ML20137E254
| ML20137E254 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 11/21/1985 |
| From: | Blake J, Coley J, Crowley B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20137E221 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-416-85-38, GL-84-11, NUDOCS 8511270227 | |
| Download: ML20137E254 (15) | |
See also: IR 05000416/1985038
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION il
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101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report No.: 50-416/85-38
Licensee: Mississippi Power and Light Company
l
Jackson, MS 39205
(
Docket No.: 50-416
License No.: .NPF-29
Facility Name:
Grand Gulf
Inspection Conducted: October 21-25, 1985
Inspectors:
A.M. b
lA
/ / -d2 0-8f
B. R. N owley
QV
Date Signed
% .Y Osrk
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Date Signed
Approved by:
// // f
J.
. flare, Section Chief
Date Signed
E ipeering Branch
D vision of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 81 inspector-hours on site
in the areas of induction heat stress improvement (IHSI) and nondestructive
. examination (NDE) of recirculation system piping.
Results:
One violation was identified - individuals performing inspection same
as those performing activity being inspected - paragraph 5.b.(3).
I
CD11270227 851122
PDH
ADOCK 05000416
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- J. E. Cross, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, General Manager
- C
R. Hutchinson, Manager, Plant Maintenance
- R. F. Rogers, Technical Assistant to Station General Manager
- L. F. Daughtery, Compliance Superintendent
- B. C. Lee, Quality Assurance (QA) Supervisor - Audits
- R. S. Lewis, Materials Science Engineer - Nuclear Plant Engineering (NPE)
R. A. Courtney, Senior Quality Representative
D. D. Little, QA Representative
J. D. Bailey, Compliance Coordinator
C. M. Renfroe, Plant Outage Engineer
Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians,
mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
Other Organizations
J. W. Self, Services Supervisor - Nuclear Plant Services, General Electric
(GE)
T. Brinkman, Level III Examiner, GE
M. Taylor, Project Manager, Nutech Engineers, Inc. (Nutech)
R. H. Smith, QA Administrator, Nutech
R. A. Greer, Field QA Supervisor, Nutech
J. R. Sheffield, Shift Supervisor, Nutech
J. Brihmadesam, Metallurigist, Middle South Services
NRC Resident Inspectors
- R. C. Butcher, Senior Resident Inspector
J. L. Caldwell, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were sucnnarized on October 25, 1985, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspector described the
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed
below. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
After the completion of the inspection, the licensee identified a problem
with liquid penetrant (PT) indications on recirculation system loop "A" ring
cross.
Seeparagraph5.b.(4).
F-
.}
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2
(0 pen) Violation 416/85-38-01, Individuals Performing Inspection Same As
Those Performing Activities Being Inspected - paragraph 5.b.(3).
The licensee identified as proprietary some of the materials provided to oc
reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
However, proprietary
information reviewed is not discussed in this report.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
4.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items were not identified during the inspection.
5.
Independent Inspection Effort
a.
General Inspection (548348) (4?.9028) and (429408)
The inspectors conducted a general inspection of portions of the
reactor and auxiliary buildings to observe activities such as house-
keeping, material identification and control, and material storage.
b.
Induction Heat Stress Improvement (IHSI) of Recirculation (RECIRC)
SystemWelds(55050)
In response to NRC letter dated July 27, 1983, relative to inter-
granular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC), the licensee issued letters
AECM-83/0481 dated August 17, 1983 and AECM-83-0667 dated October 14,
1983 providing:
A summary of materials and fabrication methods used for the
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Recirculation (RECIRC) and Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Systems
Mitigating techniques to be used for materials not conforming with
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Revision 1, and schedule for completion of planned
techniques
Justification for operation with materials not conforming to
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Preservice Inspections performed to serve as a baseline for
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further identification of IGSCC
'
Programs to be implemented for water chemistry to minimize IGSCC
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In the letters, the licensee identified 24 welds that were considered
to contain nonconforming materials (NUREG 0313) and committed to
perform mitigating techniques on the 24 welds prior to startup
following the first refueling outage.
All other welds in the RECIRC
and RHR systems were considered to contain conforming materials based
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on material type or fabrication technique ~ (corrosion resisting clad,-
- bnnealing etc.).
The-licensee later decided to use IHSI as the miti--
gating technique for the 24 welds and to perform the IHSI during the
' Fall 1985 r9aini.enance outage.
Also, the licensee decided to perform
. IHSI on th'e Loop "A" and loop
"B" cross caps since the caps were
^ furnace. stress relieved during fabrication.
In addition, to the
.
c commitment to perform mitigation techniques, the licensee also
( comitted to perform Ultrasonic (UT) examination of the 24 welds prior
>
to and after IHSI, (See Licensee letter AECM-84/0297 dated June 3, 1984
7
- Response to Generic Letter 84-11).
.
-During the' current outage, in addition to performing IHSI and pre and
Lpost IHSI UT, the licensee performed a new baseline UT inspection on a
portion :of the corrosion resistant clad (CRC) welds in the RECIRC
System. - The remainder of the CRC welds.will be inspected during the
,
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/ ..
first refueling' outage.
The reason'for establishing a new baseline on
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'the CRC welds is that the. original baseline was performed using the 45
shear wave UT - technique.
Technology developed after the. orignial
f
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baseline revealed that 'for stainless steel weld materials, the -60'
- 3~
shear. wave technique.
Therefore, the licensee decided to establish a
longitudinal wave technique provides a far superior inspection to the-
,
new-biseline using the " state of the art" (Longitudinal) technique.
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See paragraph 6 below for details of the observations and reviews made
.'
'by the inspectors relative to the current (IHSI and CRC) UT examina-
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tions.
,The inspectors performed observation / review of IHSI- activities as
detailed below.
The work was being controlled in accordance with MP&L
' Design Change Pukage (DCP) 84/4000, Revision 1. " Induction Heating
- , -
Stress Improvement (IHSI) of Reactor Recirculation System Welded Piping
Components".
In accordance with the DCP, the applicable code is the
1
ASME Boiler and Pressure lessel Code,Section XI,1977 Edition, S79
Addenda.
Nutech Engineers Inc. is the contractor for the IHSI.
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. ,,(1) Procedure Review
U
In addition to' the .DCP, the inspectors reviewed the following
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documents relative to the IHSI:
MP&L Maintenance Work Order (MWO) F55837, " Perform IHSI On
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Reactor RECIRC Welds" including WI&IR's
Nutech Procedure XML-03-005, Revision 3, " Procedure For
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Induction Heating Stress Improvement - Grand Gulf Unit 1
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Nuclear Power Station"
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. Selected Sections of the Nutech " Quality Assurance Manual"
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were reviewed
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(2) Observation of Work Activities and Review of Quality Records
The inspectors performed the following observations / reviews and
compared the results with applicable procedures:
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Weld W33' - observed test heat inprocess, checked equipment
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calibration stickers,. and reviewed training.and calibration
records for power supply operator
Weld G10-Al-E - Observed thermocouple (T/C) layout of
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installed T/C's prior to heating and reviewed in-process IHSI
Weld Package
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XCAP-A - Observed T/C layout of installed T/C's prior to
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heating and reviewed in-process IHSI Weld Package
Weld W11 - Observed location of T/C's and Coil prior to
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Weld G10-Al-D - Observed layout of installed T/C's and
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reviewed in-process IHSI Weld Package
Weld G10-B1-C - Visually examined T/C removal areas
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Weld G10-B1-E - Observed in-process attachment and location
of T/C's and reviewed training and certification records for
personnel (ttachingT/C's
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Weld .G10-01-B - Observed visual (VT) and liquid penetrant
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(PT)- inspections of T/C removal areas (See paragraph 7 for
details of PT inspection).
In addition completed IHSI Weld
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Package ihcluding TC. strip charts was reviewed.
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Weld G10-B1-A - Observed VT and PT of TC removal areas (sed
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paragraph 7 below).
In addition completed IHSI Wold Package'
including TC strip charts was reviewed.
Weld W34,- Observed VT and PT. of TC removal areas (see
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paragraph' 7 below).
In addition completed IHSI Weld Package
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inc\\uding T/C strith charts and training and certification
records for power supply operator were reviewed.
n
<t
Weld W29 - Observed test heat activities
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N*N
Weld W10 - Observed test heat and regular heat, reviewed
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in-process and completed IHSI Weld Package, and reviewed -
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training and certification records for power supply operator.
Weld W27 - Reviewed completed..IHSI Weld Package including T/C
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strip charts'
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Weld GG1-15 - Reviewed completed IHSI Weld Package
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Weld W30 - Reviewed completed IHSI Weld Package
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(3) During the above observations / reviews, the inspectors noted that
for the majority of records reviewed, the person who inspected T/C
placement and installation was the same person who performed
layout and installation of the T/C. This is contrary to paragraph
10.1.2 of section 10 of the Nutech QA Manual which requires that,
" Inspection personnel shall be individuals other than those who
performed or directly supervised the activity being inspected and
they shall not report directly to the immediate supervisors who
are responsible for the activity being inspected".
This failure
to follow the inspection program is in violation of 10 CFR 50,
Appendix B, criterion X and is identified as item number
y
416/85-38-01, Individuals Performing Inspection Same As Those
Performing Activities Being Inspected.
The inspectors noted that
all activities other than T/C location and installation were being
independently inspected. . In addition, Nutech QA was performing
independent surveillances of all activities including T/C location
and installation.
Also, MP&L placed MP&L QC hold points on a
random number of welds for inspection of T/C location and
installation.
Therefore, based on the above program and the
inspector's. observations, it appears that T/C's were being located
and installed correctly.
Upon identification of the above violation, Nutech took immediate
corrective' action by issuing NCR number XML-03-002 and revising
procedure XML-03-005 to specifically delineate the personnel
authorized to perform inspections.
(4) During the week of October 28, 1985, while performing liquid
penetrant (PT) inspection of thermocouple removal areas after
induction heat stress improvement (IHSI) of selected recirculation
systems welds, numerous PT indications'were found on the "A"
loop
ring header cross.
The indications were located in a seven-inch
,*
circumferential band below the cross-to-cap weld and a 6" circum-
x
ferential band above the cross-to-discharge pipe weld.
In both
cases, the indications were random in orientation, up to 3/4" in
3
length (except for one 3-1/2" indication), approximately 1/4" in
depth and located in the heavy section of the cross.
Identical
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indications were found in a spare unit 2 cross which was used for
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IHSI procedure development.
The original indication bands
appeared to correspond to the areas of overlap of the IHSI coils
9 a' 'g
for the Unit 1
"A" cross and the Unit 2 cross. After identifying
the. problem, the licensee initiated various analysis and tests to
identify the nature of the discontinuities causing the PT indica-
tions. . The inspectors monitored licensee activities relative to
the problem through telephone contact with licensee personnel and
the resident inspectors.
In addition a sample of the Unit 2
m
ts
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material was obtained by RII for an independent analysis to be
completed later,
c.
Indications in Main Steam Bypass Pipe
See RII Reports 50-416/84-38 and 50-416/85-19 for a discussion of the
previous history and background of this problem. As a result of MT and
UT indications found in line
"A"
in May, 1985 (See RII Report
50-416/85-19), line "A" has been isolated since that time.
During the
current outage, the licensee removed a representative " Boat" sample
from an indication area in line "A"
for metallurgical analysis. During
the current inspection, the inspector discussed the metallurgical
analysis results with the Middle South Services Metallurgist and
reviewed photomicrographs from the " Boat" sample.
Based on the
metallurgical analysis, the licensee and Middle South Services
Metallurgist concluded that the MT indications found in line
"A" in
May,1985 were caused by shallow aluminum oxide inclusions which are
normal for the type material, and have no relation to previous bypass
line failures.
The photomicrographs reviewed support this c~1clusion.
In general, these type inclusions are of no significance.
Within the areas inspected, no violations, except as noted in para-
graph 5.b., or deviations were identified.
6.
Nondestructive Examination (NDE) of Recirculation (RECIRC) System Piping
On April 19, 1984, NRC issued Generic Letter 84-11 to all licensees of
operating reactors, applicants for operating license, and holders of
construction permits for boiling water reactors.
This letter addressed a
problem that had been identified in inspections conducted at several boiling
water reactors (BWRs) wherein intergranular stress corrosion cracking
(IGSCC) in large diameter recirculation and residual heat removal piping had
been revealed.
These inspections were conducted pursuant to IE Bulletins 82-03, Revision 1, and 83-02 and the NRC August 26, 1983 orders. The letter
expressed the Commission's opinion that the results of the above inspections
mandated an ongoing program for similar reinspection at all operating BWRs.
The Generic Letter also described those actions which licensees should take
to provide an acceptable response to the IGSCC concern.
Mississippi Power and Light Company's (MP&L) letter of response to Generic Letter 84-11, dated June 3, 1984, was reviewed by Region II.
In this letter
MP&L identified twenty-four (24) welds in the recirculation system that were
nonmitigated and susceptible to intergranular stress corrosion cracking
(IGSCC).
The susceptible welds were scheduled to receive induction heat
stress improvement (IHSI, see paragraph 5) during the first refueling
outage.
Ultrasonic (UT) examinations for the detection of IGSCC were to be
performed on these welds iruediately before and as soon as practical after
the performance of the IHs1 measures.
General Electric (GE) Apparatus and
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Engineering Services were selected as the vendor to perform the UT examina-
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tions using manual A scan instruments prior to IHSI and the enhanced ultra-
image automated equipment commonly referred to as the " SMART" System for UT
examinations performed after IHSI.
The applicable codes, regulatory requirements and licensee commitments for
the examinations were the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (B&PV), Sections V and XI (77S79), the
Coordination Plan between NRC, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI),
and the Boiling Water Reactors Owners Group (BWROG) for Training and
Qualification Activities of NDE Personnel", and Code Case N335.
a.
ReviewofProcedures(730528)
The inspectors reviewed GE procedures pertaining to the UT examination
of stainless steel for IGSCC to ascertain whether these procedures were
consistent with regulatory requirements and licensee commitments. The
following procedures were reviewed:
Procedure No. UT1.43, Procedure for Ultrasonic Examination of Pipe
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Welds Using Automatic Equipment
Procedure No. UT1.30, Procedure for Ultrasonic Examination of
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Austenic Metal Welds for IGSCC
Procedure No. UT-46, Procedure for Ultrasonic Examination of
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Recirculation Piping Caps for IGSCC
Procedure .No. UT1.20.3, Procedure for Ultrasonic Examination of
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CRC Welds for Middle South Energy, INC., Mississippi Power and
Light Company Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Unit 1
The above procedures were ' reviewed to determine if the following
procedure elements were properly implemented:
The type of apparatus to be used including frequency range,
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linearity, and signal attenuation accuracy requirements were
specified.
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The extent of coverage (beam angles, scanning surface, scanning
rate and directions) and methods of scanning were specified and
consistent with the ASME Code.
Calibration requirements, methods, and frequency including type,
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size, geometry, and material of calibration blocks as well as
location and size of calibration reflectors within the block were
clearly specified and consistent with the applicable ASME Code.
The sizes and frequencies of search units were specified and
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consistent with the ASME Code, Code Case N335, and had been
demonstrated on qualification specimens at EPRI, NDE Center.
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Beam angle or angles were specified and consistent with the ASME
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Code, Code Case N335 and had been demonstrated on qualification
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specimens at EPRI, NDE Center.
Methods of compensation for the distance traversed by the ultra-
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sonic beam as it passes through the material were specified and
consistent with the ASME Code.
The reference level for monitcring discontinuities was defined and
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the scanning gain setting specified. These values met or exceeded
the ASME Code.
Methods of demonstrating penetration were established.
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Levels or limits for evaluation and recording of indications were
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specified. These values met or exceede,i the ASME Code.
Methods of recording significant indications were established and
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the reporting requirements were in accordance with requirements
established by the licensee.
Acceptance limits were specified or referenced and were in
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accordance with the ASME Code,Section XI.
In addition to meeting the code requirements delineated above, 3 of the
GE procedures incorporated inspection parameters described in EPRI's
Module 17, Revision 1, " Generic Procedure for Detection and Discrimina-
tion of IGSCC." This module was utilized for GE's personnel qualifica-
tion at the EPRI NDE Center during September,1985.
Procedure No.
1.20.3 did not follow the parameters described in EPRI Module 17.
However, this procedure did incorporate techniques recommended as a
result of EPRI research and was demonstrated for the Code inspector in
accordance with the ASME Code,Section XI, paragraph IWA-2240.
b.
Observation of NDE Activities (73753)
The inspectors observed work activities and reviewed documentation to
ascertain whether personnel equipment and materials were properly
qualified and/or certified; approved NDE procedures were available and
were being followed; specified NDE equipment that had been qualified at
the EPRI NDE Ceiter during personnel and procedure qualifications was
being used; NDE personnel were knowledgeable of examination methods and
operation of the NDE equipment; NDE personnel with the-proper level of
qualification and certification were performing the various examination
activities including designation of NDE method / technique to be used,
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equipment calibration, examination, and interpretation / evaluation /
acceptance of test results.
The following examinations / evaluations /
calibrations were observed by the inspectors in the evaluation of the
examination processes:
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GE demonstrated that their manual procedure calibration was as
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documented in their completed examination test reports for RECIRC
-header end cap _ weld G10-Al-C.
The GE Level III examiner was observed while he conducted evalua-
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tions of UT indications / conditions discovered by the inspectors
(see paragraph 6.c below) during their independent re-examination
of RECIRC weld G10-Al-C.
The inspector observed collection of data and evaluations
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performed with the GE SMART System of Weld No.1833G001-W-33.
SMART system calibration for RECIRC Weld W-10 was observed.
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The calibrations / examinations / evaluations delineated above were
observed to determine if the examination activities were consistent
with the approved procedures in the following areas;
The type of apparatus used, including frequency range as well as
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linearity and signal attenuation accuracy.
The extent of coverage (beam angles, scanning surface, scanning
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rate and directions) as well as the scanning technique.
Calibration, methods and frequency including the type, size,
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geometry and material of identified calibration blocks as well as
location and size of calibration reflectors within the block were
clearly determined and recorded.
The sizes and frequencies of search units.
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Beam angle or angles.
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Methods of compensation for the distance traversed by the ultra-
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sonic beam as it passes through the material including distance -
amplitude correction -curves, electronic distance - amplitude
correction
. The reference level for monitoring discontinuities was as defined
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and the scanning gain setting was as specified.
Methods of demonstrating penetration.
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Levels or limits for evaluation and recording of indications.
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Method of recording significant indications.
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Acceptance limits were determined.
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The examination personnel were thoroughly familiar with the
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inspection system, its application, operation and its limitations.
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c.
Independent Re-examination of Completed Work Activities
The inspectors conducted an independent verification re-examination of
RECIRC end cap weld No. G10-Al-C using region II ultrasonic equipment.
The examination was performed to evaluate the technical adequacy of the
GE procedure for this specific weld and to determine whether the GE
examiners had correctly implemented the procedure.
The end cap weld
was chosen because GE had recorded an indication in this weld and it
was on the sixteen inch RECIRC header which GE identified to the
inspectors as being extremely difficult material to UT examine because
of its metallurgical structure.
As a result of the inspectors' calibration and examination of weld
G10-Al-C, the following findings were observed and presented to the
licensee to determine the basis of their evaluation.
(1) During calibration, the inspectors discovered that the transducer
they had selected would not calibrate to 7/8 node for 1/2 V-Path
examination or to 12/8 node position for full V-Path examinations
in accordance with the GE procedures.
The apparent cause was
attributed to high material attenuation.
The inspectors were using a 3/8 x 3/8 inch x 1.5 mega hertz (MHZ)
send and receive transducer. This transducer was selected because
the inspectors were warned that the material was extremely noisy
and the 1.5 MHZ frequency should have optimized the examination.
In addition, the transducer was constructed so that the sound
exited the transducer wedge near the front of the transducer,
allowing greater 1/2 node coverage. As a result of the failure of
the inspector's transducer to establish a distance amplitude curve
in accordance with the GE procedure, the inspectors requested GE
to demonstrate that their transducer would set up as required by
procedure.
GE performed their setup as requested and demonstrated
that their 3/8 inch diameter 2.25 MHZ transducer could detect the
7/8 node hole for 1/2 V-Path examinations.
The GE 3/8 inch
diameter 2.25 MHZ would not set up on the 12/8 position, but the
inspectors were satisfied that if GE had used a 1.5 MHZ trans-
ducer, which GE also had qualified for these inspections, the 12/8
position would have been observed.
As a result of the licensee's
decision to perform additional surface conditioning to welds in
the RECIRC system whose configuration prevented 1/2 V-Path examina-
tions, GE was not required to perform full V-Path examinations.
(2) The inspectors observed a counter bore signal when scanning the
end cap side of the weld.
This signal and was observed approxi-
mately 360
around the end cap and straight beam examination of
the area verified the geometric condition.
A review of the GE
data revealed that GE also identified this geometric indication.
(3) UT signals were observed at 12:00 o' clock from both sides of the
weld.
These signals had not been recorded by GE. Scaffolding for
..
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this we'1d had been removed, the weld was ground smooth making the
toe of-the weld difficult to determine, and lighting was extremely
poor.
The inspector requested that the licensee provide a ladder
and light. in the area so that an evaluation could be performed in
a satisfactory manner.
This was accomplished the following day -
and GE's Level III accompanied the inspector to assist in deter-
mining the source of the UT signal indications.
The evaluation
revealed that the. transducer had been positioned on the' weld and
that sound beam _ redirection was occurring as a result of the
dendritic structures in the weld.
This condition was localized,
however, to a small area near the top of the weld. GE's Level III
also: recognized the condition and GE data collectors using the
" SMART" system later identified that they could accurately identi-
fy this phenomena.
GE's examination procedure did not require
. metallurgical indications to be recorded.
(4)- The only difference between what GE had reported in this wald and
the results the inspectors obtained was one spot -indication
(approximately 31/2"- long) at 3:00 o' clock.
The indication was
observed _ as exceeding 100% DAC and the inspector = plotted the
_
indication at the furthest extremity of the heat affected zone.
GE's' Level III examiner stated that this indication was in a
- border line area that was extremely noisy and that the initial
examiner'probably. had determined that it was caused by the met-
allurgical properties of the material. . The inspectors concurred
with GE's evaluation of the area.
However, the inspectors _cau-
tioned the licensee that when an indication caused by any condi-:
tion is borderline, the indication should.be recorded to prevent
misinterpreted during subsequent examinations, .possibly resulting
in an expensive and unnecessary overlay weld repair. The licensee
and GE agreed and stated that in fact the indication would be
recorded 'on the subsequent automated system examination after
'IHSI.
.In summary, the inspectors independent examination challenged the GE
. procedure and the Level II evaluations.
However, as a result of.this
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challenge the inspectors were able to obtain a much greater level of
='
confidence than otherwise could be obtained in the NDE activities
performed at Grand Gulf.
d._
-Review of_NDE Records (737558).
The inspectors reviewed records associated with the qualification and
certification of personnel and equipment, examination results and data
sheets, calibration data sheets, weld profile data, examination evalua-
tion data, records on extent of examinations, records on disposition of
findings, re-examination data after IHSI
and records identifying NDE
materials such as couplant and certified marking materials.
The
records were reviewed in part to determine if personnel and equipment
' utilized by GE to perform the examinations had been qualified / certified
'in accordance with SNT-TC-1A and the most recent certification effort
.
12
administered by the EPRI NDE Center in accordance with the "Coordina-
tion Plan for NRC/EPRI/BWR0G Training and Qualification Activities of
NDE Personnel".
The records were also reviewed to determine if the
data files were complete, technically adequate and within the previous-
ly established acceptance criteria.
Records for the following welds were reviewed:
Calibration
Weld Nos.
Data Sheet Nos.
Sheet Nos.
W-34
85-1004
85-1003
G10-B1-E
85-1005
85-1003
Cross Cap #A
85-1010
85-1009
Cross Cap #B
85-1011
85-1009
W-30
85-1013
85-1012
W-6
85-1014
85-1012
W-7
85-1015
85-1012
W-4
85-1017
85-1016
W-27
85-1018
85-1016
G10-B1-A
85-1020
85-1019
G10-B1-X
85-1021
85-1019
G10-B1-L
85-1022
85-1019
G10-Al-F
85-1034
85-1033
G5-81-A
85-1036
85-1035
W-28
85-1037
85-1035
W-10
85-1042
85-1041
G9-B1-B
85-1044
85-1043
During the review of the above records, the inspectors noted that
examiners who had been specifically certified to one transducer size,
frequency, and beam angle at EPRI were using a different diameter
transducer in the field.
The licensee stated that their verbal in-
structions with the NRC-IE training coordinator and EPRI did not
establish the diameter of the transducer as a limiting factor.
On
October 24, 1985, the inspectors and the licensee held a conference
call to -the EPRI NDE Center to discuss the matter of transducer dia-
meter with the NRC-IE Training Coordinator.
The NRC IE training
Coordinator stated that the diameter of the transducer was not a
limiting qualification parameter for a transducer, but that frequency
and angle were qualification parameters.
The NRC IE Training Co-
ordinator stated, however, that the inspectors should be satisfied that
the difference in transducer -diameters reflected good engineering
judgement (1/8 " difference) or the licensee should demonstate their
selection by comparing calibration distance amplitude curves (DAC) and
gain settings between the qualified transducer and the diameter of
transducer used.
The inspectors review of calibration records between
the two diameter transducers in the same material and pipe sizes and
this review did not reveal any significant deviation between DAC
calibration.
~
.
13
Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Liquid Penetrant Examination (57060)
The inspector examined the liquid penetrant (PT) examination activities
described below to determine whether applicable code and regulatory require-
ments were being met. See paragraph 5 above for the applicable code.
a.
removal areas for the following welds:
G10-B1-A
G10-B1-B
W34
The examinations were observed to verify that:
Applicable instructions or travelers clearly specified the proce-
-
dure to be used and that a copy of the procedure was available for
the inspection.
Sequencing of examinations relative to other operations - were
-
specified and in accordance with applicable code and procedures.
Personnel performing the examinations were qualified.
-
Materials used for the examinations were certified and the certi-
-
fications met applicable requirements.
Areas, locations and extent of examinations were clearly defined
-
The following attributes were as specified in the applicable
-
procedure and consistent with applicable code:
(1
Surface preparation / cleaning method, type, time, etc
(2
Penetrant type
(3
Penetrant application method
(4) Penetration time
(5) Temperature of surfaces
6) Penetrant removal
7) Drying
8) Developer, application, type
(9) Developing time
(10) Evaluation technique
(11) Acceptance criteria
(12) Reporting of results
b.
Personnel qualification / certifications records for NDE personnel who
performed the PT inspections of the welds listed in paragraphs a. above
were reviewed.
,
..
14
c.
Material certification records for the below listed PT materials, used
to inspect the welds listed in paragraph a. above, were reviewed.
Remover
- DR60 - Batch 431H4
' Penetrant - DP40 - Batch 41501-
Developer - D100 - Batch 45F6
Within the areas inspected, no' violations or deviations were identified.
.
_