ML20136C941
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UNITED STATES .
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2
REGION 11 f
. ATLANTA, GEORGIA i ,
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s PLANT STATUS REPORT CRYSTAL RIVER
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UNIT 3 i
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. FEBRUARY 1996 M
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$ 9703120218 970306 iA PDR FOIA $
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BINDER 96-485 . PDR
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- ' PLANT STATUS REPORT FOR CRYSTAL RIVER (01/96) l
. . TABLE OF CONTENTS i
PART 1 - FACILITY DESCRIPTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 l 1.1 FACILITY / LICENSEE ... . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 i 1.2 UTILITY SENIOR MANAGENENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 i '
1.3 NRC STAFF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
! 1.4 LICENSE INFORMATION . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . ... . . . 2 1.5 PLANT CHARACTERISTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .' 2 1.6 SIGNIFICANT DESIGN INFORMATION . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 2 1.7 EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES / PREPAREDNESS . . . . . . . . . 5 1.8 PRESENT OVERALL STATUS (Past Six Months) . . . . . . . . . . 5
-1.9 0UTAGE SCHEDULE AND STATUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 l
'PART 2 - PLANT PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . 6 2.1 GENERAL PLANT PERSPECTIVE . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.2 SALP HISTORY (Past 2 SALP Periods) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.3 SELECTED SALP AREA DISCUSSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 PART 3 - SIGNIFICANT EVENTS . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . 10 3.1 SIGNIFICANT EVENTS BRIEFINGS (Past 12 Months) . . . . . . . . 10 3.2 ENFORCEMENT STATUS / HISTORY (Past 12 Months) . . . . . . . . . 10 PART 4 - STAFFING AND TRAINING ..................... 11 4.1 OPERATIONS STAFF - OVERALL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.2 TKHUC FORCE .......................... 11 4.3 OPERATOR QUALIFICATION /REQUALIFICATION PROGRAM (Past Two
-Years) ........................... 11 4.4 PLANT SIMULATOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.5 INPO ACCREDITATION ..................... 12 PART.5 - INSPECTION ACTIVITIES ..................... 12 5.1 OUTSTANDING ITEMS LIST
SUMMARY
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.2 MAJOR INSPECTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.3 INFREQUENT INSPECTION PROCEDURE STATUS . . . . . . . . . . . 13 ATTACNMENTS
- 1. PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
- 2. ALLEGATION STATUS AND
SUMMARY
- 3. NRR OPERATING REACTOR ASSESSMENT
- 4. ORGANIZATION CHART 5.- POWER HISTORY CURVE
- 6. MASTER INSPECTION PLAN .
- 7. SITE ACTIVITY SCHEDULE
- 8. SITE INTEGRATION MATRIX
- 9. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS GRAPH a
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Crystal River - 1/96 1 l
PART 1 ' FACILITY DESCRIPTION i M- FACILITY / LICENSEE Crystal River Unit 3: Located 7 miles northwest of Crystal River, Florida,.in Citrus County. The Florida Power Corporation corporate office is located in St. Petersburg, Florida.
M UTILITY SENIOR MANAGEMENT A. J. Keesler (Allen), President & CEO (Will retire on April 1,1996)
P. M. Beard, Jr. (Pat), Senior Vice President,. Nuclear Operations G. L. Boldt (Gary), Vice President, Nuclear Production B. J. Hickle (Bruce), Director, Nuclear Plant Operations .
P. F. McKee (Paul), Director, Quality Programs P. R. Tanguay (Paul), Director, Nuclear Operations Engineering and Projects L. C. Kelly (Larry), Director, Nuclear Operations Site Support W. L. Conklin, Jr. (Bill), Director, Nuclear Operations Materials .'
and Controls R. C. Widell (Rolf), Director, Nuclear Operations Training R. W. Davis (Ron), Assistent Plant Director, Nuclear Plant Operations and Chemistry J. W. Campbell (Jerry), Assistent Plan.t Director, Nuclear' Plant '
Maintenance and Radiation Control F. Sullivan (Fran), Manager, Nuclear Plant Technical Support B. C. Moore (Brent), Manager, Nuclear Integrated Scheduling W NRC STAFF
! S. D. Ebneter (Stew), Regional Administrator, (404) 331-5500 L. A. Reyes (Luis), Deputy Regional Administrator, i (404) 331-5179 :
E. W. Herschoff (Ellis), Director DRP, (404) 331-5623 l i K. D. Landis (Kerry), Branch Chief, (404) 331-5509 l L. S. Mellen (Larry), Project Engineer, (404) 331-5561
- R. C. Butcher (Ross), Senior Resident Inspector, (904) 795-7677
.T. A. Cooper (Todd), Resident Inspector, (904) 795-7677 S. A. Varga (Steven), Director, Nuclear Plant Operations, .
Division of Reactor Projects-I/II, (301) 415-1403 l J. A. Zwolinski (John), Deputy Director for Region II Reactors, j (301) 415-1453 )
D. B. Matthews (Dave), Director, Project Directorate 11-2, (301) 415-3048 L. Raghavan '(. Rags), Project Manager, (301).415-1471 H. L. Ornstein (Hal), Reactor Operations Analysis Branch, (301) 415-7574 5
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-Crystal River - 1/96. 2 M LICENSE INFORMATION Docket No. -
302 l License No.- DPR-72 ?
Construction Permit Issued 9/25/68 l Low Power License 12/3/76 . i Full Power License 1/28/77 Initial Criticality 1/14/77 :
Electrical Energy 1st Generated 1/30/77 l
- Commercial Operation 3/13/77 ,
M PLANT CHARACTERISTICS I Reactor Type: Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) PWR, 2-Loop ;
Containment Type: Pre-stressed, Post-tensioned
. reinforced concrete i Power Level: 825 Mwe, (2544 Mwt)
Architect / Engineer: Gilbert Associates, Inc. !
NSSS Vendor: Babcock & Wilcox !
Constructor: ,J. A. Jones Construction Company j Turbine Supplier:
Westinghouse !
Condenser Cooling Method: Once Through j Condenser Cooling Water: Gulf of Mexico l M SIGNIFICANT DESIGN INFORMATION ;
1.6.1 REACTOR INTEGRITY Reactor Pressure Vessel: The reactor vessel is bolted to reinforced l concrete foundation desigreed to support and position the vessel and to l withstand the forces imposed on it by a combination of loads including the weight of vessel and internals, thermal expansion of the piping, Design Basis Earthquake (DBE), and dynamic load following reactor trip.
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Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary: The Decay Heat Removal (DHR) System suction is isolated by three electrically operated valves in series. j Discharge side is isolated by one electrically operated valve and one I check valve. DHR is located outside containment.
1.6.2 REACTOR SHUTDOWN
, Reactor Protection System: The Reactor Protection System-is a two out of four channel system which trips the reactor based on various parameters including anticipatory trips on main turbine trip and loss of main feedwater.
ATWS Protection: ATWS protection was installed during 1990 refueling outage.
Remote Shutdown Facilities: Remote shutdown facilities are located in a 3 dedicated room near the emergency switchgear rooms. j I
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- Crystal River - 1/96 3 1.6.3 CORE COOLING .
. Feedwater System: The main feedwater system consists of two 60% steam driven pumps.
Emeraency Feedwater System: The Emergency Feedwater System consists of ,
- two 100% capacity pumps, one steam driven and one motor driven each of which can deliver flow to either steam generator.
i Turbine Evoass/ Steam Duma Canacity: The turbine bypass system consists ;
of four valves which pass 15% of full power steam flow. There are two.
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Atmospheric Dump valves which pass 7.5% of full power steam flow.
l Auxiliary Feedwater System: An additional non-safety-related motor.
driven feedwater pump was installed during the 1992 refuel outage.
i l Emeroency Core Coolina' System: The Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) consists of three High Pressure Injection (HPI) pumps, and two Low Pressure Injection (LPI) pumps. The HPI pumps have a single pump flow rate of greater than 500 GPM at 600 PSIG. The LFI pumps have a single pump injection of 2800 GPM'to 3100 GPM. The ECCS is actuated on high Reactor Building pressure as well as low RCS pressure. This dual J
- actuation provides diverse mechanisms of ECCS actuation to protect the
- core. There are two core flood tanks which require no automatic or ;
manual actions to actuate. . Total core flood tank borat'ed water volume . j would cover 3/4 of the reactor core assuming no water in the core post l l accident.
Decay Heat Removal: Two 100% capacity pumps are located outside the containment. The plant is designed for hot shutdown. There is an interconnection between the DHR System and the Makeup and Purification 4
System (MU) to utilize the makeup filters.for reactor coolant system purification while the Decay Heat Removal system is in service.
. 1.6.4 CONTAINMENT 1
Pressure Control / Heat Removal: There are two redundant containment spray pumps.which remove heat'from the containment atmosphere following.
l an accident. There are also three reactor building cooling fans which provide cooling both in normal operation and following an accident.
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Hydroaen Control: Post-accident hydrogen is controlled primarily i through_a building purge system. There also exists provisions to.
connect a recombiner which is available from a remote location.
l 1.6.5 ELECTRICAL POWER l Offsite AC: The primary source of offsite AC is the 230 KV switchyard.
- There are five transmission lines and three generators feeding that switchyard. There are two transformers and lines from the 230 KV yard
' to the plant Class IE buses.
This system was upgraded by the addition of dedicated transformers to serve as the primary and backup feeds to the Class IE-buses. Non class IE loads continue to be supplied by previoQsly installed equipment. The 500 KV substation can be utilized as an additional source of offsite t
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1 Crystal River - 1/96 4 j
!' power during plant outages, j Onsite AC: Onsite AC is provided by two 2850 KW (continuous) Fairbanks l
- Morse diesel generators which feed the Class IE buses. l DC Power: The plant has two 125/250 VDC Class 1E batteries. There is also an additional non-1E 125/250 volt battery which feeds most of the l non-1E loads.
- - Station Blackout Resolution Status
- The, plant is a four-hour coping, AC ;
independent. plant. Procedures have been put in place to satisfy the 580 ;
i-rule. The only modification required to address 580 was the addition of ,
air accumulators for the steam dump valves. This modification was installed during the 1992 refuel outage.
I 1.6.6 SAFETY-RELATED COOLING WATER SYSTEMS ,
Service Water: The Nuclear Services cooling. Water function is cosiprised of the Nuclear Service and Decay Heat Seawater System (RW) and the .
Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling System (SW). Three of the four nuclear service heat exchangers supply the full normal and emergency j cooling requirements, with the fourth unit in reserve. A drop in system
- pressure, originated for example by a lo'ss of the normal duty pump, will '
l automatically energize the preassigned emergency pump. l The Decay Heat Services Cooling function is comprised of the Nuclear Service and Decay Heat Seawater system (RW) and the Decay Heat Closed Cycle Coolin'g System (DC). The normal function of the' RW and the DC system is removal of heat released by the core after shutdown. After
- depressurization of the RCS, decay heat cooling is initiated, starting
, when the primary coolant temperature has been reduced to 280 degrees F at the reactor outlet nozzle. The system is split into two separate redundant loops, each comprising full capacity seawater pumps, closed cycle heat exchanger, decay heat removal heat exchanger, and half of the various components associated with decay heat. Except for the Reactor Coolant System drop line, the loss of any component oi loop will not
- deprive the system of the required cooling capability.
-I The circulating water system (CW) function is- to supply cooling water to the main service condenser and secondary service heat exchangers during
- normal operation. This system is not essential to the safety of the
- 4. plant and will shutdown on loss of normal electrical power. The CW system along with the secondary services closed cycle cooling water ;
system (SC) are utilized only on non-nuclear related process. l
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closed Coolina Water Systems: The secondary services closed cycle 3 system (SC) function is'to remove the heat generated by the main i
. generator and related equipment and other non-nuclear related l i components. This system is not essential to the safety of the plant and ;
will shut down on loss of normal electrical power. The SC system is designed with reserve pumps and coolers to ensure continuity of service.
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Crystal River - 1/96 5 l.6.7 SPENT FUEL STORAGE CR-3 has three areas designated for fuel storage:
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- - The fuel transfer canal within the reactor building may be used for intermediate wet storage of new or spent fuel during refueling activities. This location is also equipped with a failed-fuel j container.
- - New fuel may.be stored dry for a temporary period in the unloading i area, and then transferred to wet storage within the auxiliary
- building.
- Spent fuel is stored underwater in either of two spent fuel pools,
. -both of which have the capability to store failed fuel in
- containers. The spent fuel pools both feature high density j storage racks. The plant has full core discharge reserve up to
- year 2610.
M EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES 7 PREPAREDNESS Emergency Operations Facility (EOF): 10 miles away at the Nuclear Training Center Technical' Support Center (TSC): Onsite, in Technical Support Building
) Operational Support Center (OSC): .Onsite The most recent emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on October 26, 1994. NRC Regional personnel did not monitor this exercise. The residents participated and judged the licensee's performance during the exercis,e as good, with the exercise objectives successfully met.
! The next emergency preparedness exercise is scheduled for October 16, 1996.
bg PRESENT OVERALL STATUS (Past Six Months) i
! On January 9,1996 the unit was taken off line and into Mode 5 to repair a condenser tube leak and clean up the secondary system. The licensee repaired the tube leak and returned the unit to power' operation on January _ 26, 1996.
. Availability Factors:
All of 1994: 83.3%
. All of 1995: .89.5% j Year to Date: (thru January, 1996). 32.6%
Cumulative: 67.9% .!
Capacity Factor for Cycle 96.5% . j d
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I Crystal Rivcr - 1/96 6 )
M OUTAGE SCHEDULE AND STATUS
-The facility ~ is currently on a twenty-four month refueling frequency
- with no scheduled mid-cycle outages. Refueling Outage 9 9R) was !
completed on June 3, 1994. The unit came off line on Apr 1 7, 1994, and !
l was placed back on line on June 3,1994.- The outage was scheduled for 60 l' days and was completed in just over 57 days. Maintenance between ;
refueling outages is now accomplished during planned on-line system
- - outages or during unplanned short notice-outages.
The-next refueling outage (10R) is scheduled to start on February 29, l' 1996. Major modifications scheduled for that outage include:
i 188 Description
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1 92-01-02-01 RCP-1A Motor Replacement i :
j 93-05-07 Replace Battery Chargers / Inverters !
> 93-06-28-01 Upgrade Turbine Trips i
94-04-10-01 Replace LP Turbines
- k. 95-05-02-01 Wald RTD Thermowells (.T-hot & T-cold)
- PEERE Replace CRDM Thermal Barriers
- i. PART 2 - PLANT PERSPECTIVE
} M GENERAL PLANT PERSPECTIVE i
The plant has operated good with few equipment problems or plant j i transients. However, the number of significant-issues identified this !
j period has increased and the licensee's response has not always been
- timely.
l The more significant issues recently identified are as follows:
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- On September 5, 1994 an operating shift performed an unauthorized test of the reactor coolant system make up tank and operated L outside the acceptable operating regien. This test revealed that i the make up tank operating curve was non-conservative.
- On January 30, 1995, engineering issued a new make up tank
< operating curve. .On January 31, 1995 the licensee found the_new operating curve was also non-conservative. The residents then identified that the BWST level designated in emergency operating procedures for swap over from the BWST to the RB sump had not i taken vortexing into consideration. These first two issues were -
l the subject of escalated enforcement action per EA 95-126.
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- In September 1994 the licensee identified that some safety related ,
L TS instrumentation setpoints were not correctly implemented into i 4 calibration procedures resulting--in non-conservative setpoints. .
- Licensee correc.tive actions have not been timely. This issue was the subject of an Enforcement Conference and Escalated Enforcement 4 #
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Crystal River - 1/96' 7 Action (see EA 95-016). The licensee's corrective actions.are I l
still ongoing.
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- In November 1994 an NRC service water inspection team' identified
- an inadequate service water self assessment, inadequate. ,
E operability evaluations, and failure to implement GL 89 l L commitments. Subsequent inspections in this area have shown more !
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- problems. -
- In January 1995 NRC inspectors identified that the control complex
, habitability envelope was not being maintained in accordance with i assumptions used in the design calculations. The licensee did not !
- surveil the control complex habitability ~ envelope for integrity or i
- deterioration. The licensee has developed a corrective action '
l plan which is being followed.by the resident inspectors.
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- Several instances have been identified where non-safety related components have been found integral to safety related systems. ,
- Examples include.the containment purge valves, the containment i mini-purge valves, and the make-up pump lube oil pumps.
A Management Meeting was held on March 1, 1995,' with the licensee to
! discuss the problem trends at the site and the . licensee's plans to correct them. Another meeting was held on October 13, 1995 to discuss
- the licensee's progress in correcting the identified trends. i 1 .
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! The licensee presented a corrective action implementation plan. A follow-up inspection of the licensee's progress in implementing the J corrective actions presented to the NRC was conducted during the week of L September 11, 1995. The follow-up concluded: (1) that with the i 1
exception of the operations area, the licensee's tracking and trending i L process was 'not clearly defined, was inconsistently applied, and could
, fail to identify adverse trends, (2) management oversight of significant
- issues needs to be strengthened, and (3) for operability determinations, l the clear expectations reflecting managemeht's highest safety standard i' were absent. Another followup inspection is scheduled for the week of i- February 12, 1996.
i l The majority of the problems experienced at the site during the
! assessment period are related to inadequate management oversight,
, personnel performance, or design basis issues.
L2 SALP HISTORY (Past 2 SALP Periods)
SALP PERIOD ENDING SEPTEMBER 1995 SALP PERIOD ENDING FEBRUARY 1994 L Operations -2 Operations -2 Maintenance -2 Maintenance -2
, Engineering -2 Engineering -1 Plant Support -1 Plant Support -1
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The last'SALP assessment period ended on September 16, 1995. The SALP r - was presented to the licensee on October 31, 1995. The licensee accepted the SALP presentation by letter dated December 13, 1995 stating their acceptance of the SALP results and a commitment to address the
- noted issues. The present SALP period ends March 22, 1997.
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. Crystal' RivGr - 1/96 8
- 'M SELECTED SALP AREA DISCUSSIONS A' number of design basis issues have arisen, compounded by personnel
- errors which support the NRC's position'that there is a negative trend
- in plant. performance. Licensee management has identified contributing j' . factors and developed a corrective ~ action program to address them.
[ OPERATIONS Overall plant operational performance has been good with some notable
- exceptions in personnel performance. There were few transients'and no !
i plant trips. Plant capacity factor has remained very high, meeting or i
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exceeding all of the plant goals.
i Poor judgement on the part of licensed individuals has resulted in '
i several personnel error related, issues.
1 i Significant problems have been attributed to lack of management
! oversight and involvement, interfaces with other organizations, non- ,
routine operations,. operability evaluations and the identification and
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- resolution -of problems.
- Examples of the l'ack of' operator attention to detail include the
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l o>eration of the make-up tank outside the acceptable operating region l
wille operators performed an unauthorized test, failure to follow
!- procedures for bypassing an annunciator for an inoperable AMSAC system, j examples of' failure to follow procedures resulting in mispositioned valves and the lack of an adequate E0P program identified during the-i- last SALP period. The E0P upgrade program is progressing. The review
- of setpoint and design assumptions has lead to a number of open issues and required changes in the E0Ps.
l Management oversight deficiencies include an LER that appeared to.
trivialize the licensee's failure to accomplish a TS required surveillance, the failure of management to actively pursue and resolve
- operator concerns regarding the non-conservative make-up tank operating curve, and the failure of the licensee's audit program'to identify the licensee's need for improvement prior to actions being initiated by the NRC. .
F i MAINTENANCE / SURVEILLANCE E Performance in the area of maintenance and surveillance of. plant i' structures, systems, and components remained-good. ,
Identified strengths include the effective implementation of an on-line
- _ system maintenance program and productive use of diagnostic equipment to
-identify and correct problems.
Challenges include procedure adequacy and compliance, missed and l! inadequate survaillances.- One violation was written for missed TS
-surveillances when a new surveillance included in the. Improved Technical
!: Specifications was not incorporated into the plant procedures and
- therefore was 'not properly performed for approximately eight months.
E There have been two instances where notes in the Technical
. Specifications regarding performance of surveillances were found to not
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. . Crystal River - 1/96 9
apply to the design in the plant. During the last refueling outage, the licensee failed to perform the required ISI inspection of the RCP flywheels. When an indication was detected during an ISI inspection on
- the pressurizer surge line during the last refueling outage, no notification was made to the NRC.until September 1994, when the ISI report was submitted. By the applicable codes, the NRC should have been notified when the indication was detected.
ENGINEERING / TECHNICAL SUPPORT Performance in this area has declined. Systems engineering has made positive contributions to plant performance improvement, but multiple design issues have been raised. Licensee corrective actions have not been timely.
Challenges include management involvehnt and oversight, quality and timeliness of licensing submittals, control of the design basis, and self assessment. .
In September 1994, an issue was identified with TS setpoints not being incorporated correctly into plant procedures. Instrument error was not properly incorporated into instrumentation setpoints, resulting in several instruments being set outside of the TS allowed values.
Examples were identified in RPS, EFIC, and ESAS. Response by the licensee for follow-up of original finding in RPS w'as slow, taking until January 1995 to complete the review of the RPS.. EFIC, and ESAS instrumentation. The licensee agreed to verify the other TS setpoints, only after being. urged to do so by the NRC.
Another problem identified was with the licensee Licensing department providing positions on TS interpretation issues to the NRC, only to be later contradicted by the site line-management. Examples include the Licensing group taking the. position that instrumentation setpoints that exceeded TS allowable values, but did not exceed safety evaluation limits, would not cause safety related equipment to be declared
. inoperable; TS values are nominal numbers and not absolute limits
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! regardless of FSAR or TS basis; and a disagreement between the Licensing !
group and the site line-management on whether a breach of the control l room habitability envelope resulted in the control room emergency ventilation'. system being inoperable. ,
On January 30, 1995, engineering concluded their reanalysis of the make-up tank design operations curve and issued a new curve. On January 31, i 1995 the licensee identified that the assumptions used to produce the
' new curve did not agree with the requirements of the plant Emergency 4 Operating Procedures. This resulted in the new curve being non-conservative with respect to the design basis. Additionally, at the
- prompting of the NRC, the licensee looked at the impact that vortexing in the BWST would have on the required NPSH for ECCS pumps. As a .
result, the E0Ps were revised to allow for adequate level in the BWST to i-
- prevent vortexing problems. Operators.are now operating at 7 psig below the new curve. 'These issues.are included in fhe same escalated enforcement action as the original curve and MUT issue.
In November 1994 a s.ervice water (SW) team inspection identified that the SW self assessment was inadequate, inadequate operability e e g
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Crystal River .1/96' 10 l evaluations,:and failure to implement GL 89-13 commitments.
1 j Several instances of design deficiencies resulting in Appendix R -
violations have been identified. These include a design error which leads to inadequate circuit isolation in the remote. shutdown panel and a j design deficiency which may cause make-up tank vortexing because of failure to meet Appendix R requirements.
2 I PLANT SUPPORT The challenge in Plant Support is to maintain performance at the current i
level.
0- .The radiation protection program continued to adequately maintain .
external and internal radiation exposures within regulatory limits. The I
, dose at the site for 1995 was approximately 8 man-REM, one of the lowest .l' 4
-in the industry. The licensee's audit program identified
- recommendations addressing technical and quality issues with. adequate
! responses'and corrective actions for issues resulting in program l
{ improvements. The licensee continued efforts to reduce respirator usage ;
1 while observing'some increase in PCEs. The licensee maintained adequate '
i j postings for contaminated and radiation areas. Housekeeping and l contamination control practices were observed to be adequate although -
L the inspector rioted some areas where additional improvements couhi have
- been made. 'Ir the areas of radiological effluents and radioactive
! waste, parameters were reliably measured and maintained well below TS -
i limits. Licensee initiatives resulted in a reduction of radioactive ,
effluent releases as well as solid waste volume in 1995. )
The emergency preparedness program continued to be effectively I
- implemented. Training programs continued.to be strong, as demonstrated i by successful emergency response organization responses during the 1994 j . exercises. However, the operation of the TSC HVAC system outside the i design basis and inadequate corrective action for previously identified problems indicates a nr 3d for more management attention.
I The physical security program continued to be effectively implemented.
- Management support for the program was strong. Personnel were
- knowledgeable and performed well, and the turnover rate was low.
Concerns identified in the OSRE have been handled effectively with the exception of a disagreement between the licensee and the OSRE team over requirements of the security plan. This itea remains under discussion.
L Housekeeping practices were good. The decay heat pits have been coated to reduce ground water leakage into the building and the number of l leaking valves has been reduced. Improvements have been noted in general housekeeping. The licensee is working to correct problems with rain water leakage through the roofing. Some recent equipment problems were related to the failure of temporary drain lines during reroof,ing.
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Fire protection has had several problems identified with fire brigade !
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, turnovers and training records maintenance. The inspectors have noted an improvement in the turnovers sin'ce these items were identified.
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PART 3 - SIGNIFICANT EVENTS l
M SIGNIFICANT EVENTS BRIEFINGS (Past 12 Months) i October 12, 1994 - Failure to adequately maintain ATWS-AMSAC.
1 January 18, 1995 - Make-up tank operation outside design basis.
. M ENFORCEMENT STATUS / HISTORY-(Past 12 Months)
- An enforcement conference was held on March 3, 1995, regarding non-
- conservative instrumentation setpoints for TS safety related equipment. ,
An NOV and proposed imposition of Civil Penalty of $25,000 was issued on
- March 24, 1995.
An exit meeting was held by telecon on July 5, 1995, regarding the operation of the make-up tank outside of the operating procedures and the ,
adequacy of design control and corrective actions that affected the
- operability of the ECCS pumps. The licensee and licensed operators exits were held separately. Inspection report 50-302/95-13 (EA 95-126) was
- issued on July 7,' 1995. Due to the subsequent discovery of additional' information concerning a second event, another inspection was conducted,
! Inspection Report 50-302/95-22 (EA95-126) was issued which addressed the overall Make-up tank problems. An enforcement conference is not yet i
scheduled.
I PART 4 - STAFFING AND TRAINING M OPERATIONS STAFF - OVERALL Reactor Operators Number of Shifts: Six crew rotation (Includes 1 on
- vacation, 1 in training, 1 on day shift support, 3 on duty)
Length of Shifts: 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Number of Personnel per Shift: 10 (1 Shift Manager, 2 SR0s, 3 R0s,1 STA and 3 non-licensed auxiliary i operators) Note: The Shift Manager may also be the STA~.
Total Licensed Operators: 35 Total Number of SR0s: 14 Total Number of ROS: 21 (numbers do_ not include shift personnel involved in the make-up tank evolution)
M WORK FORCE 'e
. Plant Staffing Level as of 12/31/95(excludingoutagepersonnel) 3 e
- - - . . . - . .- . -- - - . . . _ _ ..~ . _. . . . - . -
r Crystal River - 1/96 12 Authorized Actual Lic./Contr. Lic./Contr.
Senior VP and Nuclear Production 14/ 0 14/ 0 Engineering and Projects 152/ 21 148/ 22 Material and Controls 100/ 1 97/ 1 Quality Programs 23/ 0 23/ 0 Plant Operations (Ops, Mnt, RC/ Chem) 351/ 100 338/ 100 Site Support 29/ 10 29/ 10 Training 62/ 10 61/ 10 Security- -/ 84 / 84 Total 731/ 226 710/ 227 M QPEMTOR OUALIFICATION/REQUALIFICATION PROGRAM (Past Two Years)
Onerator Licensino Exam Test Results (last' 2 Years) !
Ogig Igag Anolicants Passed /Percentace
-11/95 Requal Inspection Good,results i; - 11/93 Initial 2 SR0s 2 SR0s/100%
1 R0 1 R0 /100%
5/93 Initial 6 SR0s 4 SR0s/ 67%
- 6 R0s 5 R0s / 83%
5/93 Requal 3 SR0s 3 SR0s/100% ;
j 3 R0s 3 R0s/100%
11/92 Requal 6 SR0s 4 SR0s/ 67%
! 9 R0s 8 R0s/ 89%
1 R0 Requal retake 1 R0 /100%
Dates of next scheduled exam: 3/96 i
4.4 PLANT SIMULATOR
! A site-specific simulator became operational and was placed into use for training on May 28, 1990. The simulator was certified in September 26, 1991. Simulator fidelity reports have identified only minor
- discrepancies in the operation of the simulator.
iti INPO ACCREDITATION An INPO assessment team was on site from January 22 through February 2, 1996. No results are known at this time.
! An INPO Design Interface and Communications assist visit occurred 5/23/95 through 5/25/95.
Last assessment: September 19-30, 1994 - Category 2.
' Previous assessment: January 1993 - Category 2 l
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~ Crystal River 13
.1/96 PART 5 - INSPECTION ACTIVITIES M gyLiTANDING ITEMS LIST
SUMMARY
Change From Section Pre-95 1915 Ig.t,31 1/96 Reoort DRP 6 41 47 DRS 0 15 15 TOTALS "I 55 37 ,
1 M MAJOR INSPECTIONS IR-No. DAtg Iy.gg ,,
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91-15 July 22 - August 16, 1991 Allegation Followup 92-01 January 6 - 10, 1992 MOV Team Inspection i
- 92-201 March 23 - 27, 1992 Procurement and Commercial
~
Grade Dedication Programs a
93-11 April 12 - 17, 1993 Offsite Power Problems 1 93-18 June 28 - July 30, 1993 EDSFI 93-16 December 6 - 10, 1993 E0P Inspection f ~
94-01 January 18 - 21, 1994 Emergency Preparedness Exercise 1
! . 94-04 Jan~uary 31 - Feb. 11, 1994 Incorporation of Electrical &
- Instrumentation Areas of Improved TS into Procedures NA February 15 - 18, 1994 Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (0SRE) 94-26 November 7 - 10, 1994 Service Water System Self-Assessment Inspection l
95-06 January 30 ~Feb. 3, 1995 Satpoint Methodology i Inspection 95-16 September 11-15, 1995 - Corrective Action Plan Inspection 95-22 December 11-15, 1995 Make-up Tank Evolution Review M- INFREQUENT INSPECTION PROCEDURE STATUS No core inspection procedures are ' overdue at this time.
All Temporary Instructions applicable to Crystal River are up to date.
1
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CRYSTAL xdVER -
Operational Period .ianuary 1,1995 through January 29, 1996 1
100 4.
% 80-m o
a 60- 1. Crystal River 3 was taken to mode 5 on January 9,1996,
. E-' to repair a condenser tube leak,-which was allowing Z seawater intrusion into the secondary plant.
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hhhhhhhhhhhhhh s\d d w\ d J n\ d d Nd N s\ sd s\ d PERIOD OF OPERATION .
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Graph does .not include power reductions for routine repairs, waterbox cleaning, or required repairs. ,
fa ROSS C. BUTCEER
- POSITION September 1993 - Present
- Senior Resident Inspector, Crystal 1 River l i
. BIPERIENCE J
U.S. Nucisar Reaulatory Ceneminaion 1988 - 1993: Senior Resident Inspector, Turkey Point 1985 - 19r,8: Senior Resident Inspector, Grand Gulf 1986 - 1985: Project Engineer, Region II Tennessee Vallev Authority 1978 -
i980: Test Engineer .
Norfolk Naval Shievard J
1974 - 1973: Shift Test Engineer Aerosence Encineer 1957 - 1974 2nd Lt. U.S.-Army. Cores of Encinaars EDUCATION Bachelor of Science - Mechanical Engineering, University of l Oklahoma L
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TODD 1. 000PE1
. POSITION October 1993 - Present: Resident Inspector, Crystal River
, EXPERIENCE U.S. Nuclame Darruimtney c'a==4mmion i
1989 - 1993: Resident Inspector, McGuire 1987 - 1989: Reactor Inspector, Quality Programs, DRS, 3 Region II I canrcrim power ca===nv 1977 - 1937 Reactor Engineering Supervisor shift Technical Advicor Startup Test Engineer System Engineer Reactor I:ngineer
- EDUCATION Georgia Institute of Technology, Nuclear Engineering, 1977 l
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. J l UNITED STATES !!
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY :
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COMMISSION ,
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- i CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR PLANT l
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!! i REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR !
i 1 QUARTERLY PRESS i d '
CONFERENCE ;'
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l: FEBRUARY 22, 1996 d W
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. PLANT: ST. LUCIE LOCATION: Ft. Pierce, FL I,i MEMBER UTILITY: Florida Power & Light Company m .
DIRECTIONS PROM WEST PALM BEACH h INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT: FT. PIERCE -
7 Take the Airport Access Road to Belvedere Road. Turn / s ea gg l east (right) onto Belvedere Road, and proceed to inter. .L.U sa-f state 95. Take 6-95 North to Exit 61 way A1A on the right. Take A1A cast (
y 76 to High-
), cross the A
M interocestal Weserway, then north along the ocean to the entrance on the left. Total approx. distance =
4 i 9 ;
DIRECDONS PROtt EOP: m j 1-95 North to Midway B. / I Road Exit which is Bi l south of Ft. Pieros.
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'l CRYSTnL filVER MAJOR ISSUES-- 1 A
Backaround: In November 1994, regional management' met with the licensee to I discuss the increasingLnumber of issues identified at Crystal River. In ]
February, 1995, the resident inspectors, regional management, and NRR ,
personnel performed a detailed root cause analysis of issues identified at l Crystal River. The underlying root cause-identified was a lack of management i commitment to program implementation (lack of management oversight). FPC did a root cause analysis and concluded a lack of attention to detail. The NRC and FPC findings and FPC's corrective action plan were discussed on March 1, 1995. A meeting was held in the NRC regional office on August 25, 1995, to 4 discuss the status of the licensee's corrective actions.
A followup inspection of the licensee's progress in implementing the .
corrective action plan was conducted during the week of September 11, 1995.
The followup inspection concluded: l (1) with the exception of the operations area, the licensee's tracking and I trending process was not clearly defined, was inconsistently applied, !
and could fail to identify adverse trends; .
l (2) management oversight of significant issues needed strengthening: I several. examples were identi.fied where issues had not received adequate j management attention (i.e. operability determination process, control complex habitability envelope resolution, root cause evaluations, large Request for Engineering Assistance backlog, etc.); and (3) for operability determinations, the clear expectations reflecting management's highest safety standard were absent.
Additional meetings were h' eld on October 13, 1995,.and February 5, 1996 to discuss the licensee's progress in correcting the identified trends. Another followup inspection of the licensee's corrective action plan is scheduled for the week of March 25, 1996. The licensee has recently reorganized their management team to address the make-up tank and other identified problems.
Issues: The more significant issues are discussed below and represent weakness in Manaaement oversiaht and commitment to the resolut 4n of sianificant issues.
- Unauthorized test of the make-up tank:
Additional information revealed in July 1995 reopened the 01 investigation. An enforceme.nt conference is being scheduled with the ,
licensee to discuss four potentially escalated . violations concerning procedure violations, conducting an unauthorized test, inadequate .
corrective actions, and inadequate Design Control. Additionally, !
individual enforcement conferences are being scheduled for each of the six members of the crew that conducted the unauthorized tests on September 4 and September 5, 1994.
- Ooerability evaluations and Commitment Manaaement:
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- Recently, containment purge valve control circuitry was discovered to' !'
have non-safety related components not isolated from the safety related
- components. The-licensee had not declared the. components inoperable and !
was not planning on~ pursuing corrective actions until after the upcoming
. refueling outage. The resident inspector's concerns prompted the_ . :
- ' licensee into.beginning acti.on.
}
- 'In September 1995 a team inspection of the licensee's CAP noted that the !
licenswe's operability determination program was in the process of being rewritten. The operability determinations reviewed by the inspectors. -
were considered inadequate in content and justification.
In September 1995 a deviation was identified in that the licensee had i failed to maintain the Technical Support System. habitability as committed to in their TMI action plan requirements. The licensee has
- imposed a limitation on the number of support personnel that can be in
! -the TSC un'til this problem is resolved.
In November 1994 an NRC service water. inspection team identified an
- inadequate service water self assessment, . inadequate operability
. evaluations, and failure to implement GL 89-13 commitments. While
- service water system operability is not a concern, some unresolved i design issues remain.
F
- Control comolex habitability envelope (CCHE):
J i In January 1995 NRC inspectors identified that the control complex habitability envelope was not being maintained in accordance with assumptions used in the design calculations. The licensed had not performed a surveillance of the control complex. habitability envelope
- for integrity or deterioration. .
t
-* Outside Desian Basis Issues:
~
\
F Several recent. instances have_been identified where non-safety related !
i-' components have been found integral to safety related systems. Examples !'
include the containment purge valves, the containment mini-purge valves, and the make-up pump lube oil pumps. On a positive note, the licensee
. is aggressively identifying design basis issues. TSs require the reactor building purge radiation monitor be operable when the purge and min-purge valves are required to be operable. . The purge and mini-purge valves are designated as safety related, however, the radiation monitor i is designated as non-safety related. The licensee identified that no-i electrical-isolation devices exist between the valves control wiring and 4 lthe radiation monitor wiring. The make-up pumps'are the high head 1 L injection' pumps also. On a LOOP, the MVPs would load on the diesel, however, the MVP ac lube oil pumps would not load on the diesel and the de backup' lube oil pumps were.non-safety related.
L - An REA identified'in 1992 a potential outside design basis. concern about
- the OTSG blow down cross connect valves being open above 600 psig during
+
a startup or cooldown. During these conditions, if a faulted steam 1
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- generator was to occur, the possibility exists for the two OTSGs to be'
.- cross connected. This issue was not addressed until September, 1995, i' when_it.was-discovered that the concern was legitimate. Further i
. analysis revealed the condition was not.outside design basis.'
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- Setooint Action Plan:
1 j The licensee.has a continuing effort to improve the accuracy, methodology, and precision of many of the safety related .setpoints.
LER 92-003. addresses an instance where the emergency diesel generator fuel oil tank volume versus level calculations were inaccurate,
- resulting in'the tank being inoperable. The corrective actions included 1 i verifying the calculatichs for. a number'of other tanks. This was not i being. worked on until the . resident inspectors identified it in early 1995.
On September 14, 1994 the licehsee identified conflicts between existing calculations which were used to establish Reactor Protection System trip setpoints. The different setpoint calculations were due to the licensee l extending their refueling outage from 18 to 24 months. On November 28, j 1994 as part of the expanded review of other setpoints, other setpoint )
discrepancies were noted for the Engineered. Safeguards Actuation System. i On January 18, 1995"to resolve TS interpretation problem, the licensee,
- NRC Region II, the residents, and NRR discussed the TS, The FSAR and i determined the TS values were allowable values and could not be t exceeded. The residents notified the DNPO and the DNPO directed the TS t setpoints be adjusted accordingly.
4 An engin,eering inspection in February 1995 documented that the only safety related setpoint calculation that had been completed as part of
- the licensee.'s corrective actions, did not follow the methodology specified by licensee documents and some of the assumptions were
. nonconservative. , ,
l On March 3, 1995 an enforcement conference was held on instrument setpoints followed by the issuance of a SL III violation and a $50,000
, CP. The licensee discussed their corrective. actions and categorized TS setpoints into four categories.
. Cat. 1 -
Setpoint values designated as allowable values in TS.
Cat. 2 - Setpoint values relied upon in safety analysis or design J basis but not specifically designated allowable value in TS.
Cat. 3 -- Setpoint. values considered in the safety analys.is but appropriately treated as nominal setpoints.
t Cat. 4 -
Setpoint values not considered in the design analysis.
The installed-setpoints were mostly adequate with only minor deviations i identified. The set' point program proposed by the licensee was accepted. l
'To date, all Cat.1 calculations have been completed, and 65% of the j
Cat. 2 calculations finished with the remainder due by July 29, 1996. l i
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Approximately 70 % of the total corrective actions,have been c.ompleted with an overall completion date of August 26.-1996.
- E0P Enhancement Prooram:
A major rewrite of the E0Ps is underway. Recent revisions have shown significant improvement.
In NRC IR 93-16, a number of potential violations (11) were identified against the licensee's E0P program; including a failure to develop an adequate PSTG, failure to take adequate corrective action on previously
. identified PSTG deficiencies, failure of the procedures to provide i adequate guidance, failure to follow the verification and validation procedure, and failure to perform adeouate 10 CFR 50.59 reviews. .A corrective action pla~n was developed to address the violations.
NRC IR 94-23 a November 28, 1994 to December 16, 1994 inspection of the licensed operator requalification program. This report identified among other-problems, weaknesses in operator performance.
Followup on the makeup tank issues revealed that some assumptions in the E0Ps could not be supported by design calculations. The setpoint issue has challenged the accuracy of some of the setpoints used in the E0Ps.
In response to these issues the licensee has expanded the E0P
-Enhancement Program to include a reverification of assumptions and setpoints in the E0Ps. As the. licensee program has progressed, they have discovered that a number of concerns have existed on each of the E0Ps, some for a number of years. Addressing these concerns has increased the scope of the enhancement program.
The licensee has procured contract engineers to assist is the program.
At present, the licensee is anticipating the completion of the enhancement program in S.eptember,1996, .with some further revisions to the E0Ps are expected as the identified technical issues are resolved.
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i EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
. PRE-DECISIONAL SEMI-ANNUAL PLANT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT 4 CRYSTAL RIVER l
i . .
Septestier 1995-February 1996
! Current SALP Assessment Period:
- SALP Period
- September 17, 1995 - March 22, 1997 Most Recent SALP Previous SALP i SALP ending 9/16/95 SALP ending'2/19/94 ,
'i_
. Operations 2 2 Maintenance 2 2 ;
! Engineering . 2 1
' An INPO assessment team was on site from January 22 through February 2, 1996.
No results are known at this time. ,
Last assessment:
~
September 19-30, 1994 - Category 2.
4- Previous assessment: January 1993 - Category 2
, I. Performance Overview
[ On January 9,1996 the unit was taken off line and into Mode 5 to repair F a condenser tube leak and clean up the secondary system. The licensee
, repaired the tube leak and returned the unit to power operation on January l
28, 1996c .
The plant has operated well with few equipment problems or plant j
transients. ,
The more significant issues are as follows:
y
- Manaaement oversicht and commitment to the resolution of sianificant
. issues needs to be strenathened. -1
- Unauthorized test of the make-up tank: Additional information
[ revealed in July 1995 reopened the 01 investigation. An enforcement I
- conference is being scheduled with the licensee to discuss four ,
potentially escalated violations concerning procedure- violations, i
conducting an unauthorized test, ineffective corrective actions, and
. ineffective Design Control. Additionally, individual enforcement conferences are being scheduled for each of the six members of the j
. . crew that conducted the unauthorized experiments on September 4 and i September 5, 1994.
- ' Operability evaluations and Commitment Manaaement: In November 1994 an NRC service water inspection team identified an- inadequate s
7 - '-
l service water self assessment, inadequate operability evaluations, and failure to implement GL 89-13 commitments. While service water
. system operability is not a concern,'some unresolved design issues
[ remain.
)
- Control e.;molex habitability envelone (CCHEh In January 1995 NRC inspecto 1 identf fied that the control complex habitability envelope l was not sing maintained in accordance with assumptions used in the
. design ca.::ulations. The licensee had_not performed a surveillance of - .the control complex . habitability envelope for -integrity or deterioration.
- Outside Desian Basis Issues: Several recent instances have been )
I identified where non-safety related components have been found i
- ~
integral to safety related systems. Examples include the l containment purge valves, the containment mini-purge valves, and the !
, make-up pump. lube oil pumps. On a positive note, the licensee is j aggressively identifying design basis issue,s. ;
- Setooint Action Plan: The licensee has a continuing effort to improve the accuracy, methodology, and precision of many of the safety related setpoints. -
l
! * .E0P Enhancement Proaram: A major rewrite of the E0Ps is underway.
Recent revisions have shown significant improvement.
A Management Meeting wa's held on March 1,1995, with the licensee to discuss the problem trends at the site and the licensee's plans to correct them. Another meeting . was held on October 13, 1995 to discuss the
- licensee's progress in correcting the identified trends. The licensee ;
4 presented a corrective action implementation plan. A follow-up inspection of the licensee's progress in implementing the corrective actions presented to the NRC was conducted during the week of September 11, 1995.
] The follow-up inspection concluded: (1) that with the exception of the ,
! operations area, the licensee's tracking and trending process' was not 1 clearly defined, was inconsistently applied, and could fail. to identify l
adverse trends, (2) management oversight of significant issues needs to be strengthened, and (3) for operability determinations, 'the clear expectations reflecting management's highest safety standard were absent.
Another follow-up inspection is scheduled for the week of February 12,
- _ 1996. i The previous PPR concluded that the results of the inspection of the-corrective actions indicated noticeable improvements in operations,- -
- maintenance and engineering with only slight improvement in operability
. determinations and management oversight. The PPR panel also stated that l the core engineering inspection should focus on a stronger 'look at l engineering management oversight and self assessment during the second or j third quarter of 1996. ,
l The licensee has recently reorganized their management team to address the j make-up tank and other identified problems.
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- II. Functional' Area Assessments
- . The last SALP assessment period ended on September 16, 1995.. The SALP was a presented to the licensee on October 31, 1995. The licensee accepted the SALP presentation by letter dated December 13, 1995 stating their acceptance of the SALP results and a commitment to address the noted j - issues.
5 The September 1995 PPR concluded that there were noticeable improvements-
! in operations, maintenance, and engineering with only slight improvement in operability determinations and management' oversight.
A number of design basis issues have arisen, compounded by personnel errors which supported the NRC's position that there was a negative trend 1
in plant performance.. Licensee. management has identified contributing factors and developed a corrective action program to address them.' ,
l OPERATIONS s
! Overall plant operational performance has been good with some notable l exceptions in personnel performance. There were few transients and no 3
plant trips. Plant capacity factor has remained very high, meeting or i exceeding all of the plant goals.
I
' Poor judgement on the part of licensed individuals has resulted in several j, personnel error related issues.
I Significant problems have been attributed to lack of management oversight and involvement , interfaces with other organizations, non-routine i operations, operability evaluations and the identification and resolution l of problems.
I Examples of the lack of operator attention to detail include the operation of the make-up tank' outside the acceptable operating region while t
operators performed an unauthorized test, failure to follow procedures for
, bypassing an annunciator, examples of failure to follow procedures resulting in mispositioned valves and the lack of an adequate E0P program
! identified- during the last SALP period. The EOP upgrade program is l progressing. The review of setpoint and design assumptions has lead to a i number of open issues and required changes in the E0Ps.
i MAINTENANCE / SURVEILLANCE Performance in the area of maintenance and surveillance 'of plant structures, systems, and components remained good.
2 Identified strengths include the effective implementation of an on-line .
system maintenance program and productive use of diagnostic equi.pment to identify and correct problems. ,
Challenges include procedure adequacy and compliance, missed and i inadequate . surveillances. One violation was written for missed TS . i 4
surveillances when a new surveillance included in the Improved Technical '
Specifications 'was not incorporated into. the plant procedures and 1
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i therefore was not properly performed for approximately eight months.
There have been two instances where notes in the Technical Specifications.
i regarding performance of surveillances were found to not apply to the design in the plant. During the last refueling outage, the licensee
~
failed to perform the required ISI inspection of the RCP flywheels. When l 4
an indication was detected during an ISI inspection on the pressurizer !
i surge line during the last refueling outage, no notification was made to-
! - the NRC until September 1994, when the ISI report was submitted. By the applicable codes, the NRC should have been notified when the indication j was detected.
E - ENGINEERING / TECHNICAL SUPPORT l
. Performance in this area has declined. . Systems engineering has made positive contributions to plant performance improvement, but multiple j
1 . design issues have been raised. Licensee corrective actions have not been timely.
! Challenges include management involvement and oversight, quality _ and timeliness of licensing submittals, control of the design basis, and self l assessment.: ~
l l
l .
l In September 1994, an issue was identified with TS setpoints not being !
i~ -
incorporated correctly into plant procedures. Instrument error was not 4
properly incorporated into instrumentation setpoints, resulting in several i instruments being set outside of. the TS allowed values. Examples were l
I of original finding in RPS was slow, taking until January 1995 to complete the review of the RPS, EFIC, and ESAS instrumentation. The licensee-l agreed to verify the other TS setpoints, only after being urged to do so i by the NRC.
l Another problem identified was with the licensee's Licensing department providing positions on TS interpretation issues to the NRC, only to be later contradicted by the site line-management. Examples include the i Licensing group taking the position that instrumentation setpoints that i- - exceeded'TS allowable values, but did not exceed safety evaluation limits, j would not cause. safety related equipment to be declared inoperable; TS
- values are nominal numbers and not absolute limits regardless of FSAR or TS basis; and a disagreement between the Licensing group and the site line-management on whether a breach of the control room habitability envelope resulted in the control room emergency ventilation system being inoperable. These issues are being addressed by a change in the licensing manager and.the development of a rigorous operability procedure which is
- driven by operations and includes formal engineering involvement.
[
On January 30, 1995, engineering concluded their reanalysis of the make-up tank design operations curve and issued a new curve. On January 31, 1995 i the licensee identified that the assumptions used to produce the new curve did not agree with the requirements of the plant Emergency Operating Procedures. This resulted in the ne'w curve being non-conservative with
. respect to the design basis. Additionally, at the prompting of the NRC,
, the licensee looked at the impact that vortexing in the BWST would have on the required NPSH for ECCS pumps. As a result, the E0Ps were' revised to d
~
allow for adequate level .in the BWST to prevent vortexing problems. l Operators are now operating on a new, more conservative curve. These I issues' are included in ' the same escalated enforcement action as the original curve and MUT issue.
' . . l In November 1994 a service water (SW) team inspection identified that the l SW self assessment was inadequate, inadequate operability evaluations, and failure to implement GL 89-13 commitments, l
Several instances of design deficiencies resulting in Appendix R violations have been identified. These include a design error which leads to inadequate circuit isolation in the remote shutdown panel and a design deficiency which may cause make-up tank vortexing because of failure to meet Appendix R requirements. -
PLANT SUPPORT Plant Support continues to perform in an excellent manner.
4 The radiation protection program continued to adequately maintain external and internal radiation exposures within regulatory limits. The dose at ,
4 the site for 1995 was approximately 8 man-REM,- one of the lowest in the !
industry. The licensee's audit program identified recommendations addressing technical and quality issues with adequate responses and corrective actions for issues resulting in program improvements. The licensee continued efforts to reduce respirator usage while observing some increase in PCEs. The licensee maintained adequate postings for !
- contaminated and radiation areas. Housekeeping and contamination control ;
practices were observed to be adequate although the inspector noted some l areas where additional improvements could have been made. In the areas of j radiological effluents and radioactive waste, parameters were reliably measured and maintained well below TS limits. Licensee initiatives resulted in a reduction of radioactive effluent releases as well as solid waste volume in 1995.
l' The emergency preparedness program continued to be . effectively implemented. Training programs continued to be strong, as demonstrated by successful emergency response organization responses during the 1995 exercises. However, the operation of the TSC HVAC system outside the design basis and inadequate corrective action for previously identified problems indicates a need for more management attention.
The physical security program continued to be effectively implemented.
Management support for the program was strong. Personnel were knowledgeable and performed well, and the turnover rate was low. The security force has developed a sensitivity for operational concerns, being recognized on several occasions for the prompt identification of plant conditions, which, had they been allowed to continue, could have caused major problems at the plant. Concerns identified in the OSRE have been handled effectively with the exception of a disagreement between the
' licensee and the OSRE team over requirements of the security plan. This item remains under discussion.
l e
Hous'ekeeping practices were good. The decay heat pits have been coated to reduce ground water leakage into the building and the number of leaking valves has been reduced. Improvements have been noted in general housekeeping. The licensee is working to correct problems with rain water leakage through the roofing. Some recent equipment problems were related ,
to the failure of temporary drain lines durir.g reroofing operations.
Fire protection has had several problems identified with fire brigade turnovers and training records maintenance. The inspectors have noted an improvement in the turnovers since these items were identified.
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l l PERCY (PAT) M. BEARD, JR.
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, NUCLEAR OPERATIONS .
i 1
d Pacy M. Board, Jr. is a senior vice president, nuclear operations at Florida Power Corporation. He joined tiu utiity ;
in 1989 Prior to that Board
. , was vice presulent and director of government re st iions at INPO. Board was I appested vice president of govemment reistions at INPO in .May 1988, and he managed INPO's reistionsidps with the U.S. Numiser Regeistory Commission, the U.S. Dapsetment of Energy and a wide range of industry aryminations ,
i sud as NUMARC, NPOC, eel and EPRI.
! Peter to being amned vias president of governeset reistions at INPO, he served as vies president of tbs suuhusion and unistanos youp. He had previously served as director of the evaluation and assistanes division. Befue juising
] ;
- INP0 in 1981, Based served mare than 20 years is the U.S. Navy. His last assignment was as conensadsg sNiner of the USS Simon bks. He graduated with a bachelor's degros in marine and electrical enginsonng from the U.S.
' . Naval Academy in 1968 and received a doctorate in nuciter physics from Duke University in 1964.
i Board was born in Opelika, Alabama in 1936. His family moved to Gainesvdie, Florida in 1937 where he psw up i graduating from Gainesvdie High School before attending the U. S. Naval Academy.
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( Gary L Beidt i
POSITION i
i 1989 to Present: ' Vies Premdent,Nusiser Producten i <
- . I i
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! nmidePowercamerseen
- 1900 to 1900 Assisesnt to the Vise Premdent, Nasiest Operanens t
1987se less Obesour, Feasil Mont operesses 105 & sesi i 19N to 1987 ' Diulsion Mensper,8essh 8snesent
+ tossteless Menever.NesiserPlant operseene Naciser Plant EngmeennsfTesluunni serviess Meneger l
! 1983 te 1983 !
1981 to 1983 SRO Uconse Training 4
Nasieur Tesimusel serviese " i l ' 1900 to 1981 4
1970 te 1900 Teslunsel Support EngineerI Perfenuance Enginesnes Superviser Besten Edissa Conveny l /
4' Semist Perionesses Enginest :
- .1976 to 1978
1 Mahnenense Engineer i- Rossier Engineer ,
i-4
!. 1973 to 1974 Aemstant Ensamanne Groep Supennser I I
! - ' Sanier Nasiser Enymser
.. EDUCATION .
! . Northwestern Universty, Bashelor of Soisses. Sciones Engmeenne (AstreasuccelMeist).1988 j U. 8. Navy Nasiser Power Training Program Profemmensl Engmeer.Moshamael i- ,
Sanier Reester Opmater Ucenes, Crystal River Nesiser Plant i
Floride State Cerenad Fire Figiner i PROFESSIONAL DRSANIZATIONS t
Anurisen seesty et Meshamosi Engesers ,
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NAME JOIRY W. CAMPBELL
. P0ffTION 1190 to Present Assistent Plant Directer Maintenance end Redstion Protection 7154le 1198: Meneger Nocher Plant Technical Support C:PERINCE i
i Radde Power Cagerueles 4 1l70is ilet Ehemsel Mehenemme Fay ==. Phat Elastnesi andCaesi Empmew, Menspr, EksehsNCaesh Eaghsense, k Manager Higgins Power Plant, Nasirs hat Mamagar CR4,Ilumspr i limiserPlant Tesimmel8w CR4 l 4
- 130.Passac Assistant Plant Diester Meineseense and Redsmus Protecten ,
1 l 1878 Materof Scioeca Enyneemg.Univoresy of CaseralFloride,Oriende 1972 Bachelor of Science Engesenne.Floride TechneisgiceiUniversity, i
'Odende UCMSE81CENTIFICATIONS l
Hagstood Preisesional Engineer . Floride,1980 4
3110Lkenes CR3,1983 4
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NAE ' l WWEen L Conklin,Jr.
l P081T10N , i 1991.Present Director, Nuclear Operations Materiale and Centrols I
EXPERIENCE Raide Power Corporessa 1991 to 1991: Menever,Pewar Plant Meterials Manage,infensesen Network Systems Direeter,lafenuseen Systems
. Manager,T&D Matanels Manager.Pachesing T&D Meteriale National Safe Corporation ,
1875 to 1981: General Operations Mennew Deyron Corporation 1973 to 1975: Project Manager I
EDUCAT10N .
Teens Teek Universty, Lubbeek. Teres. Beebeler ef Saenos, induetnel Engmesnne .1989 Florideinsatute of Techneiser.Meheurne Floride,Mastere of Busesse Adnaastration 1984
]
PROFESS 10NAl 0RGANIZAT10NS
- Certrfied Purcheems Meneger National Association of Purchasing Menegas l Amencen Produccan and inventary Centrol Society (APICS)
Cwnfed FAA Flightinstructor 4
5 0
, 1I29196 1
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ME Rensed W. Davis POSm0N Present Assistaat Plant Director Nuoleer Opwations & Chansstry Herida Pewer Carperenes EXPERIENCE Hwide Power Corporates 1901 to 1996: Moseger,Nedser Piset Malmesense Ostage Shift Mesager(7R,8M,8R) ,
Nualeer Shift Supwvuw Reacter Opwat'er NeeUcensed Opweter U.S. Army 1978 to 1980 i
Electnc Hess & Rubber Company
, .1972 to 1975: Assounting Manager laternal Auditor i
4 EDUCATION Universityof Delewws 8.S.1972 boensed Reacter Operater,1984 1987 s
beensed Senior Reacter Opwater,1988 1992 S
e
i
' r 3831 R. David deMontfort
+
fMlIE1 Present Meneger Neelser Plant Operemens Floride Poww Carpersten ,
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El5BlEIE Florida Poww Casperation ,
1000 to 1906: Nasiesr Operatens instector Aesstent Nuclear ShNt Supenneer .
Nedeer Operets ,
Reisehne Superweer l Assistent Neelser Shift Mensgar i Non-Ucensed Operster Beliding Sannsee
' 1 l
SEGAIE!
Themes Edison Causes,40 credit hows towards B.S. degree.1989 s ,
Centrol Floride Cessnamty College, AA degree,1989 4
NRC Senior Reester Operster Ucones,1987 l NRC Reacter Operster Ucenes.1983 Pinelles Vecstienel Tech. Insutute. Electromes,1979 1
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A i POSITION Iggs.Present Manager, Noaiser Ucensus Fierule Pewar Carperecen EXPERIENCE Floride Power Corporation 1000to1994 Meneger,Neelser L4enseg Nasiest Enemesnne Superviser IMeehennell8tructural Design 8eceeni Nesleer Preiset Engmeer Wochenmailstructwel Design Seeneni
! Neoleer Engineer il- Quality Systeme Stens & Webster Engmeerug Corporation ,
1982 to 198k Lead Licensee Engineer Oyster Creek ESSF Project Radiation Protection Engmeer . Nine Mile Point 2 IYoiset Career Deveispment Engineer l
e EDUCATION Roteer University,New Brunswick,NJ:B.S.,MechanicalEngmeenns 1982 Profeemenal Enymeer, State of Floride
! PROFESSIONAL DRGANIZATIONS i
AmancesNuclearSociety National Amances Nuclear Somety . Florida Section i
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NAM Bruce J. Hickle POSITION 1982 Present Director, Nuclear F;ent Operations Floride Psww corporation EXPERIENCE Flodde Power Carperseen 1982 te 1982: Director QualityProgress MenegarNesleer Plant Operseems Assistent Operations Meneger Stwtup Menegw Outage Shift Manager 3enestry & Radiation Protection Superintendent ,
Osaka Public Peww District 1976 to 1982: Supenneer Chenestry and Radiation Protection Plant Health Physicist l
Liesname Adammetrator Senior Engmeer NUS Corporation .
l 1974 to 1976: Assemets Engineer j
- Wissenen Elastric Poww Campeer. Point Beed Nudeer Plant 1973 to 1974: Toshnical Assutent EDUCATtDN Catholic Universty. Washmeten D.C., M.S.E., Mechemcel Eng'meeting - !
NeeleerOption 1876 l l
. University of Wiecenen. B.S. 1972 i Certfied Weste Water Treatment Plant Operator State of Wisconan Cartdied Wetw Tresesent Plant Operator State of Nobreake QasidiedSRO CrystalRiverUnit3 PROFESS 10NAl 0RGANIZAT10NS Ameneen Nucieer Seeisty American Somety of Moshemsel Engineers j I
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. Sarsh G.Jh ,
POSITISE 1992 to Present: Menegar. Nuclear Cheastry and Redation Protection
- EXPERIEBCE
. Findde Power C_ _153 18s2 1982: Manager, Nesleer Gaelity Asenesammte i Iset Iset: Messen,ossety Andies .
1ssS1ss1: Messen,seeNusiner Servisse l
- 1 5 19061988 Supenneer, Re&ological Emergency Plannme j i
l 1983 1986: Re6olessel Emergency Plannes Speemlist i
1901 1983: Chenestry and Radiation Protocoon Spacelist !
\
5 l Newport News Shipbuilding i 1974 1981: Sanier Superuser, Reselegical Centrais i
j EDUCATION
, Saebeler of Saianos Degree in Prefusmonal Management,1986 1- NOVA Univarany Ft. Lauderdale,R l
i-v.ime Menessasse Cowese 4
. Sameimihed Esalmer Troisins 1
! hnreducten to Hesith Phyace Cowse for Poww Reacter Re6enen Preteneen Tesiummons i Neussen Poww & Light Radiation Pretsenen Tosineiesy Reakwesinteressensi Planens for Nueiser Emergenmee' ;
- and Advensed Cowse in Plename fw Nedser Emergenas Harvard Sdeelof Pue6e Health Caniernes en Nondadwiessel Erscuenen Riske During s'Nesiser Plant Emergency Paumyiveme state universey .
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P Weency .".- ' - Plans sad Proyens Wakehop +
Sosanne Deniepeem fw Emergency Preparedness Eswomes Werkshop
. settese Nwdwen tshwetenu Systems Troieles fw Enemeers
. Floride Poww Cwperstwa PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZAff0N$ .
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4 ALLEN J.KEESLER,JR.
PRESIDENT AND CINEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION ST. PETER $3URG, FLORIDA i .
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA Aass J. Kessier,Jr. was born in St. Petershws, floride in 1938. He attended the University of Alabase where he magered in engissonne and leasr ressmed his Beebeler of Science in Basmess Adnuestretain degree from Regins CeEage in Wi 4
)
Bir. Kessier joined Fluids Power Carpersten in 1983 as e esammuni repressnestme. He earved in venous espensi Power esmer -insising essasi sagnemme pestisms, ese diasism manager and two district manager pemeens, and En l esser eensavedes hafore besmans presulent of Teismin Carperusion in 1982. He teammad as prendset of that subside Progress Corporenen uma preseend to preadset and shhi esesnia efseer of rimide Power in 10ss.
} Rer. Kessim is eseve in esserai sivic end preissmensl ergenimeens. .
He is en de Esassen Cassettee of the Fluide Elesenc Power Cerrdestes Group,Inc is en Homerwy Board Manhar of the Jula Achievenant Sunseest Adwiesty Canal, and is on the floride Real Estate Journal Advisory Ceancil Editenal Board. He senes as e l
j' member of the Edison Electne insatute Beard of Directors and is en officer and beard member of the is else a member of the boards of directors of Florida Progrees Corporation Associated Industnes of Florida, Southirust Corp 4 the St. Petersburg Area Chamber of Commeros.
Mr. Kassier and his wife, Serek. reside in St. Petersiers. They have few desghters and few greadchihiren. -
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Nort Keen i
i f~ gggggg l 352.Present: Outage Manager i )
i
& .a Nasher Maintenenes Supesistendent 850 382 '
Assistent Nealeer Maintenense Sepenntendent 718 8 810 0 7182 7lgs Senior Neelear Elastsineill&C Shop superviser
> ago. 752 - Nesiser ElectricalShop 8eporviser .
- 1f78 01g0 Centreet Sepervient j
' Nesiser Electrician 1 5f74 If70 Groundman j
- El72 El74
.' 11171 SI72 . Laborer '
If71 '.11/71 Electrician
- s j Electncion: U.S. Navy.
447. If71 -
l EDUCATTON 4
- 1982 Master of Business Administretien, NOVA Universty,Ft.Leaderdale,FL 1987 Basholer of Science, NOVA Universty, Ft. fmderdale, FL '
^
1983 Assemate of Arts,CentralFlorida Commesty CeInge,Ocela,FL 1982 Assemate of Science, Centrol Floride Comnenity Cologe, Ocela, FL 1980 Graduated, Bronford High Scheel, Branford, FL Various Menegement Deveispment Courses by Floride Power Corporation i
a Nuclear Engineering Training Program, successfuly Completed,1987 i~ !'
Sidtt operstions Technical Advisor Training (Equivaient SRO TrainingL Successfuly Compieted,1989 l l
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Poolf.MeKee .
J 2 0 311195 Direster Oselity Programs Florlds Power Corporaties f 1902 to Presamt 4
- EEEEE 1 Maide PoserCaparation 195 to 1992: Olrester NasinerPlant Operations i * ' Nasiser Plant tienegar Nasiser Plant Operemone Meneger Nasiest Operseems$sparunomient i NRC Licensed Senior Reester Operster Nume== Toshnisel sernnes aspenntendent i Assistent Plant 8spanntendsat CR4 Nasiser Operseems Fagi=== CR4 l
Plant Engmeer Tweer Plant j Asessists Rossies Engineer t
! DulCAIEE i
- Hohert Cassee, Geneve, New York, Liberal Arts
- Unluersey of Floride,Bashelor MoshemselEspineenne IBM Universey of Raide.Beshelor Nesleer Engesenne Soissess,with bemers IBM l
l - Nuelser Plant semier Reester Operater License Carefisseen 1982 i
! PROFESSIONAL GRGANIZATIONS 4
Amanssa 8.sisty fn omsky Centrei
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- Asenssa 8esisty of Moshemsel Engmeers q.
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i Brent C.Meere -
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i 1 PORTION l-i 1982 Pressut 48===pr,Wak Casteis Meride Power Carperseen .
i 4 ENEME j PierWe PowerCapumiss Meisessense aguienemiset j 1950 to 1982:
PenipalNeelserMeelmeiselEmsneer
- Omase Pisans Coordisser j i 1988 to 1987
- OpereeeneTesimisellaserector Reside Poww & Usht-1988: Traininglastreeter
( .
i . Omahe Pubic Power Distiet 4 ISOR: Systems Enemeerinewester j f
' Teinde Edises.Davie Bases Station
- 1988: Operesses Proendes Writer 2 1885 to 1988: Manager, Nesiser 0;mrosens & Meissemenes infennseen Sennes 4
Deke Power Campest 1972 to 1985: System Predeemen Engineer Ostage Manager & Operemens Easmeer 4
i Meere Enginsonne
- toes te Ign: Amomeeve Engineer 4
EDUCATION ClemassUnissuey,8.8 MesimmisalEngissonas
! i WMM*1M SR0 OossesStomes(19751983)
~
lleesterOperseas 0asase(19741 l
Pfl0 FESS 10NAL OflGANIZATIDNS
\
Assassa NesismSemmy 4
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H&ME i Paul R.Tanguay .
POSITION
' 1990 - Present Director, Nuclear Engineering & Projects ;
! EXPERIENCE
- - Florida Power Corporation 1983 to 1990: Manager, Nuclear Operations Engineering .
Manager, Ntaclear Mech./Struct. Eng4nameing l Supervisor, Nuclear Engineering (Mech.)
Nuclear Mechanical Engineer ,
i Combustion nE'gineering Corporation
- 1973 to 1983: Supervisor, Plant Engineering Design
' Lead Engineer, Plant Engineering Design
- Design Engineer, Plant Engineering j EDUCATION:
i
! University of Hartford, B.S. Mechanical Engineering, 1972 4 University of Hartford, Completed courses toward MBA
. Waterbury State. Technical College, AAS Mech. Engineering -
Metallurgy Option, 1972 Licensed Professional Engineur
- PROFESSIONAL AFFILTATIONS:
American Society of Mechanical Engineers I
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- American Nuclear Society ,
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RAIK Asif C.WidsE P0ffil05 Director, Nusiser Operstises Troising .
169li Presset Florlds Poww Cwpersese EXPERIERCE ReeldsPaestGwyeresian 1900.teIEc Olrosser,Ilusiser Operamens ses support 1983 1000: Blasager,80ssiser oparsmens Fagimaming -
1982.ISBR: Messesr,Ilesisar Ensisseries Pisieses 1878 1982: PhiestEnsisser esmersi0,nessedissanc set Didsien 1973 1978: Enguesnes 8spennser Faslima Ensamer field Engeser System Ossign Fay ==r f* EDUCATIOE W5 Mesinneel Engesenne . Lewou Tesimalspesi insatuts .1973
] PROFESSIONAL ORSANIZATIONS j no isr - E.gmeer l
I B&W Owears Grass New Fremstemel 4 4
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-NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 4
{ .y. 3. ReBION N 101 MARIETTA STREET. N.W., sutTE 2000 t
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ATLANTA. GEORGIA 3GH30185 *
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October 20, 1995 '
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- Florida Power Corporation i Crystal River Energy Complex '
. Mr. ~ P. N. Beard, Jr. (SA2A) ,
Sr. VP, Nuclear Operations ,
, ATTN:' Ngr., Nuclear Licensing ,
4 15760 West Power Line Street -
i Crystal River, FL -< 34428-6708 !
! l
- 'SU8 JECT: . SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE (SALP)
(NRC INSPECTION REPORT N0. 50-302/95-99) l
Dear Mr. Beard:
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I The-Systematic Assessment of Licensee Parformanci (SALP) for the period i February 20, 1994, through September 16, 1995, has been completed for Crystal River 3. The results of the evaluation are documented in the enclosed SALP i- report which will .be discussed with you at a public meeting at the Crystal l River 3 Site Administration Building auditorium on October 31, 1995, at 9:30 l
- a.m. At the meeting you should be prepared to discuss our assessment and any
! initiatives that address our concerns and challenges identified in the SALP l
report.
3
.During this assessment period the overall nuclear safety performance of personnel at Crystal River 3 continued to be good, with notable decline in the j engineering area. The plant was operated well, with no reactor trips.
Several significant performance deficiencies in the' middle of the period
- highlighted weak management involvement in day to day operations; weak vertical communications; and weak interfaces between engineering, operations, and maintenance. These performance deficiencies also indic'ated a lack of
- effective self assessment and a lack of aggressive, focused effort by.the lina
- organization to identify and resolve problems. Your management's Corrective Action Plan, which was monitored by the NRC, effected some performance improvements late in the period. The NRC plans to continue to monitor. your
. progress through' additional inspections and management meetings.
In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
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FPC- 2 )
. l Should you have any questions- or comments, I would be pleased to discuss them with you. ;
Sincerely, id Stewart D. Ebneter' .!
Regional Administrator ,
Docket No.: 50-302 r License No.: DPR-72 l
Enclosure:
SALP Report ,
cc w/ encl: .
4 Gary L. Boldt, Vice President Nuclear Production (SA2C) i Florida Power Corporation j Crystal River Energy Complex ,
4 15760 West Power Line Street i Crystal River, FL 34428-6708 1
. B. J. Hickle, Director- i Nuclear Plant Operations (NA2C)
- . Florida Power Corporation l Crystal River Energy Complex .
15760 West Power Line Street -
Crystal River, FL 34428-6708 i
L. C. Xelley, Director (SA2A) .
- Nuclear Operations Site Support Florida Power Corporation -
Crystal River Energy Complex 15760 West Power Line' Street Crystal River, FL 34428-6708 l
i Rodney E. Gaddy Corporate Counsel Florida Power Corporation MAC - ASA P. 0. Box 14042
, St. Petersburg, FL. 33733 Attorney General Department of legal Affairs The Capitol
, Tallahassee, FL 32304 ec w/enci cont'd: .See page 3 9
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FPC- 3-cc w/ enc 1 cont'd:
- Stil Passetti .
Office of Radiation' Control Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard
' Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Joe Myers, Director .
Division of. Emergency Preparedness
. Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive 1 Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100 Chairman Board of County Commissioners Citrus County 110 N. Apopka Avenue - i Inverness, FL 36250 j
- Robert B. Borsum B&W Nuclear Technologies 1700 Rockville Pike, Suite 525 Rockville, MD 20852-1631 I
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SALP REPORT - CRYSTAL RIVER 3 50-302
- FEBRUARY 20. 1994 - Sein t.riBER 16. 1995 I. . BACKGROUND
! The SALP Board convened on October 5, 1995, to assess the nuclear safety j i . performance of Crystal River 3 for the period of February 20, 1994,
. through' September 16, 1995. The Board was conducted pursuant to NRC j Management Directive 8.6, " Systematic Assessment of Licensee Perfomance. " Board members were Ellis W. Merschoff: (Chair >erson),
Director, Division of Reactor Projects, Region II (RII); Al'>ert F.
Gibson, Director, Division of Reactor Safety, RII; and David B.
Matthews, Director, Project Directorate II 1, Office of Nuclear' Reactor Regulation. - ,
The perfomance . category ratings and .the assessment functional areas
, used below are defined and described in NRC Management Directive 8.6,
" Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP)."
i II. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS - PLANT OPERATIONS
! This functional' area assesses the control and execution of activities
- directly related to operating the plant. It includes activities such as
- plant startup, power operation, plant shutdown, and response to
! transients.
L
!- Overall performance in the operations area during this SALP period has.
been good. The plant has been operated safely, with few transients and
. no reactor trips during the entire assessment period. The previous SALP also noted good performance in the area of. operations, with deficiencies occurring late in the SALP period indicating a need for improved management involvement and oversight. This weakness continued into the i current SALP period, with several significant performance deficiencies l
- occurring at about the midpoint of the SALP. Some bprovement has been l
! noted during the final six months of the period, due to a renewed effort by management to set and enforce expectations for plant operators.
Management has exhibited a good sensitivity to risk during this period, i through the application of an innovative on-line risk monitor, as well 1 as improved work and access controls to the switchyard. Additionally, industry operating experience had been effectively employed to assure
! industry lessons are applied at Crystal River.
a- ,
I Plant startup, . shutdown, and refueling activities, as well as routine
- operations, were well planned and controlled, with appropriate attention given to shutdown risk. Conversely, non-routine activities and disposition of abnormal conditions were not handled well, due largely to weak interfaces between operations, maintenance, and engineering; weak vertical communications;~and weak management involvement in day to day operations. .Recently, operations has exerted more control over the work
, control process and has enforced improved standards for planning and !
. procedures.
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Performance in the area of self assessment has been mixed during this l period. Audits have effectively used internal and external operatir.g experience to identify deficiencies. The line organization, however, has lacked an aggressive, focused effort to identify and resolve .!
problems. !
The Plant' Operations area is rated Category 2.
III. PERFORNANCE ANALYSIS - NAINTENANCE -
i This' functional area assesses licensee activities in the areas of" testing and maintaining plant structures, systems, and components.
Activities assessed include preventive, predictive, and corrective maintenance, as well as surveillance, post modification, and post j
- maintenance testing. ,
I Performance in the area of maintenance improved over the period. There were no trips caused'by equipment failures or maintenance errors. Few shutdowns or power reductions were caused U s.nuipment failures and few repetitive equipment problems occurred. The appearance and material condition of the plant were improved.
t Predictive maintenance and troubleshootinr, were effective. Techniques
- such as vibration ~ analysis, thermography, and oil cnalysis were used to identify degraded equipment so that it could be repaired prior to
~
! failure. Special instrumentation was being developed and a prototype L had been installed to monitor the performance of safety-related heat
- exchangers. The program for monitoring flow assisted corrosion
- continued to be used effectively to predict degradation of plant piping.
Time delayed reflectometry was used to identify grounds in electrical 1 systems.
Outage activities, both during'the refueling outage and on-line system l
- outages, were implemented well. Few equipment problems occurred
- following the refueling outage. Assessment of the increased risk j associated with on-line maintenance activities improved.over the period. )
L Reviews performed late in the period were thorough and the associated i maintenance was planned and controlled to minimize risks.
Procedural adherence, which was a problem during the previous SALP
- period, continued to'be a challenge this period. Failure to follow j- procedures resulted in valves being mispositioned, accumulation of trash,
- in the Reactor Building Sump, and improper equipment setpoints. Several instances of missed surveillances occurred due to procedure inadequacies -
and personnel errors. These resulted in the loss of a vital AC bus, failure to properly test relays, and inaccurate testing of diesel fuel oil.
The licansee completed a comprehensive self-assessment of the ,
maintenance program late in the period which provided valuable insights L into strengths' and weaknesses of the maintenance program.
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- The Maintenance area is rated Category 2..
- IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS - ENGINEERING l This functional area assesses activities associated with the design of-i plant modifications and engineering support for operations, maintenance, surveillance, and licensing activities.
! Licensee performance in this area, primarily in the early period of this i SALP cycle,.showed declining performance. Weaknesses were identified in j
the humanareas of (1) control performance of modifications, errors, and (4) quality(2)icensing of l submittals. management o I 1 Design engineering has been slow and, in certain cases, ineffective in 1 providing support to plant operations. Untimely engineering support
- resulted in physical implementation of modifications without supporting design calculations and without procedures to properly implement and-4 verify that the modifications would function as intended. Management j
, did not exercise adequate oversight to ensure that calculations were i based on sound technical bases and had received appropriate quality
- checks. The weak management oversight may have contributed to design
- discrepancies in establishing conservative design parameters and limits l
for plant operations. j Weaknesses identified this period were, in general, self-revealing or
, identified by self-assessment, and licensee actions or the extent of ;
corrective actions have been largely reactionary. Several of the ,
- licensee's -self-assessments and root cause analyses lacked depth. !
l Management of human perfomance issues was weak as manifested by lack of '
attention to detail which resulted in several design deficiencies and lack of quality in licensing submittals. .1
\
Licensee performance in the nuclear plant technical support area continued to be strong. Planning and coordination of on-line system outages have been conservative and effective. The licensee closely monitored equipment condition and initiated actions to resolve several long-term equipment . problems. These actions contributed significantly ,
to' good plant performance.
During this SALP cycle, several long-standing design deficiencies ,
emerged as safety-significant issues and the backlog of requests for
{ engineering assistance increased. This posed a significant challenge to the engineering area, and could have contributed to the weak l performance. The licensee consolidated its engineering staff at the. l site and integrated the Nuclear Plant Technical Support into the Nuclear l
} Engineering and Projects organization. This reorganization should result in improved interface between engineering staffs. The licensee
~
, also initiated corrective action programs and management processes to !
enhance human performance and reinforce safety attitude. l
[ - These management actions, which were implemented during the later part of this SALP period, are begi.nning to show improvement and are resulting
- i. -
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1 i in more timely and thorough reviews. The timeliness and quality of- ,
information submitted-to the NP.C show improvement. Organizational. and !
i interface improvements have resulted in improved interdisciplinary coordination. Continued management involvement will be required to minimize errors, control design processes, and ensure the ability of ,
! engineering to provide critical plant support. -
] The Engineering area is rated Category 2.
[ V. PERFORNANCE ANALYSIS - PUK SUPPORT l
This functional area addresses radiological controls, radioactive effluents, chemistry, emergency preparedness, security, fire protection, .
- and housekeeping controls.
- Overall, the radiological control program was effectively implemented.
- Personnel radiation exposures were well controlled during the period j with exposures significantly below regulatory limits. Site collective
- dose was as low as reasonably achievable. Management support of the As-l Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable program was a strength as evidenced by the implementation of several effective dose reduction initiatives. The radiation protection training program was-comprehensive in scope and in i
maintaining a high level of staff qualifications.
4 Chemistry and radiological effluent programs remained effective. An effective effluent control program limited effluents and associated doses to the public to a small fraction of regulatory limits. Good techniques were used in the collection, preparation, and analysis of effluent samples. Environmental monitoring demonstrated that plant
! operations had caused negligible impact to environs of the plant. ,
- Radioactive material was transported in accordance with regulatory i requirements. The licensee maintained an aggressive plant chemistry program to assure that system degradation was minimized.
l The emergency preparedness (EP) program continued to provide a high level of readiness to respond to events as evidenced by the licensee's l
- fully successful performance during an off-hours exercise. Licensee 2 readiness to respond to an emergency was further supported by a strong training program and good emergency response facilities. Continuing challenges for the EP program remained, however, in that the required EP
! program audit needed strengthening and some corrective action needed in i emergency facility maintenance was not completed in a timely manner.
1 l
The overall plant security program was effectively implemented. The i security program was enhanced significantly by an effective fitness for
. duty program with strong program audits, by proactive security officers
- who were effective in identifying abnormal plant conditions during facility patrols, and by the use of security professionals from other licensees on audit teams to strengthen an already strong audit function.
' Fire protection response capabilities were maintained in a good state of readiness. Maintenance of fire detection and suppression systems e
l 5 I provided good equipment availability. Effective self assessments l included weekly walkdowns to identify fire hazards and proactive '
identification of fire protection program deficiencies. Increased management oversight to ensure adequate fire brigade manning and to maintain fire brigade training status current would strengthen the fire protection program. ,
The Plant Support area is rated Category 1. !
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- onPonmoN B13) 866 433!.
N EW S- R E L E A- S E For more information contact:
Mark jsecos ,
(904) 563-4489 I
FPC NUCLEAR PLANT SUSTAINS "WORLD CLASS *' PERFORMANCE 4
CRYSTAL RIVER. FL (Jan. 19,19951-Fiorica Power Corporation's Crystal ,
River Nuclear Plant for the second consecunve year achieved "world class" l performance oy coerating at almost 83 percent capacity during 1994 and has averageo greater tnan 80 cercent cacactIV for tne tnree-year oeriod from 1992 to 1994.
The cacacity figure reflects the amount of electricity the nuclear plant produced compared with the total amount it could have proouced hao it operated at full power the entire year.
Strong and safe performance during 1994 reflects tremendous savings for Florica Power Customers. Every cay Customers save from $250,000 to $350,000 in lower fuel costs when the Crystal River Nuclear Plant procuces electricity at full power.
The 860 megawatt (million watt) nuclear power plant achieved its best sustained three-year performance since it began producing electncity in 1977.
"We are very proud of the plant's improved performance," said Dr. Pat Seard, Senior Vice President. Nuclear Operations. "Our world class standing reflects the hard
. work, codication, and first rate amilities of our staff.
"Sustaming Ine safe, legal, and efficient operation of our nucisar plant remains top priority as we ciligently work for continueo improvements in plant operations."
FPC's nuclear piant now ranks in the top third of all commercial nuefear power plants in America. Since the plant's refueling enced last summer, it has operated at essentially full power, or almost 98 cercent cacacity.
"To remain strong in an increasingly competrtive industry, we must maintain high proouction leveis for our nuclear plant." Bearo said. "Our 1995 plant production
- goal is 95 percent capacity."
Florica Power's nucicar plant is locatec on a 5,000 acre site at the Crystal River Energy Complex near the Gulf of Mexico in Citrus County.
Florida Power Corporation is the principle s'uosidiary of St. Petersburg based Fiorica Progress Corporation (NYPSE:FPC) ano serves 1.2 million Customers in central and nortnern Florida.
95-1 N
.-' _w cam =. ewm
THE TAMPA TRIBUNE '
DATE 2/12/95 PAGE I Citrus FOR YOUR INFORMATION MARKJACOBS F P C CORPORATE COMMUNICATIONS NRC says gq X mistakes
- F .
must stop .
By DEAN SOLOY
. Trmane Star! Wrteer .
CRYSTA1. RIVER - Federst Flonda Power and the NRC met ressusers are tattag Flortda Power la November to dise*e the cena Corp.'to test for recent renner mtp. caras, and the uttitty reopended by takes at its ancisar ptant that point enumag a Mm==y===w . Review to a troubling trund. Pamei to develop a plan to improve Cosspany officials and the No. performance. Though he wouldn't gigy gegunnuay ramm=aa will stM ePesaAss. c9mptay 9w*aem n Mart Jacobs said the penet came inset Marca i to discuss tas utullD Q #P with a number of ideas. The aan 80sWP ""' * ' r - "5 ' h*
pins to stop h eam W 73 ,,,,,,, ,,,,,, ,, ,,,,,, ,,,,
13e sais. 500fRS5ns sWered seraous.Jacobs said me utal-
- takes. In a IRS lOl' M tty takes thess sortounty. "We recog.
l~
pen. tener probierns. ,
mise the poseanni siganficance of l sammu protnema, becsame eyesciany calling for gg j the meetifts. ## ,1 suball problems become big prob-NRC Re- MSN C1. ARK , lamL" ' t j The NRC has given Florkta Pow- l gional Ad Nuoleer Reguistory ~
statstrator , , ,
er good marts the Ust several Stewart D. years for improvenients la operat.
- Eboeser en musumanumensmusammum 4 tes anclear plaat 114 too earty to closse a suggest the roosat problems repre-j twegase list of opemesnal errorf seer a desertoranon in opersnons.
- made over the past several teontbs. Qart said.
"These are by so menes maior l
i anfety prontains." and they han i
"tieste or ao Maa safety signif.
1:ssce." seu NRC speammuna Een j Qarh. But collectively, he said. they 1.dicate some 'setton needs to be 4 taken to reverse the tread.
-rtees types of events can be a .
preestser to amore sertous pr*
lema." Clart said. adattag. "At tids penet in time. they're not deemed to W to Crystal River."
la its analyses of the proldems at me plant, the NRC acted an in-czgese in hanoma erner and wash-assess la supervisten and ""M .
! esamt. The snamakes tatsdalled spr*
things as failing to perform re-quared servallance on ettmpment and mas repens late to the NRC.
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THE TAMPA TRIBUNE c#
, DATE 3N1/98 __
PAGE 1 Citm l
Reich OKs =wie R MPORATE Rgg,Ag
! back pay for l fired worker Dr DEAN SOLOV .
1 Trttuce saett weteer .
- CRY 3TAL RIVER - UJ. !.aeor $ecresary Rebert L'
Retts ses soprows em amasamuratw staeget neum. At a startag in May. Trttt asses for seerty 313.000 eneseos awase et 83.1H in hace pay to e =weasse. in sees meses nas Daemmat leet Me mano sement us to 880.0de se esassemessry eessages. tense.
niewerewee werees ter a centracter as Flertes Pu** tag Ge ferias rer a siew of perament preseems seat ne j er Cory.s aucteer esaL sete treegat samtasune ernes eteenses.
I ~ In a secasses setes T1ntreasy. Rama tan Aaminas, Rette. tae Jaases. retecise me arpesset estens
' tressie Law Juage Ameelf Jasses s 1994 evner sargefy **Trttr was act crease 6e oness as amenes met aos manges. kle greases Dougaas fritt - Area sa 1987 essaares sepmassaansy 20 esse prior as ans aest aest
) e a someerary stectricson wie Mest Ceemressere se weeas new werees esteer esesse er senseresses l gee, e trocuss et me swore he was sneenig Dog israses treesses se as safe." l
!' rereses Figers reesset to reneeseear tem queuesyi Tritt repremonene statsett fareg seest of the i
g3es,,, y, eens ama mas les year taat. at ses emer. near er.
Tlie easy casme was Retta's adenes of pmfeet nama M masamme, j
1 4
stemt tageres swee Trtet.1ressa essess add op to s eses: $1.700, seas Trltre Tasmes newyer. Leess D. Pet. I
- ser.
7te 83.230 le causpuessaassi for 30 asaltseems este i Tritt woese neve versas ans me met teos Area. Maser i ame reus pay 8035 la resetanusement for Triers ses.
, w+esamt essonom.
In asetuest Reheft instracted the lawyers to flgare west Petasy is swee la teen. see saae & pease will
! seeses etthe ese mese can't agen se a flgere. Amtet i amo etueres Meer to pour e caer er Aaseers seestos et see vers paese. serse Trues seressoas aan se re.
emesse to es ensemos aae see goes referensue ween fritt seerenes ser toes is me future.
Seessag Pensers toes unser west enve tas way rer i en a m m.
James erlier. a Tasmes leaner wee nas repre.
l I senese rhier se me ease. ass suas as cuent wut as. !
- pena la une lla U.S. Cisses! Caert of Appens la AI.
namen. He etene est se re amma for cosmesset Meesty.
Fluer fust sa espoet as see amassa esert aner Rettet lega fladees met Trtst and esem assouvetty fires. The court ma-am st. seytes a emetes't be flang unsal semases were estatemens.
Trtit.orgest Meer faret hast wenn as venema to go taas a- - -
area amor Meenen Power removes airmensaaring seassement tse esy
- essere womest esfertes sa ========== The Emarer fleerseensemos Act et 1974 preseas sceners at asene.
er power panels trem emog poemaea ser regnes salt.
ty teaterne.
i Pleer argoes tasm was se segummer amfety con.
term. ama Tylet was atos ser ressoas to west weere -
So was aangass.
i ln 1988. Jesses esses a ressammeanes ereer ta Pteers taver. Set Roses reeesses the anslag sa 1993 .
l aos etteres Jansen to setermans wnst Tritt was ew.e.
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UNITED STATES
/*'...==...**. -
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE O'F PUBLIC AFFAIRS, REGION 11
, ., / 101 Marietta St., Suite 2900, Atlanta, GA 30323
% Tel. 404-331-5503
. %+<* /
No.: 11-95-25 ,
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Contacts: Ken Clark / Roger Hannah (Monday, March 27,1995)
Telephone: 404-331 5503/331-7878 NRC STAFF PROPOSES $25,000 CIVIL PENALTY AGAINST FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION l l
The Nuclear Regulaton/ Commission staff has proposed a $25,000 civil penalty against Florida Power Corporation for alleged violations of NRC requirements at the Crystal River l nuclear power plant near Crystal River, Florida. I in a letter to the company dated March 24,1995, NRC officials said the penalty was being proposed because setpoints on several instruments were' not set conservatively with respect to the technical specifications for those systems, l
in a nuclear power plant, systems are designed to shut down the reactor if measurements l
of certain operating levels go outside assigned limits or setpoints. At the Crystal River i facsity, the NRC staff identified instruments where procedures failed to provide enough '
margin between where the instruments were left and the setpoint values required by the technical specifications.
The safety significance of the individual violations is low because the actual settings were !
not that far from the required values. However, the NRC staff is concerned that the process for setting the limits was ineffective. I The base civil penalty for this type of violation is $50,000, but the NRC said it was reduced to $25,000 because the company identified programmatic setpoint issues.
The company has 30 days from receipt of the Notice of Violation to either pay the civil penalty or to protest its imposition.
9
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qAs* CCN l Comorate Communications News 4
! Monday, Maren 27,1995 1
! NRC Announces P" 000 Fine For Setpoint Violations 1
The Nucinar Regulatory Comm:ssion (NRC) will announce a $25,000 fine against
- Florida Power Corporation today for violations associated with setpoints for safety
. related systemi at the Crystal River Nuclear Plam.
j .
The company will accept the violation and. pay the fine, accwiding to Dr. Pat
- Beard, FPC senior vice praaidaar, nuclear operations. The fine was reduced by
- fifty perces because the violations were self-idemifed by the company and then cd to the NRC.
! All setpoints related to this NRC action have been cotid. A s,.L.Jw I
action plan to evaluate other serpoims, and maice adjuurmams if necessary, has been developed.
l l These setpoints autommeicmily and safely shut down the nuclear plant when j operating conditions reach certain limits. Simply stated, the violations and fine i stem from not having enough margin between the setpoint and the operating limits
- contained in the plant's cuwishaa*ive Tarknimi Spaciffearinns. This resulted in !
. 1egal non-compliance. !
\
i The safety margm is determine
. click on Bucetm Soarns' men on ' CON *'ana then open tne newest rnessage under Subject.
T11E TAMPA TRIBYNE DATE .u18/95 PAGE 1 Citrus #
t ' W, t' a '
ICRYOUR1" REl O MARK JACCES FPC CCRPORATE FE' C3
! Utility offering reward Utu. .ty seeking after apparent sabotage instmation By k5kAN 50LOV M to ustomers 2 ine Demn &
sponSIDie can ce cauant au forcec to pay 5h hi Tribune stati Wnter da-es. Jacobs sata.
CRYSTA!. P.!VER - Fior::s Power The rewsro wouta t:e paid from snare- m h the last m'*
Corp. :s offenns a $50.000 rewarc for Infor- holder profits. ja ,,m
- nstson iencing to the conviction of an ao- "Te re not ca!!!ng tais saDotage Decause
- on the m me parent $3Doteur wno idled a cosa plant for at could have oeen an unintennocal act. We four weens. Just don't know." Jacobs saad. He acsatowl.
M N for h of 6 The 469 megawatt plant was out ,cf ser. edged. thougn. the meinent appears to have - me 6 The m a me plan, m
' e Jan. 25 througn Feb. 23 at a cost of been miennonal. has been in opermatos stnes 1989.
ty $3 milijon. Someone staced a for. Jacons, wno ans worked at tne unlifT posed no threat to worsers or the a r .atenal into n tunncating oti system. nearly 10 years. saan if it 3 smootage, then g yg g ,
utility sposesman . Mark Jacons said Moo- it's "one of the more sign!!! cant cases in myone vna huon is i dOy. The matenal was detectec througn . company fitstory. asked to e % W Sm-isborntory analysts. As for the reward. "I don't belleVe ty Joks Panam a m Repairs ran aoout $400.000. waaie the weTe ever done tats before . . certamly e*
added cost of replacement fuels was $2.5 i, militon. e said. The cost will be passed See UTILITT. Pate 2 4
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N 0 W S R E I- F AS
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I PPC Corporate Relations Department
Contact:
! mora.ne j (304) 583 4483 (Officel ;
j (904) s37 3528 (Homel j
l FLORIDA POWER COOPERATES WITH NUCLEAR REGU a
Crystsi River, FL (July 24,19951 ma rida f"ower Corporation is coo l '
with the Nucient Requistory COi. ..uion during an NRC review of croc i
l at the Crystal fUver Naciser Mont d d in September,1994.Thl pissedures and NRC requiremems when they con ucte un l Power identified the violation, reported it to the NRC, and took cGJo
)
l prevent recurrence.'The manegament of the Crystal River Nuclest Plant regre l
occurred because they do not reflect the comp l Seard, senior vice pr :sident, nuciser operations.The contmi roo l absence with pay pending the outcome of PPC and N The four other control room operators were l
responsibitttles after the incident.
i reessigned to other shifts. All of the corrtrol room operator j were counseled by management.
! the September 5 incident, were advised ofh the l
l nuclear plant.It is not approortste to publicly discuss the detafia about t l
and PPC completes the review of this case. However, as soon as Florida Power Coiw.. den management officists l Merida Progress Corporation (NYSE:FPC) and serves 1.2 rnils i and northem Rorida,
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test wasn t T* -. t hglii authorized m *"- e r 5# *I
- lared calcu[.tu,',e7 **
ha J gj 5" a Workers whoconducted the-0 nuclearplanttest.which [f",",,,I h
- a
,tme== eammi.h between regulators $aydidnotitnpeni ****"*'*
' j
- 3" the tank.
the public,are put onleave. *#kers concluded that l
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' the ****"** IN8iB at which the pump i
[
sy JonaE SANCHE1 Imman--seur e t ,,o,,, g'd,,, =rt ==r es
% W 4 : cated.
j CRYSTAL RIVER - Fcur Merida Durms the test, the J
- Power Corp. employees have been % between these two
! placed on paid lesves of absence while *mtoutsideseneptake ~ '
officals review an unauthorned test the as l workers concocted at the nucisar plant. , sounded.NRCr%
e pump misht not ha,e l
in addition.Fionaa Power nas trans. ,g during the test, wideh
,] ferred two supernsors mvolven in tne jaated 35 nanntes.
- case to jobs outade the plant's contros W
- er'7 Lanes og73,o [RC'
%e company conceoes chat, in con. Atlanta office, g, ducting the test. the four workers sute was that operstata int i ) jected equipment to conditions that vic> war outside gudelines.
i p lated Fione Power operating proce. "Wepraecinavert,ts,,
j deres as wed as Nuclear Rermatcry ance with NRC re Consensmon sindelines. Her j
- R B
oth Morsia Power and theg'saodenen,,tnia*g r-sore. 2.co,e se,,, ,,
Nucleartorr mg wi,Y PFC - -e % ~
separate reviews of the test, which oc. take action agames the i
f p t curred in Septeinber. He four workers '**'n workers. Jasshe 8
ne e j
i g gji !
were control recen operators, accordmg to Flonds Power spokesman Mark Ja.
cobs. He sasd the nulity company was semor pia.: ,,,,,,,,ajee proceduras with the tem *5 ""8 control room wortere g
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cooperatiost with the NRC. "*t **ohd in the tesang.
na NRC said the violation mvolved .
g a pressurssee tank that. durmg an emer-g'he I the NRC deaugen g, four. sanetsona could b g/ J gency, feeds water to a pump that floocts nas and suspensen.
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3l en g,
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the reactor veneel shtuid more ccramat be reqoited.
Rease see Trst Page 3 j g },
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incident atnuclearpowerplant % %,,,_ .
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E'lorida Power Corporation is cooperating - ssion nselly witas a federal Nueteer Regulatory Conrrnr. . decides topuntsh tbe
- Consmission review of procedural vlotations N#I##o/rporrt storkerz sarnctions that occurred at the Crystal Rirer Nucient .
PlantlastSeptemtser. ;
That was the word Tuesday from Mark J: cobs, spokesman (br the power plant, who i
said he was thalted in his response to reported '
i
.cioistless "beesuse the isseee is still mader between the water level and the igdrugen pres- i reviewbythe NitC" sure in the tank because they thought florida l
'Jacobs said the company acknowledges con- Power engineers' calcuistions were wrong 8 l 1 :>l rooms operators vietated plant og They found the calestations didn't accurately , ,
p.eceduses and NRC sv<pdreneents they depict the water level-hydrogen pressure ratie at which Die pumpwould antwont. ' ,
condmeted immuthoriaed tests 1I months ago.
- Public safety was not at risk, said Kerry During their test, alarias sounded, sisualing . l Landts of tie NRCs Amanta etEce.1he big cose. the tank was outside acceptable parameters. .
8 cern was diet operasers hdestionally went out. They allowed the experiment to cuetinne for 35 >
minutes whiletheycollecteddata .
sidegeMellnes Had a real einergesicy occurnd during that 1he NitC seid the vietation irevolved a tank time, an important essergency peep usigitt not. :
ssed in an esnergency to feed vester to a posep keve worked,theNRCsaid. j that weidd inlect the water into the reactor ves. Florida Power identified the violation, set if there was a problemi wine the melant sys.
test Please sw N, Pagm The operators tested the relationship t A .
F
= . . . . _ _ _ - _ . . . . .
ale, Florida Ptruer amenagers wNt be denL 1he fear other coalici rcon sper- aveEshle tD asswer'GerGeorgeestleet. f refled the cosapany's stendInst com. seasswerereessignediocitershlen If the NRCideeldes'to pouleti the inNament to complete ensepDance of f ses. sed N RC All of the eestret roose operweers sesseet seems weetmas.===h== eundd plant operathig levolved ha sIse facident were cessen-
- c ' 'i==_~ Dr.Patteerd, sealer seled by aseenesessent.Jacu8s seid. Aand InsteileIhnes andsuspenseen.
IN.C...
vleepresidesd.asefear "r est 'Ete NBC Inst etted Florida Power I cmwan dpom eqp.14 Jacobs said the esmeral rooms opera-h W la One Septa all ether coatset roese Imeldous, Corp. k W epuetten of me tors hsw been gdseed so set were advised of the situsiles byd seuler .d . Crystal.Bleer=Mut.t.est , e.a . e. Pla Jacobs explaimed it to the tretive leave of absence weds pay pemi- to escarately caNbrate .
^ re. sysur EltB P6RC,',
, , , ' " ' " " * * ~ met test Move & se e i., o,e e.ieon. of rec ,,,d NRc pia.t me.sgers who ,es.g eed reviewsofGeeesse terrect plant operettag ,._ _ _ _
og4 mess.
pemThe Aeoeciated l
The two centrol roora sida supervi- alleta condueHag tests et the sosteer "The manageaient of the Crystal .on were reassigned Is neeHiestrel plant.- s.- ..u .. . ann as it is aggressi. Pressseusseedm#feesport.
--- __-__--____.-_---a - - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ .
ANN FOR YOUR WFORMATION l DATE 7/29/95 PAGE 1 Chrus MA:E JACOBS
, FPC CCHPORATE RE.ATIONS Ignored warnings prompted .
~
4 test. nuke plant worker says
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i l By DEAN 50LOV Asap.sre rst vsol.stsons 5 From Page1 l Tribune staff Writer j lf Sere were a m37A1. RIM - W at h ,The
, , , ,insomung
, , , , , , , o,m,,n,oir
,, ,,,,,,, asaaram
_ vesseens ,,,,,,, , 3,,, ,,sorteus
, , , , accduas
, , , , , , , , , sa-3 da Power Corp.'s sectar plaat faded for buummuseman merenumlessto snes ser asser.
i more than a year to carrect calcalansas Planes Pmmer Cors.:
!' that could have reamered as emergnacy 5mmmm Van $1cklen believed the rano
! ptsay asseems, despete a enuma room open. ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, - 6 m by me w
- tar's warams that they were wmus,2e eneses essesy gissonnen. wue wreas. that duggung tan sener j operstar smad in newff releases doenemmes, gg,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,y,,,,,,,,,,
1 Met k me unkweed act asm me The operstor. Mars van sicklaa. was , ,,,,,,,,, , ,,, ,,,,,,
etBact es ayutregas pruusmas tant en-
- pus on osaa leave test wesemos for as role l wamer nouse enn nyasagen creeswa e ne gaaeus pmencied, ated cosed remit j- sa conaucting a test in Septecater that. ' rnenauetenu. J la one of the pussps anteng.
- proven the enginees wrong out violases a none siese simsvamammummine ciri I
Asarais miemmed k me aimum i Safety rules. womes ein tummer soures ter an emesgenor l rosas wage thof tened the hypotne.
4 "We've been havlas secteur sadsey eeI> pues ensues se sumonos som a census -
ses. but 1emenad of taktag maps to l corns - rae. personedy - eunes aheet May tensi to tne mesmar ansmang nume.' braag tae tsat premman enes wuna
- of 1993." he told funcinar Regatasary Com> 5 And tinarrest guesamme mense nave l safary guadalenas, the NRC said, me j nusunos mvenuseners m a Decommer tasar* messes omne ssenses se see us opermees casumund h guter eaa.
J W. emesgeser pumme sia mannerinet De wmas cdedeness pued me J *! kept sotag up termest my masess. watas nur novo guenanmes snam a ;
i As, wasca taas to engmeerugs and we've usessewaaressassy sgomover.su had different occamens titrengsels me year wwe suo saamerestupmet Westitcast threat a paine misty i j
{ gg boemmes of cabaremerguacy encamp that I've genes seguiner week me eagneers symmens a the phus, tae NRC man.
- "8'""
aa sand he spearseeded the superviser Dawla A. Fields and assammat 1
- Sept. S test a fear asys aser leerums the saIR supervoor Robert P. Wein move not. selves esseus a set an bruegat I l engineers apparessty were steeklag with knee Merres, as: Atlanta lawyer repet-
! semigas me groep of four. sand if his caeum them omede shty 6 l thetr r*ir-nemeta==
! he NRC sand tne tem appears to nave did anytasms wrwas, a wemst w-s as A Jaty 7 NRC report tisand four !
i been an tatannomai violenna of messy rutan. the NRC clahma. Aderra send - as Van Sieg. apparent vicentless and sesd they f j aae a commeersag flalog me St. Peterusery, lest ama $lesert did ta theer nazarviews - 8tSant "31gBIficam weamaammer* In J benen untity. The assacy amo a commeertag the test was =====e.=a was approval of me ""*"1**"a=s ability to resetve i the unusnal step of tantas acusa aguant sua supervuurs. Richara Henarscks. an At- Prettems. It also crustaand me each
$ Van Sickten and' tan five operators wee laman astermey repressenas Fleids and neers for taesr strars and1steing to
. worsma wie him. all of whom Flartaa Pow. Wehn. deelemas casamiem. recosmza tanut
! er put on leave. At temas are the mistanta== for the re- la Ina inservissa, me fear sand j Transcripts frein separate intarviews !!c between wuser leved and hydrogen pres. they woeMat nave tamed the curve i j was four of the sig - Vem Sicklen. Jack ss;t in me plaart mateep taat, ne taas had toy tarwa K was s W ha-
, Dendar Stewart Jr. Chrktsa Smith and weeld prevede weser to one of three angs- ses curve"- faames a was ceassa.
< Jamm Dosas Ah-have been Ende N II$eutes peep teint cesad he temas are8theDeE3 M as m j pabile. Tramournpis of latermer wat ehtB and should be adaared to stracity.
< gge pg,Ayy, pag, =
1 J
)
.a .s a.
- r use wasners. That's because the TSI instatistion manual they were using aid n 3-j nuts and bolts.anc bolts, but Titus saad the iurors felt it was just " common sense" to u i He said almost everyone on tne jury had experience wnh a home improv washers witn nuts anc bolts. Also, tners was tesumony that althougn it was left ou TSI did in fact use wasners. Titus saad.
Finally, he saus. there was some tesumony snat m the Sanois tests the fl
- touched the Thermo-Lag. 'They were broiling it. ramer than oaxing it." Titus said .
i "If TSI knew tnat a biggnr furnace wouid give it different rautts and nocony else k i
supporteo sand. the government's case. But everyoody knew mat you can't use a toas i Tam =nny soout confusion m the industry at the time over wnst was reouired by i should be usan also seemed to sway thajury. ** People did make the conu else in ene whole industry is equally stuity. " Tiuas saut.
i j Sdit the jury's innocent vernact took some delibesnuon. Titus said he and about f
! jury initially wenied to convie.t TSL but not Feldman on the charges. !
However. ne said the jury interpreted the judges instrucuens. given just prior to{
say that the jury could not convict one of the defendants without convicting the othe
(
2 deliberanons. the jury sent a aose to Judge Deborah K. Chasanow asinns fo cosmet TSI ano not Feldman. Titus said the judge's response was to re-read h j took so mean "no." At that point. they ceaseo pursumg the aussuon oiconvicung TS juror were noiding out for a convicucn of TSL but in tne eno yielded to the maiorttv.
! .-DavadSsa#faur. Washmgson !
I 1
4 NRC'S 01 PROBING EVENTS SURROUNDING UNAUTHORIZE:
NRC's Office or invesaganons :O!) is proostig pa, l 1 violanons by Florida PowerCorp. (PPC) resseor 1
operstars unit was runnmg. tRos) who conducted unauthorized tests m the Crystal River-3 control w room{
- . l 1
1- the hydrogen pressure of the unit's maks.up tank (MUTl .
! FPC sposesman Mark Jacoos declined to comment on the nanare of the improper c pnmde details of the pg, I' j
.I violanons. He noted that the incident first occurred on WS.!
that the unlity is cooperaung fully with NRC Invesugators. Crystal River-3 is an 868
- PWR which began commercial operemon in March 1977. l The MUT. a 4.488-gailon capacity tank. serves as a recetver for reactor coolant sy i return. enemical addition. and system maze.up. FPC saad in a Maren i licensee event repo 3 incident. It acts as a surge tank to accommocate small changes in'RCS volume an running tne maxe.up water pump.
1 Durmg normat opersuon. the MUT receives vta spray at the top of the tank RCS ma absorbs hydrogen trom the tank chamber ano removes dissolved oxygen from sne j Thissaid.
utility is me primary way FPC controis dissolved oxygen concentranon m the RCS
~
s j
1 break loss of coolant accident (LBLOCA) the high' pres
the LER stases, any cooling weser from the LPI in the arma r:ontaining the break would .
Accormag to the LER. plant connot room ROs. suspecung the MUT hydrogen pr ,
i- curve was snaccurate. conduced a maks-up and purificanon system " evolution" to get data i
of lisaitthe MUT for the hydrogen pressure compared with the level of water in the tank. Th component.
The ROs. the LER stanas, thougnt at the time that the evoiutiors was bounded b i: anos, but stauoned an RO at ths MUT vent header and added another RO in the contro
'!he RO conducung the evolution anucipseed and subsequently connnnes, that h into the unacceptable opereung region of the curve.
~ The ROs raised the MUT weser level to a high limit sespost of 86 inches an pressere in the MUr to the limit curve the LER atates. As the MUT waser level was d sospoint of 55 inches, the hydrogen pressure was observed to move mio the uri=e===*
stansa. "At the 35-inch MUT levet, hydro' gen pressure was coserved to be 1.7 psig (pounds ,
4
, - - - - - - - - c- - .- ,,amm e n .. .- ~-em * -
d
- ~ ;
/ .
1 i
gaugej preamre greezershan that alloweo by tne MUT pressure limit curve." The antiry noteI 1
- ' thes vented the MUT to within the accentacle region of the MUT pressure iimit curve.
^ The operators set an intenm MUT hyorogen operaung curve on Seeismeer 9. requring personn T manuma pressure at 2.5 psig neiow me 8 psis curve piam operators had relied os for soie operemon. an new MtTT operaung curve on January 31. the LER states. However. on Thy 2 plant officials desertma ,
l '
- that the new curve and the mienm curve were cassa on an assumpuon that did not conespon emergency operaung proceoute guicance ano nesoed to be recalculassa. ,
4 la hindsight. the LER states, a management review of the ROs' acuon Sepameer $ desernused that th evolution perrormea consututed a test, which requaes a oedicatea proceoure and review under 10 CFR i
"n n-t said the non conservsusm m the MUT pressure limit curve resulted from incorrect 4- uaes used in calculanons establishing sne curve, and a lack of unaarstancing by plant engte i uous personnel that the curve was actually a cesign basis limit curve instead of its intended use as an ad j trouve curve. wedch should provice opermang marps from the design pass, the LER semes.
j In a July 24 statament. FPC saxi it acknowledges that Crystal River.3 consol room opere j, operenng procoeures when they conduced the unauthonzed tesis, and that uuhty has taken correenve anmoes to i prevent the incident from happemng again, "The managernent of the Cr/stal River nuclear plant regrets these vioiamons occaned becum
' recess the company's steadfast communent to comp 6ete .~...yL of plant opersong procedurwa and NRC regulanons." said Pat Beeni. FPC semor vice prendent. nuclear operanons.
j Besse nosed that the convoi room operators who autnonzad the tests have been placed on a p
=^====s-
.! - uve leave of absence penmng the outcome of the O! prooe of the maner. Two Crystal River.3 control roo
" opere ors have osen reassigneo to non-contros room resconstbilities: iour other control room operato 4 reassigned to otner stuits. anc the remammg control room opertsors present opnny tne event were senior management. FPC said. All otner licenses reactor opermors at the plant were appraised of the smi l by ==aagawwat. which . ...y.
zec the importance of following plant procedums. FPC said.
i INRC sources who reviewed the LER detailing how the Crystal River.3 Ros impsopeny eaarherad said that they believe that NRC will likely to cite FPC with a level 2 violanon the secana most severe viola os a four-level scale. with possible fines up to 580.000.
i
)~ [ One source noted that NRC Region II Adamistrator Stewart Ebnerer has taken a person maner and has discussed the event with the reactor operators wno authonzed the inappropnate
{ s unfp_,g -meham a. zwnsar, wasmgam
' SHUTDOWN RULEMAKING UNDERGOES STAFF REVIEW; DECEMBER PUBUCATION SET
! NRC staff have subenised a proposed rulemaking on shutdown conditions to semor managanam i_
review. the scarf is seneduled to bneithe Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguares in October en the r worked rulemasung anc to go out for puolic comment in Decemoer. ;
The puolic comment pened will be the secono for the proposeo rutematung. which has oeen un in senest since 1992.
According to Wanen Lyon of the reactor systems oranen of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regula j second comment penod was seemeo necessarv since the rulematung has enanged so substanually s
. first puolished for comment in October 1994.
l, The new proposea rule only addresses snutdown operauons, while the ongmal p..,ys.4 rule also j low power consitions. Lyon said. Most of the enanges to the ruiemakang stemmed from "signancant f fram indusury." he added.
"Prealdy. I don't think we had looked at it well enough from the licenses point of view." Lyon said. A
, tionally, he nosed. when the proposed rule was first pathshed the staff hadn't had the advantage of the shesdown PRAs (probabilistic risk assessments: its contractors performee on Entergy Opersoons Inc Gulf and Virgunta Power's Surry pianas. -
i -
3 The soworked rule is espected to leave plant technical specifications uneaa-had but regare licensees to ,
i incorporass their responses to the mie into their penedic updates of plant Final Safety Analysis Rep b Acconhas to Lyon. the language of the rule itself has been reouced from several pages to less The Reguissary Guide has been rewrmen as well.--David Srellfaz Washsngson
. HOPE CREEK OPERATOR ERROR LEADS TO LOCALIZED CORE BOluNG While onohng down the rescer earty last maash for an umpiaaned massements outage, ope Servios Elemenc & Gas Co.'s (PSE&G) Hopt Creek nneropony reducen cooling water flow tu t it to boil in some areas wrule the unit was in sanadown inode.
camps M.E.C.-4ason s.1995
niE TAMPA TRIBUNE 5"jo ya "="
DATE 8/2510! PAGE .1 Focus on Florida FPC CORPORATEREATIONS ,
Workers fired over testing at i nuclear plant l By DEAN SOLov Trlha se dtati W rtter CRYITAL RIVER - Florida Power Corp. firma l two aussear piam operators IVedassesy and pu11ed 1 tan scammes at two emers for consacans as nasatao.
rtud test a year age.
M cGa' 00m were given .6 for ther 7tde in the tem, watch uncoveres fanity ens- -l acertas evinM*=**aan that conid have readored sa sEIREWemy pens taaeerande in a senses secansaL l
The su opesanoes were pm on pass lasse last - ;
maask. N Nutteur Regulanary Canansmen is tureen-tiesstas the incadent aan comM !!ae florsda Power.
Deste A. Fields the sadst supe"vser on diuty and oma of two stras. took r=afin==nsuaH9y T13y3g37, W ha autnarttaa the test sect. $. ne five operames 1rno l
- reportes to j
him "have been sever *Y 64 Lost in the entire Q$ discussion is the factthat I ammanssa.- the operators' coricorris j **I am Werg ygtigl[. 99
, ver7 diasp-j pm*='ad that - Ossed A. Pleists
{ Flertaa Pow. stIIt seaperviser
- er Corp. has i
takaa tasse careerhendtag actless agatant sagdoyees was cary
! Womand to h mat the plant was betag oper-3 aded ta an unumps insamer." Fleids sand. "IJim ta the
! taltre disenates is the fact that the operstars* con-l amas were vand.-
[
He anc casemaand the tant because they beneven lausumassam a***=aa== were wrees aan could have l !adt the emergemey punsp assess.
l Ha operusers **=n==v=d tha *af===es' data by
! losertag waner levede ta a tant that feeds the pnann la an emeramany. nat stonesed assety sedannes saa set att alarnis. The NRC later smad the operators were corroes sad the casasances were cdumment.
i Da NRC send the een gemas no eruns to the
- pehnt. bat is concursed tile age ==mam apparsetty de .
esame a. .ame - -
y7- rme W ab M M IM thS M 8""A8"A**'***
- wee a pinse for years.
In addities to Fleida. samusant shift superviser Returt P. Welus was fired.
i M two cadef opermours. Mast Vem sicdeles and l Jast DeMar $tsuert Jr. had tastr federai liceaues -
damestrated, insamens the St. Pseurusurteamma uttitty sertppen them et maar amanty to run tas Crystal River i pemmt.m two may be rummmened to seer taas at tha l i phER. Bald Sudest Enyara. mer seen repressusuave.
Es seat the maten well ala a sesevassa.
l *1t'k toetssa." Empus sud at taa acneas. -!!'s
, met smaa. persed. Ira saams no same me wiens inme-agen." l Chrbuttne Sakk ama Jamma Themes Atattsson, the i two was recouvet the drenmag sows wtti futurn to I their fehs. Envare saad.
Flertaa Power spessamma Mara *Jacces asas te
- a. - . , - -
. . . . - , , , , c ,,-, ~ , ,-- - ,
4 FOR YOURINFORMATION i ST. PETE.RSBURG TIMES umacons FPC CORPORATE REATIONS j Date 8/2!95 Page 1 Citrtss I
1 Florida Power workers i
discipi'ned i "?- T " " * " = Then=*r nerem attbe DiscipHnad l CRYSTA1. RIVER - Flarnia. Power .,,,,,,i l Corp. has maammed sixworsars won wun undearixmeridant l j a ,es,ed in ea. -==v sa n-nehan-i amie, wasthatworiters " "'I' "I" h 8h' "'k- l ty tes at the enusesy's nummer past m . . Entm
""-"" - 3_7 brQKe 3
4 W Rf,w. manhas to paperwars filed. warheenan% bstum.the damparvumminumano.
2 Thusseur wah the indessi Naamar Rasmis- safetyrules,the aar ==, ""' amineraquemamer no j gas.y Commmmmmma.
, rm sed frma verhai gpa I Immmmareinveistintmmmedsimums m , n' - " . - to so ed. r===* mhaw.
i to h casemmaman acosamman -- 3a75. N pump asar not have Publicsaierywas w win g l Roger Hamman amuL _oreen dunas.the t.m i Neither ths - nor Flan,n.a notattisk. laned35 nummes.ths-
! Power waaid say how many warums were
- l fired and how many Tecumves h disci. N'comumaness med is July phna. thatthetems didmetpass apublie
! Finada Power womid not raiemme the amier thren. N mer amanum
! employees' names out of comumen ice their was that opnemuus nummesumily 4 I
pnvecy, a commmere amid. ,
wat ammula gedaimes. '
} m Nacisar Ragskamry f- is At that tems. Fluida Power
- -- 6aremsaassaman
- w,mweithamadams. spahnamen Medt Jasshs and. the l But It appears that with this ame and canapany pracused "verhaum i estiier esforts. Flacids Power has reanised ea-e..- " with compmar and l
its and of theimmagska. g,g,,,g ,,,g,gg,,, g,, ,,,i,,,
The memimme ommerad in plants..
i when warzari smi amourvoors aSeptember.
the pimus's Hemidtheawomidmac
- l. contrai room mustmanity lowstua sus pres- allow **davinnon wahmut formai
! sure made a womwask.affidnis sud. pressaare."
- mtwaaris demenad to flood theruso. Shertir after theimmiset,two tar coesrai vammei. wimsk is waare rammen. mquervaars were tramissed to tive masanals are omrud in a nueiner samura- joka cursuis the piant's commd
' tar. m waser would dames aser fire that room.
reamitad frein sa nomises or unmi-p Meanwnila. the four control I h tantwasdemissed to disila raen w'-= were pissedaspad
. . s ,e i.,eis at wish the pump #nge not leaves at ahnames.
i fumenna. Fleemia Power asemeses had antab. Flamin Powerammemed amuser 11abad these levels, which comentand the plus mammems to ammme geme>
r.a-e'a===4 between hydressa prename and demus with tha summentag emmust rose w ahmus wen v ue aus in.
Messe ese M % 6 veinedin the ammag,Januhsamid.
l P1erkia Power andSad tha
-en11mmedermiles die.
assumer
- Hamsak amid. He addedthatthenamemamawaname
. ruumrod to incimin the ammes ed j .
. the employees a quemma i
l i
nn,, - --
THE TAMPA TRIBUNE ;
om 1o,1,,o viez 1 ctrxm , g
- ,iai K, Woman i
/,Lf says she -
3i, "
- was fired illegally % ,1 Nuclear plant roofer accused sy DEAN 50LOV l Trtmose statt Writer CRYSTAL RIVER - A Dennes. WWam housa. seer tae h los woman nrod by a contrac:ct tion of Michtet McEasay. Se at Flonda Power Corp /r nuchar company's preendent and cidet es.
eseave of8 ear. one of James'so, plast fHed a federal whistleblower cotoptalat asamst tne roonat com- ga ftred aer. Pebssy mid- i
tastead of disalpitatas (the pay. cr,wg igey firea her for esta$ W Tracy A. James claims Prttis-i McEnany Inc 2 Tampa fooftas jois 13e towyer seul.
csecrector. illagnuy fttea ner Oct. The fasagy Rensgestsettes l 11. Est attorney. Taaspa lawyer g gg 1374 pasecewarmerset at-Lamas Patney. mailed her cofaa placet f!983 betas plaint nennay to the US. Labor w reperms seisty ese- ;
l Deparanent and the Nuclear Ree-i utstory ^"" -
1 McEnany cosAd nu be rocked i James was fired hears after for cosassent. j notify 1as Florica Power secanty i
' .that amotner Prttt>McEaasy em- Accordial to Pelsey. James pteyse vietaten safety rules, the consplannen to Ykser sarmandes.
comptaint says. Tne compistat Florida Powers nameer sadety l sesas damages, but doesat specify concerse . % ~ and te 1
? as amosat. esecurred taa firens v6eisend folk Jaanes. stven securtty clear
- erst law. The aume day as see Ar-l
" same by tas unuty.was kirse Ael- lag. PWaey esad.13e uditty ia*
l
- 14 by Prttt>McEnasy to serve es a forsted tas connesear of Sarasa-l fire.weam and securuy escart, me des's openson. and McBassy then l f
esemplaint says. ta6d her that she's meAted but l taars set ammeseabia."
os oct.11.she and nasmar es, James dessa's went tile ph j- cart wwre overseelas a reenat hees. Pussy east. !a itsst of taa
+
crew of senet people at a budstn8 aheusve leasmes ses suggette,ses la the nuclear camePam-The crew ja coacmesed wortners weeld reesh-tan been uncasperettu to James,
! ass,heesma.
mesias rues and sezeity esp 5 cts l
remeras. Pines.y sets. '"!bere was ,
a lot of assant terummenttype of 1 I
heksyter.laEnid.
' About 10:54 a.m ese of the seven sinned te waneer edLJannes repensesty tend kiin se remus. Set he refamed. Secartty was eaMed.
aan tne egetsyee was adehme out et the plaat after curseus at James, the contpaast says. Ac- ,
corassa to Putney. tae rest et the '
-===r **** wamaa ett me los to-j % e, re
~ - . . . . .- .-,
-, ...-.- . - _ _ - _ - . . . _ _ _ = . - _ _ _ . _ . . .
l s 10-1G-1995 C6 s aar-r, rear, v.isse ;myg, gitqgg et, ya :..e4 ng g;gg ,,gg
, ,s.o.e . .. . . . .
~ =.@ ""*" l '7MW Y.. .
1 FaxTransmitta! Memo
- K iuda. '~&Em [. /l " " i l
us;; - c,W u4s
,,,, ,,,,s. ,ec, .
tv=-. % Co=== ,D=== ]cm-e 1
!4 THE TAMPA TRIBUNE MR YOUR t% FORMAT'.01 4
DATE 10/14/98t PAGE 1 CITRUS MAAK .;Acots 4
PPC COMOPAT1PELAct5 Nuclear plant improves ,
3 An official evaluation of 1 the piant's perfonnance is ,
j scheduled Oct. 31. l l .
as osAN set.ov
! Tretese 6edi Wetter i CRY $'TAL RIV 1
Car. se,s m .ER. m.*=. Fisnee re.e a Peser re.
- ie- -e e,seere ~ ~us. Nuke plant doing , pretty good,
, - , e.
m,te , - . e see - ..e.
casmus was me Weseear asemamm. e 75== enes a mes mer esse =ee esas immesamt i fy Cefamines adne Florle Peeer fast manygetslee 6 SF G W i . to sensmas ses stans of Ise sautr's of- '""
fers to suomse speseelemh it 1ses one M , M,* 1 Sm M,, ,,m, ,, g,,, '""'e"e'n"ge"se'r"s'o'n'e'
- s ag gm **a"etsanssa.
1 in a series et maassnes enere ese super m. I j tas esasames la e6eme pena e amneaar N 0 I
pereurmasse of permummet,
. at me samt. ,,fte ,,,,,,,,,g,,g, spesessen were,gr,o,sse , , , . elet l
!
- Plant pertersatase appears to be Es ease meestest seen es the bet the seem vielse8 WIE l'RC I pseur seus overen. som sessen a 33 ene Prten, peweise a eneses ser one guesumes nas, se essmer nues. ore. j 4 emur. seesmagemoder et Reges II, cessa petite to mesener the suminosa een same as amasseems enIIW ftS et We ,
names as me h Delame damast temps Flenes Pseer legersees als 36est sur a trial saa.
, get wede tBe roguestore assunse persernames, see he essassesse its pSAIS the en htague wee I i , pleases weta preereas se fer. taee .rbe papale se esisme men. ggy ,epeates errors to selsgrutaas j esses a emas reeer to est east es one The opermente sessmente less safespeessass etesosaaeb lacreases scretur.
i *To tent weet to sies see essa.-
i sese Saat of. Messuess. GNeeger et fees.
i ter gestems a 18e NRC4 repsett edBEe 1
i te Aasensk '
', The NRC es om.31 etalgrammsas i ellient 88easeAsa et plRES Smetrummet over me pass is samas, stessar ease i
ne aguels S 9FW temes' FIseles Peo.
l tr5 Woesses set aans sedest tas emetyg eggereue reessemang.
I Deus see seen year. pesetens at
! We pass asse esem a $3BJs0 Ilse ese en esmemmes ses a sesmans amm.
4 angerent temaeus as agganger 134.
TesNBC M S mI M We80 IN h SteE W emmasogn op.
aggre esseemes amusineses tesuk 34 A6 4WD 950feIIe Were Stret toe eene see mest assammes rossaan ene WB5e m tesWWWerues m Oma et meus dised enumne mas so.
s puster Astun F. Weem enemmes Pvt.
. M Pestle useIIe5 etssWS Seteus sumamemme amese wenn me samese was-itsee saa. Es test a few seems ese seemeures e assoas er names as eery
! asta me emmeners seen presens er ausseur greenmaa, easmeseggs Ptsp.
- M 7trueris Weg 9 emme egen sus Asist GEmette B GS h amans som a engene enemment aAgr me mesen. Wege egna "As s FIsress PNWe5 480 eMM genat someer) eksemanecer ese remeest et See WUEE PLANT. Pese 8 .
TUTR. P.21
3 " . UNITED STATES
/ ..'"$ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
~
- . OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, REGION II j 101 Marietta St. Suite 2900. Atlanta. GA 30323 j
i, % s */ Tel . 404-331-5503 or 7878 i
No.: 11-95 85 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE I Contacts: Ken Clark 404-331 5503 (Tuesday, October 24,1995) j Roger Hannah 404-331-7878
, CRYSTAL RIVER Pl. ANT RATED " SUPERIOR" IN ONE AREA, i
" GOOD" IN THREE OTHERS IN ASSESSMENT REPORT l The Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant received performance ratings of " superior" In plant support j and " good" in plant operations, maintenance and engineering in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's latest systematic assessment of licensee performance (SALP) of the facility.
i i The SALP report was sent October 20 to Florida Power Corporation, which operates the plant
- near Crystal River, Florida. It evaluates the plant's performance from February 20,1994, through j
September 16 of this year. ,
i NRC and Florida Power Corporation officials will discuss the report during a meeting set for 9:30
! a.m. Tuesday, October 31, in the site administration building auditorium at the Crystal River site.
! The meeting will be open for public observation. NRC officials will be available after the meeting i to speak with reporters, state and local officials, and members of the public.
i l NRC systematic assessment reports rate licensees in four functional areas - plant operations,
! maintenance, engineering, and plant support - and assign ratings of Category 1, 2 or 3 depending on whether their performance in those areas was superior, good or adequate. The l ' report on Crystal River gives the plant a Category 1 rating in plant support, indicating " superior"
- performance. It assigns a rating of Category 2 to the plant operations, maintenance and l engineering areas, indicating " good" performance.
i
! In his cover letter to the report, NRC Regional Administrator Stewart Ebneter said "the overall safety performance of personnel... continued to be good, with notable decline in the engineering area."
r i
Mr. Ebneter noted that there were "several significant performance deficiencies in the middle of the period." He mentioned " weak management involvement in day to day opersoons; week
- vertical communications; and weak interfaces between engineering, operations and
! maintenance." Mr. Ebneter also underscored "a lack of self assessment 'and a lack of aggressive, focused effort by the line organization to identify and resolve problems." However, i he did refer to the company's Corrective Action Plan which he said led to "some performance i . improvements late in the period."
L
. EDITORS: A copy of the full SALP report is available from this office.
i
UNITED STATES
'. ..,\
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
- ; 0FFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, REGION II J e
i '
101 Marietta St. . Suite 2900.. Atlanta. GA 30323
%s' Tel. 404 331-5503 or 7878 l
, No.: 11-95-86 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE i Contacts: Ken Clark 404-331-5503 (Tuesday, October 24,1995)
~
Roger Hannah 404-331-7878 NRC OFFICIAL TO HOLD NEWS CONFERENCE OCTOBER 31 AT CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR Pl. ANT The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's top official in the Southeast will hold a news confarence at 11:30 a.m. on Tuesday, October 31 in the site administration building audit 3rium at the Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant. ;
~
Stewart D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator for the NRC in Atlanta, will meet with area news media representatntes to discuss tho' recent performance of Fionda Power Corporation's Crystal River plant and NRC regulatory responsibilities throughout Flonda and the United States.
4 Ebneter and other NRC staff membe's r will meet with Florida Power Corporation officials l at 9:30 that moming in the same location to discuss the NRC's latest systematic assessment of licensee performance (SALP) of the facility. That meeting will be open to i observation by members of the public and the media. '
l i ###
1 i
i I
4
- i 1
____--______u
j ST. PETERSBURG TIMES
! Date 10/31/9E Page 1 Citrus t
i Nuclear plant's performance ratings dip 2
e a Flors.aa. Power's .r Aasy ,sLus w, , A " notable dechne" was gaand in easmaanos.
l CrystalRiver and a % d agen ,e 5.am.4 amat . . . to
- - CRYSTAL RIVER - Just how safe ar* mi==nty and rematve prohimes*' === named a this melmarMs opersnams at Flonda Power's ancisar plant! Fed- per's assessment.
ratingshavefaEell and regnistara, who recently annolated an & h p % y and 4
i andafederal e pmmmen- at the piant,wW aggar ,,agny measures - were runed sepaper.
he in town tadsr to answer that quesumL uu w operanons and engemanng were j
1 fha , n --
' D0 table clar Hne,,12 Canumisman's . fnxatheNuclearWV =y reganalcdBoein Atlanta wiBmeet rasad d e Kan C1micamidMrepans i engineeringanda with Flanda Power ofBcials to dmeums the sdant s w about every two y M are g af h jn 38 88 P'"" ' dearent fnun random site unpassues because
! The mestag is apen to the puh:ic, and NRC they rate the quahry of the cP""*'m over a kat
. lxDb Solving. af6cials wa answer quesnans sharward. penod d h 1
In the four areas NRC cnaques, the Crystal Problems found along the way would have to
- e River plant recurved one sapenar ratma and be munedstely correctad and eauld result in the three good rsangs.Iastyear.the aanpany being casd. he said. I - " *t
- sepanar in two of the four areas. plant was rated i Please see statuses Pa0s 6 i
!N -
f from Page 1 i
I the and of the review. such as a l
correente acnon pian n=h-nwv4 5
by Flands Power, also are comed-i ored. ha ssuL l Florida Power spokesman
! MarkJambsamid the counpanyron-
' . tinny candmeta its own meernal
! amasennema but takes NRC re.
pans menandy.
l
- "E wm
- y use this re-part to address any areas that i
i adskt asedinnenmenset."Jacobs '
j sumL "It's a very comprehenarve 4
e renew."
I cinis will discans the tw6mnenen report at a masang at 9:30 a.m.
. toder in the site admunstranan batting suhtorunn at the Flands Power enspier. north of Crystal River at Powerkne Road and U.S.
- 19. A name comiersace wiD follow at 11:30 a.m.
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SITE INTEGRATu .. C] ATRIX BY DATE -
~
Number of items: 161 CRYSTAL RIVER 3 CAUSE TYPE SOURCE CODES ID SFA ITEM COMMENTS DATE 1/9/96 IR 95-21 E S O On January 9,1996, a condenser tube failure Breaker closure is projeded for caused secondary chemistry levels to greatly January 20,1996.
exceed recommended plant operating limits.
The unit was brought to COLD SHUTDOWN to allow plugging the condenser and clean up of the secondary side.
S2f21/95 STREN IR 95-20 O N PS A security guard idertified a vibrating conduit and pmmptly notified operations so conective action could be taken.
12/21/95 WEAK IR 95-20 M N E Corrective actions in LER 95-014 was different See LER 95-014 and DEV 95-16-05 than submitted in response to Deviation 95 05. Supplemental response not submitted until corrective action dates in original had been missed..
12/21/95 NCV NCV 95 F L M Failure to follow instructions resulted in stroking 02 the wrong valve.
12/21/95 STREN IR 95-20 O N O Significant improvements were made in operator training over the past year to correct previously identified deficiencies. ,
12/21/95 STREN IR 95-20 O N O Operators promptly recognized that a Alert action by an operator. See maintenance technician stroked the wrong NCV 95-20-02 valve and retumed the valve to its correct position.
12/21/95 WEAK IR 95-20 M N O No program existed requiring the Shift TS 5.6.2.16 requires the licensee Supesvisor document, upon entering LCO 3.0.6 have a Safety Function that they had conducted an evaluation of a loss Determination Program to of safety function. determine the loss of safety function when. entering LCO 3.0.6.
l 10/1/95 IR 95-18 D L E Flow meters for SW flow to RB coolers operate See LER 95-019
. off scale high, disabling the delta flow used to
! - annunciate a SWleak in containment.
indeterminate requirements at this time.
l FROM: 1/1/90 TO: 1/29/96 Page 1 of 18 29-Jan-96 l
CAUSE DATE TYPE SOURCE CODES ID SFA ITEM COMMENTS 10/1/95 STREN IR 95-18 O N PS A health physics technician was observant in identifying that a section of the reactor building sump grating was not property restrained.
10/1/95 WEAK IR 95-18 M N E The licensee did not perform a timely review of .
a 1992 concem regarding operating with both steam generator cross lie valves being open at the same time.
10/1/95 WEAK IR 95-18 F N M The licensee failed to property install / reinstall the restraining clips on the reactor building sump grating.
10/1/95 NCV NCV 95 F D L E ASME Section XI Testing -Core Flood check 04 valves tested at 3,000 gpm verses the 22.600 gpm expected in an accident.
10/1/95 NCV NCV 95 D L E de oil pump on MUPs are misclassified as non- See LER 95-020 01 safety. On a loss of off site power, the ac pumps are not loaded onto the EDG bus, leaving the HPIs dependent on non safety equipment for operation.
, 10/1/95' NCV NCV 95 M P L- E TS SR 3.3.7.1 contains a note that permits not This is the second of two similar 05 entering TS actions for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> when performing events. See LER 95-018 and NCV the surveillance. CR-3 design does not support 95-16-01 use of the note, but the procedurcs did not
. recognize this.
10/1/95 NCV NCV 95 P L E Inadequate procedure to flow balance the decay See LER 95-022 02 heat closed cycle cooling system. Two components had low flow.
10/1/95 NCV NCV 95 D L E inconsistent design assumptions used for reactor See LER 95-023 03 building spray system calculations.
10/1/95 NCV NCV 95 F L M Failure to install seawater (RW) system spool See LER 95-024 06 piece per design drawings.
t FROM: 1/1/90 TO: 1/29/96 - Page 2 of 18 29-Jan-96
l . CAUSE
!- DATE TYPE SOURCE CODES ID SFA ITEM COMMENTS I
- 10/1/95 WEAK IR 95-18 M N O The decision was made to voluntarily remove l two different safety systems from service i concurrently.
10/1/95 STREN IR 95-18 O N O The shift supervisor exhibited a questioning See LER 95-018 and NCV 95 ,
attitude and conservative decision regarding the 05 l challenging of the surv. test procedure for the ESAS logic matrices.
9/1/95 WEAK IR 95-16 M F L M The licensee identified where a Reg Guide 1.97 and repaired. This is a weakness Insturment would not calibrate dudng the last in communications and is refueling outage, but the technicians failed to indicative of weak management notify operations; resulting in the failure for the oversight on the followup actions.
Item to be logged, tracked, (continued in A redundant component was comments) verified to be operable, resulting in no loss of function. See LER 95-9/1/95 WEAK IR 95-16 M N O The operability determination fo the Emergency to instruct the operators on the Feedwater initiation and Control natural issue. This was not done untilthe circulation cooldown setpoint stated the system next day.
was operable based on th guidance in the EOPs and that a Short Term Instmction would be issued (continued see comments 9/1/95 NCV NCV 95 P L O Inadequate procedure for the performance of action statement, but the 01 the emergency diesel generator undervoltage procedure failed to recognize this.
^
relays surveil!ance testing. TS gave inaccurate This is the first of two similar Action Statement directions. The plant design events. See NCV 95-18-05 and '
does not support the TS (continued in comments) LER 95-018.
9/1/95 NCV NCV 95 -F L M The licensee identified that the ES valve CFV-02 25 was miswired, changing the closure logic (coriservatively) for the valve.
9/1/95 VIO VIO 95-16-03 F P. L O Inadequate procedure for the flow balancing of . See URI 95-11-02 and LER 95-the cooling water to the makeup pump results in 010. Procedure had been revised, :
the operation of the pump with cooling water resulting in it being made flow outside of the design basis. Inadequate.
FROM: 1/1/90 TO: 1/29/96 Page 3 of 18 29-Jan-96
CAUSE DATE TYPE SOURCE CODES ID SFA 11 .d COMMENTS 9/1/95 NCV NCV 95 F N PS The licensee failed to follow the procedure for a 04 breach in the control complex habitatulity envelope.
9/1/95 DEV DEV 95-16-05 M L E The licensee failed to adhere to the commitment - See LER 95-014 to maintain the TSC ventilation system.
9/1/95 WEAK IR 95-16 M N M Degraded housekeeping conditions were observed dudng several site tours. -
9/1/95 WEAK IR 95-16 M N E The inspector concluded that the licensee's control room habitability envelope action plan was weak in assuring that the plant was currently ,
operating within its design basis.
9/1/95 STREN IR 95-16 O N PS The observation by a security guard of an oil leak on a service air compressor and the prompt notification of operations was responsible for preventing further degradation and possible failure of the compressor.
9/105 STREN IR 95-16 O N O The Operations Group Event Free Operations Program was fully implemented and was providing usefut trending data. This program set the standard for the other licensee departments and was considered a strength.
9/1/95 WEAK IR 95-16 M N 'O The licensee's operability determination program was in the process of being rewrit. ten. The operability determinations reviewed by the inspectors were considered inadequate in content and justification and are considered a weakness.
9/1/95 STREN IR 95-16 O N O The operations shift supervisor challenged the See NCV 95-16-01 adequacy of the procedures used to calibrate and functionally test the EDG undervoltage relays. Subsequent review determined that the procedures needed rev. and the TS associated .
. with the system isin error.
FROM: 1/1/90 TO: 1/29/96 Page 4 of 18 29-Jan-9G
CAUSE
/
DATE TYPE SOURCE CODES ID SFA ITEM COMMENTS 9/1/95 STREN IR 95-16 O N E The system -G.;;;5 involvement and efforts to resolve the issues with the TSC vetilation system were considered a strength.
9/1/9F VIO EA 95-016 M L E Two additional examples of failure to maintain See LER 95-015. LER 95-016, and setpoint control were identified. (1) Emergency VIO 95-02-04 feedwater low level initiation setpoint, (2) EFIC natural circulation cooldown setpoint.
9/1/95 - WEAK IR 95-16 M N O The licensee's tracking and trending process for the Event Free Oper. Program was not dearty defined, was inconsistently applied. and could fail to identify adverse trends.
9/1/95 - WEAK IR 95-16 M N O The inspectors identified examples where and structured method for management oversight needed to be corrective actions development.)
strengthened (examples- CCHE Issues. . This area was considered to be a operability determinations, root cause weakness.
evaluations, defining expectations for the issue Manager (continued see comments) 8/2/95 WEAK IR 95-15 D M N E There were 11 IFis identified. The cover letter stated that a number of significant discrepancies
. still exist in the areas of design and ' operation of the SW systems and the depth of the licensee's self assessment was less than adequate.
8/1/95 NCV NCV 95 D L E The potential exists for the loss of the Nuclear See LER 95-012
~
01 Services Closed Cooling Water pumps due to a postulated fire in the remote shutdown panel room. The licensee took prompt corrective actions, resulting in the NCV.
8/1/95 URI 95-14-03 M N O Available emergency feedwater for natural circulation cooldown. The licensee no longer administratively controls all of the sources of water necessary for the natural circulation .
cooldown, to assure that the minimum arialyzed requirments are maintained.
FROM: 1/1/90 TO: 1/29/96~ Page 5 of 18 29-Jan-96
CAUSE DATE TYPE SOURCE CODES ID SFA ITEM COMMENTS 8/1/95 NCV NCV 95 F L M Failure to follow procedure for the installation of See LER 95-011 04 control complex habitability envelope door seals, resulted in the door seals being mounted in a ~
configuration differeni than what the door had been qualified under.
8/1/95 VIO VIO 95-14-02 D L E Failure to maintain separtation per 10 CFR 50, See LER 95-013 Appendix R, for the two trains of the makeup and purification system. A scenario has been
- identified in which a single fire can render both MU trains inoperable.
7/1/95 VIO VIO 95-13-01 F L O Deliberate operation of makeup tank outside the See URI 94-22-01. Escalated acceptable operating region. Enforcement issue. See EA 95- .
126.
7/1/95 VIO VIO 95-13-02 M L E Operating curves for makeup tank outside the Escalated Enforcement issue. See design basis and failure to take adequate EA 95-126.
corrective actions for significant conditions adverse to quality.
7/1/95 VIO VIO 95-13-04 P L E Inadequate net positive sudion head to an See LER 95-005. Escalated Enforcement issue. See EA 95-
~
Engineered Safeguants pump during accident
~
conditions. 126.
7/1/95 VIO VIO 95-13-03 M L E (3 Examples) Inadequate design assumptions design basis requirements for for borated water storage tank swapover level; available stored fire protedion failure'to take adequate corredive actions for waterinto procedures. See significant conditions adverse to quality; and URI 95-08-04. Escalated failure to adequately translate (continued in Enforcement issue. See EA 95-comments) 126.
6/1/95 WEAK IR 95-11 M N E Corredive action for PR.90-024, conceming inconsistencies be' tween pump test acceptance criteria and the FSAR does not appear timely.
6/1/95 URI 95-11-02 P L O Operation outside of the design basis for See VIO 95-16-03 and LER 95-010 makeup pump 1A during the B train emergency core cooling system outa0e. Cooling vater form attemate system (DC) did not meet 50 gpm
. requirements. ,
FROM: 1/1/90 TO: 1/29/96 Page 6 of 18 29-Jan-96 t
CAUSE DATE TYPE SOURCE CODES ID SFA ITEM COMMENTS
.6/1/95 WEAK IR 95-11 F N E Multiple examples of lack of control of modification implementation on non-safety related modifications.
6/1/95 WEAK IR 95-11 D L E MAR 88-05-25-05 had multiple design errors requidng excessive numbers of FCNs to correct.
6/1/95 IFl 95-11-01 M N O No Self Contained Breathing Apparatus See LER 95-009 requirements for some personnel (Security, STAS) during a toxic gas release . Accidental actuation of CREVS.
5/1/95 LER LER 95-008 D L E Lube oil collection tank not collecting all oil leaking from RCPs 4/1/95 WEAK IR 95-09 M N E Discussions between FPC licensing dept and NRC technical group on new TSI problem without FPC Operations, NRC Regional, Projed Mgr or Residents being aware of new operability concems.
4/1/95 WEAK IR 95-09 M N O Weaknesses in log keeping practices discovered when following up on loss of spent fuel pool cooling incident.
4/1/95 WEAK IR 95-09 M N E Change in FPC position regarding reportability
~
was issued to NSs, & NSM from licensing, bypassing operations management.
4/1/95 WEAK IR 95-09 M N O Licensee informed the NRC that future CCHE See LER 95-004. This is contrary breach discoveries (outside design basis) would to 10 CFR 50.72 reqirements.
. not be reported to the NRC per 10 CFR 50.72 but if it exceeded one hour duration, the resident would be notified.
4/1/95 WEAK IR 95-09 M . N E On 4-19-95 notified by Engr. that scheduled See LER 94-006.
dates for completion of certain TS setpoints had been missed. Dates in LER were not met and l NRC had not been notified.
1 FROM: 1/1/93 TO: 1/30/96 Page 7 of 18 304an-96
. . . _ . . _ . . -- _ _ _ . . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ , . _ .. _ _ .m _ _ _ . __ _ . _ . _ . _ _ . .
MWE DATE TYPE SOURCE CODE 9 10 SFA ITEM COMMENTO 3/1/95 WEAK IR 95-08 F S M Poor communications between maintenance personnel and operations personnel resulted in a minor plant transient (-13% electrical output reduction)
. 3/1/95 NCV NCV 95 P L E Inadequate pmcedures resulting in the fasture to .
01 enter TS action statements during relay testing.
Identified by operator.
2/1/95 VIO VIO 95-07-01 F L M Failure to follow procedure to'open a switch See LER 95-002.
~
resulted in the loss of a vital bus.
1/31/95 IR 95-06 M D N E Recalculated setpoints for RCS pressure low Engineering inspection of and RCS pressure low- low could challenge TS licensee's setpoint calculations.
allowable values, and the methodology for instrument stdng error did not follow ISA 67.04 as specified in procedures.
1/30/95 VIO . VIO 95-03-01 M N E Failure to report per 10 CFR 50.72 a pressunzer surge line flaw.
1/30/95 IR 95-03 M N E EOPs failed to ensure adequate NPSH to ECCS Another example of URI 94-22-01. 1 pumps when switching imm injection to .
See VIO 95-13-03.
recirculation.
1/8/95 NCV ~
NCV 95 F L~ O Failure to complete a licensed operator medical l 01 exam on time. -
- 1/8/95. URI 95-02-02 M N M Failure to maintain control complex habitallity See LER 95-004 and LER 95-001.
envelope. Two additional examples of CCHE . '
i-discrepancies identified in IR 95-09.
1/8/95 VIO VIO 95-02-03 M P N M Failure to test first level undervoltage relays for EDGs.
1/8/95' VIO . VIO 95-02-04 M D L E Use of non-conservative trip setpoints for safety See URI 94-22-02, LER 94-006, related equipment. (4 examples) LER 95-015 LER 95-016, and EA
. 95-16.
1/7/95 VIO VIO 94-27-03 M N E One 50.72 report was late in 1994. Additional example was identifled in IR 95-08.
FROM: 1/1/90 TO: 1/21W96 Page 8 of 18 29-Jan-96
___ _ - - - -_____________=______A__-. . - - _ ___ _ __ __ _ _ _ .- __
CAUSE- -
LDATE- TYPE SOURCE CODES 10 SFA- ITEM COMMENTS 1/7/95' ~
' VIO - - VIO 94-27-02 M N 'E Two LERs were late in 1994. Addihonal example identified in IR 95-08. g 1/7195 - WEAK 1R 94-27 . P N O Independerd vedfication accomplished with performer and vedfierin same area.
12/1/94 WEAK IR 94-18 F. D N E Documentation in desagn basis calculation, cnhanced design basis documents PMT requirements, and in prs and WRs.
12/1/94- NCV NCV 94 F D N E Uncorrected actuator capability calculation for 15 valve FWV-36.
12/1/94 1R 94-18 M N E FPC was requested by IR cover letter to discuss ,
fourteen issues regarding MOV program.
12/1/94 IFI 94-23-01 M N O Inadequate size and quality of the training
- department JPM examination bank for operator Iicense examinations.
12/1[94 IFl 94-23-02 M N O Ineffective training department evaluations of individual operators during simulatory exerdses
- - of annual operating examinations.
12/1/94 WEAK IR 94-23 M N O Weak operator performance on the simulator in the areas of conduct of operations. EOP usage and transition, control board operations, and off-site dose assessment 12/1/94 NCV NCV 94 M N O Failure of operators to complete adequate plant 03 tours during license re-activation.
11/28/94 LER LER 94-012 M P L E Improved TS added sunleillance requirement for first level undervoltage relays for EDGs. FLUR relay surveillance not accomplished.
11/15/94 LER LER 94-011 P L O. Surveillance requirement to check valve '
alignment in RBS system not accomplished due to modification that removed control room indication.
l FROM: 1/1/90 TO: 1/29/96 Page 9 of 18 29-Jan-96
.___ - --_ -___ _______________ _ _--______-----_ _ - _-______ - - ______ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - - - - . - . . ~ , _ . - = -. . _ - _ - _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ - _ _
CAUSE
~D?TE 1YPE SOURCE CODES ID SFA ITEM COMMENTS ew.
11h4/94 VIO' VIO 94-25-01 F N M Personnel errorleads to breach of control See LER 94-10 complex habitability evelope resulting in ~
operation outside design basis. Failure to maintain contml of the contml complex habitability envelope.
11/10/94 WEAK IR 94-26 M N E- Adequacy of Service Water self-assessment.
11/10/94 URI 94-26-01 M N E Past operability evaluations. (SWSOPA) and failure to implement GL 89-13 commitments.
11/10/94 WEAK IR 94-26 M N E SWSOPA team members understanding of process instrument bias when relating test data to design requirements.
10/12/94 IER LER 94-07 F L E Failure to perform surveillance of RB penetrations following modification to add flanges.
10/10/94 VIO VIO 94-25-02 F L O Failure to perform TS required surveillance Repeat of VIO 92-27-02. See LER 3.8.1.1 with EDG A inoperable.94-008.
9/28/94 LER LER 94-05 F L E Failure to perform RCP flywheel surveillance as required by TS.
9/9/94 WEAK IR 94-22 M N O Shift supervisors not qualified for respiratory and/or SCBA.
9/1/94 VIO VIO 94-22-03 F L PS Inadequate chemistry instruction resulted in DG fuel oilin excess of TS limits.
9/1/94 URI 94-22-01 F L O Operators violated procedures by performing an tank hydrogen pressure / level limits unauthorized test of MUT pressure vs. level, to which constituted operation outside demonstrate that a curve in the procedure was . design basis. See VIO 95-13-01, in ermr. Makeup and purification System EA 95-125, and LER 94-009.
evolution confirms unacceptable makup -
(continued see comments)
- FROM: 1/1/90 TO: 1/29/96 age 10 of 1 294an-96
~
CAUSE DATE TYPE SOURCE CODES ID CFA ITEM COMMENTS
~ 9/1/94 VIO URI 94-22-02 F L E Non-conservative trip setpoints for safety mlated understanding of technical equipment (RPS, ECCS, etc.). Engineering requirements leads to calculations did nd specify instrument string _ nonconservative RPS and EFIC uncertainties or show how/where they'were setpoints and potential violation of incorporated into pmcedures. Deficiency in technical specifications. See VIO (continued see comments) 95-02-04, EA 95-16, and LER 94-006.
9/1/94 WEAK IR 94-22 M N E Licensing gmup initially stated to NRC an official Operations and Plant Management position that they do nd declare equipment did not agree that this was the inoperable when trip setpoints are set in excess licensee's position.
of TS values, as long as calculations show SA limit not exceeded.. (coontinued see comments) 8/22/94 NCV NCV 94 F L E Inadequate procedure - Failed to include 01 containtnent integrity checks for DHV-4, DHV-41, DHV42, & DHV43 during SBO.
8/16/94 M L PS Enforcement Conference held to address discrimination against a security guard by licensee cordractor, Bums Inc. A SLil violation was issued against Bums, and discretion &ry enforcement applied to FPC with no violation issued 8/5/94 M N ~E Licensee planned to inspect two MSV welds and not the four that were needed to satisfy the NRC SER as an alternative method to satisfy EQ requirements. (MSV-55 & 56) 8/5/94 M N E Licensee did nr'. notify NRC of reduction in SW-commitments until after approval of reduced-scope SW inspection, and submittal had no ,
technicaljustification.
7/22/94 LER LER 94-03 F L PS Late LER - Personnel ermr in June,1993, leads to entry into a high radiation area without pmper dosimetry equipmerd and violation of technical specifications. -
7R194 WEAK IR 94-16 . M N E PRC accepted FWP-7 as operable following a mod without any post-modification testing.
FROM: 1/1/90 TO: 1/29/96 age 11 of 1 29-Jan-96
CAUSE DATE TYPE SOURCE CODES ID SFA ITEM COMMENTS 7/6/94 IR 94-16 E L M Water was discovered in EFP-1 oil, and shaft was replaced - NOED was granted.
7/1/94 VIO VIO 94-19-01 F M L E Failure to control procedures for the AMSAC See LER 94-004 system (bcensee failed to revise required 1 procedures in February 94 and again in May 94) 7/1/94 VIO VIO 94-19-03 F L O Operators failed to follow procedure for See LER 94-004 bypassing AMSAC annunciator, so no corrective action was initiated for several days.
7/1I94 IR 94-16 O S M Condensate pump oil lead due to loose bolts on lower bearing housing which was improperty
, installed by vendor duing refubishment 7/1/94 VIO VIO 94-19-02 P F L 0 Failure to follow surveillance procedure for to as-left setpoint System was left AMSAC system. Rather than resolving set at 89% FP instead of 45%
inadequate procedure, technician worked required. See LER 94-004 outside it. Tecnician arbitrally set the voltages and recorded as-found data as identical (continued in comment section) 6/14/94 IR 94-16 E S M Two power runbacks to 55% when rod 1-3 dropped into the core. Bumed center pins were fotmd on center pin connectors.
6/1/94 WEAK 1R 94-14 P M L E issued procedure revison incorporating an .
AMSAC modification before the modification was complete.
5/31/94 IR 94-14 F M N E Delay in having standby FW pump ready for reactor SU and not informing NRC.
5/23/94 WEAK IR 94-14 F M N M improper control of material storage after t
inspection and closecut of RB sump.
5/23/94 WEAK IR 94-14 F M N PS Fire Watch was found
- relaxing" in R B area posted as high rad (he was relocated).
FROM: 1/1/90 TO: 1/29/96 age 12 of 1 29-Jan-96 m._._ .__.-__ . - _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ - m._ .m _ ._- _ _ . - _ _ - _ . _ __ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - . . . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ . _ . - _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ --m_ __.-- _
- w
- w'*-
CAUSE DATE TYPE SOURCE CODES ID SFA ITEM . COMMENTS 5/IN94 WEAK IR 94-09 M N E EDG System maintenance could have been as,sii Ad eariier, dudng refueling outage, without need for on-line system outage, if -
property planned.
4/21/94 VIO VIO 94-11-01 F M N E NDE violation for poor technique and problems with personnel qualification and equipment calibration records.
4/18/94 URI 94-12-01 F M N O Post Maintenance Testing was signed off in work package before R was performed.
4/18/94 WEAK IR 94-12 F N M Conduit was inspected and QC verfied without identifying deficiency.
4/15/94 IFl 94-10-01 M L PS Numemus personnel contaminations due to steaming (see above) and poor airbome 1-132 in containment, possibly fiRration of SG tent.
preventable by better outage planning and oversight Unplanned events contributing included 6-hour shutdown of RB purge, pressurizer (continued in comments section) 4/14/94 IR 94-14 E L M Out-of-calibration pressurizer heater controller caused steaming which contributed to release of altbome lodine contamination. .
4/12/94 -NCV NCV94-14-01 F D L E Failure to perform an adequate design revaw See LER 93-008 resulted in 'potentially inoperable MOVs under degraded voltage conditions.Four hour phone call for discovery of FWV-18 as another example of LER.
4/4/94 LER LER 94-02 P L E Entered TS 3.0.3 for voltages of two ES busses above procedural limits during test.
4/4/94 LER LER 94-02 P L O Performance of surveillance to check power distribution breaker alignment and power availability verification results in entry into LCO 3.0.3.
FROM: 1/1/90 TO: 1/29/96 F.9013 of 1 29-Jan-96
CAUSE DATE TYPE
~
SOURCE CODES ID SFA ITEM COMMENTS 3/15/94 VIO VIO 94-07-01 F L M Mispositioned isolation valve following surveillance rendered control complex chiller inoperable.
3/15/94 LER LER 94-001 F L M isolated both trains of MU system HPi flowpath See IFl 94-07-02 for 20 minutes, entered TS 3.0.3.
3/14/94 ' VIO VIO 94-07-01 F L M EDG fuel oilday tank drain valve left mispositioned following maintenance.
3/12/94 VIO VIO 94-07-01 F L O Decay heat. valve left misaligned in dosed position when lifting clearance on spray pump.
3/1/94 WEAK IR 94-07 M N O Removal of DHR train A for maintenance while B train of NSCCC wasin an outage.
2/4/94 NCV NCV 94 F L M EFW pressure switch isolation valve left 05 mispositioned after maintenance.
2/1/94 WEAK (OSRE) M N PS Safeguards 2/1/94 WEAK IR 94-04 M N E TS surveillance activities on 18 month cycle, licensee on T.4 month refuel cycle.
1/1/94 WEAK IFl 94-01-02 M N PS Onsite accountability not complete within 30 minutes.
1/1/94 WEAK IR 94-03 F S O Failure to fill and vent EDG fuel oil system after
. outage resulted in failed start attempt ,
1/1/94 WEAK IR 94-03 ~F N M Failure to do post maintenance cleanup prior to operability test of EGDG.
12/1/93 NCV NCV 93 P L PS Failure to follow TS 6.12.1-High radiation area '
~
03 control.
12/1/93 NCV NCV 93 F L PS Failure to follow Radiation Protection 02 Procedure. (3 examples).
~
12/1/93 -NCV NCV 93-29, P L PS Inadequate Security Procedure. -
01 FROM: 1/1/90 TO:-1/29/96 a9e 14 of 1 29-Jan-96
CAUSE -
DATE TYPE SOURCE CODES ID SFA ITEM COMMENTS 12/1/93 WEAK IFl 93-31-01 E S M Loss of 230 kV south bus due to inadequate switchyard maintenance.
11/22/93 VIO EMP M L O Enforcement Conference held to address case -
DISCRIMINA of employee discrimination by licensee TION contrador. Both fluor and FPC have denied the violation. NRC rejected the denial, but FPC notified NRC in 9/94 that they have additional information to be considered.
11[1/93 V'VEAK 1R 93-27 F N E Failure to property oversee contractor tendon survellance.
11/1/93- VIO VIO 93-20-02 F N O Use of correction fluid to change medical records.
11/1/93 VIO VIO 93-20-04 F N O Inadequate records of remedial training.
11/1/93 V'O VIO 93-16-06 F M N O inadequate 50.59 reviews of EOPs (xeoroxed identical 50.59s without supporting details, and inaccurate statements that EOPs were developed in " strict accordance with vendor guidelines") -
11/1/93 VIO VIO 93-16-03 F M N O Failure to control quality documents (EOP '
Deviation Document and FSAR Requal Program descritption).
11/1/93 VIO VIO 93-16-05 F M N O Failure to follow EOP Verification / Validation Procedure.
l 11/1/93 VIO VIO 93-27-01 F N E Failure to perform tendon survellance per procedures.
11/1/93 VIO VIO 93-16-01 F M N O A complete EOP rewrits was implemented without development of current Plant Specific Technical Guidelines.
- F L O Failure to concuct required survellance.
, 01 FROM: 1/1/90 TO: 1/29/96 a9e 15 of 1 29-Jan-96
f . . .
CAUSE DATE TYPE SOURCE CODE 3 ID CFA ITEM COMMENTS 11/1/93 WEAK IR 93-281 F N O Adverse weather checklist steps not accomplished without explantation why.
11/1/93 VIO ~
VIO 93-18-04 F M N O Several EOPs and Aps were inadequate, and procedures for writing, verifying, and validating EOPs were inadequate .
11/1/93 VIO VIO 93-20-01 F N O Failure to notify NRC cf change in operator medical status.
10/1/93 WEAK IR93-23 F L M Oil in EFP govemor dropped imm PM program.
9/18/93 WEAK IR 93-23 E P S M Reactor trip caused by failure of one of four reactor cooling pumps. (Licensee response was
. appropriate.)
8/1/93 VIO VIO 93-21-01 M P N O Corrective actions for VIO 93-09-01 were inadequate, posted instructions could not be performed due to physical obstruction of valve.
7/1/93 VIO VIO 93-18-02 F N E MCC, thermal overload, & breaker set Ing not per drawings.
7/1/93 NCV NCV 93 P N O Mispositioned BSV-8 valve following 02 surveillance test. (Licensee also issued a PR regarding 13 configuration control problems in 13 months.)
~
7/1/93 VIO VIO 93-18-01 F N E Failure to conect battery test to agree with calculations.
6/1/93 NCV NCV 93 F L PS Entry into high radiation crea w/o proper 02 monitoring device.
6/1/93 VIO VIO 93-174)1 F L O Failure to perfonn safety evaluation prior to plant change.
6/1/93 NCV NCV 93 F L PS Failure to sign in prior to RCA entry. .
03
~
4 FROM: 1/1/90 TO: 1/29/96 age 16 of 1 294an-96
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ -- _ *- ._ _ _ _ _ _ - - ._.__u__.__--- __ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.________m ____ . _ - _ -._
CAUSE DATE TYPE SOURCE ~ CODES ID ^ SFA ITEM - COMMENTS
^
6/1/93 NCV NCV 93 F L PS Unsecured vital door. .
01
-5/1/93 VIO VIO 93-13-01 F L 0 Disabled neutron powerchanneldeviation I alarm due to mispositioned Annunciator slide i link.
4/19/93 -VIO VIO 93-09-01 P F L O Damage to makeup pump from starting it ~
without lutxication .
4/9/93 VIO VIO 93-11-01 P F L M EDG start and Three-Minute Interuption of Decay Heat Removal during removal of 500 KV i substation battery fmm service without adequate~
procedure.
-4/1/93 VIO VIO 93-13-01 F L O. Degraded pressurizer spray capability due to mispositioned isolation valve RCV-36.
4/1/93 NCV NCV 93 F L E Instrument error not included for CFT operating 03 limits. i 4/1/93 VIO VIO 93-13-01 P L O Inadequate makeup pump recirculation flow for 71/2 hours, raising. discharge pressure and causing pump damage, due to mispositioned valve.
3/29/93 1R 93-09 E L .M Loss of offsite power (500 Kv backfeed) during ,
midcycle outage due to salt W on insulators fmm major storm of 3/13/93.
. . i 3/5/93 VIO VIO 93-09-01 P L O Overcooling transient fmm improper instructions for taking manual control of DH Hx Outlet Valve. l l
I age 17 of 1 -
FROM: 1/1/90 TO: 1/29/96 29-Jan-96
's ;
CAUSE DATE TYPE SOURCE CODES ID SFA ITEM COMMENTS Cause Codes: SALP Functkunal Aroes: ID Code:
P DEFICaENT PROCEDURES / QUAL RECORDS E ENGW8EERING L LICENSEE F- PERSONNEL ERRORtFAILURETO FOLLOW M MAINTENANCE N- NRC E EQURENT MALFUNCTION / FAILURE O OPERATIONS S SELF-REVEALED T TRAINING PS PLANT SUPPORT O OTHER D DESIGN AND ENGINEERING DEFICIENCIES M INADEQUATEIW30df O'KRSIGHT FROM: 1/1/90 TO: 1/29/96 aDe 18 of 1 294an-96
i _L UNITED STATES :
i; t, i
NUCLEAR REGULATORY i.,
COMMISSION i :
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ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR PLANT :
l ll JANUARY 2,1994 - JANUARY 6,1996 !i ll i 1
. SYSTEMATIC ~ ASSESSMENT OF l; -
l! LICENSEE PERFORMANCE l ll (SALP) .
i l
i l
- PRESENTATION l l
_l l FEBRUARY 22, 1'996 KO 1
l . ,
t- --
NEW SALP PROCESS
-p Resident Program inspection x N
?
\
Region Based \
\ v' inspection ,
'N Licensing / p.
A MINISTRATOR REGIONAL SALP BO'ARD Special /
Initiatives
/
,/
/
/
Event Reviews MlP SALPPRC.CH3
l FUNCTIONAL A EAS FOR OPERATING R$AdibES i 1. PLANT OPERATIONS i .
l 2. MAINTENANCE l 3. ENGINEERING 1
l
! 4. PLANT SUPPORT
- - Radiological Controls
- l. - Security
- Fire Protection 4
run ca:
a
1 PERFORMANCE CATEGQRY RATINGS.
Category 1. Ucensee attention and involvement have been properly focused on safety and resulted in a superior level of '
performance. Ucensee programs and procedures have provided effective controls. The licensee's '
self-assessment efforts have been effective in the identification of emergent issues. Corrective actions are technically sound, comprehensive, and thorough.
Recurring problems are eliminated, and resolution of issues is timely Root cause analyses are thorough.
Category 2. Ucensee attention and involvement are normally well focused and resulted in a good level of safety performance. Ucensee programs and procedures normally provide the necessary control of activities, but deficiencies may exist. The licensee's self-assessments are normally good, although issues may escape identification. Corrective actions are usually effective, although some may not be complete. 1 Root cause analyses are normally thorough. j i
Category 3. Ucensee attention and involvement have resulted in an
- acceptable level of safety performance. However, licensee performance may exhibit one or more of the following characteristics. Ucensee programs and .
procedures have not provided sufficient control of activities in important areas. The licensee's
- self-assessment efforts may not occur until after a potential problem becomes apparent. A- clear
- i. understanding of the safety implications of significant "
' issues may not have been demonstrated. Numerous l minor issues combine to indicate that the licensee's j corrective action is not thorough. Root cause analyses
- do not probe deep enough, resulting in the incomplete I resolution of issues. Because the mergin' to
, unacceptable performance in important aspects is l' small, increased NRC and licensee attention is required.
< 1 j '.
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L i
SAINT LUCIE SALP li .
PLANT OPERATIONS i
OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN THIS AREA DECLINED' j TO GOOD '
i
- STRENGTHS
1 . 1 i
- OPERATOR PERFORMANCE DURING TRANSIENTS EFFECTIVE COMMAND AND CONTROL DURING ll OFF NORMAL CO'NDITIONS
- QUALITY ASSURANCE i
j
~
l CHALLENGES: l i
l
- PROCEDURAL ADEQUACY'AND COMPLIANCE
!
- ACCEPTANCE OF LONG STANDING DEFICIENCIES l
i
- MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT AND OVERSIGHT i
- OPERATOR PERFORMANCE DOING ROUTINE '
l ACTIVITIES i
l -
i .
1 .
i l _
l i
SAINT LUCIE SALP !
. MAINTENANCE OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN THIS AREA DECLINED l TO GOOD STRENGTHS:
- PREDICTIVE MAINTENANCE PROGRAM
- RECOGNITION OF CHANGES IN PERFORMANCE
- IN SERVICE INSPECTION PROGRAM l
- CONTROL AND USE OF TEMPORARY SEALANTS l
l I
! CHALLENGES: . l l l
- REPETITIVE EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS i
- PERSONNEL' ERRORS
!
- PROCEDURAL ADEQUACY
- MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT -
l i
l SAINT LUCIE SALP l ENGINEERING OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN THIS AREA REMAINED SUPERIOR l l
STRENGTHS: 1
- MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT )
- IMPLEMENTATION OF DESIGN CHANGES
- LICENSING ACTIVITIES l
!
- PLANT SUPPORT l ;
! CHALLENGES:
i ;
' COMMUNICATION. AND INTERFACE WITH OTHER DEPARTMENTS i
}
i' :
. 9
SAINT LUCIE -SALP PLANT SUPPORT OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN THIS AREA REMAINED SUPERIOR STRENGTHS:
- RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS
- SECURITY
- EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CHALLENGES:
l
- AVOIDING COMPLACENCY i
i 5
d 9
I .
4 4 9
I
- - - - - - - - - r -
SAINT LUCIE SALP RATING
SUMMARY
SALP CYCLES 10 AND 11 i
Last Previous
] Rating Rating -
l SALP Period 1/2/94 - 5/3/92-
, 1/6/96 1/1/94 Functional Areas
, Operations 2 1
- Maintenance 2 1' l Engineering 1 .1 Plant Support. 1 1 4
9 h
T EXECU'IVE
SUMMARY
Pre-Decisional Semiannual Plant Performance Assessment St. Lucie 1 and 2
- Current SALP Assessment Period: 1/7/96 through 6/97 Last SALP Rating Previous SALP Rating I 1/2/94 - 1/6/96 5/3/92 - 1/1/94 Operations 2 1 Maintenance 2 1 Engineering 1 1 Plant Support 1 1 Last INP0 Assessment: 1 Previous INPO Assessment:'l I. Performance Overvie.w Since July 1995, there have been a series of events that led to questioning the plant's overall performance. These have included:
1
- A Unit I turbine trip due to procedural weaknesses, poor operator performance, and weak supervisory oversight.
t The attempt to restage an RCP seal using inadequate and i inappropriate procedural guidance. The evolution was compounded i by failing to follow aspects-of the guidance that did exist, which led to the failure of the second and third stage seals. )
1 A main steam isolation signal due to an operator failing to block ;
the MSIS signal during a cooldown when an annunciator indicated that the . block was enabled. This. failure occurred despite the i fact that the operator's attention was directed to the annunciator i on at least two different occasions.
Both pressurizer power operated relief valves being found inoperable due to incorrect assembly during a refueling outage..
The conditions had existed for approximately 10 months (SL3,CP).
An loss of RCS inventory (4000 gallons) due to a shutdown cooling relief valve which lifted and then failed to reseat due to incorrect setpoint margins (a generic problem involving several valves). The licensee had sufficient evidence that this generic condition existed, but had failed to act promptly to evaluate the conditions (SL4). l
- The sprayd.own of' containment due to an insdequate procedure and operator error coupled with'an existing operator-work-around.
O
l I-
- The significant operator inattentiveness which resulted.in the overdilution event on January 22, 1996, highlighted the recent large number of personnel errors and lack of command _and control in the control room.
These and several other recent deficiencies involving weak procedures, a general lack of procedural compliance, equipment failures, and personnel errors clearly indicated that the plant's past high level of performance had declined. An NRC root cause effort determined that, in addition to procedural adherence / adequacy weaknesses, the licensee suffered from
, weaknesses in both interfaces.across organizational lines and corrective actions.
II. Functional Area Assessments A SALP board convened on January 18, 1996. The board concluded that the licensee's performance in the areas of Operations and Maintenance had declined from excellent levels of performance to good levels. The '
conclusions reached by the board are summarized below.
Operations The board determined that safety performance in the Operations area had declined, particularly in the final six months of the assessment period.
As bases, the board noted an' increase in the number of operational events attributable to:
- Weaknesses in operator performance
- Acceptance of long-standing equipment deficiencies
- Management expectations were not effectively communicated to personnel and enforced a Weaknesses in procedural adequacy and adherence l
- - Implementation and adequacy of corrective actions The licensee undertook a number of efforts to reverse declining performance following the onset of the operation.al events described above. Verbatim procedural compliance was established as the norm for the site, which resulted in the need for literally hundreds of l procedural changes and around-the-clock on-site review committee j meetings. An increased emphasis on the initiation of co'rrective action documentation resulted in an increase in the number of documents initiated, but has also resulted in increases in backlogs.
Maintenance ;
The~ board determined that performance in this area declined during the previous assessment period. However, the board found that six unit ,
trips which occurred during the period had roots in maintenance.
Weaknesses identified by the board included: ,
- Inadequate post-maintenance testing
- Procedural adequacy and adherence
- Instability in management due to acting managers while the
- maintenance managerfreceived SR0 training
1 The board indicated that the current stability of the maintenance management-appeared to be reversing the observed negative trends.
Engineering :
1 The board found that engineering had sustained a superior level of performance. Support to both operations and maintenance, the quality and support of design modifications, and initiatives to reduce the numbers of operator workarounds and jumpers / lifted leads we seen as strengths.- Licensee submittals to the NRC were noted to be of high quality, as were safety evaluations.
Plant Support '
The board found that plant support organizations collectively performed at a superior level. Area breakdowns were as follows:
- Health Physics was identified as having strong management support and initiatives such as remote monitoring and electronic dosimetry were seen as strengths. Reductions in the areas of contaminated floor space and the volume of solid waste were also noted. ;
- Security was cited as maintaining an excellent leyel of performance during staff reductions due to the implementation of biometrics. Training, including the use of a combat firing range, and self-assessments were considered good. Some performance .
problems were noted through the period, however, including two !
. failures to provide compensatory measures during computer failures.
- Fire Protection performed well in both drills and in responding to plant fires; however, survel.11ance testing observations indicated weak procedures, poor attention to detail, and hardware deficiencies.
- Emergency preparedness was considered good, and the status of equipment and supplies were found to be adequate. The full participation exercise was successful.
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DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS - ST. LUCIE UNIT 1
- 1. On January 9, the unit was manually tripped in response to a' loss of the 1B MFWP.
- 2. The unit tripped from loss of load when the generator excitor circuit. breaker ' was ,
. inadvertently opened locally on March 28, 1994.
3.- On June 6,. 1994, the unit experienced a main generator lockout, followed by turbine and reactor trips, when a thunderstorm blew a section of flashing across two ' output ,
terminals of' main transformer 1A.
- 4. ~ Power was reduced to 80%-power on August 10, 1994, due to Digital Electro-Hydraulic System (DEH) leak. The unit was returned -to full power on August 23, 1994. ,
- 5. 'hheturbinewastakenoflineonAugust28, 1994, to repair a leak in the DEH. Repairs were completed and the unit returned to power on.the afternoon of August 28, 1994.. The unit was returned to full power on September 2, 1994. ,
t
- 6. The unit tripped as the result of a lighting strike in the switchyard.on October 26, 1994. Since the unit was scheduled to start a refueling outage on October 31, 1994, a -i decision was made to start the refueling outage
- 7. .On February 27, 1995, the unit was removed from service, for the replacement of pressurizer code safety valves which had been leaking by the seat since shortly after i startup in November, 1994. The unit was returned to power on March 8, 1995. ,
- 8. On July 8, 1995, the unit tripped during turbine valve surveillance testing. 'The-unit was returned to power on July 12, 1995. -
- 9. On August 1,1995, the unit was shutdown as a result of Hurricane Erin. Due to a series of equipment problems and personnel performance issues the unit remained shutdown until '
October 9, 1995.
- 10. On November 17,~1995, the unit was manually tripped due to low' steam generator level when the feed regulating valve failed to mid position.
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DESCRIPTION OF svamas - ST LUCIE UNIT 2
- 1. On February 27, 1994, the unit was coasting down to the cycle 8 refueling outage. The unit was'taken off-line on February 14, 1994.
- 2. On April 23, 1994, the unit tripped from 30% power during RPS adjustment.
- 3. The unit 2 turbine was shutdown on July 9, 1994,.and reactor power reduced to Mode 2 on July 10, 1994. On July,14, 1994, the unit was shutdown to repair a stuck closed trip circuit breaker. The unit was restarted and placed on line on July 15, 1994.
- 4. On February 21, 1995, ihe unit tripped as a result of low steam generator water level.
The condition was the result of a feedwater regulating valve closure after a steam generator water level control level transmitter failed high. The transmitter was replaced and the unit was returned to service on February 25, 1995.
- 5. On April 25, 1995, the main generator was taken of line to repair a faulty power supply in the DEH system. -
- 6. On August 1,1995, the unit. was shutdown as a result of Hurricane Erin. It was restarted on August 4, 1995.
- 7. On October 9, 1995, the unit was shut down for a scheduled refueling outage.
8' . On January l', 1996, the unit went critical.
- 9. On January 5,1996, a manual trip was initiated on high generator hydrogen temperature.
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REGION 11 ATLANTA, GEORGIA PLANT STATUS REPORT ST. LUCIE Units 1 and 2 !
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February,1996 i
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PLANT STATUS REPORT FOR ST. LUCIE
\ TABLE OF CONTENTS 5-
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I L PART 1 - FACILITY DESCRIPTION 1.1 FACILITY / LICENSEE..'..................................Page 2 i 1.2 UTILITY SENIOR MANAGEMENT ...........................Page 2 i 1.3 NRC STAFF............................................Page 2 1.4 L I C ENS E I N FORMAT I ON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3 l 1.5 PLANT CHARACTERISTICS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3 1.6 SIGNIFICANT DESIGN INFORMATION.......................Page 3 1.7 EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES / PREPAREDNESS. . . . . . . . . . .Page 8 1.8 PRESENT OPERATIONAL STATUS (Past Six Months) . . . . . . . . .Page 9
- 1.9 OUTAGE SCHEDULE AND STATUS...........................Page 10
' PART 2 - PLANT PERSPECTIVE a
' 2.1 GENERAL PLANT PERSPECTIVE............................Page 11 2.2 SALP HISTORY (Past Two SALP Periods).................Page 11 ]
2.3 SELECTED SALP AREA DISCUSSIONS ......................Page 11 i d -
PART 3 - SIGNIFICANT EVENTS l 3.1 SIGNIFICANT EVENTS BRIEFINGS (Past 12 Months)........Page 16 3.2 ENFORCEMENT STATUS / HISTORY (Past 12 Months) . . . . . . . . . .Page 16 2
PART 4 - STAFFING AND TRAINING' 4.1 OPERATIONS STAFF - 0VERALL...........................Page 16
- 4.2 WORK FORCE ..........................................Page 17 4.3 OPERATOR QUALIFICATION /REQUALIFICATION PROGRAM.......Page 17 i 4.4 PLANT SIMULATOR......................................Page 17 4.5 INPO ACCREDITATION....................................Page 17 l PART 5 - INSPECTION ACTIVITIES 5.1 OUTSTANDING ITEMS LIST
SUMMARY
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 18 5.2 MAJOR INSPECTIONS....................................Page 18 PLANNED TEAM INSPECTIONS.............................Page 18 5.3 5.4 ' INFREQUENT INSPECTION PROCEDURE STATUS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Page 18 5.5 SIMS STATUS (OPEN TMI ITEMS) . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . ./ age 18 ATTACHNENTS
- 1. PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
- 2. ALLEGATION STATUS
- 3. NRR OPERATING REACTOR ASSESSMENT
- 4. ORGANIZATION CHARTS
- 5. POWER HISTORY CURVES
- 6. MASTER INSPECTION PLAN (NOT INCLUDED)
- 7. SITE ACTIVITY SCHEDULE
- 8. -SITE INTEGRATION MATRIX . ,
- 9. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS GRAPH l l
4 4
2 P A R T- 1- F A'C I L I T Y, DESCRIPTION 1.1 FACILITY / LICENSEE FACILITY: St. Lucie Units I and 2 PLANT LOCATION: Hutchinson Island near Port St. Lucie, Florida LICENSEE: Florida Power and Light Co. (Corporate Office in Juno Beach, Florida) 1.2 UTILITY SENIOR MANAGEMENT CORPORATE:
J. L. Broadhead (Jim), Chairman of the Board and CEO J. H. Goldberg (Jerry), President, Nuclear Division SITE:
W. H. Bohlke (Bill) - St. Lucie Plant Interim Vice President C. L. Burton (Chris) - Services Manager L. W. Bladow.(Wes) - Nuc. lear Assurance Manager
-R. E. Dawson (Bob) - Business Manager D. J. Denver (Dan) - Site Engineering Manager A. DeSoiza-(Andy) - Human Resources Manager P. L. Fincher (Pat) - Training Manager T. G. Kreinberg (Tom) - Nuclear Materials Management Superintendent J. Marchese (Joe) - Maintenance Manager C. A. Pell (Ash) - Outage Manager L. A. Rogers (Lee) - Systems and Component Engineering Manager J. Scarola (Jim) - Plant General Manager E. J. Weinkam III (Ed) - Licensing Manager .
J. A. West (Jeff) - Operations Manager
-1.3 NRC STAFF REGION II, Atlanta, GA:
~
S. D. Ebneter (Stew), Regional Administrator, (404) 331-5500 L. A. Reyes (Luis), Deputy Regional' Administrator -(404) 331-5610 E. W. Merschoff (Ellis), Director DRP, (404) 331-5623 K. D. Landis (Kerry), Branch Chief, (404) 331-5509 L. S. Mellen (Larry), Project Engineer, (404) 331-5561 E. Lea (Edwin), Project Engineer,-(404) 331-3641 SITE:
M. S. Miller (Mark), Senior Resident Inspector, (407) 464-7822 S. S. Sandin (Steve), Acting Resident Inspector, (407) 464-7822
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4 NRR:-
D. B. Matthews,- Director, Project Directorate 11-2, 3 (301) 415-1490-J. A. Norris (Jan), Senior Project Manager, Project .
! -- Directorate.II-2, (301) 504-1483
'AE00:
S. Israel-(Sandy), Reactor Operations Analysis Branch, '
- (301) 415-7573 1.4 LICENSE INFORMATION'
, Unit 1 -
Unit 2 -
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Docket Nos. -
50-335 50-389 License Nos. DPR-67 NPF-16 i Construction Permit Nos. CPPR-74' CPPR-144 i Construction Permit Issued 7/1/70 5/2/77 Low Power License NA 4/83 Full Power License 3/1/76 6/10/83
, Initial Criticality '
4/22/76 6/2/83 1st Online . 5/17/76 6/13/83 L Commercial Operation 12/21/76 8/8/83
\
l 1.5 PLANT CHARACTERISTICS t
l- Descriotion Units I and 2 Reactor Type Combustion Engineering PWR, 2-loop Containment Type Freestanding Steel w/ Shield Building 4
' Power Level 830 MWe (2700 MWt) ;
Architect / Engineer Ebasco l NSSS Vendor Combustion Engineering
! Constructor Ebasco l Turbine Supplier Westinghouse 1 Condenser Cooling Method Once Through Condenser Cooling Water Seawater g SIGNIFICANT DESIGN INFORMATION
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1.6.1 REACTOR INTEGRITY i
Reactor Pressun Vessel (RPV)
With the; pres et fuel type and management policy, Unit 1 is
- expected. to roth a 40-year RPV life. On this unit, the fuel type
. and management policy have been modified to make that RPV life
, span possible. Presently, a program is evolving for RPV life 4
extension beyond the projected 40 years, potentially to 60 years, via a flux reduction program. A flux reduction program has
. tarted with the addition of eight absorbers in core corner
i l
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% positions,. performance of vessel fluence calculations, and i
- determination of an. optimum power profile for each core load.
Calculations using current methodology and uncertainty predict a ,
significant RPV life extension, but not to 60 years. l
. Due to different design and construction characteristics, Unit 2 !
RPV life expectancy exceeds 60 years. Low leakage core designs j are now used for economic reasons, however the low leakage designs ;
provide even greater life expectancy. j Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary On this.CE plant, ECCS-to-RCS injection points are isolated'by at $
least two check valves and one closed MOV. High pressure safety ;
- injection (HPSI), low pressure safety injection (LPSI), and- ;
containment spray (CS) pumps' common containment sump suctions are .
isolated from the containment sump by one closed MOV in ;
~
conjunction with a closed seismic piping system. The CS headers are isolated from containment by one closed MOV and a check valve - !
in conjunction with a closed seismic piping system. CVCS has the ;
normal complement of two automatic actuation isolation valves. ;
1.6.2 REACTOR SHUTDOWN Reactor Protection System The reactor protection system provid,es protection for the reactor fuel and its cladding by providing automatic reactor shutdowns based on input from reactor power, reactor coolant pressure, coolant temperature, coolant flow, steam generator pressure, containment pressure, turbine hydraulic fluid pressure, and, in Unit 2 only, Component Cooling Water flow to reactor coolant pumps. The RPS is a redundant, four channel system that operates on a two-out-of-four logic.
ATWS Protection ATWS protection, outside the normal reactor protection system, is j
' initiated' via the ESF pressurizer pressure signal. It actuates by opening contactors.in the output of the CEA MG sets, thereby interrupting control element assembly power at its source. This .i protection has been installed on both units per CE, the NSSS, recommendations. ,
R = te Shutdown Facilities These facilities are located in the switchgear rooms beneath each unit's control room.
1.6.3' CORE COOLING Feedwater System I
i 5
The ' main feedwater pumps are motor driven with each delivering 50 percent of the flow required for full power.
- Turbine Byoass/ Steam Dumo Canacity Each unit has five steam bypass valves, providing 45 percent of total capacity.
Unit I has one atmospheric dump valve per train (two trains) and.
Unit 2 has two valves per train. Each unit has the capability of dumping nine percent steam flow to the atmosphere.
Auxiliary Feedwater System i
There are two motor-driven pumps on each unit with 100 percent capacity per pump. There is one steam-driven pump on each unit with 200 percent capacity. Any of the three pumps can inject to either steam generator. Automatic initiation and faulted steam '
generator protection are provided by each unit's Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation System provided by the NSSS. ;
Emeroency Core Coolina System j In each unit, there are two HPSI pumps and two LPSI pumps with no unit-to-unit cross-connections. One pump of each type per unit will handle a postulated LOCA. The LPSI pumps also provide decay heat removal as required when the unit is shut down.
Decav Heat Removal As indicated above, the LPSI pumps also provide decay heat removal as required when the unit is shut down by taking suction from the
. RCS (hot legs), passing.the fluid through the shutdown cooling t heat exchangers, and returning it to the RCS (cold legs). The heat removing medium is.CCW - discussed in section 1.7.6 below.
Shutdown cooling flow path overpressure protection is provided by automatic isolation valves and various relief valves in the ,
system.
1.6.4 CONTAINMENT Pressure Control / Heat Removal l There are two containment spray pumps and four containment fan . ;
coolers available per unit to suppress pressure spikes and cool l the containment. One CS pump and two fan coolers will handle a postulated LOCA. There are no unit-to-unit cross-connections.
This engineered safety feature is automatically started by ESFAS. 4 Hydrocen Control ,
4 i
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- 1 i' . 6 Post-LOCA containment hydrogen' control is accomplished on each unit by two trains of hydrogen recombiners located on the <
j operating deck _inside containment. By elevating, in a controlled manner, the. temperature of containment atmosphere flowing through the recombiner, the recombiner units. recombine hydrogen and oxygen to: form water, thus preventing the buildup of hydrogen to potentially explosive levels.
l.6.5 ELECTRICAL POWER ;
Offsite AC
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The station switchyard is connected to the transmission system by l three independent 240 KV 1.ines.that share a right of way and interconnect with FPL's grid on the mainland approximately 10' ,
- miles West of the plant site. There are two independent offsite power feeds from the station switchyard to the emergency busses.
Onsit'e AC 1
Onsite AC power is provided by four EDGs (two per unit). EDGs are independent of other plant systems except vital DC power for j control of starting. A Station Blackout (580) cross. connection is i installed and tested. This cross-connection serves the emergency l
' busses directly and reduces cross-connect time to less than 15
- minutes.
DC power Two trains of vital batteries per unit have been routinely tested for four-hour DC load profiles. Recently, following a cell i replacement, they have been tested for three-hour battery capacity instead. The battery capacity test.is harsher than the load profile test and is intended to more accurately reflect expected usage. There are four normal chargers per. unit with swing .
chargers available for service. Non-safety batteries can be '
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-cross-connected to the safety-related swing bus if needed.
- Instrumentation Power Each unit has four inverters, two powered from each vital DC train, that provide four trains of instrumentation power. ,
f.tation Blackout Resolution Status' Unit 2 is a four-hour "DC coping" plant per the original license while Unit 1 is subject to the station blackout (SBO) rule of 10 ,
CFR 50.63 requiring additional licensee action (unit-to-unit cross-connect of 4160V bus). ,
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1.6.6 SAFETY-RELATED COOLING WATER SYSTEMS
. Intake Coolina Water (Service Water)
Intake cooling water (ICW) for each unit originates in the unit-common Intake Canal. The canal level varies with the tides since i it is filled by a level difference between the Atlantic Ocean and the ICW pumps. One 16-foot and'two 12-foot diameter pipes pass
' under the beach to connect the ocean and canal. The intake pipe ends in the Atlantic are covered by intake structures (' rebuilt in
- 1991) intended to limit flow velocities, particularly vertical velocity, to reduce marine life entrapment. After use, ICW returns to the ocean through the Di.scharge Canal and under-beach -
pipes.
. Each unit has two trains of ICW plus a swing pump that can be aligned to either train electrically and physically. The licensee i
has converted the deep draft ICW pumps from externally (water) lubricated to self-lubricated to increase reliability. The 100
' percent (each) capacity pumps take suction from the intake canal via a canal intake structure using traveling screen debris
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' protection. The intake canal structures adjacent to the ICW pump i
suctions are continuously injected with a hypochlorite solution to
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reduce marine growth in the associated piping and heat exchangers.
The ICW pumps move water through two trains of heat.exchangers !'
that cool component cooling water (CCW) and two trains of heat exchangers that cool main turbine cooling water. During a postulated accident, water flow isolates from the turbine cooling !
i heat exchangers. The discharge from the heat exchangers returns l via the discharge canal to the ocean. ]
Closed Coolina Water Systems ji i
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- Each unit has two trains of Component Cooling Water (CCW). The l arrangement of two pumps and a swing pump mimics the .ICW system. ,
j The swing-pump can be. aligned to either train. The 100 percent
- (each) capacity pumn drive water through the CCW/ICW heat exchangers and then on to the heat loads, mainly the containment
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fan coolers and the shutdown cooling (decay' heat) heat exchangers (which also can operate as containment spray heat exchangers).
Additionally, CCW cools a variety of bearings, seals, and oil i coolers for the HPSI, LPSI, and CS pumps. A non-safety-relat.ed
- portion of the CCW system cools reactor coolant pump seals and the 4 spent fuel pool. This section isolates upon engineered safety features actuation.
1.6.7 SPENT FUEL STORAGE Wet storage capability exists up to the year 2002 (Unit 2) and 2007 (Uni.t 1).
J 9
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8 1.6.8 INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM ;
Instrumentiair compressors and driers on each unit provide all l
- instrument air for Unit 2 and all.but containment air for Unit 1. i Unit I has instrument air compressors inside containment.
1.6.9 STEAM GENERATORS Each unit. has two large steam generators (SGs) rather than the three or four usually seen. The licensee has begun to focus on a :
Unit 1 SG replacement in 1998. The SGs are under construction at i
~the.B&W Canada shops and a site organization is functioning.
i 1.7 -EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES / PREPAREDNESS Emergency Operations Facility: 10-miles West of site, !
I-95/ Midway Rd. Exit ,
Technical Support Center: Onsite, Adjacent to Unit 1 Control Room .
Operational Support Center: Onsite, 2nd floor of,
- North Service Building ;
The last annual emergency preparedness exercise was in February,1996.
This exercise was formally evaluated by the NRC.
Since St. Lucie site has a high probability of hurricanes, communications facilities were improved following the Turkey Point experience with Hurricane Andrew in August,1992. Improvements include:
- High Frequency Auto-link with other FPL sites and NRC.
- Enhanced 900 MHZ System for site and mobile communications, with radios also in the licensee's EOF and county emergency facility.
- Cellular phones with hardened antennas.
Hardened Local Government Radio antenna ties.
1.8 PRESENT OPERATIONAL STATUS Availability Factors:
Unj,1_J, Unit 2 -
1991 81.0 100.0 1992. 96.5 75.2 1993 74.0 71.8 -
.1994' 86.8 79.6 l 1995 (through 7/95) 93.9 98.3 l Cumulative (through 7/95) 77.7 83.7. !
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9 1.8.1 UNIT 1 OPERATING HISTORY (Past Twelve Months from 1/25/96)
Un'it 1 operated continuously during the past 12 months with the following exceptions:
On February 21, 1995, the unit was removed from service for 'the replacement of pressurizer code safety valves which had been leaking by the seat since shortly after startup in November, 1994.
On March 4,1995, the unit experienced a 14 minute loss of shutdown cooling. The apparent root cause was operator error by a reactor operator placing one loop of SDC in standby. The operator.
apparently closed the srction valve to the operating, vice standby, pump.. The operator in question denied the error; however, the licensee determined that he was responsible. He.
resigned froia the company. The unit was returned to service.on ,
March 8, 1994.
On July 8,1995, the unit tripped during turbine valve surveillance testing. It returned to power on July 12, 1995.
On August 1, 1995, the unit was shutdown as a result of Hurricane Erin. Due to a series of equipment problems and personnel ,
l performance issues, the unit remained shut down for 73 days.
Problems encountered during the shutdown included a maintenance-induced RCP seal failure, discovery of two inoperable PORVs due to maintenance errors during refurbishment, a loss of inventory event while placing shutdown cooling in service due to lack of margin to relief valve lift setpoint and complicated by an excessive blowdown value, inadvertant spraydown of the Unit 1 containment, catastrophic failure of the IB EDG, and leaking pressurizure code safety valve flange leakage. The unit r'eturned to power on October 12. -
On November 16, the unit was manually tripped when a feedwater regulating valve ' failed to the 50% position, resulting in low !
steam generator water level. The root cause of the failure was i determined to be a faulty power supply. The power supply was l replaced and the unit was returned to service on November 18. ;
On January 22, 1996, operator error resulted in an excessive dilution event which resulted in reactor power accending to 100.2%. The operator in question apparently left the control room while dilution was in progress without informing other !
watchstanders of the evolution in progress. The operator was removed from licensed duties and the final disposition of the i event is pending. ;
T.'
1.8.2 UNIT 2 OPERATING HISTORY (Past Twelve Months from 1/25/96) t Unit 2' operated continuously during the past 12 months with the following exceptions:
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\ On Febiuary 21, 1995, the unit tripped as a result of low steam generator water level. The condition was the result of a i- feedwater regulating valve closure after a steam generator water
- level control-' level transmitter failed high. The transmitter was replaced and the unit was returned to service on February 25,
, 1995.
4 4
On April 25, 1995, the unit was shutdown for approximately 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> to replace a main turbine DEH power supply.
t On August 1,1995, the unit was shutdown as a result of Hurricane
- Erin. It was restarted on August 4, 1995, but operated at reduced power from August 17 through 29, 1995, to clean condenser water boxes and repair equipment problems.
L On October 9, the unit entered a refueling outage. The outage was
' complicated by the discovery of leaks in RCS flow transmitter taps j - at the loops, a reactor flange 0-ring leak, discovered during repressurization, and the failure of one stage of an RCP seal
! package. The unit returned to power on January 1, 1996.
The unit was manually tripped from approximately 35% power on January 5 due to high generator hydrogen. temperature. The root
- cause of the event was improper operation of a turbine cooling water temperature control valve which supplied cooling water to
' the hydrogen coolers. Post-trip review resulted in the discovery i of clogged steam Venerator water level transmitter sensing lines
! which resulted in artificially low le'vels being indicated when steam generators were isolated upon turbine trip. The lines were blown down and the unit was returned to service on January 7.
1.9 OUTAGE SCHEDULE AND STATUS
~
. Unit l's last refueling outage began on October 26, 1994, and ended on
- November 29, 1994. Major activities included: refueling; reactor vessel nozzle and flange weld ISI inspection; installation of a permanent cavity seal ring; replacing reed switches for several CEAs; integrated safeguards test; steam generator tube inspection and plugging; steam generator sludge lancing; repair of refueling water storage tank; several instances of reduced inventory / mid-loop operations; replacement .
of ICW/CCW LOOP logic (HFA latching relays) with pull-to-lock switches; removal (collection) of Rx vessel neutron flux dosimetry; modification ,
of.EDG skids to allow access underneath; inspection of ECCS sump area; !
+ replacement of a main transformer; modification of containment spray NaOH addition piping; and mechanical, electrical, and I&C systems l maintenance. The next Unit I refueling outage is scheduled for April 29,.1996.
Unit 2's last refueling outage began on October 9,1995, and ended, January 1, 1996. Major outage activities included: refueling; steam ,
generator tube. inspection and. plugging; low pressure turbine blade l replacement; emergency diesel generator inspection; replacement of three i
. , - . - , - . - _ , . . - - . ~ ,.%.. r-a
I 11 reactor coolant pump mechanical seals; and mechanical, electrical, and I&C systems maintenance. The next Unit 2 refueling outage is scheduled for April 15, 1997.
PART 2 - PLANT PERSPECTIVE 2.1 GENERAL PLANT PERSPECTIVE A SALP board meeting was conducted on January 18, 1996, covering the SALP period of January 2,1994, through January 6,1996. The facility was rated category 1 in the areas of Plant Support and Engineering and 2 in the areas of Operations and Mainenance and Surveillance. The latter scores were a decline from the previous SALP cycle, when the facility was rated category 1 in all areas. l 2.2 SALP HISTORY (Past 2 SALP Periods)
The last SALP period, SALP Cycle 11, ended on January 6,1996. The ,
current SALP period ends (tentatively) in June, 1997. '
ASSMT. OPS RAD MNT/SURV EP SEC ENG/ TECH SAQV PERIOD 5/1/89 - 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 10/31/90 11/1/90 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5/2/92 PLANT OPS MAINTENANCE ENGINEERING PLANT SUPPORT 5/3/93 - 1 1 1 1 1/1/94 1/2/94 - 2 2 1 1 1/6/96 2.3 SELECTED SALP AREA DISCUSSION Since July 1995, there has been a series of events that led to questioning the plants overall performance. These have included: i
. A Unit I turbine trip due to procedural weakness, operator performance and supervisory oversight. )
. The attempt to restage an RCP seal using inadequate and !
inappropriate procedural guidance. The evolution was compounded by failing to follow aspects of the guidence that did exist, which i led to the failure of the second and third stage seals.
e 9
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. A main steam isolation signal due to an operator failing to block the MSIS signal during a cooldown when an annunciator indicated that the block was enabled. This failure occurred dispite the fact that that the operator's attention was directed to the annunciator on at least two different occassions. .
. Both pressurizer power operated relief valves being found inoperable due to incorrect assembly during a refueling outage.
The conditions had existed for approximately 10 months.
. An loss of RCS inventory due to a shutdown cooling relief valve ;
which lifted and then failed to reseat due to incorrect setpoint margins (a generic problem involving several valves). The licensee had sufficient evidence that this generic condition existed,-but had failed to act promptly to evaluate the .
conditions.
. The spraydown of containment due to an inadequate procedure and operator error coupled with an existing operator-work-around.
These and several other recent deficiencies involving weak procedures, a '
general lack of procedural compliance, equipment failures, and personnel errors clearly indicated that the plant's past high level of performance had declined.
These and other problems led to several plant management changes, an overall evaluation of the recent plant problems by a plant-requested independent assessment team, and a root cause evaluation by the NRC. In a meeting with the NRC on August 29, 1995, the licensee committed to use ;
the results of the independent assessment team to develop an action plan i for improvement. l l
Plant Ooerations Summary of Previous Assessment The previous SALP assessment concluded that Operations remained strong, that management actions were aggressive in dealing with identified weaknesses, and that attention to detail was a continuing challenge for the licensee.
Summary of the Most Recent SALP The board concluded that licensee performance had declined in the l most recent SALP period. The' board found that day-to-day !
activities were conducted with a degree of complacency. I
- Corrective actions, management involvement and communication'of f expectations, attention to detail, procedural adequacy and adherence, and operator workarounds were similarly considered to be challenges to licensee performance. l 9
._ . = . . -- . .
I 13 4 \ Maintenance / Surveillance Summary of Previous Assessment i Maintenance was assessed as category 1 in the previous SALP. l Assessments made early in the most recent cycle indicated that the j performance level of maintenance activities had not abated. j i 1 Sunnary of the Most Recent SALP l The board concluded that performance in this functional area had
- declined. Areas of concern included the existance of long-standing equipment problems and a sense that management expectaticns were either low or not adequately enforced. Of particular concern was the fact that equipment failure factored into 6 unit trips during the SALP cycle. Additionally, worker adherence to procedures, and the quality and adequacy of procedures was found to be a challenge to performance.
Enaineerina Summary of Previous Assessment j The previous assessments for I!his SALP cycle concluded that engineering was generally strong. Good support of the plant was cited, as was the quality of engineering products, both to the site and in submittals to the NRC.
Summary of the Most Recent SALP The board concluded that Engineering continued to perform at a superior level. Continued support to the plant, as well as adequacy in safety and operational evaluations were identified. In addition, the licensee's activities at the engineering materials laboratory and in the developement of maintenance specifications were seen as strengths.
PART 3 -
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 3.1 SIGNIFICANT EVENTS BRIEFINGS (Past 12 Months)
Unit 1: 95-08, 3/22/95, Failures of Rosemount Transmitters due to Gas Permeation of Monel Diaphragms Unit 2: None 3.2 ENFORCEMENT STATUS / HISTORY (Past 12 Months)
. SL III Violation ($50,000 CP) for violations associated with inoperable Unit 1 PORVs 4
1 14- ,
f
. Predecisional Enforcement Conference held, SL IV violation issued i for failure to take prompt corrective action for issues relating j to relief valve lift and blowdown setpoint values which resulted in a loss of Unit 1 RCS inventory while on shutdown cooling.
PART 4 - STAFFING AND TRAINING j l
4.1 OPERATIONS STAFF - OVERALL (9/95) !
Average performance of the operations staff has been noted. Control i i
room demeanor of personnel is above average.
i Number of Shifts: (RCO, SRO) Five shift rotation, 8-hour shifts; (NPO, ANPO, SNPO) Five shift rotation, 8-hour shifts.
Number of SR0s: 38 active /13 inactive / 51 total Number of R0s: 23 active /1 inactive / 24 total Total Licensed Operators: 61 active /14 inactive / 75 total 4.2 WORK FORCE (2/96)
Plant personnel (including 787 disciplines below) l Breakdown by Ma.ior Oroanization FPL Contractors Operations 128 0 Chemistry 20 0 Health Physics 73 0 Maintenance 311 60 Outage Management 21 0 Nuclear Material, Management 36 0 Site Engineering 50 0 ,
Juno Engineering Security 9 120 37 0 QA/QC
- Includes Reactor Engineers, System Engineers, and Test Engineers 4.3 OPERATOR OUALIFICATION/RE00ALIFICATION PROGRAM (Past Two Years) 4.3.1 REQUALIFICATION PROGRAM Last Inspection - 9/26/94, Inspection Report 50-335,389/94-19 .
Next Inspection - 10/96 ,
4.3.2 INITIAL EXAMS 6
4 4
15 Last Exams 10/17/94 - 2 R0 2 passed for 100%
9 SRO 9 passed for 100%
Next Exam 3/25/96 - 6 RO 4.4 PLANT SIMULATOR The simulator is on site and fully certified to meet ANSI /ANS 3.5, 1985.
4.5 INPO ACCREDITATION All training programs are maintaining INPO accreditation. .The site specific simulator has been used for training since 1988 and has been fully certified for approximately 5 years. NRC inspections in the form of operator examinations at the simulator have found no serious -
problems.
PART 5 - INSPECTION ACTIVITIES 5.1 INSPECTION FOLLOWUP OPEN ITEMS
SUMMARY
(UNITS I AND 2 COMBINED)
(10/6/94)
Pre Division Change from Ig11]. Last Report Division _jl 1921 DRP 4 34 18
_,_QB1 1Q 4 14 Total 14 37 51 Note: Each item that applies to'both units is counted as one item.
5.2 MAJOR INSPECTIONS NR-No. Q31g Ty,gg RG-1.97 89-02 1/89 89-03 3/89 NDE 89-07 3/89 EQ 89-09 3/89 Design Control 89-24 10/89 Maintenance Team Inspection 89-27 11/89 .EOP Followup 90-09 4-5/90 OSTI 91-03 2-3/91 EDSFI 91-18 9/91 MOV (no negative findings)91-201 9-10/91 Service Water Inspection 92-14 7/92 Emergency Preparedness Program 92 ,
7/92, EDSFI Followup 93-01 1/93 Check Valves 94-11 5/94- MOV Followup 95-05 6/95 Engineering 9
i 16 95-16 .
9/95 PORY Special Inspection 96-01 1/96 Dilution Event Spectial Inspection 5.3 PLANNED TEAM INSPECTIONS None 5.4 INFREQUENT INSPECTION PROCEDURE STATUS No core inspection procedures are overdue at this time.
5.5 SIMS STATUS - OPEN TMI ITEMS There'are no open TMI items.
4 l
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PERIOD OF OPERATION (MONTHLY)
.lANil ARY 2.1994 THROllGH .l ANU ARY 6.1998 _
4 i DESCRIPTION OF EVRf7S - ST, LUCIE UNIT 1 .
- 1. On January 9,.the unit was manually tripped in response to.a loss of'the IB MFWP.
- 2. The unit tripped from loss of load when the generator excitor circuit ' breaker was inadvertently opened locally on March 28, 1994.
- 3. On June 6,.1994, the unit experienced a main generator lockout, followed by turbine and
~
reactor trips, when ~ a thunderstorm- blew a section of flashing across two output terminals of main transformer 1A.'
- 4. Power was reduced to 80% power on August 10, 1994, due.to Digital Electro-Hydraulic System (DEH) leak. The unit was returned to full power on August 23, 1994.
. 5. The turbine was taken of line on August 28, 1994, to repair a leak in the DEH.. Repairs were completed and the unit returned to power on the af ternoon of August 28, 1994. The unit'was returned to full power on September 2, 1994. j i 6. . .The unit tripped as the result of a lighting strike in the switchyard on October 26, '
1994. Since the unit was scheduled to start a refueling outage.on October 31, 1994, a i
decision was made to start the refueling outage
- 7. On February '27, 1995, the unit was removed from service for the replacement of pressurizer code safety valves which had been leaking by the seat since shortly after startup in November, 1994. The unit was returned to power on March 8, 1995.
8 '. On' July 8, 1995, the unit tripped during turbine valve surveillance' testing. The unit was returned to power on' July 12, 1995. .
- 9. On August 1, 1995, the unit was shutdown as a result of Hurricane Erin. Due to a series of equipment problems and personnel performance issues the unit remained shutdown until October 9, 1995. .:
t
- 10. On November 17, 1995, the unit was manually tripped due to low steam generator level when-the feed regulating valve failed to mid position.
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ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 - SALP CYCLE 11 l
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w s DESCRIPTION OF syn .. - ST LUCIE UNIT 3
- 1. On February 27, 1994, the unit was coasting'down to the cycle-8 refueling outage. The-unit was taken'off-line on February 14, 1994.
- 2. On April 23, 1994,-the unit tripped from 30% power during RPS adjustment.
- 3. . The unit.2 turbine was-shutdown on July 9, 1994, and reactor power reduced to Mode 2 on July-10, 1994. On July 14, 1994, the unit wa,s shutdown to repair a stuck closed trip-circuit breaker. The unit was restarted and placed on line on July 15, 1994.
- 4. On February 21, 1995, the unit tripped as a result of low steam generator water level. ,
The condition was the result of a feedwater regulating valve closure - after a - steam
. generator water level control level transmitter failed high. The transmitter was replaced and the unit was returned to service on February 25, 1995. I
- 5. On April 25, 1995, the main generator was taken 'of line to repair a faulty power supply- -
3 in the DEH system.
- 6. On August 1, 1995, the unit was shutdown as a result of _ Hurricane Erin. It was restarted !
on August 4, 1995.
- 7. On October 9, 1995, the unit was shut down for a scheduled refueling outage.
- 8. On January 1, 1996, the unit went critical. -
- 9. On January 5,'1996, a manual trip was initiated on high generator hydrogen temperature.
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1 i i.'
i February 8, 1996
{ :
Florida Power and Light Company J ATTN:' Mr. J. H. Goldberg i' President - Nuclear Division
. P. O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420
SUBJECT:
. SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE (SALP)
(NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-335/95-99; 50-389/95-99)
I-
Dear Mr. Goldberg:
The Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) for the' period January 2, 1994 through January 6, 1996, has been completed for St. Lucie. +
- The results of the assessment are documented in the enclosed SALP report which i will be discussed with you at a public meeting at the St. Lucie Site on ;
February 22, 1996, at 1:00 pm. At the meeting, you should be prepared to ;
- discuss our assessment and any initiatives that address our. concerns and !
challenges identified'in the SALP report. l Overall the performance of the St. Lucie Plant was assessed as good over the ,
i performance period. The.overall performance was mixed with the response to ;
. transient events being very good but. routine activities performed at a i l somewhat lower level of performance. The engineering and plant support functional areas sustained the previously assessed ratings of superior performance, but there is a disturbing performance trend in the functional areas of operations and maintenance. Performance declined significantly in
- these areas from superior ratings that had been sustained over several past 1
' performance periods to a level of good performance. There is a concern that i the.long period of superior performance may have led .to a pervasive complacent- !
4 environment that is tolerant of equipment issues and a lack of discipline in - '
adhering to procedures. There is evidence that the decline in human i
performance may be aggravated by inadequacies in the quality of the procedures themselves. Another contributor appears to be acceptance of a lower standard
. of performance by a significant part of the organization.
A further concern is the degree to which the performance declined before it.
[ was detected by the organization's self-assessment programs. There is a clear i indication that these programs were not effective in identifying the trends early. It is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of the extensive corrective actions that were instituted in the very late part of the assessment period, but it is clear they must be aggressively pursued to ,
terminate the negative trend in performance.
l l
OFFICIAL COPY ,
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FP&L -2 I
In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of !
this letter and its enclosure will be placed in.the NRC Public Document Room. l l
Should you have any questions or comments, I-would be pleased to discuss them ;
. with you. . '
Sincerely, Orig signed by Stewart D. Ebneter
,a
! Stewart D. Ebneter l- Regional Administrator l
Enclosure:
As stated 4
- cc w/ encl:
D. A. Sager, Vice President 4
- St. Lucie Nuclear Plant P. O. Box 128 Ft. Pierce, FL 34954-0128 H. N. Paduano, Manager.
Licensing and Special Programs Florida Power and Light Company P. O. Box-14000 Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420 i J. Scarola, Plant General Manager -
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant P. O. Box 128 Ft. Pierce, FL 34954-0128 Robert E. Dawson, Plant Licensing Manager St. Lucie Nuclear Plant P. O. Box 128 Ft. Pierce, FL 34954-0218 J. R. Newman, Esq.
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius 1800 M Street, NW Washington, D. C. 20036 John T. Butler, Esq.
Steel Hector and Davis '
4000 Southeast Financial Center -
Miami, FL 33131-2398 cc w/ enc 1: Continued see page 3 s
4
- , v, - <
- - - . . . - . = . - _ . . . .
FP&L 3 cc w/ enc 1: Continued Bill Passetti
~ 0ffice of Radiation Control Dept of Health and Rehab. Serv.
1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Jack Shreve, Public Counsel Office of the Public Counsel c/o The Florida Legislature 111 West Madison Avenue, Room 812 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1400 Joe Myers, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive .
Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100 Thomas R. L. Kindred, County Administrator St. Lucie County 2300 Virginia Avenue Ft. Pierce, FL 34982 Charles B. Brinkman Washington Nuclear Operations ABB Combustion Engineering, Inc.
12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 3300 Rockville, MD 20852 Distribution w/ enc 1:
Chairman Shirley Ann Jackson Commissioner K. C. Rogers J. M. Taylor, EDO H. L. Thompson, Jr., DEDS J. L. Milhoan, DEDR G. M. Tracy, Regional Coordinator, EDO W. T. Russell, NRR R. P. Zimmerman, NRR
, ' A. C. Thadani, NRR J. Lieberman, OE S. A. Varga, NRR J. A. Zwolinski, NRR D. L. Gamberoni, Jr., NRR/ILPB (2 copies)
D. B. Matthews, NRR J. Norris, NRR R. W. Cooper, RI W. L. Axelson, RIII J. E. Dyer, RIV K. E. Perkins, WCFO E. W. Merschoff, RII J. R. Johnson, RI!
A. F. Gibson, RII Distribution w/ enc 1: Continued see page 4 6
SALP REPORT - ST. LUCIE 50-335; 50-389
- JANUARY 2. 1994 - JANUARY 6. 1996 I. BACKGROUND The SALP Board convened on January 18, 1996, to assess the nuclear safety performance of St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 for the period of January 2, 1994, through January 6, 1996. The Board Meeting was conducted pursuant to NRC Management Directive 8.6, " Systematic l Assessment of. Licensee Performance." Board members were Ellis W. '
Merschoff (Chairperson), Director, Division of Reactor Projects, Region II (RII); Johns P. Jaudon, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor
, Safety, RII; and David B. Matthews, Director, Project Directorate II-1, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. i The performance category ratings and the assessment functional areas used below are defined and described in NRC Management Directive 8.6,
" Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP)."
.II. PERFORNANCE ANALYSIS - PLANT OPERATIONS <
This functional area assesses the cont'rol and execution of activities i directly related to operating the plant. It includes activities such as ;
- plant startup, power operation, plant shutdown, and response to )
l ,
transients. I
- Overall performance in the operations area has declined from its !
i previous superior level to an overall rating of good. The plant has
- . been operated safely, although there has been an increase in the number ,
of operational events. This increase is attributable to the following: )
! weaknesses in operator performance, the acceptance of long standing i
deficiencies in plant equipment, management expectations not effectively i communicated to personnel and enforced, weaknesses in procedural
, adequacy and adherence, and the implementation and adequacy of corrective actions. Quality Assurance activities associated with F
1 Operations remained strong and effective in identifying areas for )
- improvement. ;
l Operator performance during the period has, overall, been good, and '
continued to be strong during unusual plant events or evolutions. I Operators showed alert and proper response to ten reactor trips, ;
reflecting well upon the licensee's training program and individual :
. capabilities. Similarly, operator performance during twelve observed i i
startups and seven monitored entries into reduced inventory conditions ,
were typified by excellent command and control and thorough operator knowledge. However, operator performance during less demanding or less i focused evolut_1ons showed weaknesses in proc.edural adherence, the identification and correction.of deficiencies, and attention to detail.
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- j. Of'particular concern, procedural. adherence and adequacy issues resulted
- in, or contributed to, an increase in the number and severity of
- . operational events. The. lack of overall quality in plant procedures was
- underscored by the shear volume of procedural changes required when a i policy of verbatim compliance was adopted.
The ability of Operations to identify and correct problems in a manner
- i sufficient to prevent recurrence was also of concern. This issue was I
compounded by identified weaknesses in communications across '
. organizational interfaces, in that failures in informal comunications
- were not compensated for by programmatic methods.
. a I
Finally, operator attention to detail has declined during this SALP j period. Given that issues of procedural inadequacies existed, the
. importance of attention to detail by operators was amplified, in that it represents an important barrier to failures. The decline in attention a
1 to details was indicative.of an onset of complacency through the SALP
' period, a trend which operations management failed to identify and
- - remedy in a timely manner.
The Plant Operations area is rated Category 2.
i III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS - MAINTENANCE
!. This functional area assesses licensee activities in the areas of testing and maintaining plant structures, systems, and components.
Activities assessed include preventive, predictive, and corrective maintenance, as well as surveillance, post-modification, and post-
! maintenance testing.
! Overall performance in the maintenance area declined from its previous i superior level to an overall rating-of good. Maintenance provided' generally effective support for plant operations on a day-to-day basis.
However, there were problems with equipment that adversely affected
- overall plant performance and provided . unnecessary challenges to
- operations. .
! Significant problems related to maintenance were manifested by an
- operability issue with pressurizer power-operated relief valves, reactor
- coolant pumps seal failures, and inadequate post-maintenance test determinations. There were also procedural difficulties encountered,
. especially in surveillance and preventive maintenance procedures. These issues had been present but unrecognized previously, and the licensee's remedial actions included an attempt to utilize a " verbatim compliance" approach. However, the older procedures were not written to a . level of detail that would support this methodology, and the plant rank and file
- were not well oriented in the concept of procedural adherence; therefore, the use of verbatim compliance did not resolve the problems
- emanating from weak procedures.
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- Management of the maintenance area changed during this assessment i period, and by the end of the assessment period, the new management -
i appeared to be providing the leadership necessary to reverse the.
1 . observed negative trends. In the area of procedures, the new management team instituted a dual approach of correcting the procedures and training the personnel to use them which has seen some preliminary successes.
r
- The surveillance program was implemented. satisfactorily, but the ,
-procedural problems discussed above kept it from rising- to the superior level. Corrective maintenance was performed acceptably and generally had strong management involvement. -
! In addition to the apparent str.ength of the new management team', the i predictive maintenance group was considered a strength. The group was adept at vibration analysis, thermography, and lubrication analysis.
The predictive maintenance group had strong and positive interactions
- . with the operations and maintenance programs and, furnishing early
- warning of incipient equipment failures, and long-term degradation of
- important components.
}- Licensee preparations to implement the new maintenance rule were successful in ' identifying equipment such as the radiation monitoring i system and the emergency diesel generators which were not performing to
!, the-licensee's expectations.
The Maintenance area is rated Category 2.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS - ENGINEERING t
This functional area assesses activities associated with the design of l i plant modifications and engineering support for operations, maintenance, 1 i surveillance, and licensing activities. l t
The overall performance in the Engineering area remained superior. !
! . I
! The strength of the engineering group was shown in the area of design 1 and installation support. This was manifested by a number of well engineered and implemented plant modifications. In the area of design
, control and maintenance of the current licensing basis, the engineering organization typically performed well with occasional weaknesses.-
1 .
-The plant's operations were supported successfully throughout tho' l assessment period. Of particular note was the design and installation on Unit 2 of the condenser tube cleaning system. In addition, the licensee has undertaken several initiatives to reduce the number of jumper / lifted leads, eliminate operator work-arounds, reduce the number L of old work orders, and to improve the performance of contractors. The i fuel vendor independence program will result in better control of core !
- design, improved support *for_the plant and. enhanced fuel utilization. l
! The support of maintenance activities remained strong. The 45th Street l Laboratory provided good support with component specialists along with i
, i i
- - - , ~ ,-- ,...r - , , e -
l 4
i
! effective nondestructive examination services. A comprehensive program i of monitoring Alloy 600/690 applications focused on the pressurizer, reactor vessel and loop piping penetrations. The recently implemented l maintenance specification program should result in effective maintenance i
support, efficient engineering, and enhanced plant safety. In light of i
- the weaknesses discussed in the Maintenance section, the support of
! maintenance activities by engineering is an area where improvements
! could be achieved. ,
! Throughout the assessment period, licensing submittals have been
- consistently of. high quality, reflecting sound engineering judgment and l appropriate attention to detail. Safety evaluations demonstrated the
- j. licensee's commitment to safety and compliance with regulations.
i
- . The Engineering area is rated Category 1.
! V. PERFORNANCE ANALYSIS - PLANT SUPPORT i
This functional area addresses radiological controls, radioactive
, effluents, chemistry, emergency preparedness, security, fire protection, l and housekeeping controls. -
The overall performance in the Plant Support area has remained superior.
.The radiation protection program received strong management support.
! The accumulated dose goal was met for the first year of the assessment period but not for the second year. This was the result of the
- maintenance problems and the resulting increased outage time. The l -
radiation protection organization continued to implement strong i Initiatives in the "as low as reasonably achievable" (ALARA) program
,- through the use of remote monitoring of potentially high radiological
- dose work and the introduction of electronic dosimetry. Management involvement and support was evidenced by the small amount of surface area contamination, a.significant. reduction in the volume of solid waste, and the readiness of the post accident sampling system. Training and self-assessments were found to be effective. Thus, the combination of management support and an innovative health physics organization resulted in superior performance.
Security maintained an excellent level of performance during a staff reduction _of the guard force and the introduction of biometrics.
Measures used included effective training, which included the use of a
! combat firing range and good self-assessments. Changes to the security '
plan were both appropriate and made in a timely manner. However, there were-some performance problems such as a repeat instance of failure to compensate in a timely manner for a computer failure; this suggested a, problem with the' effectiveness of corrective action from a previous-event.
-In the fire protection area, combustible control was effective and the fire brigade performed'well during drills and during an actual event.
However,' observation of surveillance testing of the fire protection
5 systems revealed weak procedures, poor attention to detail, as well as minor past errors that had gone uncorrected. On balance, procedural and surveillance problems detracted from the otherwise excellent level of performance in the fire protection area.
In the emergency preparedness area, the full participation exercise conducted in 1994 was successful, and appropriate emergency classifications were made. Overall exercise performance was rated as good. The status of equipment and supplies needed to support emergency.
preparedness was found to be adequate. .The emergency preparedness program maintained a good state of readiness for event response.
The Plant Support area is rated Category 1.
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INSPECTOR INPUT St. Lucie Plant INPUT FOR INSPECTION REPORT NO.: 50-335,389/96-02 DATES OF INSPECTION: March 4 - 8 , 1996 A. Inspector: i i Rich C. hod, Reactor Inspector Datp$1gned Approved By: 8/M f,n.,,P.E.fredrickson, Chief W .
, Date Sig d Special Inspection Branch .
Division of Reactor Safety B. I.0 Persons Contacted:
Licensee Employees i W. Bush, Instrument and Control Sunervisor R. Dietz, Licensing Engineer i R. Kulavich, Diesel Generator Engineer !
A. Martens, Acting Maintenance Manager l Other licensee employees contacted included craftsmen, technicians, engineers, administrative personnel, and operators.
NRC Personnel M. Miller,. Senior Resident Inspr;ctor C. Input for the appropriate inspection area.
3.0 Maintenanca 3.1 Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspectors observed maintenance act.ivities on systems-and components to determine if.the activities were conducted in accordance with regulatory requirements, approved procedures, and appropriate industrial codes and standards. The inspectors also reviewed the selected procedures and verified that corrective maintenance activities ~for safety-related systems and components were being conducted in a manner which resulted in reliable safe operation of the plant and plant
~
equipment. In order to ensure that the maintenance was performed effectively, the inspectors verified the following specific elements: !
applicable tools -were properly calibrated, correct parts and tools were used, supervision was adequate, and approved procedures / instructions were used. The items observed a,re listed below:
8
l 2
Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator IA Test and Surveillance Unit 2 Waste Gas Compressor Maintenance Unit 2 CTCS Recirculating Pump 2B1 Mechanical Seal Replacement l1 Torque Wrench Calibration '
- i 3.1.1 Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator 1A Test and Surveillance
~
Prior to diesel generator test and surveillance, the inspector.s observed ]
- that a diesel generator engineer and a technician walked down the 4
radiators to check erosion / corrosion problems. Several photos were i taken for evidence to show the management about severe problems on the t radiators. sPer the engineer, these radiators were installed just about i three years ago and has corrosion problems' due to the salty environment.
l The licensee already plans to replace them during the coming outage.
The photos would be used to confirm the severe condition and speed the !
. process. l s
j There are two diesel engines connecting to a common diesel generator in !
J the middle to produce electricity. This type of the diesel engines is ;
j called tandem yngines. One engine contains 12. cylinders and the other ;
- contains 16 cylinders. ;
/ :
The procedure used for test and surveillance 'was Operating Procedure No. I
~1-2200050A, IA Emergency Diesel Generator Periodic Test and General l Operation Instructions, Rev. 24. The inspectors observed the following .
n, activities related to the testing such as checking diesel mounted fuel r
- tank level, diesel oil storage tank level, the operability of 1A fuel ;
1 oil transfer pump, blowing down all four air receivers, engine and i j_ governor oil levels, engine running at 900 RPM, 4200 volts, 3400 KW of l power, local alarms ,and annunciators in the control room, engine oil i temperature and pressure, the full speed of 900 RPM at least one hour, j j '
-etc. The inspectors noticed a small amount of oil leak around several i cylinder covers. The engineer stated that the small amount of oil leak
,. was normal. l
? ,
The inspectors considered that the diesel generator engineer and testing I
- operator were knowledgeable and skillful in handling the test and )
t performing the maintenance. The diesel started as expected and ran smoothly in a good condition.
- 3.1.2 Unit 2 Waste Gas Compressor Maintenance
)
The inspectors observed head inspection and, assembly on Unit 2 Waste Gas i Compressor. The seal was leaking and was replaced. The procedure used )
i was 2-MMP-06.01, Waste Gas Disassembly, Repair, and Reassembly, Rev.~1.
4 The compressor and parts were inspected for damage,-cuts, nicks, l scratches, degradation, cracks, etc. No defects were found. The parts i were cleaned using Isopropyl Alcohol. All 0-rings were replaced with. ;
new 0-rings and the sizes of-new 0-rings matched the sizes of the old 0-rings. .
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3 The head assembly included the installation of the support head, lower
- head, three layers of diaphrages, the cap screws to secure the diaphrages with the torque to six in.-lbs, the upper head, 0-rings 1 attached to all heads, and the head assembly bolts with torque to 300' j
ft.-lbs. The inspectors especially observed the craftsmen torque the head assembly bolts to 300 ft.-lbs in a torque sequence marked on top of j the upper head because the right bolt torque sequence would distribute i
-the torque pressure and prevent damage to the bolts and heads. The J
. inspectors also verified the torque wrenches.to be within the '
! calibration dates. ;
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- 3.1.3 Unit 2 CTCS Recirculating Pump 281 Mechanical Seal Replacement l
L The Condenser Filter Cleaning Syst_ ems are new systems and were ins'talled
- , a< couple of months ago to circulate and clean-intake cooling water '
i through the condenser filter. The recirculating pumps have leaked since i the installation. The inspectors observed the replacement of the new ;
L seal, Chesterton 442 Mechanical Seal. The old seal was inspected by the ;
L licensee engineer for damage, wear, degradation, etc. No damage was ;
found. However, the seal was found to have wear slightly due to the- '
- grit. There was no procedure for this task. The craftsmen followed the
' instructions. attached to the. kit for the removal and installation of the .
l seals. l During the review of the copy of the' Work Order in the field, the j inspectors found that the craftsmen'did not sign and date on page 2 of the Work Order, which requires the craftsmen to~ verify that they are working on the correct unit and components prior to shysically starting work. The inspectors questioned the craftsmen why tiey did not sign and 4
date on the page 2 of the Work Order as required. They replied that the master copy (or control copy) of the Work Order was brought to the
- field, signed, and returned to the office prior to physically starting
- work. The copy of.the Work Order in the' field was not required to be signed since the master copy was 'already signed.* Later, the supervisor said that the craftsmen went to the field for the clearance and came i- back the office to sign the master copy which meant that they verified the correct unit and components prior to~ physically starting work. The i,
- inspectors questioned what are the effective time span for the clearance document. The. supervisor said " as long as you.want". The problem ~is J.
i that the craftsmen may not go back the field immediately to physically starting work due to other problems. It-may be delayed a couple of days or months due to the change of the procedure, condition, environment,or emergency. ;Therefore, signing in the master copy after the clearance check could not be verified that the act was prior to physically
, starting work. The copy in-the field is still-required to be signed and '
i i' dated prior to physically starting work. The management agreed to '
reinforce the requirement to sign the work copy in the field. The -
[ Linspectors considered this problem as a weakness.
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4 i 3.1.4 Torque Wrench Calibration The inspectors observed the torque wrench calibration practice in order to see if they complied with the procedure. The procedure used was .
. General Maintenance Procedure No. M-0004, Calibration of Mechanical Maintenance Measuring and Testing Equipment, Rev. 18. The torque wrench tester is Model TBT-600. Prior to the torque wrench calibration, the tester itself is required to be calibrated using the same procedure.
The inspectors witnessed the retest of several torque wrenches which indicated all of them to be within the acceptable range of + or - 4% of i torque values. Each_ torque wrench was checked at 20 percent, 40 percent, 60 percent, 80 percent, and 100 percent of its capacity. The torque wrench operator tests wrenches and compares the test values against the tables in the attachments to the procedure. ~The tables 1.ist the acceptable ranges for each torque values. The inspectors randomly selected several torque values from the tables, checked the figures of the range values, and found them to be acceptable.
6.0 Review of UFSAR Commitments .
A recent discovery of a licensee operating their facility in a manner contrary to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) description highlighted the need for a special focused review that compares plant practices, procedures and/or parameters,to the UFSAR descriptions.
While performing the inspections discussed in'this report, the inspectors reviewed the applicable portions of the UFSAR that related to the areas inspected. The inspectors verified that the UFSAR wording was consistent with the observed . plant practices, procedures arid /or parameters.
D. 7.0 Pre-exit
- q Pre-exit was conducted on March 8, 1996. The inspectors described the areas inspected, and discussed in detail the inspection results.
Proprietary information is not contained in this. report. Dissenting ,
comments were not received from the licensee. '
- E. 8.0 Acronyms None F. Summary Statement
- i 3 The procedures used for the maintenance on the eme'rgency diesel 1
generator testing, the mechanical seal replacements, and the torque i
. wrench calibrations were adequate to provide the details for the craft ,
to perform maintenance, inspection, and calibration (paragraph 3.1). !
The crafts were knowledgeable and skillful in doing the work. The inspectors were satisfied with the work performed. However, one weakness was observed for a crew not signing and dating the work copy of 4
the Work Order in the field prior to physically starting work.
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G. IFS Forms: None H. Completed NOV: NONE I. Cover Letter Paragraph:- NONE J. NOTE FOR DRS ONLY: The report file name is S:\DRS\ SIB \SL96020.RCC f t
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