ML20062E812

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Forwards Reproductions of Articles That Appeared in June & Aug 1978 Editions of Nuclear Security Safeguards Newsletter, in Support of IE Circular 78-17
ML20062E812
Person / Time
Site: Crystal River Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/17/1978
From: Kenna W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To: Stewart W
FLORIDA POWER CORP.
References
IEC-78-17, NUDOCS 7812120197
Download: ML20062E812 (4)


Text

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NOV 171978 n Rep Refer To:

RII:WJT 50-302 -

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i Florida Power Corporation -

Attn: Mr. W. P. Stewart

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Director of Power Production ' i Post Office Box 14042, Mail Stop C-4 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733

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Gentlemen:

We have received pericission to reproduce the attached articles which appeared in the June and August editions of the Nuclear Security Safeguards Newsletter. These articles provide further background information to the mutually significant issues of guard training and records falsifica-tion as discussed in IE Circular 78-17.

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. _ _ AElUSLETTER Operatlofial Systems locarporated . staa n.w h.nsi.a so ie..re . 4,i .v4 222ei . r7asi saim3a Northeastern Ressonal Office . So Federal Street . Boston. MA o211o .16171 as2 813a

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k Federal Judge's Message By t.oren Evenson, Security Asociaie. OSI In the June issue, we reported on the investiga- . still pending according to Frank M Tuerkheimer, tion and indictment of three Wiscons:n Security Bu- United States Attomey for the Western Drstrict of reau employees for making false statements to NRC Wisconsin.

about secunty at a Dairyland Power Cooperative The imposition of the sentences was not an easy nuclear power plant. The two defendants who plead- matter for United States Destrict Judge James E.

ed gu"ty were both given 20 day sentences on July Doyle. In identically worded opmiens for each de-14, 1978, and action against the third defendant is fendant, Judge Doyle set out his reasoning:

"There is only one question to be resolved in ImDlementatiOn Of a

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  • 5'"aci"S d'ci5- " '" thi$ c'5' Th' defendant is not in need of rehabilitation. Nor is any further nr.netion necessary to deter this particu-73*55 DO1kbd lar man from similar raisconduct in the future.

The 10 CFR 73.55 physical protection require. The sangle questron is whether a further sanc-ments for nuclear power plants were to be imple- tion of some severity is necessarv as a general de-mented by May 25,1977 if they involved procedural terrent, which means the impostition of a sanction rneasures and by August 24,1978 if they mvolved upon ona person in the hope that others who learn use of equipment On September 29,1977, the N RC of his fate w..I be deterred from engaging in similar

_ delayed the implementation of one procedural conduct.

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measure (physical search of employees) until August 24,1978, claiming that it required more study. Now,

Is false reporting the kind of offense as to whien the theory of general deterrence must be

-as of August 7,197E, the physical search and equip- invoked, assuming that others will actually be de.

rnent requirements. ore delayed until February 23 terred by what happens here? My answer is yes. The 1979. effective administration of many govemmental pro-The rationate for delaying enforcement of the yams depends upon obtaining information from requirement is simply that licersees have indicated those involved. Obviously, if the mformation pro-that they cannot comply by August 24. Licensees vided is insecurate, the govemmental response may cited delays in receiving equipment, constructing be skewed. In the present case, it appears that the facilities, and installing and testing oc4uipment. The discrepancy between the truth and the inaccurate NRC delayed the pat 4own search requirement agam information was probably of little practical signifi-because it may be affected by NRC's pendmg de. cance But it is clearly not acceptable that those cisien on the proposed meterial access program, and, bound to prove the information to the pavemment m any event, there is a ** lack of urgency to require should decide whether accuracy is important in a

' pat down' searches of employees." in light of this partic lar case. It is the admmestrators of the pro-admission, NRC meght be better off to lesten to what yam who must make such a judgment.

the licensees have been saying all along: There is no **ls the importance of this particular program need, let alone urgency, for conducting a pat down sufficient to require the invocation of general deter-search of reptar em,.loyees. If conditions change so rence, again assuming its eff cacy? My answer es yes.

radically in the future ' hat there is an urgency for indeed, secunty measures in the nuclear industry

~ such searches, NRC could impoor the requirement at are a matter of grave importance.

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    • ls it likely that the imposition of a sanction "Bechse of this defendant's excellent record of some severity in this case will in fact deter others over the years, I have decided upon a sentence which from s4milar conduct? This question cannot be represents the absolute minimum wh4Ch I consider answered by any objective standard. Courts must do necessary to sand the message to those in govern.

their best to answer it in dealmg with various kinds ment and in industry with responsability for secunty of offenses. In this case, the " audience" consists of in nuclear plants."

'd those in the nuclear industry with responsibility for 5 security precautions for today and for tomorrow, The message e.s clear: The Federal judic.iary I- whether they be officials and employees of the means busmess in tending its mapport to the NRC's Nuclear Regulatory Commission, or of Dairyland suurity requirements. Once a decision is made to Power Cooperative and similar enterprises. or of engage in NRC heensed activities, a commitment companies engaged in providing security services. misst be made to canply with all current and future My best judgment is that there are persons in that replations. And the bcensee would be wise to insts- ,

audience who will be deferred by the knowledge tute intenal controk to assure that those charged

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that even persons like this defendant, who was near the bottom rung of the ladder of responsibility for p security at the Genoa plant, received a sanction for There is a doubic edged reason for full compli-s falsificadon of a report. ance with nuclear security regulations. Nuclear se-cunty personnel are charged with upholding the law, "Is the punishment already suffered by this and NRC regulations have the effect of law. Nuclear defendant sufficient to achieve general deterrence? security personnel must not be placed in the posation My answer is that it should be, but it probably is not. of having to viotate laws, for to do so would expo'.e I am aware that the defendant has already suffered them not only to the trsk of Federal criminal charges, grievously simply from the fact of conviction of a but also the destruction of their credibility. As oner.

felony and the attendant publicity. But unless the ous (or whatever other adjective is chosen) as some court itself no e linposes a sanction of some severity, security replations seem to be, licensees must either i i believe that the general deterrent effect will be seek an exemption from NRC or fully comply. Full muted and perhaps minimited.

compliance usually requires the support of many "Is this theory of geneval deterience fair? My diverse elements. Licensees must assure that the answer is that it embodies a large quotient of un. cwpwaw secu6ty managu, plant secunty sum fairness as this case dramatically illustrates. But if undent, or wh eww is charged with canpWce general deterrence were abandoned as a permissible has the necessary support in the form of people, factor in sentencing. the effect nationally and over a '*C I***'"" '* *N l period of decades would probably be profound and unfortunate for the community. gggggg I

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Le mg T.:o Plasd Guilly To Conspirscy, Falsa State:nant By Loren Evenson, Security Associate Operational Systems incorporated

  • Count One Defe .d.nts A and B and other co-consp.rators violated 18 U.S C. 371 (conspiracy) by Two former officiais of a contract guard service conspiring to " defraud the United States by impairing.

impeding. and obstructing the (NRC) in the perfor-lu e piesded guilty to criminal charges stemming from mance of its functions" and "by making fa!se and ficti.

ripresentations they made or caused to be madt to the l tious statements and representations . bout material '

NRC in regard to their furnishing trained security of. facts in matters within the jurisdiction of the (NRC)."

fice rs et .s nuctcir power plant.

The parts of the conspiracy were the direction by the I the nuclear power plant was the Lacrosse Boiling co. conspirators to Defendant A to prepare false fire-Water Reactor, Genoa, Wisconsin, operated by the arms requalification forms, the preparation by Defen.

Dairviand Power Cooperative. The Physical Security Plan that Dairyland submitted as part of its NRC dant A of the forms, the filing of the forms with Dairy.

land knowing that the forms would t:e made avas!ab'e

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license stated that security personnel would be tested to NRC, and the sub%ssion by Defendant B to NRC and requalified every six months in the use of firearms. of a faise payro!! record.

To irnplement the Plan, Dairyland entered into a con?

tract with the Wisconsin Security Bureau (WSB) which

  • Count Two: Defendant A viotated 18 U.S C.1001 (false s*atemeat) by fehng four firearr9s requalification required WSB to furnish a guard force and specified'. foro,s with Cair>!and on March 1,1977 that he knew the training each guard must undergo. to be fa!se.

When NRC inspected the plant in February 1977, the inspectors found that the guards did not aispear to

  • Count Three: Defendant A vio!ated 18 U.S.C.

1001 by filing one firearms reauaiifi:ation form with have been trained in the use of firearms as specified in Dairyland on April 5,1977 that he knee to be false.

the plan. NRC issued a notice of non<ompliance to Dairy'ar d, which in turn notified WSB. WSB then pro.

e Count Four: Defendant 8 vic!ated 18 U.S.C.

1001 by presenting NRC ins e:P +5 . ,it h a payroll vided Dairyland or NRC with at least five traming form he knew to be faise.

records show'ng for the period in question that secur-ity personnel had been trained in firearms, with at

  • Count Five: Defendant C vic:ated 19 U.S C.1C01 and 1002 by commanding and inc c.ng a security .

fcast one security officer's time record showing that he had sper*t four hours et the firing range, and with a ficer to make statements to NRO :nscetters that knew to be f alse.

security officer who stated that he had received 72 On May 30,1978 Defendant A pleaded guilty to hours of classroom trainmg and 16 hcurs of firearms training before starting work at the plant. Count Four and on une 2 De'endant 8 picaded guilty When NRC inspectors examined the documents and to Count One. Defendant C pleaded not guitty to Count Five on June 5. The maximum penalty for each

_ interviewed the security officer, they found that the count is five years imprisonment, a $10.000 fine, or

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v documents had been back dated and that the security both.

of ficer was not telling the truth. NRC called a manage- These are the first such charges brought in connec-rr.er t meeting of appropriate officials, at which Dairy- tion with security at a nuclear powet p! ant. They may land disclaimed knowledge of the falsifications but not be the last. Security is a Isve issue, and the tenden.

W58 remained silent. Since Dair ytand was then m com cy of some utilities to shunt it to the s de must be

.n'iance, having accuired a new contract guard service vehich provided trained security officers. Dairyland was avoided. Utilities must take an active interest in the management of the s?curity force and cornpliance with re tuired only to show how it would assure comphance m the futuf e. their security plan and NRC recuirements. Thorough management audits, meetings with secarity offiega!s, Thmiing the matter was over Dairyland was sur. and oc sonal Msoection will assure tre utihty tM the prised some months later when NRC asked if it would requirec security is in p! ace or that the necessary conperate in a Depa tment of Justice inouiry mto the chang *s are being made.

incident . Dairyland did fully cooperate anr1 Justice concluded that it was not responsible Justice did fmd eweicer serve ,rr se'c;.,e ci Seas.erre o a.,3rees the basis for a full FBI criminal mvestigation of the me traer es, Ooc <er,o*ei Srsre-: r,ct,c.- erce 3taa responsible WSB of focials.

No"' Ma%n9ro" **u ewd A'!*aro" V '9 "4 2220r The results of the FBI investigation were provided dev'eu ear coa-nears even.oas. s.,ncir nas. or er,cies l to Frank M Tuerkhe,mer. United States Attorney for '8 #' I"8'*W8 > I* 8- D"erre . Ure, 5.'cwe the Western District of WesConsm, and he presented O '"

the matter to a Federal Grand Jury sittmg m Madison. , ,

W s:onsin. On May 24,1978 the Grand Jury returned

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