IR 05000354/1988018

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Insp Rept 50-354/88-18 on 880601-0711.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification, Surveillance Testing,Maint Activities,Ler Followup & Assurance of Quality
ML20151J492
Person / Time
Site: Hope Creek PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 07/26/1988
From: Swetland P
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20151J483 List:
References
50-354-88-18, NUDOCS 8808020274
Download: ML20151J492 (11)


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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION I

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Report No.

50-354/88-18 License NPF-57

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Licensee:

Public Service Electric rnd Gas Company P. O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Facility:

Hope Creek Generating Station Dates:

June 1, 1988 - July 11, 1988 Inspectors:

G. W. Meyer, Senior Resident Inspector D. K. Allsopp, Resident Inspector

__2d3[0 ate Approved: c; E t'e

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P. D. Swetl_and, Chief Projects Section 2B

v Inspection Summary:

Inspection SFK4/88-18 on June 1,1988 - July 11.1988 Areas _ Inspected: Routine resident safety inspection of the following areas:

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operational safety verification, surveillance testing, maintenance activities, licensee even*. report followup, and assurance of quality, l

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Results:

The inspector noted a control room licensed operator did not fully understand a control room indication regarding the status rf the hydrogen

recombiner (Section 2.2).

The corrective action for high differential pressure I

across a diesel generator lube oil strainer increased the diesel out of service

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time unnecessarily (Section 3.2).

The inspector identified a problem with the lubrication on an environmentally qualified Rosemount transmitter (Section 3.2).

The inspector's review indicated that operations, maintenance, and surveillance testing activities were well planned and performed in a safe, effective manner

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(Section 6.0).

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Details

1.0 SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS The unit entered this report period operating at full power and remained on line throughout the report period.

2.0 OPERATIONAL SAFETY VERIFICATION (71707,71709,71981)

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2.1 Inspection Activities On a daily basis throughout the report period, inspections verified that the facility was operated safely and in conformance with regulatory

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requirements.

Public Service Electric and Gas (PSE&G) Company management I

control was evaluated by direct observation of activities, tours of the

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facility, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety system status and limiting conditions for operation, and review of facility records.

pSE&G's compliance with the radiological i

protection and security programs was also verified on a periodic basis.

These inspection activities were conducted in accordance with NRC

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inspection procedures 71707, 71709, and 71881 and included weekend

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inspection on July 10 and deep backshift inspections on July 6 and 7.

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2.2 Inspection Findings and Significant plant Events

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A.

On June 15 bydrogen recombiner loop A was out of service for r

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preventive maintenance. During a review of the control room following

the morning turnover of operating shif ts, the inspector noted that t

the out of service indicators for both the loop A and '. cop 8 hydrogen recombiners were lit, indicating that both loops were out of

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service.

If such a condition actually existed, the Technical

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Specifications would have required one loop returned to service

within one hour or a -eactor shutdown within six hours.

The inspector asked the licensed control room operator why both out of service i

indicators were lit, but the operator was unable to answer and i

appeared to be unaware of the dual indication.

The operator confirmed that the loop A isolation valves were closed and that the

locp B isolation valves were open.

Later evaluation by the system engineer found that the logic for the indicators would by design erroneously light both loop out of service indicators whenever either

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loop was removed from service.

The system engineer it.itiated a design change to correct this error.

In discussions with plant management the inspector emphasized the importance of operators being aware of all indications and responding to the indications as actual conditions until proven otherwise.

Plant management agreed ind stated that these messages had been emphasized to the operators and would continue to be emphasized.

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On June 20 a full recirculation pump runback occurred reducing reactor power from 100'4 to 65%. All plant equipment responded as designed.

The runback occurred as a result of a design chenge being performed to electrically connect the control room information display system (CRIDS) computer to the safety parameter display system (SPDS)

computer. The runback was initiated when the I&C technician performing the computer connections inadvertently grounded a pin i

connection which caused the "A" reactor narrow ange level channel to fail low. All work on the design change was stopped until the

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ir.cident was understood. The unit was stabilized and returned to 100% power the same day.

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On July 11 hydrogen recombiner loop B was removed from service for preventive maintenance. The dual out of service indication was lit

on both recombiner loops as the design change to correct the dual

indication for only one recombiner out of service had not been completed. Wh(n the inspector questioned a licensed operator

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regarding the dual out of service indication, the operator was aware j

of the out of service design logic and the correct status of both

recombiner loops.

The inspector concluded that the corrective

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actions taken in response to the inspector's earlier control room observation had been appropriate.

This area of licensed operator j

awareness and response will continue to be reviewed.

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(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (87-01-03); Unwanted accumulation of

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nitrogen adversely affecting Safety Auxiliaries Cooling System (SACS)

operations. The insp ctor had noted that several SACS automatic pump f

and valve actuations had been induced by gaseous nitrogen accumulation j

in system components and instrumentation sensing lines. During the t

recent refueling outage, Hope Creek implemented Design Change Package

(OCP) 4HC-0014, which installed a floating roof in the SACS surge

tank. This floating roof acts as a barrier between the nitrogen and i

water, minimizing the absorption of nitrogen into the water.

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implementation of this DCP no automatic pump or valve actuations have

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occurred and nitrogen usage has been reduced by approximately 90%.

t This item is closed.

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(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (88-09-01); High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) control oil valve. A mispositioned HPCI centrol

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oil valve, not on the valve checkoff list or physically restrained, i

had affected HPCI performance.

PSE&G corrected this by instaliing a band clamp around the valve and its handwheel and listing the valve's locking device on the checkcff list.

(A caution instruction had

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previously been in place.) Th1 inspector reviewed the corrective

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actions and found them to be acceptable.

This item is closed.

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3.0 SURVEILLANCE TESTING (61726)

i 3.1 Inspection Activity

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Ouring this inspection period the inspector performed detailed technical

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procedure reviews, witnessed in progress surveillance testing, and reviewed completed surveillance packages.

The inspector verified that the

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surve111ance tests were performed in accordance with Technical Specifica-

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tions, approved procedures, and NRC regulations.

These inspection i

activities were conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedure

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61726.

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The following survetilance tests were reviewed, with portions witnessed

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by the inspector i

IC-FT.SM 005 Main Steam Line Low Pressure Setpoint l

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Verification

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IC-FT.BG-001 RWCU Isolation Setpoint Verification

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j IC-DC.ZZ-175 FRVS Pressure Transducer (Tavis) Calioration t

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IC-CC.SP-031 FRVS Vent Wide Range Radiation Monitor - Channel

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j Calibration

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OP-IS.BD-001 RCIC Pump - Inservice Test I

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MD-DC ZZ-001 Diesel Generator - Rocker Arm Lube Oil High Level

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Alarm Switch Calibration i

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IC-DC.ZZ-088 C FRVS Recirculation Flow Transmitter - Channel

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Calibration

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l IC-FT.AS-008 Division 4 Main Steam Line Monitor Functional

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Test (

OP-IS.BJ-001 HPCI Pump Inservice Test (IST)

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l IC-FT.SE-17 Functional Test on "E" APRM

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OP-ST.BB-001 Recirculation Jet Pump Operability Test

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OP-ST.GS-001 Drywell and Suppression Chamber Oxygen

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Concentration l

OP-ST.JK-004

"0" Diesei Generator Operability Test

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I Generally, the survetilance activities inspected were effective with

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i respect to meeting the safety objectives of the surveillance testing i

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3.2 Inspection Findings

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A.

On July 6 the D Diesel Generator was taken out of service for preventive n.aintenance. After completion of all outstanding work the

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Operattor-Department performed the diesel generator operability test

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as a retest to ensure the diesel was operable. Although the diesel

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started and loaded proptrly, the diesel was declared inoperable after

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the one bocr run because the lubricating oil strainer dif ferential

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pressure ataceeded 10 psid, an acceptance criterion. Mter cleaning

the lubrica'.ing oil strainer, the diesel generator opt ability test

was successfully completed.

l A similar event had occurred in March 1988 when B Diesel Generator i

exceeded the acceptance criterion for lubricating oil strainer

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diffitrential pres.ure in the middle of the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> run. As corrective i

action, the acceptance criterion for the lubricating oil strainers was I

l reduced from 15 psid (the vendor's limit) to 10 psid (the vendor's l

recommended time for strainer cle:ning).

The inspector concluded

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that this procedure change was unnecessarily restrictive and had caused an acceptable diesel mm to be declarea unsatisfactory.

Further, the inspector concluded that the event demonstrated poor

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e p o.ional planning, in that following the diesel outage for preventive maintenance, another diesel outage was needed to complete

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additional preventivt maintenance.

Following tne current diesel

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generator lubricating oil problems, a procedure revision was e

initiated to revise the acceptance criterion back to 15 psid.

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The acceptability of ths preventive maintenance on the lube oil strainers during the March 1488 refueling outage is discussed in l

Section 4.2.A.

B.

On July 11 the inspector observed the calibration of a Rosemount flow transmitter on C FRV5, an environmentally quailfied component.

Follt, wing the calibratien the 0-ring was replaced and the threaded

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i cover torqued back ca the transmitter, in both instances using i

Versaiube, a greasy luoricant.

The inspector noted that the work i

order also listed a 55M lubricant, but the instrument technicians

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could not explain for what the 65M lubricant was intended.

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procedure specified that the 0-ring be greased and that the cove-i threads be coated with Versalube.

However, the technician's l

supervisor later stated that the 55M iuhricant should have been ned on the 0-ring. The cover and 0 ring werc later removed and

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r"installed properly.

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The supervisor noted that in the beginning of the procedure, the

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55M lubricant was listed as 0-ring graase but he stated that the procedure needed improvement in the clarit of the instructions and initiated a procedure change.

The supervisor stated that technician t

training on the different lubric6nts and their applications would be l

reempha'ized to the *.echnicians.

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effect of Versalube on the 0-ring.

The inspector noted that both lubricants are specified for t.,e on the transmitter and both appear similar in nature.

The NRC reytw of the PSE&G engineering evaluation

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i and the procedure change wil de performed under Inspector Follow Item 88-18-01.

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On June 29 and 30, 1988, the residents were participants of an on-site meeting to discuss the NRC's review of Hope Creek's Inservice Testing i

(IST) Program.

The meeting was held to provide clarification of Hope Creek's position on general and system specific questions to enable the NRC to compl*te its evaluation of the program. The residents noted the meeting involved in-depth technical discussions of the IST program requirements and specific details of PSE&G's program.

D.

During the inspector's observation of the HPCI IST run on July 7, 1988, an equipment operator iradvertently left his dosimetry at the radiation area boundry wnen he reentered the radiation area. The HPCI test run had been aborted due to a problem with the mechanical overspeed trip device. The equipment operator was removing his anti-contamination clothing in preparattor. to leave the radiation area when he was directed to reenter the area to manually close the motor operated steam isolatic.i valve which would not close from the main control room.

The inspector brought the dosimetry proolem to the attention of a radiation protection technician who then returned the dosimetry to the operator.

Following adjustment of the trip plunger string compressor on the HPCI overspeed trip device and adjustment of the steam isolation valve control circuit, the IST test run was :ompleted successfully on July 8,1988.

Later, the inspector reviewed Radiological Occurrence Report (ROR)88-180, which documented and evaluated the above incident.

The inspector concluded that the ROR reviewed the incident acceptably and provided adequate corrective action.

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(Closed) Violation (87-2?-01; 88-05-01);

Inadequate restoration of FRVS pressure transducer. The inspector reviewed the PSE&G response dated February 26, 1983 and May 4, 1988, which described the corrective actions implemented to ensure proper instrument restorations. Based on the observed restoration of the FRVS pressure transducer and the other instrument restorations witnessed above, these items are closed.

4.0 MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES (62703)

4.1 Inspection Activity During this inspection period the inspector observed selected maintenance activities on safety related equipment to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Technical Specifica-tions, and appropriate industrial codes and standards.

These inspections were conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedure 6270 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _

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Portions of the following activities were observed by the inspector:

Work Order Procedure Description 880701024 MD-PM.KJ-005 0 Diesel Generator - PM for generator inspection 871201551 MO-PM. KJ-002 0 Diesel Generator - PM on starting and control air system 890917017 None 0 Diesel Generator -

Clean Lube Oil Strainer 880710023 MD-CM.GM-001 B Control Room Return Air Fan - Repair 880701024 MD-PM.JK-005 Emergency Diesel Generator Electrical Inspection 880628114 MO-GP.ZZ-022 Reactor Protection System Motor Generator Bearing Replacement 881114003 MD-CH.EA-003 Service Water Strainer Overhaul and Repair Generally, the maintenance activitias inspected were effective with respect to meeting the safety obje.ctives of the maintenance program.

4.2 Inspection Findings A.

As discussed in Section 3.2.A, 0 Diesel Generator exceeded the acceptance criteria for lobe oil strainer differential pressure, and the strainer was cleaned. A similar event occurred to the B Diesel Genirator in March 1933.

The inspectors learned that preventive maintenance had been performed on the lube oil strainers on the four diesel generators during the refueling outage (begun in February 1988),

prior to the problems on the B and 0 Olesel Generators.

The inspectors requested that the preventive maintenance records and the operating parameter records regarding the lube oil strainers be retrieved and evaluated to determine what preventive maintenance had been done and its adequacy.

PSE&G stated that this evaluation had been begun and would be completed. The adequacy of the lube oil strainer preventive maintenance is an Unresolved Item (88-18-02).

B.

The inspector observed the outboard bearing replacement on the "A" Reactor P-otection System (RPS) motor generator set. After the bearing was replaced the motor generator was started up and the

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output voltage set at 125 volts in accordance with MD-ST.SB-001 (6 month electrical protection ass 1mbly chan;el functional test). The inspector questioned why the Operations Dvpartment procedure for motor generator startup was not used which specified a generator output of 120 volts. Tho system engineer was contacted and the generator was set to 120 volts output.

The system engineer was aware that a discrepancy between the procedures existed and had initiated a procedure revision to correct this discrepancy. However, no interim compensatory measures were implemented to ensure the incerect procedure output settings were not utilized.

The safety significance of the RPS generator output voltage being set at 125 volts vice 120 volts is negligible. This motor generator is a normally energized fatisafe system.

The components downstream of the generator are protected by two electrical protection assemblies per RPS bus which trip and protect the bus on overvoltage, undervoltage, or underfrequency.

PSE&G had previously identified this weakness and improved the procedure revision process in April of this year.

All procedure revisions are now initiated in the Technical Department where a revision characterization and priority are established. A computer program was impiemented to track procedure revisions and to allow prompt recall of all outstanding revisions against a given procedure.

The residents will continue to monttor this area.

C.

The maintenance department did not file a fire impairment permit nor notify the fire department when they placed large quantities of combustible materials in a safety related area, as is rec,uired by the Station Administrative Procedures (SAP). As part of corrective maintenance on a service water strainer large blocks of fire retardant wooden blocks were placed in the service water structure to temporarily support the service water strainer head when it was removed. Although the safety significance in this specific case is negligible as a roving fire watch inspection is routinely conducted at the service water structure every hour, there is room for improved clarity in the SAP.

The Fire Department is reviewing the SAP to provide additional specific guidance concerning transient fire loads.

The residents will continue to monitor this area on a routine basis.

5,0 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT FOLLOWP (92700)

PSE&G submitted the following event reports and periodic reports, which were reviewed for accuracy and timely submission.

The asterisked reports received additional followup by the inspector for corrective action implementation.

The (+) items identify events which are detailed in the inspector's preceding monthly repor _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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Monthly Operaung Report for June 1988

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Generator Caused by Misconfigured Part Received

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From Vendor j

+ LER 88-010-00 Two HPCI Oil Control Valves Discovered Not In The

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Required Position For Operability - HPCI Declared Inoperable

Circulating Water Pumps Due to Malfunction of the

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Circulating Water System Multiplexer

Level Signal l

LER 88-014-00 RWCU ! solation on High Differential Flow

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+ LER 88-015-00 Unanticipated Loss of Second CREF Chiller

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(Closed) Unresolved Item (86-58-01); Indicated reactor water level oscillations during severe transient.

LER 86-092-01 describes Hope Creek's troubleshooting efforts to solve significant indicated level

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oscillations which were observed during the full power generator load

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reject test performed in the startup test program.

PSE&G has determined

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oscillations in the reactor Ivvel sensin, lines which were detected by fast-acting Rosemount transmitters.

3eneral Electric (GE) has addressed

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I this phenomenon in Service Informatioa Letter (SIL) - 463 and Rapid Information and Communtcation $1L - 012 which referred to this as i

"Inherent Process Signal Noite". GE recommends thtt the fast-acting transmitters currently installed be modified to provide adjustable

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filtering capability as soon as practicable. Modified circuit boards were

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purchased from Rosemount, but were not installed during the first refueling outage due to production delays associated with environmental qualification.

The reden gned Rosemount circuit boards are presently scheduled for delivery in November, 1988 and installation during the mid-cycle outage in l

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January 1939.

Hope Creek installed a filter circuit in the General Electric control panel to provide interim adjustable filtering capability.

These filter circuits have been instalied and tested, and displayed no i

abnormal oscillations during the two reactor scras.s which the plant experienced after the refueling outage.

Thh item is closed.

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LER 88-012 details the malfunction of the Circulating Water System (CWS)

multiplexer which resulted in the operators inserting a manual reactor scram frott 100% power.

The multiplexer malfunction caused spurious pump discharge valve closures, pump trips, and eventu&lly an emergency trip of all CVS pumps.

The plant operators manually scrammed the reactor prior to reaching the automatic scram setpniet because of the demonstrated unreliability of the CWS over the preceding two hour period.

Corrective action included replacing two faulty multiplexer cards in the terminal station and contacting the multiplexer manufacturer concerning specific maintenance and troubleshooting practice enhancements. Additional details of this event are discussed in paragraph 2.2 of NRC Inspection Report 88-16.

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LER 88-013 discusses an automatic reactor scram from 100% power due to preventive maintenance on the "A" secondary condensate pump auxiliary oil pump (SCPAOP) circuit breaker. Due to an unusual electrical design, de-energizing the SCPAOP breaker also removes power from the associated secondary condensate pump (SCP) low suction pressure trip which de-energized the SCP. With the "A" reactor feed pump out of service for maintenance, the ensuing level transient scrammed the reactor on low water level.

Additional details on this event are discussed in paragraph 2.2 of NRC Inspection Report 88-16.

6.0 ASSURANCE OF QUALITY Generally, the inspectors concluded that the operations, maintenance, and surveillance testing activities had been performed in a safe, effective manner. During this inspection report period the inspectors reviewed thirteen surveillance testing activities in a range of areas and found one problem (lubricants on Rosemount transmitter).

The first line supervisors were frequently at the work site and responded quickly and knowledgeably to problems.

Fittings and flanges required for maintenance activity were

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screened prior to use to ensure they were not suspect material as addressed in NRC Bulletin 88-05. Work activities were weil planned and coordinated which minimized equipment out of service time. Also, the availability of safety equipt.snt during the period was very good, with a minimum nunber of corrective maintenance problems on major safety equiprnent.

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outages were largely preventive maintenance.

Hewever, the tightening of the acceptance criterion for dif ferential

pressure of the diesel lube oil strainer required the diesel out of j

service time to increase to allow lube oil strainer to be cleaned.

The inspectors noted that the acceptance criterion was modified in a conservative direction and no safety problems resulte *

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i 7.0 EXIT INTERVIEW (30703)

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The inspectors met with Mr. S. LaBruna and other PSE&G personnel i

periodically and at the end of th( inspection report period to summarize

the scope and findings of their inspectior. Activities.

The inspectors

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discussed the actions on previous inspection items tabulated below.

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J 86-58-01 Closed Section 5.A

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87-01-03 Closed Section 2.2E

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87-29-01 Closed Section 3.2E

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88-05-01 Closed Section 3.2E

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88-09-01 Closed Section 2.2F

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i Based en Region I review and discussions with PSE&G, it was determined that this report does not contain informaticn subject to 10 CFR 2 restrictions.

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