IR 05000354/1986051

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Insp Rept 50-354/86-51 on 861112-13.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness Insp & Observation of Licensee Full Participation Emergency Exercise Conducted on 861112
ML20207G600
Person / Time
Site: Hope Creek PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 12/22/1986
From: Amato C, Fox E, Lazarus W, Thomas W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207G592 List:
References
50-354-86-51, NUDOCS 8701070349
Download: ML20207G600 (10)
v • d • e


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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report No.

50-354/86-51 Docket No.

50-354 License No.

NPF-57 Priority Category C

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Licensee: Public Service Electric and Gas Company Post Office Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Facility Name: Hope Creek Generating Station Inspection At: Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspection Conducted:

November 12-13, 1986 Inspectors:

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C. G Arifato, Retjiana 7Rea Leader date

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W.~ C T6omat, Emergency Preparedness

'da t'e Inspector These team members reviewed the inputs for this inspection report.

J. A. Berry, SR. Resident Inspector, Shoreham C. R. van Neil, NRC Headquarters G. Arthur, Sonalyst, Inc.

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J. A. Mac Lellan, Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory J. M

, So alyst, Inc.

Approved by:

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'date Em ncy aredness Section 8701070349 861224 PDR ADOCK 05000354 O

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Inspection Summary:

Inspection on November 12-13, 1986 (Report No.

50-354/86-51).

Areas Inspected:

Routine announced emergency preparedness inspection and observation of the licensee's full participation, Emergency Exercise cenducted November 12, 1986. The State of Delaware also participated but with partici-pation limited to demonstration of procedures to clear the surface waters of the Delaware River.

Results: No violations were identified. The licensee's emergency response actions for this exercise were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.

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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted

  • C. Banner, Associate Engineer, Emergency Preparedness J. Berkowitz, Director, Division Environmental Quality, N.J. Dept. Environmental Protection
  • J. Boettger, Assistant Vice-President, Nuclear Operations Support
  • R. Buricelli, General Manager, Engineering and Plant Betterment S. Bravar, Public Information Manager
  • J. Clancy, Principal Engineer, Radiation Protection Services B. Connor, Manager Operations, Hope Creek D. Deieso, Assistant Commissioner for Management and Environmental Control, N.J. Dept. Environmental Protection R. Drewonwski, Manager, Nuclear System Engineering J. Eaton, Nuclear Shift Technical Advisor R. Edmonds, Assistant Manager, Nuclear Training D. Fawcett, Engineer, Emergency Preparedness
  • L. Fink, Co-owner Representative, Atlantic City Electric Co.
  • J. Hagan, Manager, Station Planning, Hope Creek
  • D. Kasner, Technical Supervisor
  • J. Kotch, Principle Engineer P. Kudless, Manager, Site Maintenance
  • J. Lazzardi, Co-owner Representative, Atlantic City Electric Co.

J. Leech, Technical Supervisor

  • R. Lovell, Manager, Radiation Protection / Chemistry M. Meltzer, Nuclear Training Supervisor P. Moeller, Manager, Site Protection J. Molner, Radiation Protection Supervisor, Hope Creek C. Mc Neill, Sr., Vice President Nuclear
  • W. Reuther, Principal Engineer, Nuclear QA
  • L. Reiter, General Manager, Licensing and Reliability E. Riley, Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor, Hope Creek J. Russel, Radiation Protection Supervisor, Hope Creek J. Schaeffer, Engineer, Emergency Preparedness D. Scott, Chief, Bureau of Nuclear Engineering, N.J. Environmental Protection Dept.

M. Shedlock, Senior Nuclear Maintenance Supervisor R. Skwarek, Manager, Nuclear Protection Management

  • M. Trum, Supervisor, Service Operations D. Vito, Senior Engineer, Licensing Other licensee personnel were also contacted.
  • Denotes those present at the exit interview on November 13, 1986.

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2.0 Emergency Exercise The Hope Creek Generating Station announced exercise was conducted on November 12, 1986 from 12:30 p.m. to 9:30 p.m.

a.

Pre-Exercise Activities The exercise objectives, submitted to NRC Region I on August 25, 1986, were reviewed and, following revision, determined to adequately test the licensee's Emergency Plan.

On September 25, 1986, the licensee submitted the complete scenario package for NRC review and evaluation.

Region I representatives had telephone conversations with the licensee's emergency preparedness staff to discuss the scope and content of the scenario. As a result, minor revisions were made to the scenario which allowed adequate testing of the major portions of the Emergency Plan (EP) and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP) and also provided the opportunity for licensee personnel to demonstrate those areas previously identified by the NRC as in need of corrective action.

NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on November 12, 1986.

Suggested NRC changes to the scenario were made by the licensee in the areas of technical support and radiological data.

In addition, missing information was provided. These changes were also discussed during the briefing. The licensee stated that certain emergency response activities would be simulated and that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent scenario deviations or disruption of normal plant operations.

The exercise scenario included the following events:

Fuel handling accident Accountability, search and rescue Partial loss of feed-water Power surge to 125% of full power Anticipated transient without scram Reactor trip Use of Post Accident Sampling System Release of radioactive material to the environment

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In plant, onsite and offsite radiological monitoring Dispatch of teams from the Operations Support Center Use of the Event Classification Guide (ECG) and Emergency Operating Procedures (E0P)

Calculation of projected offsite dose equivalents and dose commitments Use of field team data to verify projected doses Development of Protection Action Recommendations Recovery Planning Meeting b.

Activities Observed During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, NRC team members made detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the emergency response organization (ERO), activation of emergency response facilities (ERFs) and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of the ERFs. The following activities were observed.

1.

Recognition of initiating conditions, correlation of these with Emergency Action Levels (EALs), selection and use of Emergency Operation Procedures; and completion of notification to offsite governmental authorities.

2.

Staffing and activation of Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs).

3.

Communication between and within ERFs.

4.

Assessments of accident conditions including but not limited to fuel damage and gap fraction release estimates, application of barrier breech analysis, and primary to secondary containment vending.

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Communication with the Director NRC Executive Team at NRC Headquarters.

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Determination of projected doses based on "what if" calculations prior to onset of release and on release values thereafter; and use of field team data to check and adjust projected dose values.

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Functional Radiation Monitoring System (RMS).

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Formation of Protective Action Recommendations (PARS).

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Support of New Jersey State Government and NRC Incident Response Team personnel at the EOF and other ERFs (NRC team only).

10. Provisions for in plant radiation protection; 11.

Performance of off-site and in plant radiological surveys; 12.

Performance of technical support, repair and corrective actions; 13. Assembly and accountability of personnel; and 14. Management of Recovery Operations.

3.0 Exercise Observations The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of the emergency response facilities, and use of the facilities were generally consistent with their emergency response plan and implementing procedures.

The team also noted the following actions of the licensee's emergency response organization that were indicative of their ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions:

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Command and control by the Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor was excellent. Technical resolution was outstanding in the Control Room, trends were anticipated and there was a good interface with the NRC Resident Inspector.

Internal communications were very good.

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Command and Control in the Technical Support Center was very good, technical competence and a positive attitude were displayed, different approaches to problem solving were explored, the Emergency Director utilized the staff and there were frequent briefings.

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The Operations Support Center (OSC) was functional within eleven minutes of activation notification and staffed with qualified personnel. The initial condition briefing was excellent. Over thirty (30) teams were dispatched from the OSC throughout the exercise. Teams were given thorough radiation protection briefings. OSC teams discussed and implemented solutions to problems.

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The Emergency Response Manager exercised good Command and Control, held frequent staff meetings involving State of New Jersey officials and the NRC Director of Site Operations. A check board was used to determine if a declaration of Site Area Emergency (SAE) was indicate.

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The Technical Support Group within the E0F functioned well,

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established priorities and estimated fuel damage based on Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) data.

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Licensee off:ite monitoring teams were trained, knowledgeable and well equipped. Use of aerial surveillance greatly enhanced plume tracking capability.

The Field Team Coordinator instructed teams, briefed them as to changing conditions and received field team data.

Licensee and NRC Field Team Data were used to adjust projected doses.

The facilities provided by the licensee to support the New Jersey

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State Gcvernment Team and the NRC Incident Response Team were adequate.

Licensee interaction with personnel from the teams was frequent and thorough.

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Protective Action Recommendations (PARS) were developed with the participation of the New Jersey State Government personnel and the NRC Director of Site Operations.

The NRC identified the following areas which need to be evaluated by the licensee for corrective action (the licensee conducted an adequate self-critique of the exercise which also identified some of these areas).

These items will be evaluated during a subsequent inspection.

Emergency Response Organization staff in the Control Room, Technical Support Center and the Technical Support group within the Emergency Operations Facility did not recognize a power surge followed by an Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS). The data were presented manually; a simulator was not used.

(50-354/86-51-01)

Control Room (CR) staff did not declare an Unusual Event (UE) as the result of the transient opening of a safety relief valve.

It was classified as a four hour notification per 10 CFR 50.72. The UE was declared later based on a contingency message. This was primarily due to the scenario data.

(50-354/86-51-02)

Because the Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor's log book showed the incor-rect time for declaration of a Site Area Emergency (SAE), the Control Room staff was not aware of the SAE declaration time.

(50-354/86-51-03)

Command and control of some teams sent from the Operational Support Center (OSC) was weak and at times the OSC was unaware of their location.

(50-354/86-51-04)

Cumulative dose records of OSC teams were not maintained; and there are no Status Boards in the OSC HP area to record and display plant radiation conditions and team member cumulative doses.

(50-354/

86-51-05)

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There was a delay in dispatching a search and rescue team due to uncertainty of the last known location of this missing person. When this person was found fifteen minutes were required to bring a stretcher to his location.

(50-354/86-51-06)

The Dose Assessment staff in the Emergency Operations Facility was unaware of a blown penetration as a source of leakage; used a six hour default time rather than the four hours prescribed in procedures when release duration was unknown; did not use available New Jersey field team data. Communication efficiency was reduced when a staff member was as-signed another duty by the Vice-President-Nuclear not consistent with the Emergency Plan.

(50-354/86-51-07)

A review of Hope Creek training records indicates the number of currently qualified key and senior Emergency Response Organization personnel is less than three per position. This would make it difficult to staff the Emer-gency Response Organization for an extended period.

This item is unresolved. (50-354/86-51-08)

4.0 Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items Based upon discussions with licensee representatives examination of procedures and records, licensee written affirmation of training status, observations made by the NRC team during the exercise and review of press releases, the following items were not repeated and are closed:

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(Closed) IFI (50-354/85-40-05). The training program is to be completed by the time 5% full power operation begins.

(Closed) IFI (50-354/85-40-24). The Radiation Monitoring System

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(RMS) should be installed and approved.

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(Closed) IFI (50-354/85-53-01). Managers (EDO, TSC and RAC) were not always aware of what each other was doing, and what was considered by the EDO to be the top priority effort of the moment.

(Closed) IFI (50-354/85 a3-02).

No discussion by TSC engineering

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after all but vital power was los+. or what would be out of commission and require emergency power.

(Closed) IFI (50-354/85-53-03). The radio communicator was used for

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several other tasks and was consequently away from the radio

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frequently. At times, incoming information from plant teams was

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(Closed) IFI (50-354/85-53-04).

There is confusicn about the proper

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equipment tagging procedure to be followed during an emergency.

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(Closed) IFI (50-354/85-53-05).

The prescribed method of tracking radiation protection personnel was unavailable when the Senior Radiation Protection Technician (SRPT) left and took the log book with him.

In addition, no person was left in charge.

(Closed) IFI (50-354/85-53-07).

Radio communications from TSC were

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very poor.

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(Closed) IFI (50-354/85-53-08). The Environmental Team did not follow procedures in handling the iodine samples:

(a) They did not go to a low background area to remove the sample from the sampler; (b) They did not label the iodine cartridge bag; and (c) They did not follow the procedure in purging the sample cartridge.

(Closed) IFI (50-354/85-53-09). Access control at the E0F was poor.

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(Closed) IFI (50-354/85-53-10).

Several positions in the EOF, most

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notably in Dose Assessment, appeared to have more than one person performing the same designated functions.

Review and revise emergency organization as necessary to perform assigned tasks.

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(Closed) IFI (50-354/85-53-11).

It did not appear that the Radiation Safety Manager (RSM) formulated all PARS as designated in EP II-3.

Dose information was provided to the ERM who developed the PARS.

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(Closed) IFI (50-354/85-53-12).

Some of the press releases were poorly written in that they referred to PARS made by Public Service Electric and Gas (PSE&G).

PSE&G does not have the authority to direct the public in the enactment of PARS.

(Closed) IFI (50-354/86-30-01) Review results of last exercise.

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5.0 Licensee Critique The NRC team attended the licensee's post-exercise critique on November 13, 1986 during which licensee controllers presented and dis-cussed their observations of the exercise. Their critique was adequate.

Licensee participants highlighted areas for improvement which the licensee indicated would be evaluated and appropriate actions take F

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6.0 Exit Meeting and NRC Critique Following the licensee's self critique, the NRC team members met and evaluated the licensee's critique. And then, the NRC team met with licensee's representatives listed in Section 1 of this report. The NRC Regional Team Leader summarized observations made during the exercise.

The licensee was informed no violations were observed; and previously identified items were adequately addressed. Although there are areas identified for corrective action, the NRC team determined that within the scope and limitations of the scenario, the licensee's performance demonstrated they could implement their Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner that would adequately provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.

Licensee management acknowledged the findings and indicated they would evaluate them and take appropriate action regarding the items identified for corrective action.

At no time during this inspection did the inspectors provide any written information to the licensee.

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