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Category:REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT (SEE ALSO AO LER)
MONTHYEARML20216E5401999-09-0707 September 1999 Special Rept:On 990826,discovered That Meteorological Sys Upper Wind Speed Cup Set Broken,Causing Upper Wind Channel to Be Inoperable.Cup Set Replaced & Channel Restored to Operable Status on 990826 ML20210R1051999-08-0606 August 1999 Special Rept:On 990628,cathodic Protection Sys Was Declared Inoperable After Sys Did Not Pass Acceptance Criteria of Bimonthly Surveillance.Work Request 98085802 Was Initiated & Connections on Well Anode Were Cleaned or Replaced ML20206P2081998-12-31031 December 1998 Special Rept:On 981218,inoperability of Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Channels,Was Observed.Caused by Data Logger Overloading Circuit.Replaced & Repaired Temp Signal Processor ML20198B1341998-12-14014 December 1998 Revised Special Rept:On 980505,discovered That Certain Fire Barriers Appeared to Be Degraded.Caused by Removal of Firestop Damming Boards.Hourly Fire Watches Established in Affected Areas ML20196D4041998-11-19019 November 1998 Rev 1 to Special Rept:On 980618,determined That Method Used to Calibrate Wind Speed Instrumentation Loops of Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Sys Does Not Meet TS Definition for Channel Calibration.Procedure Revised ML20153B0531998-09-16016 September 1998 Special Rept:On 980817,errors in Implementation of Selected Licensee Commitment Testing Requirements on Fire Protection Sys Instruments,Was Discovered.Caused by Error in Interpretation of SLC Requirement.Will Revise Procedures ML20236M9151998-07-0707 July 1998 Special Rept:On 980611,determined That Required Firewatch Patrol Had Been Missed.Caused by Firewatch Being Performed on Wrong Unit Due to Human Error.Employee Was Verbally Counseled on Firewatches & Documentation Was Corrected ML20236G4451998-07-0101 July 1998 Special Rept:On 980618,declared Wind Speed Instrumentation Loops of Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Sys Inoperable.Caused by Failure to Meet TS Definition of Channel Calibr.Will Revise Selected Licensee Commitment ML20248K1431998-06-0202 June 1998 Special Rept:On 980505,discovered That Certain Fire Barriers Appeared to Be Degraded.Caused by Shrinkage of Foam & Improper Installation During Construction of Plant.Posted Fire Watches & Repaired Firestop F-AX-348-W-134 ML20247H5351998-04-12012 April 1998 Special Rept:On 980415,missed Insp of Fire Hose Caskets Was Discovered.Caused by Error in Transferring Info from One Procedure to Another.Planned Rev of Applicable Procedure to Include Gasket Insp at Appropriate Frequency ML20216B0211998-04-0606 April 1998 Special Rept:On 980325,determined That Loose Parts Monitoring Sys Being Inoperable for Greater than Thirty Days.Caused by Incorrect Testing.All Channels of Loose Parts Monitoring Sys Tested Utilizing Revised Test Method ML20217K9271998-03-26026 March 1998 Special Rept:On 971229,procedure Step for Closing Safety Injection Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation Valve Was Inadvertently Skipped.Caused by Injection of Water Into RCS from Rwst.Simplified Procedures & Discussed Event ML20216D5641998-03-0505 March 1998 Special Rept:On 980204,discovered That Fire Detection Panel Was Apparently Not Communicating W/Several Local Fire Detectors.Caused by Faulty Computer Sys Cards.Replaced Four Computer Cards in Sys ML20202C4701998-02-0505 February 1998 Ro:On 971228:Unit 1 Loose Parts Monitoring Sys Channel 6 Was Declared Inoperable Due to Excessive Static on Channel. Caused by Loose Connection.Work Order Has Been Written to Pursue Repairs ML20138E6851997-04-24024 April 1997 Special Rept:On 970318,Unit 1 Loose Parts Monitoring Sys Channel 13 Was Declared Inoperable Due to Sporadic Electical Static.Channel Was Removed from Svc & Entered Into TS Action Item Logbook as Inoperable ML20149M7251997-01-20020 January 1997 Special Rept:On 961209,Unit 1 Loose Parts Monitoring (Lpm) Sys Channel 20 Declared Inoperable Due to No Signal Being Received from Field.Lpm Channel 20 & 22 Operable & Providing Monitoring Coverage for Primary Side of 1D S/G ML20134K4901996-11-0606 November 1996 Special Rept:On 961009,selective Licensee Commitment for Operability of Fire Protection Sprinkler Sys Not Maintained. Continuous Fire Watch Established within One H Following Identification of Incorrect Remedial Action ML20134H1331996-11-0404 November 1996 Special Rept:On 961004,Unit 1B DG Failed Due to Failure of Motor Operated Pot,Electronic & Mechanical Governor,Governor Droop Relay & Mechanical Binding of Fuel Rack Control Linkage.Dg Procedures Will Be Revised ML20113A1801996-06-17017 June 1996 Special Rept:On 960521,declared Detectors A01 for Zone 69 & A04 for Zone 60 Inoperable Because Detectors Effectively Isolated from Area in Intended Protection.Detectors Relocated,Tested & Declared Operable on 960524 ML20100H9801996-02-20020 February 1996 Special Rept:On 960111,Unit 1 Loose Parts Monitoring Channel 21 Declared Inoperable,Due to Spurious,Unexplainable Electronic Bursts.Work Request Initiated to Pursue Corrective Action ML20100H9751996-02-20020 February 1996 Special Rept:On 960111,Unit 2 Loose Parts Monitoring Sys Channel 7 Declared Inoperable,Due to pre-amp Bias Voltage Indicating Zero Volts Twice During Previous Seven Days.Work Request Written to Pursue Corrective Action ML20097F5011996-02-11011 February 1996 Special Rept:On 960102,Unit 2 Loose Parts Monitoring Sys Channel 17 Was Declared Inoperable.Two Other Channels Operable & Providing Coverage Against Loose Parts ML20096E7731996-01-12012 January 1996 Special Rept:On 951214,unit 2 DG Valid Failure Occurred. Caused by Fuel Line Fitting Backing Off from Cylinder Head Connection,Which Resulted in Fuel Oil Leakage.Dg Successfully Started,Run & Declared Operable on 951215 ML20096A8761995-12-18018 December 1995 Special Rept:On 951120,during Periodic Surveillance Testing, Lpms Channel 5 Declared Inoperable.Caused by Erratic Preamp Bias Voltage Indications.Work Request 95048483 Initiated to Perform Corrective Maint During Unit 1 Cycle 9 ML20094Q5811995-11-13013 November 1995 Special Rept:On 951014,auxiliary Bldg Filtered Exhaust Sys Pump Room Heater Declared Inoperable Due to Blown Fuse & Not Restored to Operable Status within 7 Days Per Ts. Technical Investigation Will Be Performed ML20094B8291995-10-25025 October 1995 Special Rept:On 950919,loose Parts Monitoring Sys Channel 1 Declared Inoperable Due to Erratic Preamp Bias Indication. Work Request Written to Investigate & Repair Channel ML20098A4641995-09-19019 September 1995 Special Rept:On 950817,Unit 2 Lpms Channel 12 Was Declared Inoperable Due to Channel Sensor Failing Acceptance Criteria During Performance of PT/O/A4600/03 ML20092G6041995-09-14014 September 1995 Special Rept:On 950815,CNS Unit 1 DG 1A Invalid Failure Occurred Due to Main Bearing High Temp Trip Signal.Caused by Failed Splice Installed in Circuit for RTD 1LDRD5630.New RTD Installed in Main Bearing 5 ML20086H1401995-07-12012 July 1995 Special Rept:On 950615,Channel 4 Was Declared Inoperable Due to Noise Uncharacteristic of Healthy Channel Detected Via Vibration & Loose Parts Monitoring Sys.Corrective Maint Will Be Performed During 1EOC9 Outage ML20086H1431995-07-11011 July 1995 Special Rept:On 950608,Channel 13 Was Declared Inoperable. Trending of Bias Voltage & Background RMS Evaluated to Conclude Channel Was Experiencing Periodic Failures. Corrective Maint Will Be Performed During 1EOC9 Outage ML20086C6441995-06-29029 June 1995 Special Rept:On 950523,Unit 1 Train a Fuel Handling Ventilation Filter Heaters Declared Inoperable.Evaluation Done to Determine Fault ML20085M4061995-06-20020 June 1995 Special Rept:On 950501,lower Rv Tube 4 Was Declared Inoperable ML20084N7271995-05-25025 May 1995 Special Rept:On 950425,valid Failure of DG 1A Occurred. Caused by Jacket Water Thermostatic Control Valve Sticking in Position Which Reduced Engine Cw Flow Through Heat Exchanger.Thermostatic Cv Internals Removed & Replaced ML20082L2711995-04-17017 April 1995 Special Rept:On 950308,Unit 2 Cathodic Protection Sys Was Declared Inoperable & Remained Inoperable Greater than 10 Days ML20081D4851995-03-13013 March 1995 Special Rept:On 950211,actuation of PORV 1NC32B Occurred. Procedure OP/1(2)/A/6100/02 Revised to Require More Emphasis on Monitoring Pressure Indication During Sensitive Evolutions ML20080Q8701995-03-0202 March 1995 Special Rept:On 950202,Unit 1 DG 1B Invalid Failure Due to Overcurrent Breaker Trip During Governor Troubleshooting ML20149H7821994-12-20020 December 1994 Special Rept:On 941129,discovered That Selective Licensee Commitment (SLC) for Visual Insp of Fire Rated Assemblies Exceeded Due to Misinterpretation of Requirements of SLC 16.9-5.Fire Barriers Visually Inspected ML20078R0021994-12-12012 December 1994 Special Rept:On 941103,Channel 3 (Upper Rv a) Declared Inoperable.Caused by Channel Sensor Failure of Acceptance Criteria During Performance of PT/0/A/4600/03.Repair Planned for End of 2EOC7 Outage Due to Containment Entry Required ML20078K7361994-11-17017 November 1994 Special Rept on 941021,DG 1A Invalid Failure Occurred Due to Main Bearing High Temp Trip.Operability Performance Test Successfully Completed & Engine Declared Operable on 941022 ML20149G8041994-11-0101 November 1994 Special Rept:On 940922,CNS,Unit 2 Cathodic Protection Sys Declared Inoperable & Remained Inoperable for Greater than 10 Days.Wo 94080948-01 Initiated to Replace Prepackaged Anode Well 1.WO Scheduled for 941114 ML20076F3191994-10-0404 October 1994 Special Rept:On 940908,valid Failure of D/G 1A Occurred Due to Air Start Valve Sticking Open.Maint Procedure MP/0/A/7650/99 Revised,New Air Roll Criteria Developed & Sixteen Starting Air Valves Replaced ML20072P4251994-08-23023 August 1994 Ro:On 940719,channel 9 (S/G a Channel 2) Declared Inoperable.Work Request Was Generated to Repair Channel During Future Outage of Sufficient Length Since Containment Entry Required for Work ML20072E5961994-08-15015 August 1994 Special Rept:On 940715,inoperability of Unit 2 Vibration & Loose Parts Monitoring System Channel 4 & 6 Occurred.Caused by Leds Not Lighting During Performance of PT/0/B/4600/03. Work Orders 94051250-01 & 94051251-01 Initiated ML20071N8511994-07-28028 July 1994 Special Rept:On 940711,main Steam Relief Valve Exhaust Monitors Declared Inoperable Due to Engineering Calculation Concerns.Engineering Calculation CNC-1229.00-00-0047 re-performed Using EPA-400 Methodology ML20071N7441994-07-28028 July 1994 Special Rept:On 940711,delta-t Channel on Chart Recorder Found to Be out-of-tolerance Due to Drifting of Analog to Digital (A/D) Converter Card.A/D Card Replaced & delta-t Channel Chart Recorder Declared Operable ML20070K0191994-07-18018 July 1994 Special Rept:On 940630,re Inoperability of Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor 2EMF12.Work Request 94026262 Generated to Reattach 2EMF12 to Main Steamline.Work Request Completed on 940701 ML20069H0861994-05-31031 May 1994 Special Rept:On 940501,Unit 2 DG 2A Invalid Failure Occurred Due to Right Bank Turbocharger Vibration Trip.Based on Cooper-Enterprise Recommendations,Procedure Changes Made to Calibr Procedures for All Four DGs ML20065K5011994-04-13013 April 1994 Special Rept:On 940314,invalid Failure of Diesel Generator 1B Occurred Due to Output Tripping During Calibration of Electronic Governor.Dg 1B Started Successfully on 940315 & Declared Operable ML20064G2911994-03-15015 March 1994 Special Rept:On 940203,SG Channels 9 & 11 Declared Inoperable.Channels Failed to Meet Band Limited RMS Acceptance Criteria During Performance of 18 Month Channel Calibr Test.Work Request Written to Repair Channels ML20064G2771994-03-0707 March 1994 Special Rept:On 940125,Channels 6,7 & 10 Were Declared Inoperable.Channels Failed to Meet Acceptance Criteria During Performance of 18 Month Channel Calibr Test.Work Request Written to Repair Channels 1999-09-07
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20212J1891999-10-0101 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Exemption from 10CFR54.17(c)re Schedule to Apply for Renewed Operating Licenses ML20212A6271999-09-30030 September 1999 Rev 0 to WCAP-15243, Anaylsis of Capsule V & Capsule Y Dosimeters from Duke Energy Catawba Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Radiation Surveillance Program ML20217H0201999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 05000414/LER-1999-004-01, :on 980906,error During Tagout Caused de-energization of Vital Bus & Actuation of Ltop.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Individuals Involved Were Counseled1999-09-27027 September 1999
- on 980906,error During Tagout Caused de-energization of Vital Bus & Actuation of Ltop.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Individuals Involved Were Counseled
05000413/LER-1999-015, :on 990616,discovered That Auxiliary Bldg Filtered Ventilation Exhaust Sys Was Inoperable.Caused by Improperly Positioned Vortex Damper.Damper Was Repositioned Correctly & Sys Was Retested Successfully1999-09-27027 September 1999
- on 990616,discovered That Auxiliary Bldg Filtered Ventilation Exhaust Sys Was Inoperable.Caused by Improperly Positioned Vortex Damper.Damper Was Repositioned Correctly & Sys Was Retested Successfully
ML20212G2511999-09-22022 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 180 & 172 to Licenses NPF-35 & NPF-52,respectively 05000413/LER-1999-008, :on 990610,operations Prohibited by TS 3.5.2, Was Violated.Caused by Inoperable Centrifugal Charging Pump. Operators Swapped to CCP 1A & Sys Parameters Were Returned to Normal.With1999-09-21021 September 1999
- on 990610,operations Prohibited by TS 3.5.2, Was Violated.Caused by Inoperable Centrifugal Charging Pump. Operators Swapped to CCP 1A & Sys Parameters Were Returned to Normal.With
05000414/LER-1999-005-02, :on 990727,missed Emergency DG TS Surveillance Concerning Verification of Availability of Offsite Power Sources,Was Declared.Caused by Defective Procedure.Revised Affected Procedure1999-09-20020 September 1999
- on 990727,missed Emergency DG TS Surveillance Concerning Verification of Availability of Offsite Power Sources,Was Declared.Caused by Defective Procedure.Revised Affected Procedure
05000413/LER-1999-009, :on 990518,inoperability of Containment Valve Injection Water Sys Valve in Excess of TS Limits Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Retest Following Surveillance Test Failure.Valve Was Retested & Returned to Service1999-09-15015 September 1999
- on 990518,inoperability of Containment Valve Injection Water Sys Valve in Excess of TS Limits Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Retest Following Surveillance Test Failure.Valve Was Retested & Returned to Service
ML20216E5401999-09-0707 September 1999 Special Rept:On 990826,discovered That Meteorological Sys Upper Wind Speed Cup Set Broken,Causing Upper Wind Channel to Be Inoperable.Cup Set Replaced & Channel Restored to Operable Status on 990826 05000413/LER-1999-014, :on 990816,missed Surveillances & Operation Prohibited by TS Was Noted.Caused by Defective Procedures or Programs Inappropriate TS Requirements.Affected Procedures/ Programs Were Revised & Testing Was Performed1999-09-0101 September 1999
- on 990816,missed Surveillances & Operation Prohibited by TS Was Noted.Caused by Defective Procedures or Programs Inappropriate TS Requirements.Affected Procedures/ Programs Were Revised & Testing Was Performed
05000414/LER-1999-004, :on 990616,CIV 2NM-221A Was Returned to Svc Without Testing,As Required by TS 3.6.3.Caused by Programmatic Deficiency.Test Procedure Has Been Revised & Subject Valve Was Successfully Tested & Returned to Svc1999-09-0101 September 1999
- on 990616,CIV 2NM-221A Was Returned to Svc Without Testing,As Required by TS 3.6.3.Caused by Programmatic Deficiency.Test Procedure Has Been Revised & Subject Valve Was Successfully Tested & Returned to Svc
ML20212B4711999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 05000414/LER-1999-003, :on 990612,unplanned Actuation of ESFAS Occurred Due to a SG High Level.Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Msiv 2SM-7 Was Closed & SG 2A Level Was Returned to Normal1999-08-31031 August 1999
- on 990612,unplanned Actuation of ESFAS Occurred Due to a SG High Level.Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Msiv 2SM-7 Was Closed & SG 2A Level Was Returned to Normal
ML20211B1281999-08-31031 August 1999 Dynamic Rod Worth Measurement Using Casmo/Simulate ML20217H0321999-08-31031 August 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 05000413/LER-1999-012, :on 990727,adverse Sys Interaction Between Annulus Ventilation Sys & Auxiliary Building Ventilation Sys Was Discovered.Caused by Inadequate Design.Compensatory Actions Developed & Implemented.With1999-08-26026 August 1999
- on 990727,adverse Sys Interaction Between Annulus Ventilation Sys & Auxiliary Building Ventilation Sys Was Discovered.Caused by Inadequate Design.Compensatory Actions Developed & Implemented.With
ML20211A9791999-08-20020 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Licensee Request for Approval of Proposed Relief from Volumetric Exam Requirements of ASME B&PV Code,Section Xi,For Plant,Unit 2 ML20211C1291999-08-17017 August 1999 ISI Rept Unit 1 Catawba 1999 RFO 11 ML20211F3441999-08-17017 August 1999 Updated non-proprietary Page 2-4 of TR DPC-NE-2009 ML20210U8341999-08-13013 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 179 & 171 to Licenses NPF-35 & NPF-52,respectively ML20210R1051999-08-0606 August 1999 Special Rept:On 990628,cathodic Protection Sys Was Declared Inoperable After Sys Did Not Pass Acceptance Criteria of Bimonthly Surveillance.Work Request 98085802 Was Initiated & Connections on Well Anode Were Cleaned or Replaced ML20212B4871999-07-31031 July 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20210S2891999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 05000413/LER-1999-009, :on 990518,inoperability of Containment Valve Injection Water Sys Valve Was Noted in Excess of TS Limits. Caused by Inadequate Testing Following Surveillance Test Failure.Valve Was Retested & Restored to Service1999-07-19019 July 1999
- on 990518,inoperability of Containment Valve Injection Water Sys Valve Was Noted in Excess of TS Limits. Caused by Inadequate Testing Following Surveillance Test Failure.Valve Was Retested & Restored to Service
05000414/LER-1999-004-02, :on 990610,violation of TS 3.6.3 Was Noted Due to CIV 2NM-221A Being Returned to Service Without Testing. Caused by Procedure Deficiency.Civ 2NM-221A Was Tested & Returned to Operable Status1999-07-15015 July 1999
- on 990610,violation of TS 3.6.3 Was Noted Due to CIV 2NM-221A Being Returned to Service Without Testing. Caused by Procedure Deficiency.Civ 2NM-221A Was Tested & Returned to Operable Status
ML20209E4361999-07-0909 July 1999 SER Agreeing with Licensee General Interpretation of TS LCO 3.0.6,but Finds No Technical Basis or Guidance That Snubbers Could Be Treated as Exception to General Interpretation 05000414/LER-1999-003-02, :on 990612,unplanned Actuation of Esfa Sys Due to a SG High Level Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Long Term Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence of Event Are Being Developed1999-07-0808 July 1999
- on 990612,unplanned Actuation of Esfa Sys Due to a SG High Level Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Long Term Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence of Event Are Being Developed
ML20196K6631999-07-0707 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee 990520 Position Re Inoperable Snubbers ML20209H4501999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20210S2951999-06-30030 June 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 05000414/LER-1999-002-03, :on 990504,plant Was Forced to Shutdown as Result of Flow Restriction Caused by Corrosion of Afs Assured Suction Source Piping Due to Inadequate Testing. Affected Piping Was Cleaned & Flow Tested1999-06-0303 June 1999
- on 990504,plant Was Forced to Shutdown as Result of Flow Restriction Caused by Corrosion of Afs Assured Suction Source Piping Due to Inadequate Testing. Affected Piping Was Cleaned & Flow Tested
ML20209H4561999-05-31031 May 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20196A0001999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20196L1881999-05-31031 May 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 1 to DPC-NE-3004, Mass & Energy Release & Containment Response Methodology ML20206T4771999-05-31031 May 1999 Rev 3 to UFSAR Chapter 15 Sys Transient Analysis Methodology ML20206P5201999-05-14014 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves ML20206N8391999-05-0404 May 1999 Rev 16 to CNEI-0400-24, Catawba Unit 1 Cycle 12 Colr ML20196A0041999-04-30030 April 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206R1811999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206N8261999-04-22022 April 1999 Rev 15 to CNEI-0400-24, Catawba Unit 1 Cycle 12 Colr. Page 145 of 270 of Incoming Submittal Not Included ML20205S5551999-04-21021 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Response to GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions 05000413/LER-1999-004, :on 990310,operation Prohibited by TSs Was Noted.Caused by Incorrect TS Requirements for Cravs & Auxiliary Bldg Filtered Ventilation Exhaust Sys Actuation Instrumentation.Submitted Lar.With1999-04-12012 April 1999
- on 990310,operation Prohibited by TSs Was Noted.Caused by Incorrect TS Requirements for Cravs & Auxiliary Bldg Filtered Ventilation Exhaust Sys Actuation Instrumentation.Submitted Lar.With
ML18016A9011999-04-12012 April 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Defect in Component of DSRV-16-4,Enterprise DG Sys.Caused by Potential Problem with Connecting Rod Assemblies Built Since 1986,that Have Been Converted to Use Prestressed Fasteners.Affected Rods Should Be Inspected ML20205N3651999-04-12012 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting IPE of External Events Submittal ML20205N2381999-04-0909 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 178 & 170 to Licenses NPF-35 & NPF-52,respectively ML20205N2121999-04-0808 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 177 & 169 to Licenses NPF-35 & NPF-52,respectively ML20206R1931999-03-31031 March 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205P9521999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205B3101999-03-26026 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 176 & 168 to Licenses NPF-35 & NPF-52,respectively 1999-09-07
[Table view] |
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7 DUKE POWER.
october-15, 1990 t.;
h' iDocument' Control Desk 1
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission T
- Washington, D..C.
20555 y
Subject:
- Catawba Nuclear Station Docket 50-414 1
Special Report
.i
.IIR C90-067-2; PIR'2-C90-0294 1
. Gentlemen:
- Att' ached 5is.a report concerning' UNIT COOLDOWN TO.~ COLD-'
- SHUTDOWNLDUE TO REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE.
This report isisubmitted as a "Special" Report to ensure!
l m
-industry awareness of this event.
The health and safety 4
of the.public were"not'affected-by this incident.
j
,o Very truly yours, A
c.
1 iJ..Wi Hampton Station Manager I
6 ken: REPORT.SP
' Mr. : S. D. - Ebneter American Nuclear Insurers i
t xc:
Regional ~ Administrator, Region II c/o Dottie Sherman,--ANI' Library
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.U.,S. Nuclear Regulator Commission The Exchange,-Suite'245'
.101'Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 270 Farmington Avenue.
Atlanta,'GA 30323 Farmington, CT 06032 i
d M &.M Nuclear. Consultants Mr. K. Jabbour 1221 Avenues.of the Americas U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission-
- New York','NY. 10020 office of Nuclear. Reactor Regulation-Washington, D.'C.
20555.
.INPO Records Center Suite 1500 Mr. W. T. Orders s1100 circle 75 Parkway NRC Resident Inspector Atlanta; GA 30339 Catawba Nuclear Station-10C109 9010240310 901015 ADOCK0500g4 g
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DUKE POWER COMPANY.
CATAWBA' NUCLEAR STATION-PROBLEM INVESTIGATION REPORT-NO. 2-C90-0294
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~ UNIT COOLDOWN TO COLD' SHUTDOWN DUE TO REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE ABSTRACT-I On September 14,,1990 at approximately 0200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br />, with Unit"2 in Mode 3, Hot
~
Standby,. vendor personnel were'in the process of performing-a leak repair on a.
. Core Exit Thermocouple Nozzle Assembly (CETNA)-on-the Reactor Vessel head.
In Lorder'to perform the: leak repair,~it was necessary to drill through a modified
"~
'. blind hub'(part of the Grayloc flange t.c the CETNA) into the Reactor Coolant (NC) System pressure boundary.
.A sealantiinjection valve was installed during this process ~to provide isolation at the pressure boundary. After the final l drilling was completed, the sealant injection valve would not close. A second' valve was-threaded.into the back'of the first valve, but before it could be
-closed the entire assembly ejected from the' hole. A conservative decision was-made to consider the leakage'as NC system pressure boundary leakage'. ~ Unit 2 commenced cooldown.,to Mode 5, Cold Shutdown, and an-Unusual Event.was declared.
.An analysis will.be performed to determine the cause(s)fof this'failurei The original CETNA leaks are attributed to a: Manufacturing Deficiency in that'the modified blind hubs;did not taeet dimensional requirements during fabrication.
i The unacceptable; hubs were identified and replaced. This report is being submitted'as.a Special Report!
- 3
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'kfDUKElp0WER COMPANY / CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION
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PIR!2-C90-0294/Speci21'R: port
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BACKGROUND
' The Reactor Coolt.nt' [EIIS: AB] (NC) System is designed to transporb heat from the ;
Reactor to the-Steam Generators [EIIS:HX]'(S/Go), where heat is transferred to-
'the Feedwater.[EIIS:SJ)-(CF) System and Main Steam [EIIS:SD] (SM) System of the secondary. side. The/NC System-consists of four identical ~ heat transfer loops t
connected in parallel to the Reactor Vessel [EIIS:VSL].
The Incore Instrumentation [EIIS:IG] (ENA) System =provides'information on the
' neutron flux distribution and fuel assembly outletctemperatures at selected core locations. Chromel-alumel.thermocouples are threaded into guide tubes that penetrate the Reactor Vessel head through seal assemblies,4 and: terminate 1at.the-exit flow end of the fuel assemblies.
-Catawba Unit 2. utilizes a Core Exit Thermocouple Nozzle' Assembly (CETNA) to provide the.NC' System pressure boundary seal.where the: thermocouple 11eads
- penetrate the Roactor Vessel head. There are five CETNAs on Unit 2 identified-as1 connections #74 through 78.
The CETNA, supplied by Combustion' Engineering, M
-Inc'. (CE),-consists of a nozzle assembly which is threaded and seal _ welded-to
.the Reactor vessel head-nozzle, a Grayloc clamp set,La modified blind hub to Lform tho'second halffor the flange and house Grafo11 packing. rings; drive sleeve and nut;' thrust bearing and washers, and'a hinged split collar to retain the assembly. Gray Tool Company manufactured the original Grayloc clamp sets,.
including tho modified blind hubs. Gray Tool later.gave up their N-stamp.and turned over the manufacturing responsibility for these parts to CE.
During the.
Catawba Unit 2'End-of-Cycle 2 (2EOC2) refueling outage; discoloration was found on three of1 he original modified blind-hubs (manufactured by Gray Tool); As'a t
conservative measure, these hubs were replaced with spare hubs manufactured by' CE.
Leakage inspections were conducted:during'startup, and no leakage was noted.
Technical Specification (T/S) 3.4.6.2 requires NC system leakage to be limited to no pressure boundary leakage during Mode 1, Power operation, Mode 2, Startup,.
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- Mode 13, Hot' Standby, and Mode 4, Hot Shutdown. " Pressure boundary leakage is i
defined:as-leakage.(other than S/G tube leakage)'through.a non-isolable fault in a NC system component body, pipo (EIIS: PSP]. wall, or vessel wall. With any~
ptessure boundary. leakage present, the required action 1s to be11n at least Hot 1
Standby within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in Mode 5, Cold Shutdown, within the following 30
' hours. The T/S Bases states that pressure boundary leakage'of any magnitude;isi
(,
unacceptable since it may be-indicative of an impending gross failure of the, 1
pressure boundary.-
g EVENT-DESCRIPTION i
-On1 June 10, 1990, Unit 2 was shutdown for the End-of-Cycle 3-(2EOC3) refueling
- outage.- Following cooldown, it was noted that Core Exit Thermocouple Nozzle j
. Assemblies.(CETNAs) had been leaking at the Grayloc flange connection.
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g f-Maintenance Engineering Services (MES) contacted Design Engineering.and the CETNA supplier,4 Combustion Engineering (CE), to evaluate the reason.for the-
' leaks so that corrective-action could be taken prior to restart. During disassembly _of the CETNAs,.a breakaway torque. check was performed on the Grayloc clamp nuts. The' breakaway torque results indicated that the bolting material' 4
.had relaxed during plant operation, therefore, CE recommended a new torque procedure for the Grayloc flange connection, which Design approved for use at Catawba.-
On Augus.t. 19, 1990 the CETNAs were reassembled using the new torque procedure j
per Work Request'(W/R) 5312 SWR.
'A "On September 4', '1990 with Unit 2' in Mode 4, Maintenance inspected the Reactor q
Vessel-head and CETNAs for leakage. CETNA #74 had boron residue present, i
' indicating leakage had occurred, but did not appear to be leaking at this time, j
- CE was contacted and recommended that the CETNAs be rechecked in. Mode 3, due to i
a' design feature that provides better seating nt higher pressures, j
On September 5 at 2355 hours0.0273 days <br />0.654 hours <br />0.00389 weeks <br />8.960775e-4 months <br />, Unit 2 entered Mode 3.
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LOn-September 6,-the CETNAs were reinspected and no-leakage was identified.
On-September'8, another inspection was performed and boron residue was found on CETNAs #74'and N76 in the area of'the lower Grayloc clamp seal. On September 9,
]
Maintenance cleaned the boron residue.from both leaking CETNAs and observed a-g small steam leak'at #76 (#74 did not appear to be_ leaking at this time)..CE was contacted and recommended that'a torque check pass be performed on'the Grayloc flanges.. Maintenance performed the_ torque check on #76 and did not note any nut
' movement, Indicating the proper torque existed. On September 10, the CETNAs were inspected several times, andiboth #h and #76 were leaking _a small amount--
~
of steam. -At the time,. leak' repair by injection of a sealant atsthe Grayloc-
, ' connection was considered. This process is regularly used throughout the j
i industry for repair of leaks under pressure.
MES,' Design, and-CE conducted I
i
' extensive evaluations to establish a sealant injection leak repair procedure for l
the CETNAs.- During this evaluation process on September 12 at 0500 hours0.00579 days <br />0.139 hours <br />8.267196e-4 weeks <br />1.9025e-4 months <br />, Unit y
- 2. entered Mode 2 for completion of Zero Power physics Testing (ZPPT).
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'On September 13, Catawba Nuclear Station. Modification (NSM) CN-20626 and:the' I
required 10CFR50.59 evaluation were approved to allow injection af_a sealant into the.CETNA seal ring areasz on,#74 and #76. The process consisted of' e
? partially drilling into the~ modified blind hub at the Grayloc, flange, tapping:
- l thel hole,. inserting a threaded sealant' injection valve-[EIIS
- V), and drilling i
F through the remaining hub thickness to the NC system pressure boundary.
The
-sealant' injection valve would then be: closed to isolate the pressure boundary, and reopened when;the sealing process wasto begin. Mock-up training sessions were. conducted to familiarize workers with the repair procedure and the Jconfiguration of the. involved components. W/R 3109 MES was originated to
. implement this modification.
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- 10n, September-13 at:1200 hours, Unit 2 entered Mode 3 to. allow c: ETNA repair work
'to begin. At'approximately 2130 hours0.0247 days <br />0.592 hours <br />0.00352 weeks <br />8.10465e-4 months <br />, a pre-job meeting was held between-(Radiation protection (Rp), MES, Maintenance,'and Utilities Support Specialist,
.Inc)--(USSI)/ who had been contracted by Duke power to perform the repair work.
,,p i:Rp requested that the area be cleaned prior to work beginning so that the Dinit'ial part of the job'could be performed without respirators and additional-protective wear. The cleaning'was completed at approximately 2300 hours0.0266 days <br />0.639 hours <br />0.0038 weeks <br />8.7515e-4 months <br />. 'Also q
-during~ pre-job; preparations, each sealant injection ~ valve was cycled several' times to' ensure proper; operation.
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on September,.14 at;approximately 0020 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />, USSI personnel entered the area to
~
begin: work on CETNA #76.. 'The initial-drilling was performed, the hole was'
. tapped, and'the sealant injection valve was: inserted. At approximately 0200 V,
hours the final' drilling into the NC system pressure boundary was completed.
As.
'theLdrill bit wastretracted from the hole, USSI personnel attempted to close the
.-sealant injection valve, but th'e valve would not close. They then screwed a isecond sealant injection valve into the back of the-first valve, while holding
~
-the: first ; valve in place. -When the first valve was released 1n order to close the1second: valve, the entire essembly ejected from the hole. =Within minutes, a
~ conter punch was ' tapped einto t he hole to attempt to plug the opening. -Leakage was reduced but-did not stop :ompletely. USSI personnel left the area at this
~ time to locate another size r. enter punch to better plug the hole. At j
L approximately 0305Jhours, UFSI attempted to' insert a center punch with a.187 inch diameter, but-was 'unst.ccessful. The original center punch was reinserted, again reducing the leak'bst not completely stopping it.
4-Soon after the problem (occurred, the Shift Manager, Shift Supervisor,'MES,-and Maintenance met to evaluate the NC system leakage. A conservLtive decision was reached to considerLthe loakage as NC system pressure boundart 1sakage. The T/S 3.4.6.2 action statement was entered and preparations began far cooldown to Mode
' 5.
m On September.14 at 0710 hours0.00822 days <br />0.197 hours <br />0.00117 weeks <br />2.70155e-4 months <br />, operations commenced cooldown to Mode 5.
Also at this-time,:an Unusual: Event was declared and proper notifications were made per
= Catawba Emergency Response procedures. Even though leakage had been reduced by W
' installation of the center punch, efforts continued to minimize the leakage'to prevent contamination of.other components in the area.
O On September 14 at 1428 hours0.0165 days <br />0.397 hours <br />0.00236 weeks <br />5.43354e-4 months <br />, Unit 2 entered Mode 4.
on September 14 at approximately 1530 hours0.0177 days <br />0.425 hours <br />0.00253 weeks <br />5.82165e-4 months <br />, USSI personnel installed a modified-m#D C-clamp in place of the center punch at CETNA #76 in order to minimize leakage.
This reduced leakage even:further, but not completely.
'On September 14 at 2338 hours0.0271 days <br />0.649 hours <br />0.00387 weeks <br />8.89609e-4 months <br />, Unit 2 entered Mode 5 and the Unusual Event was terminated.
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Following-Unit.2:cooldown to Mode 5, CE;and Gray Tool' representatives were..
onsite to assist"in'the final CETNA repair work. 'While inspecting the spare 3
modified blind hubs manufactured by CE, it was determined that the hubs,did not' meet tholdimensiona11 tolerances required for these' parts. 'After evaluation,>1t was also determinedithat -the: dimensional error would-have prevented. proper seal seating-contact:when installed. The original' hubs manufactured by Gray Tool' twere checked'and no dimensional problems were.found. -All.five CETNAs were subsequently checked to verify which hub (CE or Gray Tool) was currently.
installed.: CETNAs 874, 76, and 78 had hubs manufactured by C", and #75~and 77' had'the' original hubs manufactured by' Gray Tool. The original Gray 20n1 hubs for; connectors #74,c76,.and 78 were located,-cleaned, and inspected. No dimensional problems. wore found, and the hubs were approved for rouse.
Onl September '21,! the original modified blind hubs manufactured by Gray Tool were-
~ installed at.CETHAs.N74,176, and 78. -After this replacement was complete, all five. Unit 2 CETNAs-had-dimensionally acceptable hubs in place.
On September 25 at 2318 hours0.0268 days <br />0.644 hours <br />0.00383 weeks <br />8.81999e-4 months <br />, Unit 2 entered Mode 4.
On September 26 at approximately 1530 hours0.0177 days <br />0.425 hours <br />0.00253 weeks <br />5.82165e-4 months <br />, Maintenance inspected all five
- CETMAs:for leakage. No leakage was noted.
On September-27 ats0449 hours0.0052 days <br />0.125 hours <br />7.423942e-4 weeks <br />1.708445e-4 months <br />, Unit 2-entered Mode 3.
At approximately 2130 hours0.0247 days <br />0.592 hours <br />0.00352 weeks <br />8.10465e-4 months <br />, Maintenance again inspected all five CETNAs..No leakage was noted.
CONCLUSION LWhile attempting to repair the leaking CETNAs, the sealant-injection valve installed at the tK: system pressure boundary would not close. A second valve
-was-threaded <into the back<of-the. original.valvo, but before the second valve could be' closed the' entire assembly ejected from the hole. MES will perform a root' cause analysis to deterndne the cause(s) of' the failures associated with the sealant injection valve. This report will'be revised upon~ completion of this analysis'.
- The: original;CETNA' leaks are attributed to a Manufacturing Deficiency in that the modified blind; hubs manufactured by CE did not meet required dimensional tolerances. The' original hubs manufactured by Gray Tool were-checked-and met' the dimensional requirements. Inspection of all five CETNAs revealed that #74, 76, and 78'had-hubs supplied by CE.
These CETNAs'were' identified as the ones that had' experienced leakage..The original hubs manufactured by Gray Tool were located,1 cleaned,;and; inspected. ;No,dimoncional problems were noted and they H'
were installed'on! Unit 2.
All:five Unit 2 CETNAs'now have dimensionally acceptable modified blind hubs installed. During subsequent startup preparations, Maintenance inspected all five CETNAs in Mode 4, and again in Mode 3, for. leakage. No leakage was noted.
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'PIR:2-C90-0294/Special-ReportL j. PIysL6I 4
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E After investigations concerning the improperly manufactured hubs, CE feels that the improper hubs are isolated to Catawba-2, Millstone-3, and CE-Stock. All Limproper hubs,at Catawba have been located.
In addition, CE contacted Millstone-3lto advise them of the, improper hubs. The Duke Power Quality
' Assurance Vendor Division has been contacted and advised of this problem.
.Thtl decision to consider the leakage as Reactor Coolant System pressure boundary.
leakage, and the resultant Unit cooldown 'and declaration of an Unusual' Event,
- ,'3 was a conservative action not' strictly required by' Catawba Technical-j,; (,
' Specifications. Pressure-boundary leakage limits are established to preclude growth of defects to the point where coplant leak rates. pose a threat to nuclear-safety. Unit shutdown ~is required before crack propagation recults in'.
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-potentially limiting leak rates'.
The drilling of a 3/16 inch diameter hole 1s l
_'not-considered.to have posed a demonstrable potential for propagation., Leakage through the drilled hole was well-within the capability of the normal charging
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_ system _and posed no danger to unit safety. This event was conservatiYely-
. reported to the NRC under'the provisions of 10CFR50.72. This' report is l' "
_ sub:nitted as a Special Report and is not required under 10CFR50.73.
This oventLwas cons'idered for reportability under the requirements of 10CFR Part
-211with the conclusion that cxistence of a substantial: safety hazard was not demonstrated. Leakage through the CETNA was of a magnitude that'would have
- remained.well within the capability of.the normal charging system. The
_ potential for a' catastrophic failure of the CETNA,J1eading to a loss of coolant accident and. safety system challenge, was not created as a result of the
.out-of-tolerance fittings Further,-the vendor concluded that only two plants,_
,-Catawba Unit 2-and Millstone Unit 3, could potentially have the out-of-tolerance parts. - Thus, it was concluded that a Part 21' report was not required. This report is submitted as a Special Report to ensure industry awareness of this
= event.
A' review of the OEP database for the past 24 months revealed one event.in which' an operating. Unit was shutdown due.to a Manufacturing Deficiency (LER 413/90-24). This ' incident involved a Nuclear Service Water [EIIS:BI] (RN)
- System purp [EIIS:P) motor,[EIIS:MO] for which a stator had been manufactured
'approximately.0.1 inches shorter than required. Two other events in this time period were_ attributed'to Manufacturing Deficiencies. LER 414/89-01 involved a
. Reactor Trip due to a fuse that failed on a feedwater control valve. LER 413/89-26 documented an unexpected Hydrogen Skinner Fan [EIIS:BLO] breaker
- [EIIS:BRK] trip due to a defective Westinghouse breaker. These two incidents are different-from.the incident in this= report in that they were not attributable to dimensional requirement inaccuracies. Per Nuclear Safety
? Assurance-guidelines, this11s not a recurring problem.
, CORRECTIVE ACTION-SUBSEQUENT 1)'After the sealant injection valve assembly ejected from the NC system pressure boundary, Unit 2 commenced cooldown to Mode 5 and an Unusual Event was declared.
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,9 PIR 2-C90-0294/Special-Rsport My[Q[Pr@aL7; en v
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- 2) During: subsequent investigations, the spare modifiSd blind hubs
. q) manufactured by CE'were inspected'and'it was determined that they did notf meetthedimensionalreq0irementsforthesepqrts, f
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- 3) The original ~ hubs manufactured,hv Gray *.,ol'were inspected. I No dime'nsional' problems were noted, e
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-4) All five, Unit.2 CETNAs wore inspected to determine whether CE or Gray Tool $
hubs were installed. -CETNAs #74, 76, and 78 were identified as having CE:
hubs installed.
'5) The original Gray Tool hubs for CETNAs'#74, 76, and 78 were lo'cated,-
_ cleaned, and_ inspected. All were acceptable for installe.cion on_ Unit 2, 4?:'
and-were installed per W/R 5312 SWR.
- 6) Maintet.snce inspected all five CETNAs for leakage during Mode 4,'and againt in Mode 3.
Noileakage was noted.
~7)-The~Duk'e PewerLQuality Assurance Vendor Division was. contacted and-advised
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-of the prob.' ems concerning the hubs manufactured by CE.
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-PLANNED
'1) An analysis will be performed'to dotermine the cause(s) of-the failures
' associated with the sealant injection valvo.
- 2) This report will be revised upon completion of the sealant injection-valve canalysis.
1 SAFETY ANALYSIS 4
1 1 Following;this. incident, Performance conducted a; review of Operator hid Computer
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.'(OAC)= data to establish the leakage' rate at.the~ repair location. An initial
_jW reviewfindicated that NC system leakage at the.CETNA was'6'to 9 gpm. After a detailed _ review lof plant evolutions in progress during the incident,' the' actual 3-
. leakage rate was determined toibe les3 than 5.gpm.
A leak of this magnitude is well within normal' charging pump cap.bility-(approximately 150 gpm)-and falls.
'welltbelow the limits of a smell'h nak Loss of Coolant Accident'(LOCA)~. The; actualthole. diameter (.1875 inches) was less than the hole size of.375 inches
__ q
_ considered in Section 15.6.5-of the Catawba Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR);
for'which NC system inventory-can-be maintained by one-charging pump.
n ty.
LThe_ health and safety of tho'public were not affected by this incident.
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