ML20084F964

Responds to IE Bulletin 83-07, Apparently Fraudulent Products Sold by Ray Miller,Inc. Investigation Discovered Six Purchase Orders Involving Ray Miller Matls.Evaluation of Subj Matls Revealed Inapplicability of Bulletin

ML20084F964
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	04/18/1984
From:	Fiedler P GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To:	Murley T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
IEB-83-07, IEB-83-7, NUDOCS 8405070012
Download: ML20084F964 (5)

Text

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w GPU Nuclear Corporation Nuclear 1

= = = 388 Forked River, New Jersey 08731-0388 609 971-4000 Writer's Direct Dial Number:

April 18, 1984 Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Administrator Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406

Subject:

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket No. 50-219 Response to IE Bulletin 83-07 Apparently Fraudulent Products Sold by Ray Miller Inc.

The purpose of this submittal is to provide you, as requested, with the results of our investigation conducted in response to IE Bulletin 83-07.

In responding to the subject bulletin, we have performed the following actions:

1) Reviewed our Procurement Quality Assurance logs which list all Important to Safety purchases dating back to 1974.

2) Reviewed purchase files from 1972 back through the beginning of plant operation in 1969.

3) Reviewed the Purchasing vendor files of all purchases back through 1972.

4) Reviewed Secondary Vendors (as noted in IE Bulletin 83-07) against the Purchasing vendor list and contacted all vendors which we had done business with as a result of this review.

5) Contacted frequently used important to safety material suppliers on our Supplier Quality Classification list which supply piping and piping materials to request information concerning potential Ray Miller material that we may have received from them.

In performing these reviews, totaling over five hundred (500) man hours of .

research, we have located a total of (6) six Purchase Orders involving Ray Miller materials.

Upon locating these purchase orders, we requested the materials be evaluated to determine their continued acceptablity. 'Ihis evaluation, conducted by the Mechanical Components and Radwaste Systems Engineering department concluded that none of the fraudulent practices by Ray Miller Inc. apply in the case of the six orders supplied to Oyster Creek.

8405070012 840418 PDR ADOCK 05000219 PDR G

GPU Nuclear Corporation is a subsidiary of the General Public Utilities Corporation

4 In addition, each application (purchase order) was reviewed by the following outline:

1) Description of m terial and application

2) SysteWsafety classification where the material was applied

3) Potential fraudulent practice on material

4) Safety significance assuming most likely fraudulent practice, or assuming material failure

5) Determine disposition of installed material The individual dispositions of the six noted purchase orders are as follows:

P.O. #18799

1) Aluminum pipe fittings employed in the " Control Rod Drive Water Quality Modification" 1 - 3" x 3" x 2" Sch. 40 Tee 1 - 1" 150 lb. RF Socket Weld Pipe Flange

Material certified to be 6061 - T6 Aluminum This modification provided a cross-tie from the 8" condensate transfer line to the condensate storage tank, to the storage tank supply line to the control red drive pumps, with the objective of bypassing the storage tank so as to provide higher quality water to the CRD hydraulic system.

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2) he supplied material is installed in the Condensate Transfer System.

mis system is classified as "Important to Safety" and is listed as a system " Required to Mitigate the Consequences of Postulated Accidents".

3) No specific occurrences of fraudulent practices applicable to aluminum pipe fittings are cited in IE Information Notice No. 83-01. Postulated-fraudulent practices might be substitution of other alloys, foreign supply, or inadequate pressure rating.

4) The safety function applicable to the Condensate Transfer System is the provision of a back-up water supply to the Core Spray Pump suctions through a 12 inch line from the Condensate Storage Tank, connecting to the pump suctions via normally locked closed valves. he consequences of a failure of the subject fittings could be leakage flow from the Condensate Transfer System with consequential reduction of back-up water supply available for the Core Spray System. We failure would not directly impact Core Spray unless the back-up supply was actually in use.

4 j 5) Disposition: Use as-is. The material is located in a portion of the-system with a design pressure of 50 psig. W e actual operating pressure-

. is less than 50 psig. R us, there is significant margin between

operating pressure and design pressure of the material. Also, the system received an initial service-leak test in accordance with ANSI B31.1.

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. . . - _. - - _..~ _-. _ .__- - - - _ - _ _ _ .-. - -.

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!- I P.O. #73171 l i

1) Instrument tubing fittings employed in "Feedwater Flow Element Modification" i

6 - 900 1/2" ss elbows 3 - Wes 1/2"'ss 3 - 450 ss elbows This modification moved the low pressure tap (connection) on the main

feedwater flow element from a location at the throat of the flow element

! (venturi) to a position just downstream of the flow element. The reason

! was to correct an inherent flow measurement error caused by a venturi bypass.

2) This material is installed in the Feedwater System. It is installed in the non-reactor coolant pressure boundary portion of the system and is thus "Not Important to Safety" from a piping standpoint. However, it is i functionally part of the.Feedwater Control System which is classified-

with systems " Required to Mitigate the Consequences of Postulated Accident", based on its relation to reactor water level control.

t 3) Applicable fraudulent practice could be inadequate pressure rating.

i 4) Applicable safety-related function potentially inpacted by material 4

failure would be control of reactor water. level.~ A failure of the i downstream pressure tap on the feedwater flow element would be falsely i interpreted by.the three element feedwater control system as a high flow-signal. The initial action of the control system would be to throttle

, the feedwater control system except that the integral punp runout

1. protection circuit over-rides the 3-element control to maintain flow at.

l the high alarm :wt point. Sere is thus no reduction in reactor water.

level and no safety concern.

! 5) Disposition: Use as-is.

4 In addition to the above noted parts, two (2) purchase orders,in the category of-

" Limited Purchase Orders" were placed. Rese involved aluminum backing rings for i the Condensate Transfer Line (L.P.O. #76534)'and a'second order of pipe fittings.

I and caps for tenperature sensor probes -(L.P.O. #00601).. J hese orders are known

! as Low Value purchase orders with values less than $150.00.

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Individual disposition of the noted purchase orders are as follows:

P.O. #IDP 76534 1). Aluminum backing' rings enployed in the Condensate Transfer line:.

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12 - 6" Backing Rings Sch. 40 6061 Al; 6 - 4" Backing Rings Sch. 40 6061 A1.

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2) W e material is installed in the condensate Transfer System. his system is "Important to Safety". However, the exact location of

. installation could not be determined, nor any details of installation or post-installation testing.

3) No applicable fraudulent practices were cited in IN 83-01 for aluminum backing rings. Postulated fraudulent practice might be alloy substitution or foreign supply.

4) Applicable safety function for Condensate Transfer System is back-up water supply for Core Spray System. The impact of deficient material (backing rings) could be deficient pipe welds where the backing rings are used. Failure of welds could impact back-up water supply integrity for core spray system,

5) Disposition: Use as-is. Aluminum backing rings were not generically identified as fraudulent material. Initial service leak test would have provided test of pressure integrity of welds.

P.O. #LPO 00601

1) Pipe fittings employed in a modification to add temperature sensing probes to the Circulating Water System (Dilution Plant).

7 - 1" to 1/2" ss reducers 14 - 1" ss pipe caps

2) he Circulating Water System is "Not Important to Safety".

3) Possible inadequate pressure rating.

4) Material failure could result in small leakage of water from the Circulating Water System, with no safety related impact.

5) Disposition: Use as-is.

Finally, we have identified two (2) other purchase orders of the "J-19" series which are purchase orders released by Burns & Roe for the fabrication of the A0G and the New Radwaste Building. Wese orders are the most costly and most extensive orders for the site. One order (P.O. (J19-1001) involved two 4" DeZurik Permaseal Valves and the other (P.O. #J19-100201) wasfor$8,500worthof various size pipe and pipe fittings.

Since the location, if any, of Ray Miller, Inc, components in NRW or AOG cannot currently be identified, it must be assumed that they could be any place within the two buildings and must be evaluated accordingly.

The systems in NRW are, for the most part, relatively low in operating temperature and pressure. The highest " operating" tenperature is 2100F, listed for the Chem Waste Concentrator bottoms and this temperature is less than the 2200F

normally used. The three process pumps with the highest possible shutoff heads are the High Purity Waste Pumps, the Cnem Waste Floor Drain Pumps, and the Radwaste Filter Sludge Pumps with shutoff heads of 175 psig, 175 psig, and 108

psig, respectively. From there the other pumps are less than 85 psig. Thus, material of lower quality than purchased is not expected to have a catastrophic effect on IEW which has been in operation since 1978 without component failure of the type feared by this IE Bulletin.

1 In addition, it has been determined that the failure of systems and structures (other than the seismic bathtub) in NRW would not cause undue risk to the health and safety of the public. l Furthermore, the pressures and temperatures in the A0G are lower than those found in IEW. Except for the hydrogen recombiner subsystem, the maximum gas temperature and pressure are 1800F and 14.7 psig, respectively. The recombiner subsystem was purchased as a complete unit from CTI (which is not referenced in the subject bulletin) and therefore does not contain any Ray Miller components which may have been purchased for Oyster Creek. Cooling water temperature and pressure maximums in A0G are 1500F and 75 psig, respectively.

As an extension of the above logic, the potential for failure of Ray Miller equipment in A0G, if any exists there, is even less than that in NRW. In addition, the AOG is not considered a safety system.

Should you have any further questions, please contact Mr. Michael Laggart, BWR Licensing Manager at (201) 299-2341.

Very truly yours, a 1 V~

ter . Fiedler Vice President and Director Oyster Creek Sworn to and Subscribed before me this \fD day of April 1984 hN of New JerseybW

_A Notary innCE Lll0NOEMORE gymy PUEIC 0F NEW JERSEY PBF BH M E' 0'emision Ewes leir 31.1985 cc: tEC Resident Inspector Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Forked River, IU 08731 i