Reactivity Control

. System, conducted on January 13, 1986. During this. surveillance the QC inspector witnessed 37 mandatory witness points with no discre-pancies note ~.1 Findings No unacceptable conditions were noted during the above revie .0 Preoperational Test Witnessing The inspector observed test equipment being connected and setup by the STE in accordance with Detailed Test Procedure (DTP) - SB-0009, Main Steam Line (MSL) High Radiation Trip. This test was being conducted to measure response time of the MSL High Radiation Trip of the Reactor Protection System (PTP-SB-1). Testing was not accomplished during the time of.ob-servation due to noise. pickup in the test equipment cable The test signal needed was in the low picoampere range and very suscep-tible to low level noise signals. The test engineer .seemed knowledgeable of the system and during a subsequent discussion the inspector learned that a different' test equipment arrangement would be required to complete the testin .1 Findings The testing was being conducted in accordance with the procedure. A review of the completed portion of the procedure did not identify any unacceptable condition .0 Independent verification During the reviews discussed in paragraphs 4 and 5.4 of this report the inspectors independently verified that testing conducted and analysis performed satisfied the referenced acceptance criteri .0 Plant Tours The inspector made several tours of various areas of the facility to ob-serve work in progress, housekeeping, cleanliness controls and status of construction and preoperational test activitie I

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.. 12 9.1 Findings No violations were observe .0. Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required i order to determine whether they are acceptable, an item of noncompliance or a deviation. Unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 4.2 and 4.3.of this repor .0 Exit Interview At the conclusion of the site inspection on February 21, 1986, an exit in-terview was conducted with the licensee's senior site representatives (de-noted in Section 1). The findings were identif.ied and previous inspection items were. discusse At no time during this inspection was written material 'provided to the 11-censee by.the inspecto Based on the NRC Region I review of this report and discussions: held with licensee representatives during this inspection, it was determined that this report does not contain information subject to 10 CFR 2.790 restrictions.