IR 05000354/1999004

Insp Rept 50-354/99-04 on 990530-0711.No Violations Noted. Major Areas inspected:cornerstone-mitigating Sys,Pi Verification

ML20210R498
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek
Issue date:	08/11/1999
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20210R495	List: IR 05000354/1999004 ML20210R491
References
50-354-99-04, NUDOCS 9908170131
Download: ML20210R498 (23)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION !

REGION I ,

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Docket No: 50-354 License No: NPF-57 Report No: 50-354/99-04 Licensee: PSEG Nuclear LL Facility: Hope Creek Nuclear Generating Station Location: P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 Dates: May 30,1999 - July 11,1999 Inspector (s):' J. D. Orr, Senior Resident inspector N. Della Greca, Senior Reactor Engineer i S.M. Pindale, Reactor Engineer-Approved By: Glenn W. Meyer, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 3 l Division of Reactor Projects ]

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9908170131 990811 PDR ADOCK 05000354 G PDR

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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS Hope Creek Generating Station NRC Inspection Report 50-354/99-04 The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspection using the guidance contained in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 2515*.

Inspection findings were assessed according to potential risk significance, and were assigned colors of green, white, yellow, or red. The inspection found only green findings, which were indicative of issues that, while not necessarily desirable, represented little risk to safety. White findings would have indicated issues with some increased risk to safety and which may have required additional NRC inspections. Yellow findings would have indicated more serious issues with higher potential risk to safe performance and would have required the NRC to take additional actions. Red findings would have represented an unacceptable loss of margin to safety and would have resulted in the NRC taking significant actions that could have included ordering the plant to shut down. The findings, considered in total with other inspection findings and performance indicators, will be used to determine overall plant performanc Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems e Green. The inspectors identified poor risk management administration during a risk significant B station service water (SSW) loor, autage. PSEG appropriately determined that the B SSW loop outage was in Hope Creek's highest risk significant category (red)

for out-of-service equip;nent. However, PSEG did not address this higher risk condition properly, in that schedulers did not develop administrative controls and operators did not plan any contingency actions or implement any controls regarding possible adverse 1

. equipment actions. There were no actual consequences in that the loop outage was completed as planned. (Section 1R13)

Performance Indicator Verification e The insp9ctors identified a reporting error in historical data for the Safety System Unavalability, Heat Removal System performance indicator (PI). The error related to an inaccurate estimate of the time the system was required to be available in 1997. The error caused a small increase in this white Pi and did not result in the yellow threshold being exceeded. PSEG corrected the error in the next Pl submittal. (Section 40A2)

Other e The inspectors concluded that PSEG had previously implemented appropriate corrective actions for white performance indicators in Safety System Unavailability, Heat Removal System and Protected Area Security Equipment Performance Index when the applicable events occurred in 1996 and 1998, respectively. No additional NRC inspection is warranted or planned. (Section 40A4)

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Report Details Summary of plant status Hope Creek was operated at or near full power for the duration of the inspection perio REACTOR SAFETY (Comerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity)

1R13 Maintenance Work Prioritization and Control Insoection Scooe (71111-13)

The inspectors evaluated PSEG Nuclear's on-line risk assessment for the B station service water (SSW) loop outage conducted on June 14,199 Observations and Findinos The inspectors determined that poor risk management had existed when PSEG isolated the B SSW loop on June 14,1999 to repair the D SSW pump discharge valve. The discharge valve was leaking by and precluded any future repairs on the D SSW pump or strainer without a complete B SSW loop outage. PSEG schedulers and managers recognized that the B SSW loop outage presented a significant increase in plant risk, and proceeded with the outage because the discharge valve maintenance was necessary and beneficial. Nonetheless, appropriate administrative controls were not implemented to address this risk significant plant condition. Specifically, no LCO (limiting condition for operation) maintenance plan was implemente The risk matrix color during the SSW loop outage was red, the highest category of risk significance. Hope Creek operators and maintenance schedulers use the risk matrix to evaluate increased plant risk for various system outages. The matrix assigns a color code, green, yellow or red, for particular system outage configurations. The red matrix color was not necessarily unallowed, but needed an increased level of review and planning to minimize any unnecessary contributors to plant risk. Typically, PSEG has prepared an LCO maintenance plan to administratively control the risk review, maintenance planning, and work control for plant conditions categorized as red. In fact, the inspectors had reviewed similar preparations for an A SSW loop outage on April 7, 1999. The inspectors noted that the LCO maintenance plan provided for the previous A SSW loop outage was detailed and provided the operators with contingency plans and relevant risk informatio The inspectors discussed the lack of an LCO maintenance plan for the risk significant B SSW loop outage with the assistant operations manager. The assistant operations manager agreed that an LCO maintenance plan was appropriate and should have been provided. PSEG initiated corrective actions to improve its process for developing and implementing LCO maintenance plans. PSEG also promptly trained the control room supervisors on expectations for approving risk significant maintenance and LCO maintenance plans. The inspectors concluded that the poor risk management had not

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constituted a violation but had potential significance to the human performance related to risk management. As such this represented a green findin OTHER ACTIVITIES 40A2 Performance IndicatorVerification Inspection Scope (71151)

The inspectors verified the accuracy of and methods used to calculate the Safety System Unavailability, Heat Removal System performance indicator (Pl). Observations and Findinos The inspectors identified one instance of incorrect historical data used for the Safety System Unavailability, Heat Removal Syst6m Pl. The historical data was supplied by PSEG on a best faith effort consistent with the pilot program guidelines. The error related to the estimate of hours that the RCIC (reactor core isolation cooling) system had been required to be available in the fourth quarter 1997. The corrected unavailability remained white and changed to 6.1% from 5.7% but did not approach the yellow threshold (12%). The inspectors noted that PSEG had implemented administrative controls to ensure accurate data would be submitted to the NRC in the future. PSEG corrected the Pl data in the subsequent Pl package submittal 40A4 Other l l

.1 White Performance Indicators: The inspectors reviewed the causes leading to and l followup corrective actions for white performance indicators in Safety System j Unavailability, Heat Removal System and Protected Area (PA) Security Equipment l Performance Index. The inspectors determined that the heat removal system i unavailability PI was white for RCIC system mostly due to a surveillance test failure that j occurred in 1996, and the root cause of that failure was resolved by PSEG in 199 (NRC Inspection Reports 50-354196-11 Section M2 and 50-354/97-10 Section M provided a detailed explanation of the RCIC system problems.) Tne inspectors concluded that RCIC system performance problems had been addressed and that PSEG had already completed appropriate corrective action The security equipment PI was white due to compensatory measures implemented during planned security system upgrades during the fall of 1998. These compensatory actions were implemented during the planned system outages and did not represent responses to emerging equipment problems. As such, corrective actions were not applicabl '.

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Based on above review of the two white Pls, the inspectors concluded that the applicable l concems had occurred in 1996 and 1998, that appropriate actions had been taken by PSEG, and that no additional NRC inspection was warranted or planne .2 (Open/ Closed) LER 99-006-00: B Channel Primary Containment Isolation Signal I Actuation. This event was described in NRC Inspection Report 50-354/99-03. The !

inspectors verified that the LER was consistent with the original event followup. This l LER is close j l

COA 5 Manaaement Meetinos i

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1 Exit Meetina Summary j On July 16,1999, the inspectors presented their overall findings to members of PSEG Nuclear management led by Mark Bezilla, General Manager of Hope Creek Operation PSEG Nuclear management acknowledged the findings presented and did not contest any of the inspectors' conclusions. Additionally, they stated that none of the information i reviewed by the inspectors was considered proprietar l PSEG Nuclear /NRC Manaaement Meetina l

On June 29,1999, members of NRC Region I management led by Randy Blough, 1 Director of the Division of Reactor Projects, met with members of PSEG Nuclear management led by Dave Garchow at the John B. Campbell Family and Fitness Center of Salem County in Salem, NJ. The meeting was open to public observation. PSEG managers presented the status of several current issues of mutual PSEG and NRC interest during the meeting. Sv'es used in PSEG's presentation are included as Appendix A to this repor l

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ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Opened / Closed 50-354/99-006-00 LER Engineered Safety Function Actuation - B Channel ;

Primary Containment Isolation Signal Actuatio l

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(Section 40A4)

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LIST OF BASELINE INSPECTIONS PERFORMED (

The following baseline inspection procedures were implemented during the repoit perio Documented findings are contained in the body of the repor Procedure Title Report Number Section 71111-03 Emergent Work (B SW Loop Outage) 1R03 71111-04 Equipment Alignment (B SSW Loop & C SSW Pump Outages) 1R04 71111-05 Fire Protection (EDG Room Fire Suppression Systems) 1R05 71111-07 Heat Sink Performance (A2 SACS HX Performance Monitoring) 1R07 71111-09 Inservice Testing of Pumps and Valves (D SSW & B&D CS PPs) 1R09 71111-10 Large Containment isolation Valve Leak Rate & Status Verification 1R10 (Primary Cnmt Vacuum Bkr Surveillance Testing)

71111-11 Licensed Operator Requalification (Simulator Observation 1R11 )

6/16/99)

71111-12 Maintenance Rule Implementation (11/15/99 SCRAM & SRVs) 1R12 71111-13 Maintenance Work Prioritization & Control (B SSW Loop Outage) 1R13 .

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71111-15 Operability Evaluations (Review of all outstanding & HPCI 11 1R15 l valve)

71111-16 Operator Workarounds (Reviewed all outstanding) 1R16 71111-22 Surveillance Testing (SCRAM time testing & CS Interfacing LOCA 1R22 PS)

71151 Performance Indicator Verification (SSU, Heat Removal) 40A2 i

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