IR 05000354/1987003

Insp Rept 50-354/87-03 on 870209-13.No Violations,Deviations or Unresolved Items Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness Program

ML20205G074
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek
Issue date:	03/23/1987
From:	Amato C, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20205G053	List: IR 05000354/1987003 ML20205G048
References
50-354-87-03, 50-354-87-3, NUDOCS 8703310367
Download: ML20205G074 (13)

Text

.

-.

-

_.-

_. =. -

_ _

_ _. - - - - _

. - ~ -

_-

- - _.

__

---_--.

_

.

.

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

]

Report No.

50-354/87-03 Docket No.

50-354 License No. NPF-57 Priority Category C

-

i j

Licensee:

Public Service Electric and Gas Company

!

Post Office Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Facility Name: Hope Creek Generating Station

'

i Inspection At: Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey

,

Inspection Conducted:

February 9-13, 1987 l

Inspectors:

8b /.$ #FjL i

CTG.'Ama1(o, Regional Team Leader dsfe

'

l W. V. Thomas, Region I T. E. Tuccinardi, Region I

Approved by:

N J/23//7

'

. J. La'zarus, Chief date

'

ergency Preparedness Section Inspection Summary:

Inspection on 9-13 February, 1987 (Report No. 50-354/87-03)

Areas Inspected:

Routine, announced, preventative emergency preparedness l

inspection of the licensee's emergency preparedness program conducted

February 9-13, 1987.

,

Results:

No viol uions, deviations, unresolved items or inspector follow-up i

items were identified.

I i

l.

,

I

i

!

i

8703310367 870326

PDR ADOCK 05000354

O PDR i

i

!_._--.-,._._,,___.__

_

_.. _, _ _ _ _. _... _ _

_ _.

.

.

.

.

Details 1.0 Persons Contacted

• • C. Adams, Manger, Emergency Preparedness

C. Banner, Associate Engineer, Emergency Preparedness

• • R. Beckwith, Senior Staff Engineer, Licensing and Regulation, Hope Creek P. Benini, Principal Engineer Programs and Audits, Nuclear Quality Assurance

-

.

P. Bledsoe, Radiati.on Protection Supervisor Hope Creek D. Burgin, Associate Engineer, Emergency Preparedness J. Boettger, Assistant Vice-President, Nuclear Operations Support R. Burricelli, General Manager, Engineering and Plant Betterment J. Clancy, Principal Health Physicist, Radiation Protection Services

• • J. Defebo, Lead Engineer, Nuclear Quality Assurance R. Donges, Lead Engineer, Licensing-Salem R. Edmons, Assistant Manger, Nuclear Training C. Fenton, Lead Engineer, Nuclear Quality Assurance D. Fawcett, Engineer, Emergency Preparedness E. Galbrath, Technical Senior Engineer, Hope Creek Chemistry

• • R.

Griffith, Sr., Principal Engineer, Nuclear Quality Assurance D. Hanson, Manager, Nuclear Training M. Ivanick, Supervisor, Nuclear Security Support Site Protection J. Johnson, Senior Radiological Engineer Radiation Protection Services

• • R. Lovell, Radiation Protection / Chemistry Manager Hope Creek C. McNeil, Jr., Vice-President, Nuclear P. McNulty, Associate Engineer

• • L. Reiter, Assistant General Manager, Licensing and Reliability D. Renwick, Senior Security Supervisor, Site Protection E. Riley, Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor, Hope Creek A. Salatka, Nuclear Fire Protection Supervisor, Site Protection L. Salamon, Acting Manager, Public Information J. Schaeffer, Engineer, Emergency Preparedness K. Serotkin, Technical Publications, Emergency Preparedness G. Suey, Chemistry Supervisor, Hope Creek Operations

• • L. St. Laurent, ALARA Engineer, Radiation Protection Services C. Vondra, Operations Engineer, Hope Creek

• • W. Weckstein, Nuclear Training Supervisor, Nuclear Training R. Werdamm, Instructor, Nuclear Training

• • Denotes those present at the exit interview

.

-

_ _.

.

-

.

_-

.

,

1 I

t 2.0 Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings a) Closed (50-354/86-51-08) A review of Hope Creek training records in-

,

dicates the number of currently qualified key and senior Emergency Re '

sponse Organization personnel is less than three per position. This would make it difficult to staff the Emergency Response Organization for an

'

extended period.

l The inspectors reviewed the training and qualification records for the Hope. Creek Emergency Response Organization (ERO) dated February 2, 1937 and determined that approximately 593 of the 1843 Nuclear Department staff

,

have been qualified for one or more of the ER0's 55 positions. There are at least three persons qualified for all ERO managerial, Protective Action and decision forming positions.

Three positions are not filled: a tech-nician position; a clerical position; and an information manager's posi-tion resulting from attrition. The last noted position will be filled as rapidly as possible and a pool of clericals and technicians is available to staff the other positions. This item is closed.

b) Closed (50-272/86-22-05) and (50-311/86-22-05).

Dose projections were i

made using a single straight line Gaussian model. A more refined method was needed especially after the release was terminated. Overall assess-

ment is difficult with the simple model since it is unable to track the

_

plume and effectively determine dose offsite.

!

The same dose projection methodology is used for both Hope Creek and Salem. The prime system is known as Meteorological Information Dose Assessment System (MIDAS). MIDAS is a plume segment model (non-straight

!

line Gaussian) MIDAS can " track" a plume after the release terminates.

Data may be entered into MIDAS by computer interrogation of data sources or manual entry. Back-up dose projection systems are available. This

'

item is closed.

3.0 Operational Status of the Emergency Response Program i

To determine if the licensee has developed, maintains and understands a standard classification system and action levels, the bases for which include plant and effluent values, the inspectors reviewed the response record for an actual Unusual Event and observed operators responding to a

,

hypothetical, fast breaking scenario.

!

l j

3.1 Emergency Detection Classification and Protective Action Decision Making. During the course of the inspection, an actual Unusual Event

[UE) was declared. The inspectors reviewed the time log and forms for this event and observed operator response to the simulated event.

The actual Unusual Event was declared at 6:35 A.M. on February 11, 1987.

The cause was an unidentified leak exceeding 5.0 gallons per J

minute (gpm). A reactor shut-down was begun. A check of the records indicated the Control Room (CR) staff used the correct Emergency

l l

~

t

!

I

'.. - - - -,,

.. - -, _. - -, - - -

-

-,-

-

_ _ - _ _

._._ - - - -

.

.

Operating Procedures (EOPs), selected the proper Sections and Attach-ments of the Event Classification Guide and used the correct Emergen-cy P.lan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs). Notification to the States of Delaware and Ne.w Jersey were made within six and nine minutes re-spectively of the declaration. An additional nine notifications were made including the required call to NRC. A similar procedure was used

to effect notification of the cancellation of the Unusual Event.

A hypothetical event was programmed to "run" on the Hope Creek Sim-ulator.

A Hope Creek operator group undergoing annual requalifica-tion-training responded to a fast breaking scenario.

They selected the correct Emergency Operating Procedures, Sections and Attachments of the Event Classification Guide, and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures. The incident was correctly classified as a General Emer-gency using barrier breech analysis which tracked NRC Inspection and Enforcement Information Notice 83-28. A Protective Action Recommen-dation (evacuation and sheltering) was made and communicated to the both States (simulated call).

The accident was classified in nine minutes and eight required immed-iate notifications were made within thirteen minutes thereafter.

Based on a review of training records and the preceding comments, the inspectors concluded licensee staff is adequately trained to detect and classify emergencies, develop Protective Action Recommendation and communicate these to offsite authorities in a timely manner.

4.

Training Training is a shared responsibility between the Nuclear Training Center (NTC) and Emergency Preparedness Program (EPP) which follows the stipula-tions given in Section 16, Revision 10 of the Hope Creek Generating Sta-tion Emergency Plan.

Emergency Response training consists of ten ; raining courses plus General Emergency Training and practical training. During calendar year 1986, 1400 Nuclear Department personnel received EP training and 593 were qualified for one or more of the 55 Emergency Response Organization (ER0)

positions. There are at least three individuals currently qualified for each ERO key position. A qualified trainer with a graduate degree in Health Physics supervises this effort, conducts classes, participates in practicals and operates the data base tracking system. A nuclear engineer with a Pressurized Water Reactor background is assigned half time.

Licensed operators during requalification training are scheduled to re-ceive eight (8) hours of Emergency Preparedness training which includes event classification, Protective Action Recommendation formation, notifi-cations and dosimetry. Other training areas evaluated or checked, were:

.

.

.

site medical and fire protection; security; off-site agencies and govern-mental organizations which would respond to a site request for support; and emergency training for State, County and Local governments.

The site Medical Department receives training from a contractor, RMC, the staff'of which includes physicians. RMC also provides training for the Salem Hos-pital staff. The licensee's Nuclear Fire Protection staff numbers 37 plus clericals.

The Firemen are trained and qualified in EMT and operate their fire protection training program. This training extends to members of local volunteer fire companies which would respond to a request for assis-tance. Security Officers receive General Employee training plus Security Action Training during simulated Emergencies which includes accountabil-ity.

The States of Delaware and New Jersey conduct training for their staffs and those of involved counties and local governments.

Letters of Certifi-cation attesting to this training have been sent to the Cognizant Regional Assistance Committee Chairman for U.S. FEMA Regions II and III per Plan-ning Standard P, criterion 4 of NUREG-0654.

These certifications were sent by New Jersey and Delaware during January,1987.

Based on the above, the inspectors determined:

1)

a training program has been developed and maintained which meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(15),Section IV F of Appen-dix E to 10 CFR 50 and Section II of NUREG-0654, Revision 1; 2)

the extent and type of training suggests job task analysis is appropriate for each response position; and 3)

the training is effective; operating personnel and dosimetrists demonstrated their emergency response capabilities and awareness of their responsibilities and accountabilities.

5.0 Shift Augmsntation The inspectors reviewed training records, as noted in Section 4 above, inspected Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) and reviewed inspection reports of observed exercises to determine if shif t staffing for emergen-cies is adequate in numbers and capability, and if administrative as well as physical means are available to augment the Emergency Response Organ-ization (ER0) in a timely manner. About 1400 Nuclear Department staff

,

l members have received emergency preparedness training and 593 of these are currently qualified for ERO positions (see Section 2.a).

The ERO staffing

'

schedule meets the goals of Table B-1 of NUREG-0654, Rev 1. A review of inspection reports for past exercises indicates the ERFs are staffed in a

,

l timely manner.

In addition, the licensee conducts quarterly tests of the

'

call-in system. The Technical Support Center (TSC) and Emergency Opera-I tions Facility (EOF) are fully equipped; the TSC is a dedicated facility while the EOF is rapidly reconfigurable.

l

,

.

-w--y

-., - -

,,wey y-g-ang,.

,--.y_,y-

---p--,,,,-.,,,,,,g,,w ye,,m-

-,,,,p.

,,.,,,yy

,

,g-

,,p,-

.-m,,q.

.

m y

4,y c-q.,ye_,,y n,,,,,,,,,,,_-,4

,,

-

___

__

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

.

.

6.0 The Emergency Preparedness Program (EPP)

10 CFR 50.54 (q) requires Part 50 licensees to develop, follow and main-tain in effect emergency plans which meet the sixteen standards of 10 CFR 50.47, the requirements of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50 and Post TMI Action Plan requirements. To determine if these criteria were met, the inspec-tors reviewed EPP program activities for 1986. This review plus other areas inspected provide the basis for determining if requirements are met.

The inspectors also developed a composite of the EPP staff.

The EPP is managed by an experienced emergency planner promoted from the EPP staff.

EPP is authorized thirteen professional positions plus secre-tarial/ clerical. Cumulative experience totals 80 years, 25 of which are in emergency planning.

Eight hold bachelor's or higher degrees.

Two have reactor operations backgrounds, one for PWRs and the other for BWRs, two have radiation protection backgrounds, and one is trained in emergency and disaster planning. The EPP participates in a staff rotation program with reactor operations.

This year a Senior Shift Supervisor from Hope Creek is assigned.

In cooperation with the Nuclear Training Center, EPP devel-oped twenty Hope Creek training scenarios and participated in these.

Monthly tests or checks were run for:

The Alert and Notification System (71 sirens and 2000 tone alert radios)

Communication systems with both States; Communication from the Hope Creek Control Room to the Emergency Response Facilities and NRC; Telecopiers; Quarterly call-out tests.

Two full participation exercises were conducted plus several medical, account ability and radiation monitoring drills.

In addition a media seminar was held.

Equipment and communications gear was inventoried quarterly. Twenty-one changes were made to the Event Classification Guide, and the Emergency Plan and its Implementing Procedures which did not reduce Plan effectiveness.

These plan changes were reviewed with both States as were Emergency Action Levels and concurrence was obtained.

Letters of Agreement were updated, and 24,000 public information brochures distributed in the form of calendars.

The fabrication, format and erec-tion of fifty metallic road signs were funded.

Each sign is located at the intersection of a road and the circumference of the ten mile Emergency Planning Zone. The sign's message advises motorists what to do if they hear a siren.

_-_.

_ _ _ - _ _

-

-

.

.

_

7.0 Management Involvement Vice-Presidents and General Managers were interviewed to ascertain their knowledge of and involvement with EPP. Acceptable levels of management involvement were noted. They were involved in Emergency Preparedness to varying degrees from one-third of the time to participation in bi-weekly status meetings. All were very knowledgeable with respect to emergency planning activities on and offsite; they are routinely involved with offsite activities. All stressed Public Service's policy of commitnient to safety and excellence. Goals and objectives are established and man-agerial performance is evaluated in this area. All are satisfied with the Emergency Preparedness Program but believe there is still room for improve-ment.

Emergency Response training is valued and is considered a diver-sifying and broadening activity for the staff. Managers interviewed expressed a need for more exercise interaction with the NRC.

8.0. Accident Dose Projection To verify that the dosimetric methods and assumptions used by the li-censee, offsite authorities, and the NRC are consistent and explicable, the inspectors reviewed results of computer runs using the same input.

Dose and dose commitment were calculated and results compared.

Results between licensee values and those for one of the States agreed closely; in some instances there was no statistical significant differ-ence.

Results between licensee values and those for the other State showed good agreement close-in but the difference was greater than a factor of ten further out.

NRC IROAM (version 5) values were low in all cases but within a factor of ten of the licensee's values. This is rea-sonable based on the degree of sophistication of the models used.

This difference may be described as the difference between Class A and Class 8 models described in Appendix 2 of NUREG-0654.

Such differences arise from the use of a straightline Gaussian Model (NRC IRDAM) and a plume segment model (licensee's MIDAS).

In addition, one State uses a puff model which may also be based on an elevated source term.

9.0 Post Accident Measurements and Instrumentation To determine if adequate methods and operable instrumentation exist and are maintained for: determining breech of barriers to fission product mobility; assessing core damage; estimating the magnitude of a fission product release or potential release; and calculating projected doses and dose commitments, the inspectors examined post-accident monitoring systems and associated procedures. The primary systems which support dose assess-ment activities are the Radiation Monitoring System (RMS), Meteorological Monitoring System (MMS) and Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS).

___ ______________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

.

_

Accident assessment dosimetric capabilities are provided by the RMS and

~

the use of Meteorological Information and Dose Assessment System (MIDAS)

software.

The RMS is a computerized digital Radiation Monitoring System consisting of a centralized radiation processor (CRP), two digital main frame computers and a network of Local Radiation Processors (LRP) located throughout the plant.

LRPs monitor:

process systems; ventilation efflu-ents; and local area radiation.

The LRPs have sufficient " intelligence" to support themselves or function as stand alone systems should the CRP be unavailable for communication with the LRPs, plus local displays and term-inals which provide for input, output, and data acquisition. The RMS will be used to provide information for offsite dose assessment.

The MMS is a computerized digital data acquisition system which provides information

-

from the Artificial Island meteorological tower. The MMS consists of one communication computer and a primary and backup data acquisition system.

Information from the MMS is available in the EOF and through Dial-up where ever access is necessary. The meteorological information is relayed through a data link to the Hope Creek CRP and is available for any loca-

!

tion where the Radiation Monitoring System display keyboard printers are available.

These locations include the Radiation Protection Control Point, Control Room, Technical Support Center and Emergency Operations Facility.

The inspectors determined four calculational modalities are available for calculating dose equivalent and dose commitment equivalent. Three dif-ferent computers and software and a manual method are available.

Emer-gency Response Organization personnel responsible for dose assessment are trained in their use.

Software has been documented and validated.

Prime reliance is placed on a real-time system called MIDAS which remotely senses release points and the meteorological tower.

Data may also be entered manually. The other computer systems are personal computers including laptops.

Input for these can be obtained from the RMS and from the RM-11 panel. Dose calculation capability is provided in the Control Room, Technical Support Center and Emergency Operation Facility.

On shift personnel are trained in the use of the back-up systems. MIDAS users are on-call.

Software and instructions for the back-ups are stored in lockers but are not inventoried.

Inventorying of software and training of back shift personnel in MIDAS use will be tracked by the NRC and sub-ject to future inspection.

Noble gas release rates are expressed as gross releases rather than xenon equivalent. The radiciodine release rate is radionuclide specific; the value for I-131 is reported.

The inspectors concluded that the radiological and meteorological instru-mentation described in the Emergency Plan and Procedures used for assess-ment of plant radiological conditions during and after an accident are available and maintained.

The detector efficiencies and conversion fac-tors nave been determined for those radiological monitors used in dose projections.

i l

..

.

_ _ _ _ _.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_ _ _

_

r

.

.

_

The Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) is a General Electric Design.

NUREG-0737 requirements for obtaining and analysis of containment atmos-phere and Reactor Coolant System samples have been demonstrated.

In ad-dition to the systems described above, portable sampling and survey in-strumentation and multi-channel analyzers for isotopic analysis are avail-

'able within the Hope Creek Station with backup instrumentation and support available from Salem Station.

Licensee commitment to the Post TMI Action Plan Requirements are detailed in Volume I of the Final Safety Analysis Report; these include a commit-ment to the criteria of NUREG-0654.

The inspectors determined the following instrumentation and read-outs are in place and functional to effect barrier breech analysis and undertake Core Damage Assessment (CDA): reactor vessel water level including fuel zone level; dry well pressure and hydrogen concentration; primary contain-ment high range monitors; suppression pool water temperature and level; primary containment temperature and pressure; vessel metal temperatures; safety relief valve (SRV) status based on acoustic data and discharge thermal values; secondary containment radiation area monitors (read from the RM-11 panel) and pressure difference; and status of the filtration, recirculation ventilation system and the main steam isolation valves.

This information is accessible to the TSC and EOF staff via the Safety Par-ameter Display System (SPDS). Safety Relief Valve position indication is displayed by the Control Room Integrated Display System (CRID). CRID is available in the TSC but not the EOF.

SPDS is a " subset" of CRID.

Instrumentation read-out in the Control room with the exception of radia-tion data is located in a single area dubbed the bezel by the operators located to the left of " horse-shoe" panel facing operator stations The inspector concluded instrumentation permitting post accident assess-ment is in place, calibrated, functional and that remote facility read out is available. The data displayed by this instrumentation will enable accident assessors to classify accidents, make and refine Protective Action Recommendations (PARS), calculate projected dose and dose commit-ments based on release data or containment monitor readings, and assess core damage.

l 10. Public Information Program The inspectors reviewed literature distributed to the public advising them what to do in the event of an emergency and examined the Emergency News

Center. This was done to determine compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7). The inspectors determined publications have been developed and disseminated throughout the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ)

which detail emergency response information. Calendars for the States of Delaware and New Jersey have been distributed containing this information.

,

i

_

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ _, _ _.

. _, _ _, _

. _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _. _ _ _, _ _ _ -

_

.

.

In addition, emergency response information is placed in Delaware and New Jersey telephone directories. A Salem and Delaware area map has also, in the past. years, been distributed.

Road signs have been placed at over 50 points leading into the plume EPZ, which advise drivers to tune into selected AM or FM radio stations when they hear the public alert systems.

The calendars and telephone directory ads are updated yearly.

Tone-alert radios have also been placed in selected commercial establishments such as the local motels, restaurants, and shopping centers.

~

Provisions have been made for special population groups through the use of the special needs data base system.

This system contains a listing of names, addresses, and telephone numbers of individual members of the pub-lic within the EPZ requiring transportation or other equipment due to disability or infirmity. The database is updated on a yearly basis and coordinated with local agencies to assure notifications and if necessary evacuations are carried out in a timely manner.

The facility which would become the Emergency News Center (ENC) is located in the City of Salem and is maintained in stand-by condition. The inspec-tors concluded the requirements for public information are being met.

11.

Licensee Reviews / Audits 10 CFR 50.54(t) requires a licensee to perform a review of its emergency preparedness program at least once every twelve months. The inspectors reviewed the audit report for Hope Creek, and the Quality Assurance Pro-cedure (QAP) Manual upon which the audit was based to ascertain if this requirement is met.

The licensee has conducted an independent audit of its emergency preparedness program. The audit was performed by the Nuclear Quality Assurance Department and completed on October 28, 1986.

The most recent Government Interface Adequacy Evaluation was completed on January 23, 1987. There were no program deficiencies or areas of concern identified.

The licensee makes the evaluation of the adequacy of the interface with State and local Governments available to appropriate State and Local governmental agencies upon request.

Recommendations for improvements made by the independent review group are documented and reported to corporate and station management; they are maintained on file for five years.

The Quality Assurance Department observes licensee drills and exercises as a means for identifying defic-iencies and weaknesses and recommends appropriate corrective actions.

12. Notifications and Communications The licensee's communications procedures were reviewed and communications systems inspected to determine if a communication capability meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5),(6)and(7) and Section IV.D to Appen-dix E of 10 CFR 50 are met.

_

_ _ _ _

_ _.

_ _ _ _ _ _ -

..

,

-

The licensee maintains a capability for notifying and communicating with licensee personnel, offsite supporting agencies and local governmental authorities, and the population within the EPZ in the event of an emer-gency.

The notification procedures are consistent with the Emergency Classifi-cation Guides and the Emergency Action Levels. The notification proce-dures require verification of activation messages. Alerting, and acti-vating emergency response personnel are effected using beepers assigned to on-call emergency response personnel. The system is tested quarterly. The content of standard initial emergency messages to offsite local govern-mental agencies is complete and adequate.

The prompt notification system, including provisions for giving instruc-tions to the public within the EPZ is in place and maintained. The siren system is tested monthly. During 1986, the overall system reliability for both Delaware and New Jersey was 98.75%. The licensee also maintains tone alert radios in business establishments throughout the EPZ and a special needs database, which identifies residents with impairments or disabili-ties.

Procedures are in place with each State and/or local agencies to provide the evacuation of special needs personnel. The siren system is equipped with diagnostic feed-back capability.

The inspectors verified that communications equipment and procedures are in place in Emergency Response Facilities as described in the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures.

The communications equipment and pro-cedures are consistent with the needs for communication within the licen-see's emergency response organization, for offsite agency support, and for communication with state and local governmental agencies as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6).

Communications equipment located in the emergency response facilities was operable. Periodic communications drills are performed in accordance with Administrative Procedure EPIP VI-6, " Communications Drills."

Portable communication systems in use by onsite and offsite monitoring teams are part of the Security Radio System, a four channel VHF Network with power and equipment redundancy. This system is also used by the security force and as a backup to the Lower Alloways Creek Police Depart-ment. Cellular phones are used to backup the VHF radio communications

'

system. During previous emergency exercises, the portable communications systems have shown sufficient range and power to operate throughout the EPZ.

There are five major emergency communications systems in use at Artificial Island, two redundant backup systems, and three support systems.

These ten functionally independent systems are in use in the Emergency Response Facilities, and in some cases the State, County and local facilities share the use of these communications systems.

Sufficient redundancy, indepen-dence and diversity exists in the overall communication system network to insure operation in the event of power failure _

..

. _ _ _ _.. - _. -

_ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _

_ _ _.

.

.

4 Public Service is developing a fiber optic communication line to link the i

Island (the site) with the Nuclear Training Center in Salem.

Information i

i moved through this medium will be transferred to a land line phone.

'

!

I The inspectors conclude'd the required communications are in place and r

functional.

Procedures have been developed for their use. The required degree of independence, redundancy and diversity are in place.

13.

Emergency Worker Protection To' determine if procedures, equipment and facilities are in place for

'

protecting onsite workers, the inspectors reviewed procedures and checked facilities.

i

{

Section 12 of EPIP.IV-108 addresses emergency dose limits and use of j

potassium iodide (KI). Dose limits are established which track with the Protective Action Guides (PAGs) developed by the U.S. Environmental Pro-

'

tection Agency. Acceptance of Emergency Dose requires approval of the Emergency Duty Officer or the Radiological Assessment Coordinator or the Nuclear Senior Shift Supervisor (with the advice of the Shift Radiation Protection Technician). Use of KI requires approval and is voluntary.

Specifics are given in EPIP.IV-108.

EPIP.IV-104 discusses among other things, Emergency Task ALARA Review.

Personnel dosimetry and decontami-

"

,

nation procedures have been developed; decontamination capability and i

emergency dosimetry is available. The inspectors concluded adequate provisions for emergency worker protection are in place.

!

]

14.

Future Changes to the Emergency Plan and Procedures A Consolidated Plan is under development which will replace the Salem and t

Hope Creek Plans and Procedures.

The Consolidated Plan will integrate the t

two Site Plans into an Artificial Island Emergency Plan, a comprehensive site plan.

!

'

Supplemental procedures and materials for each reactor type will be iden-tified.

Letters of agreement and evacuation time estimates will be com-bined for a single site.

The Emergency Classification Guides and Emer-gency Action Levels will be separate, reflecting the different reactor

l types.

!

,

i

!

I

.

.

.

The Emergency Classification Guide (ECG) for Salem will be rewritten so its format will be identical to that of Hope Creek. Other " common" format procedures wil.1 be written for the ENC and EOF.

Many of the engineering functions of the Operations Support Group within the E0F will be trans-

ferred to the TSC for the respective station. The result is concentration of engineering functions on site; the EOF will then concentrate on offsite concerns and over-all management of the emergency.

15.

Security Interface With The Emergency Preparedness program Th'e Emergency Preparedness / Security interaction was evaluated to identify any potential performance deficiencies or conflicts between Emergency Preparedness and Security.

The inspectors interviewed a small number of personnel from each organization and reviewed procedures.

Information given in NUREG/CR-4093 served as the basis for planning this activity.

In addition to security training, security personnel are required to attend an emergency preparedness overview annually. They also participate in d. fils and graded exercises and receive briefings on expected security actions both on and offsite.

Security stations are set up at the E0F and ENC Additional stations can be established onsite by the security force or offsite by local police departments or the State Police.

A Security Contingency Plan, dated November 17, 1986, has been published and covers a wide range of subjects pertinent to Emergency Preparedness including procedures for rapid interface with the Emergency Preparedness Program and Procedures for sabotage.

The inspectors determined that the Emergency Plan and Procedures are integrated with the Security procedures and no apparent deficiencies or conflicts exist.

16.

Exit Meeting The inspectors met with licensee personnel listed in Section 1 at the conclusion of the inspection.

The licensee was informed that no viola-tions or deviations were noted.

Two outstanding items were closed; there were no unresolved items.

The inspectors also discussed some areas for improvement.

The licensee acknowledged these findings and agreed to eval-uate them, institute corrective action as necessary and include needed corrections in the Consolidated Plan.

At no time during the course of the inspection did the inspectors give the licensee written material.