IR 05000354/1986031

Insp Rept 50-354/86-31 on 860609-20.No Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Previous Insp Findings & Power Ascension Test Program,Including Overall Program & Test Results Evaluations

ML20203D179
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek
Issue date:	07/11/1986
From:	Eselgroth P, Florek D, Wink L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20203D160	List: IR 05000354/1986031 ML20203D154
References
50-354-86-31, NUDOCS 8607210168
Download: ML20203D179 (10)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /86-31 Docket N License No. NPF-50 Licensee: Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza Newark, New Jersey 071.01 Facility Name: Hope Creek Generating Station, Unit 1

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Inspection At: Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspection Conduc d: June 9-20), 1986 '

Inspectors:

ead actor Engineer / dite D:for ,

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, k8 N Wink,ReactrEnsfndfr

)'/ pte Approved by: 7 ~ 8' Id P. Eselgroth/ '

1ef, date f

Test Progr Section, 08, DRS Inspection Summary:

d Inspection on June 9-20, 1986 (Inspection Report No. 50-354/86-31)

Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection of previous inspection findings, '

the power ascension test program including the overall program, test results evaluations and operational interfaces, surveillance test activities, independ-ent measurements and verification, QA/QC interfaces and tours of the facilit Results: No violations were identifie NOTE: For acronyms not defined, refer to NUREG-0544 " Handbook of Acronyms and Initialisms." <

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DETAILS 1.0. Persons Contacted Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G)

G. Chew, Power Ascension Results Coordinator i G. Daves, Senior Engineer, Operations

• R. Donges, Licensing Engineer G. Duncan, Inservice Testing Supervisor i *M. Farshon, Power Ascension Manager B. Forward, Power Ascension Administrative Coordinator

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S. Funstein, Instrument and Control (I&C) Supervisor

• A. Giardino, Manager, Station QA J. Gibson, Shift Test Coordinator

• R. Griffith, Principal QA Engineer D. Kelly, Power Ascension Engineer

• P. Krishna, Assistant to the General Manager

• S. LaBruna, Assistant General Manager M. LaFatta, I&C Supervisor

• M. Metcalf, Principal QA Engineer j D. Moon, Shift Test Coordinator J. Montgomery, Maintenance Surveillance Coordinator

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E. Rush, I&C Surveillance Coordinator l

W. Ryder, Operations Surveillance Coordinator

• R. Salvesen, General Manager

• Schaeffer, Onsite Safety Review Engineer

• Schell, Principal Engineer Power Ascension C. Sullivan, Power Ascension Engineer L. Zull, Lead Startup Test, Design and Analysis Engineer U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission D. Allsopp, Resident Inspector R. Borchardt, Senior Resident Inspector

• R. Summers, Project Engineer

• Denotes those present at exit meeting on June 20, 1986.

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. The inspector also contacted other members of the Licensee Staff including Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisors, Reactor Operators, Test Engineers, Tech-nicians and members of the Technical Staf .0. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item (354/86-24-02) Performance of Power Ascension i Tests in Conformance with Administrative Procedures (Reference Inspaction Report 50-354/86-27). The inspector verified that an augmented i

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training program for test personnel had been complete Following inter-views with selected test personnel the inspector was satisfied as to the scope and effectiveness of the training program. The inspector had no further questions concerning corrective actions taken on this matte (Closed) Unresolved Item (354/86-27-02) MSIV surveillance timing practic The inspector reviewed the "as-run" retest of MSIV closure times using the revised procedure OP-TE.AB-102, MSIV Closure Time. The revision to the procedure included a correction factor for MSIV closure times to account  ;

for the fact that the closed limit switch may in fact represent as little as 90% closed. The licensee has elected to apply the same, maximum correction factor to all MSIVs rather than unique correction factors for

each MSIV. The "as-run" retest indicates that all MSIVs met the Technical Specification stroke time requirement when the correction factor was applied. The inspector had no further question on this subjec ;

3.0. Power Ascension Test Program (PATP)

3.1. References

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l Regulatory Guide 1.68, Revision 2, August 1978, " Initial Test Programs for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants" ANSI N18.7-1976, " Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance i for the Operational Phrase of Nuclear Power Plants" t

I Hope Creek Generating Station (HCGS) Technical Specifications, I Revision 0, April 11, 1986 HCGS Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Chapter 14, " Initial ,

Test Program"

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HCGS Safety Evaluation Report (SER), Chapter 14, " Initial Test Program" Station Administrative Procedure, SA-AP.ZZ-036, Revision 3,

! " Phase III Startup Test Program"

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Specification NEB 0 23A4137, Revision 0, " Hope Creek Startup Test Specification" 1 HCGS Power Ascension Test Matrix, Revision 3 i i i  !

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3.2. Overall Power Ascension Test Program (PATP)

The inspector held discussions with the Power Ascension Manager, Power Ascension Results Coordinator and other members of the PATP staff to determine the status of test results evaluations, test procedure reviews and the overall readiness to begin low power testin The inspector determined that, with the exception of the initial criticality testing sequence, all open vessel test results had been evaluated and formally approved. The licensee indicated ,

that the initial criticality testing sequence had been deferred to

. Test Condition Heatu The inspector was provided with a copy of the revised procedure TE-SU.ZZ-041, Full Core Shutdown Margin Demonstration, Revision 2, which governs the initial criticality testing sequence, and reflects the current plans to conduct this test in Operational Condition 2 and also reviewed normal station procedure RE-ST.ZZ-007, Shutdown Margin Demonstration, Revision 2. The detailed (Level III) schedule for Test Condition Heatup was reviewed and discussed with Power Ascension personnel. The inspector noted that surveillance testing on the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) systems at rated pressure in accordance with technical speci-fications 4.5.1.b.3 and 4.7.4 b were not identified on the schedul Based on the discussions, the licensee will identify the appropriate surveillance tests on the schedule. The inspector had no further question .3 Power Ascension Test Results Evaluation Scope The power ascension test results discussed below were reviewed for the attributes identified in Inspection Report No. 50-354/86-2 Discussion All power ascension test results packages were found to meet the attributes referenced above. A summary of the test results follows:

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TE-SU.ZZ-131, Preliminary Process Computer Test, Results Approved June 5, 1986 i

All acceptance criteria were satisfied. The test verified the

proper functioning of process computer software and the inter-face between the process computer and the transversing incore probe (TIP) syste TE-SU.ZZ-172, NSSS Piping Expansion Walkdown, Results Approved May 29, 1986

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All acceptance criteria were satisfied. The test involved a visual inspection of the main steam and recirculation systems to verify the absence of unacceptable conditions prior to the commencement of system heatu TE-SU.ZZ-175, Balance of Plant Systems Piping Expansion During Initial Plant Heatup, Results Approved June 5, 1986 The test obtained baseline data against which the subsequent thermal expansion of the selected balance of plant systems would be evaluated. During the system walkdowns, thirty-one (31) results deficiencies were identified which involved lack of required clearances to accommodate anticipated thermal expansions. All deficiencies were appropriately dispositione TE-SU.ZZ-002, Test Plateau Sequencer Procedure for Test Condition Open Vessel, Results Approved June 6, 1986 This procedure documented the testing performed during Test Condition Open Vessel, identified tests that were not performed and all open results deficiencies from completed testing. The procedure provided the bases for the determination that all required testing had been accomplished and that any incomplete testing or open results deficiencies may be carried over to the subsequent testing condition without jeopardizing the safe operation of the facilit The procedure documented that at the end of Open Vessel Testing, there were thirty-two (32) open results deficiencies. Each deficiency had been dispositioned and assigned a limiting plant condition (temperature or power) by which the required work must be completed. .Four (4) tests originally planned for Test Condition Open Vessel were not completed and the determination was made that they could be safely performed in Test Condition Heatup. The four deferred tests, comprising the initial criticality sequence, were:

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TE-SU.ZZ-041, Full Core Shutdown Margin Demonstration

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TE-SU.SE-062, SRM Response to Rod Withdrawal

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TE-SU.SE-064, SRM Non-Saturation Demonstration

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TE-SU.SE-101, SRM/IRM Overlap Verification l

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Findings No unacceptable conditions were identifie .4 Power Ascension Program / Operational Interfaces Scope The inspector reviewed operational procedure OP-IO.ZZ-003, Startup from Cold Shutdown to Rated Power, Revision 1, held discussions with various operations and test personnel, witnessed portions of shift briefings and operations shift power ascension training to ascertain the readiness to proceed with power ascension testin Discussion Based on the review of OP-IO.ZZ-003, the inspector questioned the need for modification to the normal station startup procedure to i

reflect the special constraints imposed on the first plant startup due to the power ascension program. The licensee had been review-ing the operational procedures from the power ascension program constraints but had not yet modified the procedure to reflect the constraints. These licensee activities will be reviewed in a subsequent inspectio Discussions were also held on power level determinations for the low power license. The licensee has plans to utilize the power ascension constant rate APRM heatup rate procedure TE-SU.!E-121 to calibrate the APRMs and average the APRMs to determine power. The inspector indicated that logging the power levels periodically should also be

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performed to assist in the assessment of plant- transients, if any, by the use of the periodic logs and nuclear instrument chart recorder The inspector witnessed a portion of the training provided by the power ascension test personnel to the operations personnel on the activities associated with the initial criticality. The inspector also witnessed portions of shift turnover meeting Findings No unacceptable conditions were note .0 Surveillance Test Activities Scope The inspector examined the surveillance procedures listed in Attachment A to determine whether the licensee was meeting the technical specification requirements for entry into Operational Condition The examination consisted of reviews of approved surveillance procedures for technical

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adequacy, reviews of completed surveillance tests to determine that tech-nical specification requirements were met and witnessing of the performance of surveillance tests. The inspector also reviewed the licensee's computer based surveillance logs to determine the overall status of the surveillance program. In addition, the inspector reviewed the local leak test performed on MSIV HV-F028 Discussion The inspector determined that the approved surveillance procedures listed in Attachment A were technically adequate to satisfy technical specifica-tion requirements. The review of completed surveillance test results in-dicated that the technical specification requirements were being satisfie The field performance of the surveillance tests witnessed conformed to all procedural and administrative requirement Under work order WO86-05-31-034-1, while performing a local leak test on

the outboard MSIV sealing system, following maintenance on the packing of MSIV sealing system valve IAB-HV-F07CD, the licensee detected excessive leakage through MSIV HV-F028 The MSIV was disassembled and repaired and a subsequent local leak test satisfactorily performe Following review of the work order and discussions about the local leak test performed, the

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inspector's questions were adequately answere Findings No violations were identifie .0 Independent Measurements and Verifications Independent measurements and verifications were performed during the witnessing of surveillance tests as described in Section 4.0 as well as during the review of test results evaluations in Section The inspector's measurements and verifications agreed with those of the license No unacceptable conditions were note .0 QA/QC Interfaces The inspector observed QA involvement in the power ascension test results evaluations. In addition, the inspector reviewed QA internal memorandum dated May 19, 1986 providing revisions to the power ascension surveillance plan to reflect changes made to the power ascension progra No unacceptable conditions were noted.

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7.0 Tours of the Facility

In the course of witnessing surveillance activities, the inspector made tours of various areas of the facility to observe work in progress, housekeeping and cleanliness controls.

l No unacceptable conditions were identified.

8.0 Exit Interview ,

At the conclusion of the site inspection on June 20, 1986, an exit meeting .

was conducted with the licensee's senior site representative (denoted in  !

section 1.0). The findings were identified and previous inspection items

, were discussed. At no time during this inspection was written inspection

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findings provided to the licensee by the inspector. Based on NRC Region I  ;

.; review of this report and discussions held with the licensee representa-

.' tives during this inspection, it was determined that this report does ot i contain information subject to 10 CFR~ 2.790 restriction !

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ATTACHMENT A SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURES Key: PR = Procedure Reviewed for Technical Specification compliance VC = Verified test complete via Surveillance Log CT = Completed Test Results Reviewed SW = Surveillance Witnessed IC-CC.BB-035, Nuclear Boiler - Division 1, Channel B21-N678A High Reactor Pressure (PR, VC, CT)

IC-CC.BG-002, Reactor Water Cleanup - Division 4, Channel G33-N603D Differential Flow (Isolation) (PR, CT, SW)

IC-CC.SE-023, Nuclear Instrumentation System - TIP System Calibration (PR, SW)

IC-FT.BB-009, Nuclear Boiler - Division 1, Channel B21-N694A Drywell Pressure (PR,VC,CT)

IC-FT.BF-001, Control Rod Drive Hydraulic - Division 1, Channel A1/A, C11-N601A Scram Discharge Volume High Water Level (PR, VC)

IC-FT.SK-005, Steam Leak Detection - Division 1, Channel A1, G33-N600A, E, J, N, T, AA RWCU High Temperature (PR, VC, CT)

IC-FT.SK-009, Steam Leak Detection - Division 1, Channel A1, B21-N605A, N606A, N607A, N608A Main Steam Line Tunnel High Temperature (PR, VC, CT)

IC-FT.SM-011, NSSSS - Division 3, Channel B21-N681C Reactor Vessel Level (Trip 1, 2) (PR, VC)

IC-FT.SP-007, Control Room Vent Process Radiation Monitoring Non-Divisional Monitor RY-48580 (PR, VC)

IC-FT.SP-029, Process Radiation Monitoring - Non-Divisional Monitor RY-4856A Refuel Floor and Reactor Building Exhaust Channel A (PR, VC, CT)

OP-ST.GS-003, Reactor Building / Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breaker Operability Test - Monthly (VC - Monthly, CT)

OP-TE.GS-101, Containment Atmosphere Control System Valves - Inservice Test (PR,VC,CT)

OP-TE.SM-005, PCIS/HPCI Isolation Functional Test - 18 months (PR, VC, CT)

OP-TE.SM-006, PCIS/RCIC Isolation Functional Test - 18 months (PR, VC, CT) l l

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Attachment A 2 RE-RA.SE-004, TIP System Axial Alignment (PR, CT, SW)

i OP-IS.AB-102, MSIV Closure Time (VC)

OP-ST.BC-002, Suppression Pool Spray Valves (VC)

OP-ST.BC-003, Suppression Pool Cooling Valves (VC)

! OP-ST.GS-002, Drywell/ Suppression Pool Purge Valves (VC)

OP-ST-GS-004, Suppression. Pool /Drywell Vacuum Breakers (VC)

OP-ST.GS-005, Hydroge,n Recombiners (VC)

OP-ST.GU-001, Filtration Recirculation Ventilation System Operability (VC) i OP-ST.SF-003, RPS Manual Scram (VC)

OP-ST.SV-001, Remote Shutdown (VC)

IC-FT. AB-001, MSIV High Flow (VC)

IC-FT-AB-033, SRV Acoustic Monitor (VC)

IC-FT.BB-014, SRV Low-Low Set (VC)

IC-FT.BB-015, RPS Reactor Water Level 3 (VC)

IC-FT.BB-019, RPS High Drywell Pressure (VC)

IC-FT.BB-023, RPS High Reactor Pressure (VC)

!. IC-FT.BC-009, Leak Detection High/ Low Interface (VC) .

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IC-FT.BF-005, RPS - Scram Discharge Volume Level Switch (VC)

IC-FT.BF-010, Scram Discharge Volume - Rod Block (VC)

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IC-FT.SK-014,CoolerLeakDetection(VC)

IC-FT.SP-001, MSIV High Radiation (VC) .

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