IR 05000354/1989011

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Safety Insp Rept 50-354/89-11 on 890501-0619.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Radiological Controls,Maint & Surveillance Testing,Emergency Preparedness,Security & LER & Open Item Followup
ML20246J880
Person / Time
Site: Hope Creek PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 07/10/1989
From: Swetland P
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20246J871 List:
References
50-354-89-11, NUDOCS 8907170475
Download: ML20246J880 (8)


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.U.LS.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSION'

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-REGION I.

1 Report No.

50-354/89-11'

License NPF-57:

Licensee:

.Public Service Electric and Gas Company j

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P. O. Box 236

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Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

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' Facility:

. Hope Creek' Generating Station Dates:

May 1,1989 :- June 19,1989'

Inspectors:

G. W. Meyer, Senior Resident Inspector D. K. Allsopp, Resident Inspector

. Approved:

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._2 /0-P. D.I wetland, Chief, Projects Section 28 Data S

Inspection Summary:.

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Inspection 50-354/89-11 on May 1, 1989 - June 19, 1989 Areas Inspected:. Resident safety inspection.of the following areas:

operations, radiological controls, maintenance & surveillance testing, emergency preparedness, security, engineering / technical support, safety.

assessment / assurance of quality, and Licensee Event Report and open item followup.

Results: The inspectors did not identify any violations. in Executive Summary follows.

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EXECllTIVE SUMMARY Hope Creek Inspection Report 50-354/89-11 May 1, 1989 - June 19, 1989 Operations: A personnel error by a Nuclear Shift Supervisor resulted in a surveillance test for an action statement on diesel fuel oil not being completed in the Technical Specification required time period. A detailed inspection of the C EDG determined the diesel to be properly aligned and folly functional with equipment in good physical condition. A previous violation concerning control of equipment alignment was closed out.

Radiological Control: Routine inspaction did not identify any noteworthy findings.

Maintenance / Surveillance: A personnel error by the maintenance job supervisor resulted in a non-Q temperature switch being installed in the A CREF chiller for three days.

The inspector observed a loose electrical lead cause a blown fuse during a surveillance test.

HPCI was removed from service to repair a packing leak on an isolation valve.

Emergency Preparedness: The inspector observed Emergency Drill H89-02 and concluded the drill effectively exercised the B team of emergency response personnel.

Security: Routine inspection did not ideitify any noteworthy findings.

Engineering / Technical Support: Thomas Crimmins was named as Vice President -

Nuclear Engineering, effective May 35.

Safety Assessment / Assurance cf Quality: The inspector noted that additional personnel errors contributed to sustaining the higher incident rate identified in the previous inspection report.

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I Details

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'1.

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

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The unit entered this report period (May 1 - June 19) at full power and continued power' operations throughout the period.

2.

OPERATIONS (71707,'71710,93702)

2.1. Inspection Activities The inspectors verified that the facility was operated safely and in con-form:nce with regulatory requirements.

Public Service Electric and Gas

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(PSE&G) Company management control.wes evaluated by direct observation'of activities, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with per-sonnel, independent verification of safety system status and Limiting Conditions for Ope _ ration, and review of._ facility records. _These inspec-tion activitiss'were' conducted in accordance with NRC inspection'proce-dures 71707,.71710, 71715, and 93702. The inspectors performed 127 hours0.00147 days <br />0.0353 hours <br />2.099868e-4 weeks <br />4.83235e-5 months <br /> of normal and backshift inspection including weekerd inspection on May 20, 2.2 Inspection Findings and Significant Plant Events A.

(LER 89-10) On April 14, a surveillance test to demonstrate avail-

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ability of offsite power-sources was missed due to an oversight by the Nuclear Shift Supervisor (NSS).' The A EDG'was declared inoper-able when its fuel oil storage tank level dropped below minimum dur-ing a planned fuel oil exchange in preparation for a fuel delivery.

-Due to a personnel error, the NSS failed to complete this surveil-lance test within one. hour of declaring the EDG inoperable as re-quired by Technical Specifications Action Statement 3.8.1.1.b.

The

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.NSS was distracted during this time period by plant restoration from an inadvertent C channel loss of coolant accident (LOCA) actuation and reactor recirculation system runback (discussed in NRC Inspec-tion Report 50-354/89-09, paragraph 2.2. A. ).

Corrective action in-cluded reviewing the event with all shifts including the need for adequhte follow through and self-checking. This missed.urveill3nce test is classified as a licensae identified violation' ani is not being cited because the criteria specified in Section V.A of tne Enforcement Policy were satisfief (NCV 354/89-11-01).

B.

The C Emergency' Diesel Generator (EDG) System was reviewed in ac-cordance with NRC inspection prou dure 71710 to identify equipment conditions that might degrade performance, to determine that in-

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strumentation was calibrated and functioning, and to verify that valves were properly positioned and locked as appropriate. Also, the inspectors reviewed the operating, alarm response, and abnormal procedures and the instrumentation logic drawings. The C EDG was found to be fully functional with the equipment in good physical l

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condition. No conditions adverse to system operability were observed nor were any minor discrepancies identified that were not previously noted by PSE&G.

C.

(Closed) Violation 50-354/87-17-05; Control of equipment alignment.

This violation corcerned plant equipment which was positioned con-trary to Technical Specifications. Corrective action included a procedure revision to the equipment control procedure, training for licensed and non-licensed operators, and implementation of an ex-tensive intermediate valve numbering and locking program for in-strument sensing lines.

The inspector reviewed the procedure change and conducted a sample audit of intermediate valve labeling and locked status.

These corrective actions appeared to have been suc-cessful based on the lack of similar occurrences. The inspector had no further questions and this item is closed.

3.

RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS (71707)

PSE&G's compliance with the radiological protection program was verified on a periodic basis.

There were no noteworthy findings in this area.

4.

MAINTENANCE / SURVEILLANCE TESTING (62703. 61726)

4.1 Maintenance Inspection Activity The inspectors observed selected maintenance activities on safety-related equipment to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Technical Specifications, and appropriate in-dustrial codes and standards.

These inspections were conducted in ac-cordance with NRC inspection procedure 62703.

Portions of the following activities were observed by the. inspector:

Work Order Procedure Description 880920172 MD-CM.KF-001 Spool B service water elbow replacement 890510120 MD-GP.ZZ-003 HPCI valve repair

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The taaintenance activities 'nspected were effective with respect to meet-ing the safety objectives of the mair tc.9hnce program.

4.2 Surveillance Testing Inspection Activity The inspectors performed detailed technical procedure reviews, witnessed l

in progress surveillance testing, and reviewed completed surveillance packcges.

The inspectors verified that the surveillance tests were I.

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performed in;accordance with Technical 1 Specifications,. approved proce-

dures, and NRC regulations.

These inspection activities were conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedure 61726.

The following surveillance tests were. reviewed, with portions witnessed by.the..i n specto r:

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'IC-FT.SE-018-Functional test of F APRM

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IC-CC.SE-018 F APRM channel calibration

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OP-IS.EAJ.02 Inservice test of B service water pump

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IC-GP ZZ-067 Calibration of fuel pool heat exchanger

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pressure indicator IC-FT.SK-022 Functional-test of RCIC Channel D steam leak

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detection temperature switch

'The surveillance testing activities inspected were effective _with respect to meeting the safety objectives of the surveillance testing program.

4.3 Inspection Findings A.

(LER 89-08) In the previous inspection period, a non safety related

(non-Q) temperature switch was installed for three days in a safety related system due to_a personnel error by a new Maintenance De-partment job supervisor.

To determine the storeroom stock number for a defective temperature switch on the A control room emergency filtration (CREF) chiller, the job supervisor referred'to'a cross reference of parts after the item did not appear on the bill of ma-terial. ' The job supervisor mistakenly chose a stock number with a non-Q-application and initiated a non-Q work request. This prevented

~the storeroom issuer and quality assurance department from detecting the error prior to the equipment being returned to service. The installed part was functionally and visually identical to the replaced part; howuver, it, lacked the proper certification. The CREF planner p

detected the error when reviewing Work Orders completed during the

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weekond.

Corrective action included replacing the temperature switch

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with a qualified switch and training for all Maintenance Department supervisors including this particular job supervisor. This incident is classified as a licensee identified violation and is not being I

cited because the criteria specified in Section V.A of the Enforcement Policy were satisfied (NCV 354/89-11-02).

B.

While'the inspector observed a surveillance test on the nuclear monitoring instrumentation. the technician allowed an electrical test lead to ground, resulting in a blown fuse. The technician was working inside a confined instrumentation cabinet, which was crowded L

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L with electrical contacts. A similar error in a nuclear steam leak (.

detection cabinet would have initiated an engineered safety feature isolation signal as had occurred in the past.

To minimize the dif-ficulty to technicians performing surveillance tests, Hope Creek is implementing design change 4HC-204. This design change will connect a test jack box to various internal relay contact points and allow the technician to perform surveillance testing without having to enter the instrumentation cabinet. The inspector reviewed the de-l sign change package and the test jack box and concluded that this design change should significantly reduce the difficulty presented to technicians working in instrumentation cabinets. This design change is scheduled to be performed during the upcoming refueling outage.

C.

(LER 89-12) On June 7, the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI)

system was declared inoperable to support a repair to a packing leak on the HPCI outboard steam supply isolation valve. The steam leak was attributed to normal wear of the packing. The valve was iso-lated, two rings of packing were added to the stuffing box, and the valve was returned to service.

5.

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (71707)

The inspector observed the performance of PSE&G's B team of emergency response personnel during the Hope Creek Emergency Drill H89-02 held on May :10, 1989. The drill exercised station personnel and included declara-tion of a General Emergency and a simulated hydrogen explosion with an offsite release..The inspector observed emergency response personnel in the operational support center, technical support center, and the control room. The inspector noted that problem identification and resolution during the drill were good and that communications were timely and ac -

curate.

The inspector concluded that this practice drill was an effec-tive training tool and had improved the performance capabilities of emer-gency response personnel.

6..

SECURITY (71707)

PSE&G's compliance with the security program was verified on a periodic basis, including adequacy of staffing, entry control, alarm stations, and physical boundaries.

There were no noteworthy findings in this area.

7.

ENGINEERING / TECHNICAL SUPPORT Thomas M. Crimmins, Jr. was named as the Vice President - Nuclear Engi-neering effective May 15.

This is a new position and he will report to Steven E. Miltenberger, Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer.

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SAFETY ASSESSMENT / QUALITY VERIFICATION The inspector noted a. continued, higher incidence rate of minor personnel errors that was initially identified in the previous inspection report.

This report discusses a personnel error (grounded electrical lead)

identified by an NRC inspector and two personnel errors caused licensee events. The errors had minimal significance by themselves, but the rate of these errors represents an adverse short term trend and a degradation from Hope Creek's normal standards. The inspectors will continue to monitor this area to determine whether these errors represent isolated incidents or a deterioration of performance.

9.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) AND OPEN ITEM FOLLOWUP (92700)

A.

PSE&G submitted the following event reports and periodic reports, which were reviewed for accuracy and adequacy of the evaluation.

Monthly Operating Report for April 1989 ad May 1989 LER 89-08 Installation of a non-Q instrument in a safety re-lated system caused by choosing the wrong stock num-ber when replacing the instrument; discussed in sec-tion 4.3.A of this report.

LER 89-09 Initiation of channel C emergency core cooling system (ECCS) logic following over-voltage trip of class IE channel C ECCS instrument inverter; discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-354/89-09 section 2.2.A.

LER 89-10 Missed technical specification surveillance due to lack of follow through by licensed personnel; dis-cussed in section 2.2.A of this report.

LER 89-11 High radiation area not properly reposted following maintenance as required by technical specifications; discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-354/89-09 sec-tion 3.2.A.

LER 89-12 High pressure coolant injection (HPCI) (single train safety system) declared inoperable due to steam sup-ply valve packing leakage equipment failure; dis-cussed in section 2.2.B of this report.

B.

The following previous inspection item was followed 'm during this in-spection and is tabulated below for cross reference purposes.

Closed Violation 37-17-05 Section 2.2.C

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l 10. EXIT INTERVIEW (30703)

The inspectors met with Mr. J. Hagan and other PSE&G personnel peri-odically and at the end of the inspection report period.to summarize the scope and findings of their inspection activities.

Based on Region I review and discussions with PSE&G, it was determined that this report does not contain information subject to 10 CFR 2 re-strictions.

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